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Part V
Article VI – The Legislative Department

Section 1: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Legislative Power: The authority under the constitution to make laws and to alter or repeal them
BASIC CCONCEPTS:
1. Cannot pass irrepealable laws
2. Principle of separation of powers
3. Non-delegability of legislative powers
CASES:
GR No 208560, November 19, 2013
Belgica vs Executive Secretary

NATURE: These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS: The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy
NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for
Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the
NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off
Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged
before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional,
and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court
issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued
restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b)
non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local
autonomy.
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2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence,
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates
the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1)
scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to
wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be
used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in
effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE
ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR
RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT
CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A
―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.

63 Phil. 139
Angara vs Electoral Commission

FACTS: Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for
garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed
Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion
to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied
Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further
cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral
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Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING: In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935
Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

67 Phil 22
Planas vs Gil

FACTS: In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board member of Manila, published a statement criticizing
the acts of certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following morning, she
received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president directing her to report before
the Civil Service Commission (CSC). She was directed to explain and prove her allegations.

She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that as an elective
official, she is accountable for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses
punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which petitioner
is affiliated. Further, she contends that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen and in the
exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be the subject of an administrative
investigation; that the issue is only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents of said statement infringe any
provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil, however took cognizance of the case hence
Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing that under the separation of
powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive which are of
purely administrative in character.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President.

HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will
neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it
does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his
acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental
powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality
in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers.

In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a
particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an investigation
undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the present
proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government
is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive
upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference
is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate official and employees of the executive Department to
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the extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the
validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended.

Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out her
opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations. The
CSC has the right to elicit the truth.

34 SCRA 178
Luzon Stevedoring vs SSS
“Labor Standards – Coverage of the Social Security Act”
FACTS:Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC) is engaged in the business of stevedoring, lightering and towing in the cities
of Iloilo and Bacolod. It owns, maintains and operates towboats, barges and a drydock. In 1959, it carried in its payrolls
temporary employees of 1,752 and 2,552 stevedores in the cities of Iloilo and Bacolod, respectively, who were hired on
rotation and on vessel-by- vessel basis. They were paid daily with the understanding of being laid off at the end of each
day. On the average, each stevedore worked for 14 days during the year. In October 1960, LSC petitioned to the SSS that
the temporary employees be exempt from SSS contributions on the ground that they “work only intermittently and are
not in a position to maintain membership in the Social Security System long enough to be fully entitled to the law’s
sickness, disability, death and retirement benefits”. And that the law could not have intended them to be covered
without enjoying the benefits of the program. SSS however denied LSC’s petition and it ordered LSC to pay back
premiums. LSC countered stating that the compulsory coverage of the SSS contributions only covers permanent
employees. LSC invoked Section 9 of the Social Security Act as amended by Republic Act No. 1792 which states that an
employee must at least have been with the company for six months to be covered by the compulsory coverage. LSC also
invoked Sec. 8 of the same law which defines employment covered by the Social Security Act and also provides
exemption therefrom. Paragraph 10 of that section would state that services by temporary employees may be excluded
by regulations of the Social Security Commission. This is interpreted by LSC as a provision that Congress has delegated to
the Social Security Commission the issuance of regulations bearing on the exemption of services performed by
temporary employees from social security coverage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the temporary employees are exempt from the compulsory coverage.

HELD: No. The Social Security Act was amended by Republic Act No. 2658 on June 18, 1960. The amendment broadened
the coverage of the Social Security System, increased its benefits and liberalized the terms and conditions for their
enjoyment. Sections 9 and 10 were made to read as follows:

“SEC. 9. Compulsory Coverage. — Coverage in the System shall be compulsory upon all employees between the ages
of sixteen and sixty, inclusive, and their employers: . . .”

“SEC. 10. Effective date of coverage. — Compulsory coverage of the employer shall take effect on the first day of his
operation, and that of the employee on the date of his employment.”

Eliminated was the six months’ service requirement. Without such requirement, all employees regardless of tenure,
such as the employees in question, would qualify for compulsory membership in the SSS; except of course those classes
of employees contemplated in Section 8(j) of the Social Security Act. With such removal, it is the intent of Congress to
broaden and include temporary workers to the compulsory coverage. On the other hand, in regards section 8, paragraph
10 being invoked by LSC, no such regulation has been cited to buttress the claim for exemption. Perforce, no exemption
could be granted as there is no way of telling whether or not the employees in question belong to a group or class
designated by regulation of the Social Security Commission as exempt.
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39 SCRA 106
Garcia vs Macaraig

FACTS: Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The
court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February
28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can
not be properly established due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up and running.
When Macaraig realized that it would be some time before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an
extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties,
never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten
months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to
assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his
court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in
violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by
law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the
duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department of
the executive oi charge of prosecution of cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge.

HELD: No. Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not
constitute incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume
his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being ‘a judge without a sala’, but forces and circumstances beyond his
control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.

On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long
standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his
work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not
do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must
always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests
by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good
intentions in the interest of the public service.

Sept. 26 1996
Bondoc vs HRET
“Removal of a Member, Separation of Powers”
FACTS: Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga.
Pineda was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista
Party (NP). Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET (House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.

Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep.
Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He confessed
that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted to Camasura’s expulsion from the
LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held
and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda in the
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reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera.
Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).

Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is
an official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the HRET without violating the
doctrine of separation of powers.

HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature
particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being complained of
is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already
been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc
wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already
reached a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already become moot and academic. LDP is
merely changing their representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be reinstated because his
removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in
the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.

**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1
coming from the minority.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.”

270 SCRA 106

Defensor Santiago vs COMELEC

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the
COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed
Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the
COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days.
On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special
civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to
which no such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other
modes of initiative.
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ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded
adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would constitute a
revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the
COMELEC.

HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded
the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of
initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order
of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws,
it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin
Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

Nature of Legislative Power

Limitations to the grant of legislative power

Doctrine of non-delegation power The principle in administrative law that congress cannot delegate its legislative
powers to agencies. Rather, when it instructs agencies to regulate, it must give them an "intelligible principle” on which
to base their regulations.

Permissive delegation of legislative power

1. Section 23 (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

2. Section 28 (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
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3. Delegation to Local Governments: know better the needs of the people therein
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Art. 10, Sec 5 Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes,
fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy
of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.

CASES
39 Phil 660
Rubi vs Provincial Board
FACTS: The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It
is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi
and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from
the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up
their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the
provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was
duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the
Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized,
when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE: Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?

HELD: No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the
provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later
no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official.
The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed
the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to
the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor,
with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the
law. This is necessary since the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”. As
officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to
select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a
backward state.

Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
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65 Phil 56
People vs Vera
FACTS: Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for reconsideration
and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review,
which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and
thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application
for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set
the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other
things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on
Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution).

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

RULING: Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in those provinces
in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply
to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of
the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is
to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the
application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through
appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without
such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act
in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not
one of the provinces — and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a
probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation
officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.

Reason for delegation:

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CASES
151 SCRA 208
Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board

FACTS: The petition assails the constitutionality of PD No 1987 entitled “An act creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board” based on several grounds, including the following: (1) Section 10 of PD No 1987 which imposes a tax of 30% on
the gross receipts payable to the local government is a rider and the same is not germane to the subject thereof; (2) the
tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process of the
Constitution; and (3) undue delegation of power and authority.

ISSUE: Is PD 1987 constitutional?

RULING: Yes.
(1) The contention that the tax provision of the Decree is a rider is bereft and devoid of merit because the title of the
Decree, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) aimed at regulating and controlling the video
industry, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its preamble and reasonably covers all its
provisions. Moreover, it is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the
body of the decree.
(2) It is axiomatic that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely
deters the activities taxed. The legislature acts upon its constituents in imposing a tax; thus, in general, a sufficient
security against erroneous and oppressive taxation is afforded the taxpayer. Also, the tax imposed by the Decree is a
revenue measure. The tax of 30% is exacted for a public purpose i.e. to answer the need for regulating the video
industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights and the
proliferation of pornographic video tapes.
(3) The grant in Section 11 of the Decree of authority to the VRB to “solicit the direct assistance of other agencies &
units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units
to perform enforcement functions for the Board” is NOT a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment
of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement and implementation.

Free Telephone Workers Union vs Ople

Delegation of Power – Completeness Test

FACTS: In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union (the Union) and the
Philippine Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over the issue
pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed the provisions of Article 264 as it averred that it is an
undue delegation of power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting discretion to the
Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations
Commission, it also effectively granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining.

ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of Labor was yet to take on the
entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional application of the law.

The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power. There could be, however, an
unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the
exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford
protection to labor. But as to whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the law, that is yet to be
determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual determination of the labor dispute in issue.
 12

There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a sufficient standard. The law cannot be
any clearer, the coverage being limited to “strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.”

