1
1.) SOFIA M. GUILLANG, represented by SUSAN GUILLANG-
CABATBAT, v. RODOLFO BEDANIA AND RODOLFO DE
SILVA
G.R. No. 162987, May 21, 2009
CARPIO, J.;
quasi-delict;. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relations between the
parties is called a quasi-delict.
exemplary damages; in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
proximate cause; proximate cause is that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
FACTS:
On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the afternoon, Genaro M.
Guillang was driving his brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan along
Emilio Aguinaldo Highway in Cavite. Antero, Felipe, Dignadice, and
Llanillo had all just left from Golden City, Dasmariñas, Cavite, and
were on their way to Manila. At the other side of the highway,
respondent Bedania was driving a ten-wheeler Isuzu cargo truck
towards Tagaytay City , the truck was owned by respondent Rodolfo de
Silva. Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf
Course, Bedania negotiated a U-turn, when the truck entered into the
opposite lane of the highway, Genaro’s car hit the right portion of the
truck. The truck dragged Genaro’s car some five meters to the right of
the road.
All the passengers of the car were rushed to De La Salle University
Medical Center in Dasmariñas, Cavite for treatment, as the consequence
of the collision. Antero, among others received severe injuries, and later
on died due to those injuries.
Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the heirs of Antero instituted a
complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against respondent
Bedania and de Silva on April 24, 1995.
The trial court found Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly
maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the highway
without due regard to traffic rules and the safety of other motorists
RODOLFO BEDANIA AND RODOLFO DE SILVA Appealed to the
CA the appealed decision was REVERSED DISMISSED, for lack of
merit.
ISSUE:
Dose the Appellate court erred in dismissing the case?
Was there gross negligence on the part of Bedania on making a U-turn
in the highway without due regard to traffic rules and safety of other
motorists?
And was it the proximate cause of the collision?
Is RODOLFO DE SILVA grossly negligent in the selection and
supervision of his driver, Bedania?
Is he also liable for damages?
HELD:
Yes, the CA erred in dismissing the case. Article 2176 of the Civil Code
provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties is called a quasi-delict. To sustan a claim based on
quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur; (a) damage suffered
by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection
of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interest of another person that degree of acre, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury.
YES, Bedania acted with gross negligent in making sudden U-turn in
the highway without due regard to traffic rules and safety of other
motorists. In this case, the report showed that the truck, while making
the U-turn, failed to signal, a violation of traffic rules. The police records
also stated that, after the collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned the
petitioners and his truck, this is another violation of a traffic regulation.
Therefore, the presumption arises that Bedania was negligent at the time
of the mishap..

The police sketch does not indicate an intersection and only shows that
there was a road leading to the Orchard Golf Course near the place of
the collision. Furthermore, U-turns are generally not advisable
particularly on major streets it is not normal for a truck to make a U-
turn on a highway. he should seek an intersection where it is safer to
maneuver the truck. Bedania should have also turned on his signal lights
and made sure that the highway was clear of vehicles from the opposite
direction before executing the U-turn.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
contrary, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time
of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Yes, Bedania’s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision
which claimed the life of Antero and injured the petitioners. Proximate
cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is
traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed
with the proper precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have
happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a
serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or
minimize that risk. The truck’s sudden U-turn triggered a series of
events that led to the collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero
and the injuries of petitioners.
As to De Sivla as Badenia’s employer, is also liable for the damages
suffered by Genaro and other petitioners. under Articles 2176 and
2180of the Civil Code, de Silva’s liability was based on culpa aquiliana
which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of his
employees, subject to the defense that he exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employees. de Silva failed to prove this defense and, consequently, held
him liable for damage.
