Case # 1:
CULILI v. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
(ETPI)
FACTS:
Nelson Culili was employed as a Technician, and
was promoted to Senior Technician after 15 years. In
1998, due to business troubles and losses, ETPI
implemented a two-phased Right-Sizing Program:
reduction of ETPI’s workforce, then a company-wide
reorganization (transfer, merger, absorption or abolition
of departments). ETPI offered a Special Retirement
Program to employees who have been in service for at
least 15 years. Of all the employees who qualified, only
Culili rejected the offer. The functions of Culili’s unit
were absorbed by another department, and his position
was abolished (and was eventually absorbed by another
employee) due to redundancy. Culili wrote to the union
president in protest. He was informed of his termination
from employment through a letter from the ETPI AVP.
This letter was similar to the memo shown to Culili by
the union president weeks before Culili was dismissed.
Culili claims that ETPI contracted out the services he
used to perform to a labor-only contractor, which not
only proved that his functions had not become
unnecessary, but which also violated the CBA + LC. In
addition, neither he nor the DOLE were formally notified
of his termination. He found out about it when he was
handed a copy of the letter, after he was barred from
entering ETPI’s premises. ETPI already decided to
dismiss him even prior to the AVP’s letter, as evidenced
by an earlier version of the letter.
ETPI denied hiring outside contractors to
perform Culili’s work. It also denied singling Culili out for
termination. The abolition of Culili’s department and the
absorption of its functions by another department were
in line with the Right-Sizing Program’s goals. Since Culili
did not avail of the Special Retirement Program and his
position was subsequently declared redundant, ETPI had
no choice but to terminate Culili. Because there was no
more work for him, it was constrained to serve a final
notice of termination, which Culili ignored.
Culili filed a complaint for ULP, illegal dismissal,
and money claims before the LA.
LA – ETPI GUILTY OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND ULP
(AFFIRMED BY NLRC)
CA – VALID DISMISSAL, NO ULP
ISSUE #1:
WON Culili’s dismissal can be considered as ULP. NO.
However, ETPI has to pay nominal damages for non-
compliance with statutory due process, in addition to the
mandatory separation pay [LC 283].
RATIO
Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and
procedure for prosecution thereof. ¬¬¬¬-- Unfair labor
practices violate the constitutional right of workers and
employees to self-organization, are inimical to the
legitimate interest of both labor and management,
including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise
deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and
mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the
promotion of healthy and stable labor-management
relations.
ULP refers to ‘acts that violate the workers' right to
organize.’ The prohibited acts are related to the workers'
right to self-organization and to the observance of a
CBA. An employer may only be held liable for unfair
labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in
whatever manner the right of his employees to self-
organize.
There is no showing that ETPI, in implementing its
Right-Sizing Program, was motivated by ill will, bad faith
or malice, or that it was aimed at interfering with its
employees’ right to self-organization. In fact, ETPI
negotiated and consulted with the SEBA before
implementing the program. By imputing bad faith to
ETPI’s actuations, Culili has the burden of proof to
present substantial evidence to support the allegation of
ULP. Culili failed to discharge this burden and his bare
allegations deserve no credit.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not there was a valid cause for
ETPI to terminate the petitioner’s employment.
RATIO: Yes. Article 283 of the Labor Code authorizes
the employer to terminate the employment of any
employee due to redundancy to prevent losses or the
closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking
There is redundancy when the service capability
of the workforce is greater than what is reasonably
required to meet the demands of the business
enterprise. This Court has been consistent in holding
that the determination of whether or not an employee’s
services are still needed or sustainable properly belongs
to the employer.
However, an employer cannot simply declare
that it has become overmanned and dismiss its
employees without producing adequate proof to sustain
its claim of redundancy. Among the requisites of a valid
redundancy program are: (1) the good faith of the
employer in abolishing the redundant position; and (2)
fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what
positions are to be declared redundant, such as but not
limited to: preferred status, efficiency, and seniority.
In the case at bar, ETPI was upfront with its
employees about its plan to implement a Right-Sizing
Program. ETPI patiently negotiated with ETEU’s officers
to make them understand ETPI’s business dilemma and
its need to reduce its workforce and streamline its
organization. This evidently rules out bad faith on the
part of ETPI. In deciding which positions to retain and
which to abolish, ETPI chose on the basis of efficiency,
economy, versatility and flexibility. ETPI also submitted
its old and new tables of organization and sufficiently
described how limited the functions of the abolished
position of a Senior Technician were and how it decided
on whom to absorb these functions.
Case #2:
GALAXIE STEEL WORKERS UNION (GSWU-
NAFLU-KMU), et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, GALAXIE STEEL
CORPORATION and RICARDO CHENG 504 SCRA
692 (2006)
FACTS:
On account of serious business losses which occurred in
1997 up to mid-1999 totaling around P127, 000,000.00,
Galaxie Steel Workers Union decided to close down its
business operations. It thereafter filed a written notice
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
informing the latter of its intended closure and the
consequent termination of its employees effective
August 31, 1999. It posted the notice of closure on the
corporate bulletin board.
On September 8, 1999, Galaxie Steel Workers Union and
Galaxie employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
unfair labor practice, and money claims against Galaxie.
The Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the Court of Appeals were
unanimous in ruling that Galaxie’s closure or cessation of
business operations was due to serious business losses
or financial reverses, and not because of any alleged
anti-union position.
The workers’ union and employees contend that Galaxie
did not serve written notices of the closure of business
operations upon them, it having merely posted a notice
on the company bulletin board.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not [Galaxie] is guilty of unfair labor
practice in closing its business operations shortly after
petitioner union filed for certification election.
2. Whether or not the written notice posted by [Galaxie]
on the company bulletin board sufficiently complies with
the notice requirement under Article 283 of the Labor
Code.
HELD: NO.
1. Petitioners failed to present concrete evidence
supporting their claim of unfair labor practice. Unfair
labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers’
right to organize, and are defined in Articles 248 and
261 of the Labor Code.
The prohibited acts relate to the workers’ right to self-
organization and to the observance of Collective
Bargaining Agreement without which relation the acts,
no matter how unfair, are not deemed unfair labor
practices.
In this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court
of Appeals were unanimous in ruling that Galaxie’s
closure or cessation of business operations was due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, and not
because of any alleged anti-union position.
2. The requirement of the Labor Code that notice shall
be served on the workers is not complied with by the
mere posting of the notice on the bulletin board.
The mere posting on the company bulletin board does
not meet the requirement under Article 283 of ―serving
a written notice on the workers. The purpose of the
written notice is to inform the employees of the specific
date of termination or closure of business operations,
and must be served upon them at least one month
before the date of effectivity to give them sufficient time
to make the necessary arrangements. In order to meet
the foregoing purpose, service of the written notice must
be made individually upon each and every employee of
the company.
Case #3:
Sterling Products International Inc. v Sol
FACTS:
Loreta C. Sol charged the herein petitioners
Sterling Products International and its Radio Director V.
San Pedro with having committed an unfair labor
practice act. She alleged in her complaint that she has
been a regular Radio Monitor of respondents-petitioners;
that in 1960 filed a complaint against the said firm for
underpayment, money equivalent of her vacation leave
from 1952 to 1959, and Christmas bonus for 1959 = this
previous complaint resulted in her dismissal without just
cause
Petitioners’ answer: alleged that complainant is
an independent contractor whose services were retained
by petitioners to submit reports of radio monitoring work
performed outside of their (petitioners') office and that
she was dismissed because her services were no longer
required.
ISSUE # 1: WON Sterling committed an unfair labor
practice
RATIO:
NO, The term unfair labor practice has been
defined as any of those acts listed in See. 4 of the Act.
The respondent Sol has never been found to commit any
of the acts mentioned in paragraph (a) of Sec. 4.
Respondent Sol was not connected with any labor
organization, nor has she ever attempted to join a labor
organization, or to assist, or contribute to a labor
organization. The company cannot, therefore, be
considered as having committed an unfair labor practic
ISSUE # 2: WON the termination of Sol's services is
valid because she is an independent contractor
RATIO:
No, she is not an independent contractor but an
employee of Sterling. Sol was directed to listen to
certain broadcasts, directing her, in the instructions
given her, when to listen and what to listen, petitioners
herein naming the stations to be listened to, the hours
of broadcasts, and the days when listening was to be
done. Respondent Sol had to follow these directions.
The mere fact that while performing the duties assigned
to her she was not under the supervision of the
petitioners does not render her a contractor, because
what she has to do, the hours that she has to work and
the report that she has to submit all — these are
according to instructions given by the employer. It is not
correct to say, therefore, that she was an independent
contractor, for an independent contractor is one who
does not receive instructions as to what to do, how to
do, without specific instructions.
Finally, the very act of respondent Sol in
demanding vacation leave, Christmas bonus and
additional wages shows that she considered herself an
employee. A contractor is not entitled to a vacation
leave or to a bonus nor to a minimum wage. This act of
hers in demanding these privileges are inconsistent with
the claim that she was an independent contractor.
Case # 4 and 18:
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS EMPLOYEES UNION-
NFL [CABEU-NFL] vs. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS,
INC. [CAB]
FACTS:
Respondent CAB is a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines. CABEU-