December 18, 1989

PHILCOMSAT vs Alcuaz
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis
Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified
lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications
Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which
granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner
was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-making
power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no
other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists
that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and,
therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending
final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt
from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC
didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner

May rules and regulations promulgated by administrative bodies have the force of law? Penal law? In order to be
considered as one with the force and effect of law, what conditions must concur?
US vs Grimaud: This case established that “congress cannot delegate legislative power.” However, according to the
Supreme Court, “the authority to make administrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power, and such rules do
not become legislation because violations thereof are punished as public offenses.
1. The delegating statute itself must specifically authorize the promulgation of penal regulations.
2. Penalty must not be left to the administrative body but must be provided by the statute itself.
3. The regulation must be published in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation

CASES
 13

68 Phil 328
People vs Rosenthal
“Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies – Public Interest as Sufficient Test”

Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company. Later, Rosenthal and
Osmeña were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without actual tangible assets. Their shares were merely
based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581.

Section 2 provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the
Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the
Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.

Section 5, on the other hand, provides that “whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with
or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the
right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person,
partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or
corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation,
its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer
shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or
permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to
the Secretary of Finance.”

Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said
official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole
criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular
Treasurer.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in
reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued
under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor “has complied with
the provisions of this Act”, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a
certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied
with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly
conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in the public interest.”

In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 — to protect the public against “speculative schemes which have
no more basis than so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells,
distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”, — the SC held that “public interest” in this case is a
sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or
cancellation of certificates or permits.

Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain.
That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare
without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of
the provision in question show the contrary.”
 14

11 Phil 328
US vs Barrias

FACTS: In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate the business of
lighterage. Lighterage is a business involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or cascos (small ships/boats). The
said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules to implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136
provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it should not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the Collector
promulgated Circular No. 397.

Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually powered by bamboo
poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of Circular No. 397 because under said Circular, only steam powered ships should be
allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the information against Barrias, it was alleged that the imposable
penalty against him should be a fine not exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court – this was pursuant to Circular
No. 397 which provides:

For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than
P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.

Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is entirely different from the penal provision of
Act. No. 1136 which only provided a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that time the peso-dollar exchange was
more or less equal).

ISSUE: Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is valid.

HELD: No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty different from that specified by Congress. If the
Collector is allowed to do so, then in effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to legislate penalties. One of the
settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated
by that department to anybody or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it
must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The
power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the
responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the
judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide
this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation
and not through the intervening mind of another. The Collector cannot exercise a power exclusively lodged in Congress.
Hence, Barrias should be penalized in accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No. 1136. In this case, the
Supreme Court determined that the proper fine is $25.00.

86 SCRA 270
Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the
diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and another
country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as to be
employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the
ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.

 15

HELD: The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who
have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference in
situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are
thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers.

Section 2 (1), Art XVII: Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.

Section 32, Art VI: The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

Membership of the Legislative Department:

According to the 1987 Constitution, legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

Manner of election and selection:

CASE
137 SCRA 108
TUPAS vs Ople

The Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) and the National Federation of Labor Unions (NFLU) are
unions representing the agricultural and industrial sectors. They alleged they represent over a million workers all over
the country. On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 is the implementing law of the constitutional provision which
states that 3 sectors are to be represented (youth, agricultural labor, industrial labor).

FACTS: Each sector must have four representatives, 2 from Luzon, one each from Visayas and Mindanao respectively.
These sectors can submit their nominees to the President for approval/appointment through the Minister of Labor.
TUPAS however questions the constitutionality of the said BP because it allegedly lacks duly published rules on
accreditation, nomination and appointment of industrial labor representatives. Being so, TUPAS questioned the acts of
BlasOple, then Minister of Labor, in accrediting certain nominations provided by other industrial labor groups. TUPAS
claims that since there are no rules clearly stated in the BP on how the nominations must be handled, the said law has
provided undue delegation to the Minister of Labor and has left him with absolute discretion in carrying out the duty of
accrediting such nominations. TUPAS did not submit their nomination within the given 20 day period of nominating
their representation; they instead proceeded to question the constitutionality of the said BP and the legality of the acts
of Ople. Because of their failure to submit their nominees, Ople did not accredit them.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Minister of Labor by BP 697.
 16

HELD: No. The lack of merit of the contention that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is quite obvious.
Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion. What is involved then is not a
legislative power but the exercise of competence intrinsically executive. What is more, the official who could make the
recommendation is the Minister of Labor, an alter ego of the President. The argument, therefore, that there is an
unlawful delegation of legislative power is bereft of any persuasive force.

To further test the validity of the said BP, and to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard does not even have to be spelled
out. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. Such standard is set forth with
clarity in Article III, Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 which provides in full the limits and scope of the functions of
the Minister of Labor in carrying out the said provisions.

TUPAS and NFLU were free to submit their nominations to the President by merely writing a letter coursed through
respondent, and their nominees should have been submitted to the President. They did not do so. In fact, as of May 30,
1984, which was still within the 20-day period, they wrote a letter to Ople which in effect stated that they were not
submitting any nomination and informing him that they were questioning the validity of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of BP 697.
Hence, if petitioners were not able to submit any nominee they had no one to blame but themselves. And the law
cannot be declared unconstitutional on such ground.

SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of
the Philippines, as may be provided by law.

Qualification for a member of the Senate

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
 17

Qualification for a member of House of Representatives

SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.

CASE
GR No. 161658
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs Commission on Elections
FACTS: On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics
Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5 Extension
Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but
the Minority failed to name its representatives to the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the
Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.
In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with the
Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the
Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the majority. In
the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator
Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an indispensable party in this petition;
2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort;
3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of
the Whole is violative of Senator Villar's right to equal protection;
4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is
violative of Senator Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of
the Constitution; and
5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity.

HELD:

REMEDIAL LAW
First issue: An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In this case, Senator Madrigal is
not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome
of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the
part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal's interest.
 18

Second issue: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not require
the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are
purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Third issue: While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within
the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they
refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. The referral of the investigation to the Committee of the
Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members
of the Senate, and not violative of the right to equal protection.
Fourth issue: The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate
Senator Villar's right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings
has been recognized and affirmed by this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, which states:
"Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
Fifth: The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House
or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be
published,unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. Hence, in this
particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before
the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication.

573 SCRA 290 GR No 176970 December 8, 2008

Rogelio Bagabuyo vs COMELEC
Local Government – Reapportionment – Municipal Corporation – Plebiscite

FACTS: Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula
sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative
districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme
Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd
district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay;
in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took
place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative district
into two legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now
effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city’s population. This easily means better
access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.
 19

GR No. 179271 May 2009

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs Commission on Elections

FACTS: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution.
However,
the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of
canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a
resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the
SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.

ISSUES: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory
or is it merely a ceiling? (2)
Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? (3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can major political parties participate in the party-list elections?

HELD: (1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling
that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. We therefore strike
down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec
5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral
or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system.
On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

February 25, 2013

Atong Paglaum vs Commission on Elections
FACTS: This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or
underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
 20

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the
Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined
political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority
of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the
party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political
parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see
parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-
defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were
drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to
include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that
the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the
marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”.
The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political
parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national
election system like the party-list system of elections.
 21

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other
cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors
that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941
includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se
economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined
political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.

GR No. 193704 January 29, 2013 Dayao vs Commission on Elections: Separate

September 29, 2015

Lico vs Commission on Elections:
The Supreme Court (SC) has finally resolved the legal dispute between two rival factions of Adhikaing Tin-ataguyod ng
Kooperatiba (Ating Koop) Party-list Group.

In an en banc ruling written by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. Aranal Sereno, the SC annulled and set aside the Comelec
en banc resolution dated January 31, 2013 and the Comelec Second Division resolution dated July 18, 2012 “insofar as it
declares valid the expulsion of [Atty. Isidro Lico] from Ating Koop and it upholds the Ating Koop Party-list Group
represented by its President, Amparo Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group.”

“A new one is entered declaring that the legitimate Central Committee and set of officers legitimately representing Ating
Koop are the Interim Central Committee and set of officers prior to the split of Ating Koop,” the SC ruling said.

Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organi-zation which was regis-tered in November 2009 under Republic Act No.
7941, or the “Party-list System Act (Party-list Law)”.

One group is headed by petitioner Lico (the Lico Group), who represented the organization in the House of
Representatives, and the other group by Rimas.

Under Ating Koop’s Constitution and By-Laws, its highest policy-making body is the National Convention.

However, the Central Committee takes over when the National Convention is not in session.

Lico sought redress with the SC when he did not receive a favorable ruling on the matter when it reached the Comelec.

In its Sept. 29, 2015 ruling, the SC found to be without legal basis the action of the Comelec in upholding the validity of
the expulsion of Lico from Ating Koop, “despite its own ruling that the HRET [House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal] has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue.”

“These findings already touch upon the qualification requiring a party- list nominee to be a bona fide member of the
party-list group sought to be represented,” the SC said.

The SC said that “the Comelec to have committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the Rimas Group as the
legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the simple reason that the amendments to the Constitution and By-laws of Ating
Koop were not registered with the Comelec.”
 22

“Hence, neither of the elections held during the Cebu meeting and the Paranaque conference pursuant to the said
amendments, were valid. Both the Lico Group and the Rimas Group indeed assert that their respective elections were
conducted pursuant to the amendment introduced in the Second National Convention held on 14 May 2011,” it said.

“In the present case, we have gone through the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop and we do not see any provision
forbidding, either expressly or impliedly, the application of the hold-over rule,” the SC said.