2.) CASUMPANG v. CORTEJO
G.R. No. 171127 | March 11, 2015
FACTS:
 On April 22, 1988, at about 11:30 in the morning, Mrs. Cortejo
brought her 11-year old son, Edmer, to the Emergency Room of the
2
San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) because of difficulty in
breathing, chest pain, stomach pain, and fever. Thereafter, she was
referred and assigned to Dr. Casumpang, a pediatrician. At 5:30 in
the afternoon of the same day, Dr. Casumpang, upon examination
using only a stethoscope, confirmed the diagnosis of
Bronchopneumonia. Mrs. Cortejo immediately advised Dr.
Casumpang that Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds or cough
but Dr. Casumpang merely told her that her son's bloodpressure is
just being active and remarked that that's the usual
bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm.
 Dr. Casumpang next visited the following day. Mrs. Cortejo again
called Dr. Casumpang's attention and stated that Edmer had a fever,
throat irritation, as well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs. Cortejo also
alerted Dr. Casumpang about the traces of blood in Edmer's sputum.
Despite these pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang
simply nodded and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer's illness is
bronchopneumonia.
 At around 11:30 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer vomited
phlegm with blood streak prompting the Edmer's father to request
for a doctor. Later, Miranda, one of the resident physicians of SJDH,
arrived. She claimed that although aware that Edmer had vomited
phlegm with blood streak she failed to examine the blood specimen.
She then advised the respondent to preserve the specimen for
examination. Thereafter, Dr. Miranda conducted a check-up on
Edmer and found that Edmer had a low-grade fever and rashes.
 At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again vomited blood. Dr.
Miranda then examined Edmer's sputum with blood and noted that
he was bleeding. Suspecting that he could be afflicted with dengue,
Dr. Miranda conducted a tourniquet test, which turned out to be
negative. Dr. Miranda then called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic
and told him about Edmer's condition. Upon being informed, Dr.
Casumpang ordered several procedures done. Dr. Miranda advised
Edmer's parents that the blood test results showed that Edmer was
suffering from Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever. Dr. Casumpang
recommended Edmer’s transfer to the ICU, but since the ICU was

then full, the respondent, insisted on transferring his son to Makati
Medical Center.
 At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr.
Casumpang, was transferred to Makati Medical Center. Upon
examination, the attending physician diagnosed Dengue Fever Stage
IV that was already in its irreversible stage. Edmer died at 4:00 in
the morning of April 24, 1988. His Death Certificate indicated the
cause of death as Hypovolemic Shock/hemorrhagic shock/Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV.
 Believing that Edmer's death was caused by the negligent and
erroneous diagnosis of his doctors, the respondent instituted an
action for damages against SJDH, and its attending physicians: Dr.
Casumpang and Dr. Miranda.
 Dr. Casumpang contends that he gave his patient medical treatment
and care to the best of his abilities, and within the proper standard
of care required from physicians under similar circumstances.
 Dr. Miranda argued that the function of making the diagnosis and
undertaking the medical treatment devolved upon Dr. Casumpang,
the doctor assigned to Edmer. Dr. Miranda also alleged that she
exercised prudence in performing her duties as a physician,
underscoring that it was her professional intervention that led to the
correct diagnosis of Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever.
 SJDH, on the other hand, disclaims liability by asserting that Dr.
Casumpang and Dr. Miranda are mere independent contractors and
consultants (not employees) of the hospital; hence, Article 2180 of
the Civil Code does not apply.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Casumpang had committed inexcusable lack of precaution in
diagnosing and in treating the patient
2. W/N Miranda had committed inexcusable lack of precaution in
diagnosing and in treating the patient
3
3. W/N Whether or not the petitioner hospital is solidarity liable with
the petitioner doctors
4. W/N or not there is a causal connection between the petitioners'
negligent act/omission and the patient's resulting death
HELD/RATIO:
1. YES, Casumpang was negligent.
 Even assuming that Edmer's symptoms completely coincided with
the diagnosis of bronchopneumonia, we still find Dr. Casumpang
guilty of negligence. Wrong diagnosis is not by itself medical
malpractice. Physicians are generally not liable for damages
resulting from a bona fide error of judgment and from acting
according to acceptable medical practice standards. Nonetheless,
when the physician's erroneous diagnosis was the result of negligent
conduct, it becomes an evidence of medical malpractice.
