Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based
on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning
of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present
case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as
the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this
Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to
lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet,
which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at
the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in
February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since
then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned
from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;
that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had
since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it
would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared
null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were
due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3)
Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April
14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
 3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than
three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her
child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody
of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony
and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla
as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-
Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-
1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during
the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present
recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals
made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family
Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect
the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to
our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between
the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code
Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to
liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights.
. . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his
or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as
well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the
very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason
to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed
no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant
case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the
Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining
that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us
that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to
us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence
nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of
the psychiatrist based on your findings
that it is better for the Court to annul (sic)
the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living
with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist
that the parties are psychologically unfit
for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit
for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more
questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality
traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time
of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there
was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely
shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling
on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view
of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty
experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court
decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar
V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and
Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the
Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the
bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one
of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert
evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective
in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands
to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject
to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose
of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation
is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall
walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled
to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the
use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco,

Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO
SY, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision[1] dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmed the decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the
petition[3] for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy
contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady
of Lourdes in Quezon City.[4] Both were then 22 years old. Their union
was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were
born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,respectively.[5]
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then
in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga.[6]
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since
then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the
custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his
father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and
from then on, lived with his father.[7]
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation,
docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was
later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds
that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have
been living separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983,
containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership.[8]Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal
partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties
based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the
spouses.[9]The trial court also granted custody of the children to
Filipina.[10]
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide
against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon
of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo,
Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch
her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was
talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the
family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her
son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled
Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of
her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her
when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she
was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different
parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband,
evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James
Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her.[11]
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision[12] dated
April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Edpmis
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,on the following grounds:
(1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by
respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her
husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision[13] dated
December 4,1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated
physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal
separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to
petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition[14] for the declaration of Hence, this appeal by certiorari[21] wherein petitioner now raises the
absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of following issues: Jurismis
psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT
physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT
also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE
the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3)
refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF
of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED
and became manifest thereafter.[15] UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT
CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER
decision[16] dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It
stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
not constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.Lexjuris FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO
SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR
of the trial court. In the decision[17] of the Court of Appeals dated May WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE
21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973; Jjjuris
respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the
quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all 4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS
psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A
celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY
court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS
ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT
to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT
Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS;
which it found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on AND
record.[18]
5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] which the Court of V.COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA
Appeals denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996.[20] 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.[22]

In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated
at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its
absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void
for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It
appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and
marriage license are different and incongruous. Jksm
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue
for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of
fair play and justice,[23] in a number of instances, we have relaxed
observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends
in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of
litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity
and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be
defeated.[24] Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires,
exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should
not be subject to cavil.[25] In our view, the case at bar requires that we
address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and
Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of
a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply
seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that
here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a
declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in
her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the
incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of
the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to
Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical
dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court.
The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate,
September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was
attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A"
in the course of the trial.[26] The date of celebration of their marriage at
Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is
admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in
paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's
answer admitting it.[27] This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open
court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination,[28] as
follows: Es m
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you
were married on November 15,1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the
parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are
also attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked
as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial.[29] These pieces of
evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the
marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license
is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio.
In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license,
numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither
petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.[30]
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find
that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the
trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their
marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage
license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying
these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code[31] is clearly
applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional
character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private
respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles
72-79[32] of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of
the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent
is void from the beginning. Es msc
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only
photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and
daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked
as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these
have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections
having been made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise,
no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court
when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore,
that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to
timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of
the facts contained therein.[33]

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private

respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion
that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of
a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized. Esmm is

