LAWS GOVERNING VALIDITY

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented
as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had
declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce
decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in
Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly
V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to
a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.6

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife
obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63
 DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that
the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later
acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse,
as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists
on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is
also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent?
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its
enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to
cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)
registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses
who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses
validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted
and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
 Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge
Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the
same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should
be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of
its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano,
the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree
and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American
citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also
show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by
E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree
and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the
March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12,
1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both
parties."3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was
issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the
Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the
two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy
– respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned
of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained
in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt

On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending –
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down."13

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.14 The Office of
the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After
they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is,
respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.

Hence, this Petition.18

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"I

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his
first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes
absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the
applicable provisions in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by
the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment
granting the divorce decree before our courts."19

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng
Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by
the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide
for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.
decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements
under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for
such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

xxx xxx xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish,
instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first
be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence
of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of
a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.35
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36
The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their
former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the
validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant
of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound
discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue:

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal
capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the
same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.46

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under
some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground
of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy."48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his
civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal
effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the
application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had
he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records
before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" –
Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.
Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the
City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit
"1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal
Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that
the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it
may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence,
we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quofor the purpose
of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the
parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-16925 March 31, 1962

FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by her husband Angel Sanchez,
CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband Victoriano Salvanera,
GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRA
and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by guardian-ad-litem, Rafael Trias,
TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her husband Ramon Portugal, defendants-appellants.

Placido Ramos for plaintiff-appellee.

Cajulis, Trias and Viniegra for defendants-appellants Trias, et al.
Ramon C. Aquino for defendants-appellants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda.

LABRADOR, J.:

The subject of this action, which was appealed from the Court of First Instance of Cavite, is certain lands acquired from the Friar
Lands Estate Administration known as lots Nos. 225, 226, 269, 311, 1803, 1814, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2282, 2284, 2378,
2412, 2282, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688, 2722, 3177 and 3178 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate located in General Trias, Cavite,
a house of strong materials, a barn (camarin) also of strong materials, and a store also of strong materials in General Trias, Cavite
and sets of household furniture. The plaintiff claims participation in the said properties on the ground that the same were acquired
by him and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff contracted marriage in January, 1916 and who died on February 11,
1934.

The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the deceased Maria
C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda are children of the
plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer.

The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with
conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate with the following
interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 and 76%
in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the said interest in the lots above-mentioned; that upon the death of Maria
C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said properties and defendants managed the properties in trust as
co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above described, acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased
Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half thereof be given as share therein of plaintiff.

The defendants surnamed Trias and Viniegra denied the claims of the plaintiff to the properties described in the complaint, or that
said properties had been administered by the defendants in trust as co-owners with the plaintiff, and by way of special and
affirmative defense they alleged that the properties subject of the complaint had been inherited by the defendants from their
deceased father Mariano Trias and deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer and had been in possession and full enjoyment thereof for more
than 10 years, peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly and adversely under a claim of ownership to the exclusion of all others, and that
plaintiff is estopped from claiming or asserting any rights or participation in the said properties. Defendants Trias also denied for
lack of knowledge and belief the claim of plaintiff in his complaint that he was married to Maria C. Ferrer and that the marriage
continued up to the death of the latter in 1934. They further presented a counterclaim against the plaintiff for the sum of P40,000,
this amount being what was contributed by them in support of the candidacies of plaintiff when running for the office of provincial
governor of Cavite. They also filed a counterclaim for 30 pieces of Spanish gold coins and P5,000 in cash amounting in value to the
total sum of P50,000 and a counterclaim for P100,000 which is the value of four big parcels of land belonging to the defendants
which the plaintiff had appropriated for his own use.

The defendants Pugeda joined the plaintiff in the latter's claim that the properties mentioned in plaintiff's complaint were joint
properties of the plaintiff and the defendants. They also allege that the properties had gone to the management and control of the
defendants Trias who should be required to answer for the fruits and profits thereof during the administration by them of said
properties. As cross-claim against their co-defendants, they allege that they are each entitled to one-eighth of the properties left by
their mother as listed in the first ten paragraphs of the complaint, as well as a share of one-eighth each in lots Nos. 98, 2015 of the
San Francisco de Malabon estate and in a parcel of land in Lingad, Litiit in Silang, Cavite and in 60 heads of cattle.

Plaintiff denied the counterclaim of the defendants Trias and the defendants Trias, answering the cross-claim of their co-defendants
Pugeda, denied all the allegations contained in the answer of the defendants Pugeda, and further alleged that the cross-claim is
improper as the same should be the subject of probate proceedings, and the defendants Pugeda are estopped and barred by
prescription from claiming any further right to the properties left by their deceased mother.

There are two questions or issues raised in the present case. The first is the alleged existence of a marriage of Fabian Pugeda and
Maria C. Ferrer. The second is the claim of the plaintiff to various lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate under certificates of
sale issued first in the name of Mariano Trias and later assigned to Maria C. Ferrer, but paid for in part during the marriage of
plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer. A third but minor issue is the claim for furniture alleged by plaintiff to have been bought by him and
Maria C. Ferrer during the marriage, which plaintiff claims is in the possession of the defendants.

On the first issue, the existence of marriage, plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente testified that in the afternoon of January 5,
1916, on the eve of Epiphany or Three Kings, plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the Justice of the
Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them; that accordingly Ricafrente celebrated the desired
marriage in the presence of two witnesses one of whom was Santiago Salazar and another Amado Prudente, deceased; that after the
usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage contract, and after the witnesses had signed the same,
he delivered one copy to the contracting parties and another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer was at that time
the keeper of the records of the civil register. Plaintiff and his witnesses explained that no celebration of the marriage was held
inspite of the prominence of the contracting parties because plaintiff was then busy campaigning for the office of Member of the
Provincial Board and Maria C. Ferrer was already on the family way.

The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages in the
municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January, 1916, which showed that no record of the alleged marriage existed therein;
but this absence was explained by the Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept the register forgot tomake an entry of
the marriage in the registry.

Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the marriage plaintiff lived in the house of Maria C. Ferrer, which was the
house of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. Evidence was also submitted to the effect that the first issue was baptized on
August 26, 1917 and the one who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law of Maria C. Ferrer. The baptismal certificate submitted states
that the baptized child was the issue of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The registry of said birth was also submitted
and it states that the father is Fabian Pugeda and the mother is Maria C. Ferrer.

It is also not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with the deceased wife, as husband and wife, until the death of the
latter, publicly and openly as husband and wife. Lastly, a document entitled "Project of Partition" (Exhibit 5-Trias) was signed by
the parties defendants themselves. The document contains the following significant statement or admission: .

WHEREAS the parties hereto are the only children and forced heirs of the said deceased: Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara,
Constancia, and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias y Ferrer, are the children of her first marriage with Mariano Trias, now deceased;
and Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y Ferrer,are the children of her second marriage with Fabian Pugeda..

.... That it is hereby agreed by and between the parties hereto that lots Nos. 3177 and 3178 known as the Buenavista property
will be administered by one of the parties to be agreed upon and for said purpose they appoint MIGUEL F. TRIAS, and all
earnings, rentals and income or profits shall be expended for the improvement and welfare of the said property and for the
payment of all claims and accounts of our deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer, and for the maintenance and education of Teofilo
and Virginia Pugeda y Ferrer.

The judge who heard the evidence, after a review of he testimonial and documental evidence, arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff
Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this conclusion being borne out not only by the chain of
circumstances but also by the testimonies of the witnesses to the celebration of the marriage, who appeared to be truthful, as well as
by the fact that plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer lived together as husband and wife for eighteen years (1916-1934) and there
is a strong presumption that they were actually married.

On the competency of the evidence submitted by plaintiff to prove the marriage we cite the following authority: .

Art. 53. — As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a certificate of the record in the civil register shall be
admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, in which cases the
marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind. (p. 27, Civil Code) .

The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter wasin articulo mortis,
failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not
 appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate not being one of said requisites. (Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1) .

Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to
prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the
fact of marriage. (55 C.J.S., p. 900).

In our judgment the evidence submitted shows conclusively that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer, said
marriage subsisting from 1916 until 1934, upon the death of the latter, and we affirm the finding of the trial court to that effect.

On the second issue the evidence introduced at the trial shows that the lands subject of the action were formerly Friar Lands
included in the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, province of Cavite, which were acquired under certificates of sale in the name of
Mariano Trias in the year 1910 and later assigned to his widow Maria C. Ferrer in the year 1916. The different lots, the dates of
their acquisition and assignment to said Maria C. Ferrer, widow are set forth in a table appended to this decision as Annex "A".

On the basis of the facts about their acquisition and assignment Judge Lucero declared that the lots in question were conjugal
properties of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and consequently decreed that 1/2 thereof, should be adjudicated to Mariano Trias,
as the latter's share in the conjugal properties, to be divided among his 6 children at the rate of 1/6 each, and the other half to Maria
C. Ferrer, as her share in the conjugal properties, to be assigned to her children by both marriages at the rate of 1/9 each and the
balance of 1/9 to widower Fabian Pugeda in usufruct. From this judgment the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

When the case was before the Court of Appeals, the attorneys for the defendants presented a motion for new trial on the ground that
they discovered copies of four documents namely — Annexes "A", "B" "C," "D" and "E" Record on Appeal, pp. 108-117, (The last
document is a copy of a court order issued by Judge Manuel V. Moran approving the project of partition in Case No. 860, Intestate
estate of Mariano Trias) which if admitted might alter the decision. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and remanded the case
to the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the consideration of said evidence.

Upon the return of the case to the Court of First Instance, Judge Primitivo Gonzales who then presided the court, rendered a new
decision. Judge Gonzales found that the total amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer on the lots in question amounts to
only P8,911.84, while the installments paid during the marriage of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer totaled
P35,146.46. He also found that lots 3177 and 3178 were paid for during the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer in the total sum of
P16,557.32. Judge Gonzales therefore ruled that the two marriages should participate in the ownership of the lands, according to the
actual contributions made by each marriage in the installments in payment of the lands. The dispositive part of the decision, now
subject of the appeal, is as follows: .

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the Court hereby renders judgment: .

1. That lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808, 1804, 1816; 1832, 2264, 2265, 2282, 2284, 2412, 2682, 273, 2650, 2652, 2680,
2718, 2764 (21 lots) are conjugal assets of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer in the proportion of percentage and indicated in each
individual lot;

2. That lots 3177 and 3178, since all the installments for the same were fully paid during the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C.
Ferrer are hereby declared conjugal of the couple Pugeda and Ferrer; and even some of the installments for these two lots were
paid after the death of Maria C. Ferrer, they do not loss the character of conjugal property for payments were made from the
crops thereof;

3. That since Mariano Trias during his marriage to Maria C. Ferrer contributed in the payment for the installments of these 21
lots amounting to P8,911.84, half of which must be reimbursed in favor of the children or heirs of Mariano Trias to be paid
from the mass of the hereditary estate of Maria C. Ferrer; the other half of P4,455.92 to be distributed among all the children
or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage to be deducted from the mass of her estate;

4. That lots 2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and 2722 since all the installments for these six (6) lots were fully paid during
marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, they are hereby declared to be conjugal between them — one half of which
must go to the children or heirs of Mariano Trias, the other half must equally go to the children or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in
her first and second marriage;

5. That Miguel Trias as administrator of all the properties which commenced after the death of his mother who died on
February 11, 1934, must render an accounting of his administration within three (3) months time from the date this judgment
 has become final.

6. That defendants Trias to pay the costs of this action. (Record on Appeal, pp. 154-156) .

Against this ruling the appeal has come to this Court. Defendants-appellants claim that Judge Gonzales had no power or authority to
change the decision of Judge Lucero, as it was not he but Judge Lucero himself, who had heard the evidence. They have also
assigned before Us a set of errors which may be boiled down to the three main issues set forth above. As the issue of marriage has
already been considered we will now pass to the second and more important question as to whether the land subject of the action
may be considered conjugal properties of the first marriage or of the second or of both.

A consideration of the legal nature and character of the acquisition of the various lots is necessary that the issues in the action may
be justly determined.

A study of the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120) discloses that the friar lands were purchased by the government for
sale to actual occupants (actual settler and occupants at the time said land are acquired by the Government). (Paragraph 3 of
Declaration of Purposes, Act 1120). The said act expressly declares that the land are not public land in the sense in which this word
is used in the Public Land Act, and their acquisition is not governed by the provisions of the Public Land Act (Par. IV, Declaration
of Purposes, Id.) .

The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120 are as follows: .

Sec. 12. — .... When the costs thereof shall have been thus ascertained, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the
said settler and occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such settler and
occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided in this Act at the office of the Chief of
the Bureau of Public Lands, in gold coin of the United States or its equivalent in Philippine currency, and that upon the
payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the
said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner
provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. ...

Sec. 13. — The acceptance by the settler and occupant of such certificate shall be considered as an agreement by him to pay
the purchase price so fixed and in the installments and at the interest specified in the certificate, and he shall by such
acceptance become a debtor to the Government in that amount together with all accrued interest. .... Provided however, That
every settler and occupant who desires to purchase his holding must enter into the agreement to purchase such holding by
accepting the said certificate and executing the said receipt whenever called on so to do by the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands, and a failure on the part of the settler and occupant to comply with this requirement shall be considered as a refusal to
purchase, and he shall be ousted as above provided and thereafter his holding may be leased or sold as in case of unoccupied
lands: ....

Sec. 15. — The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every parcel of land sold under the provisions of this Act
until the full payment of all installments of purchase money and interest by the purchaser has been made, and any sale or
incumbrance made by him shall be invalid as against the Government of the Philippine Islands and shall be in all respects
subordinate to its prior claim.

Sec. 16. — In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of which is provided for in section twelve hereof,
prior to the execution of a deed by the Government to any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land
stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of law for the purchase of the same. In case
a holder of a certificate dies before the giving of the deed and does not leave a widow, then the interest of the holder of the
certificate shall descend and deed shall issue to the persons who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken had
the title been perfected before the death of the holder of the certificate, upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance
with all the requirements of the certificate. In case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his interest in the land before
having complied with all the conditions thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the certificate shall be entitled to all the
rights of the holder of the certificate upon presenting his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for registration.
(Vol. III, Public Laws, pp. 315-316).

A study of the above quoted provisions clearly indicates that the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the
so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale
may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. In the case at bar the sale certificates were made in favor of
Mariano Trias, and upon his death they were assigned in accordance with Sec. 16, to his widow. But the law provides that when the
buyer does not leave a widow, the rights and interests of the holder of the certificate of sale are left to the buyer's heirs in
accordance with the laws of succession. In the case of the Director of Lands, et al. vs. Ricardo Rizal, et al., G.R. No. 2925 prom.
December 29, 1950, this court thru Mr. Justice Montemayor held: .

... All this clearly and inevitably leads to the conclusion that the purchaser, even before the payment of the full price and before
the execution of the final deed of conveyance, is considered by the law as the actual owner of the lot purchased, under
obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government being that of a mere lien holder or
mortgagee.

... In conclusion, we find and hold that in the sale of a Friar Lands lot or parcel under Act 1120, pending payment in full of the
purchase price, altho the Government reserves title thereto, merely for its protection, the beneficial and equitable title is in the
purchaser, and that any accretion received by the lot even before payment of the last installment belongs to the purchaser
thereof.

We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is entirely different from a sale of public lands under the provisions of
the Public Land Act. In the case of public lands, a person who desires to acquire must first apply for the parcel of land desired.
Thereafter, the land is opened for bidding. If the land is awarded to an applicant or to a qualified bidder the successful bidder is
given a right of entry to occupy the land and cultivate and improve it (Secs. 22-28, Commonwealth Act 141). It is only after
satisfying the requirements of cultivation and improvement of 1/5 of the land that the applicant is given a sales patent (Sec. 30).

In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor, subject only to
cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is not paid. In case of sale of public lands if the applicant dies and his widow
remarries both she and the second husband are entitled to the land; the new husband has the same right as his wife. Such is not the
case with friar lands. As indicated in Section 16 of Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies before the payment of the price in full,
the sale certificate is assigned to the widow, but if the buyer does not leave a widow, the right to the friar lands is transmitted to his
heirs at law.

It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land now subject of the action none was paid for in full during the
marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that payments in installments continued to be made even after the marriage of
Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916. But it is also true that even after said marriage the certificates of sale were assigned
to Maria C. Ferrer and installments for the lots after said marriage continued in the name of Maria C. Ferrer; also all the amounts
paid as installments for the lots were taken from the fruits of the properties themselves, according to the admission of plaintiff
Fabian Pugeda himself, thus: .

Mr. Viniegra:

Q —De los productos de pesos terrenos, durante la administracion por los demandados, recibia Vd. su participation?

A —No, señor.

Q —Nunca? .

A —Because I know there are obligations to be paid to the Bureau of Lands, and I have been informed that the obligations
have been paid annually from the products of the land.

Q —Therefore, from the products of these lands - the proceeds - the obligations to the Bureau of Lands are being discounted
from the said proceeds and after the remainder, as in palay, are equally divided, is that what you mean to say ? .

A —Perhaps they were following the practice that, from the products of the lands the obligations to the Bureau of Lands would
be paid.

Court: .

Q —Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna cantidad, o sea les darian alguna participation?

A —No señor, porque estaba en Manila, but they informed me that the obligations to the Bureau of Lands were being paid
from the products of the lands.

Mr. Viniegra: .
 Q —You do not claim any participation in the remainder of the products after paying the Bureau of Lands? .

A —How would I ask for I knew they were still paying the obligations to the Bureau of Lands - that was until the Japanese
time, and I knew some obligations were not paid, as a result of which the sales certificates of some big lots were cancelled.

Court:

Q —Como se mantenia Vd.? .

A —Mi madre tenia la casa en Manila y ella recibia alguna renta. My mother helped me. (Session of November 20, 1951,
before Judge A. G. Lucero, pp. 259-261, Matro.) (Brief for Defendants-Appellants, pp. 49-51).

There is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the case at bar, and that is the fact that in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased Mariano Trias, which was instituted in August 1915, the inventory of the estate left by
said deceased included the lots purchased from the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2, Trias) and the project of partition in said special
proceedings submitted to the court as Exh. 3-Trias adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as the share of Mariano Trias in the conjugal
properties, the other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.

The above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the friar lands purchased as above described
and paid for, had the character of conjugal properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. But another compelling
legal reason for this conclusion as against plaintiff, is the judicial pronouncement on said nature of the lands in question. In the year
1915, even before the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer took place, the latter was appointed administratrix of the estate of
her deceased husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case No. 860 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1" Trias). An inventory of
the estate left by the deceased Mariano Trias, dated January 15, 1929, was submitted by her and on April 10, 1929, the project of
partition of the properties was submitted. The project includes the friar lands subject of the action, and in accordance with it
one-half of the properties listed in the inventory was adjudicated to the deceased Mariano Trias as his share and the other half
adjudicated to Maria C. Ferrer also as her share. The share of Mariano Trias was decreed in favor of his children and heirs. This
project of partition was approved by Judge Manuel V. Moran in an order dated February 11, 1929, submitted to the Court of
Appeals as Annex "E", pp. 114-115 of the record on appeal.

The pendency of the above intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Mariano Trias must have been known to plaintiff
Fabian Pugeda, who is a lawyer. It does not appear, and neither does he claim or allege, that he ever appeared in said proceedings to
claim participation in the properties subject of the proceedings. His failure to intervene in the proceedings to claim that the friar
lands or some of them belonged to himself and his wife Maria C. Ferrer, shows a conviction on his part that the said friar lands
actually belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that he had no interest therein. The project of partition was
approved as late as 1929, by which time plaintiff and defendant had already been married for a period of 13 years. Plaintiff's failure
to assert any claim to the properties in the said intestate proceedings during its pendency now bars him absolutely from asserting the
claim that he now pretends to have to said properties.

We will now proceed to consider plaintiff's claim that the lands in question had, through the joint effort of himself and his wife,
increased in productivity from 900 cavans to 2,400 cavans of rice because of the introduction therein of improvements such as a
system of irrigation for the lands. If, as admitted by plaintiff himself, the installments remaining unpaid were taken from the
produce or the yield of the said lands and if it be taken into account that one-half of said lands already belonged to the children of
the first marriage, to whom the lands were adjudicated in the settlement of the estate of their father, the deceased Mariano C. Trias,
the only portion of the products or produce of the lands in which plaintiff could claim any participation is the one-half share therein
produced from the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer. How much of said produce belonging to Maria C. Ferrer was actually
used in the improvement of the lands is not shown, but the fact that plaintiff was engaged in continuous political campaigns, ever
since his marriage in 1916 (he had devoted most of his time while married to Maria C. Ferrer to politics), portions of the products
of the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer must have been used in these political campaigns as well as in meeting the
expenses of the conjugal partnership. The value of the useful improvements introduced on the lands, joint properties of Maria C.
Ferrer and her children, was not proved in court by plaintiff. Hence the provisions of Article 1404 of the old Civil Code, to the
effect that useful expenditures for the benefit of the separate properties of one of the spouses are partnership properties, cannot be
applied. But even if such useful improvements had been proved, the statute of limitations bars plaintiff' action to recover his share
therein because Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934, whereas the present action was instituted by plaintiff only in the year 1948. After the
death of Maria C. Ferrer, plaintiff came to Manila, took a second wife, and was not heard from for 14 years, that is, until he
instituted this action in 1948. His claim for the improvements, if any, is therefore also barred. 1äwphï1.ñët

The above ruling, that the action to demand his share in the value of the improvements in the paraphernal properties of Maria C.
Ferrer is barred, is also applicable to the claim of the plaintiff herein for the construction alleged to have been made and the
furniture supposedly bought by him and his spouse Maria C. Ferrer, and which had the character of conjugal partnership property of
said spouses. In the year 1935, defendants herein presented a project of partition to plaintiff for his signature (the project of partition
is dated March, 1935 and is mark Exhibit "5"-Trias). In this project of partition of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer,
mention is made of the participation of the plaintiff's children with the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, but no mention is made therein of
any participation that plaintiff had or could have as usufruct or otherwise, or in any building or improvement. This deed of partition
was shown to plaintif but the latter did not sign it.

The express omission of the name of plaintiff here in the above deed of partition as one of the heirs of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer
was enough notice to plaintiff that defendants had intended to deprive him of any share or participation in the properties left by the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, even of the usufruct that the law assigns to him. But in spite of his knowledge of this fact no action was
taken by him until February, 1948 when plaintiff demanded his share in the properties and later brought this action.

The period of around 13 years therefore elapsed before plaintiff instituted this action. Consequently, whatever rights he may have
had to any portion of the estate left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, as a usufructuary or otherwise, must be deemed to have
prescribed. As a consequence, we find that the order of Judge Lucero granting to the plaintiff herein one-ninth share in the estate of
the deceased Maria C. Ferrer in usufruct should be set aside and the objection to the grant of such share to plaintiff on the ground of
prescription is sustained.

Having disposed of the claims of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, we will now proceed to consider the cross-claim of his children, namely,
Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda. Judge Lucero decreed that the properties left by the deceased Maria C. Pugeda, be divided
among her children, including the two cross-claimants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda, and decreed one-ninth of the properties
of the said deceased Maria C. Ferrer to each of these two children of hers with the plaintiff and assigning also to the plaintiff
one-ninth share in the said estate left by her in usufruct.

In view of our finding that the claim of the plaintiff to any share in the estate of his wife Maria C. Ferrer is already barred by the
statute of limitations, the decree entered by Judge Lucero declaring that her properties be divided into nine parts, one part belonging
to each heir and one to plaintiff in usufruct, is hereby modified, by eliminating the share in usufruct of the plaintiff therein and
increasing the share of each of her heirs to one-eighth.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio C. Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer
among her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that all of her properties be divided among her eight children
at the rate of one-eight per child. As thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

FORMAL REQUISITES

G.R. No. L-8014 March 14, 1955

PEDRO V. VILAR, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO, respondent-appellant.

Claro M. Recto and Jose Nava for petitioner-appellant.

Josefina R. Phodaca and Naomi P. Salvador for respondent-appellant.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the candidates registered
and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. after the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso
garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly elected with a plurality of
41 votes. However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative
Code, Vilar instituted the present quo warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office and that his
proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija,
in lieu of respondent Paraiso.
Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo,
Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected to
take his place.

After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and, consequently, it
declared his proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from declaring petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal
grounds to do so. from this election both parties have appealed, respondent from that portion finding him ineligible, and petitioner
from that portion holding he cannot be declared elected as mayor for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.