 In the present case, evidence on record established that in
confirming the diagnosis of bronchopneumonia, Dr. Casumpang
selectively appreciated some and not all of the symptoms presented,
and failed to promptly conduct the appropriate tests to confirm his
findings. In sum, Dr. Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue
fever, which failure, especially when reasonable prudence would
have shown that indications of dengue were evident and/or
foreseeable, constitutes negligence. Apart from failing to promptly
detect dengue fever, Dr. Casumpang also failed to promptly
undertake the proper medical management needed for this disease.
Dr. Casumpang failed to measure up to the acceptable medical
standards in diagnosing and treating dengue fever.
 Dr. Casumpang's claim that he exercised prudence and due diligence
in handling Edmer's case, sside from being self-serving, is not
supported by competent evidence. He failed, as a medical
professional, to observe the most prudent medical procedure under
the circumstances in diagnosing and treating Edmer.
2. No, Dr. Miranda is not liable for negligence.
 We find that Dr. Miranda was not independently negligent.
Although she was subject to the same standard of care applicable to
attending physicians, as a resident physician, she merely operates as
a subordinate who usually refer to the attending physician on the

decision to be made and on the action to be taken. We also believe
that a finding of negligence should also depend on several
competing factors. In this case, before Dr. Miranda attended to
Edmer, Dr. Casumpang had diagnosed Edmer with
bronchopneumonia. There is also evidence supporting Dr. Miranda's
claim that she extended diligent care to Edmer. In fact, when she
suspected, during Edmer's second episode of bleeding, that Edmer
could be suffering from dengue, she wasted no time in conducting
the necessary tests, and promptly notified Dr. Casumpang about the
incident. Indubitably, her medical assistance led to the finding of
dengue fever. Dr. Miranda's error was merely an honest mistake of
judgment; hence, she should not be held liable for medical
negligence.
3. Yes, causal connection between the petitioners' negligence and
the patient's resulting death was established
 Casumpang failed to timely diagnose Edmer with dengue fever
despite the presence of its characteristic symptoms; and as a
consequence of the delayed diagnosis, he also failed to promptly
manage Edmer's illness. Had he immediately conducted
confirmatory tests, and promptly administered the proper care and
management needed for dengue fever, the risk of complications or
even death, could have been substantially reduced. That Edmer later
died of Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV, a severe and fatal form
of dengue fever, established the causal link between Dr.
Casumpang's negligence and the injury. The element of causation is
successfully proven.
4. YES, SJDH is solidarily liable.
 As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its
independent contractors. However, it may be found liable if the
physician or independent contractor acts as an ostensible agent of
the hospital. This exception is also known as the doctrine of apparent
authority.
 SJDH impliedly held out and clothed Dr. Casumpang with apparent
authority leading the respondent to believe that he is an employee or
agent of the hospital. Based on the records, the respondent relied on
SJDH rather than upon Dr. Casumpang, to care and treat his son
Edmer. His testimony during trial showed that he and his wife did
4
not know any doctors at SJDH; they also did not know that Dr.
Casumpang was an independent contractor. They brought their son
to SJDH for diagnosis because of their family doctor's referral. The
referral did not specifically point to Dr. Casumpang or even to Dr.
Miranda, but to SJDH.
 Mrs. Cortejo accepted Dr. Casumpang's services on the reasonable
belief that such were being provided by SJDH or its employees,
agents, or servants. By referring Dr. Casumpang to care and treat for
Edmer, SJDH impliedly held out Dr. Casumpang as a member of its
medical staff. SJDH cannot now disclaim liability since there is no
showing that Mrs. Cortejo or the respondent knew, or should have
known, that Dr. Casumpang is only an independent contractor of the
hospital. In this case, estoppel has already set in.