NFL is a duly registered labor union and a certified
bargaining agent of the CAB rank-and-file employees.
CABEU-NFL sent CAB a proposed CBA, seeking
the increase of their benefits. CAB, however, did not
agree to grant additional and separate Christmas
bonuses. The collective bargaining negotiations resulted
in a deadlock. CABEU-NFL filed a Notice of Strike.
CABEU-NFL aggressively asserts that CAB is
guilty of unfair labor practice on the ground of its refusal
to bargain collectively and its failure to resume
negotiations with CABEU-NFL. They claim to be the duly
certified bargaining agent of the CAB rank-and-file
employees and that such subsequent CBA with CABELA
constitutes an act of unfair labor practice prohibited
under Article 248 (g) of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not CAB has committed an unfair
labor practice.
HELD:
No. The disassociation of more than 90% of
rank-and-file workers from CABEU-NFL, it was
constrained to negotiate and conclude in good faith a
new CBA with CABELA, the newly established union by
workers who disassociated from CABEU-NFL. CAB
emphasizes that it declined further negotiations with
CABEU-NFL in good faith because to continue with it
would serve no practical purpose. Considering that the
NCMB has yet to resolve CAB’s query in its letter-
response, CAB was left without any choice but accede to
the demands of CABELA. Such actions of CAB are
nowhere tantamount to anti-unionism, the evil sought to
be punished in cases of unfair labor practices.
Furthermore, basic is the principle that good
faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the
duty to prove the same. By imputing bad faith to the
actuations of CAB, CABEU-NFL has the burden of proof
to present substantial evidence to support the allegation
of unfair labor practice.
Case # 5:
CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS
ASSOCIATION vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., W.E.
MENEFEE and B.F. EDWARDS
FACTS:
Petitioner is a labor organization of Filipino
managers supervisors in Caltex Inc. After the Association
was registered as a labor organization, it sent a letter to
the Company informing the latter of the former's
registration and sought for the recognition of the
Association as the duly authorized bargaining agency for
managers and supervisors in the Company. The
Company countered that the managerial employees are
not qualified for membership in a labor organization.
The Association filed a notice to strike due to
refusal to bargain in good faith and to act on demands.
Later, they filed a ULP case because the
Company manifested their antagonism to it; that its
President issued a statement of policy designed to
discourage employees and supervisors from joining labor
organizations; that the Company refused to bargain;
that the steps taken by the Company sought to destroy
the Association or discourage its members from
continuing their union membership. The Association was
forced to file a strike notice.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is liable for unfair
labor practice.
HELD: Yes. Under Sec. 14(c) of RA No. 875, the parties
themselves are required "to participate fully and
promptly in such meetings and conferences as the
(Conciliation) Service may undertake." In this case, the
parties agreed to meet and yet, notwithstanding this
definite agreement, the Company sent no
representatives.
 Admittedly the certification election proceeding
for the Cebu Supervisors Union in the Company had
been pending for six (6) years already.
The company issued a statement of policy which
conveyed in unequivocal terms to all employees the
following message:
We sincerely believe that good employee relations can
be maintained and essential employee needs fulfilled
through sound management administration without the
necessity of employee organization and representations.
We respect an employee's right to present his
grievances, regardless of whether or not he is
represented by a labor organization.
An employee reading the foregoing would at
once gain impression that there was no need to join the
Association.
After the settlement of strike, the Company
preferred non-members of the Association in promotions
to higher positions and humiliated active unionists by
either promoting junior supervisors over them or by
reduction of their authority compared to that assigned to
them before the strike, or otherwise downgrading their
positions.
We perceive in this particular action of the
Company its anti-union posture and attitude. The Court
finds the Company B.F. Edwards and W.E. Menefee
guilty of unfair labor practices and they are therefore
ordered to cease and desist from the same.
Case # 6 and 9:
REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK vs. CIR
FACTS:
The Bank had in its employ the respondents
which was discharged for having written and published
"a patently libelous letter . . . tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt not only of officers and
employees of this bank, but also of your employer, the
bank itself."
The letter referred to was a letter-charge which
the respondents had written to the bank president,
demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality,
nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees. And
copies were also given to the chairman of the board of
directors of the Bank, and the Governor of the Central
Bank.
At the instance of the respondents, prosecutor
A. Tirona filed a complaint in the CIR=, alleging that the
Bank's conduct violated section 4(a) (5) of the Industrial
Peace Act which makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice
or discriminate against an employee for having filed
charges or for having given or being about to give
testimony under this Act."
ISSUES:
1. WON there is unfair labor practice when
respondents (employees) were discharged for having
written and published a libelous letter against the bank
president.
2. WON the discharged of the respondents based
on the libelous letter constitute illegal dismissal.
RULING:
1. YES
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual
capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self-
organization that includes concerted activity for mutual
aid and protection, interference with which constitutes
an unfair labor practice under section 4(a)(1). For, as
has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or
demands, even by a small group of employees, if in
furtherance of their interests as such is a concerted
activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated.
Indeed, when the respondents complained
against nepotism, favoritism and other management
practices, they were acting within an area marked out by
the Act as a proper sphere of collective bargaining.
2. YES
What the Bank should have done was to refer
the letter-charge to the grievance committee. This was
its duty, failing which it committed an unfair labor
practice under the Industrial Peace Act. For collective
bargaining does not end with the execution of an
agreement. It is a continuous process. The duty to
bargain imposes on the parties during the term of their
agreement the mutual obligation "to meet and confer
promptly and expeditiously and in good faith . . . for the
purpose of adjusting any grievances or question arising
under such agreement" and a violation of this obligation
is an unfair labor practice.
Case # 7:
Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation
Facts:
The petitioner disfavored the fact that the private
respondent employees have formed a union. When the
union became the collective bargaining representative in
the certification election, the petitioner refused to sit
down to negotiate a CBA. In the course of a labor
dispute between the petitioner and respondent union,
the union members were not given work for more than
one month. In protest, complainants staged a strike
which was however settled upon the signing of a
Memorandum of Agreement.
 A conciliation meeting was conducted wherein
Luisa Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abrega, and
Boboy Silva were not considered by the company as
employees, and thus may not be members of the union.
It was also agreed that a number of other employees
will be reinstated. When respondents again reneged on
its commitment, complainants filed the present
complaint. It is alleged by the petitioners that the above
employees are mere seasonal employees.
The NLRC held that there was illegal dismissal
and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
1. W/N the petitioner is guilty of unfair labor
practice
2. W/N the employees are illegally terminated
RULING:
1. The NLRC also found herein petitioners guilty of unfair
labor practice. It ruled as follows:
Indeed, from respondents refusal to bargain, to their
acts of economic inducements resulting in the promotion
of those who withdrew from the union, the use of armed
guards to prevent the organizers to come in, and the
dismissal of union officials and members, one cannot but
conclude that respondents did not want a union in their
hacienda clear interference in the right of the workers to
self-organization.
We uphold the CAs affirmation of the above findings.
Indeed, factual findings of labor officials, who are
deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within
their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not
only respect but even finality. Their findings are binding
on the Supreme Court. Verily, their conclusions are
accorded great weight upon appeal, especially when
supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the
Court is not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of
their factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing
that these were arbitrary and bereft of any rational
basis.
2. Yes, they are regular and not seasonal employees.
For them to be excluded as regulars, it is not enough
that they perform work that is seasonal in nature but
they also are employed for the duration of one season.
The evidence only proved the first but not the second
requirement.
The ruling in Mercado v. NLRC is not applicable since in
that case, the workers were merely required to perform
phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time,
after which, their services are available to other
employers. The management's sudden change of
assignment reeks of bad faith, it is likewise guilty of ULP.
Case # 8
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD.,
EMPLOYEES ASSN. vs. INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE
CO. LTD.
FACTS:
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees
Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers &
Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building
Employees Association-NATU (referred as UNIONS)
entered into separate collective bargaining agreements
with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU
Insurance Group (as the COMPANIES).
The Unions jointly submitted proposals to the
Companies for a modified renewal of their respective
collective bargaining contracts which were about to
expire. Thereafter, negotiations were conducted but
these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union
shop, as a result of which the Unions filed a notice of
strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining." Upon
several conciliation conferences, the Companies insisted
that the Unions first drop their demand for union
security, promising money benefits if this was done, as a
result the demand for union shop was dropped. Then
parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no
satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of
salary increases. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a
strike in protest against what they considered the