The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals. However, as the latter court found that while petitioner raises in his brief
only questions of law respondent raises both questions of law and fact, and both appeals are indivisible in that they pertain to only
one case, that court resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to the provisions of sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
upon the theory that one of the appeals is exclusively cognizable by the Supreme Court.

The only issue before us is whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code, or whether he actually resigned as minister before the date of the elections, and his resignation duly accepted,
as claimed, thereby removing his disability. As may be noted, this is a question of fact the determination of which much depends
upon the credibility and weight of the evidence of both parties.

The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was ordained as minister of the Evangelical Church of the Philippines in
1944 and as such was given license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that since 1944 up to 1950 he acted
as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and without interruption and has been renewing his license to solemnize
marriages as prescribed by the regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries; that on April 19, 1950, respondent transferred to the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines, having been assigned to work in the same place and chapel during the years 1944-1950;
that on April 7, 1951, respondent applied for, and was issued, a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as
minister of the new church up to the end of April, 1952; that said license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united
church nor respondent has requested for its cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly known as minister of the United
Church of Christ, but he has not attached to his certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as minister.

The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tends to show that while he was formerly a minister of the United of Christ in
the Philippines, he, however, filed his resignation as such minister on August 21, 1951, because of his desire to engage in politics;
that said resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951; that
respondent turned over his chapel and his office to the elder members of his religious order on August 21, 1951, and since then he
considered himself separated from his order and in fact he has refrained ever since from conducting any religious services
pertaining to that order.

Which of these versions is correct?

After careful examining the evidence of record, and after weighing its credibility and probative value, we have not found any
reason for deviating from the finding of the trial court that respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he belonged
and that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the
prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. Indeed, if respondent really and sincerely
intended to resign as minister of the religious organization to which he belonged for the purpose of launching his candidacy why
did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries.1 The
importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the
authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This
information is necessary for the protection of the public. This is specially so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages,
the registration of which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to
secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the
official in charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes
upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to
do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing full
well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.

It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his claim by submitting as evidence certain documents purporting to show the
alleged resignation and its acceptance by the cabinet of his church at a meeting held on August 27, 1951, but, considering said
documents in the light of the shortcomings we have pointed out above, one cannot help but brand them as self-serving or as
documents merely prepared to serve the political designs of respondent in an attempt to obviate his disqualification under the law.
And this feeling appears strengthened if we examine the so-called minute book wherein, according to witness Jose Agpalo, are
entered the minutes of all the meeting of the church, because upon an examination thereof one would at once get the impression that
it was prepared haphazardly and not with such seriousness and solemnity that should characterize the religious activities of a well
established religious order. As the trial court aptly remarked "All these lead the court to believe with the petitioner, that the
supposed resignation and acceptance were made at a later date to cure the ineligibility of the respondent." We are therefore
constrained to hold that respondent is disqualified to hold the office of mayor as found by the trial court.

As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained second place in the
elections, our answer is simple: this Court has already declared that this cannot be done in the absence of an express provision
authorizing such declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such provision but apparently seems to prohibit it. This is what
we said in at least two cases where we laid down a ruling which is decisive of the present case.

. . . . In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second
place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person
who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645.)

Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the Revised Election Code, does not provide that if the contestee is declared
ineligible the contestant will be proclaimed. Indeed it may be gathered that the law contemplates no such result, because it
permits the filing of the contest by any registered candidate irrespective of whether the latter occupied the next highest place or
the lowest in the election returns. (Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 489, 47 Off. Gaz., [No. 2] p. 727.)

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002

(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)

MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated
23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on
17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the
marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise
deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.1âwphi1.nêt

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which
allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño
for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.

In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000
to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17
February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan
which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.

Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to him by
petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage
and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the
wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated
the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void.
Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When
they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage
license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator.
She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and
that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this
administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings
and is now bothered by her conscience.

Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January
2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner
nor Orobia claimed it.

It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage that
allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued
another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record
of their marriage.

On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar
of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that
their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent judge
guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of
P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.

We agree.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior
courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.1âwphi1.nêt

The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos. We held that:

"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the
area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)

In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his
jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:

"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply,
more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative
that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
 provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons."3

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara,4 we
held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that
gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.1âwphi1.nêt

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a
catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend
upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the
unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that
power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a
disciplining authority.6

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur,
is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909

ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.

Domingo Franco, for appellant.

Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907,
before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.

There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and consists,
first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the
defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the peace, and
ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same day, signed by the justice of the peace,
by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the presentation of the petition above
mentioned; that the persons who signed it where actually present in the office of the justice on the same day named; that they
ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they had there asked for. It also stated that being
required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a
witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero
and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September, 1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally
married by the justice of the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.

The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties were legally married on the day named. The
evidence in support of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed. Second. The evidence
of the defendant, who testifies that he and said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named, together with the
witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document above mentioned. Third. The evidence of
Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared
before the justice at the time named and did sign the document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified to
the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace, who testified that the
plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above-named, and the justice of the peace were all present in the office of the justice of
the peace at the time mentioned.

The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the peace and
never was married to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but says that she signed it in her own
home, without reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask the consent of
her parents to the marriage.

There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which we think, when properly considered, is not
entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married brother and was there for about
two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the house except in her company. But she
admitted on cross-examination that she herself went to school every morning and that on one occasion the plaintiff had gone to
church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says
that at the request of the defendant on the day named, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese named
Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany
her, the witness, to her own house for the purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two
rights left the store, but instead of going to the house of the witness they went directly to the office of the justice of the peace where
the ceremony took place; that after the ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the mother was approaching, and
that they thereupon hurriedly left the office of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found
them.

The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of the peace, who died after the ceremony was
performed and before the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of
the witnesses for the defendant.

The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant in his brief. It appears that during her first
examination she was seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was adjourned to a
future day and was completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her collapse was due to the fact
that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating the office of the justice of the peace was at the time in the municipal building,
when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the record justifies the claim of the appellant. The statement as to the
location of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards corrected by the witness and we are satisfied that she told the facts
substantially as they occurred.

There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said she did
not appear before the justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were all written by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was proven. No. 9 is as
follows:

ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be informed that we have been
married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of the house.

Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.

Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain here.

Yours, ROSAL.

Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of the 25th of September, is as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.

ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law will not let me go there; if it
suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.

Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese store,
 because I don't like to go without Pacita.

The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about it.

Yours, ROSAL.

It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the afternoon at
the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written after the marriage before the justice of the
peace. It is as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.

ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you see that the
tide is high because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of loading lumber.

Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate the marriage at this time,
because I don't like her to know to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told me this morning that she
heard that we would go to the court, and that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being married I must
do it right.

Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.

I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he wishes.

Yours, ROSAL.

Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.

ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the steamer Rosa, for the purpose of asking my father's
permission for our marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem proper, and, if he does not wish us
to marry without his permission, you must request his consent.

Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my brother ill treatment is a matter of no importance,
as every thing may be carried out, with patience.

It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the plaintiff was
on the same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no communication with the defendant during the voyage. The
plaintiff and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after consulting with her
family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of procuring the cancellation of the
certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below to the
effect that the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.

It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the
defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:

No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.

Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing until after
the document was signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married." The petition signed
the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of
the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that
they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A
mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificates
gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace
declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this
case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her,
which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document
which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were
able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the
circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.

The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the complaint. Among these allegations was a
statement that the parties had obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant was afterwards allowed to
amend his answer so that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint except that relating to the condition in regard to the
consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this amendment. After the trial had commenced the defendant was
again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which
related to the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this second amendment destroyed completely the first amendment and the
defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to allege in his first amendment, but by reason of the haste with which the first
amendment was drawn he had unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what he had intended to state. After argument the
court allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in this allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see
how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.

The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.

G.R. No. L-32473 October 6, 1930

MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his guardian ad litem, Pedro Madridejo, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GONZALO DE LEON, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

L. D. Abaya and S. C. Pamatmat for appellants.

Aurelio Palileo for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken by the defendants, Gonzalo de Leon et al. from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Laguna holding as follows:

Wherefore, the court finds that Melecio Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next of kin, and hereby orders the defendants in case
No. 5258 to restore and deliver the ownership and possession of the property described in the complaints filed in the aforesaid
case, to Melecio Madridejo, without cost. So ordered.

In support of their appeal the defendants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court, to wit:

1. The lower court erred in holding that the marriage between Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez is valid.

2. The lower court also erred in declaring that solely because of the subsequent marriage of his parents, the appellee Melecio
Madridejo, a natural child, was legitimated.

3. The lower court lastly erred in not rendering judgment in favor of the defendants and appellants.

The relevant facts necessary for the decision of all the questions of fact and of law raised herein are as follows:

Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de
Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of
births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez,
which was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit B). On June 17, 1917, a
24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920,
Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan
(Exhibit A). She died on the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the
plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd
of May, 1928.

With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo
and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in
articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

Touching the second assignment of error, there has been no attempt to deny that Melecio Madridejo, the plaintiff-appellee, is the
natural son of the Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, The only question to be decided is whether the subsequent marriage of his
parents legitimated him.

Article 121 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 121. Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by
the parents before or after the celebration thereof.

According to this legal provision, in order that a subsequent marriage may be effective as a legitimation, the natural children born
out of wedlock must have been acknowledged by the parents either before or after its celebration. The Civil Code has established
two kinds of acknowledgment: voluntary and compulsary. Article 131 provides for the voluntary acknowledgment by the father or
mother as follows:

Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public
document.

Article 135 provides for the compulsary acknowledgment by the father, thus:

Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:

1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.

2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the defendant father, justified by
the conduct of the father himself of that of his family.

3. In cases of rape, seduction, or abduction, the provisions of the Penal Code with regard to the acknowledgment of the issue,
shall be observed.

Article 136 providing for the compulsory acknowledgment by the mother, reads:

Art. 136. The mother may be compelled to acknowlegde her natural child:

1. When the child is, with respect to the mother, included in any of the cases mentioned in the next preceding article.

2. When the fact of the birth and the identity of the child are fully proven.

Let us see whether the plaintiff-appellee, Melecio Madridejo, has been acknowledged by his parents Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana
Perez, under any of the provisions above quoted.

To begin with the father, no document has been adduced to show that he has voluntarily acknowledged Melecio Madridejo as his
son, except the registry certificate of birth, Exhibit B. This, of course, is not the record of birth mentioned in the law, for it lacks the
requisites of article 48 of the Law of Civil Registry. It, no doubt, is a public instrument, but it has neither been executed nor signed
by Pedro Madridejo, and contains no statement by which he acknowledges Melecio Madridejo to be his son. Although as Pedro
Madridejo testified, he furnished the municipal secretary of Siniloan with necessary data for recording the birth of Melecio
Madridejo, and although said official inscribed the data thus given in the civil registry of births, this is not sufficient to bring it
under the legal provision regarding acknowledgment by a public document.
As to the mother, it does not appear that Flaviana Perez supplied the data set forth in the civil registry of births, Exhibit B, or in the
baptismal register, where of Exhibit 2 is a certificate, and which constitutes final proof only of the baptism, and not of the kinship or
parentage of the person baptized (Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil., 350). Furthermore, church registers of baptism are no longer
considered public documents (United States vs. Evangelista, 29 Phil., 215).

Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo or Flaviana Perez, either before or after their
marriage. 1awph!l.net

Did Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio Madridejo as his son, by compulsion?

The compulsory acknowledgment by the father established in article 135 of the Civil Code, and by the mother according to article
136, requires that the natural child take judicial action against the father or mother, or against the persons setting themselves up as
the heirs of both, for the purpose of compelling them to acknowledge him as a natural son through a judgment of the court.

In the instant action brought by Melecio Madridejo not only has he not demanded to be acknowledged as a natural child, which is
the condition precedent to establishing his legitimation by the subsequent marriage and his right to the estate of his uterine brother,
Domingo de Leon, but he has not even impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo, or the heirs of his mother, Flaviana Perez, in
order that the court might have authority to make a valid and effective pronouncement of his being a natural child, and to compel
them to acknowledge him as such.

The plaintiff-appellee alleges that the second paragraph of the defendants' answer amounts to an admission that he is indeed
Flaviana Perez's son, and relieves him of the burden of proving that his mother acknowledged him as a son before her marriage.
Such an admission would have been affective if the present action had been brought for the purpose of compelling Flaviana Perez
or her heirs to acknowledge the appellee as her son.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez,
either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the defendants absolved with costs against the appellee without
prejudice to any right he may have to establish or compel his acknowledgment as the natural son of Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana
Perez. So ordered.

G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio
Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in
Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a
Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II,
records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March
1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born
on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her
children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who
later died in 1977 without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she
claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the
properties acquired by Eustaquio.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she is the legal surviving
spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St.
Jude Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right
and as an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged
prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar,
Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually filed in the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the
early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30
September 1942;12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War issued by the Office of the
Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth
of Climaco Avenido;13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3 March 1979;
her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not
the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate
her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:
 1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he contracted marriage with the
petitioner although he had a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco,
Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao
del Norte;19 and

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del
Norte.20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the
properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as well as Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:

For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA
AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.

The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby
DISMISSED.22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the evidence on the existence of her
marriage to Eustaquio.

In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while
pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA
ruled:

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who
testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September
1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to
his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that
the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of her
marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25dated 5 June 2008, raises the
following legal issues:

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a subsequent
marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of the execution or
existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the original document;

and

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove the existence of a valid
marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the witness stand.26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of
Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present her
certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was
said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B")
stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are
presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952.
Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between
[Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it
considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce
her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court
declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they
deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence
consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina
Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA
found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G.
Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly
delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the
introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus
confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court
clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The
court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary
evidence when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as
a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of
secondary evidence of the contents.

xxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol
testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined
from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to
establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even
there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and
recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The
Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in
the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are
usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage
ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial evidence
furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the
event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the

Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to
the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person
who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who
testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September
1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to
his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that
the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro
matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the
unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is
AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared
NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
 DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July
24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109.
Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January
8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married
on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at
around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his
mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria
signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of
2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a
copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C.
Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in
favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8,
1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his
counsel.8

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic
appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to
Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He
testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality
of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on
January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other
person.11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and
May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to
solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at
the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary
Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev.
Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage
contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride,
Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin
secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and
witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the
wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City
Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with
the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license
before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not
read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She
also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an
information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26

As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of
Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons
depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27
She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A
certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they
gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married
on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the
existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage
had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the
time were Chinese.31

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria
and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the
license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
 annulled;

2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired
during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel
from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria
Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.

SO ORDERED.34

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the
questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY
SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL
DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS
THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE
PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35

The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence
that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had
comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy.38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo
Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.39

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July
24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S
OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the
Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which
read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the
solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a
valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a
valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held
that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the
office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested
certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as
permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license,
the Court held:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not
exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents,
civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter
all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other
relevant data.44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain
records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a
certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No.
9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification used
stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could
not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the
Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal
Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact,
proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to
the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption
that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage
license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the
license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother,
Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty.
Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not
knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have
testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the
testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys
probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and
submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage
license issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that
their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further
held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging
a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to
discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said
that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was
presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the
CA:

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married
and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of
legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely.
Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing
appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellant’s family, taken during the
marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit
"5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on
15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only
after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent
marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not
operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of
the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the
Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the
license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks
to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to
him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is
clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the
marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of
contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For
this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated
that both contracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he
did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for
seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the
late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with
bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act would be dealt with more severely.

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his
earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which
were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective
marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with
their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
 impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he
had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of
their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he
would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and
Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to
before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article
63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in
such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had
been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not
serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim
"ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the
law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.10

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the
amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE
NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the
Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito
G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their
father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent
before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate
an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It
was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However,
upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."
13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is
that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of
their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved
pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of
whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of
the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity —
that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law.
The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless
the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil
registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same
person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal
and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised
Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are
considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage
with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the
time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband
and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void after his
death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the
sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is
valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while
the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning
the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the
children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent.
The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two.
It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A
void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though
no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon
the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between
any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes
either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either
party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus,
Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged
that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage
as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for
pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and
determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make
a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified
of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer
as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of
respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it
stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer
returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because
he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than
the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration.
The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it
and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and
that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal
gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR
THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both
parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits
and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being
inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by
way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole
purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is
one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration
purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to
filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for determining the
presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to
establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into
for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is
used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also
legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946,
the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to
marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a
marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what
forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a
marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it
as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive,
they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is
not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into
solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being
that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally
denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have
upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case,
the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code,
consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall
render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A
"freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real
in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code,
such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and
the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding
of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A
marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual
marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create
any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective,
or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be
bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent
to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application
for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a
limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The
possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared
valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they
see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered
into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites,31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only
valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the
marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it
is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the
circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn
involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute
fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does
not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the
injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the
sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void
would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court
cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is
ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE

G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975

LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO
PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX
VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO
PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA
PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.

Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.

Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.

Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom
he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had
five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.

Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is
survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido,
another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.

Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo.
Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.

Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his
children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is
survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.

On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document
denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458,
471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.

Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962
they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on February 22,
1963, against the children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and
Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone. They alleged, among
other things, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the document in question through misrepresentation, false
promises and fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate
and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing
allegations.

After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial
Partition." However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that the
five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were
the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and
his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows: declaring the following as the legitimate
children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido; Nicanora
Perido, deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido and
Wilfredo Perido; and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs
of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido,
Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A.
Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and
808) except Lot No. 458 as exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that each of them should be divided into eight (8)
equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix Perido, but because of his death leaving eight (8) children, the same should be divided
and alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel Pirote;
1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba
1/64 to Letia Perido, of age, married to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz; 1/64
to Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but because she is now dead the same should be divided and
alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to
Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead leaving five children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows:
1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo Perido, of age married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano
Perido, but he is already dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to Wilfredo Perido, of
age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he is already dead
with seven children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56
 goes to Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina
Perido, of age, married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of are
single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but because he is
already dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married to Salud Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria
Perido. of age, married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo Perido, of
age, married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as conjugal partnership property
of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat, which should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to be
divided into eight (8) equal shares and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5) equal shares or 11/120
for each of the children and again to be divided by the children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel Perido
owner of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be determined accordingly later; and (6) declaring null
and void Exhibit "J" of the plaintiffs which is Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without costs and without adjudication with
respect to the counterclaim and damages, they being members of the same family, for equity and justice.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido,
Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of
Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.

Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed it in toto. The appellants moved to
reconsider but were turned down. Thereupon they instituted he instant petition for review reiterating in effect the assignments of
error and the arguments in the brief they submitted to the appellate court.

The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said
children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first
wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In
support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were born, as testified to by
petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as
shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido.

The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita
Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the
circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.

With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it
is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. This
presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part
of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee1 this Court explained the rationale behind this
presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living
in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."

While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the presumption of marriage arising from previous
cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass upon the uncorroborated testimony of
petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina Baliguat
was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because "during the celebration of the marriage by the
Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and placed in the altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the
ceremony.

In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808
were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing of the contention of the petitioners that said lots belong to the conjugal
partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:têñ.£îhqwâ£

... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that the lands covered by the certificates of title (Exhs.
B to G) were all declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing that the lands were inherited by
Lucio Perido from his grandmother (t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the exclusive properties of the
late Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and second marriages. By fiat of law said Properties should be divided
accordingly among his legal heirs.

The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from
his grandmother and contend that they were able to establish through the testimonies of their witnesses that the spouses Lucio
Perido and Benita Talorong acquired them during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The question involves
appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals, the factual findings of which are not reviewable
by this Court.

The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12
of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said the appellate
court:têñ.£îhqwâ£

With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same
should be considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the
lower court on this point need not be disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido,
the registered owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the law presumes a property
registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal (Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48
Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes stronger when the document recites that the spouse
in whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else, like in the case at bar. It appearing that the legal
presumption that the No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary,
we are constrained to rule, that the same is the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat.

In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal
property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot
came from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of the first marriage. As in the
second assignment of error, the issue raised here also involves appreciation of the evidence and, consequently, the finding of the
appellate court on the matter is binding on this Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would require an examination of all the
evidence introduced before the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances surrounding the
case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It
would thus abolish the distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat
the purpose for which the latter procedure has been established.2

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

BIGAMOUS OR POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

G.R. No. L-5877 September 28, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant.

Nestor A. Andrada for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for appellee.

PARAS, C.J.:

The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding him guilty of the
crime of bigamy and sentencing him to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, with costs.
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May
14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2,
1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba,
Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.

The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and, therefore, non-existent, having
been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to
Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de
Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not
exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs.
Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.

The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is not controlling. Said case is essentially different,
because the defendant therein, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary formalities, and the
Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without merit.

In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of his first
marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his second
marriage in 1941, provides as follows:1âwphïl.nêt

Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either
case until declared null and void by a competent court.

This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal
and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first
spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage
valid until declared null and void by a competent court.1âwphïl.nêt

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.

G.R. No. L-10016 February 28, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis for defendant and appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy. The facts are not disputed and, as
found by the trial court, are as follows:

On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in
the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu (Exhibits "1" and "1-A"). While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting,
the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the
Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.

The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an employee of the Office of the Municipal
 Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A" and testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and
complainant Maria Faicol). After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the
accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he
maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and
seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a
teacher-nurse.

It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for it appears that in 1949 and 1950,
Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953,
the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence,
the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu. (See
Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F")

The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasangin Sibonga, Cebu, on October 3, 1953, Although
the accused made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however, believes that the attempt is
futile for the fact of the said second marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of the said marriage, but also by
the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused
made by Maria Faicol. (See Exhibits "A" and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954).

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of
an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C.
Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of
the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter. Authorities given for this ruling are 5 Viada, 5th edition, 651; 35 American
Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs. Bickford, 74 N. H. 466, 69 A. 579.

Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4767). In this case the majority
of this Court declared:

The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by
any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's second
marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven
consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a
subsequent court.

We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case above-quoted But this weighty reasons
notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may
not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent
enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages
been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law.
In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to.

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not
renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and
appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs
de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-43905 May 30, 1983

SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PAOMBONG,
BULACAN, respondents.

Amelita G. Tolentino for petitioner.

Hermin E. Arceo for Maria Clemente.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The reversal of respondent Court's Order, dismissing petitioner's suit for her "declaration ... as the lawful surviving spouse of
deceased Amado Tolentino and the correction of the death certificate of the same", is sought in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari.

The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria Clemente, at
Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1, 1948 (Annex "C", Petition), while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino,
celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting (Annex "A", Petition).

Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2768 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II, which
Court, upon Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the prison sentence
imposed on him, he continued to live with private respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry
"Name of Surviving Spouse — Maria Clemente."

In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in the
death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the
proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding,

Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan,
for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado. In an Order, dated October
21, 1976, respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance, dismissed the case, stating:

The Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants in this case, thru counsel Atty. Hernan E. Arceo, for the reasons therein
mentioned, is hereby GRANTED. Further: (1) the correction of the entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not
the proper remedy because the issue involved is marital relationship; (2) the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction
because as prescribed under Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code — publication is needed in a case like
this, and up to now, there has been no such publication; and (3) in a sense, the subject matter of this case has been aptly
discussed in Special Proceeding No. 1587-M, which this Court has already dismissed, for lack of the proper requisites
under the law.

In view of the above dismissal, all other motions in this case are hereby considered MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED. 1

Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by respondent Court in ordering dismissal.

We rule for petitioner.

First, for the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil
Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the
deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a
proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one
who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual most affected; is a party defendant, and has appeared to
contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant. The publication required by the
Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all,
publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. 2 Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule 108, it was the Court that was caned upon to order the
publication, 3 but it did not. in the ultimate analysis, Courts are not concerned so much with the form of actions as with their
substance. 4

Second, for the merits. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the
necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the
accused of the existence of such marriage. 5 The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of
his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. 6 No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage. 7 It can be safely concluded, then, without need of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that
private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the
records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.

Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the other issues raised need no longer be discussed.

In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private respondent and that the entry
made in the corresponding local register is thereby rendered false, it may be corrected. 8 While document such as death and birth
certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield
to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy. 9

WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21, 1975, of respondent Court is hereby set aside and petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino,
hereby declared the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the corresponding correction be made in the latter's
death certificate in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan.

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.

Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the
Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for
short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having
been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior
subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been
allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the
first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first
marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent
Judge-

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;"
and

(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because
assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married
each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON.
JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.

Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.

Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.

City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of the Court is whether or
not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for
annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a
prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.

The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City
Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First
Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed
based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.

On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which
action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to
entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was
already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity
interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage.
Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit
executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article
76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.

Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of
said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a
prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.

In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554
for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further
directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.

A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension of proceedings
the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by respondent
judge in his order of denial.

The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.3 It is one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.5

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or
innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who
filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer
the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be
applied to the present case. Said case states that:

The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean
that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that
the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be
shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for
the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for
bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable.
And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party
complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the
fact would not be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity
of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely
abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of
threats, force and intimidation.

Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be
the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it
was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage while a previous one
existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as
contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a
complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not
aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that
the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a
case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is
proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to
establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction.
The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records
reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan
as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was
obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is
belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as
husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified
by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on
September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with
the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence.
Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that
Leonilo Donato was already previously married.

In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is
no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for
bigamy can be undertaken.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14,
1980 should be sustained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement
as to costs.

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a
member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.

The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts to serve a
copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that he could not be found nor
reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no
answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's Resolution
and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his
answer to the complaint against him" in the instant
case. 3

On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his Answer,
Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that
she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that
when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had
mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre)
was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted
marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4

In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the
child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further
explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done
so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech position.
According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means
to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.

The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a Resolution dated 6
January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 5

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing on 7
July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex parte, since
respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put
clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered
her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his
evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent
did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present
evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda.
Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.

On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court. The Report
summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:

Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and respondent met for the
first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then
married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14);
it was then that respondent started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and
respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at the Lyceum
University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p.
11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage
was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having
secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite her [complainant's]
objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no
need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court
of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25,
1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in
1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his parents (ibid, pp.
19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later that respondent married a certain
Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the
City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as
Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent
and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was found to exist
(Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative case against respondent with the
Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was considered closed for being moot and academic
when respondent was considered automatically separated from the service for having gone on absence without official
leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7

There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977
before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina
Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was
subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of
respondent with complainant.

Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not
rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that
pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A.
Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to
contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an
argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8
Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow.
For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with
the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he convinced
the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry
him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported
by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten
complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own
child safely in a hospital.

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness
to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because
marriage is a basic social institution. 9

In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the
Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:

It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. Whether
the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well
of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11

In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made a dupe of
complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before
her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while
continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member
of the Bar." 13

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second
marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him through law school,
leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his
first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of
admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of
this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.

G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January 20091 and 3 April 20092 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of
the absent spouse of respondent.

In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an
electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3
March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.

Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda
claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her
brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to
Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2002-0530.

On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.

On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus
failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the
motion.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court.
Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the
judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.

In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,3 the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family
Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 3 April 2009.4

Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.

Issues

1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is
not subject to ordinary appeal

2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under
Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented

Our Ruling

1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not
subject to ordinary appeal

In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition assailing the RTC’s grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,5
the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial
proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties,
by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to
question it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing.

We affirm the CA ruling.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied.)

Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage
under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code.

Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled "Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law." Subsumed thereunder are
Articles 238 and 247, which provide:

Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:

ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51,
69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.

Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death
is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,6 the Republic likewise appealed the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was an error for the Republic to file a
Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to the CA, to wit:

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal,
precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final
and executory."

xxx xxx xxx

But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s decision
dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a
notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and
should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.

Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result reached by the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,
additionally opined that what the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review under
Rule 45.

In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in
Republic v. Jomoc,7 issued a few months later.

In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent husband for the purpose of
remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of
Appeal on the ground that, under the Rules of Court,8 a record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing special proceedings
cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or
absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special proceedings, a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code.
Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioner’s action was a summary proceeding based on
Article 41 of the Family Code, rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this action
was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.

We do not agree with the Republic’s argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded our ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As
observed by the CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family
Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a
vehicle for questioning the trial court’s Decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
the Family Code was intended "to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar."

At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings
under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic v. Tango:9

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the
Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the
rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:

ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:

ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51,
69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a
matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed
in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the
court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC
judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondent’s spouse was immediately final and executory and,
hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.

2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under
Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent had presented

Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on
the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already
dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code. Petitioner cites Republic v. Nolasco,10 United States v. Biasbas11 and
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro12 as authorities on the subject.

In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after giving
birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the ruling
on the ground that respondent was not able to establish his "well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead," as required by
Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized that this provision imposes more stringent requirements than
does Article 83 of the Civil Code.13 The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still
alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead
under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a "well-founded belief" that the
absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that case,
the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is
already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited United States v. Biasbas,14 which it found to be instructive as to the diligence required in
searching for a missing spouse.

In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife,
considering his admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that suspicion was the fact
of her absence.

Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTC’s
grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the respondent therein had not
been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that his spouse was already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and
provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a
well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.1âwphi1 It may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably
founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life
which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their
disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present
acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by
present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search
to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from
the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not
diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese
Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass
media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.

The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already
dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed.
Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."15

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed be order3 dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal
City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor’s husband,
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.

The Factual Antecedents

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling
in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1)
the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s
expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.

After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had
not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a
petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a
well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her
sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point
to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile,
prompting her to file the petition in court.

The Ruling of the RTC

After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s petition and declaring Jerry presumptively dead. It
concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had
passed without the former receiving any news about the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order dated
December 15, 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor is presumptively dead pursuant to
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F.
Cantor.5

The Ruling of the CA

The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the RTC’s part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Order dated December 15,
2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.7

The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The Petition The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to
challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings,
including presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the
Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review on certiorari.

The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the declaration of her husband’s
presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise,
the petitioner invites this Court’s attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of search
conducted and the respondent’s resultant failure to meet the strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.

The Issues

The petition poses to us the following issues:

(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code; and

(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition.

a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy

Court’s Judgment in the Judicial

Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable

The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and executory.

Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. [underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the dispositions and conclusions
therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as against the parties but even as against the courts.8 Modification of the
court’s ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary proceeding thus
prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to appeal is not granted to parties
because of the express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, to wit:

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal,
precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of [Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final
and executory." It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTCto give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.

An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and
executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is
merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary
judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties
therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated
differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]

Certiorari Lies to Challenge the

Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death Under the Family Code

A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be
made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.

As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has become final does not automatically negate the original
action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court.
Certiorari may be availed of where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and
where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure finds support in the case of Republic v. Tango,11 wherein we
held that:

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the
Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the
rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:

"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:

"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51,
69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a
matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed
in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]

Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the RTC’s
order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.

b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief

The Essential Requisites for the

Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the
Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.12

The Present Spouse Has the Burden

of Proof to Show that All the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code are present.
Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue,
it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation
is not evidence.13

Declaration of Presumptive Death

Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard

Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter
standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive
death can be granted. We have had occasion to make the same observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial
differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a
judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a
stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is
still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee
is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that such absentee is still alive,
failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from
the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more
stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead.15

The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouseis already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort (not a mere passive one).

To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an analysis of the following relevant cases is
warranted:

i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled that the present spouse failed to prove that he had a
well-founded belief that his absent spouse was already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife
allegedly consisted of the following:

(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;

(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;

(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among his friends;

(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during his free time;

(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and

(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.

Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court found that he failed to present the
persons from whom he allegedly made inquiries and only reported his wife’s absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his
petition in the RTC.

The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the
Family Code:

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present
acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by
[the] present spouse.18

ii. Republic v. Granada19

Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was
already dead prior to her filing of the petition. In this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries from their
relatives regarding the absent spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass
media. Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),20 the Court ruled against the present
spouse, as follows:

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search
to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquiredabout the whereabouts of Cyrus from
the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not
diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese
Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass
media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

iii.Republic v. Nolasco21

In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who had been missing for more than
four years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of:

(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;

(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and

(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless. The Court ruled that the present spouse’s
investigations were too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only
proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.

iv.The present case

In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, which
consisted of the following:

(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and

(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the following
reasons:

First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband.1âwphi1 It can be inferred from the records that her hospital
visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent
search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers
these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.

Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. While a finding of
well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it
proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least,
report his/her absence to the police.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate
Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present
spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the
friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.

Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither
was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her
friends and in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a
diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As held
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief
of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after
the disappearance of the absent spouse and the natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."

Strict Standard Approach Is

Consistent with the State’s Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage

In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their marriage, has consistently
applied the "strictstandard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should
ensure that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),23 we emphasized that:

In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a
missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by
parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those
who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family
Code for relief because of the xxx summary nature of its proceedings.

The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State’s policy to protect and strengthen
the institution of marriage.24 Since marriage serves as the family’s foundation25 and since it is the state’s policy to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic social institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In
interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale –to uphold the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of
Appeals27 reflected this sentiment when we stressed:

[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest
interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set
forth the following basic state policy:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.

Strict Standard Prescribed Under

Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit

The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently, the application of a stringent
standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the
court's declaration.

Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present spouse's good faith in contracting
a second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith
and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly
comply with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.

Final Word

As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required in petitions for declaration of presumptive
death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has
consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial.
To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article
41 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
order dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor
presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SUBSEQUENT MARRAIGE UPON REAPPEARANCE OF ABSENT SPOUSE

G.R. No. L-43701 March 6, 1937

In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escaño.

ANGELITA JONES., petitioner-appellant-appellee,
vs.
FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir, oppositor-appellant-appellee.

Salvador E. Imperial for petitioner-appellant-appellee.

Vicente L. Faelnar , Hipolito Alo and Ciriaco S. Salazar for oppositor-appellant-appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal taken from the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu on March 14, 1935 , in the intestate proceedings
of the deceased Marciana Escaño, denying thereby: (1) the motion to appoint a new administrator and (2) to set aside the order of
May 9, 1932, declaring the heirs of said deceased; (3) holding it unwarranted to declare that the properties of the intestate estate are
paraphernal properties of said deceased, but reserving to the parties the right to discuss which of said properties are paraphernal and
which are conjugal; (4)setting aside the order of January 10, 1933. granting to the administrator fees in the sum of P10,000, and that
of June 26, 1933, approving the project of portion and the final account; and (5) ordering the presentation of another project of
partition and final account.

As Marciana Escaño had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her entire estate, and
in an order issued on May 9, 1932, Angelita Jones, her daughter by her first marriage, and Felix Hortiguela, her widower by her
second marriage, were declared her only heirs. In a motion filed with the conformity of the guardian of the heiress Angelita Jones,
Felix Hortiguela, as administrator, prayed that his fees, as such, be fixed at P10,000 which was granted by the court in its order of
January 10, 1933. The administrator later presented an inventory of the properties left by said deceased Marciana Escaño, a final
account of his administration, and a project of partition of the intestate estate wherein he adjudicated to himself a part of the estate
in payment of his share of the conjugal properties and his usufructuary right, and the remaining part to Angelita Jones. The latter,
who was a minor, was represented in the proceedings by her guardian Paz Escaño de Corominas. The project of partition and final
account were approved in an order of June 26, 1933, and the properties were turned over to the respective grantees by virtue
thereof.

On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir
of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escaño; that there never was a valid marriage between her mother and Felix Hortiguela or
that had such marriage been celebrated, it was null and void; and even granting that it were valid, Felix Hortiguela was not entitled
to a share in usufruct of one-third of the inheritance; that the petitioner was a minor and that during the hearing of the intestate
proceedings she had not been assisted by counsel but was represent by the same attorney of Felix Hortiguela; that during said
proceedings there had been committed many errors and inaccuracies which impaired her rights and that the fees of P10,000 charged
by the administrator were highly unreasonable and unconscionable. She prayed: (a) for the reopening of the proceedings; (b) that
her husband appointed special administrator without bond; (c) that her mother's alleged marriage to Felix Hortiguela be declared
null and void; (d) that the partition of the properties made by administrator or Hortiguela be declared null and void that petitioner be
declared the only universal heir of her deceased mother; and (e) that in case there was a valid marriage between Felix Hortiguela
and Marciana Escaño, Hortiguela be declared not entitled to the widower's usufruct; the errors in the administrator's account be
corrected; the latter be granted a remuneration of only P4 a day, and new partition of the properties be made.

After Hortiguela's answer had been filed and the evidence for both parties received, the court issued the order of March 14, 1935,
the provisions of which are stated in the first paragraph of this decision. Both parties appealed therefrom.

The principal question upon the resolution of which depends that of the others, is whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged marriage
to Marciana Escaño was celebrated.

It is a fact that in December, 1914, Marciana Escaño married Arthur W. Jones in the suburban catholic church of San Nicolas,
Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him. In
October, 1919, proceedings were institute in the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte, at the instance of Marciana Escaño, to
have her husband judicially declared an absentee. On the 25th of said month, the court issued an order declaring Arthur W. Jones an
absentee from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the provisions of article 186 of the Civil Code, with the proviso that said judicial
declaration of absence would not take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers. Said order directed the
publication thereof in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper "El Ideal". Pursuant thereto, said order was published in the
Official Gazette during the month of December, 1919, and January, February, March, April, May and June, 1920. On April 23, 1921,
the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in the
Official Gazette and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño were married before the justice of the
peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage.

Now, Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made not in the order of October 25,
1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6
years and 14 days elapsed; and in accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No. 68, the marriage so contracted
by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño is null and void. This court does not believe so. For the purposes of the civil marriage law,
it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with
the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of
the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the
celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General orders, No. 68).

In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana Escaño's former husband should be counted from
January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927,
more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.

For some unknown reason not attributable, of course, to the fault or negligence of Felix Hortiguela or Marciana Escaño, the
marriage contracted does not appear recorded in the marriage register of the municipality of Malitbog. Angelita Jones assigns as
one of the errors of the court its having declared that failure to record said marriage does not affect the efficacy and validity thereof.

On this point, the court a quo very correctly stated as follows:

Section VIII of General Orders, No. 68, as amended, provides that the person solemnizing the marriage must transmit the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, and failure to transmit such certificate shall be fined not less than twenty-five
and not more than fifty dollars; but does not provide that failure to transmit such certificate to the municipal secretary annuls
the marriage. Interpreting this legal provision, the Supreme Court, in its decision of September 5, 1931 (Madridejo vs. De
Leon, 55 Phil., 1 ) said:

"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter was in articulo
mortis failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since
it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, the forwarding of a copy of
the marriage certificate not being one said requisites."

In another case (U. S. vs. De Vera, 28 Phil., 105), the court said:

"Certificate issued pursuant the provisions of section 20 of the Municipal Code by municipal secretaries, marriages recorded in
their respective registers, are not the only ones that can attest and prove such facts to such an extent that other proofs
established by law may not be presented or admitted at trial, when through the omission or fault either of the municipal
secretary himself or of the person who solemnized the marriage, it was not duly entered or recorded in the municipal register."

Furthermore, Marciana Escaño believed Arthur W. Jones to be dead when she contracted her second marriage. Her daughter
Angelita Jones herself was of the same belief, since she lived with her mother after the latter had married Hortiguela, treated
Hortiguela as her true stepfather, and lived and traveled with him together with her mother. She certainly would not have behaved
so if she had not believed her father to be dead. Still furthermore, according to section 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure,
a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead.

Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escaño and was divorced from her at the time of her death there is
no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession, as in the present case (6 and 7
Manresa, pages 497-499 and 134-141, respectively).

Therefor, there is no reason to annul the order of May 9, 1932, declaring that the heirs of the deceased were her widower and her
daughter Angelita Jones. Neither is there any reason to annul the order of June 26, 1933, approving the partition of the properties of
the intestate estate.

The inaccuracies and error attributed to the administrator Felix Hortiguela in Angelita Jones' motion and alleged therein as one of
the grounds for asking for the reopening of any assignment of error. It should, therefore, be considered that the petitioner has
desisted from her intention relative to this alleged ground for the nullity of the proceedings.

As to the administrator's fees, the evidence shows that of the P10,000 granted by the court to Hortiguela as his own sum of P8,000
for the latter's professional services in this as well as in other cases affecting the estate of his deceased wife. Taking into
consideration the nature of and the amount involved in this and in the other cases wherein Attorney Faelnar has rendered his
services this court is of the opinion that the sum of P8,000 paid by the administrator is a reasonable and moderate compensation.
Angelita Jones' objection to the effect that she had no reason to contribute to the payment of Faelnar's fees is untenable, considering
the fact that said attorney's professional services were rendered for the benefit of the administration of the estate of the deceased
Escaño prior to the controversy provoked by said heiress. As to the remainder of P2,000, said administrator is entitled to collect the
sum of P4 for every day employed by him as such, and considering the importance of the inheritance in question and the time
elapsed since the inception of the administration proceedings this court is of the opinion that the sum of P2,000 is an adequate
compensation for said administrator's services.
Lastly, had the court jurisdiction to set aside, as it did, the order of January 10, 1933, approving the administrator's fees and the
order of June 26, 1933, approving the partition and the final account? Had the court jurisdiction to order the presentation of another
project of partition and final account? These are the questions raised by Felix Hortiguela and this court is of the opinion that said
orders having therefrom, the court has lost jurisdiction that no appeal was ever taken therefrom, the court has lost jurisdiction over
the case and it could not resume it under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under section 598 thereof because the
above-cited section refer to grounds other than those upon which Angelita Jones' motion of May 3, 1934, is based.

For all the foregoing consideration this court reverses the appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so far as it set aside the order of
January 10, 1933, relative to the administrator's fees and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the final account and the project of
portion, and in so far as said order of March 14, 1935, required the presentation of a new project of partition; denied the
appointment of Angelita Jones husband as administrator; affirms the order of May 9, 1932, relative to declaration of heirs; and
holds it unwarranted to make a finding as to whether or not the properties of this intestate estate are paraphernal properties of the
deceased Marciana Escaño reserving to the parties the right to discuss which are paraphernal and which are conjugal properties. So
ordered.

G.R. No. L-1780 August 31, 1948

Petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw. CONSUELO SORS, petitioner-appellant.

J. Rodriguez Serra for appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

Pleading under oath that she is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish citizen, to whom she was married in Manila on
November, 1936, whom she bore a child named Alexis Szatraw born on 8 September 1937, with whom she had lived from the time
they were married until February, 1940, when her husband, on the pretext that he would call on some friends, departed from the
conjugal abode carrying the child along with him and never returned, about whose whereabouts she made inquiries from among her
husband's friends and countrymen and learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai, where, according, however, to
information obtained from Polish citizens who had arrived from that place, he and the child had not been seen and could not be
found; that all her efforts to know the whereabouts of her husband and child were in vain; and that, because of her husband's
absence for more than seven years during which she has not heard any news from him and about her child, she believes that he is
dead, Consuelo Sors prays that her husband be declared dead and that her parental authority over her child, should the latter be alive
and later on appear, be preserved.

The foregoing facts pleaded in the petition were proved. The evidence further shows that she and her husband did not acquire any
property during their marriage and that his life was not insured.

Upon the foregoing evidence the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is not for the settlement of the estate of the
absentee, and because the rule of evidence establishing the presumption that a person unheard from in seven years is dead, does not
create a right upon which a judicial pronouncement of a decree may be predicated. The petitioner has appealed.

The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed property brought
to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is
merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard
from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a
special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or
special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding.
In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is
there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans vs. Wislizenus,
42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration
that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that
the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that
the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's
situation, because such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and
executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a
judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to
pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or
establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is
decided by a final judgement, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the
judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular
fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is. therefore,
clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of
the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have
such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard
from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may
be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable time and be made to
perform a superfluous and meaningless act.

Little effort is necessary to perceive that a declaration such as the one prayed for by the petitioner, if granted, may make or lead her
to believe that the marital bonds which bind her to her husband are torn asunder, and that for that reason she is or may feel free to
enter into a new marriage contract. The framers of the rules of court, by the presumption provided for in the rule of evidence in
question, did not intend and mean that a judicial declaration based solely upon that presumption may be made. A petition for a
declaration such as the one filed in this case may be made in collusion with the other spouse. If that were the case, then a decree of
divorce that cannot be obtained or granted under the provisions of the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could easily be secured by
means of a judicial decree declaring a person unheard from in seven years to be presumptively dead. This is another strong reason
why a petition such as the one presented in this case should not be countenanced and allowed. What cannot be obtained directly
under the provisions of Divorce Law could indirectly be secured under the provisions of Rule 123, section 69 (x). Obviously, the
latter must not be made to prevail over the former.

The order appealed from is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs is made, because no adverse party appeared in this Court and in
the court below.

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail
the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with
various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological
incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel
provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most
liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3
Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14,
1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends
on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his
job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila
and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and
that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared
to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife,
but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora
Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital
and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court
of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of
the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is
anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil
Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal
and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral
conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship
with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats
the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it
did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect
in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been
no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to
annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing
at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions
of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such
failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness
to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting
and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding
Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
11
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

12
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and
solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart
from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent
with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel
Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143376 November 26, 2002

LENI O. CHOA, petitioner,

vs.
ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding, provided
the petitioner can show that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course is not plain, adequate or
speedy under the circumstances. Indeed, when the plaintiff’s evidence is utterly and patently insufficient to prove the complaint, it
would be capricious for a trial judge to deny the demurrer and to require the defendant to present evidence to controvert a
nonexisting case. Verily, the denial constitutes an unwelcome imposition on the court’s docket and an assault on the defendant’s
resources and peace of mind. In short, such denial needlessly delays and, thus, effectively denies justice.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 16, 2000 Decision1 and
the May 22, 2000 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."3

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4

The Facts

Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan.
On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a Complaint5 for
the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-8098. Afterwards he filed an
Amended Complaint6 dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her alleged
psychological incapacity.

The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted his Formal
Offer of Exhibits7 dated February 20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to
Evidence)8 dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter.

Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order9 denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. It held that "[respondent]
established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert."10 After her Motion for Reconsideration11 was denied in the
March 22, 1999 Order,12 petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari,13 docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not
available. The proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was handed down later, to
take an appeal therefrom.14 In any event, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent judge in issuing the assailed
Orders.15

The CA also ruled that "the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests on the sound exercise of the [trial] court’s
discretion."16 Further, the "[p]etitioner failed to show that the issues in the court below [had] been resolved arbitrarily or without
basis."17

Hence, this Petition.18

The Issues

In her Memorandum,19 petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"1) Upon the denial of petitioner’s demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is she under
obligation, as a matter of inflexible rule, as what the Court of Appeals required of her, to present her evidence, and when an
unfavorable [verdict] is handed down, appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law, despite the palpably and patently
weak and grossly insufficient or so inadequate evidence of the private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of marriage case,
grounded on psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family Code? Or under such circumstances, can the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari be directly and immediately resorted to by the petitioner; and

"2) In upholding the lower court’s denial of petitioner’s demurrer to evidence, did the Court of Appeals wantonly violate,
ignore or disregard in a whimsical manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February
13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58 SCRA 17)?"20

Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence? and (2) in its denial, did
the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Resort to Certiorari

Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent weakness and gross insufficiency of respondent’s
evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Echoing the CA, respondent
counters that appeal in due course, not certiorari, is the proper remedy.

We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.

However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People,21 this Court declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in due time was indeed the
proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and allow certiorari when the lower court acts with
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:

"No appeal may be taken from:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) An interlocutory order;

xxx xxx xxx

"In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65." 22

In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:

"SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying
the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require."23

Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari.24 In Cruz v. People, this exception was stressed by the Court in this wise:

"Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge interlocutory orders of the trial
court may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of
discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies."25

Second Issue:

Denial of Demurrer to Evidence

Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional circumstances, this Court is now tasked to determine
whether the present case falls under the exception; that is, whether the RTC indeed committed a "patent error" or grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the
issue."26 The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a verdict.27 In passing upon the sufficiency of
the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.28

We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that the evidence against respondent (herein
petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of
the parties’ marriage.

First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latter’s psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury,29 false
testimony,30 concubinage31 and deportation.32 According to him, the filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed
that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the country. He contends
that this "is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband as the father of her
children, had acted to the contrary."33

We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, even if taken as true, merely
establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological
incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.

Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary offerings, sufficient to
prove petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity. He testified in these words:

"Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by ‘psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.’ What do you mean by that?
 A Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time she even want it aborted by taking pills. She
was even immature, carefree, and she lacked the intention of procreative sexuality.34

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. CHUA:

And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically incapacitated? Will you please elaborate on this what you
mean by ‘carefree’ approximating psychologically incapacitated?