Thus, the SC added that “in accordance with corporation law, the existing Interim Central Committee is still a legitimate
entity with full authority to bind the corporation and to carry out powers despite the lapse of the term of its members
on Nov. 14, 2011, since no successors had been validly elected at the time.” (PNA

GR No 178678 January 29, 2013

Dr. Hans Christian M. Seneris vs Commission on Elections

FACTS: In 1999, Melquiades Robles was elected president and chairperson of BUHAY, a party-list group duly registered
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-year term for all its party
officers, without re-election. BUHAY participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its president. All the
required Manifestations of Desire to Participate in the said electoral exercises, including the Certificates of Nomination
of representatives, carried the signature of Robles as president of BUHAY. On January 26, 2007, in connection with the
May 2007 elections, BUHAY again filed a Manifestation of its Desire to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation. As in the past two elections, the manifestation to participate bore the signature of Robles as BUHAY
president.
Dr. Hans Christian Señeres, on the other hand, filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to Certificates. In
it, Señeres alleged that he was the acting president and secretary-general of BUHAY, having assumed that position since
August 17, 2004 when Robles vacated the position. Señeres also claim that the nominations made by Robles
(nominations pertaining as to who should represent BUHAY in Congress) were, for lack of authority, void owing to the
expiration of the latter’s term as party president. Furthermore, Señeres asserted that Robles was, under the
Constitution, disqualified from being an officer of any political party, the latter being the Acting Administrator of the
Light Railway Transport Authority (LRTA), a government-controlled corporation. Robles, so Señeres would charge, was
into a partisan political activity which civil service members, like the former, were enjoined from engaging in.
On July 9 and July 18, 2007, respectively, the COMELEC issued two resolutions proclaiming BUHAY as a winning party-list
organization for the May 2007 elections entitled to three (3) House seats and it also declared Robles as the duly
authorized representative of BUHAY.

ISSUE: Whether or not Robles should be disqualified as president of BUHAY.

HELD: No, Robles is not disqualified as the president of BUHAY. His being the chairman of LRTA and the president of
BUHAY, a party-list group, is not compatible. There is no law prohibiting that the LRTA chair cannot be a president of a
party-list group. Further, Robles is not guilty of electioneering. Robles’ act of nominating BUHAY representatives to
Congress is not electioneering. The crime electioneering is clearly defined under Section 79 (b) of the Omnibus Election
Code but Robles did not commit any act defined thereunder.
Anent the issue that Robles’ term as president of BUHAY already expired when he made the nominations hence the
nominations are void, the Supreme Court ruled that the nominations are valid. This is because of the “Hold-Over”
doctrine under corporation law. As a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold over after the expiration
of their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed. The holdover doctrine has, to be sure, a
purpose which is at once legal as it is practical. It accords validity to what would otherwise be deemed as dubious
corporate acts and gives continuity to a corporate enterprise in its relation to outsiders.

GR No. 190529 April 29, 2010

 23

Philippine Guardian and Brotherhood, Inc. vs Commission on Elections

FACTS: Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the latter’s
motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of
MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from
the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.

ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s
delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-
list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate
reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as
PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for [it] was given an opportunity to
seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply
the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s
side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is
not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice
and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis et non
quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a
decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all
courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
 24

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override
the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it
aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law
in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC]
now abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.

GR No. 189783 April 7, 2010

Benigno Aquino III vs Commission on Elections
FACTS: Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and
was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao,
and San Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards
that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.

HELD: NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned
about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to
be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

Natural Born Requirement:

357 SCRA 545

Antonio Bengson III vs House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Teodoro Cruz

Residence Requirement:

January 12, 2016

Velasco vs Belmonte
FACTS: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5,
1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On
March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.
He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He
won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
 25

ISSUE: (1) W/N respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that
"no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.” (2) W/N HRET acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the petition “despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally
and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.”

HELD: (1) NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN. Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the
lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. If he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
(2) NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET
is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple
reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.

GR No. 202202 March 19, 2013

Tagolino vs HRET & Lucy Torres Gomez
FACTS: In this case, on November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of
Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates,
Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of College
Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-
adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement
under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course
and/or cancelled.The COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution granting Juntilla’s petition without any qualification.

Richard thereafter manifested that he is accepting the resolution in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing
of the necessary documents for substitution. The substitute? His wife, Ms. Lucy Torres-Gomez. Lucy accepted the
nomination and endorsement from the Liberal Party.

Juntilla, opposed the candidacy of Ms. Lucy as Richard’s substitute. Juntilla stated that there should be no substitution
because there is no candidate to substitute for.

The COMELEC First Division decided in favor of Juntilla, but said that the substitution was valid. The COMELEC en banc
affirmed the First Division’s resolution. The resolution hinges upon the reasoning that Richard is indeed disqualified, but
one’s “disqualification does not automatically cancel one’s certificate of candidacy, especially when it is nominated by a
political party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared
disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege given to a political party to exercise and not dependent totally
to a candidate.”

At this point, the COMELEC was close to perpetuate their wrong decision. This was thereafter corrected by the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the substitution of Richard Gomez as a candidate valid

 26

HELD: The Supreme Court said no, it is not valid.

A substitution is only valid when the candidate is disqualified. If the candidate to be substituted made material
misrepresentation in his CoC, it will result to a denial of due course/ cancellation of CoC. In disqualification, there is a
candidate to be substituted. In cancellation, there is no candidate to speak of in the first place.

Under the Omnibus Election Code, disqualification is provided under Section 68 (pursuant to Section 77), while
cancellation is provided under Section 78. Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where substitution is
permissible, that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause." Noticeably, “material misrepresentation” cases are not included in the said section and
therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.

RICHARD GOMEZ COMMITTED MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION RESULTING TO THE CANCELLATION OF HIS COC.

The COMELEC First Division decision was the cause of the confusion when it used the word “disqualification” instead of
“denied due course to and/or cancelled”. Still, the COMELEC en banc could have corrected this confusion. At this point,
the Supreme Court has this to say;

“In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure to
comply with the one year residency requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word
"disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En
Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo
warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified – and not that his CoC was denied due course
to and/or cancelled – would mean that he could have been validly substitute by private respondent, thereby legitimizing
her candidacy.

Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree the denial of due
course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC should not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the
invalidity of private respondent’s substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richard’s
"disqualification" is his failure to comply with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution
which is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC,
misrepresentation contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one’s qualifications for
elective office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status”

Reading the case at this point is disheartening, because by the time Juntilla won the case, Ms. Lucy had two months left
before the next elections. Justice was served, only too late.

The Supreme Court further stated:

“In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First Division’s February 17,
2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Department’s finding that Richard was only "disqualified" and that his CoC
was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval of private respondent’s substitution. It
overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard’s CoC and in
consequence, disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of
the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondent’s substitution.”

The Court ended:

 27

“Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate for the
position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could not have
been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues
respecting private respondent’s own qualification to office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision rendered by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

June 15, 2004

Ocampo vs HRET and Mario Crespo a.k.a. Mark Jimenez
Facts: Mario B. Crespo aka Mark Jimenez, a duly-elected congressman of the 6th district of Manila, was declared
ineligible for the position in which he was elected for lack of residency in the district and was ordered to vacate his
office. Ocampo then averred that since Crespo was declared as such, he should be declared the winner, having garnered
the second highest number of votes.

Issue: Whether or not the candidate who has the second highest vote should be declared as winner considering that the
duly-elected representative is not eligible for the office.

Ruling: No. The fact that the candidate who had the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or
ineligible for office does not give rise to the right of the candidate who garnered the second highest vote to be declared
winner. To do otherwise would be anathema to the most basic precepts of republicanism and democracy. Therefore, the
only recourse to ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to hold another election.

GR No. 187478 December 21, 2009

Rep. Danilo Fernandez vs HRET and Jesus Vicente

FACTS: Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna in the
May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he indicated his complete/exact address as “No. 13
Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna” (alleged Sta. Rosa residence).
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification but the COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said petition for lack
of merit. Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Laguna on June 27, 2007,
having garnered a total of 95,927 votes, winning by a margin of 35,000 votes over the nearest candidate. On July 5,
2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET citing as main ground for the quo warranto
petition that petitioner lacked the required one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution. Since the HRET ruled in favor of private respondent, petitioner ran to the Supreme Court for legal
succour.

ISSUES: The issues for determination are: (1) whether the HRET had jurisdiction over the case; and (2)
whether petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement to be a
Member of the House of Representatives, as provided in the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: The SC did not agree. The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the HRET
and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals,[33] which is
conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who
has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of
Representatives. [34]
 28

Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of
Representatives while the latter was still `a candidate.
 29

Ang Ladlad vs COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a
petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision.
It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated
the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well
as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda
to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that
the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELEC’s field personnel.

ISSUE: WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;

WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

HELD: Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of
the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality
in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for
the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at
worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under
the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest.
 30

G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Aldaba vs. COMELEC

FACTS: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative
district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the
creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress
through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693)
and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos),
by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of
250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “An act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is
unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.

HELD: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds
that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional
Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect
because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements
supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l Statistics
Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in which case, the
Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification issued by Director
Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of
223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to
equalize the population and voting power among districts.

a. On the manner of nomination and appointment of Sectoral Representatives to the House of Representatives

Exec. Order No. 198, June 18, 2987:

SECTION 1. Sectoral Representatives. – There shall be twenty-five (25) sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives.
Nine (9) sectors shall be represented in the House of Representatives, namely: (a) labor; (b) peasant; (c) urban poor; (d)
indigenous cultural communities; (e) women; (f) youth; (g) veterans; (h) the elderly and (i) the disabled, whose
representatives shall be appointed by the President from the nominees of their respective sectors or of a member of the
sector in the manner herein provided.