Companies' unfair labor practices
Meanwhile, eighty-seven unionists were reclassified as
supervisors without salary increase nor in responsibility
so that these employees will be deemed resigned from
the Unions. Moreover, the Companies sent to each
strikers a letter which states “However, if any of you
would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may: 1.
Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of
your intention to do so; 2. Take your meals within the
office; 3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end
of the day or to sleep nights at the office where
comfortable cots have been prepared; 4. Enjoy free
coffee and occasional movies; 5. Be paid overtime for
work performed in excess of eight hours; and 6. Be sure
arrangements will be made for your families. The
decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in
the motives of the strike or in the fairness of the
Management.”
The Unions continued to strike. So, some management
men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines causing
injuries. The Companies then filed criminal charges
against the strikers before the City Fiscal's Office of
Manila and again sent individually to the strikers a letter
quoting “If you are still interested in continuing in the
employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no
criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you
until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office.
If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be
forced to obtain your replacement.” Consequently, the
striking employees decided to call off their strike and to
report back to work. However, before readmitting the
strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also
to be screened by a management committee, and
readmitted only some but adamantly refused
readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions
who were most active in the strike, on the ground that
they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the
respondents," without however stating the specific acts
allegedly committed.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Companies committed unfair labor
practice when it sent individual letters to the strikers.
2. WON the dismissal of the 34 employees is illegal
thus constitute unfair labor practice.
RULING:
1. YES
The said letters were directed to the striking employees
individually — by registered special delivery mail at that
— without being coursed through the Unions which were
representing the employees in the collective bargaining.
Citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., “the act of an
employer in notifying absent employees individually
during a strike following unproductive efforts at
collective bargaining that the plant would be operated
the next day and that their jobs were open for them
should they want to come in has been held to be an
unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the
right of collective bargaining through dealing with the
employees individually instead of through their collective
bargaining representatives.”
Besides, the letters should not be considered by
themselves alone but should be read in the light of the
preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding
them. The letters should be interpreted according to the
"totality of conduct doctrine,"... whereby the culpability
of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only
on the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be
appraised against the background of and in conjunction
with collateral circumstances. Thus, the facts of the case
constitute unfair labor practice.
2. YES
It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort
to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination
in the readmission of strikers returning to work — the
respondents delegated the power to readmit to a
committee. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in
the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power
of reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.
Case # 10:
G.R. No. 171664 March 6, 2013
BANKARD, INC., Petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION- FIRST DIVISION,
PAULO BUENCONSEJO,BANKARD EMPLOYEES
UNION-AWATU, Respondents.
Doctrine: Contracting out of services is an exercise of
business judgment or management prerogative. Absent
any proof that management acted in a malicious or
arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise of judgment by an employer.
The Facts:
First, respondent Bankard Employees Union-
AWATU (Union) filed before the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) its first Notice of Strike
(NOS) alleging commission of unfair labor practices by
petitioner Bankard, Inc. (Bankard), to wit: 1) job
contractualization; 2) outsourcing/contracting-out jobs;
3) manpower rationalizing program; and 4)
discrimination. Secondly, the Union declared a CBA
bargaining deadlock and filed its second NOS alleging
bargaining in bad faith on the part of Bankard.
As regards the first issue, it was Bankard’s
position that job contractualization or outsourcing or
contracting-out of jobs was a legitimate exercise of
management prerogative and did not constitute unfair
labor practice. The Union contended that the number of
regular employees had been reduced substantially
through the management scheme of freeze-hiring policy
on positions vacated by regular employees on the basis
of cost-cutting measures and the introduction of a more
drastic formula of streamlining its regular employees
through the MRP.
As to the second issue, Bankard denied that
there was bad faith on its part in bargaining with the
Union, because Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
was entered into between Bankard and the Union. The
Union averred that Bankard’s proposals were way below
their demands, showing that the management had no
intention of reaching an agreement.
NLRC issued its Resolution16 declaring that the
management committed acts considered as unfair labor
practice (ULP) under Article 248(c) of the Labor Code
and that the issue of bargaining in bad faith was
rendered moot and academic by virtue of the finalization
and signing of the CBA.
The CA dismissed the petition, finding that the NLRC
ruling was supported by substantial evidence.
Issue: Whether or not Bankard committed acts
considered as ULP.
Ruling: No
 In this case, the Union claims that Bankard, in
implementing its MRP which eventually reduced the
number of employees, clearly violated Article 248(c) of
the Labor Code which states that:
Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. –
It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of
the following unfair labor practice: (c) To contract out
services or functions being performed by union members
when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization;
Nothing in the records strongly proves that
Bankard intended its program, the MRP, as a tool to
drastically and deliberately reduce union membership.
There was no proof that the program was meant to
encourage the employees to disassociate themselves
from the Union or to restrain them from joining any
union or organization. There was no showing that it was
intentionally implemented to stunt the growth of the
Union or that Bankard discriminated, or in any way
singled out the union members who had availed of the
retirement package under the MRP. The MRP was
implemented as a valid cost-cutting measure, well within
the ambit of the so-called management prerogatives.
Contracting out of services is an exercise of
business judgment or management prerogative. Absent
any proof that management acted in a malicious or
arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise of judgment by an employer. Bankard merely
validly exercised its management prerogative. Not
shown to have acted maliciously or arbitrarily, no act of
ULP can be imputed against it.
Case # 11:
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INC, - versus - written explanations of the three respondents, the Club
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS:
Petitioner Alabang Country Clubis a domestic non-profit
corporation. Respondent Alabang Country Club
Independent Employees Union (Union) is the exclusive
bargaining agent of the Clubs rank-and-file employees.
In April 1996, respondents Christopher Pizarro, Michael
Braza, and Nolasco Castueras were elected Union
President, Vice-President, and Treasurer, respectively.
On June 21, 1999, the Club and the Union
entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),
which provided for a Union shop and maintenance of
membership shop. CBA included a security clause stating
that all regular rank-and-file employees, who are
members or subsequently become members of the
UNION shall maintain their membership in good
standing as a condition for their continued employment.
Section 4 of the same CBA provided grounds for
dismissal of an employee which included malversation of
union funds.
Subsequently, in July 2001, an election was held
and a new set of officers was elected. Soon thereafter,
the new officers conducted an audit of the Union funds.
They discovered some irregularly recorded entries,
unaccounted expenses and disbursements, and
uncollected loans from the Union funds. The Union
notified respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras of the
audit results and asked them to explain the
discrepancies in writing.
Thereafter, on October 6, 2001, in a meeting
called by the Union, respondents Pizarro, Braza, and
Castueras explained their side. Despite their
explanations, respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras
were expelled from the Union, and were furnished
individual letters of expulsion for malversation of Union
funds.
In a letter the Union, invoking the Security
Clause of the CBA, demanded that the Club dismiss
respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras in view of
their expulsion from the Union. The Club required the
three respondents to show cause in writing within 48
hours from notice why they should not be dismissed.
Pizarro and Castueras submitted their respective written
explanations on October 20, 2001, while Braza
submitted his explanation the following day.
The Clubs general manager called respondents Pizarro,
Braza, and Castueras for an informal conference
inquiring about the charges against them. Said
respondents gave their explanation and asserted that
the Union funds allegedly malversed by them were even
over the total amount collected during their tenure. They
claimed the charges are baseless. The general manager
announced he would conduct a formal investigation.
Nonetheless, after weighing the verbal and
concluded that said respondents failed to refute the
validity of their expulsion from the Union. Thus, it was
constrained to terminate the employment of said
respondents. Respondents received their notices of
termination from the Club.
Respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras
challenged their dismissal from the Club in an illegal
dismissal complaint filed with the NLRC. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of the Club, and found that there
was justifiable cause in terminating said respondents.
The NLRC rendered a Decision declaring the dismissal of
the complainants illegal. The NLRC ruled that there was
no justifiable cause for the termination of respondents
Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras. According to the NLRC,
said respondents expulsion from the Union was illegal
since the DOLE had not yet made any definitive ruling
on their liability regarding the administration of the
Unions funds.
The Club then filed a motion for reconsideration
which the NLRC denied. CA upheld the NLRC ruling.