ATTY. MIRANO:

I think we better ask the witness what he means by ‘carefree.’

ATTY. CHUA:

Okay.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

WITNESS:

She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child, she wants me to hire an attendant in order to
take care of the child. Even when the children were sick she does not bother to let the children see a doctor.35

xxx xxx xxx

"STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):

‘ATTY. CHUA:

Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to the defendant, did you notice any characteristic or traits
which you consider as psychological incapacity?’

WITNESS:

Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she won’t talk to me when I call her up by telephone. So,
all she wanted for me to visit her everytime and even at the time when I am busy with some other things. So, I think that is
all."36

Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects of petitioner’s personality; namely, her
alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of procreative sexuality." None of these
three, singly or collectively, constitutes "psychological incapacity." Far from it.

In Santos v. CA,37 this Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability."38 Said the Court:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family
Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity’ under Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's ‘Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code
and their Parallels in Canon Law,’ quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's ‘Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases’). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
‘psychological incapacity’ should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological
incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."39

Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,40 we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or
a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There
was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union.

Sorely lacking in respondent’s evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the disability of
a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage."41

Respondent’s pious peroration that petitioner "lacked the intention of procreative sexuality" is easily belied by the fact that two
children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged "defect" was already existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.

Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony presented by respondent. His
witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity.
Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither
did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The pertinent portions of his testimony are quoted thus:

"ATTY. CHUA:

And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties, meaning the husband and the wife in the present
case have a personality which is normal. That is your conclusion?

WITNESS:

They are normal, but they cannot mix together.

Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that they are not compatible with each other?

A. Yes.

Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any personality disorder, bordering on abnormality?

A. Yes.

Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly match?

A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who knows how to handle marriage, that should
try to intervene.

Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we call maximum tolerance and give and take, will
that serve the purpose?

A. That would served the purpose of getting well.

Q. Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?

A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally disordered. It cannot be harmonized. So this case,
if only they have tried professional help to take care of their marital problem, it could have been solved.

Q. Or the situation could have been remedied?

A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not just any from Tom, Dick and Harry could
handle this. That means from the very beginning they have personalities which they were incompatible. So if anybody would
handle that, they will not mix, they will be always quarreling with each other. They should not have got married.42

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was sought by the plaintiff, and you found out that both are normal?

A. With different personalities. So that they were incompatible.

Q. Normal, simply incompatible.

A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there in my last page. That they are like oil and water,
immiscible. Like oil and water, they will not mix.

Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told you about the frequent quarrels had with the wife.
Did he ever tell you that was a serious or major quarrel?

A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels.43

xxx xxx xxx

Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities?

A. Yes.44

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make them reconcile?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked out?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of those who possess the necessary [expertise]
could be worked out?

A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy.45

 xxx xxx xxx

Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity existing in this case?

A. Yes.

Q. Because of the …

A. The incompatibility.

Q. Incompatibility.

A. Yes.46

His testimony established merely that the spouses had an "incompatibility," a "defect" that could possibly be treated or alleviated
through psychotherapy. We need not expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to establish the
psychological incapacity of petitioner.

Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by respondent.
The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his
Professional Opinion47 began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x x."48 The expert
witness testified thus:

"ATTY. CHUA

Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your material data from the plaintiff who is the husband?

WITNESS

A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to interview Leni, and he said, he doesn’t know.

ATTY. CHUA

Q He doesn’t know. Now, Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same personal interview and written psychological
examination on the part of the wife, [w]ould you be willing to do that?

WITNESS

A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them reconcile."49

Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by
respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his
testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.

Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioner’s character, not only through the
descriptions given by respondent, but also through the former’s at least fifteen hours50 of study of the voluminous transcript of
records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine the records of this case, we still find
his assessment of petitioner’s psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.

As to respondent’s argument -- that because Dr. Gauzon’s testimony had never been objected to, the objection raised thereafter was
deemed waived -- the Supreme Court has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of admissibility of evidence
could not be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be disregarded whether objected to or not,
because it has no probative value.51

We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately.52 Here, however, the
totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity -- more so
without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and taken into account the
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed
further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly and clearly insufficient to
support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC
to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Court’s rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the process of litigation would have
been a total waste of time and money for the parties and an unwelcome imposition on the trial court’s docket.

We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.53 Any decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to overruling a
judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion.54

There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the case at bar. An appeal
would not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining the baseless action of
respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted trial, which would further clog the court dockets with
another futile case.55

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent’s
Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged psychological
incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003]

DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision[1] as well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order[2] dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private respondents
Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first petition)
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87.[3] On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw
Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana. This time, the
case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106
(trial court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to state a cause
of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum shopping.
Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion.
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order (first order) deferring resolution of the
Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the
trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order (second order) denying the motion.
In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to
state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner
Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus
giving rise to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping
in filing the second petition. Judge Pison explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition (Civil
Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial
courts first order deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order erred in deferring action on the Motion
until after a hearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial
courts second order corrected the situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court in effect denied the
Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to
sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the existence of forum
shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case must amount to res judicata in the other. In this
case, there is no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the first petition before
filing the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because there is no final decision on the merits.

Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE

SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94
IN FAILING TO STATE THE FILING OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS
TERMINATION AND STATUS.[4]

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Sufficiency of Cause of Action

Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is untenable. A cause of action is an act or
omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff.[5] A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three
essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the
defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.[6]
 We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code.[7] The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married at
the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached to the petition. The couple established
their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October
1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978.
The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the
non-complied marital obligations in this manner:

xxx

5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a
disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the whole
day.

6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew
to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.

7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her
feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted to feel
a little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued that he could occupy another room in their
conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade her from demanding
that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.

8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their
conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.

9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner waived his right to
the conjugal dwelling in respondents favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The
separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present time.

10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of
gains is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof.

11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the
psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.

12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is void ab initio and needs to be
annulled. This petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof.

xxx.[8]

The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the
old Rules of Court.[9] Ultimate facts refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of
action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the material
elements.[10]
Petitioner Diana relies mainly[11] on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals[12] as well as in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina.[13] Santos gave life to the phrase psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the Family Code, by defining the term
in this wise:

xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. xxx.
 Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in cases for annulment of marriages
grounded on psychological incapacity.[14]
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she
contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The
second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is
permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the
disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marital
obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new Rules).[15]Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages

x x x.

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or
both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time
of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)

Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[16] The obvious effect of the new Rules
providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root
cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and control the human body. Scientists
still do not understand everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of many
psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the
new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos
second petition complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of
petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] the
Court held:

In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the
complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be
done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be
assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that
the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain(Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all the factual
averments in the complaint.[18] Given the hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could render judgment
over the case.

Forum Shopping

Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions certificate of non-forum shopping which does not
mention the filing of the first petition and its dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94.[19] Petitioner Diana refers to
this portion of Circular No. 04-94-
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory
pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the
best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the
status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed.[20]

Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of non-forum shopping that he had
previously commenced a similar action based on the same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of non-forum
shopping should have stated the fact of termination of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to the petition or one belatedly filed or
one signed by counsel and not the party himself constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in the dismissal
of the complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously held that the rule of substantial compliance applies to the
contents of the certification.[21]
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the omission of a statement on the prior
filing and dismissal of a case involving the same parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:

xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia
as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought
to be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would be more in
keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.

The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did not also amount
to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition (Civil Case No.
Q-95-24471) about the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to keep the peace between him and his
grown up children. The dismissal happened before service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia
since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently filed the second
petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.
Circular No. 04-94,[23] now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, must be interpreted and applied to achieve
its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice. The
Circular should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal
of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[24]
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family that the state cherishes and protects.[25] In rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of whether the
marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this issue after trial on the merits where each
party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the allegations
in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action and does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the
second petition is not subject to attack by a motion to dismiss on these grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as well as the Resolution dated 7 August
1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

[G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision[1] dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals[2] affirming the decision[3]
dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between
herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her
husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave
birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became
manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support.
She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on
July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the
motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of
general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60
days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The
trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He
prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated.
On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby
declared NULL and VOID.

The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into the records of the
afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.

SO ORDERED.[4]

In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:

It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father
to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to
the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very
immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital
life.[5]

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand,
judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[6]

The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and
returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months,
he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he
did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his
family, and to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support pursuant to Article 68 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as a social
inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left
them without even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68
to 71 of the Family Code?[7]

The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina[8] and
Santos vs. Court of Appeals.[9] In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a mixed marriage, the husband
being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform
his marital obligations, despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.[10]

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically
constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of
reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of
the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[11]Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.[12]
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines provides that:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita
vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.[13] (emphasis supplied)

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.[14] The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically
identified. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.[15]
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned them a month
after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did
not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume
his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due
to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.[16] There was no showing that the case at bar was
not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact
that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.[17] There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.[18]
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a
mixed marriage, the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction
between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,[19] this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects.
While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005
amended decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004 decision3(original decision) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The Factual Antecedents

On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support his family, Cesar went
to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having
an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin.
Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity.8

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She
insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.9

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home.10He testified that
he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.11

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for
Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness,"13 but had been "unable
to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other
depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go
with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship."16

The RTC Ruling

In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not
serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which she
was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of
the nullity of a marriage.

Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its original decision
and entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision,20 the CA found two circumstances indicative of
Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital
obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.

The Petition

The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a
psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not
constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.

The Case for the Respondent

Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave and incurable
psychological incapacity.

The Issue

The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence

on Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that
"a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."

In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations";21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at
the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.23

Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s

psychological incapacity

In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he learned
of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home,24 as well as his continued financial support to her and their
children even after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and
abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The
psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness.28 Dr. Flores’ observation
on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she
was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time
element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship;
workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human
relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as
measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this
purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital
relationship30 is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed a reversible
error when it reconsidered its original decision.1âwphi1

Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the
parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lolita Castillo-Encelan.

Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 201988

MARIA VICTORIA SOCORRO LONTOC-CRUZ, Petitioner

vs.
NILO SANTOS CRUZ, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The most challenging part of being in a difficult marriage is to thrive in one. In the case of petitioner Maria Victoria Socorro
Lontoc-Cruz (Marivi) and respondent Nilo Santos Cruz (Nilo), their marriage withered as this was beset with problems such as the
lack of quality time, recriminations, disillusionment, loss of passion, and infidelity. The estranged spouses considered their union as
non-functional, attributing the failure of their marriage to their respective personality disorders that repelled each other.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1challenges the November 22, 2011 Decision2 and May 29, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93736 that affirmed the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 207, Muntinlupa
City in Civil Case No. 05-095 which refused to declare the marriage void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Factual Antecedents

Twenty-two-year-old Marivi met 28-year old Nilo sometime in March 1986. They became steady in August of the same year. Nilo,
whose job was then in Hong Kong, prodded Marivi to marry him so she could join him there soonest. Marivi agreed. The couple
married in a civil ceremony5 on October 21, 1986 followed by a church wedding6on February 8, 1987. The marriage produced two
sons: Antonio Manuel, born on April 25, 1988, and Jose Nilo, born on September 9, 1992.

On July 7, 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage7 based on
psychological incapacity. She averred that it had been medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from "inadequate personality
disorder related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal complex,"8 while she herself was found to be suffering
from a "personality disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic with immaturity x x x."9

To show that Nilo failed to provide her with the necessary emotional, psychological, and physical support, Marivi cited the
following:

1. His infidelity and his non-commitment to the marriage as he continued to act like a bachelor;

2. The lack of 'oneness' in the marriage as Nilo would make decisions (on financial matters) without consulting or considering her
suggestions; treating her as a housemate or a "mayordoma;" keeping from her his whereabouts, when he would come home or how
much his income was;
3. The lack of sexual contact for more than a decade as Nilo made excuses;

4. Putting up a facade that he is a caring, concerned, and loving husband, especially to his bosses; and

5. Preference towards the company of his peers/friends.10

In his Answer,11 Nilo claimed that he was madly in love with Marivi; that at the start of their relationship, both he and Mari vi
would exhibit negative personality traits which they overlooked; that he believed that both he and Marivi were suffering from
psychological incapacity; and that he was not singularly responsible for the breakdown of their marriage. He stressed that Marivi
also contributed to the deterioration of their union, to wit:

1. Marivi would demand that he behave in ways he was not accustomed to or inconsistent with his career position;

2. Marivi was jealous of his friends; and would often make hasty conclusions that he was having an affair with other women;

3. Marivi would exhibit volatile temperament if things did not go her way; would not admit mistakes, and blame others instead;

4. Marivi would make decisions impulsively, such as changing an item she gets tired of, or demanding that Nilo change a motor
vehicle simply because she did not like it; and

5. She lacked respect for Nilo, and would speak to him degradingly, and even accuse him of being gay or a homosexual.12

On October 11, 2006, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision13 approving the parties' Compromise Agreement14pertaining to
custody, support, and dissolution of the properties. Trial on the issue of the nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity ensued.

Marivi's Version

Marivi narrated that when they were still going steady, Nilo would only spend Saturdays and Sundays with her and devote the
weekdays to partying with his friends; that even after their engagement, Nilo would still meet other women and accept invitations to
beauty pageants and cocktails;15 that Nilo was not the type who would kiss passionately; that Nilo would not engage in foreplay
during sex, but wished only to satisfy himself; that Nilo would engage in anal sex and would only stop when she complained that it
was painful; that Nilo would thereafter sleep, leaving her feeling "used," and that Nilo was impulsive, daring, and adventurous.16

She also claimed that Nilo would habitually come home late; that Friday nights were Nilo's boys' night out; that unless she would
ask him to take her out on a date, Nilo would not do so; and that Nilo would call her a "nagger" even if she was merely asking him
to come home early.17

Marivi further narrated that Nilo would engage in extramarital affairs; that a few months into their marriage, Nilo had an affair with
an unmarried female officemate;18 that Nilo ended the affair only after she (Mari vi) threatened to tell his employer/supervisor;19
that Nilo had another affair a few weeks after the birth of their second son; that when confronted with his womanizing and made to
choose between her and the children or the other women, Nilo replied that he was "confused,"20 which prompted her to leave and
stay in Cebu with her parents; and that she heard from her friends that while she was in Cebu, Nilo was living a bachelor's life.21

Marivi added that she eventually reconciled with Nilo but despite the reconciliation, Nilo never really changed, and that he
remained indifferent, insensitive, and unappreciative. According to Marivi, she would instead call up her parents and sisters to talk
about their family problems;22 that while he (Nilo) told people that he was proud of her, he never gave her the emotional,
psychological, and physical support she needed.23 She felt like she was no more than a mayordoma to him, and that they were just
"housemates." Nilo would come home late on weekdays and preferred to go out with his friends. Their quarrels were frequent and
their conversations were superficial; Nilo would rather talk about himself, instead of asking Marivi about her day or about their
children. He was controlling and domineering,24 and refused to consider her suggestions; he would not want his money mingled
with her (Marivi's) money.25 Nilo would shell out money when he wanted to buy things, but would make excuses when it came to
Mari vi's suggestion for a family vacation.26 Marivi also claimed that Nilo had no sense of companionship with their children; and
that Nilo even told their son that their brand new house was everything to him.27

Marivi was moreover bothered by Nilo's effeminate ways; he was vain and would have weekly "beauty" treatments.28Furthermore,
they no long had sex after the birth of their second son. While they tried to have sex twice, Nilo failed to have an erection. After that,
Nilo would refuse to have sex with her which made her (Marivi) question his sexual orientation, so much so that Nilo physically
hurt her when she questioned his virility.29

Marivi's father, Manuel, likewise stated that Marivi would call them up for help because Nilo had hurt her during the couple's
quarrel; that their marriage was not harmonious due to Marivi's youth and her unfamiliarity with Nilo's personality and family
values. He considered Nilo only as a provider, not as a husband and a good father to his sons.30

Marivi's younger sister, Margarita Ledesma (Margarita), who lived for four years with Nilo and Marivi, claimed to have witnessed
how lonely Marivi was. She alleged that Nilo was absent when Marivi gave birth to their second son; that Nilo was short-tempered
when driving; and that the couple would often fight because Nilo would always come home late or because Marivi suspected Nilo
of infidelity. Margarita believed that Nilo did not really want to save the marriage, although he told her that he loves Marivi and the
children.31

Nilo's Version

Nilo acknowledged his contribution to the breakdown of the marriage because his job required him to come home late, his inability
to sexually perform adequately, his failure to be the "ideal husband,"32 and because he had had extramarital affairs in the years 1992,
2002, and 2006.33 At the same time, Nilo insisted that Marivi also contributed to the collapse of their union.

According to Nilo, Marivi would always want to know his companions and whereabouts; would demand information about his
female acquaintances; and would even call up his workplace to ask where he was. Moreover, her conceit and her "prima donna"
attitude embarrassed him. Marivi would order him to act in accordance with their stature in life, and would demand that he instruct
his office staff to accord her special treatment as Hewlett Packard's "first lady" during the time that he was Hewlett Packard's
President. Marivi would also instruct their housemaids to call him "sefiorito;" and she would make a "big deal" out of her being a
"mestiza," and would think of herself a "trophy wife."34

Nilo claimed that Marivi was "unappreciative" of him, had a misdirected sense of self-entitlement, and would complain if she did
not get her own way, as she was used to, she being her father's favorite daughter; Marivi did not even care about discussing family
finances with him as long as she got what she wanted. She also had a violent temper and would hurl things at him during their
fights; that she would blame him for everything, and would keep on reciting his past mistakes. Marivi did not understand the
demands of his job, and unfairly compared his work to her father's job, the operation of which was limited to a single area, a
compound in a mine site in Cebu. He explained that the multinational companies he then worked for required him to work beyond
the normal office hours because he has to meet "sales quotas in millions of dollars," entertain people from different headquarters,
and meet with different clients from areas far from his residence.35

Worse, Nilo was turned off by Marivi's act of broadcasting to her whole clan his inadequacies during their intimate sexual relations,
which began after he witnessed Marivi giving birth to their first child. When he confided to Marivi about this, she instead accused
him of having another affair. Since then, he did not feel any sexual excitement and attraction toward her when they were together.
Instead of discussing the problem with him candidly, she accused him of being gay. Nilo stated that the last time they had sex was
in 1997 or in 1998.36

The Clinical Findings

In support of her claim that she and Nilo were suffering from psychological incapacity, Marivi presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr.
Villegas), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Ruben Encarnacion (Dr. Encarnacion), a clinical psychologist.

Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nilo to have "inadequate personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved
oedipal complex,"37 while she diagnosed Marivi to have "personality disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic, with
immaturity x x x."38

In the March 21, 2005 Psychiatric Report,39 Dr. Villegas stated:

The root cause of the above clinical conditions, on the part of Marivi Cruz, were the overindulgence and over attention of her
parents, in a prolonged manner, carried over to adult adjustments. On the part of Nilo Cruz, his negative identification and
resentments towards his father and close attachments to his mother, continued by his long-time maid, to the point of an oedipal
situation led to his inadequacy, along masculine strivings, with difficult assertions of his authority and power.

The above clinical conditions existed prior [to] marriage but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital stresses and
demands. Both are considered as permanent in nature, because they started early in their developmental stage, and therefore became
so deeply engrained into their personality structures. Both are considered grave in degree, because they hampered, interfered and
disrupted their normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments.40

According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate each others' weaknesses and that the incapacities of the parties are grave
because they preferred to satisfy their own needs rather than to give in to the other's needs.41

She claimed that Nilo's lack of a father figure weakened his masculinity. He cross-identified himself with his mother because his
father, a disciplinarian and the thrifty one, was often absent because of his military service. While he was still a teenager, his mother
migrated to Canada and their long-time maid acted as his surrogate mother. Nilo sought from his wife his mother's nurturing
qualities, but he felt hostility when Marivi failed to meet his ego ideal. His aggression was in the form of passivity, punishing his
wife by not sexually performing.42

Dr. Villegas noted that Nilo would put on a facade, a compensatory mechanism according to social norms. While he was not exactly
a homosexual, he covered up his weak masculine traits by being a "playboy." Nilo could only comply with the financial obligation
of marital life, but not the psychological and emotional parts of it.43 Nilo likewise was an inadequate father figure to his own two
sons, especially the younger, who has already manifested strong feminine traits.44

Marivi, on the other hand, expected that her interactions with the world would be like that of her own close-knit family, a
perception attributable to her parents' prolonged gratification of her dependency needs. Her father was a dedicated, devoted, and
responsible family man who regularly came home to spend time with them, while her mother was a good housewife, who always
found time to personally attend to their needs. Dr. Villegas described Marivi’s one with strong mood fluctuations, emotionally
immature, with low self-esteem has difficulty neutralizing the outbreak of negativity in her behavior, is suggestible, egocentric, and
impelled by a desire to "extort" from others. To Dr. Villegas, the couple's respective personality disorders were mutually repelling,
their brain waves not being in sync because what Marivi expected from Nilo happened to be Nilo's weakest point.45

Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas' diagnosis. On the basis of Nilo's five-to-six sessions and Marivi's eight bi-weekly
psychotherapy sessions with him, Dr. Encarnacion concluded that there was no chance of a successful marriage in a dysfunctional
union when there is double psychological incapacity. He categorically stated that Nilo was incapable of being a good husband and a
good father. Nilo lacked an individual coherent identity and instead went by the standards of general society, which is driven by the
desire to gain material wealth, power, and control. Nilo did not like close relationships and was incapable of forming some; his
social anxiety, associated with paranoid fears, was manifested by excessive vanity. Nilo projected an image of a wealthy, successful,
handsome man surrounded by women, in none of whom, however, he was interested in a long-term sexual relationship; he saw
himself as a performer-provider and was disinterested in spending quality time with his family, in carrying on conversations with
members of his family, insensitive, intolerant, and demanding.46

Dr. Encarnacion attributed respondent's psychological disorder to his childhood, in which he did not have fond memories of tender
moments and vacation times with his family. Nilo grew up very close to his mother who always listened to his complaints and with
whom he sympathized, hence his unresolved oedipal issues; even as he patterned his masculinity strivings after his stingy father, the
family provider, but whom he nonetheless described as "unappreciative, undemonstrative, and quite materialistic." At the age of 18,
when his parents migrated to Canada and left him in the Philippines, he then lost his role models, incapacitating him from creating
his own identity. Thus, when he began working at the age of 21, he imbibed the values of his workplace, where feelings and
emotional discussions were absent, factors that nonetheless somehow worked to his advantage in his job.47 Dr. Encarnacion opined
that Nilo's incapacity was his "rigidity," which drove him into imposing his family upbringing on his mvn family, instead of
adjusting to the modem family setup, i.e., that the modem father should take on new roles and be part of family activities where his
family needs him to be, e.g. taking the children to the pediatrician or to the park, camping with the family, or being with them in
church, instead of strictly confining himself to being a provider.48

As for Marivi, Dr. Encarnacion found that she exhibited "Histrionic Personality Behaviors and Features" as manifested by her
impressionistic speech, her exaggerated expression of emotions, and her suggestibility. He stated that Marivi's "inflexibility"
consisted in her expecting a high standard of faithfulness from all men as exemplified by her dad, who was also very devoted to her
mother. However, because dissatisfied and frustrated by her actual marital situation, she sought attention, externalized blame,
displayed anger, mistrust, resentment, and self-indulgence.49

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its October 13, 2008 Decision,50 the RTC denied the Petition.

The RTC took a dim view of the expert witnesses' attribution of a double psychological incapacity to Marivi's nature of being a
"father figure woman," and to Nilo's "oedipal complex." The court noted that Marivi already disengaged herself from her father as
her standard of an ideal husband when she married Nilo, despite the latter's limitations and his then being already very focused on
his job. Marivi's need for assurance that she is loved, vis-a-vis her looking up to her father as her standard, was not by itself
sufficient to declare her psychologically incapacitated.

As for Nilo, the RTC found no concrete evidence of "oedipal complex;" the RTC held that prioritizing his work over the emotional
needs of his family was not reflective of his psychological incapacity because what he did was still for his family's benefit. Neither
was Nilo's lack of sexual interest in Marivi a case of psychological incapacity, for this was a result of his being turned off by
Marivi's unabated naggings and her revelations to her family of his sexual inadequacies.

From the RTC's verdict, petitioner appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its November 22, 2011 Decision,51 the CA united with the RTC in rejecting the alleged existence of psychological incapacity
pointed out by Dr. Villegas and by Dr. Encarnacion.