SECTION 2. Scope of the Sectors. – The labor sector refers to the industrial labor group, which includes all non-
agricultural workers and employees.
The peasant sector covers the agricultural group, which includes all persons who personally and physically till the land as
their principal occupation, agricultural tenants and lessees, rural workers and farm employees, owner-cultivators,
settlers and small fishermen.
 31

The urban poor sector includes the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas.
The indigenous cultural communities sector covers all ethnic groups and cultural communities.
The women sector shall cover all women.
The youth sector embraces persons not more than thirty-five years of age.
The veterans sector embraces persons recognized as such veterans by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The elderly sector covers persons who are sixty-five years of age or over.
The sector of the disabled covers the physically and socially disabled.

SECTION 3. Nominations. – (a) Nominations of the sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives must be
made by the organizations/s or aggroupment of members of the sectoral groups defined in Section 2 hereof or by a
member of the sector.
(b) All nominations shall be filed with the Office of the President not later than July 20, 1987.
(c) Nominations must be in writing and accompanied by the following supporting documents, namely; (i) curriculum
vitae of the nominee/s; (ii) an indication of the sector to be represented by the nominee; (iii) an endorsement of the
nominating group or individual; and (iv) such other relevant materials as may help the appointing authority.

SECTION 4. Term. – The sectoral representatives appointed to the House of Representatives shall serve until noon of
June 30, 1992.

SECTION 5. Vacancy. – In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in the House of
Representatives, the President shall fill the vacancy by appointing a representative for such sector who shall serve for
the unexpired term.

SECTION 6. Separability Clause. – Any portion or provision of this Executive Order that may be deemed unconstitutional
shall not have the effect of nullifying other portions or provisions thereof as long as such remaining portions or
provisions can still subsist and be given effect in their entirety.

SECTION 7. Effectivity Clause. – This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

CASES
September 4, 1989
Deles vs Commission on Appointments

FACTS: This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel CoA to allow
Quintos-Deles to perform and discharge her duties as HoR member representing Women's Sector and to restrain
respondents from subjecting her appointment to the confirmation process. Quintos-Deles ad three others were
appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Art. VII Sec 16 p.2 and Art. XVIII Sec. 7 of the
Constitution.

ISSUE: WoN the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the HoR to be confirmed by the
CoA.

RULING: Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that
sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other officers whose appointments are vested
 32

in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2 which gives the President ”the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” The
records show that Deles’ appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to
April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.

b. Gerrymandering: manipulate the boundaries of (an electoral constituency) so as to favor one party or class; a
term to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the
party in power.

95 SCRA 763
Ceniza vs COMELEC

FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars
voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M)
cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on
the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue
to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS
(Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution.
They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further,
petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of
the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an
opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire
province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that
the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies
cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial
officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions
germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and
therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local
government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of
gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division,
merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the
approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement
that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the
creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is
based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and
development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has
sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically
 33

situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the
continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in
other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of
allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another
component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of
suffrage.
120 SCRA 337
Lozada vs COMELEC

FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an election to fill the
vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973
Constitution which provides: “In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a
regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the
vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.” COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially,
that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2)
this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not
apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the legislature.

HELD: The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s decision, orders or rulings. This is
as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads: “Any decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his
receipt of a copy thereof.” There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be
reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only
known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge
expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and
this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to
exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to
appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP,
not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and
exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for
mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to
vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

RA 6645-RE: Filling up of Congress Vacancy, December 28, 1987

An Act PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at least
(1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a
resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy
and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy of Congress is in recess, an official
communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the
 34

Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five
(45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things
the office or offices to be voted for: provided, however, that if within the said period a general election is scheduled to
be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.

Section 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for due distribution and
publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their
respective localities by posting at least three copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election
precincts, and a copy in each of the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings.

Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two newspapers of general
circulation.

Section 17, Article 18: Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of three
hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of the
House of Representatives, the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional
Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred
eighty thousand pesos each.

15 SCRA 479
Philconsa vs Gimenez

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows
retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective
officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the
Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the
provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because
it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity
equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re
election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty
(20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service,
which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate
received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their
compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No.
3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute “forbidden compensation” within the meaning of
Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The
payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for
computing the gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

ISSUE: Whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which reads as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an
annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the
House of Representative and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of
 35

the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law,
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation
of sixteen thousand pesos.

HELD: Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the
amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: “No increase
in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National
Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase.” In other words, under the original constitutional provision
regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation “other
emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided
for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term “other emoluments.”
Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for
services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for
services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were
immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article
VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.

56 SCRA 823
Ligot vs Mathay
FACTS: Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three
consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his
second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other
officials of the national government” was enacted into law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of
Congress (senators and congressmen) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the
Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”

Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act No. 186, section
12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee,
appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the
basis therein provided “in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the
rates of pay as provided by law.” The House of Representatives granted his petition however, Jose Velasco, the then
Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same.

The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended
December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for
members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed,
because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under
Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

 36

HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of
increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly.
Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office
ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of
compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other emoluments”
to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on
December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited
by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in
effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of Ligot’s colleague, ex-Congressman
Melanio Singson, “Such a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by
enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”

Section 11: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

a. Privilege from arrest

44 SCRA 22
Martinez vs Morfe
Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional Convention. Both were facing
criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification of a public document before the sala of Judge Jesus Morfe.
While Bautista was charged for violation of the Revised Election Code. The two were later arrested, this is while the
Constitutional Convention was still in session. They now assail the validity of their arrest. They contend that under the
1935 Constitution, they are immune from arrest because the charges upon which they were arrested are within the
immunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.

HELD: No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to
the Constitutional Convention. They are accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of
treason, felony and breach of the peace. In the case at bar, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista were arrested fall
under the category 0f “breach of peace”. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal
Code or any special statute. Therefore, Martinez and Bautista cannot invoke the privilege from arrest provision of the
Constitution.

NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in any committee thereof.

b. Freedom from speech and debate

 37

Section 12: All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest
that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.

Section 13: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

135 SCRA 431

Adaza vs Pacana
FACTS: Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He
took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr.
was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would
expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections;
petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the
candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then
he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis
Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the
lawful occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he
was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term
expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France,
Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and
simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously.
Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such can, by virtue
of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.

HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .”
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He
cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza further
contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his
office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to
the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May
14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or
barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.”
Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and
205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

140 SCRA 153

Punzalan vs Mendoza
 38

Cicero Punsalan and Estelito Mendoza were the vice governor and the governor of Pampanga respectively. Both belong
to KBL. On 17 May 1984, Mendoza tendered his resignation as the governor but the same should only be “effective at
the President’s pleasure.” On 30 June 1984, Mendoza was appointed as the Minister of Justice by the president. On 14
July 1984, he was concurrently appointed as a member of the Batasan Pambansa. On 16 July 1984, he filed a request to
the Minister of Local Government (MLG) to consider him as the governor-on-leave of Pampanga while the President was
considering his resignation. The request was subsequently approved by the MLG. Mendoza advised Punsalan to take the
governorship temporarily while his resignation is being considered. Punsalan subsequently took his oath of office not as
the acting governor but as the governor and thereafter assumed office. About 6 months later however, Mendoza
resigned from his Batasan Membership and upon the result of the KBL’s caucus, he returned to Pampanga to assume his
governorship. Punsalan denounced Mendoza’s return claiming that he has already vacated his office by virtue of his
resignation which was impliedly approved by the President. Punsalan also pointed out that when Mendoza was a
member of the Batasan, he was barred from holding governorship because there is an inhibition against Batasan
Members from holding two elective positions; this is a constitutional provision which cannot be compromised. Further,
Punsalan claimed that Mendoza had forfeited his right and title to the office when he accepted his appointment as
Minister of Justice and that of “appointive” Batasan Member because of the incompatibility” of the positions with the
Governor’s office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza can still return to his governorship.

HELD: Section 10, Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution provides:

“A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his
tenure except that of Prime Minister, Member of the Cabinet or Deputy Minister. Neither shall he, during the term for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office which may have been created or emoluments thereof increased
while he was a Member of the Batasang Pambansa.”

Punsalan anchored his contention upon the above provision but he failed to ascertain that the Constitution made a
distinction. The Constitution itself divided the Batasan membership into three categories: The elective
provincial/city/district representative; the sectoral representatives who are either “elected or selected as may be
provided by law”; and those “chosen” from Members of the Cabinet. It is the SC’s opinion that the prohibition in
question does not extend to the third group of members, those chosen from the Cabinet. The prohibitions, undoubtedly,
deal with “a Member” who enters the Batasan primarily as a legislator voted into office by the electorate of his
constituency, the “elected” provincial or city or district representative with a “fixed term” (6 years) of office i.e an
elected governor who, while in office, was elected as a member of the Batasan cannot concurrently hold those two
elective positions. Mendoza was elected as the governor but was not elected as a member of the Batasan; he was
appointed. Punsalan’s contention that Mendoza’s resignation was impliedly approved by the president is not tenable.
The president in fact needed more time to consider the validity of the resignation and upon the KBL’s recommendation,
he instead chose to approve Mendoza’s return to his governorship.