3.) CUSTODIO ET AL VS COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO.
116100
Pacifico Mabasa owns a property behind the properties of spouses
Cristino and Brigida Custodio and spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos.
The passageway leading to Mabasa’s house passes through the
properties of the Custodios and the Santoses.
Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos built a
fence around their property. This effectively deprived Mabasa passage
to his house. Mabasa then sued the Custodios and the Santoses to
compel them to grant his right of way with damages. Mabasa claims that
he lost tenants because of the blockade done by the families in front.
The trial court ruled in favor of Mabasa. It ordered the Custodios and
the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanent easement and right of way and
for Mabasa to pay just compensation. The Santoses and the Custodios
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
However, the CA modified the ruling by awarding damages in favor of
Mabasa (Actual damages: P65k, Moral damages: P30k, Exemplary
damages: P10k).
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of damages by the CA is proper.
HELD: No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum
absque injuria.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage)
when his tenants left because of the fence made by the Santoses.
However, when Santos built the fence, he was well within his right. He
built the fence inside his property. There was no existing easement
agreement, either by contract or by operation of law, on his property.
Hence, Santos has all the right to build the fence. It was only after the
judgment in the trial court that the easement was created which was even
conditioned on the payment of Mabasa of the just compensation. Santos
did not commit a legal injury against Mabasa when he built the fence,
therefore, there is no actionable wrong as basis for the award of
damages. In this case, the damage has to be borne by Mabasa.
4.) ALLAN C. GO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND
STYLE “ACG EXPRESS LINER,”, PETITIONER,
VS
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, RESPONDENT
Facts: Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of
Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of
marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting various
overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to
meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane,
Australia, who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries
Australia (AFFA).
Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents appointing
Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast
ferry vessels in the Philippines. As such exclusive distributor, Cordero
offered for sale to prospective buyers the 25-meter Aluminium
Passenger catamaran known as the SEACAT 25.
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers
of Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of
Cebu City, a single proprietorship, Cordero was able to close a deal for
5
the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum
of Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed
Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran
(SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement
between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions
totalling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale
of each vessel.
Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane,
Australia, and on one (1) occasion even accompanied Go and his family
and Landicho, to monitor the progress of the building of the vessel. He
shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel accommodations,
transportation and entertainment during these trips. He also spent for
long distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson,
Go, Tecson and Landicho.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with
Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila
Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from
their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT
25. Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested
quotation of the second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane
where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho
to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while
Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to
Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and
Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the
second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation
was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made
Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG
Express Liner.
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-
35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable
jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating
his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his
rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions (balance of unpaid
commission from the sale of the first vessel in the amount of
US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for the sale of the second vessel
in the amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral and
exemplary damages, including P800,000.00 representing expenses for
airplane travel to Australia, telecommunications bills and entertainment,

on account of AFFA’s untimely cancellation of the exclusive
distributorship agreement. Cordero also prayed for the award of moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over
his person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was
no act committed in violation of the distributorship agreement. Said
motion was denied by the trial court on December 20, 1999. Robinson
was likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer within the
period granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion
to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied
by the trial court on February 26, 1999. Subsequently, they filed their
Answer denying that they have anything to do with the termination by
AFFA of Cordero’s authority as exclusive distributor in the
Philippines. On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped
communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the first
vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status
reports and airing the client’s grievances to his principal, AFFA, such
that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend
to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the
Philippines. As to the inquiry for the Philippine price for a Wartsila ship
engine for AFFA’s other on-going vessel construction, this was merely
requested by Robinson but which Cordero misinterpreted as indication
that Go was buying a second vessel. Moreover, Landicho and Tecson
had no transaction whatsoever with Cordero who had no document to
show any such shipbuilding contract. As to the supposed meeting to
settle their dispute, this was due to the malicious demand of Cordero to
be given US$3,000,000 as otherwise he will expose in the media the
alleged undervaluation of the vessel with the BOC. In any case,
Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission for the sale
of the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement dated August
7, 1997 considering the termination of his authority by AFFA’s lawyers
on June 26, 1998.