The CA found that Dr. Villegas and Dr. Encarnacion failed to paint a clear picture of the supposed gravity or seriousness of Nilo's
psychological incapacity, and that it was unconvinced of the doctors' conclusion that Nilo had a deep propensity to cover up for his
serious inadequacies.

It ruled that Marivi failed to prove that Nilo's failure to comply with his sexual obligation was due to some psychological condition
or makeup, as this could very well be explained by the stress brought about by Marivi's negative attitude toward Nilo, who was
turned off by her act of revealing to her clan their bedroom secrets instead of privately resolving the problem with him. Moreover,
the CA said it is a non sequitur, that just because he could not sexually perform according to Marivi's standard, he should thus be
labelled a gay or homosexual. It appears that Nilo has "selective" impotency, for while he could not have an erection for Marivi, he
nevertheless had had extramarital affairs. Neither did the CA see anything wrong with Nilo's "put-on fa9ade" of a happy marriage to
protect the family's privacy.

The CA did not even consider Marivi's alleged histrionic traits as reflected in her behavior, e.g., her persistent demand as to Nilo's
whereabouts, her constant naggings, her attention-seeking acts, grave or serious enough to qualify as psychological incapacity. The
CA ruled that it was the couple's irreconcilable differences that marred their marriage; that the negative acts or actions of one
spouse were neutralized or offset by the other's negative acts or actions, and that these are "mere character flaws or bad habits that
the spouses developed over the years [which] can be modified or changed depending on the desire of either spouse to do so."52 The
CA thereafter disposed of the appeal, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in CV No. 05-095 denying the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage between appellant Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz and appellee Nilo Santos Cruz for
insufficiency of evidence is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED."53

Marivi moved for a reconsideration but it was denied in the CA's May 29, 2012 Resolution.54

Issue

At issue before us is whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall under Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant the
declaration of nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

We sustain the findings of both the RTC and the CA.

Article 36 of the Family Code states:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and applying this provision. In Republic v. De Gracia, 55 we reiterated the doctrine in
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 56 "that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved)." Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 57 we reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, as embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 58 viz.:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.x x x.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.

xxxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage.x x x.

xxxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.

xxxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be accepted as root causes.x x x.

xxxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

xxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.

Notably, "mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting personalities' [as in the present case,] in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity."59 "Nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons" amount to
psychological incapacity.60 We further elucidated in Yambao v. Republic61that the psychological condition should render the subject
totally unaware or incognitive of the basic marital obligations:

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true
inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations
of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.62

In Marcos v. Marcos, 63 the actual medical examination of the one claimed to have psychological incapacity is not a condition sine
qua non, for what matters is the totality of evidence to sustain a finding of such psychological incapacity. While it behooves this
Court to weigh the clinical findings of psychology experts as part of the evidence, the court's hands are nonetheless free to make its
own independent factual findings. "It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings."64

With specific reference to the case before us, even granting that both parties did suffer from personality disorders as evaluated by
the expert witnesses, we find that the conclusions reached by these expert witnesses do not irresistibly point to the fact that the
personality disorders which plague the spouses antedated the marriage; that these personality disorders are indeed grave or serious;
or that these personality disorders are incurable or permanent as to render the parties psychologically incapacitated to carry out and
carry on their marital duties. What can be inferred from the totality of evidence, at most, is a case of incompatibility. For a
personality disorder to be declared clinically or medically incurable or permanent is one thing; for a spouse to refuse or to be
reluctant to perform his/her marital duties is another.65

Indeed, we are loath to overturn the findings of the RTC and the CA. More than that, too, the evidence on record do not square with
the existence of psychological incapacity as contemplated by law and jurisprudence. In the case of Nilo, what brought about the
breakdown of his relationship with Marivi was not necessarily attributable to his so-called "psychological disorder" but can be
imputed to his work and marital stress, and his ordinary human failings.

With regard to his failure to sexually perform "adequately," the same appeared to be a case of "selective impotency," as he was
turned off by Marivi's disclosure of their bed secrets to her family. Furthermore, Nilo testified that the sexual problem with Marivi
did not crop up until the birth of their second son, and that he felt that the blame was invariably and unfairly laid on upon him, thus:

THE COURT:

The Court has just some questions with regard to the main issue. During your direct testimony; Mr. Witness, you mentioned some
of your faults which [may be] the reason why the instant case was filed. x x x one of those faults is no sex. When did that happen? x
xx

A. If I recall it right, Your Honor; I [had] some challenge[s] immediately after the first birth of my eldest son which I x x x shared
with the psychologist or psychiatrist who [had] examined me.

THE COURT:

But when you got married with your wife that was not a problem until the birth of your last son?

A. Yes, your Honor.

x x x x66

ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:

Q. So it is attributable to the petitioner though you claim that it is your fault, is that correct?

A. Because, your Honor, that kind of situation, I always get blamed, so for the purpose of settling all these questions, when you
make that mistake, you'll always be the one to be blamed although as per the psychologist and the psychiatrist, there's also a reason
why I am not able to perform sex to my wife because in those ten (10) years that we were together, after the first one, [didn't] have
any other affairs but I kept being blamed that I [had] just because I [was] not able to perform sex to her. The whole family, her
family knows that in that premise because I got, one time, in one of our quarrels x x x told me, ''maybe you're not making love with
my daughter because you are having an affair with another woman." So, I know 1 made a mistake in the past but if I'm x x x kept
[being] reminded of it, it's a punishment, your Honor.

xxxx

Q. What you initially said was your fault was ... as you're now talking before this Honorable Court, is really the fault of 1he
petitioner; is that what you are saying?

A. There [were] times, your Honor, I would say it was my fault. There [were] times it was caused by her faults as well. H's not one
plus one It was hers and one plus one it was mine, it depends on the situation. We've been dealing with cases before so not all the
time it's the fault of Mrs. Cruz. And not all the time it's the fault of Mr. Cruz. It's a relationship, there are times it's hers, there are
times, it's mine but we're able to fix it until this annulment situation came.

x x x x67

Nor can it be said that Nilo's failure to provide quality time for the family was caused by his "inadequate personality disorder" or
"unresolved oedipal complex." Nilo explained that he has a taxing and demanding job, and that unfortunately, with his working
hours eating up his home life, while he was able to provide his family with an adequate standard of living, the lack of quality time
for his wife became attenuated and resulted in severing his bond with Mari vi, who failed to understand the nature of his job. They
were a happy couple during the period of courtship, and even during the early years of their marriage. Nilo testified:

ATTY. REVILLA:

Q. x x x What was the reason why you had to stay up late?

A. Ma'am, I'm .. .in those I.T. companies that I worked for whether manager or managing director, my companies are ... the
companies are involved in sales and marketing and support so it entails entertainment of clients, entertainment of principals coming
from headquarters and entertainment of customers with my staff and other company.

Q. When you say LT., what does it stand for?

A. Information Technology.

Q. You also referred to a headquarters. What do you mean by headquarters?

A. Headquarters, if you work in a multinational company like companies I worked for, they have headquarters in Hong Kong, they
have headquarters in Singapore, they have headquarters in the U.S.

Q. So you had to entertain principals coming from [these] headquarters?

A. As a part of the job as required by the principals who [visit] us.

Q. How often were you required to stay out late because of your job?

A. Ma'am, it is unpredictable. Sometimes, we were required to stay for dinner and entertainment thereafter. Sometimes, we can go
home early also.

Q. Could you not refuse the invitations of going out and just go home and spend time with your family?

A. Sometimes I can refuse, sometimes I cannot. Because it becomes a condition of sale of the clients x x x.

xxxx

Q. So x x x what's the latest time of the night that you usually come home?

A. My objective as a husband and as a father is to really come as early as I can which I have explained on and on, your Honor. But
to meet my million dollar targets of the country, I have to do things beyond 5 o'clock. In several occasions when I tried to go home
early, to my disappointment, my kids are not at home because they were borrowed by my in-laws to have merienda. That's why I
complained to my wife that time that "please tell me if they are going with my in-laws because I don't want to deprive them also of
the few times I'm able to go home early."

Q. So, you are saying that you only have few times of coming home early?

A. Well, yes, but not very few.

Q. Okay. Have you tried to make an effort to remedy the situation?

A. Well, if I have my way to be able to direct my appointments in the South, my meetings in Amkor Anam, Mamplasan, in Sta.
Rosa then that will allow me to be home at least 5-6 o'clock. But most of my meetings in Makati, Quezon City, Manila especially
with government clients [do] allow me to go home early, your Honor.

x x x x68

THE COURT:

What about another fault you mentioned which is staying late, when did this thing happen?

A. When I came back from my assignment in Hong Kong in 1988 when I was given a new job in sales and marketing.

xxxx

THE COURT:

So before the birth of your children, that is after your marriage with the petitioner, this was not a problem?

A. Because, your Honor, I was assigned in Hong Kong and I was only twelve (12) minutes [away] by [foot] to our office x x x.

xxxx

And I was not in [sales] and marketing, I was the Administrative Assistant of the President of IBM in Southeast Asia so it's the ...
purely management administrative work as an administrative assistant so there's [not] much of entertaining done in Hong Kong.

THE COURT:

Okay, so in other words, at that time, that was not a problem. It was only a problem when you were appointed to your position in ...

A. IBM.

THE COURT:

That was so many years after you got married with your wife

A We got married, your Honor, in 1987 then we went back to the Philippines in July 1988 [when] I was given a new marketing and
[sales] role as a manager of general marketing which is ... which encompasses all industries aside [from] the government.

THE COURT:

So you mean to say that this problem of staying late only happened lately?

xxxx

A The definition, your Honor, of my family... late is when you don't make it at 7:00 o'clock or. .. [with] the family at 7:00 o'clock in
the evening. So ifl don't make it at seven, I considered myself late.

THE COURT:

What is the reason why you have been late?

A Your Honor, my job is not a 9 to 5 job because we ... we call on customers, we entertain customers, partners, principals, we also
have fellowship with our teams. So, we either have dinner or we have happy hours. We also see friends after. So but, physically I
cannot do that everyday, your Honor, because I also wake up automatically at 6:00 everyday whether I have a drink, or have dinner,
or I worked out in the evening or play[ed] basketball during that time, I always wake up at six. So if I stayed up late like
previously... like 2, 3, it's gonna be a burden for me physically and [I would be] unable to perform my job well. So, like I mentioned
earlier in a hearing, your Honor, many times I tried to be home by 10 to be able to watch. Before 10 to be able to watch the 10:00
o'clock news and be able to enjoy my ice cream while watching it.

THE COURT:

Well, one of those faults you mentioned is also working hard, why did you say that it is your fault?

A In our industry, your Honor, when you work out, you will definitely end up late several couple of times, but not all the time.

xxxx

Your Honor, sometimes, I get all these complaints. But when they saw my picture in the newspaper or in the TV having success
stories and contract signing, they are proud of me.

THE COURT:

When you say "so proud of me," to whom are you referring x x x?

A. My family. They call me, they congratulate me, we have dinners together to celebrate but to get to that, is the working hard and
staying away from the family.

xxxx

THE COURT:

How long did you court your wife?

A. Six (6) months, your Honor.

x x x x69

THE COURT:

Could you say that you were a perfect couple at that time?

A. When we were starting, your Honor, we [were] happy, and during the time that we were in Hong Kong. But when we went back
to Manila, there are times (the witness is in tears) ... adjusting to work and family that is why it affected my relationship to her
family and combination of mistakes happened which I admitted.

THE COURT:

How would you describe your wife during your first years of marriage?

A. [She was] a very good wife.

THE COURT:

Did she perform her duties as a wife and as a mother?

A. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

And was she that independent from her parents or she was too dependent [on] her parents?

A. On her performing her duties, with the ... as a wife and as a friend, she's independent. When it comes to our problems, she would
consult her family.
THE COURT:

So only those times when you have a problem. Like what problems, Mr. Witness?

A. Our relationship, your Honor.

THE COURT:

But most of the time, you were able to patch up your problems?

A. Yes, your Honor.

x x x x70

Interestingly, when asked if there was no more functional marital life between him and Marivi, Nilo candidly highlighted his
different perception from his estranged wife:

ATTY. STA MARIA, JR.:

Q. So, Mr. Witness, well in reality today, Mr. Witness, even the petitioner believes that there is no more functional marital life in
this relationship, would you agree with that?

A. If that's the way she thinks, I...I will have my own way of looking at things because ...

xxxx

Q. Even ... as I was saying since she was asking for nullity and you were asking for nullity, it's a fact of life as of today, as you
speak today that there is no more functional marital life between the two (2) of you?

A. You see, your Honor, that's why we're different. Her style is conclude and conclude. I have a different style because of my
background. I will only stop till death. I cannot share her legal counsel's statement with my own thinking, your Honor.

x x x x71

Even the psychiatrist Dr. Villegas pinpointed the differences of the estranged couple which led to squabbles -

ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:

Q. Doctor, from your examination of both respondent and petitioner the obligation of trust and respect for each other, how did it not
manifest in this relationship?

A.The respondent [sees] the petitioner as one who's very negativistic on him or who's very demanding and who is also trying to put
him down because according to him, the petitioner would always see his weak points rather than his strong points.

Q. Are you saying that this developed a non-trust just between them?

A None trust. They do not trust each other anymore.1âwphi1 On the part of the petitioner, because of his womanizing activities and
on the part of the respondent, that the petitioner is always looking at his weak points rather than his strong points.

x x x x72

It is significant to note that Marivi failed to substantiate Nilo's penchant for womanizing as a manifestation of his psychological
incapacity. Aside from her bare allegations, which were chiefly based on what other people told her, she never presented irrefutable
proof to corroborate her claims of his sexual proclivities, i.e., that these proclivities were already existing before the marriage and
during the first years of their marriage. Nilo, on the other hand, categorically admitted to having extramarital affairs in 1992, 2002,
and 2006, the period when the marriage was already on the rocks. Neither is there evidence of Nilo's alleged oedipal complex, the
manifestations of which were not cited by the experts, that caused the couple to fall out of love.
Anent Marivi's case, based on her family history as reflected in the experts' clinical evaluation, she grew up in a well-functioning,
supportive, and emotionally healthy family environment. Even Nilo himself attested that she was a good wife and a good mother to
their children. Her demand for attention, time, love, and fidelity is normal for a wife. The anger she felt within her is also a
legitimate reaction.

Yet the psychologist Dr. Encarnacion himself acknowledged that Marivi's so-called psychological incapacity is in fact, curable.
Thus:

ATTY. REVILLA:

Q. So even without the respondent, Nilo Cruz, petitioner would still be psychologically incapacitated?

A. I beg to [differ]: from that because the needs were not fulfilled in this particular marriage, it's like a tendency to have cancer, but
if you take care of yourself with the right environment, you will not catch cancer. Those were previous positions, that's why I called
them Histrionic Personality Traits Behaviors and Features not a full blown Histrionic Personality Disorder, the needs were badly
unfulfilled in this marriage because she married a man who did not know the language of feeling of showing some attention
towards his spouse, meaning, if she is put in a relationship with a man who is able to address these needs, she would be better, she
would be better in a marriage.

Q. So this psychological incapacity of the petitioner is only dormant at

the time that she was not yet married?

A. Well, it's grave ...

Q. Was it grave already at the time ...

A. Yes, it is, it's grave but. ..

Q. Even before the marriage?

A. ... but not incurable, that is the only adjective, grave, pre-existing ...

Q. Pre-existing?

A. Grave and pre-existing, yes, incurable, no, in the sense that if she married properly if her needs were addressed, it would not
appear in that marriage.

Q. But because of her marriage to the respondent, are you saying now that her psychological incapacity now…

A. Became an incapacity, yes

Q. ... became incurable?

A. No.

xxxx

Q. Okay. I am quite curious about the curability of the personality disorder of the petitioner. Now, if her needs are satisfied with ...
in case, assuming the petitioner enters into another relationship and her needs are satisfied then her incapacity is cured, is that what
you're saying?

A. In effect, yes, in effect, yes.

Q. Would you say, what are these needs of the petitioner that [you're] ... not satisfied of the respondent?

A. Need to be paid attention to, need to be valued, need to have an effect on someone, it is a universal need. She was made to feel
that she did not have any effect on him and so are the children, x x x well, the father made the children feel that they, wife and two
sons did not have any effect on him, ma'am.

x x x x73

Q. One last question. The needs of the petitioner, like you say, do you think she was able to convey, clearly convey her needs to the
respondent, properly convey?

A. Very clearly, yes, and then when they were still not being heard, well, iyon na nga eh, yung hostility niya and resentment would
get the better of her as a ano ... so it would become dysfunctional reaction upon reaction. That's a good question.74

Upon the view we take of this case, thus, this Court believes that the protagonists in this case are in reality simply unwilling to work
out a solution for each other's personality differences, and have thus become overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or
disillusionment toward one another. Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.75

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Petitioner Yolanda E. Garlet assails in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court the: (1)
Decision[1] dated June 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89142, which reversed and set aside the Decision[2]
dated November 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City in JDRC Case No. 6796; and (2) Resolution[3]
dated August 24, 2010 of the appellate court in the same case, which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

Petitioner and respondent Vencidor T. Garlet met each other sometime in 1988. They became intimately involved and as a result,
petitioner became pregnant. Petitioner gave birth to their son, Michael Vincent Garlet (Michael), out of wedlock on November 9,
1989. Petitioner and respondent eventually got married on March 4, 1994. Their union was blessed with a second child, Michelle
Mae Garlet (Michelle), on January 23, 1997. However, petitioner and respondent started experiencing marital problems. After seven
years of marriage, petitioner and respondent separated in 2001. Petitioner now has custody over their two children.

On May 6, 2005, petitioner filed a Petition[4] for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of respondent's psychological
incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations to petitioner and their children. The Petition was docketed as JDRC Case No.
6796. On June 30, 2005, respondent filed his Answer[5] to the Petition.

At the pre-trial, the parties admitted the following facts:

 The petitioner and respondent contracted marriage on [March[6]] 4, 1994;

 The parties' first son was named Michael Vincent Garlet and was born on November 9, 1989;

 The petitioner gave birth to another child named Michelle Mae Garlet on January 23, 1997;

 The respondent is aware that the petitioner is working in Japan as an entertainer;

 There is no ante-nuptial agreement prior to the celebration of the marriage;

 There is no separation of properties during the marriage;

 The petitioner has the custody and the one supporting the children from the time the respondent lost communication with
the children as he does not exert effort to see them;

 The petitioner admitted that the parties acquired several properties during cohabitation with qualification that the same was
bought out of the efforts and finances of the petitioner; and
  The petitioner likewise admitted that the respondent was not subjected to psychological examination by the psychologist
sought by the petitioner with qualification that respondent was given several opportunities to attend the psychological
evaluation but failed to do so.[7]

Thereafter, trial ensued.

Testifying for petitioner were petitioner herself; Marites Ereve (Marites), petitioner's sister who served as the children's nanny from
1993 to 2001; and Ms. Nimia Hermilia C. De Guzman (De Guzman), the clinical psychologist.

Petitioner and respondent were introduced to each other by a common friend in 1988. Respondent courted petitioner and they
became close. One day, after partying and drinking liquor with some friends, petitioner and respondent lost their inhibitions and
indulged in sexual intercourse. Petitioner became pregnant as a result. Respondent doubted if he fathered the unborn child and
refused to support petitioner. Respondent urged petitioner to have an abortion, to which she did not agree. During petitioner's
pregnancy, respondent did not visit her nor did he give any financial assistance. After giving birth to Michael, respondent visited
petitioner only once.[8]

In order to support Michael, petitioner left for Japan to work for six months as a cultural dancer. Petitioner temporarily entrusted
Michael's care and custody to her mother and siblings in Bicol. Upon returning to the Philippines, petitioner took Michael back to
live in Manila. Petitioner also brought Marites with them to Manila to serve as the nanny.[9] Respondent visited petitioner and
Michael several times but respondent still did not offer petitioner any monetary help as he was jobless.[10]

From 1990 to 1994, petitioner returned to Japan several more times to work, but she maintained her relationship with respondent
for the sake of their son. Sometime in 1992, petitioner instructed respondent to scout for a real property on which she may invest
her money. With the money petitioner remitted, respondent purchased a 210-square meter lot in Morong, Rizal (Morong
property),[11] but registered the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-38509[12] covering said property in his name. Despite
petitioner's pleas, respondent refused to transfer the certificate of title to the Morong property in petitioner's name.[13] Later on,
respondent, without petitioner's consent, sold a 69-square meter portion of the Morong property to spouses Avelino Garlet (Avelino)
and Cipriana A. Garlet, respondent's brother and sister-in-law, respectively, who secured TCT No. M-56993 for said portion in their
names.[14] Respondent also mortgaged the Morong property to his sister-in-law's friend, which forced petitioner to redeem it for
P50,000.00.[15]

Petitioner bought another parcel of land in Pila, Laguna on March 3, 1994 (Pila property).[16] Respondent insisted on including his
name as one of the buyers in the deed of sale for the Pila property even though he was jobless and had no money to contribute for
the purchase of said property.[17]

It was also in 1992 that petitioner and respondent started living together on the Morong property. They often quarreled but
respondent stayed with petitioner because she was the breadwinner of the family. Respondent later asked petitioner to marry him.
Thinking it was for the best interest of their son, petitioner agreed and she married respondent on March 4, 1994.[18]

After their wedding, respondent turned into a "selfish, greedy, irresponsible, philandering and physically abusive husband." From
1994 to 1997, their family relied on petitioner's savings for their needs. Petitioner purchased a jeepney to augment their family's
finances but respondent did not ply the jeepney.[19]

Petitioner hoped and asked respondent to change his ways. But even after the birth of their daughter, Michelle, respondent never
bothered to look for a stable job. Worse, respondent maintained his vices of gambling, drinking, and womanizing.[20] Respondent
neglected Michael and Michelle, and relied on Marites to take care of the children.[21]

In 1998, petitioner was forced to work in Japan again as all her savings had been exhausted. Petitioner was able to save enough
money to invest in a mini-grocery store. Petitioner placed respondent in charge of the store but the store suffered losses, which
respondent could not account. Petitioner infused additional capital into the store but it still ultimately closed.[22]

Upon returning to the Philippines in 2000, petitioner felt devastated upon learning that respondent had squandered her hard-earned
money, pawned her jewelry, and incurred debts in her name.[23] Petitioner also discovered the incident when respondent allowed a
"male friend" to sleep in the master's bedroom. According to petitioner, this was highly unusual as they never previously allowed
anyone to sleep at their house.[24]

Additionally, every time petitioner came home and brought presents for her parents and siblings, respondent got angry and
 demanded from petitioner all her earnings.[25]

Petitioner and respondent were fighting constantly. Sometime in 2001, they had a serious altercation during which, respondent
strangled petitioner. Fortunately, a third person intervened and saved petitioner.[26]

Petitioner and respondent tried to settle their marital issues before the barangay. There, respondent admitted taking petitioner's
money and jewelry because he had no means to support himself and the family. Realizing that there was no more love and respect
between them and that respondent was just using her, petitioner finally separated from respondent.[27] Petitioner and respondent
executed on September 10, 2001 before the barangay a Kasunduang Pag-aayos[28] wherein they agreed that respondent would
leave the house in exchange for the jeepney, tricycle, and P300,000.00; and that respondent would have visitation rights, i.e., twice
a week, over their children. Since the separation, petitioner had been solely supporting their children with the income from her
businesses in Bicol, Bulacan, and Pasig.

Petitioner filed an application for support, alleging that she had been spending approximately P15,000.00 a month for the two
children, and paying the children's tuition fees in the following amounts[29]:

Michael Michelle
Grade 6 P 18,118.10Nursery P 18,280.00
1st year high school 20,366.00Grade 1 21,741.00
2nd year high school 24,241.00Grade 2 15,050.00
3rd year high school 26,996.00Grade 3 17,704.00
4th year high school 29,676.00

In addition, petitioner had expended around P15,000.00 for the children's medical and dental needs and about P100,000.00 for the
children's clothing needs since 2001. As the children would be starting school again, Michael would need P15,000.00 for his tuition
fee for the first semester in college, plus P20,000.00 for his monthly allowance, books, supplies, and other miscellaneous expenses;
while Michelle would need P30,000.00 for her annual tuition fee, as well as P15,000.00 for food allowance, school supplies,
tutorials, clothing, and other miscellaneous expenses.[30]

Considering the children's foregoing expenses, petitioner asserted that her demand for respondent to pay P20,000.00 per month, or
P10,000.00 a month for each child, was just and reasonable.[31]

Clinical psychologist, Ms. De Guzman, reported that she interviewed petitioner and gathered information from the couple's relatives
and neighbors.[32] Ms. De Guzman's attempts to talk to respondent at his house were unsuccessful. Ms. De Guzman, however,
explained that her failure to personally interview respondent would not affect her findings, saying that "what is being tapped in the
psychological assessment is the unconscious level, more or less. And what is represented or uncovered in the unconscious level
would be correlated to the manifested behavior. Having observed the respondent since the time that I have been appearing in this
case, there are some aspects or some attitudes and behaviors that correlated with the descriptions of those people whom I
interviewed."[33]

In her report entitled "Psychological Capacity of Petitioner Yolanda Ereve Garlet"[34] (Psychological Report), Ms. De Guzman
cleared petitioner of any psychological disorder, saying that petitioner has the capacity to understand and comply with her marital
obligations. In contrast, Ms. De Guzman found respondent to be suffering from a narcissistic type of personality disorder. Quoted
below are Ms. De Guzman's test results and her evaluation of both petitioner and respondent:
Petitioner is endowed with an average intellectual capacity and possesses practical sounding cognitive skills that enables her to
confront her challenges in an efficient manner. However, her better judgment and analytical functions are inclined to falter when
pressures and stresses overwhelm her.