ISSUE: Whether the three respondents were
illegally dismissed.
HELD: NO.
Another cause for termination is dismissal from
employment due to the enforcement of the union
security clause in the CBA. Here, Art. II of the CBA on
Union security contains the provisions on the Union shop
and maintenance of membership shop. Termination of
employment by virtue of a union security clause
embodied in a CBA is recognized and accepted in our
jurisdiction. This practice strengthens the union and
prevents disunity.
In terminating the employment of an employee by
enforcing the union security clause, the employer needs
only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security
clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the
enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA;
and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the unions
decision to expel the employee from the union. These
requisites constitute just cause for terminating an
employee based on the CBAs union security provision.
The language of Art. II of the CBA that the Union
members must maintain their membership in good
standing as a condition sine qua non for their continued
employment with the Club is unequivocal. It is also clear
that upon demand by the Union and after due process,
the Club shall terminate the employment of a regular
rank-and-file employee who may be found liable for a
number of offenses, one of which is malversation of
Union funds.
The three respondents were expelled from and by the
Union after due investigation for acts of dishonesty and
malversation of Union funds. In accordance with the
CBA, the Union properly requested the Club, letterto
enforce the Union security provision in their CBA and
terminate said respondents. Then, in compliance with
the Unions request, the Club reviewed the documents
submitted by the Union, requested said respondents to
submit written explanations, and thereafter afforded
them reasonable opportunity to present their side. After
it had determined that there was sufficient evidence that
said respondents malversed Union funds, the Club
dismissed them from their employment conformably
with Sec. 4(f) of the CBA.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, we are
constrained to rule that there is sufficient cause for the
three respondents termination from employment. We
rule that the Club substantially complied with the due
process requirements before it dismissed the three
respondents.
The three respondents were notified that their dismissal
was being requested by the Union, and their
explanations were heard. Then, the Club, through its
President, conferred with said respondents during the
last week of October 2001.
The three respondents were dismissed only after the
Club reviewed and considered the documents submitted
by the Union vis--vis the written explanations submitted
by said respondents. Under these circumstances, we find
that the Club had afforded the three respondents a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and defend
themselves.
Case # 12:
DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC. and WARFREDO
C. BALANDRA vs. MARIANO SALDIVAR, NENA
TIMBAL, VIRGINIO VICERA, ALFREDO AMONCIO
and NAZARIO S. COLASTE
Facts:
The Associated Labor Union (ALU) is the exclusive
bargaining agent of plantation workers of petitioner Del
Monte Philippines, Inc. (Del Monte) in Bukidnon.
Respondent Nena Timbal is also a member of ALU. Del
Monte and ALU entered into a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) with an effective term of five (5) years
from 1 September 1988 to 31 August 1993.
Timbal, along with four other employees were charged
by ALU for disloyalty to the union, particularly for
encouraging defections to a rival union, the National
Federation of Labor (NFL). Allegedly, Nena Timbal
personally recruited other bonafide members of the ALU
to attend NFL seminars and has actually attended these
seminars together with the other ALU members. The
matter was referred to a body within the ALU
organization, ominously named Disloyalty Board. The
charge against Timbal was supported by an affidavit
executed on 23 March 1993 by Gemma Artajo, also an
employee of Del Monte.
Timbal filed an Answer before the Disloyalty Board,
denying the allegations in the complaint and the
averments in Artajos Affidavit. Nevertheless, the ALU
Disloyalty Board concluded that Timbal was guilty of acts
or conduct inimical to the interests of ALU. It found that
the acts imputed to Timbal were partisan activities,
prohibited since the freedom period had not yet
commenced as of that time. Thus, the Disloyalty Board
recommended the expulsion of Timbal from membership
in ALU, and likewise her dismissal from Del Monte in
accordance with the Union Security Clause in the
existing CBA between ALU and Del Monte. The Regional
Vice President of ALU adopted the recommendations of
the Disloyalty Board and affirmed by the ALU National
President the expulsion of Timbal. Timbal and her co-
employees were terminated upon demand of ALU
pursuant to Sections 4 and 5 of Article III of the current
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Timbal and her co-employees filed separate complaints
against Del Monte for illegal dismissal, unfair labor
practice and damages. The Labor Arbiter affirmed that
all five were illegally dismissed and ordered Del Monte to
reinstate complainants, including Timbal, to their former
positions and to pay their full backwages and other
allowances, though the other claims and charges were
dismissed for want of basis. The NLRC reversed the
Labor Arbiter and ruled that all the complainants were
validly dismissed. On review, the Court of Appeals ruled
that only Timbal was illegally dismissed.
Issues:
1. or not Del Monte Philippines is guilty of unfair
labor practice.
2. Whether or not Timbal was illegally dismissed.
Held:
1. No.
It bears elaboration that Timbal’s dismissal is not
predicated on any of the just or authorized causes for
dismissal under Book Six, Title I of the Labor Code but
on the union security clause in the CBA between Del
Monte and ALU. Stipulations in the CBA authorizing the
dismissal of employees are of equal import as the
statutory provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code,
since a CBA is the law between the company and the
union and compliance therewith is mandated by the
express policy to give protection to labor. The CBA,
which covers all regular hourly paid employees at the
pineapple plantation in Bukidnon stipulates that all
present and subsequent employees shall be required to
become a member of ALU as a condition of continued
employment. A CBA provision for a closed-shop is a valid
form of union security and it is not a restriction on the
right or freedom of association guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Timbal’s expulsion from ALU was premised on the
ground of disloyalty to the union, which under Section
4(3), Article II of the CBA, also stands as a ground for
her dismissal from Del Monte to wit: that loss of
membership in the union shall not be a ground for
dismissal by the company except where loss of
membership is due to disloyalty to ALU in accordance
with its Constitution and By-Laws as duly registered with
the Department of Labor and Employment. Indeed,
Section 5, Article II of the CBA enjoins Del Monte to
dismiss from employment those employees expelled
from ALU for disloyalty, albeit with the qualification in
accordance with law.
2. Yes
Even if the dismissal of an employee is conditioned not
on the grounds for termination under the Labor Code,
but pursuant to the provisions of a CBA, it still is
necessary to observe substantive due process in order to
validate the dismissal. As applied to the Labor Code,
adherence to substantive due process is a requisite for a
valid determination that just or authorized causes
existed to justify the dismissal. As applied to the
dismissals grounded on violations of the CBA,
observance of substantial due process is indispensable in
establishing the presence of the cause or causes for
dismissal as provided for in the CBA. The dismissal for
cause of employees must be justified by substantial
evidence, as appreciated by an impartial trier of facts.
None of the trier of facts below the Labor Arbiter, the
NLRC and the Court of Appeals saw fit to accord
credence to Piqueros testimony.
The Disloyalty Board may have appreciated Piqueros
testimony in its own finding that Timbal was guilty, yet
the said board cannot be considered as a wholly neutral
or dispassionate tribunal since it was constituted by the
very organization that stood as the offended party in the
disloyalty charge. Without impugning the integrity of
ALU and the mechanisms it has employed for the
internal discipline of its members, we nonetheless hold
that in order that the dismissal of an employee may be
validated by this Court, it is necessary that the grounds
for dismissal are justified by substantial evidence as duly
appreciated by an impartial trier of facts. The existence
of Piqueros testimony was appreciated only by the
Disloyalty Board, but not by any of the impartial
tribunals which heard Timbals case. The appreciation of
such testimony by the Disloyalty Board without any
similar affirmation or concurrence by the NLRC-RAB, the
NLRC, or the Court of Appeals, cannot satisfy the
substantive due process requirement as a means of
upholding Timbals dismissal.
All told, we see no error on the part of the Court of
Appeals when it held that Timbal was illegally dismissed.
Case # 13:
BPI vs. BPI-EU Davao Chapter
Facts:
On March 23, 2000, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
approved the Articles of Merger executed on January 20,
2000 by and between BPI, herein petitioner, and FEBTC.
This Article and Plan of Merger was approved by the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 7, 2000.
Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter -
Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank (hereinafter the
Union, for brevity) is the exclusive bargaining agent of
BPIs rank and file employees in Davao City. The former
FEBTC rank-and-file employees in Davao City did not
belong to any labor union at the time of the merger.
Prior to the effectivity of the merger, or on March 31,
2000, respondent Union invited said FEBTC employees
to a meeting regarding the Union Shop Clause (Article
II, Section 2) of the existing CBA between petitioner BPI
and respondent Union.
The parties both advert to certain provisions of the
existing CBA, which are quoted below:
Section 2. Union Shop - New employees falling within
the bargaining unit as defined in Article I of this
Agreement, who may hereafter be regularly employed
by the Bank shall, within thirty (30) days after they
become regular employees, join the Union as a condition
of their continued employment. It is understood that
membership in good standing in the Union is a condition
of their continued employment with the Bank.[8]
(Emphases supplied.)
Respondent Union then sent notices to the former
FEBTC employees who refused to join, as well as those
who retracted their membership, and called them to a
hearing regarding the matter. When these former FEBTC
employees refused to attend the hearing, the president
of the Union requested BPI to implement the Union
Shop Clause of the CBA and to terminate their
employment pursuant thereto.
After two months of management inaction on the
request, respondent Union informed petitioner BPI of its
decision to refer the issue of the implementation of the
Union Shop Clause of the CBA to the Grievance
Committee. However, the issue remained unresolved at
this level and so it was subsequently submitted for
voluntary arbitration by the parties.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the former FEBTC employees
that were absorbed by petitioner upon the merger
between FEBTC and BPI should be covered by the Union
Shop Clause found in the existing CBA between
petitioner and respondent Union.
Yes, all employees in the bargaining unit covered by a
Union Shop Clause in their CBA with management are
subject to its terms. However, under law and
jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are
exempted from its coverage, namely, employees who at
the time the union shop agreement takes effect are
bona fide members of a religious organization which
prohibits its members from joining labor unions on
religious grounds; employees already in the service and
already members of a union other than the majority at
the time the union shop agreement took effect;
confidential employees who are excluded from the rank
and file bargaining unit; and employees excluded from
the union shop by express terms of the agreement.
Indeed, the situation of the former FEBTC employees in
this case clearly does not fall within the first three
exceptions to the application of the Union Shop Clause
discussed earlier. No allegation or evidence of religious
exemption or prior membership in another union or
engagement as a confidential employee was presented
by both parties. The sole category therefore in which
petitioner may prove its claim is the fourth recognized
exception or whether the former FEBTC employees are
excluded by the express terms of the existing CBA
between petitioner and respondent.
No Substantial Distinction Under the CBA Between
Regular Employees Hired After Probationary Status and
Regular Employees Hired After the Merger
Verily, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there are
no substantial differences between a newly hired non-
regular employee who was regularized weeks or months
after his hiring and a new employee who was absorbed
from another bank as a regular employee pursuant to a
