SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V.
ATIENZA Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court
Facts:
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a
principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society. It reclassified the area
described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of
effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan
Terminals of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation. Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon, in
an original petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon.
Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
In our March 7, 2007 decision, we ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local
Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including
Ordinance No. 8027. We concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. After we rendered our decision on March 7, 2007, the oil companies and
DOE sought to intervene and filed motions for reconsideration in intervention.
The oil companies called our attention to the fact that on April 25, 2003, Chevron and Shell had filed a
complaint against respondent for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 and assailing its validity with
application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. The cases
were docketed as civil case no. 03-106377 and civil case no. 03-106380, respectively. Later on, these two
cases were consolidated and the RTC of Manila, Branch 39 issued an order granting the applications for
writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. Petron likewise filed its
own petition in the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, also attacking the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO). This was
docketed as civil case no. 03-106379. In an order, the RTC enjoined the parties to maintain the status quo.
Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.
Aggrieved anew, Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila, Branch 20, asking for the
nullification of Ordinance No. 8119. This was docketed as civil case no. 06-115334. Petron filed its own
complaint on the same causes of action in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41. This was docketed as civil case
no. 07-116700. The court issued a TRO in favor of Petron, enjoining the City of Manila and respondent
from enforcing Ordinance No. 8119.
Issue:
1. Whether or not ordinances are included in the enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicial
notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
2. Whether or not respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by Ordinance
8119 and therefore, estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance
No. 8027
3. Whether Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional
Held:
1. No. While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with
respect to local ordinances is different. Although, Section 50 of RA 409 provides that, “All courts sitting in
the city shall take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the Sangguniang Panglungsod.” This cannot
be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should have taken steps to
procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to inform the Court about it.
is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have
access. The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text
of the rules the party desires it to have notice of. Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a
trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice
of local ordinances.
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove any
discretion a court might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a statute
does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party must make the
ordinance available to the court for it to take notice.
In its defense, respondent claimed that he did not inform the Court about the enactment of Ordinance No.
8119 because he believed that it was different from Ordinance No. 8027 and that the two were not
inconsistent with each other. In the same way that we deem the intervenors late intervention in this case
unjustified, we find the failure of respondent, who was an original party here, inexcusable.
Therefore, the March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119
for the simple reason was that the Court was never informed about this ordinance.
2. No. While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary
to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made
the statements regarding the ordinances in a different case, which are not the same as this case before
us. To constitute a judicial admission under Rule 129, Sec 4, the admission must be made in the same case
in which it is offered.
Hence, respondent is not estopped. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered
estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the
same time, also impugn its (8119’s) validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent positions and
distrust any attempt at clever positioning under one or the other on the basis of what appears
advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity
of a statute or ordinance. Nonetheless, we will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.
Also, to summarize the two ordinances can be reconciled. Ordinance No. 8027 is applicable to the area
particularly described therein whereas Ordinance No. 8119 is applicable to the entire City of Manila.
3. YES. Without a doubt, there are no impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is
unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their desire
for the relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny and preserve their
lives and safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of
economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose
billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights,
the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable,
property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals right to
property, the former should prevail.
We are also putting an end to the oil companies’ determination to prolong their stay in Pandacan despite
the objections of Manilas residents. Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their operations in
the Pandacan Terminals, they cannot feign unreadiness considering that they had years to prepare for this
eventuality. Just the same, this Court is not about to provoke a crisis by ordering the immediate relocation
of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site. The enforcement of a decision of this Court, especially
one with far-reaching consequences, should always be within the bounds of reason, in accordance with a
comprehensive and well-coordinated plan, and within a time-frame that complies with the letter and spirit
of our resolution. To this end, the oil companies have no choice but to obey the law.
Further, ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a concurrence of lawful
subject and lawful method.