Personality profile reveals a woman who is overly submissive to the point of being gullible such that she normally gets the raw end
of a deal in most social situations. As much as possible, she would want a smooth sailing interaction especially with her loved ones,
trying to compensate for lost time when she is not around them.

She is however, the type who knows and honors her commitments and obligations even if the people she trusts, as in the case of her
wayward husband – Respondent have already betrayed her.

She is basically goal-focused and independent-minded but these mature and positive traits easily dwindle when her sentimental
nature gets the better of her. She welcomes praises and attention accorded to her by her milieu such that she sometimes fail to
decipher who among them are merely taking advantage of her generosity/kindness. Consequently, she easily gets fooled,
particularly as she could really be too trusting.

Assertiveness and strength of character are the least among her traits but Petitioner always makes it a point to maintain a positive
outlook and disposition in life despite her failures. She is very sensitive and considerate of the feelings of other people.

Pyschosexual adjustment is basically adequate even if she has developed a wary attitude towards members of the opposite sex.

Over-all analysis of the test data failed to yield traces of any on-going psychopathological condition nor of any type of personality
disorder. Thus, Petitioner is still Psychologically Capacitated to understand, comply and execute her marital obligations.

The same could not be said as true for the Respondent who is undoubtedly suffering from the Narcissistic Type of
Personality Disorder, as evidenced by the following symptomatic behavior:

 He is unable to maintain his own direction in life without the financial help and support of other people. He clings to the
Petitioner, who is the breadwinner, sacrificing to be away from home to be able to build up a stable future, for his finances. He
also maintains an amorous relationship with different women as a source of added emotional support, boost of and satisfaction
of his self-directed/immediate needs and desires.

 He is not motivated to work and likewise capitalizes on his physical assets to attain what he wants to achieve.

 He is contented with his present lifestyle without thought of others and has no foresight to prepare for a healthy family,
emotionally and socially. He is not bothered by his conscience and even flaunts his indiscretions publicly.

 He has marked adjustment difficulties with his immediate relatives.

 He has a very poor impulse control, easily using invectives/verbal tirades and at times unable to control his aggressions that
physical fights with Petitioner arose.

 He took advantage of Petitioner's kindness, resourcefulness and industry, by not fulfilling his part of the marriage covenant.
He never cared nor attended to his children but often delegated them to whoever would be willing to assist him.

 He appears not to make use of his judgment and decision making abilities as he is under the mercy of his immature
impulses where the important aspect of his life, is himself and immediate gratification of his needs.

Thus, attending to his responsibility, understanding and complying with his obligations in marriage are beyond his capacity.
Conclusively, the breakdown of their marriage could be traced to Respondent's aforementioned traits plus his inadequacy and
insecurity in dealing with mature roles. Respondent's traits and attitudes have been present even before marriage so that to effect
any change or improvement in his dispositions, would be difficult to do. The Psychological Incapacitation is pervasive, permanent
and clinically proven to be incurable. Respondent has accepted it as his means of coping with stressing life demands and is not
aware that it was the source of their estrangement and final breakdown of their marital relationship.

The root cause of which started in his early days of training where ambivalent/matter-of-fact treatment was received from
immediate caregivers. Because of his ordinal position among the children, being the youngest boy, he was always given the choice
of what to do, favored or praised. He was not able to overcome such indulgence, carried it to his adolescent/adult years, as he was
always given the most attention.

Contrarily, they were also somehow neglected because of financial lack so much so that parents had to work overtime to earn
adequately for their living. Respondent together with his younger siblings were left to the care of elder brothers/sisters who just
simply/literally followed what their parents would want of them. Guidance and discipline were imposed upon the elder siblings but
became oblivious towards the Respondent. It developed in Respondent on how he would go about his life without experiencing the
deprivation and hardship that he had undergone. He became self-focused and at the same time hunted for women vulnerable to his
superficialities.

Thus, they are better off apart for the sake of everyone who are within their bounds of reach" for Respondent does not realize the
pain he is causing towards other people, specifically his legal wife – the Petitioner as well as their children.
It is therefore recommended that their marriage covenant be dissolved for everyone's peace of mind, through due process in this
Honorable Court.[35]

Respondent testified on his own behalf. However, in an Order[36] dated September 14, 2006, the RTC declared respondent's direct
testimony stricken off the record because of respondent's failure to appear for his cross-examination. After petitioner submitted her
Memorandum,[37] the case was deemed submitted for decision.[38]

In its Decision dated November 27, 2006, the RTC gave weight to Ms. De Guzman's conclusion that respondent was suffering from
a Narcissistic Personality Disorder and ruled that:
Based on the evidence submitted, the parties never shared a true married life.

After a careful evaluation of the records, this Court finds the petition to be impressed with merit. The respondent is described as
suffering from narcissistic personality disorder found to be permanent, severe, serious, and incurable, rendering him as
psychologically incapacitated to perform the marital obligations.

Respondent neglected his obligations as a husband and father to their children. Even prior to the marriage, the respondent
manifested his psychological incapacity. He suspected the paternity of his son with the petitioner and even turned his back upon
learning it. He has visited only on the day of giving birth by the petitioner of their son. He never cared for his son and would only
visit him once in a while. He never worked to support his son. In fact, the respondent was financially dependent on the petitioner
even before the marriage. He defrauded the petitioner by registering all the properties bought by the petitioner from the latter's
exclusive income under his name declaring themselves as married. Worst, he sold a portion of the property in Morong without the
knowledge of the petitioner.

During the marriage, the respondent's laziness became manifest. He focused on his self and does not care who gets hurt for as long
as it satisfies him. He gambles and drinks at the expense of the petitioner. He was given the chance to earn for himself and for the
family and still, he did not handle it well and instead continued with his vices.

The respondent disregarded his obligations to spend quality time with the petitioner and especially with their children. He even
committed infidelities.

All deeds and actions of the respondent are clear demonstrations of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.

By reason of the respondent's immaturity and irresponsibility stemming from his NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER,
he was unable to fulfill his duties and responsibilities towards his wife and children, thus constituting psychological incapacity.

The psychological report shows that respondent's psychological incapacity is characterized by juridical antecedence as it was found
to have existed even prior to the time he contracted marriage with petitioner. Respondent's personality disorder, the root cause of
which can be traced in his childhood years was found to be pervasive and permanent. Being the youngest boy, Respondent was
always favored and praised but was not properly guided and disciplined by his parents as the latter were pre-occupied with
improving their finances.

It also speaks of gravity because respondent is incapable of rendering marital obligations like commitment, fidelity, trust, support
and love toward the petitioner and their children which are very vital in a marital relationship. In fact, Ms. De Guzman stated in her
report that attending to his responsibilities, understanding and complying with his obligations in marriage are beyond respondent's
capacity.

It is incurable because the psychological incapacity of the respondent is deeply rooted, it is already in his character. No amount of
therapy, no matter how intensive, can possibly change the respondent insofar as incapability to perform his essential marital
obligations with the petitioner and to his children are concerned. Respondent has already accepted such incapacity as his means of
coping with stressing life demands.[39]

The RTC further held that all of the properties which were acquired during the marriage were bought with petitioner's exclusive
funds, thus, negating the presumption of equality of shares between the parties in a void marriage under Article 147 of the Family
Code. The RTC awarded the custody of the children to petitioner, but granted weekly visitation rights to respondent and ordered
respondent to give support to the children.

In the end, the RTC adjudged:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between YOLANDA EREVE GARLET and VENCIDOR
TAEP GARLET held at the Office of the Mayor, Morong, Rizal on March 4, 1994, as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO on [the]
ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent to perform the essential marital obligations in accordance with Article 36 of
the Family Code, with all the legal effects thereon.

The property relation between the petitioner and respondent under Article 147 of the Family Code is deemed DISSOLVED. The
real properties acquired prior to marriage and cohabitation is hereby declared exclusive properties of the petitioner particularly the
real property covered by Transfer Certificate [of Title] No. M-38509 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal; and the tricycle and jeepney
covered by Certificate of Registration Nos. 13175616 and 27224267, respectively.

The parties are directed to submit list of properties for liquidation, partition and distribution; and the delivery of presumptive
legitime of their common children with notice to their creditors upon finality of this decision.

The custody of the children, namely: 1) Michael Vincent E. Garlet; and 2) Michelle Mae E. Garlet is hereby awarded to the
petitioner subject to visitorial right of the respondent once a week at the most convenient time of the said children. The respondent
is hereby adjudged to give support to the children in the amount of P3,000.00 a month each to be deposited every 5th day of the
month in their respective bank accounts under trust of the petitioner; and he is hereby directed to provide at least one-half of the
cost of their education.

The petitioner shall revert to the use of her maiden name.

The Local Civil Registrars of Morong, Rizal, and Pasig [City] are directed to cause the entry of the foregoing judgment in the Book
of Marriages upon issuance thereof.

A decree of declaration of nullity of marriage shall be issued upon compliance with the foregoing judgment.[40]

The RTC denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration in its Order dated February 26, 2007.

Respondent's appeal before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 89142. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision
dated June 21, 2010, reversed the RTC judgment, reasoning as follows:
[W]e scrutinized the totality of evidence adduced by Yolanda and found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that
Vencidor was psychologically incapacitated.

In essence, Yolanda wanted to equate Vencidor's addiction to alcohol, chronic gambling, womanizing, refusal to find a job and his
inability to take care of their children as akin to psychological incapacity. At best, Yolanda's allegations showed that Vencidor was
irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature. The incidents cited by Yolanda did not show that Vencidor suffered from a
psychological malady so grave and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond.

Yolanda's portrayal of Vencidor as jobless and irresponsible is not enough. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by this rule. What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity is downright
incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.

In ruling for Yolanda, the trial court gave credence to the psychological report prepared by Ms. De Guzman. x x x

While it is true that courts rely heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of human personality, still the root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, and said
incapacity established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. Likewise, although there is no requirement that a party
to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist (as a condition sine
qua non),there is nevertheless still a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the
person alleging said disorder.
In the instant case, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature and the incapacity itself were not
sufficiently explained. What can be perused from the psychological report prepared by Ms. De Guzman is that it only offered a
general evaluation on the supposed root cause of Vencidor's personality disorder. The report failed to exhaustively explain the
relation between being a pampered youngest son and suffering from a psychological malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond.

The psychological report failed to reveal that the personality traits of Vencidor were grave or serious enough to bring about an
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Ms. De Guzman merely stated in the said report that it is beyond the
capacity of Vencidor to attend to his responsibility and understand and comply with his marital obligations. Such statement is a
mere general conclusion which, unfortunately, is unsubstantiated. We cannot see how Vencidor's supposed personality disorder
would render him unaware of the essential marital obligations or to be incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by him.

Also, we cannot help but note that Ms. De Guzman's conclusions about Vencidor's psychological incapacity were primarily based
on the informations fed to her by Yolanda whose bias for her cause cannot be doubted. Moreover, Ms. De Guzman testified that the
informations that she obtained from Yolanda were the result of one-hour interview with Yolanda and initial testing given at intervals.

While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions
deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards. Ms. De Guzman only examined Vencidor from a third-party
account. To make conclusions on x x x Vencidor's psychological condition based on the information fed by Yolanda, during a
one-hour interview, is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married
life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Presumption is always in
favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[41]

The dispositive portion of the foregoing Court of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision
dated November 27, 2006 and the Order dated February 26, 2007 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between
herein parties is hereby declared as still subsisting and valid.[42]

Petitioner received a copy of the Decision of the appellate court on June 28, 2010. Petitioner filed a motion[43] seeking an
extension of twenty days, or until August 2, 2010, within which to file a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed her Motion for
Reconsideration on August 2, 2010. However, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[44] on August 24, 2010 denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration for being filed out of time, citing the ruling in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon[45] that the filing
of the motion for extension of time does not toll the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner seeks redress from this Court through the instant Petition, grounded on the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN YOLANDA GARLET AND VENCIDOR GARLET
TO BE SUBSISTING. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPRECIATED THE APPLICABLE LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CONSEQUENTLY DECREEING THAT THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.[46]
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in (a) disregarding Ms. De Guzman's findings for being based solely on petitioner's
version of events, which was a third party account; (b) treating petitioner's evidence as "no different from hearsay;" (c) finding that
the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity was not sufficiently explained; and (d) declaring the marriage of petitioner
and respondent as valid.

Petitioner argues that based on Marcos v. Marcos,[47] it is not required that the psychologist personally examine the spouse who is
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. What matters is that the totality of petitioner's evidence establish
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner asserts that her evidence consists of not just her testimony, but also those of her witnesses. Petitioner's description of her
marriage was substantiated by the statements of respondent's brother, sister-in-law, and neighbors, which were incorporated in the
Psychological Report. What is more, the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity had been properly alleged in the
Petition, clinically identified, and proven by Ms. De Guzman in her testimony and her Psychological Report. Petitioner points out
that the RTC gave considerable weight to her evidence, and found respondent to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality
Disorder so permanent, serious, severe, and incurable that it rendered respondent incapable of performing his marital obligations.
Considering that the RTC had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses when they testified, its findings are entitled
to respect from the appellate courts. Underscoring the importance of the appreciation of the facts by the trial court in determining
whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, petitioner refers to the case of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te [48]
wherein the findings of the trial court were declared to be final and binding on the appellate courts. Based on the totality of the
evidence, petitioner maintains that her marriage should be declared null and void on account of respondent's psychological
incapacity.

Lastly, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in denying her Motion for Reconsideration for being filed out of time
based on Habaluyas Enterprises, and pleads for liberality in the application of the rules in the interest of substantial justice.

The Petition is without merit.

The Court shall first address the procedural issue regarding the denial of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration by the Court of
Appeals for being filed out of time.

In its Resolution issued on May 30, 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises, the Court already elucidated, for the guidance of Bench and
Bar, that:
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional
Trial Courts, and the [Court of Appeals]. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of
last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.[49]

The foregoing rule is still good presently. The Court, in the more recent case of V.C. Ponce Company, Inc. v. Municipality of
Parañaque,[50] still observed strict adherence to the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises. The Court acknowledged in said
case that it sometimes allowed a liberal reading of the rules in the interest of equity and justice, so long as the petitioner is able to
prove the existence of cogent reasons to excuse its non-observance. However, the Court also found therein that petitioner's reason
for failing to meet the deadline, i.e., it was without aid of counsel, did not warrant a relaxation of the rules as "it is incumbent upon
the client to exert all efforts to retain the services of new counsel."

Petitioner's counsel in the instant case sought extension of time to file the motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
Decision claiming that she had already started the draft of said motion but was unable to finalize the same "due to heavy pressure of
work in the preparation of pleadings in other equally important cases requiring immediate attention."[51] The excuse of petitioner's
counsel does not constitute cogent reason or extraordinary circumstance that warrant a departure from the general rule. Pressure and
large volume of legal work do not excuse a counsel for filing a pleading out of time. It is the counsel's duty to devote his/her full
attention, diligence, skills, and competence to every case that he/she accepts.[52]

The Court stressed in De Leon v. Hercules Agro Industrial Corporation[53] that compliance with the reglementary period for
perfecting an appeal is not only a procedural issue, but jurisdictional, thus:
As the period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, petitioner's motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration did not toll the reglementary period to appeal; thus, petitioner had already lost his right to appeal the September 23,
2005 decision. As such, the RTC decision became final as to petitioner when no appeal was perfected after the lapse of the
prescribed period.

Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the
statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of appeal in the
manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to perfect the same renders
the judgment final and executory.

The CA correctly ordered that petitioner's appellant's brief be stricken off the records. As the CA said, the parties who have not
appealed in due time cannot legally ask for the modification of the judgment or obtain affirmative relief from the appellate court. A
party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed by law loses his right to
do so. As petitioner failed to perfect his appeal within the period for doing so, the September 23, 2005 decision has become final as
against him. The rule is clear that no modification of judgment could be granted to a party who did not appeal. It is enshrined as one
of the basic principles in our rules of procedure, specifically to avoid ambiguity in the presentation of issues, facilitate the setting
forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the court in making its determinations. It is not installed in the rules merely to make
litigations laborious and tedious for the parties. It is there for a reason.

Petitioner received a copy of the Decision dated June 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals on June 28, 2010 and the 15-day
reglementary period expired on July 13, 2010 without her filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, hence, the said judgment
already became final.

Moreover, the Court is unconvinced that it should set aside the finality of the Court of Appeals judgment for the sake of substantive
justice, as the appellate court did not commit reversible error in ruling that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is subsisting
and valid because petitioner failed to establish respondent's psychological incapacity.

Petitioner insists on respondent's psychological incapacity, a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code,[54] which provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Jurisprudence had laid down guiding principles in resolving cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. In Azcueta v. Republic,[55] the Court presented a summation of relevant jurisprudence on psychological
incapacity, reproduced hereunder:
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone
of the family members.

Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina stringent guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation". It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable", thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's". The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x x x.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." The
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need
to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.
In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. With the advent of Te v. Te, the Court encourages a reexamination of
jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the
Molina doctrine. (Citations omitted.)

It bears to stress that the burden of proving the nullity of the marriage falls on petitioner. Petitioner's evidence shall still be
scrutinized and weighed, regardless of respondent's failure to present any evidence on his behalf. Any doubt shall be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage. Tested against the present guidelines, the Court agrees with the Court of
Appeals that the totality of petitioner's evidence is insufficient to establish respondent's psychological incapacity.

Petitioner imputes almost every imaginable negative character trait against respondent, but not only do they not satisfactorily
constitute manifestations of respondent's psychological incapacity as contemplated in the Family Code, petitioner's averments are
riddled with inconsistencies that are sometimes contradicted by her own evidence.
 Petitioner avers that respondent tried to persuade her to have an abortion when she became pregnant with Michael and respondent
even questioned Michael's paternity. Yet, notably, respondent never sought the correction of Michael's Certificate of Live Birth,
which specifically named him as Michael's father. The following verbal exchanges between the couple in the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos[56] also show that respondent acknowledged his children with petitioner, namely, Michael and Michelle, and was
concerned with their welfare:

Yoly - Ayoko na nga basta umalis ka sa bahay natin at kung hindi ka aalis kami ng mga anak mo ang aalis.

Vencidor
Paano mga anak natin, sinong mag-aalaga sa kanila.
–

Yoly – Ako na ang bahala sa mga anak ko bubuhayin ko sila.

xxxx

Yoly – Makikita mo pa naman ang mga anak mo, puwede mo rin naman dalawin kahit dalawang beses sa isang lingo.

Vencidor Ayoko yata Yoly na magkahiwalay tayo paano na ako, sino ang mag-iintindi sa mga anak ko, halimbawa
– na umalis ka uli papunta abroad.

Even assuming that respondent initially reacted adversely to petitioner's pregnancy with Michael, it would appear from respondent's
subsequent actuations that he had come to accept that he is indeed Michael's father.

In her testimony, petitioner claimed that her relationship with respondent was cut off when she got pregnant; that respondent never
visited her during her pregnancy; and that respondent visited her only once after she gave birth to Michael on November 9, 1989.
According to petitioner, she had no relationship with respondent until she purchased the Pila property on March 3, 1994.[57] The
records, though, bear out the continuous relationship between petitioner and respondent. First, petitioner stated in her own
Memorandum before the RTC that she "did not sever her ties with [respondent]."[58] Second, petitioner remitted money to
respondent sometime in 1992 for the purchase of the Morong property, where they eventually lived. Third, Ms. De Guzman
recounted in her Psychological Report that sometime "[i]n 1992, Petitioner and Respondent started to live [in] Morong, Rizal."[59]
And fourth, petitioner married respondent on March 4, 1994, which would just be the day after she bought the Pila property.

Petitioner further alleges that respondent meddled with the purchase and registration of the Morong and Pila properties. Although
he did not make any monetary contribution at all for the said purchases, respondent registered the TCT of the Morong property in
his name and as one of the owners in the TCT of the Pila property. In addition, respondent purportedly sold a portion of the Morong
property without petitioner's consent. But the Court notes that petitioner and respondent had already deported themselves as
husband and wife long before the purchase of the Morong and Pila properties and their actual marriage. Petitioner had a direct hand
in the preparation of Michael's Certificate of Live Birth in 1989 and she made it to . appear therein that she and respondent were
already married on December 27, 1988 in Pasay City. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that petitioner and respondent continued to
misrepresent themselves as a married couple in the purchase of the Pila property and in the case of the Morong property, the
purchase took place when petitioner was then working in Japan. It appears that petitioner belatedly renounced respondent's
authority to purchase and register the subject properties, as well as to sell a portion of the Morong property, only after their
relationship had gone sour.

Furthermore, petitioner complains about respondent's joblessness, gambling, alcoholism, sexual infidelity, and neglect of the
children during their marriage.

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, it appears that respondent took on several jobs. As indicated in Michael's Certificate of Live Birth,
respondent's occupation was listed as a "vendor." Respondent was also in-charge of the mini-grocery store which he and petitioner
put up. Most recently, respondent worked as a jeepney driver. Petitioner's claim that respondent never plied the jeepney[60] was
contradicted by her own sister and witness, Marites, who testified that respondent sometimes plied the jeepney himself or asked
somebody else to drive it for him.[61] Petitioner criticized respondent for not looking for a stable job, but did not specify what job
suits respondent's qualifications. More importantly, it is settled in jurisprudence that refusal to look for a job per se is not indicative
of a psychological defect.[62]

As for respondent's alleged drinking and gambling vices, petitioner herself had no personal knowledge of the same, relying only on
what relatives relayed to her while she was in Japan.[63] Being hearsay evidence, petitioner's testimony on the matter had no
probative value[64] even if allowed by the Court as part of her narration. It is Marites, in her testimony[65] and Sinumpaang
 Salaysay,[66] who recounted that petitioner would often play tong-its and mahjong until early morning, come home drunk, sleep
until afternoon, and leave again to gamble. While respondent could have indulged in the vices of drinking and gambling, it was not
established that it was due to some debilitating psychological condition or illness or that it was serious enough as to prevent him
from performing his essential marital obligations. As the Court pronounced in Suazo v. Suazo[67]:
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

There is utter lack of factual basis for respondent's purported sexual infidelity. Aside from petitioner's bare allegations, no concrete
proof was proffered in court to establish respondent's unfaithfulness to petitioner. Petitioner failed to provide details on respondent's
supposed affairs, such as the names of the other women, how the affairs started or developed, and how she discovered the affairs.
Ms. De Guzman, in her Psychological Report, quoted respondent's brother, Avelino, as saying that different women often looked for
and visited respondent at the latter's house after petitioner and respondent separated, but this is still insufficient evidence of
respondent's marital infidelity.

The Court already declared that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that a spouse is suffering from psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which makes the spouse
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.[68] In Navales v. Navales,[69] the Court still found no factual
basis for the husband's claim that his wife, being flirtatious and sexually promiscuous, was psychologically incapacitated, regardless
of the submitted psychological report concluding that the wife was a nymphomaniac. The Court reasoned as follows:
The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's psychological incapacity. In
her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a borderline personality,
has strong sexual urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a very weak conscience or
superego, emotionally immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic,
suffers from anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggressive,
irresponsible and vain. She further defined "nymphomania" as a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor behavior
as shown by her sexual relationship with various men other than her husband.