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of
Plaintiff and against defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe
Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29, 2001, the CA rendered
judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354
and setting aside the trial court’s orders of execution pending appeal.
6
The case before the Supreme Court is a consolidation of the petitions
for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703) and
Cordero (G.R. No. 164747).
Issue: (1) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue
the respondents for breach of contract; and
(2) whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to
Cordero for his unpaid commissions and termination of his exclusive
distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA.
Held: While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for
breach of contract because only parties can breach contractual
provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but
for inducing another to commit such breach. Article 1314 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract;
(2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a
contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal
justification.
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through
the letters issued by Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive
distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents were clearly aware
of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by
Robinson. In fact, evidence on record showed that respondents initially
dealt with and recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA
high-speed catamaran vessels in the Philippines. In that capacity as
exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of
Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf
of AFFA.
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with
contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for
which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held
liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly
held liable for the balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the
sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso

equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the
exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid.
Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be
recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
5.) CASE DIGEST:
Mariano C. Mendoza and Elvira Lim v. Spouses Leonora J. Gomez
and Gabriel V. Gomez, G.R. no. 160110 June 18, 2014
Facts: On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck (Isuzu truck) with plate
number UAW 582, owned by respondent Leonora J. Gomez
(Leonora) and driven by Antenojenes Perez (Perez), was hit by a
Mayamy Transportation bus (Mayamy bus) with temporary plate
number 1376-1280, registered under the name of petitioner Elvira Lim
(Lim)7 and driven by petitioner Mariano C. Mendoza (Mendoza).
Owing to the incident, an Information for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against
Mendoza.9 Mendoza, however, eluded arrest, thus, respondents filed a
separate complaint for damages against Mendoza and Lim, seeking
actual damages, compensation for lost income, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.
As a result of the incident, Perez,as well as the helpers on board
the Isuzu truck, namely Melchor V. Anla (Anla), Romeo J. Banca
(Banca), and Jimmy Repisada (Repisada), sustained injuries
necessitating medical treatment amounting to P11,267.35,which
amount was shouldered by respondents. Moreover, the Isuzu truck
sustained extensive damages on its cowl, chassis, lights and steering
wheel, amounting to P142,757.40.
Additionally, respondents averred that the mishap deprived them
of a daily income of P1,000.00. Engaged in the business of buying
plastic scraps and delivering them to recycling plants, respondents
claimed that the Isuzu truck was vital in the furtherance of their
business.
7
For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership
of the bus in question. Respondents argued that although the registered
owner was Lim, the actual owner of the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez
(Enriquez), who had the bus attached with Mayamy Transportation
Company (Mayamy Transport) under the so-called "kabit system."
Respondents then impleaded both Lim and Enriquez.
Thus, the RTC disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents] and against
the [petitioners]: Displeased, petitioners appealed to the CA. After
evaluating the damages awarded by the RTC, such were affirmed by the
CA with the exception of the award of unrealized income which the CA
ordered deleted. Unsatisfied with the CA ruling, petitioners filed an
appeal by certiorari before the Court.
Issue: In the case at bar, who is deemed as Mendoza’s employer? Is it
Enriquez, the actual owner of the bus or Lim, the registered owner of
the bus?
Ruling:In impleading Lim, on the other hand, respondents invoke the
latter’s vicarious liability as espoused in Article 2180 of the same Code:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
of industry.
Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable under the doctrine
of vicarious liability or imputed negligence. Under such doctrine, a
person who has not committed the act or omission which caused damage
or injury to another may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter
either directly or subsidiarily under certain circumstances.25 In our
jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed negligence is embodied in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action
under said article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer
in the selection or supervision, or both, of his employee.

Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee (culpa in eligiendo) or in the
supervision over him after the selection (culpa vigilando), or both. The
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure; consequently, it may
be rebutted. Accordingly, the general rule is that if the employer shows
to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision of
his employee he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved of
liability.32 However, with the enactment of the motor vehicle
registration law, the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code - that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or
that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage – are no longer available to the registered owner of the motor
vehicle, because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent,
modified Article 2180. As such, there can be no other conclusion but to
hold Lim vicariously liable with Mendoza.
Vicarious Liability, QUESTION: A bus owned and registered under
the name of Bea Locsin and driven by Phil Manzano hit the car of
Angelica Ramsay due to the negligent driving and for violation of traffic
regulations of Phil.
An information was filed against the driver, Phil Manzano, for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical
injuries, however, he eluded arrest, thus, Angelica filed a separate
complaint for damages against Bea. Bea, on the other hand contended
that she is exempted from any liabilities for the acts done by his
employee.
Can a separate claim for damages be instituted against Bea?
ANSWER: Yes, a separate claim for damages may be instituted against
Bea under the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed negligence.
Under such doctrine, a person who has not committed the act or
omission which caused damage or injury to another may nevertheless
be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or subsidiarily under
certain circumstances. In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed
negligence is embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis
for damages in the action under said article is the direct and primary
8
negligence of the employer in the selection or supervision, or both, of
his employee
6.) Elcano vs Hill
FACTS: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of
Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was
acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a
civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages
based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action
is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his
civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son
is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
Diff version:
Reginal Hill was married and a minor who was then still living in care
of his father, Atty. Marvin Hill. Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. Reginald was acquitted on the
ground that his acts were not criminal because of “lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistakes. The father of Agapito Elcano then filed a civil
action against Reginald and his father (Marvin Hill) for damages based
on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is
barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his
civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son
is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under
Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar
the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a

crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by
the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation
of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer
his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or
alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is
applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at the time of
the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be
subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.
7.) Candida Virata vs Victorio Ochoa
Facts: In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit
Arsenio Virata thereby causing the latter’s death. The heirs of Virata
sued Borilla through an action for homicide through reckless
imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Virata’s lawyer reserved their right to
file a separate civil action the he later withdrew said motion. But in June
1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their right
to file a separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was
ruled that what happened was a mere accident. The heirs of Virata then
sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla)
for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit alleging
that Borilla was already acquitted and that the Virata’s were merely
trying to recover damages twice. The lower court agreed with Ochoa
and dismissed the civil suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties
may choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of
9
quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
is to recover twice for the same negligent act. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’.
But said article forestalls a double recovery.
8.) NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R.
ANDAMO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR
LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990]
TOPIC: Concept of Quasi-Delict, Scope, “Intentional” Acts
NATURE: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
FACTS:
1. Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the
owners of a parcel of land situated in Silang, Cavite
a. Land is adjacent to the land of private respondent
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc.,(MOLLSI) a
religious corporation.
2. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed,
a. This allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land,
i. caused a young man to drown,
ii. damaged petitioners' crops and plants,
iii. washed away costly fences,
iv. endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers
during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants
and other improvements to destruction.
3. Andamo spouses instituted a criminal action before the RTC of
Cavite against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo
Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under
Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code

4. Andamos filed another action against MOLLSI, this time a civil
case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the same court.
a. MOLLSI filed an answer and opposed to the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.
b. TC issued an order suspending further hearings in the
civil case until after judgment in the criminal case.
5. Andamo spouses appealed the order to the IAC
a. IAC affimed the order
b. MR denied
ISSUE: Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents,
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby
causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly
liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code
on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed
independently of the criminal case.
HELD: YES. IAC DECISION REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TC
ordered to proceed with the civil case independently of the criminal
case.