merger, for purposes of applying the Union Shop Clause.
Both employees were hired/employed only after the CBA
was signed. At the time they are being required to join
the Union, they are both already regular rank and file
employees of BPI. They belong to the same bargaining
unit being represented by the Union. They both enjoy
benefits that the Union was able to secure for them
under the CBA. When they both entered the employ of
BPI, the CBA and the Union Shop Clause therein were
already in effect and neither of them had the
opportunity to express their preference for unionism or
not. We see no cogent reason why the Union Shop
Clause should not be applied equally to these two types
of new employees, for they are undeniably similarly
situated.
The effect or consequence of BPIs so-called absorption
of former FEBTC employees should be limited to what
they actually agreed to, i.e. recognition of the FEBTC
employees years of service, salary rate and other
benefits with their previous employer. The effect should
not be stretched so far as to exempt former FEBTC
employees from the existing CBA terms, company
policies and rules which apply to employees similarly
situated. If the Union Shop Clause is valid as to other
new regular BPI employees, there is no reason why the
same clause would be a violation of the absorbed
employees freedom of association.
Right of an Employee not to Join a Union is not Absolute
and Must Give Way to the Collective Good of All
Members of the Bargaining Unit (note: relevant to ULP
topic)
However, Victoriano is consistent with Juat since they
both affirm that the right to refrain from joining a union
is not absolute. The relevant portion of Victoriano is
quoted below:
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations
recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is,
however, limited. The legal protection granted to such
right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of
law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed
on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may
employ only member of the collective bargaining union,
and the employees must continue to be members of the
union for the duration of the contract in order to keep
their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace
Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350,
provides that although it would be an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization" the employer is, however, not
precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees."
By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before
the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person,
regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed
or to keep his employment, he must become a member
of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of
said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and
withdrawn.
Case # 14
G.R. No. 170112 April 30, 2008
DEL PILAR ACADEMY, EDUARDO ESPEJO and
ELISEO OCAMPO, JR., petitioners, vs. DEL PILAR
ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents.
Doctrine:
The employee's acceptance of benefits resulting from a
collective bargaining agreement justifies the deduction
of agency fees from his pay and the union's entitlement
thereto. In this aspect, the legal basis of the union's
right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory,
but quasi-contractual, deriving from the established
principle that non-union employees may not unjustly
enrich themselves by benefiting from employment
conditions negotiated by the bargaining union.
Facts:
Respondent Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (the
UNION) is the certified collective bargaining
representative of teaching and non-teaching personnel
of petitioner Del Pilar Academy (DEL PILAR), an
educational institution operating in Imus, Cavite.
The UNION and DEL PILAR entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA)3granting salary increase
and other benefits to the teaching and non-teaching
staff.
The UNION then assessed agency fees from non-union
employees, and requested DEL PILAR to deduct said
assessment from the employees’ salaries and wages.
DEL PILAR, however, refused to effect deductions
claiming that the non-union employees were not
amenable to it.
The UNION negotiated for the renewal of the CBA. DEL
PILAR, however, refused to renew the same unless the
provision regarding entitlement to two (2) months
summer vacation leave with pay will be amended. The
UNION objected to the proposal claiming diminution of
benefits.
The UNION requested DEL PILAR to submit the case for
voluntary arbitration, but the latter allegedly refused,
prompting the UNION to file a case for unfair labor
practice with the Labor Arbiter against DEL PILAR.
DEL PILAR denied committing unfair labor practices
against the UNION. It justified the non-deduction of the
agency fees by the absence of individual check off
authorization from the non-union employees.
Issue:
Whether or not the UNION is entitled to collect
agency fees from non-union members, and if so,
whether an individual written authorization is necessary
for a valid check off.
Held: YES. Union is entitled to agency fees.
NO. No need for individual authorization.
The collection of agency fees in an amount
equivalent to union dues and fees, from employees who
are not union members, is recognized by Article 248(e)
of the Labor Code, thus:
Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining unit
who are not members of the recognized collective
bargaining agent may be assessed reasonable fees
equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by the
recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union
members accept the benefits under the collective
bargaining agreement. Provided, That the individual
authorization required under Article 241, paragraph (o)
of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of
recognized collective bargaining agent.
The grant of annual salary increase is not the only
provision in the CBA that benefited the non-union
employees. The UNION negotiated for other benefits,
namely, limitations on teaching assignments to 23 hours
per week, additional compensation for overload units or
teaching assignments in excess of the 23 hour per week
limit, and payment of longevity pay. It also negotiated
for entitlement to summer vacation leave with pay for
two (2) months for teaching staff who have rendered six
(6) consecutive semesters of service. For the non-
teaching personnel, the UNION worked for their
entitlement to fifteen (15) days leave with pay.13 These
provisions in the CBA surely benefited the non-union
employees, justifying the collection of, and the UNION’s
entitlement to, agency fees.
No requirement of written authorization from the non-
union employees is needed to effect a valid check off.
Article 248(e) makes it explicit that Article 241(o),
requiring written authorization is inapplicable to non-
union members, especially in this case where the non-
union employees receive several benefits under the CBA.
As explained by this Court in Holy Cross of Davao
College, Inc. v. Hon. Joaquin. The employee's
acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective
bargaining agreement justifies the deduction of agency
fees from his pay and the union's entitlement thereto. In
this aspect, the legal basis of the union's right to agency
fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-
contractual, deriving from the established principle that
non-union employees may not unjustly enrich
themselves by benefiting from employment conditions
negotiated by the bargaining union.
Case # 15:
NORMA MABEZA, vs. NLRC
Facts:
Petitioner Norma Mabeza filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the NLRC. She alleged that she and her
co-employees at the Hotel Supreme were asked by the
hotel's management to sign an instrument attesting to
the latter's compliance with minimum wage and other
labor standard provisions of law, to which she signed
but refused to swear to the veracity and contents
affidavit before a prosecutor as instructed by
management. Subsequently, she was ordered by the
hotel management to turn over the keys to her living
quarters and to remove her belongings from the hotel
premises. She thereafter filed a leave of absence from
her job which was denied by management. When she
attempted to return to work, the same was
denied.Respondent claimed that petitioner’s
abandonment of her job and and loss of confidence are
sufficient cause for her termination.
Issue:
1. W/N the dismissal is legal.
2. W/N the dismissal constitutes ULP.
Ruling:
1. NO. Respondent’s claim that petitioner
"abandoned" her job were not enough to constitute just
cause to sanction the termination of her services under
Article 283 of the Labor Code. For abandonment to
arise, there must be concurrence of two things: 1) lack
of intention to work; and 2) the presence of overt acts
signifying the employee's intention not to work.
In the instant case, the fact that she made this attempt
clearly indicates not an intention to abandon but an
intention to return to work after the period of her leave
of absence, had it been granted, shall have expired.
Furthermore, while absence from work for a prolonged
period may suggest abandonment in certain instances,
mere absence of one or two days would not be enough
to sustain such a claim.
2. YES. The act of compelling employees to sign
an instrument indicating that the employer observed
labor standards provisions of law when he might have
not, together with the act of terminating or coercing
those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's
scheme constitutes unfair labor practice. The first act
clearly preempts the right of the hotel's workers to seek
better terms and conditions of employment through
concerted action.
This actuation . . . is analogous to the situation
envisaged in paragraph (f) of Article 248 of the Labor
Code" 24 which distinctly makes it an unfair labor
practice "to dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or
discriminate against an employee for having given or
being about to give testimony" 25 under the Labor
Code. For in not giving positive testimony in favor of her
employer, petitioner had reserved not only her right to
dispute the claim and proffer evidence in support thereof
but also to work for better terms and conditions of
employment.
Case #16:
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-
PTGWO vs. HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA
Facts:
SanMig contracted the services of Lipercon and D'Rite,
which were duly licensed by the DOLE as independent
contractors. In said contracts, it was expressly
understood and agreed that the workers employed by
the contractors were to be paid by the latter and that
none of them were to be deemed employees or agents
of SanMig. There was to be no employer-employee
relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on
the one hand, and SanMig on the other.
Petitioner Union is the duly authorized representative of
the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of SanMig
with whom the latter executed a CBA. The Union
advised SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers
had signed up for union membership and sought the
regularization of their employment with SMC.
On the ground that it had failed to receive any favorable
response from SanMig, the Union filed a notice of strike
for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union
busting. On the other hand, SanMig denies the existence
of any employer-employee relationship and consequently
of any labor dispute between itself and the Union.
Issue:
1. W/N there exist an Unfair Labor Practice.
Ruling:
1. YES. SanMig, resists that Union demand on the
ground that there is no employer-employee relationship
between it and those workers and because the demand
violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that
representation and association, for the purpose of
negotiating the conditions of employment are also
involved. In fact, the injunction sought by SanMig was
precisely also to prevent such representation. Again, the
matter of representation falls within the scope of a labor
dispute. Neither can it be denied that the controversy
below is directly connected with the labor dispute
already taken cognizance of by the NCMB-DOLE.
As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute,
jurisdiction belongs to the labor tribunals. As explicitly
provided for in Article 217 of the Labor Code, prior to its
amendment by R.A. No. 6715 on 21 March 1989, since
the suit below was instituted on 6 March 1989, Labor
Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide the following cases involving all workers
including "1. unfair labor practice cases; 2. those that
workers may file involving wages, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment; ... and 5.
cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this
Code, including questions involving the legality of striker
and lockouts. ..." Article 217 lays down the plain
command of the law.
Case # 17:
General Milling Corporation vs. CA
Facts:
In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu
City, petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC)
employed 190 workers. They were all members of
private respondent General Milling Corporation
Independent Labor Union (union, for brevity), a duly
certified bargaining agent.
On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included
the issue of representation effective for a term of three
years. The CBA was effective for three years retroactive
to December 1, 1988. Hence, it would expire on
November 30, 1991.