The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the circumstances
surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit
relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagul claims, during her testimony, that in coming out with the report,
she interviewed not only Reynaldo but also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and sister,
respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain Susan. Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these persons, which
information were supplied by whom, and how they came upon their respective informations. Indeed, the conclusions drawn
by the report are vague, sweeping and lack sufficient factual bases. As the report lacked specificity, it failed to show the root
cause of Nilda's psychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that there was a "natal or supervening disabling factor" or an
"adverse integral element" in Nilda's character that effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby complying with, the
essential marital obligations, and that her psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage, x x x. (Citations
omitted.)

That respondent delegated the care for the children to Marites, petitioner's sister, does not necessarily constitute neglect. While it is
truly ideal that children be reared personally by their parents, in reality, there are various reasons which compel parents to employ
the help of others, such as a relative or hired nanny, to watch after the children. In the instant case, it was actually petitioner who
brought Marites from Bicol to Manila to care for Michael, and also later on, for Michelle. Granting that Marites was primarily
responsible for the children's care, there is no showing that a serious psychological disorder has rendered respondent incognizant of
and incapacitated to perform his parental obligations to his children. There is no allegation, much less proof, that the children were
deprived of their basic needs or were placed in danger by reason of respondent's neglect or irresponsibility.

Petitioner additionally accuses respondent of taking her money and jewelry after their marital dispute sometime in 2001, and
submitted the Kasunduang Pag-aayos they executed before the barangay in which respondent admitted doing so. The submitted
document recorded the exchange between the couple, thus:
Vencidor – O sige Yoly ibabalik ko yong alahas mo at pera mo magsimula uli tayo.

Yoly – Ayoko na nga makisama sa iyo, basta ibalik mo na lang ang pera ko at mga alahas ko.
Vencidor – Paano naman ako dapat tayo ay hati.

Yoly – O sige ibalik mo ang P150,000.00, at alahas ko.

Vencidor – Gawin mo namang P300,000.00.

Yoly – O sige gawin mo ng Tatlong daan, pati bahay sa Pila, Laguna jeep at trysikel sa iyo na umalis ka lang ng bahay.

Vencidor – Saan naman ako uuwi, pero pansamantala lang ito di ba?

Yoly – Makikita mo pa naman ang mga anak mo, puwede mo rin naman dalawin kahit dalawang beses sa isang lingo.

Ayoko yata Yoly na magkahiwalay tayo paano na ako, sino ang mag-iintindi sa mga anak ko, halimbawa na
Vencidor –
umalis ka uli papunta abroad.

Yoly – Ayoko na nga makisama sayo kung [di] ka aalis mapipilitan ako na itataas ko na ito kaso natin.

Vencidor – O sige kukunin ko ang pera sa bangko at ibibigay ko sa iyo dadalhin ko sa bahay.

Yoly – Ang kikita (sic) ko lagi niyang sinisilip.

Vencidor – Dapat naman mag-asawa naman tayo kung ano ang iyo ay akin rin yon di ba.

Yoly – Bakit mo kinuha ang pera ko [?]

Ginalaw ko iyon kasi inuunahan mo ako. Di mo ako pinalalapit pagtulog ay mag-asawa tayo. At yong
Vencidor –
Hapon palaging tumatawag, kaya naitago ko ang mga alahas mo. Hinabol pa niyan ng saksak.

Yoly – Sinisiraan niya ako sa Hapon ay iyon ay mga kustomer ko. Masasakit ang mga sinasabi niya sa kin.

Vencidor – Binabalewala niya ako.

Basta umalis ka na sa baliay at naibigay ko na sa iyo ang [b]ahay sa [L]aguna, jeep, trysikel at pera ano pa ang
Yoly – gusto mo[?] [S]a amin ng mga anak mo ang bahay sa Natividad St., Ibaba. Wala ka pakialam roon at ako ang
nagpundar noon.[70] (Emphases supplied.)

A perusal of the aforequoted verbal exchange between petitioner and respondent in the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, though, reveals that
respondent only hid petitioner's money and jewelry as a desperate attempt to stop petitioner from leaving him, taking with her the
children. In fact, respondent repeatedly expressed concern about saving their marriage, offering to return the money and jewelry
back to petitioner as long as they stay together. It was petitioner who categorically stated that she no longer wanted to live with
respondent, offering to the latter P300,000.00 cash, the Pila property, the jeepney and the tricycle, just for respondent to leave their
marital home.
Petitioner asserts too that she had been physically abused by respondent, but offers no substantiating evidence, such as details on
the instances of abuse, pictures of her injuries, medico-legal report, or other witness' testimony.

While the Court does not hold respondent totally without blame or free of shortcomings, but his failings as husband and father are
not tantamount to psychological incapacity which renders their marriage void from the very beginning. Worthy of reiterating herein
is the declaration of the Court in Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador[71] that:
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from
the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some
marriages. The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders – existing at the time of the marriage – clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should
be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he
or she is about to assume. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)

Finally, the Court is not bound by Ms. De Guzman's Psychological Report. While the Court previously held that "there is no
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician," yet, this is
qualified by the phrase, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity."[72] The
psychologist's findings must still be subjected to a careful and serious scrutiny as to the bases of the same, particularly, the source/s
of information, as well as the methodology employed.

In Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,[73] the Court did not give credence to the clinical psychologist's report because:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information
fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone
does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more
rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent
from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted
and responded to the doctor's probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a
self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who "believes that the world revolves around him"; and who "used love as a . . .
deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea of
"love"; made a generalization that respondent was a person who "lacked commitment, faithfulness, and remorse," and who engaged
"in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look like a fool"; and finally concluded that the respondent's character traits reveal
"him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable."

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed
to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable
of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr.
Tayag's conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial
Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable – is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a
fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition.
To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side
is. to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

The Court similarly rejected the psychiatric evaluation report presented by the petitioner in Agraviador for the following reasons:
The Court finds that Dr. Patac's Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the
respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to "undergo the same examination [that the
petitioner] underwent." Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties' second child, Emmanuel, and
household helper, Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be
used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioner's own psychological condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be
psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage), the same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondent's condition. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of the
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.

We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory. We have
confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined by
a psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent
means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence appears on
record, however, to have been gathered in this case.[74]

Much in the same way, the Court finds herein that Ms. De Guzman's sources and methodology is' severely lacking the requisite
depth and comprehensiveness to judicially establish respondent's psychological incapacity. Ms. De Guzman relied on the
information given by petitioner; Avelino, respondent's brother; Ramil Ereve, petitioner's brother; an anonymous female cousin of
petitioner;[75] and the couple's neighbors who refused to give their names.[76] On the basis thereof, Ms. De Guzman determined
that respondent suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, the root cause of which, Ms. De Guzman traced back to respondent,
as the youngest child in the family, being favored, praised, and indulged by his caregivers. From there, Ms. De Guzman already
concluded that respondent's disorder rendered it beyond his capacity to understand, comply, and attend to his obligations in the
marriage; was present even before marriage; and was "pervasive, permanent and clinically proven to be incurable." To put it simply,
Ms. De Guzman is saying that respondent was a spoiled child, and while it can be said that respondent has grown up to be a
self-centered and self-indulgent adult, it still falls short of establishing respondent's psychological incapacity characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, so as to render respondent's marriage to petitioner void ab initio.

All told, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals in declaring that the marriage of petitioner and respondent as subsisting and
valid. As the Court decreed in Republic v. Galang[77]:
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and marriage is the
foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties.
In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff.
Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a
marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold
the indissolubility of the marital tie.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 21,
2010 and Resolution dated August 24, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89142 are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 217993

MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III,, Petitioner,

vs.
NORA REYES BAKUNAWA,, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, JR, J.:

For resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Manuel R. Bakunawa III (Manuel) challenging the
Decision2 dated March 27, 2014 and Resolution3 dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98579,
which upheld the validity of his marriage to Nora Reyes Bakunawa (Nora).

The Facts

Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the Philippines where they were students and became sweethearts. When Nora
became pregnant, she and Manuel got married on July 26, 1975 at St. Ignatius Church, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.4

Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates at that time, they lived with Manuel's parents. While Nora was able to
graduate, Manuel had to stop his studies to help his father in the family's construction business. Manuel was assigned to provincial
projects and came home only during weekends. This setup continued even as Nora gave birth to their eldest child, Moncho Manuel
(Moncho). However, whenever Manuel came back from his provincial assignments, he chose to spend his limited time with friends
and girlfriends instead of his family. Nora resented this and they started quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse, Manuel
depended on his father and on Nora for their family's needs.5

In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. It was during this period th.at Manuel first observed Nora's
passiveness and laziness; she was moody and mercurial. Their house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus, Manuel became more
irritated with Nora and their verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence.6

On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child. However, nothing changed in their relationship. Manuel spent most of his
time with friends and engaged in drinking sprees. In 1979, he had an extramarital affair and seldom came home. He eventually left
Nora and their children in 1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered themselves separated.7

In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for her and their children. After Manuel spent a few nights with them in the
new house, Nora became pregnant again and thereafter gave birth to their third child.8

On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City,9 on the ground that he and Nora are psychologica11y incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who testified that Manuel has Intermittent Explosive Disorder,
characterized by irritability and aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nora with Passive
Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative attitude and passive resistance in her relationship with Manuel.
Her findings were based on her interview with Manuel and the parties' eldest son, Moncho, because Nora did not participate in the
psychological assessment.10

Manuel alleges in his petition that he continues to live with his common-law wife and has a son with her, whereas, Nora lives alone
in her unit in Cubao, Quezon City. Their house and lot was already foreclosed following Nora's failure to pay a loan secured by a
mortgage on the said property.11

Ruling of the RTC

The R TC granted the petition in its Decision12 dated March 28, 2011. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between MANUEL R.
BAKUNAWAIII and NORAREYESBAKUNAWA null and void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Office of the City Civil Registrar of Quezon City is hereby ordered to make entries into the records of the respective parties
pursuant to the judgment of the Court.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished upon the Office of Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, the
Office of the Civil Registrars of Quezon City, and the National Statistics Office, as well as the parties and counsel.

SO ORDERED.13

Nora appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing inter alia that the RTC erred in finding that the testimony of the psychiatrist is
sufficient to prove the parties' psychological incapacity.

Ruling of the CA

The CA, in its Decision14 dated March 27, 2014, granted Nora's appeal and reversed the RTC decision. The decretal portion of the
decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal filed by [Nora] is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 28, 2011 of the
RTC, National Capital Judicial Region in Civil Case No. Q-08-62822 is REVERSED and SETASIDE.

SO ORDERED.15
The CA denied Manuel's motion for reconsideration16 through a Resolution17 dated April 22, 2015.

Manuel filed the present petition raising the following grounds:

I. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF °THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES DESPITE
MORE THAN CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO DECLARE ITS NULLITY DUE TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF EITHER OR BOTH PARTIES TO PERFORM THEIR MARITAL OBLIGATIONS; and

II. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION DATED MARCH 27, 2014
DESPITE MORE THAN COMPELLING REASONS FOR THE REVERSAL THEREOF.18

Ruling of the Court

As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well
as the latter's psychological evaluation report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential obligations of marriage.

Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent Explosive Disorder and that Nora has Passive Aggressive
Personality Disorder which render them psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code,19 is solely based on her
interviews with Manuel and the parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did not err in not according probative value to
her psychological evaluation report and testimony.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang,20 the Court held that "[i]f the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason
exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a
psychologist's examination and report."21 In Toring v. Toring, et al.,22 the Court stated that:

Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or
even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the time of marriage,
or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.23

In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses' psychological evaluation was Moncho,
who could not be considered as a reliable witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to Article 36 of
the Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.

The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests on Manuel despite having had the opportunity to
do so. While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated should
be personally examined by a physician,24 much less be subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. In this case, the supposed personality disorder of
Manuel could have been established by means of psychometric and neurological tests which are objective means designed to
measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.25

With regard to the Confirmatory Decree26 of the National Tribunal of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan
Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila in favor of nullity of the Catholic marriage of Manuel and Nora, the Court
accords the same with great respect but does not consider the same as controlling and decisive, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.27

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 27, 2014 and Resolution dated April 22,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98579 are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-26462 June 9, 1969

TERESITA C. YAPTINCHAY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch; VIRGINIA Y.
YAPTINCHAY, in her own behalf and in her capacity as Special Administratrix in the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and JESUS MONZON, MARY YAPTINCHAY ELIGIR, ERNESTO YAPTINCHAY, ANTONIO
YAPTINCHAY, ASUNCION YAPTINCHAY, JOSEFINA Y. YAPTINCHAY, ROSA Y. MONZON, ISABEL Y. VALERIANO,
REMEDIOS Y. YAPTINCHAY, FELICIDAD Y. ARGUELLES, MARY DOE and JOHN DOE,respondents.

V. E. del Rosario and Associates for petitioner.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The problem posed in this, an original petition for certiorari, is whether or not this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers
should stake down as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the respondent judge's order of
June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873 (Court of First Instance of Rizal) directing petitioner to deliver to Special Administratrix Virginia
Y. Yaptinchay of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the North Forbes Park property hereinafter described, and to refrain
from disturbing or interfering in any manner whatsoever with the latter's possession thereof, such order having been amended by
said respondent judge's subsequent order of June, 28, 1966 in turn enjoining defendants in said case (private respondents herein)
and/or their duly authorized agents or representatives from selling, disposing, or otherwise encumbering said property in any
manner whatsoever pending the termination of said case. We granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for and
directed respondents to return the possession of the North Forbes Park property to petitioner upon a P50,000-bond.

The controlling facts are the following:

On July 13, 1965, herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her
appointment first as Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in
Hongkong on July 7, 1965. This is known in the record as Special Proceedings 1944-P. Petitioner there alleged that the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for nineteen (19) years: from 1946 to
1964 at 1951 Taft-Avenue, Pasay City, and from 1964 to July 1965 at 60 Russel Avenue, Pasay City; that the deceased who died
without a will left an estate consisting of personal and real properties situated in the Philippines, Hongkong and other places with an
estimated value of about P500,000; that to petitioner's knowledge and information, the deceased left three daughters, Virginia
Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay Eligir and Asuncion Yaptinchay, all of age; that on July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away
from the residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to the deceased together with others exclusively owned by petitioner. It
was averred that in these circumstances the appointment of a special administrator to take custody and care of the interests of the
deceased pending appointment of a regular administrator became an urgent necessity.

Upon the foregoing allegations, the court issued on July 17, 1965 an order appointing herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay
special administratrix of the state of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay upon a P25,000-bond.

To the petition of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, an opposition was registered by Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and
Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the ground that said Teresita C. Yaptinchay,
not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate, much less to
procure appointment as administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a number of years said
petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of integrity. At the same time, oppositors counter-petitioned for the
appointment of Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as special administratrix and of Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged
surviving spouse, as regular administratrix.

To give oppositors an opportunity to be heard, the probate court, on July 19, 1965, set aside its order of July 17, 1965 appointing
petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix.

On July 30, 1965, after the parties were heard, the probate court granted counter-petitioners' prayer and named Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay special administratrix upon a P50,000-bond.1awphil.nêt

On August 18, 1965, the special administratrix submitted a preliminary inventory of the assets of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay. Included amongst these was "[a] bungalow residential house with swimming pool, situated at Park corner Talisay Road,
North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal" adverted to at the start of this opinion.

It was after respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay had been appointed special administratrix that herein petitioner Teresita C.
Yaptinchay made her second move. That was on August 14, 1965. This time, petitioner filed in another branch (Pasig Branch) of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for replevin and for liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of
her cohabitation with Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and for damages. This case was docketed as Civil Case 8873. 1 Pending hearing on the
question of the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction prayed for, respondent judge Guillermo E. Torres issued
an order of August 17, 1965 temporarily restraining defendants therein (private respondents here) and their agents from disposing
any of the properties listed in the complaint and from interfering with plaintiff's (herein petitioner's) rights to, and possession over,
amongst others, "the house now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal."

On August 25, 1965, defendants (private respondents herein) resisted the action, opposed the issuance of the writs of replevin and
preliminary injunction, mainly upon these propositions: (1) that exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was already vested in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch in the special
proceedings heretofore mentioned (Special Proceedings No. 1944-P); (2) that the present liquidation case was filed to oust said
probate court of jurisdiction over the properties enumerated in this, the second case (Civil Case 8873); and (3) that plaintiff was not
entitled to the remedy of injunction prayed for, her alleged right sought to be protected thereby being doubtful and still in dispute.

Said defendants (private respondents before this Court) in turn prayed the court for a writ of preliminary injunction to direct
plaintiff (petitioner here) and all others in her behalf to cease and desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever defendant
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay's possession amongst others of the North Forbes Park house and to order the removal from the premises of
said North Forbes Park house of the guards, agents and employees installed therein by plaintiff; to enjoin plaintiff and her agents
from entering the aforesaid house and any other real property registered in the name of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and from interfering
with or from disturbing the exercise by Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of her rights and powers of administration over the assets registered
in the name of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and/or in the latter's possession at the time of his death.

Came the herein disputed order of June 15, 1966 issued in said Civil Case 8873, the pertinent portion of which reads: "From
the pleadings as well as the evidence already submitted and representations made to the court during the arguments, it appears
that one of the properties in dispute is the property located at the corner of Park Road and Talisay Street, North Forbes Park,
Makati, Rizal which at the time of the death of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was still under construction and it also
appears that after his death said property was among the properties of the deceased placed under the administration of the
special administratrix, the defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay. Information has been given that in the evening of August 14, 1965,
the plaintiff was able to dispossess the special administratrix from the premises in question and that since then she had been in
custody of said house.

While the Court is still considering the merits of the application and counter-application for provisional relief, the Court
believes that for the protection of the properties and considering the Forbes Park property is really under the responsibility of
defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, by virtue of her being appointed Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro
Yaptinchay, the Court denies the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of the plaintiff with respect to the
Forbes Park property and the restraining order issued by this Court is lifted. The Court also orders the plaintiff to cease and
desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever the defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay in the possession of said property.

WHEREFORE, upon defendant's filing a bond in the amount of P10,000.00, let a writ of preliminary injunction is requiring
the plaintiff, her representatives and agents or other persons acting in her behalf to deliver the possession of the property
located at the corner of Park Road and Talisay Street, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal to the Special Administratrix Virginia
Y. Yaptinchay, and to refrain from disturbing interfering in any manner whatsoever defendant's possession thereof.

Which, as aforestated, was amended by the court order of June 28, 1966, which in part recites:

Considering that the present case treats principally with the liquidation of an alleged partnership between the plaintiff and the
deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and considering further that said house in North Forbes Park is included among the properties in
dispute, the Court hereby clarifies its Order of June 15, 1966 by enjoining the defendants and/or their duly authorized agents or
representatives from selling, disposing or otherwise encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending the
termination of this case.

Petitioner's motion to reconsider the June 15, 1966 order was overturned by respondent judge's order of August 8, 1966, which
recites that:

Considering that defendants, principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual or physical possession of the said properties which
were formerly held by the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and the plaintiff, by virtue of her appointment and under her authority,
as Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
denied.2

The orders of June 15 and August 8, 1966 triggered the present proceedings in this Court.

1. Petitioner's stance before us is this: As she was occupying the Forbes Park property at the time of the death of Isidro Yaptinchay,
grave abuse of discretion attended respondent judge's order issuing an injunctive writ transferring possession of said property to
respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay.

A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed in jurisprudence is that injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of taking
property out of possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title thereto has not been clearly
established. 3 With this as guidepost, petitioner would have been correct if she were lawfully in possession of the house in
controversy when Civil Case 8873 (where the injunctive writ was issued) was commenced in the Pasig court, and if respondent
special administratrix, to whom the possession thereof was transferred, were without right thereto. But the situation here is not as
petitioner pictures it to be. It is beyond debate that with the institution on July 13, 1965 of Special Proceedings 1944-P, properties
belonging not only to the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay but also to the conjugal partnership of said deceased and his legitimate wife,
Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, 4 were brought under the jurisdiction of the probate court, properly to be placed under administration.5 One
such property is the lot at North Forbes Park. 6

With respect to the Forbes Park house, petitioner offers varying versions. In the verified petition before this Court, petitioner avers
"that the construction of said North Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by petitioner and the deceased, petitioner even
contributing her own exclusive funds therefor." 7 This is a reproduction of an allegation in petitioner's June 27, 1966 alternative
motion for reconsideration or for clarification/amendment of the herein controverted order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873. 8
And again, in the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay dated August 3, 1965, she spoke of the acquisition of properties, real and
personal, in her own words, "through our joint efforts and capital, among which properties are those situated" in "North Forbes
Park." 9 All of which contradict her averment in the amended complaint dated October 25, 1965 — also verified — in said Case
8873 to the effect that she "acquired through her own personal funds and efforts real properties such as ... the house now standing at
North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal." 10

But herein private respondents vehemently dispute petitioner's claim of complete or even partial ownership of the house. They
maintain that the construction of that house was undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay without her (petitioner's)
intervention and the deceased paid with his own personal funds all expenses incurred in connection with the construction thereof. 11

It was only after hearing and considering the evidence adduced and the fact that after the death of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the Forbes
Park house "was among the properties of the deceased placed under the administration of" respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, that
respondent judge issued the injunction order of June 15, 1966 herein complained of. Worth repeating at this point is that respondent
judge, in his order of August 8, 1966, declared that defendants (private respondents herein), "principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay,
took actual or physical possession", amongst others, of the North Forbes Park house — "by virtue of her appointment and under her
authority, as Special Administratrix."

On this score, petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed for below.

2. As well established is the rule that the grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court, in the exercise
of which appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse. 12

A considerate and circumspect view of the facts and circumstances in this case obtaining will not permit us to tag the disputed order
of June 15, 1966 with the vice of grave abuse of discretion. It is quite true that, in support of the allegation that the house in North
Forbes Park was her exclusive property, petitioner presented proof in the form of loans that she had contracted during the period
when said house was under construction. But evidence is wanting which would correlate such loans to the construction work. On
the contrary, there is much to the documentary proof presented by petitioner which would tend to indicate that the loans she
obtained from the Republic Bank were for purposes other than the construction of the North Forbes Park home. And this, we gather
from pages 17 to 18 of petitioner's memorandum before this Court; and the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, Annex A thereof,
which states in its paragraph 4 that she obtained various loans from the Republic Bank "for her own exclusive account" and that the
proceeds thereof "were also used by affiant both for her business and for the construction, completion and furnishing of the said
house at North Forbes Park", and which cites her seven promissory notes in favor of Republic Bank, Appendices 1 to 7 of said
affidavit. Not one of the promissory notes mentioned reveals use of the proceeds for the construction of the North Forbes Park
house. On the contrary, there is Appendix 2, the promissory note for P54,000 which says that the purpose of the loan for "Fishpond
development"; Appendix 3 for P100,000 for the same purpose; Appendix 5 for P50,000, "To augment working capital in buying &
selling of appliances & gift items"; and Appendix 7 for P1,090,000, "For Agricultural Development". In plain terms, the fact alone
of petitioner's indebtedness to the Republic Bank does not establish that said house was built with her own funds.

It is in the context just recited that the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may
not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or
of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage with respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part
of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix.
3. Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive. Said
Article 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." .

But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions,
the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13 One such condition is that
there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property
involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be
considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the
existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent
or future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. 16

At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be better safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park
property be in the hands of the bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be subject to the control of
the probate court.

Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the herein petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction 17 issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and set aside.

Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

WHO CAN INVOKE NULLITY

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011
of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based
on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4
On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3)
for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case
from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found
in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based
its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband
or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign
judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to
establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The
petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on
bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy
would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to
realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing
marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule
108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16
The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the
final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17
Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought
(among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the
petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by
motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the
petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated
its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by
the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its
ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this
case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court
held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum
shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted
the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office
of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x
x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The
Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of
the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case
the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x
x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as
a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing
De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition.42
Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he
inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
 The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is
in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine
foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the
parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of
the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate
the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However,
the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts
must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws
under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of
the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as
a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules
of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are
not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it
can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce
decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or
Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording.
As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same
reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the
civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted
and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his
property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include
the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74
In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband
or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.
Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage
are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to
the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in
the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not
only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to
the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void.
For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as
a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry
of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the
"validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a
foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of
Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case
for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a
Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino
spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is
made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was
rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which
declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the
foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry
while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the
Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent
that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce
decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of
a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public
policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e.
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as
part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a
ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents
and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
 DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28
November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1the decretal portion
of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order
dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2

The Facts

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents
who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia)
to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc.
No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were
both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s
marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for
Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo
left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and
to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the
issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and
not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases
for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position
taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:

Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator,
let letters of administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise
Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo
and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.