Article VIII, Sec 10: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts, shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.

Section 14: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
 39

113 SCRA 31
Villegas vs Legaspi
This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether or not a member of Congress may appear before
the regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants.

Case 1
In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First Instance (CFI)
Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, then a
member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the
spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas “no member of the Batasang Pambansa shall
appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction”. The presiding judge however overruled Villegas’
challenged and proceeded with the trial. The judge said that CFIs have appellate jurisdiction.

Case 2
In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas, a corporation,
before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as counsel for the corporation. Reyes questions the appearance of
Fernandez as counsel for the corporation on the same ground invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez is also a member of
the Batasang Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi, of the Batasang Pambansa may
appear as counsels before the said CFIs.

HELD: No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel berfore CFI’s acting in their original jurisdiction.
CFI’s have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts
depending on the case that they took cognizance of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal acted as a courts of
general original jurisdiction. Both cases were not elevated to the said CFIs from any lower courts. Thus, the CFIs in the
case at bar are “courts without appellate jurisdiction”.

NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice
or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly,
be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction.
The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being
administrative agencies, are included.

113 SCRA 31
Puyat vs De Guzman

In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election
was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted –
hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to
Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares
of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr.
(from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as
 40

counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to
anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from
appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to
intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without
violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?

HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even
though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He
bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it
is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest – which
is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation.
What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.

NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice
or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly,
be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction.
The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being
administrative agencies, are included.

Section 15: The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a
different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty
days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President
may call a special session at any time.

Section 16: (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all
its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as
may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of
the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three
days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
 41

CASES

Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS: In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be
illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified
aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were
filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan,
issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from
a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago,
who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago
from office for 90 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the
Constitution.

HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”

But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:

Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is
quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the Senate.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the
office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the
use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not
only the particular office under which he stands accused.

Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial
on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of
culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could
 42

influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court
could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not
been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime
warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is
subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

Rep Ceferino Paredes vs Sandiganbayan

252 SCRA 641 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Suspension of a Member of Congress – RA 3019

FACTS: In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against
Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes),
and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and
of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued
against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the
case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was
dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his
testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the
Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes
appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite
his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:

“x x x. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the power of each
House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote
of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not
exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”

Avelino vs Cuenco 83 Phil 17 and motion for reconsideration

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful
Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a
speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the
Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his
speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only12
Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed
as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUES: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly
approved.

HELD: The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the
court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of
these separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino,
77 Phil.192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of
 43

the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate
remedy.

Afortiori

We should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are
at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in
the Supreme Court.2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice
agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate
in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and,
at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President
of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the
rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any
session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of
opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions
herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

109 Phil 863

Osmena vs Pendatun
“Parliamentary Immunity”
FACTS: In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said
speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was
passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his
allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.

Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution
violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer
where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline
its members.

ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?

HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the
legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the
courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein.
Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

Dual Purpose for keeping a journal

Article VI, Section 16(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Journal entry and enrolled bill theories; which is conclusive over the other?
 44

UNIMPEACHABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS The journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect

ENROLLED BILL Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the text of the act as passed and approved is deemed importing
absolute veracity and is binding on the courts. It is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. If
there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officer of the assembly and approved
by the chief executive, the remedy is by amendment by enacting a curative legislation, not by judicial decree (Casco Phil.
Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez) Where there is discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled bill, the latter as a rule
prevails over the former, particularly with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered in the journal

34 Phil 729
US vs Pons
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from
Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently
delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as
wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted
an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading
and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and
introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was
approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said
law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on
February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a
law on February 28, 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals
in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals
of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter
and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions
of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act
of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of
the enrolled bill in this particular case.

78 Phil 1
Mabanag vs Lopez Vito
FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to
election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the
election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the
required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has
been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the
respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If
these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have
been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the
 45

furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of
the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly
enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated
copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two
ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the
passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been
introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals
behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the
journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the
two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give
greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of
the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of
each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official documents may
be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be
provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided,
That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy
signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.”

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict,
the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

7 SCRA 347
CASCO Phil vs. Gimenez

FACTS: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the
production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are "urea and formaldehyde" which are both being
imported abroad. Pursuant to R.A. 2609 Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, The Central Bank issued Circulars fixing a
uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. The bank also issued memorandum establishing the
procedure for the applications for exemption from the payment of said fee as provided by R.A. 2609. Petitioners paid
the required margin fee with their 2 import transactions. In both of their transactions through R.A. 2609they wanted to
avail the exemption from the payment of said fee as provided by RA. 2609. Petitioners filed a refund request to the
Central Bank and the Central Bank issued the vouchers but was not accepted by the Auditor of the Bank. The refusal was
also affirmed by the Auditor General. The refusal was based on the fact that the separate importation of "urea and
formaldehyde" is not in accord with the provisions of R.A. 2609. Because section 2 of R.A. 2609 clearly provides “Urea
formaldehyde” and not “urea and formal dehyde” Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in
this provision should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde". Petitioner contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of
 46

Congress intended to exempt "urea" and" formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde" ,not the latter as a finished product.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners contentions that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction
"and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde"

RULING: No, because what is allowed in RA. 2809 is urea formaldehyde, not "urea and formaldehyde" both are different
from each other. The National Institute of Science and Technology defines urea formaldehyde is the synthetic resin
formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of “urea and formaldehyde” under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with
inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde is
clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea and formaldehyde”, What is printed in the
enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea
formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by
the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree

27 Phil 131
Morales vs Subido
FACTS: Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not
possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the
rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon
the resignation of the former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time,
given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil
Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the
minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido certified other
persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record,
or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years;
or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a city …” can be
qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved
version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has
held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the
police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain
and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged
from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as
chief of police with exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic
copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found
attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
 47

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look
searchingly into the matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that
Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go
behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government
demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts
of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying
to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of
the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be
sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house.
To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal,
is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does
not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
56 SCAR 714
Astorga vs Villegas

Differentiate a “regular” from a “special” session: The Constitution provides that the Congress shall convene for its
regular session every year beginning on the 4th Monday of July. A regular session can last until thirty days before the
opening of its next regular session in the succeeding year. The President may, however, call special sessions which are
usually held between regular legislative sessions to handle emergencies or urgent matters.

Section 17: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.

January 26, 2016

Ty – Delgado vs House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
In September 2008, the SC in Tulfo v. People convicted Pichay for libel. In lieu of imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay
fine. In October 2012, Pichay filed his COC for congressman and garnered the highest number of votes.
His opponent's (Ty-Delgado) Petition for Quo Warranto was dismissed by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) which concluded that his conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude, reasoning that Pichay was
not the author of the libelous articles but the president of the publishing company.
However, Art. 360, RPC provides: "The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a
daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the SAME
EXTENT as if he were the author thereof." Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
SC ruled that HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to
disqualify Pichay. SC held that libel still involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed was
reduced to a fine.
Pichay made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his COC. Since he was not a qualified
candidate under Sec.12, Omnibus Election Code, all votes for him were stray votes. Ty-Delgado was declared the winner
for the position of Member of the House, 1st Legislative District, Surigao del Sur in the May 2013 elections.
 48

January 12, 2016

Velasco vs Belmonte

FACTS: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of
names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each
on guaranty (sic)of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal
implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of
the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS
and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this
confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the
courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System
(GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e
are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective
in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando
Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando
Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that
Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February7 election
thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified
true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information.
ISSUE: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans
given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban
political parties.
HELD: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various
insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly,
Secs. 5(b) and 46of PD 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual
appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as
employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the
nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the
pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA 186,
as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems
[Second Whereas Clause, PD1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to
grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly
with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the
supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS
and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of
fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and
the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and
concern. Still, Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued
that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite
any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the present petition. His
position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can
only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within
the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State
power.
 49

GR No. 207264 June 25, 2013

Regina Ongsiako – Reyes vs COMELEC
FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013 which found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent COMELEC is without jurisdiction over
Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and
having taken her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are
outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner submission. The crucial question is
whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation
of petitioner on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the
issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner
certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June 10,
2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013
COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become
valid and legal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?

HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered
evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of
the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She
likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the
opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in
order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel
certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue
her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First
Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did
not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right to
be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing
that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of
proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not
 50

lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the
bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention.
Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

520 SCRA 166

Vinzons-Chato vs COMELEC
FACTS: Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the HOR, hence, Comelec ruled
that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato’s election protest against Unico regarding canvassing of returns
and alleged invalidity of Unico’s proclamation. He then filed a special civil action for Certiorari in the SC
ISSUE: WON the court should take cognizance of Chato’s election protest. If not, to who is this issue best addressed to?
WON his civil action for certiorari will prosper.

HELD: The court should not take cognizance of Chato’s election protest for it would amount to usurpation of the
constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET. Civil action for certiorari will not prosper.
In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office
and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET.
it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies with due regard to the
people’s mandate.
Special civil action for certiorari shall prosper if the following requisites concur:
Tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction. There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul or modify the proceeding. In this case, COMELEC did not commit rave
abuse of discretion when it issued a resolution holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon Unico’s proclamation. It
demonstrated fealty to the constitutional fiat regarding HRET.