On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of
the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a
request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten
(10) days.
As early as October 1991, however, GMC had received
collective and individual letters from workers who stated
that they had withdrawn from their union membership,
on grounds of religious affiliation and personal
differences. Believing that the union no longer had
standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any
counter-proposal.
On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the
unions officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor Lastimoso.
The letter stated that it felt there was no basis to
negotiate with a union which no longer existed, but that
management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue
with them on matters of common concern and was open
to suggestions on how the company may improve its
operations.
In answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated
December 19, 1991 disclaiming any massive disaffiliation
or resignation from the union and submitted a
manifesto, signed by its members, stating that they had
not withdrawn from the union.
Issues:
(1) Finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for
violating the duty to bargain collectively and/or
interfering with the right of its employees to self-
organization.
(2) Imposing upon GMC the draft CBA proposed by the
union for two years to begin from the expiration of the
original CBA.
Held: 1. Yes(Duty to bargain), Under Article 252
abovecited, both parties are required to perform their
mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating
an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation
when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC
within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original
CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What
it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the
existence of the union and the status of its
(Interfering) The CA found that the letters between
February to June 1993 by 13 union members signifying
their resignation from the union clearly indicated that
GMC exerted pressure on its employees. The records
show that GMC presented these letters to prove that the
union no longer enjoyed the support of the workers. The
fact that the resignations of the union members
occurred during the pendency of the case before the
labor arbiter shows GMCs desperate attempts to cast
doubt on the legitimate status of the union. We agree
with the CAs conclusion that the ill-timed letters of
resignation from the union members indicate that GMC
had interfered with the right of its employees to self-
organization. Thus, we hold that the appellate court did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding GMC
guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the
right of its employees to self-organization.
2. No. The general rule is that when a CBA already
exists, its provision shall continue to govern the
relationship between the parties, until a new one is
agreed upon. The rule necessarily presupposes that all
other things are equal. That is, that neither party is
guilty of bad faith. However, when one of the parties
abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the
bargaining process, a departure from the general rule is
warranted.
Case #19 ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC., VS. ST.
JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES
UNION
G.R. No. 167892 October 27, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a domestic
corporation which owns and operates the St. John’s
Academy (later renamed St. John Colleges) in Calamba,
Laguna. Prior to 1998, the Academy offered a secondary
course only. The high school then employed about 80
teaching and non-teaching personnel who were
members of the St. John Academy Faculty & Employees
Union (Union).
The CBA between SJCI and the Union was set to expire
on May 31, 1997. During the ensuing collective
bargaining negotiations, SJCI rejected all the proposals
of the Union for an increase in worker’s benefits.
This resulted to a bargaining deadlock which led to the
holding of a valid strike by the Union on November 10,
1997.In order to end the strike, SJCI and the Union,
through the efforts of the NCMB, agreed to refer the
labor dispute to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(SOLE) for assumption of jurisdiction.
After which, the strike ended and classes resumed.
Subsequently, the SOLE issued an Order assuming
jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263
of the Labor Code. The parties were required to submit
their respective position papers.
Pending resolution of the labor dispute before the SOLE,
the Board of Directors of SJCI approved on February 22,
1998 a resolution recommending the closure of the high
school which was approved by the stockholders on even
date.
Thereafter, SJCI informed the DOLE, DECS, parents,
students and the Union of the impending closure of the
high school. Subsequently, some teaching and non-
teaching personnel of the high school agreed to the
closure. Some 51 employees had received their
separation compensation package while 25 employees
refused to accept the same.
Instead, these employees conducted a protest action
within the perimeter of the high school. The Union filed
a notice of strike. Thereafter SJCI filed a petition to
declare the strike illegal before the NLRC. It claimed that
the strike was conducted in violation of the procedural
requirements for holding a valid strike under the Labor
Code.
Subsequently, the 25 employees filed a complaint for
unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal dismissal and non-
payment of monetary benefits against SJCI before the
NLRC, alleging that the closure of the high school was
done in bad faith in order to get rid of the Union and
render useless any decision of the SOLE on the CBA
deadlocked issues.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Union’s complaint for
ULP and illegal dismissal while granting SJCI’s petition to
declare the strike illegal coupled with a declaration of
loss of employment status of the 25 Union members
involved in the strike.
The Union filed a manifestation to maintain the status
quo on March 30, 1998 praying that SJCI be enjoined
from closing the high school.
It claimed that the decision of SJCI to close the high
school violated the SOLE’s assumption order and the
agreement of the parties not to take any retaliatory
action against the other.
For its part, SJCI filed a motion to dismiss with entry of
appearance on October 14, 1998 claiming that the
closure of the high school rendered the CBA deadlocked
issues moot.
The SOLE denied SJCI’s motions to dismiss and certified
the CBA deadlock case to the NLRC. After the favorable
decision of the Labor Arbiter, SJCI resolved to reopen
the high school for school year 1999-2000.
However, it did not restore the high school teaching and
non-teaching employees it earlier terminated. That same
school year SJCI opened an elementary and college
department.
The NLRC rendered judgment reversing the decision of
the Labor Arbiter. It found SJCI guilty of ULP and illegal
dismissal and ordered it to reinstate the 25 employees to
their former positions without loss of seniority rights and
other benefits, and with full back wages.
It also required SJCI to pay moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, and two (2) months
summer/vacation pay.
Moreover, it ruled that the mass actions conducted by
the 25 employees on May 4, 1998 could not be
considered as a strike since, by then, the employer-
employee relationship had already been terminated due
to the closure of the high school.
On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of ULP and illegal
dismissal.
HELD:
YES, SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal.
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the following
requisites must concur for a valid closure of the
business:
(1) Serving a written notice on the workers at least one
(1) month before the intended date thereof;
(2) Serving a notice with the DOLE one month before
the taking effect of the closure;
(3) Payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month or at least one half (1/2) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher, with a fraction of at
least six (6) months to be considered as a whole year;
and
(4) Cessation of the operation must be bona fide.
It is not disputed that the first two requisites were
satisfied. The third requisite would have been satisfied
were it not for the refusal of the herein private
respondents to accept the separation compensation
package.
The instant case, thus, revolves around the fourth
requisite, i.e., whether SJCI closed the high school in
good faith.
In sum, the SC held that the timing of, and the reasons
for the closure of the high school and its reopening after
only one year from the time it was closed down, show
that the closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of
circumventing the Union’s right to collective bargaining However, the pictures were never authenticated and, on
and its members’ right to security of tenure. its face, only show that some students watched the
Union members while they conducted their protest
FIRST: As to the timing of and reason for closure of the actions. It is the employer carries the burden of proof to
high school. establish that the closure of the business was done in
good faith.
(a) SJCI contended that it was forced to close down the
high school due to alleged difficult labor problems that it In the instant case, SJCI had the burden of proving that,
encountered while dealing with the Union since 1995, indeed, the closure of the school was necessary to
specifically, the Union’s illegal demands in violation of uphold the safety and well-being of the students.
R.A. 6728.
SJCI presented no evidence to show that the protest
Under R.A. 6728, the income from tuition fee increase is actions turned violent; that the parents did not give their
to be used as follows: consent to their children who allegedly joined the
protest actions; that the Union did not take the
(a) 70% of the tuition fee shall go to the payment of
necessary steps to protect some of the students who
salaries, wages, allowances, and other benefits of
allegedly joined the same; or that the Union forced or
teaching and non- teaching personnel, and;
pressured the said students to join the protest actions
(b) 20% of the tuition fee increase shall go to the
Even assuming arguendo that the safety and well-being
improvement or modernization of the buildings,
of some of the students who allegedly joined the protest
equipment, and other facilities as well as payment of the
actions were compromised, still, the closure was done in
cost of operations.
bad faith because it was done long after the strike had
The alleged illegality and excessiveness of the Union’s ended. Thus, there is no more danger to the students’
demands were not sufficiently proved by SJCI. The well-being posed by the strike to speak of.
alleged illegality or excessiveness of the Union’s
Furthermore, if SJCI was after the interests of the
demands were the issues to be resolved by the SOLE
students, then it should not have closed the school
after the parties agreed to refer the said labor dispute to
because the parents and the students were vehemently
the latter for assumption of jurisdiction.
opposed to the same.
The SOLE certified the case to the NLRC, which
SECOND: As to the timing and reason for the reopening
rendered a decision finding that there was insufficient
of the school. SJCI next contends that the subsequent
evidence to determine the reasonableness of the Union’s
reopening of the high school after only one year from its
proposals.
closure did not show that the previous decision to close
At any rate, even assuming that the Union’s demands the high school was tainted with bad faith because the
were illegal or excessive, the important and crucial point reopening was done due to the clamor of the high
is that these alleged illegal or excessive demands did not school’s former students and their parents.
justify the closure of the high school and do not, in
The contention was untenable.
anyway, establish SJCI’s good faith.
First, the fact that after one year from the time it closed
The Labor Code does not authorize the employer to
its high school, SJCI opened a college and elementary
close down the establishment on the ground of illegal or
department, and reopened its high school department
excessive demands of the Union.
showed that it never intended to cease operating as an
Instead, aside from the remedy of submitting the educational institution.
dispute for voluntary or compulsory arbitration, the
Second, there is evidence on record contesting the
employer may file a complaint for ULP against the Union
alleged reason of SJCI for reopening the high school,
for bargaining in bad faith.
i.e., that its former students and their parents allegedly
If found guilty, this gives rise to civil and criminal clamored for the reopening of the high school.
liabilities and allows the employer to implement a lock
Finally, when SJCI reopened its high school, it did not
out, but not the closure of the establishment resulting to
rehire the Union members; evidently, the closure had
the permanent loss of employment of the whole
achieved its purpose, that is, to get rid of the Union
workforce.
members.
(b) SJCI also contended that the Union unduly
endangered the safety and well-being of the students
who joined the valid strike held on November, thus it
closed down the high school on March 31, 1998.