The Issues

The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS
PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH
THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;
 II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT
LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY
INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed
in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still
it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.19

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the
venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his
lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a
resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered
proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC
and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up
to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of
properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being
bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable
petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than
supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record.
Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this
Court.21

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void
ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal,
the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage
to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.24

It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage.25

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to
Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly
by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does
not extinguish such cause of action.

Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not the
decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently
established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the
Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the
certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value
of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the
possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely
remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for
Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration, thus:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested
person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
 (c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’
pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on
good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28
November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

VOID MARRAIGES AND ANNULMENT FOR VOID MARRIAGES

G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision2
dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent
Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the
requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to
a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of
Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear
before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores,
the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a
medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension
House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee
of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the
alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the
marriage contract was forged.8

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and
respondent Ye Son Sune.

SO ORDERED.9

Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting
the latter’s prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake.10

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring
the marriage void ab initio.11

In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration couched in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of
this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioner’s counsel, and all concerned government agencies.

SO ORDERED.12

Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on
substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and
36 of the Family Code.13

Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following grounds:

I.

RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES
SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.

II.

GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE
CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14

Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected, because the entries made in the certificate
of marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the
latter’s personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the
RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio.16Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17

We deny the petition.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be
taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties.18 Here, the issue
raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may
be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit:

SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register
may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination
of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings,
and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who
shall annotate the same in his record.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings
may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the
trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have
been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.21

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere
application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a
summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim
interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file
their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the
court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108
are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of
respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who
entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that
she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her
alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule
108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the
Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents
were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature
appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s signature appearing in some of her government issued
identification cards.23 The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not
hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may
be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.1âwphi1 Rather,
respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate
was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought,
not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the
truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the
wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5,
2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

REQUISITES FOR A VALID MARRIAGE

[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment[2] dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch
4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000,
denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol,
for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married,
thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was
granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City,
Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information[5] filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City],
with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion
for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein
petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[7]

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab
initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a
charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a country
in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court
stressed that following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act
constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of
Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article
349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence,
the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be
accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15[13] of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy
in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a
judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,[15]
allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.[16] However, the denial was by a split vote.
The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion
prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then
there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein
petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF
CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58
PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of
good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He
highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be
doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The
crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of
criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and
the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to
an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but
flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no
account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because
he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the
elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been
judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol
Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by
petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of
Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED.[21]

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer.
Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The
trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and
that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from
the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married.[24] The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage
is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia
at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained afterthe second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who
enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if
the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void.[26]

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a
judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at
least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner
and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh
every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present
case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of
his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners
motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the
charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration
of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that
the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two
were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee,
Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro,
was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
013095-L, reads:

That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA
ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the
subsisting first marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However,
he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize
their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection
with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether
there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS
APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR
PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12

Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to
Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which
is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the
second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and
prays for his acquittal.14

Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between
petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro
and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev.
Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter
from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated
October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these
documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda
B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already
have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof (Emphasis ours).

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the
best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and
Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact
that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the
documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the
absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary
evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro
and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to
the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that
would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving
testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed
her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage
had all the requisites for validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting
his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents,
therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for
the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such,
he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.21

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22
Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A
plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage,
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s
penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between
spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which
petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified
by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under
Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were
over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is
not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to
Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes
of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look
kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy
step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a
duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the
same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum
term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated
February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an
Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being previously
united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter.

Contrary to law.3

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity
of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is
declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration
of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.

Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings filed by petitioner.

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime
of the legal wife is void from the beginning.

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for
bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared
void by the RTC.

In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:

The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004 had already been
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus
James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between
James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.

In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised in the civil case are
not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case
would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion that there
is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and
Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the
voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy
to speak of.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim.
Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24,
2008.

Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006
 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS
THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND
THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER
PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY
NULL AND VOID.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN
NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE
SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE
SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G.
TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND
UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN
THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8

In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy.

We rule in the negative.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3)
that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28,
2004.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the
RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus,
the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner
for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated.

In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the
celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action
as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.11

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable
for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that
the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by
petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of
nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner People of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1
dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616. The assailed decision granted the
petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give due course to
and receive evidence on respondent's motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch, while the assailed resolution denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case follow:

On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon
(Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the
RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license.6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis
Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina.7She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with
Bigamy.

On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information9 for Bigamy committed as follows:

That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then legally married to JASMIN
MODINA and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second or subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.

Contrary to law.10

On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be allowed to present evidence to support his motion;
that his motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two
grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished.12

On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondent’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in
the information – that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been dissolved,
respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can
the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in
an Order15 dated February 20, 2009.

Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court16 before the CA, assailing
the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab
initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.17

On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27, Manila is
hereby ordered to give due course to and receive evidence on the petitioner’s motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.18

The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People,19 and held that there is cogent basis in looking into the
motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one
essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking.20 The appellate court further held that respondent is even better off than
Morigo which thus calls for the application of such doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second marriage after filing
the petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable declaration before the complaint for
bigamy was filed against him.21 The CA thus concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion
to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge an offense.22

With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition before the Court in this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED
DECEMBER 17, 2009 GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION DATED
MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS
CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.

II.

THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENT’S FIRST MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT
EXTINGUISH RESPONDENT’S CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.23

The petition is meritorious.

The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montañez v. Cipriano,24 Teves v. People,25 and Antone
v. Beronilla.26

In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of their marriage on January 24, 1983,
respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of
psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against
respondent. The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that her
first marriage had already been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.

In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their marriage on December 10, 2001, he
again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the ground
that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was
filed against petitioner. The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.

In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage, respondent contracted a second
marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became final
and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an information for bigamy against respondent which the
latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above cases. As in Antone and Montañez,
respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal
liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The RTC refused to quash the
information. On petition for certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different conclusion.

As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint
or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the
sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the
information are not to be considered.27 To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is
evident on its fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.29 If the motion to
quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be filed30 except when the information is quashed on
the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.31

An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute
the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 34932 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

(1) That the offender has been legally married;

(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.33

Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that without such
marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with
Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s
declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an
evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time
he contracted the second marriage. This should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to
quash.34It is notproper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require
a fuller examination and it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information
on the basis of the document presented by respondent.35 With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out
which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof.

Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio.
He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do not
charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA
heavily relied on the Court’s pronouncement in Morigo v. People36where the accused therein was acquitted because the elements of
the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the
marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity retroacts to
the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the second
marriage. Logically, the accused was acquitted.

The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.1âwphi1 A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.37 It has been held in a number of
cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires
is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.38

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow respondent’s line
of defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition
for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a
complaint against him.41

Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him, because he obtained the declaration
of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In
addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the
offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the
criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription.42

Thus, as held in Antone:

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted
the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy
does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his
motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of
defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.43

In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent. The RTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated
March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.

G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
 The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration
of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three
children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and
supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982,
Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract.
Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.

Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they
acquired the following real properties:

(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;

(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to
Benjamin; and

(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then
filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as
evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article
148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the
declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition
before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her
answer.

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for
reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present
any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several
opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008,
23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence,
prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification dated
21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued
to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage
was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license.
Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and
Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was not
married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for
support.

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her
conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties
that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as
advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely
descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found
that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property
or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722,
N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that
the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court
ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal
partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a
separate proceeding.

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article
148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in
favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro
Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.

Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725,
126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623,
194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638,
194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely:
Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion
of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally
Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money
without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is
appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income
from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further
directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including
the documents of title to the petitioner.

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared by them
equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan.
The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution
of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.

Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
declaration of the status of the parties’ children.

No other relief granted.

Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in
Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.

SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the
trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did
not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the
instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the
case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She insisted
on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the
marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The
Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720
and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired
by him solely. The Court of

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive
properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared
equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while
Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and prejudice on
the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26,
2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby
AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the
respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the
share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of
respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.8

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied her motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her
right to present evidence;
 (2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial court’s decision
regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her evidence.
Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution.

It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the discretion
of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six
resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all
made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed
to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of
other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted
that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to
the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence
because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision
should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.

We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right to
present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities
given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case
because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer
to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could
not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure
that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not
be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence,
she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in
acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in
their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends
as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further
alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.

First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified
true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the
marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar
of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage
Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the
series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No.
N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered
into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV
of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the
Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III,
Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was
no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made
only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming
from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious
marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and
Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin
and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the
dates reflected on the birth certificates.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February
1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio
and non-existent.

Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision
and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned
from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not
bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall
be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the
face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for
other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held
that what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The
daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that
her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated
by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of
a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage
contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code which states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that
"Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x
x x."25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on
record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The
property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to
Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.
We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no
co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the
failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically
labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the
judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in
addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that
Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing the
decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would
justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 94226.

G.R. No. L-23433 February 10, 1968

GLORIA G. JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RICARDO R. ROBLES, defendant-appellant.

REYES J.B.L., J.:

On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action for the
annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles (Civ. Case No. E-00013), on the ground that it was bigamous. It was alleged in the
amended complaint that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles had contracted a first marriage
with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against the same defendant in the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Crim. Case No. 64124). Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and
costs, claiming that during their cohabitation, she was subjected to physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the premature
birth of their first child, who died three days later.

In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents with having
compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract that marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a
married man; and that said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until January, 1963 when he was finally able to get away and
live apart from the plaintiff.

Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that no genuine issue of fact is involved in
the case. It was claimed that defendant's contention, that his consent to the marriage was secured by force and intimidation
employed upon his person by the relatives of plaintiff, was allegedly supported by the joint affidavit of plaintiff's father and brother,
dated October 28, 1963, attached to the motion (pp. 22-32, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted the case for
judgment on the pleadings.

On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the court ruling that before it can pass
upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to defendant, there is necessity for proof that when he
contracted marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and subsisting valid marriage. The evidentiary requirement to
establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in the motion for summary judgment. Defendant's plea to have his
marriage declared as having been brought about by force and intimidation, was also denied, the court finding indications of
collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the nullification of said marriage. Reconsideration of this order, sought by
defendant, was denied on January 18, 1964. And, when both parties failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on March 9, 1964, the
court directed the dismissal of the action.

On April 17, 1964, defendant notified the court below of his intention to appeal to this Court from the abovementioned
orders of December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964, and March 9, 1964. The appeal bond and amended record on appeal, dated April
15, 1964, were thereafter approved.

It is noted that, as specified in the notice of appeal, defendant is taking exception from the lower court's orders of
December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964, and March 9, 1964; however, there is no indication or certification or proof that the filing of
the appeal notice, bond and record on appeal on April 17, 1964 were made within the reglementary period, as required by the
provisions of Section 6, Revised Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Thereunder, the record on appeal must contain, not only the full
names of all the parties to the proceeding, as well as the pleadings, petitions, motions and orders related to the order or judgment
subject of the appeal and which are necessary for the proper understanding of the issue involved therein, but also "such data as will
show that the appeal was perfected on time." This requirement, incorporated in the new Rules of Court to enable the appellate
courts to determine without protracted inquiry whether an appeal was timely made or not, was held to be jurisdictional, failure to
comply with which shall cause the dismissal of the appeal. 1 There is here no showing that the present appeal was perfected within
the reglementary period, which datum should have appeared in the record on appeal.

On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment
in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a
decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for
summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, this proceeding is hereby dismissed, conformable to Section (a) of Revised Rule
50 of the Rules of Court, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-23264 March 15, 1974

ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.
HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, respondents.

Magno T. Bueser for petitioner.

MAKASIAR, J.:p

Petitioner prays for the nullification of the order dated July 29, 1963 of the respondent Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila.
On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva,
alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that private
respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did
not live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts
remained unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu. Said marriage was
solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R. Virtucio on September 28, 1959. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No, 43347 of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.

Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for which
reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his evidence.

In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles
88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to determine whether
collusion exists between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in
the event of a negative finding, to represent the State at the trial of the case to prevent fabrication of evidence; and likewise directed
herein petitioner to furnish the City Fiscal with copies of the complaint and such other documents necessary for the City Fiscal's
information and guidance.

On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint.

Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring petitioner
with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 at 10:00 A.M.

Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962, informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply with the
subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his evidence.

In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the respondent Judge to set the date for the
reception of his evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse of sixty (60)
days from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.

On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself for interrogation by
the City Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.

In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit
himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101 of the New Civil
Code.

His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied on July 29, 1963 and on April 11, 1964, petitioner
now files his petition to annul said order of July 29, 1963 and to compel the respondent Judge to receive his evidence.

Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of
marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance
of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if
none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88 and
101 state:

ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be observed.

ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order
to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that actions for the annulment of
marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the complaint are proved (Sec. 10, Rule 35, 1940 Rules
of Court). The same rule is reiterated in Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1964 Revised Rules, with "legal separation" being substituted
for "divorce", obviously because the present Civil Code does not authorize absolute divorce.

The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of the family
are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital interest
in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated
evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by
non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason,
when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to
preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds (De Ocampo vs. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35, 38-40; Brown vs. Yambao, 102
Phil. 168, 172; Bigornia de Cardenas vs. Cardenas, et al., 98 Phil. 73, 78-79; Roque vs. Encarnacion, et al., 95 Phil. 643, 646).

Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit.

WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED.
WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960

FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo.

The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other
things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando Aquino,
on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or
about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of
lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.

At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent
the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary evidence presented
was the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made
by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.

On June 16, 1956, the trial court — noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born within 180 days
after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute
such fraud sa would annul a marriage — dismissed the complaint. Through a verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional
evidence", plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which
documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce before the trial court thru excusable negligence. The
petition, however, was denied.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of
the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception of
additional evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse
during their engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or
even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint.

On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the
case be remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of the motion, plaintiff attached as annexes thereof the following
documents:

1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-law and plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant was living at
the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with whom defendant has begotten two more children, aside from her first
born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he
and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;

2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B") admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law and
plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from plaintiff before and up to
the time of their marriage;

3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew Cesar Aquino and defendant lived together as husband and wife
before December 27, 1954, the date of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;

4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing her date of birth to be April 26, 1955;

5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of defendant with Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law;

6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of Cesar Aquino and defendant; and

7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to as late as November, 1954, the November, 1954
photo itself does not show defendant's pregnancy which must have been almost four months old at the time the picture was
taken.

Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant Conchita Delizo and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who
was representing the Government, to answer the motion for reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer for new trial until
after the case is disposed of. As both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an answer, and stating that it "does not believe the
veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes", the Court of Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion. From that order,
the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for certiorari.

After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained.

Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the
case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed, which was also an action for the annulment of
marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be
unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their
marriage. That pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than
four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was
readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on
the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is
limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the
lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height
above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as
claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she
was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Even
physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can only
claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery, etc.
Pregnancy, p. 10).

The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they got
married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or
justification in the record.

Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with what has already been adduced
would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied
the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be
taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent the Government precisely to
prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes, the same can best be determined only after
hearing evidence. In the circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a new trial were ordered.

Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for new trial. Without costs.

G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970

AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.

Isabelo V. Castro for plaintiff-appellant.

Arturo A. Romero for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, Manila, of a complaint for
annulment of marriage, docketed therein as Civil Case No. E-00431, entitled "Aurora A. Anaya, plaintiff vs. Fernando O. Palaroan,
defendant."

The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4
December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation, which action was docketed in the Court of First Instance of Manila as Civil
Case No. 21589; that judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the
validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was
being negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had
pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret
on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly
commenced ... frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that
was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the
Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.

Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in paragraph IV of the complaint and denied having had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative; he averred that under no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her and
from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4 December 1953; that he denied having committed any fraud against her. He
set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel, for her having prayed in Civil Case No. 21589 for the validity of the
marriage and her having enjoyed the support that had been granted her. He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of
the suit. Defendant Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral
damages."

Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged:

(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and pretended to shower her with love and
affection not because he really felt so but because she merely happened to be the first girl available to marry so he could
evade marrying the close relative of his whose immediate members of her family were threatening him to force him to
marry her (the close relative);

(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not because he loved her, he secretly
intended from the very beginning not to perform the marital duties and obligations appurtenant thereto, and furthermore,
he covertly made up his mind not to live with her;

(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely concretized for him, when in order to
placate and appease the immediate members of the family of the first girl (referent being the close relative) and to
convince them of his intention not to live with plaintiff, carried on a courtship with a third girl with whom, after gaining
the latter's love cohabited and had several children during the whole range of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589, had
 been litigated between them (parties); (Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)

Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26 August 1966 but it was postponed.
Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, the court realized that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to
invalidate her marriage, and, on the authority of Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, holding:

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof,
because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy
of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record. —

the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed. Plaintiff Aurora submitted a
memorandum in compliance therewith, but the court found it inadequate and thereby issued an order, dated 7 October
1966, for the dismissal of the complaint; it also denied reconsideration.

The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is
a ground for annulment of marriage.

We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment,
comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;

This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud enumerated in Article 86, as
follows:

ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:

(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the
penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;

(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than
her husband.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of marriage to the
foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one
given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise,
Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But
Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and
proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a previous conviction, and
concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such
intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage."

Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would
constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such
non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the
law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which
society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether
it agrees with the rule or not.

But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the
pre-marital relationship of her husband with another woman as her cause of action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in her reply
that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly
made up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court erred in ignoring these allegations in her
reply.

This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and absence of intention to perform duties of
consortium) is an entirely new and additional "cause of action." According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of allegations is
"apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the Complaint ..." (Record on Appeal, page 76). Said allegations were,
therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a party-plaintiff is not permitted to amend or change the cause of
action as set forth in his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445), there is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and
additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could become interminable.

On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the husband's part not to perform his
marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that fraud
should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and
this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.

IMPOTENCE

G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960

JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.

Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellant.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree
annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of
Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or
penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and
that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was
summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of
article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to
intervene for the State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the
Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her
physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof.
On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with
warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of
interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.

After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between
the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered,
upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law; that she
had not been physically examined because she had refused to be examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the Court should
have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and
that the decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or
connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be
subjected to a physical examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13
May 1957 the motion for reconsideration was denied.

The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the
husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was absent during the
hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination.

Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to
maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest
of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and
ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically
enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the
annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony
tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be
deemed to have been satisfactorily established, becase from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she
had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her
part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women
of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by
competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not
charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency."2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically
incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this
decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

MARRIAGE WHEN ONE SPOUSE IS ABSENT

G.R. No. L-14058 March 24, 1960

In the matter of the petition for the declaration of William Gue, presumptively dead. ANGELINA L.
GUE,petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

Virgilio V. David for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor E. M. Salva for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by Judge Bonifacio Ysip, dismissing the petition
of Angelina Gue. Involving as it does only question of law, the appeal was taken directly to us.

On November 20, 1957, Angelina L. Gue filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 34303, alleging
that she was married to William Gue; that they had a child named Anthony L. Gue; that January 5, 1946, her husband left Manila
where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China, but since then, he had not been heard of, neither had he written to her, nor in
anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts; that despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him; and that they
had not acquired any property during the marriage. She asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of William
Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. After due publication and hearing, the trial court
issued the order of dismissal, which we reproduce below:

This is a petition filed by Angelina L. Gue to declare her husband. William Gue, presumptively dead. During the hearing of
this petition, it was established by the testimony of the petitioner that she and her husband were married on October 11, 1944
in the City of Manila before the parish priest of Tondo, Manila, as shows in Exhibit B, the marriage contract. Her husband,
who is a Chinese citizen, left the Philippines for Shanghai on January, 1946. The petitioner joined him in Shanghai in August
of the same year. In January, 1949, the petitioner came back to the Philippines alone with her children, on which occasion her
husband promised to follow her. However, up to the present time, said William Gue has not returned to the Philippines. From
January, 1949, the petitioner had sent letters to her husband in Shanghai, but she never received any reply thereto. She made
inquiries from the Bureau of Immigration in 1955 and 1958 as to whether her husband had already returned to the Philippines
and she received Exhibit D and Exhibit E from said Office, which gave no information as to the whereabouts of her husband. It
 was also established by petitioner's testimony that no properties have been acquired by said spouses during their union, and
during which they begot two children, named Eugeni and Anthony, surnamed Gue.

With this evidence on record and considering the allegations in the petition, it is clear that no right had been established by the
petitioner upon which a judicial decree may be predicated, and this action is not for the settlement of the estate of the absentee,
as it is clear that he did not leave any.

In the case of "Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw", 81 Phil., 461, a case similar to the present, the
Supreme Court held:

The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed property
brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked
by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person
had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case,
whether in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a special proceeding.
In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner for the final determination of his
right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880), for the petition does not pray
for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he
had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead,
such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is
presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a
presumption is established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima
facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or
declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must
decide finally the controversy the right or status of a party or established finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights
and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgment or such right or status is
determined, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the
existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially
provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof cannot reach the state of finality
or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would
have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person
presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the
lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such a presumption is still disputable and remains
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the
petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.

"Little effort is necessary to perceive that a declaration such as the one prayed for by the petitioner, if granted, may make or
lead her to believe that the marital bonds which binds her to her husband are torn asunder, and that for that reason she is or
may feel free to enter into a new marriage contract. The framers of the rules of court, by the presumption provided for in the
rule of evidence in question, did not intend and mean that a judicial declaration based solely upon that presumption may be
made. A petition for a declaration such as the one filed in this case may be made in collusion with the other spouse. If that were
the case, then a decree of divorce that cannot be obtained or granted under the provisions of the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710)
could easily be secured by means of a judicial decree declaring a person unheard from in seven years to be presumptively dead.
This is another strong reason why a petition such as the one presented in this case should not be countenanced and allowed.
What cannot be obtained directly under the provisions of the Divorce Law could indirectly be secured under the provisions of
Rule 123, section 69 (x). Obviously, the latter must not be made to prevail over the former."

In view of the foregoing and the doctrine of the Supreme Court laid down in the case above-cited, the Court hereby orders that
this case be, as it is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement as the costs.

In her appeal, Angelina invoked the provisions of the Article 390 of the New Civil Code, which for purpose of reference, we
reproduce below.

ART. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening this succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
 opened.

She contends that under Article 191 of the Old Civil Code, which reads:

After thirty years have elapsed since disappearance of the absentee, or since he was last heard from, or ninety years from his
birth, the judgment upon the petition of any party lawfully interested, shall make an order declaring that such absentee is
presumed to be dead.

a person could be declared presumptively dead, but that said legal provision was repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure and
continued to be repealed by the Rules of Court. Consequently, only a mere disputable presumption of death was available to any
party, and that the case of Nicolai Szatraw, cited by the trial court, was decided on the law then existing, namely, the Code of Civil
Procedure, and later the new Rules of Court. However, according to appellant, with the promulgation of the New Civil Code in
1950, particularly, Article 390 thereof, the Courts are now authorized to declare persons presumptively dead.

In answer to her contention, the Solicitor General, as appellee herein, correctly cites our decision in the recent case of Lourdes G.
Lukban vs. Republic of the Philippines, 98 Phil., 574; 52 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 1441, decided long after the New Civil Code went into
effect, wherein we reiterated the doctrine laid own in Nicolai Szatraw, supra. We quote the pertinent portions of our decision in that
case:

This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration that petitioner is a widow of her husband
Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not authorized by law. After petitioner had presented
her evidence, the court sustained the opposition and dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.

Lourdes G. Lukban, petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at the Paco
Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he
has not been heard from despite diligent search made by her. She also inquired about him from his parents and friends but no
one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is still alive, his last known address being Calle Merced,
Paco, Manila. She believes that he is already dead because he had been absent for more than twenty years, and because she
intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may be relieved of any liability under the
law.

We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in the case of Nicolai Szatraw, 46 Off. Gaz. 1st
Sup. 243, wherein it was held that a petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be
entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceedings similar to the
present, much less can the court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity depend upon
the fact of death of the husband. This the court can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely presumed
to be dead. (Nicolai Szatraw, 48 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup. 243).

The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be made in a proceeding of this nature is well
expressed in the case above-cited. Thus, we there said that "A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory,
would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to
pass .. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from
in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become
final."

We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the merits of the case. The appealed order dismissing the petition is hereby affirmed, with
costs.