JURISDICTION OF HRET IS EXCLUSI VE. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of its members.
The use of the word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the Omnibus
Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests
relating to its members. RECKONING POINT. The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Stat ed in another manner, where the
candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congression al elections, the remedy of the
petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET.

MEANING OF ELECTIONS, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS.Ó The phrase election, returns, and
qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the
contesteeÕs title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election referred to the conduct of
the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of votes; returns to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the aut henticity of the election
returns; and qualifications to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the
proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the i nadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.
 51

449 SCRA 400

Aggabao vs COMELEC
FACTS: Georgidi Aggabao, petitioner; asserted that the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) acted without jurisdiction
when they heard and acted on Miranda’s (rival congressional candidates 4th district of Isabela) petition for exclusion
using the 4th and 7th cope of COCVs. And assuming PBC had jurisdiction over the petition, still erred in excluding the
contested COCVs for they appeared regular and authenticated. Aggabao file an urgent motion to COMELEC but still
Miranda was proclaimed as the duly Congressman of 4th District of Isabela dated June 14, 2004.
ISSUE: WON Aggabao resort to certiorari lies [ NO]
HELD: Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec.17.The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organization registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. The HRET has sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member
of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition
for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

391 Phil 344

Guerrero vs COMELEC

544 SCRA 381

Dimaporo vs COMELEC
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Section 18: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

December 21, 1989

Raul Daza vs Luis Singson
FACTS: After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its
twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the
House of Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in
the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-
formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner
and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments
and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on Appointments

HELD: At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to
reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that
such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is
entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.

Cunanan vs Tan
FACTS: Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as acting Deputy Administrator of the
Reforestation Administration. Cunanan was formerly appointed in the same position but was later on rejected by the
Commision of Appointment prompting the President to replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent.
Filing the quo warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of the convened Commission
of Appointments citing irregularities as to the numbers of members comprising the same.

ISSUE: WON the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid.

HELD: With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was ruled that such is a power vested in the
Congress as they deem it proper taking into consideration the proportionate numbers of the members of the
Commission of Appointment members as to their political affiliations. However, with their reorganization, this affected a
 56

third party's right which they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of the
petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn over the office in contention.

October 20, 1992

Guingona vs Gonzales
FACTS: On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. in his behalf and in behalf of LAKAS-NUCD filed a petition
to prohibit Senator Neptali Gonzales, ex-officio Chairman of Commission on Appointments from recognizing the
membership of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tanada. The resulting composition of proportional
representatives is as follows:
POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP PROP.REPRESENTATIVES
LDP 15 7.5 members NPC 5 2.5 members LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members To resolve the
impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise to the effect that the Senate elect 12members to the
Commission on Appointments, 8 from LDP, 2 from NPC, 9 from liberal party. This proposal was approved despite the
objections of Senators Guingona and Osmena. Senator Romulo occupied the 8th membership of the LDP while Senator
Tanada for LD-PDP-LABAN.

ISSUE: WON the election of Senators Romulo and Tanada as members of Commission on Appointments is in accordance
with Art. 6, Section 18 of the Constitution.

HELD: No, Art.6 Sec. 18 assures representation in the COA of any political party who succeeds in electing members to
the Senate, provided that the number of Senators so elected enables it to put a representative in the COA. Drawing from
the ruling in the case of Coseteng v Mitra, Jr. a political party must have at least 2 senators in the senate to be able to
have a representative in the COA, so that any member less than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership in the COA.
In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable rules and jurisprudence on the matter before this court,
we declare the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tanada as members of the COA as null and
void for being in violation of the rule on proportional representation under Art VI, Sec 18 of the Philippine Constitution.
Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Tanada to
desist from assuming, occupying and discharging the functions of members of the COA; and ordering the respondent
Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ec-officio chairman of the COA, to desist from recognizing the
membership of the respondent Senators and from allowing and permitting them from sitting and participating as
members of said commission.

March 1, 1993
Guingona vs Gonzales
Resolution for Motion for reconsideration
FACTS: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD
senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the
CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of
Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5
members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8
senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the
same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona,
a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional
representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments
 57

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the
rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of
the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to
which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18
because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the
LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at
least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a
party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may
coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have
affiliations with the other party.

Section 19: The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the
Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker.
The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a
majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.

Section 20: The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance
with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of
amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.

Section 21: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.

87 Phil.29
Arnault vs Nazareno
FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration,
bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively.
P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American,
thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively.
However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and
the second from the Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of
money to complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural
Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine Government
then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished
the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to investigate the
transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined various
witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought
to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government’s paying to Burt the total sum of
P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long
before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the Government.
 58

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of
October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine
National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on
said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with
the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the
present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then approved a resolution that cited
him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which
ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.

HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of
course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer
must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be
determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the
action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not
by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or
of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases
where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power
beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are
disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of that person
to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he
should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is
unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown. “Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is
equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so
punishable.” Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his
claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.

December 23, 2008

Virgilio Garcillano vs House of Representatives Committees on Public Information et al
FACTS: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007 election the conversation
of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the
president to have a favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played
during the house of representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed before the court
praying that such playing of the illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law.
Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be prevented from further conducting such
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investigation for the basic reason that there was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make
such investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to further proceed with their
investigation?

HELD: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published
rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of Representatives, or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following
the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have
never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear
and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that
the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for
evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so
only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the reason that the rules that
they will observe was not properly published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed
without observance of the required publication will put a person’s life, liberty and property at stake without due process
of law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already published such rules through their web page, in
observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still
does not conforme with what the constitution propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of
legislation.

May the senate committee on Foreign Relations Conduct investigations in aid of legislation for an alleged illegal acts
committed by police generals in Moscow, Russia, which is outside the Philippines?
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GR No 184849, February 13, 2009

Spouses PNP Director Eliseo de la Paz & Maria Fe de la Paz vs Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs

FACTS: In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend an Interpol GA.
De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de la Paz is also scheduled to retire. After the
GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure area for he was carrying with him €105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He
was also carrying with him €45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in writing that he is carrying such an amount
and this is in violation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime. De La Paz and his group was later released but the €s were confiscated by the Russians.
Upon arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the
investigation it was to conduct involving the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that the said committee does not have
jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow
incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate
Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of
respondent Committee. They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as
required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the
Moscow incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD: The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:”Each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings.” This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary
authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. The challenge to the
jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this
Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a
political question. Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of the Senate president and
it is shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the Rules. It is also shown that the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers of general circulation.

Power of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: (1) supervision, which connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given administrative area; (2) scrutiny, primarily intended to determine economy
and efficiency of the operation of government activities, exercised through budget hearings, the “question hour” and
the power of confirmation; and (2) investigation, which is also known as the “inquiry in aid of legislation“.
Even without this express Constitutional provision, the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. The power
of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the
information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that
subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure
thereof.
Under the separation of powers, Congress has the right to obtain information from any source even from officials of
departments and agencies in the executive branch. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right to obtain
information from the executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people
are adequately to be carried out.

Power to call department secretaries etc. during “question hour”

In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the question hour is a period of confrontation initiated by
Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the
government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. The framers of the 1987 Constitution
removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to
conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. This is provided in Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution:
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Section 22: The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Investigation in aid of legislation vs Question Hour:

Section 21 (inquiry in aid of legislation) and Section 22 (question hour) of Article VI of the Constitution are closely related
and complementary to each other, but they do not pertain to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to
the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of the oversight function of Congress. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation

Section 23: (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.

GR No 16977, April 20, 2009

Senate vs Ermita
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
“Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution,
and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the
executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the
Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which
requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress.

ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
 62

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If
the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information
without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of
invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

When power of inquiry in aid of legislation is not allowed

November 20, 1991

Bengzon, Jr. Vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly
enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office
and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the
country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government
owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion
to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue
Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a
pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to
Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding
the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and
testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant
disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is
no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition
for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known
as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to
be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of
legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is
to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the
“Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the

Investigation in aid of legislation: Executive Privilege

Executive privilege is not a clear or unitary concept, although it has been defined as “the power of the Government to
withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress” or “the right of the President and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.
 63

The matters covered under “executive privilege” include: (1) Information between inter-government agencies prior to
the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements; (2) Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in
closed-door Cabinet meetings; and (3) Matters affecting national security and public order.

Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain
types of information of a sensitive character.

GR No, 180643, March 25, 2008

Romulo Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III
testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the
NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein
he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
“executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited
in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear
and give his testimony.

ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing
laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this
concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our
Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
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3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the President
and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply
put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor
of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have
agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to
them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his
claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Two kinds of Executive Privilege

(1) One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with
Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or
diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the
identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law.
Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions
and policies are formulated.
Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of
information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the
executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might
reveal military or state secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of
government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending
investigations
(2) In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez.[77]
Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon
decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
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GR No. 174340 October 17, 2006

Camilo Sabio vs Gordon
FACTS: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners
to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO
No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative
or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or
staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

RULING: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the
House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of
investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s
high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of
inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault
that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and
that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b)
exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in
the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even
extends “to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or
establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or
its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional
provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the
policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any
constitutional basis.