SJCI provided no evidence to substantiate these claims

except for its self-serving statements in its position
paper before the Labor Arbiter and pictures belatedly
attached to the instant petition before this Court.
Case # 20:
Arellano Universty v. CA
Facts:
The Arellano University Employees and Workers
Union is the exclusive bargaining representative of about
380 rank-and-file employees of Arellano University. The
union filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike charging the
University with Unfair Labor Practice ULP. After several
controversies and petitions, a strike was staged.
Upon the lifting of the strike, the University filed a
Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal before the NLRC.
The NLRC issued a Resolution holding that the University
was not guilty of ULP. Consequently, the strike was
declared illegal. All the employees who participated in
the illegal strike were thereafter declared to have lost
their employment status.
Issue:
W/N an employee is deemed to have lost his
employment by mere participation in an illegal strike.
Ruling:
No. Under Art. 264 of the LC, an ordinary
striking worker may not be declared to have lost his
employment status by mere participation in an illegal
strike. There must be proof that he knowingly
participated in the commission of illegal acts during the
strike. While the University adduced photographs
showing strikers picketing outside the university
premises, it failed to identify who they were. It thus
failed to meet the substantiality of evidence test
applicable in dismissal cases.
However, with respect to the union officers, as already
discussed, their mere participation in the illegal strike
warrants their dismissal.
Hence, an employee cannot be outrightly dismissed by
mere participation in illegal strike.
Case # 21:
ROYAL UNDERGARMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ROYAL
UNDERGARMENT WORKERS UNION (PTGWO) and
ANTONIO CRUZ, respondents.
Facts:
Antonio Cruz was employed by Royal
Undergarment Corporation (RUC) as an electrician. He
was elected president of the Royal Undergarment
Workers Union (RUWU), a legitimate labor organization
which became affiliated with the Philippine Transport
and General Workers Organization (PTGWO). The
RUWU-PTGWO, represented by the National Secretary of
PTGWO and Cruz as RUWU President, sent proposals to
RUC for the purpose of collective bargaining.
RUC, thru its personnel manager, terminated the
services of respondent Cruz allegedly on the basis of the
latter's "record and after careful analysis and
deliberation." Respondent's wife, Felicidad Cruz, who
was also an employee of RUC, was likewise terminated.
Thus, RUWU called a strike.
RUWU-PTGWO and Petitioner Corporation entered into a
Return-to-Work Agreement thru the conciliation efforts
of the Department of Labor. The records do not disclose
the results of the consent election. Subsequently
however, Cruz and his wife were both re-employed and
reinstated by RUC, thereby indicating the victory of
RUWU-PTGWO in the consent election. RUWU-PTGWO
and RUC entered into a collective bargaining agreement
which contained a grievance procedure for the
settlement of disputes.
Such grievance procedure was applied on several
occasions involving suspensions of union members-
employees through the help and active participation of
respondent Cruz as union president. The PTGWO urged
its member-unions to stage a nationwide strike. Thus,
respondent Cruz campaigned among the members of
RUWU to join the strike.
The general manager of RUC placed Cruz on preventive
suspension for threatening "the lives of four employees"
and for having 'been reported under the influence of
liquor," both acts are "contrary to rules and regulations."
Upon the request of Cruz and PTGWO, RUC conducted a
conference which was in the nature of an investigation
of the incident. RUC dismissed Cruz for being under the
influence of liquor and for having threatened the lives of
four of his co-employees.
Cruz filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against
RUC with the Court of Industrial Relations. The
respondent industrial court, while affirming the findings
of the healing examiner, rendered a decision. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari with the RUC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the corporation is guilty of unfair
labor practice.
2. Whether or not Antonio Cruz was illegally
dismissed.
Held:
1. Yes.
The Court of Industrial Relations found from the
surrounding circumstances of the case, a valid and
sufficient basis for the charge of unfair labor practice
against the company. On the part of the company there
appears to be an attitude of antipathy towards Antonio
Cruz. We have on record the undisputed facts that
private respondent, as president of RUWU, was known
for his aggressive and militant union activities; that he
and his wife had been previously dismissed on the
ground of active participation in union affairs; that they
were re¬employed only pursuant to the express terms
of the Return-to-Work Agreement executed by petitioner
corporation and RUWU when the latter won in the
consent election; that respondent Cruz was dismissed
again for the second time in the course of his campaign
among RUWU members to join the nationwide strike of
PTGWO in which RUWU is a member union. The incident
was simply blown into such proportion so as to provide a
supposed valid cause for Cruz’ dismissal. In the light of
the initial attitude of the company earlier discussed, the
inducing cause directly contributing to Cruz’ dismissal is
the company's antipathy to Antonio Cruz’ union activity
and not his misconduct.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, known as the The
Industrial Peace Act, as amended, provides that
employees shall have the right to self-organization and
to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing and to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.
Hence, it shall be unfair labor practice for an employer
to discriminate in regard to tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization
(Section 4 (a)(4), R.A. No. 875).
2. Yes.
Based on the totality of evidence as found by the CIR
supports the conclusion that respondent Cruz has been
unjustly dismissed by reason of his union activities. The
charge by petitioner against respondent Cruz for being
under the influence of liquor on a certain date and for
having threatened the lives of his co-employees is too
flimsy to merit serious consideration.
It has previously been indicated that an employer may
treat freely with an employee and is not obliged to
support his actions with a reason or purpose. However,
where the attendant circumstances, the history of the
employer's past conduct and like considerations, coupled
with an intimate connection between the employer's
action and the union affiliations or activities of the
particular employee or employees taken as a whole raise
a suspicion as to the motivation for the employer's
action, the failure of the employer to ascribe a valid
reason therefor may justify an inference that his
unexplained conduct in respect of the particular
employee or employees was inspired by the latter's
union membership or activities.
Case # 22:
NATIONAL LABOR UNION vs. COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, EVERLASTING
MANUFACTURING, ANG WO LONG and BENITO S.
ESTANISLAO
FACTS: Petitioner charged respondent Everlasting
Manufacturing of ULP. After the conclusion of their CBA,
respondent company began hiring 24 new workers. On
the pretext of selling and closing its business, and
without any justifiable reason respondent company
dismissed and/or locked out all the members of
complainant.
Respondent company continued with its business
operations by availing of the services of the above-
mentioned 24 new workers who are non-union
members, using the same premises, business name,
machineries, tool and implements, same officials and
supervisors. Respondent failed and refused and
continues to fail and refuse to reinstate them to their
jobs.
Respondent contended that the establishment was no
longer owned by Estanislao but by Ang Wo Long who
purchased the same and that the new owner is not duty
bound to respect whatever agreement has been entered
into by the former owner and the workers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent has committed an unfair
labor practice.
HELD: Yes.
The evidence on record shows that some eight
days before the sale, Ang Wo Long filed an application
for the registration of 'Everlasting Manufacturing' as a