1. the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts.
a. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
i. damages suffered by the plaintiff,
ii. fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and
iii. the connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
2. In the present case: the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.
3. Samson vs. Dionisio:
10
a. the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, ruling that: "any person who without due
authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or
communication between a creek or a lake and a river,
thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who,
like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the
payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the
injured party.
b. Applying in the present case: the alleged presence of
damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of
respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault
or negligence, and the causal connection between the
act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual
obligation between the parties make a clear case of
a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
4. adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others.
a. An owner may build structures in his own land but such
must be all constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care
b. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
5. Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a
person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting
fault or negligence, thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
chapter.
a. "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.

b. a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged
also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary.
6. The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, which states:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
a. Report of the Code Commission: "the foregoing
provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of
criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation
of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-
delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain ...
7. Castillo vs. Court of Appeals: a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction
exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual.
a. The same negligence causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code,
or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual under the Civil Code.
b. The acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is
entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course,
11
in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action
arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the
criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability.
8. Azucena vs. Potenciano: "(t)he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and
2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than
this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said
articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be
conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction
in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
9.) M.H. Wylie v Rarang
G.R. No. 74135, May 28, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrativeofficer while pet
itioner Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the US
Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Private Respondent (PR)
Aurora Rarang was assigned as merchandise control guard in the Office
of the Provost Marshal M.H. Wylie, in
his capacity as asst. admin. Officer, supervised the publication of the
so-called “Plan of the Day” (POD) published daily by the US Naval
Base Station. The POD featured important announcements, necessary
precautions and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of
the regular features of the POD was the “action line inquiry” (NAVSTA
ACTION LINEINQUIRY), a telephone answering device in the Office
of the Admin Asst intended to provide personnel access to the
Commanding Officer on matters they feel should be brought to his
attention for correction or investigation. On February 3, 1978, the POD
under the (NAVSTA) action line inquiry, published and mentioned a
certain “AURING” as “…a disgrace to her division and to the Office of
the Provost Marshal. The same article explicitly implied that Auring
was consuming and appropriating for herself confiscated items like
like cigarettes and foodstuffs. The PR was the only one who was named
 12

“Auring” in the Office of the Provost Marshal. As a result thereof, she
was investigated by her superior. The PR commenced an ACTION FOR
DAMAGES in the CFI of Zambales against M.H. Wylie, Capt. James
Williams and the US Naval Base alleging that the article constituted
false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach
her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule. The TC ruled in favour of the PR and dismissed
the suit against the US Naval Base. The IAC (now,CA) affirmed the
judgment of the TC with modifications as to the amount of damages
awarded.
The petitioners, however, were
NEGLIGENTbecause under their direction, they issued thepublication
without deleting the said name. Such act or omission
was ULTRA VIRES and CANNOT be deemed
part of official duty. It was a TORTIOUS ACT which ridiculed the
PR. As a result of petitioner’s act, PR suffered besmirched
reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
especially so, since the article was baseless and false. The petitioners,
alone, in their personal capacities, are liable for the damages they
caused the Private Respondent

ISSUE: Whether or not the American naval officers (such as Wylie and
Capt. Williams) who commit a crime or tortious act while
discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state
immunity from suit. Does the grant of rights, power, and authority to
the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its
officers from crimes and torts?

HELD: The general rule is that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with
official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is
showing of bad faith (Chavez v. Sandiganbayan).It may be argued, as a
general rule, that Capt. Williams as commanding
officer of the naval base was far removed in the chain of command
from the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold
him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base.
However, in this particular case, the records show that the offensive
publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and that he
approved it. ART. 2176, CC prescribes a civil liability for damages
caused by a person’s act or omission constituting fault or negligence,
stating that, “Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence,..” Moreover, ART. 2219(7), Civil Code
provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander
or any other form of defamation.”Indeed, the imputation
of theft contained in the POD was a defamation against the character
and reputation of the PR. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the
Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of
the name “Auring” if the article will be published.