155 SCRA 421 November 5, 1987

Negros Oriental II Electrical Cooperative vs Sangguniang Panglungsod of Dumaguete City
FACTS: In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with
pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO II
(Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) – Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed
inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they alleged that the
power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged
exclusively with the National Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor
the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred that inherent in
the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and
with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.

 66

HELD: No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative
bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional
or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for
the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the
statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial
nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the
performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers
without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the
LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for
contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad
Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that
the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances
would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only
be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.

Section 22: The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Section 23: (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall
have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.

Limitations and restrictions for the delegation

Next adjournment

84 Phil. 369
Araneta vs Dinglasan
FACTS: The five cases are consolidated for all of them present the same fundamental question. Antonio Araneta is being
charged for violating EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Another case is of Leon
Ma. Guerrero seeking to have a permit issued for the exportation of his manufactured shoes. Another is of Eulogio
Rodriguez seeking to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds pursuant to EO 225, while another is of Antonio
Barredo attacking EO 226 which appropriated funds to hold the national elections. They all content that CA 671 or the
emergency Powers Act is already inoperative and that all EOs issued under said Act also ceased

ISSUE: Whether or not the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any force and effect

HELD: CA 671 does not fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the act has to be sought for in its nature,
object to be accomplished, the purpose to be subserved and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the
Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be “for a limited period”. It is presumed that CA 671
 67

was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is
contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the Constitutional scope of its power.
CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session of May 25, 1946, and that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and
226 were issued without authority of law. In a regular session, the power if Congress to legislate is not circumscribed
except by the limitations imposed by the organic law
92 Phil 603
Rodriguez vs Gella
FACTS: P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for
relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.
They sought to have Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to said EOs.
These EO’s were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House
Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception
that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was already declared inoperative by the Supreme Court in the
same case of Araneta vs Dinglasan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid.

HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective.
The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671
has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared
cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of
Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate its
power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the
law.” Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only
in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to
keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the
Act is coupled with interest.

Rep Act 6826: Grants Emergency powers to President Aquino

AN ACT TO DECLARE, IN VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY, A NATIONAL POLICY IN CONNECTION
THEREWITH AND TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND
SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS, TO EXERCISE POWERS NECESSARY AND PROPER TO CARRY OUT THE DECLARED NATIONAL
POLICY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance (E-VAT Law)

Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT)
Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required
by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3
readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the
Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino
averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB
1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”.
Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.
 68

ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the
Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply
means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several
instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other
such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of
Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate
were to adopt his over what has been done.

Section 25: (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed
by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing
fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in
force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

148 SCRA 20
Demetria vs Alba
FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of
1977)—as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest common to all people of
the Philippines, and as taxpayers—on the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by
authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the
President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and held that one
branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its
sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec
16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under
consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President…may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”

ISSUE:
1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act
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HELD:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department to any program of any department
included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an
undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to naught. Such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the
judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally
conferred judicial power. This is not to say that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high
authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.
Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.

July 1, 2014 and February 3, 2015

Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III
FACTS: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy.
The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came
up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign
funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens
under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the
funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by
the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate
the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted
by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed
funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received
Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It
turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M
for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions
was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions
thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order
292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
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III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and
is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate
the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were
already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse
to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited
by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of
the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA
for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the
GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as
the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to
such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of
“savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the
DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being
declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such
funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections
have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more
harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what
they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not
be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

GR No 208560, November 19, 2013: Belgica vs Executive Secretary: Refer to page 1

Section 26: (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
 71

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

151 SCRA 208: Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board: Refer to page 11

123 SCRA 569

De la Cruz vs Paras
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or
the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right
to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they
employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier
issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads
“AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la
Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84
which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed
ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that
such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of
fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a
field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance,
Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

104 SCRA 710

Insular Lumber vs CTA
FACTS: Insular Lumber Company (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The ILC
purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession. In 1956, Republic Act
No. 1435 was passed. Section 5 thereof provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those using oil in the
operation of forest and mining concessions.
In 1964, ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to have a tax refund of P19,921.37 pursuant to the
said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such provision because Sec. 5, RA 1435 is
only effective 5 years from its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ILC appealed the issue to
the CTA and the CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the
refund provision of Sec 5, RA 1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to
the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in
logging operations. The CTA did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the ILC’s right to claim
the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had
 72

already prescribed. Hence, ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of
the CTA.
The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way: The title of RA 1435 is “An Act to Provide Means for Increasing
The Highway Special Fund.” The CIR contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund.
However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this
partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid
Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ILC.

HELD: Yes, but only in the amount as found by the CTA. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no merit in the contention
of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the
Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of
the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax
on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted
constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. But that is not so for in the
passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its
title reflects its complete subject was held by Congress which passed it.

21 SCRA 496
Lidasan vs COMELEC
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios
located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman
of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be
including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province – Cotabato – to be
spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”?

HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such
title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns
of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away
from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to
what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to
find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of RA 4790.

24 SCRA 172
Alalayan vs NAPOCOR
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as
Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One) was passed. This law amended the charter of
NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA 3043 provides that:
a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit of 12%;
 73

b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers;

c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of energy.
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company (PPDC) assailed the said provision. They averred
that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in the title of the amending law nor was it included in the
amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al
believed that Section 3 was not germane to RA 3043.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it informs the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

6 SCRA 418
Cordero vs Cabatundo
Manuel Cordero was the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit (TCU) of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the
Department of Justice. He later appeared as the counsel of indigent tenant Vicente Salazar who filed a case against
landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana in order to reinstate and reliquidate past harvests. Sta. Romana filed a motion to
disqualify Cordero as counsel for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of Republic Act No. 1199 or The Agricultural Tenancy
Act of the Philippines. The said section indicates that representation by counsel of tenants who cannot afford to pay
should be done by the public defenders of the Department of Labor.
Judge Jose Cabatuando ruled in favor of Sta. Romana. Cordero appealed. During pendency of the appeal Republic Act
No. 2263, AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES, was passed. This law,
particularly Sections 19 and 20 thereof, amended the previous law and now allows trial lawyers from the TCU to
represent indigent tenants and it is also the basis of the creation of the Tenancy Mediation Division. Cordero filed a
Manifestation averring that by virtue of the amendment the issue has now become moot and academic. Cabatuando
countered that the provisions were not embraced in the title of the amending law nor in the amended law hence void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is embraced in the title of the bill and whether or not to allow trial
lawyers from TCU to appear as counsel for indigent tenants should be allowed.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question is satisfied if all parts of the law
are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title of the bill.The constitutional requirement is
complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act
and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign
to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. To declare sections 19 and 20 of RA 2263 null and void would in effect
upset the transfer of the duty of representing indigent tenants from the public defenders of the Department of Labor to
the trial attorneys in the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the Department of Justice. In
other words, a declaration of nullity of these provisions of RA 2263 would do harm to, and would be nugatory of, the
intention of Congress to consolidate the function of enforcing our tenancy laws in the Department of Justice.

281 SCRA330, November 5, 1997

Tatad vs Secretary of Energy
FACTS: Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding
ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One
 74

such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that “any person or entity may
import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own
and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own
requirement,” subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He
claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum
products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three
existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have
their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined
crude products and 7% on refined crude products.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It
violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied
that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell
and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As
the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of
4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and
cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend
to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of
pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their
product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable
because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract
new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging
to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the “new players” insofar as it placed
them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions
already being observed by the latter.

Section 27: (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where
it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with
the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the
Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or
nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but
the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

62 Phil 912
Bengzon vs Secretary of Justice
FACTS: Juan Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1912 in Lingayen, Pangasinan. Upon reaching 65 years of
age in 1933 he would have to retire in accordance with the law. He later sought to claim gratuity pursuant to Act 4051
“An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired
from the service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including the justices of the peace
 75

who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine,
and for other purposes.”
Section 7 thereof specifically provides that gratuity may be availed of by justices like Bengzon but that provision has
been vetoed by the governor-general. Bengzon said the veto is beyond the power of the governor-general hence he filed
a petition for mandamus to compel the Secretary of Justice to implement the gratuity provision of the said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bengzon is entitled to the gratuity provision of the Retirement Gratuity Law.

HELD: No. The governor-general in vetoing the said item of the law has acted within his power; for this is also in
compliance with the Organic Act. Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
established the practice for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the Governor-
General. Specifically it provided:
The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the veto
shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and to hold that the veto by the Governor-General of section 7 of Act
No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative purpose and the provisions of the Organic Act.

11 SCRA 486
Bolinao Electronics vs Valencia
FACTS: Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc.
(CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the
Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their
permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their continuing
operation had caused damages to his department.

ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.

HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN
to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine
Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the
Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation
allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in
violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed
this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.

Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced
no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

November 19, 1990

Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig
FACTS:
· December 16, 1988 Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989) which eliminated or decreased
certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the president
· December 29, 1988 à President signed bill into law (RA 6688) but vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec 55, a general
provision.
· February 2, 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 à Senate as an institution decided to contest the constitutionality of the
veto of the president of SEC 55 only.
 76

· April 11, 1989 this petition was filed

· January 19, 1990 filed motion for leave to file and to admit supplemental petition à same issues but included SEC 16 of
House Bill 26934 (Gab for FY 1990 or RA 6831)
· SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several department to augment any item in the GAB thereby violation
CONSTI ART VI SEC 25 (5) (page 459)
· SEC 16 of the GAB of 1990 provides for the same and the reason for veto remains the same with the additional legal
basis of violation of PD 1177 SEC 44 and 45 as amended by RA 6670 that authorizes the president and the heads of
depts. To use saving to augment any item of appropriations in the exec branch of government (page 460)

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the President of SEC 55 of GAB for FY 1989 and SEC 16 of GAB for FY 1990 is
unconstitutional.
HELD: The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners contend that the veto exceeded the mandate of the line-
veto power of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16 are provisions the court held that inappropriate provisions can
be treated as items (Henry v. Edwards) and therefore can be vetoed validly by the president. Furthermore inappropriate
provisions must be struck down because they contravene the constitution because it limits the power of the executive
to augment appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR 5.)
· The ‘provisions’ are inappropriate because
o They do not relate to particular or distinctive appropriations
o Disapproved or reduces items are nowhere to be found on the face of the bill
o It is more of an expression of policy than an appropriation
· Court also said that to make the GAB veto-proof would be logrolling on the part of the legislative à the subject matter
of the provisions should be dealt with in separate and complete legislation but because they are aware that it would be
NOT passed in that manner they attempt hide it in the GAB
· If the legislature really believes that the exercise of veto is really invalid then congress SHOULD resort to their
constitutionally vested power to override the veto. (ART VI SEC 21 PAR 1)
DECISION: Veto UPHELD. Petition DISMISSED.

Pocket Veto an indirect veto of a legislative bill by the president or a governor by retaining the bill unsigned until it is too
late for it to be dealt with during the legislative session.

Three ways by which a bill becomes a law

1

3
 77

235 SCRA 506

Philconsa vs Enriquez
FACTS: This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the
General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution
Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate
funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of
the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress
took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs
of prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the
President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing
Authority (NHA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.

HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In
the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president
particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared
of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision
w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is
considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign
Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize
the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for
the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al
claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it
avoided double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if
allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not
an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance,
and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill,
which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the
budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of
non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP
Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto.
Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts
must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
 78

According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations
specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated
that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation benefits. The President
declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU’s shall be
subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per
reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said
existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8,
Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the
heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on
compensation standardization. Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the
veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the
President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation
can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of
appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts know more
about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the president for that matter. Hence,
with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.

Executive Impoundment: This refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available
by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type

Section 28: (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries,
and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.

Section 29: (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any,
shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
 79

211 SCRA 219

Garcia vs Executive Secretary
FACTS: In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any
other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad
valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475
was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%.
Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24
of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not
assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating
measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all
other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures,
are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In
this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

24 SCRA 789
Pepsi Cola vs City of Butuan
FACTS: Ordinance 110 was enacted by the City of Butuan imposing a tax of P0.10 per case of 24 bottles of softdrinks or
carbonated drinks. The tax was imposed upon dealers engeged in selling softdrinks or carbonated drinks. When
Ordinance 110, the tax was imposed upon an agent or consignee of any person, association, partnership, company or
corporation engaged in selling softdrinks or carbonated drinks, with “agent or consignee” being particularly defined on
the inserted provision Section 3-A. In effect, merchants engaged in the sale of softdrinks, etc. are not subject to the tax
unless they are agents or consignees of another dealer who must be one engaged in business outside the City. Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co. filed suit to recover sums paid by it to the city pursuant to the Ordinance, which it claims to be null and
void.

ISSUE: Whether the Ordinance is discriminatory.

HELD: The Ordinance, as amended, is discriminatory since only sales by “agents or consignees” of outside dealers would
be subject to the tax. Sales by local dealers, not acting for or on behalf of other merchants, regardless of the volume of
their sales, and even if the same exceeded those made by said agents or consignees of producers or merchants
established outside the city, would be exempt from the tax. The classification made in the exercise of the authority to
tax, to be valid must be reasonable, which would be satisfied if the classification is based upon substantial distinctions
which makes real differences; these are germane to the purpose of legislation or ordinance; the classification applies not
 80

only to present conditions but also to future conditions substantially identical to those of the present; and the
classification applies equally to all those who belong to the same class. These conditions are not fully met by the
ordinance in question.

107 SCRA 104

Province of Abra vs Hernando
FACTS: The provincial assessor made a tax assessment on the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The
bishop claims tax exemption from real estate tax, through an action for declaratory relief. A summary judgment was
made granting the exemption without hearing the side of the Province of Abra.

ISSUE: Whether the properties of the Bishop of Bangued are tax-exempt.

HELD: The 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions differ in language as to the exemption of religious property from taxes as
tehy should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious purposes. Herein, the judge
accepted at its face the allegation of the Bishop instead of demonstrating that there is compliance with the
constitutional provision that allows an exemption. There was an allegation of lack of jurisdiction and of lack of cause of
action, which should have compelled the judge to accord a hearing to the province rather than deciding the case
immediately in favor of the Bishop. Exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted, it
must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. There must be proof of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings,
and improvements for religious (or charitable) purposes to be exempted from taxation.
The case was remanded to the lower court for a trial on merits.

71 Phil 547
Apostolic Perfect of Baguio vs. Treasurer
FACTS: The Apostolic Prefect is a corporation sole, of religious character, organized under the Philippine laws, and with
residence
in Baguio. The City imposed a special assessment against properties within its territorial jurisdiction, including those of
the Apostolic Prefect, which benefits from its drainage and sewerage system. The Apostolic Prefect contends that its
properties should be free from tax.

ISSUE: Is the Apostolic Prefect exempt from paying?

RULING: No, it is liable.

In its broad meaning, tax includes both general taxes and special assessment. Yet actually, there is a recognized
distinction between them in that assessment is confined to local impositions upon property for the payment of the cost
of public improvements in its immediate vicinity and levied with reference to special benefits to the property assessed.
A special assessment is not, strictly speaking, a tax; and neither the decree nor the Constitution exempt the Apostolic
Prefect from payment of said special assessment.
Furthermore, arguendo that exemption may encompass such assessment, the Apostolic Prefect cannot claim exemption
as it has not proven the property in question is used exclusively for religious purposes; but that it appears that the same
is being used to other non-religious purposes.
Thus, the Apostolic Prefect is required to pay the special assessment.

110 Phil 331

Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works
FACTS: RA 920 (An act appropriating funds for public works) was enacted in 1953 containing an item for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension of Pasig feeder road terminals – currently projected and planned
subdivision roads, which were not yet constructed, within Antonio Subdivision owned by Senator Jose C. Zulueta. The
provincial governor of Rizal, Pascual, questioned the constitutionality of the item in RA 920, it being not for a public
 81

purpose. The lower court dismissed the petition upon the ground that petitioner may not contest the legality because
the same does not affect him directly. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Does petitioner have legal standing to sue?

RULING: Yes.
It is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are as many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing
the disbursement of public funds.
Thus, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers, have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.
Thus, the records are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Where the land on which feeder roads were
to be constructed belongs to a private person, an appropriation made by congress for that purpose is null and void, and
a donation to the government made five months after the approval of the Act does not cure the basic defect of the law.

64 Phil 201
Aglipay vs Ruis
FACTS: Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the
Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic
Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act
4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

HELD: The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate
any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not violating
the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious
freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence
in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious
sects and denominations.’

GR No 65917, September 24, 1987

Manuel Alba vs Perez
FACTS: Dr. Francisco Perez, the City Health Officer of San Pablo City, was named “Outstanding Health Worker” in 1980.
Being an awardee, he is entitled to have a salary increase pursuant to Letter Of Instruction 562. The Ministry of Health
submitted to the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City to have the funds be appropriated for Perez’ salary. The SP
however denied the request claiming that the said LOI only applies to employees or officials of the national government
and Perez is a local government employee hence not covered. Upon appeal, the Office of the Budget and Management
determined that Perez is a national government employee hence he is entitled to such increase. However, Manuel Alba
– the Minister of Budget – refused to recognize Perez’ right to such increase because he averred that the constitution
provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Perez
then filed a mandamus case against Alba. The trial court judge granted the petition for mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not Perez is entitled to such increment per the said LOI.
 82

HELD: Yes. Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials irrespective of the source
of funds of their salary because the preservation of health is a national service. Besides, Perez is an employee of the
Ministry of Health and not of the city of San Pablo. Also their positions are partially funded by the national government.
Some are receiving one-half of their salary from the national funds and the other one-half from local funds. Others are
wholly paid by either the local or the national government.

There is no basis in Alba’s allegations that they cannot be compelled by mandamus as the appropriation is not
authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the Ministry of the Budget whether or not to allocate. Perez has
been proven to be a national government official, hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more
particularly the Health Ministry wherein Perez is its lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes the
ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment. Having failed to do so, he could be
compelled by mandamus.

Section 30: No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

GR No 129742, September 16, 1998

Teresita Fabian vs Honorable Aniano Desierto
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT)
which was engaged in the construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District
Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their
relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to
the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred to the deputy
Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the
Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides
that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770
cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify
such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated
therein is to be exercised over “final judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts composing the integrated
judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
 83

Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of
Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which
was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.

Section 31: No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.

Section 32: The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters thereof.