firm name or business name and that the corresponding
certificate of registration was issued to him by said office
the same day that the collective bargaining contract with
the union was executed.
Contrary to his claim, respondent Ang Wo Long
was already taking an active hand in the operation of
the business establishment after it was sold to him, and
that the 21 complaining employees since then were
already working for him as new owner. The respondent
Ang Wo Long did not show any just cause for dispensing
with the services of all the 21 union members. "The
conclusion becomes inescapable that he (Mr. Ang)
dismissed the complainants in order to break the union
and do away with the existing CBA which it has obtained
only after a strike and bargaining negotiations.”
The person found guilty of unfair labor practice
did not show up at the reopened hearings and as far as
the records before US show, had disappeared. The
concatenation of circumstances clearly indicates the
participation of both Mr. Estanislao and Mr. Ang in the
unfair labor practice.
 The face of these known facts would be
tantamount to sanctioning a deception and conspiracy to
defraud the workers of their rights already obtained in
the contract.
Case #23:
Geronimo Quadra v. CA
Facts:
While being the Chief Legal Officer of PCSO,
Quadra was in active participation to the labor
organizations of both rank-and-file and supervisory
employees. Meanwhile, PCSO charged Quadra
administratively before the CSC on the ground of neglect
of duty, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
service. The CSC found Quadra guilty on the charges
and recommended his dismissal. Quadra with the unions
file a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice before the CIR against PCSO and its officers.
CIR found that the dismissal was illegal as it constitutes
unfair labor practice and ordered the reinstatement of
Quadra. PCSO heeded to the order and filed a petition
for certiorari before the SC. During the pendency of the
case, Quadra filed a claim for moral and exemplary
damages before the CIR. Since the CIR was abolished
and NLRC was constituted, the latter granted moral and
exemplary damages to Quadra. On appeal, CA reversed
the decision.
Issue:
W/N an award to moral and exemplary damages
to an illegally dismissed employee where dismissal
constitutes unfair labor practice is proper.
Ruling:
Yes. A dismissed employee is entitled to moral
damages when the dismissal is attended by bad faith or
fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is
done in a manner contrary to good morals, good
customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may be
awarded if the dismissal is effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
It appears from the facts that petitioner was deliberately
dismissed from the service by reason of his active
involvement in the activities of the union groups of both
the rank and file and the supervisory employees of
PCSO, which unions he himself organized and headed.
PCSO may not impute to the Civil Service Commission
the responsibility for petitioners illegal dismissal as it
was respondent PCSO that first filed the administrative
charge against him. As found by the CIR, petitioners
dismissal constituted unfair labor practice. It was done
to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization.
Hence, it is proper to award moral and exemplary
damages to illegally dismissed employees as their
dismissal was tainted with unfair labor practice like the
dismissal of Quadra.
Case # 24:
CLLC E.G. GOCHANGCO WORKERS UNION
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), and e.g. GOCHANGCO,
INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner union is a local chapter of the Central
Luzon Labor Congress (CLLC), a legitimate labor
federation duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE), while the individual petitioners are
former employees of private respondent who were
officers and members of the petitioner union.
Sometime in January 1980, the majority of the
rank and file employees of respondent firm organized
the e.g. Gochangco Workers Union as an affiliate of the
CLLC. The union filed a petition for certification election.
The MOLE Region 111 office set the hearing for the
petition on February 27,1980.
The CLLC national president wrote the general
manager of respondent firm informing him of the
organization of the union and requesting for a labor
management conference to normalize employer-
employee relations. The union sent a written notice to
respondent firm requesting permission for certain
member officers and members of the union to attend
the hearing of the petition for certification election.
On February 28, 1980, private respondent
preventively suspended the union officers and members
who attended the hearing. The common ground alleged
by private respondent for its action was "abandonment
of work on February 27, 1980." On the same date, all
the gate passes of all the above-mentioned employees
to Clark Air Base were confiscated by a Base guard.
Claiming that private respondent instigated the
confiscation of their gate passes to prevent them from
performing their duties and that respondent firm did not
pay them their overtime pay, , petitioner union and its
members filed a complaint for constructive lockout and
unfair labor practice against private respondent.
While private respondent filed an application for
clearance to dismiss said employees. The services of
nine (9) more union members, were terminated by
private respondent on the ground that its contract with
the U.S. Air Force had expired.
Labor Arbiter denied respondent's application for
clearance. NLRC set aside the LA decision. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE 1:
WON respondent company is guilty of an unfair
labor practice.
HELD: Yes. cases and not the instant unfair labor practice
controversy. In any event, we have held that unfair
It is no coincidence that at the time said labor practice cases are not, in view of the public
respondent issued its suspension and termination interest involved, subject to compromises.
orders, the petitioners were in the midst of a
certification election preliminary to a labor management
conference. It was within the legal right of the
petitioners to do so, and in which management may not
as a rule interfere. It is a brazen interference as well
with the employees right to self-organization, contrary to
the prohibition of the Labor Code against unfair labor
practices.

Furthermore, the company suspended the petitioners on

the ground of "abandonment of work" on February 27,
1980, the date on which, apparently, the pre-election
conference had been scheduled. There is a clear effort
by management to punish the petitioners for their union
activities.

As a consequence of such a suspension, the Clark Air

Base guards confiscated the employees' gate passes,
and banned them from the base premise. Those passes
would not have been confiscated had not management
ordered the suspension.

ISSUE 2:

WON petitioners were illegally dismissed.

HELD: YES.

Court was not persuaded by the respondent

firm's argument that final termination should be effected
as the contract has expired." Petitioners were regular
employees and as such, their tenure did not end with
the expiration of the contract. We quote:

The records show that petitioners employees

whose employment did not terminate with the expiration
of private respondent's contract with the U.S. Air Force.
As regular employees, the petitioners' tenure are secure,
and their dismissal must be premised on a just cause.

We find none here. There is no merit in the claim that

the petitioners' terms were coterminous with the
duration of the contract. There is nothing in the records
that would show that the petitioners were parties to that
contract. It appears furthermore that the petitioners
were in the employ of the respondent company long
before that contract was concluded. But even if dismissal
were warranted, the same nonetheless faces our
disapproval in the absence of a proper clearance then
required under the Labor Code. It is true that efforts
were undertaken to seek such a clearance, yet there is
no showing that it was issued. That still taints the
dismissal with the vice of illegality.

The Court likewise rejects the claims of an

alleged waiver by the petitioners of their economic
demands, in the light of an alleged order issued by
Labor Arbiter with another case(s) involving the same
parties Labor Arbiter Aquino's resolution refers to other