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional

Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as
well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No.
44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973
between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is
hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of
celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION A petition for annulment of marriage[3] was filed by petitioner against
respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, G.R. No. 167746 and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went
Petitioner,
Present: to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on
CHICO-NAZARIO, the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ. through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose
de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and Promulgated:
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a
Respondents. August 28, 2007 marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as
neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went
to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said
DECISION
place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate
lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued
declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
the corresponding marriage contract[5] and its entry on file.[6]
petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent
petitioners appeal and affirming the decision[2] of the Regional Trial
asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325
marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office
dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of
of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners
marriage.
representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose
Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named
The antecedent facts are:
Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.[7] Petitioner has a mistress
with whom he has three children.[8] Petitioner only filed the annulment
of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.[9] Respondent,
in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court ofMandaluyong City,
[10]
60. Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be
denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered
its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as
follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as
support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days
of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.[11]
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing
the petitioners appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is
presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any
evidence to overcome the presumption.Moreover, the parties marriage
contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the
questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.[13]
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues
Branch for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for
Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite
the evidence on record that there was no
marriage license at the precise moment of the
solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it gave weight to the
Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact
that the same was not identified and offered as
evidence during the trial, and was not the
Marriage license number appearing on the face
of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling
laid down by this Honorable Court in the case
of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12
April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it failed to relax the
observance of procedural rules to protect and
promote the substantial rights of the party
litigants.[14]
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the
respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he
and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer
who arranged everything for them.[15] The wedding took place at the
stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where
Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.[16] He (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.
and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was
issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States
place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in
of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification the maintenance of which the general public is interested.[21]
states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their marriage Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number. the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the
absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December void are clear-cut.
1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to
determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil
time of its celebration. Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of due search
the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in relation to Article license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value,
58 of the same Code.[19] he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said
Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license
of the marriage of the parties states: that would render the marriage void ab initio.

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as
void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified
by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has
no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification
issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized This is to certify that as per the registry Records of
Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the 7054133 was issued in favor of
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss
Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of
Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17
intents it may serve.[26]
September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15
November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that
the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done
in the regular conduct of official business.[27] The presumption of
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
which rendered the marriage void.
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the lawfulness.[28] Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel,
parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued
respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this in Carmona, Cavite. [29]

effect was also issued by the local civil registrar

[25]
of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident
issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the
of Carmona, Cavite, reads: absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period
for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the
validity of the marriage.[30] An irregularity in any of the formal requisites
of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively
[31]
liable.
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage
license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which
states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133,
while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of
the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway
us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a
typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals
the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license
may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract
from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said
marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean
hands,[32] petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a
party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place
without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil
marriage took place because he initiated it.[33] Petitioner is an educated
person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and
voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from
his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond
at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste
or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His
attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad
faith.[34]
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in
a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There
is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in
church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was
executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they
presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract
executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City
Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as follows
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the
necessary document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to
produce? I am referring to the San Jose
de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I dont remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage
License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have
already a Marriage Contract and I dont know if it
is good enough for the marriage and they
accepted it your honor.
 COURT needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent
In other words, you represented to the San Jose official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that
de Manuguit church that you have with you said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting
already a Marriage Contract?
parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.[38]
WITNESS
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in
Yes your honor.
favor of the validity of the marriage.[39] Every intendment of the law or
COURT fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on
same marriage License in the Marriage Contract the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
issued which Marriage License is Number
7054033.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
WITNESS
is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals
Yes your honor. [35]
dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing
participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church SO ORDERED.
ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing
whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.[36]

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a

fixer who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the
ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the
Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The
authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a
marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to
the contrary.[37] Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR CV. No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro
is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They
planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They
had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had
regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired.
Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage
license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that
they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C.
Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did
not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna
Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth, respondent has been the
one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from
her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In
her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and
that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially
support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their
marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake
affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign
the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was
not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married.
He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and
that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner
as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of
mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child
when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a
marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of
nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was
born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In
addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to
undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his
refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with
respondent, saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used
as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being
irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit
dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily
admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for
support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of
petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There
was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as
required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a
marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for
declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The
proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the
obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of
the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16
October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National
Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and
the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995
between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly
annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied
by the Court of Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his
marriage with respondent because as shown by the evidence and
admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a
marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of
a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being
that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The
false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill
the absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that
there was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this
case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action
for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case,
petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative
defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject
of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another
independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of
nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented would
entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for
the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.12 Finally,
petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with
respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation,
the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his
legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent
and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective
comments on the petition.13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere
dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she
argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked
collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her
child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward
testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering
questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that
despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner
strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity
and filiation.15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that it was improper for the trial court to declare null and void the
marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing
the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the
validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support
from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover,
the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized
without a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial
court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings
of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and
thus entitled to support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court
had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second, whether
the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction
to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in
a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is
clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two
marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits.
Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of
a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity
of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
marriage an absolute nullity.22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in
any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.23 In
the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner
and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted
their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had
been living together for more than five years.24 However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked
during cross-examination, thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living
together as husband and wife for the last five years on or before
March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity
in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the
marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license.26 In the
instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact,
there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has
no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate
daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can
prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In
addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in
favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus
stating:

1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE

CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living,
Parañaque, Metro Manila;30

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial
court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the

petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but
also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his
testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former
girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit
petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go
to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances,
petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their
marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent
claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage
ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise
(Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and
"D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and
"G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D,"
"D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on
petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and
"E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.31

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision

and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166
are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70
of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is
hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896 : January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, v. GLORIA GOO
ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which
reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October
5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and
the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-
Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I,
Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage
to Gloria.
3
In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage
License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993,
was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is
crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria,
a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August
9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines
in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the
afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F.
Mu oz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two
men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but
was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he
and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that
the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he
went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check
on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their
marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be
found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion,
issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage
license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage
license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:cralawlibrary
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:cralawlibrary
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in
this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR.
ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January
19, 1993. ??? r?bl? ??r ??l l?? l?br?r
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED
AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever
legal purpose or intents it may serve.7?r?l1
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases
against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not
there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8?r?l1
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a
letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967,
which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January
20, 1993.9?r?l1
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage
licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified
that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by
Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona,
Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that
their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number,
namely 9969967, to any other person.11?r?l1
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented
Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May
Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of
the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to
solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he
solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the
residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann
Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since
1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further
testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day
before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared
by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz
submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with
that office.17?r?l1
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the
wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride,
Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured
the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further
testified that he did not know where the marriage license was
obtained.20He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993,
signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of
the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the
other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21?r?l1
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar
Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding
ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that
she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing
the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take
place, a male person went to their house with the application for
marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to
their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty.
Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She
further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage
license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained
from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed
by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced
by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before
Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26?r?l1
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties
stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria
Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the
wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said
photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and
Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and
presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as
proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in
securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors.
A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the
marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed
did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the
license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9,
1993 at their residence.28?r?l1
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June
15, 1993.29?r?l1
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of
the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30?r?l1
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August
9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been
celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were
Chinese.31?r?l1
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan,
and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that
no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took
into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona,
Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in
violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one
of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a
valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage
of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner,
and against the respondent declaring as follows:cralawlibrary
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired during
their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General,
National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their
respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in
Manila. ??? r?bl? ??r ??l l?? l?br?r
SO ORDERED.34?r?l1
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but
the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned
decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of
errors:cralawlibrary
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND
VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A
REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK
PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN
TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF
ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN
ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT
BELOW.35?r?l1 ??? r?bl? ??r ??l l?? l?br?r
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal.
It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification
could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed
had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37?r?l1
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the
marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had
comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy.38?r?l1
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as
follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage
between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on
09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.42?r?l1
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9,
1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines,
is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this
particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as
follows:cralawlibrary
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:cralawlibrary
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

SO ORDERED.39?r?l1 (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter
2 of this Title; and
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but
the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
2008.41?r?l1 contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
Hence, this petition. presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age. ??? r?bl? ??r ??l l?? l?br?r
Grounds in Support of Petition
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
I render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS voidable as provided in Article 45.
AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE. marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
II
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:cralawlibrary
xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family
Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing
officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage
one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license
under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case,
thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued
for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been
issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a
copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To
prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly
issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no
such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:cralawlibrary
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist
in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain
no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar
of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court
held:cralawlibrary
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify
that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his
office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found
in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are
public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register
book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.44?r?l1
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil
registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records
of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification
to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was
issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to
another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified
machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which
was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and
Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification,
stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent
search" in the certification, and since the certification used stated that
no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search
had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given
probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was
lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be
located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely
necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was
lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus
the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search
having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed
located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn
the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the
records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party
resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the
best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license.
Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of
the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as
to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its
contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and
Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license,
admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of
applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could
have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony
of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage
contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could
have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court.
However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her
claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cari o v. Cari o,47 following the case of Republic,48 it
was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office
had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-
issuance of said license. The case of Cari o further held that the
presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage
license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden,
and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage
license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity
in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage,
as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license
was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and
Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its
conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the
CA:cralawlibrary
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married
and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both
parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity
was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The
parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the
signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several
pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the
solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellants
family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant
where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of
all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has
[sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June
1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01
August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition
appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for
Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon
(Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50?r?l1
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure
the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is
clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning,
except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to
34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot
be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it

may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade
a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the
failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license,
given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid
marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took
steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby

GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005
in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with
respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 210764. April 15, 2015.]
LUDIVINA C. VILLARICA, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM
R. VILLARICA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a
Resolution dated April 15, 2015, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 210764 (Ludivina C. Villarica v. William R.
Villarica). — For resolution is the instant petition seeking to nullify
the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated January 7, 2014
in CA-G.R. CV No. 93049.
Herein respondent and petitioner are husband and wife.
They were married on two occasions. The first marriage was
conducted in a civil ceremony held in Meycauayan, Bulacan on
January 10, 1975. This marriage was registered with the local civil
registrar of Meycauayan. Sixteen (16) days after, or on January 26,
1975, the same parties, using the same marriage license,
reaffirmed their marriage vows in a church wedding held in
Santuario de San Jose in Greenhills, Mandaluyong. This second
marriage, on the other hand, was registered with the local civil
registrar of Mandaluyong. Thereafter, petitioner sought the
nullification of the second marriage.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision declaring the
second marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and
void on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his essential marital obligations. The RTC Decision
became final and executory on August 9, 2004.
Subsequently, when respondent asked the civil registrar of
Mandaluyong to enter into its civil registry the decision of the RTC
declaring the nullity of the parties' second marriage, the civil
registrar of Mandaluyong refused on the ground that the first
marriage between petitioner and respondent still existed as the
same was not a subject of the RTC decision.
As such, respondent moved for the amendment of the RTC
Decision praying that it include the cancellation of the parties' first
marriage. CAacTH
On September 18, 2008, the RTC issued an Order directing
the Local Civil Registrar of Meycauayan, Bulacan as well as the
National Statistics Office to cancel from their Book of Entries the
first marriage of the parties.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the above-assailed RTC Order.
Hence, the instant petition which the Court finds to be
without merit.
In the present case, the demands of substantial justice and
the Court's exercise, of its equity jurisdiction allow the amendment
of the May 31, 2004 decision of the RTC so as to include the
nullification of the parties' first marriage.
Indeed, it would be the height of absurdity to consider
respondent, on the one hand, as psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential duties of a married man insofar as his second
marriage to petitioner is concerned while, on the other hand,
consider him capable of doing so if we take into account their first
marriage, which was celebrated a mere 16 days earlier.
Also, the Court agrees with the pronouncement of the RTC
in its September 18, 2008 Order, as affirmed by the CA, that the
issue on respondent's psychological incapacity has already been
settled and the filing of a new action for the purpose of nullifying the
parties' first marriage on the same ground as respondent's
psychological incapacity is already barred by the doctrine of res
judicata by conclusiveness of judgment. Indeed, any right, fact or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same.2 IAETDc
Petitioner may argue that a subsequent petition may still be
filed for the nullification of the earlier marriage between the parties
on grounds other than psychological incapacity. It remains a fact,
however, that the second marriage of the parties was nullified on
the ground that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital duties and responsibilities, a ground which can
also be used to annul the first marriage of the parties. Considering
that the two marriages were celebrated just several days apart, it
would thus be pointless to conduct further or other proceedings to
nullify the first marriage which was not included in the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, dated May 31, 2004, or to determine the
existence of other grounds for the purpose of declaring the first
marriage as null and void.
Finally, it bears to point out that the State, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment to the instant
petition, did not oppose the ruling of the RTC and the CA, and
opined as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In our jurisdiction, it remains settled that the
State has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of
married life and in its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution, thus, the State maintains that any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity . . . . However, here, the
antecedents and circumstances surrounding the
instant case compel the State to veer away from said
principle. It thus humbly agrees with the Honorable
Court of Appeals in ruling that while the trial court is
barred from granting a nunc pro tunc judgment to
include the civil wedding, it was nevertheless
authorized to pro hac vice amend its final and
executory decision.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The trial court's Order dated September 18, 2008
amending its May 31, 2004 Decision directing the
cancellation of the Meycauayan civil marriage was
founded on "higher interests of justice and equity"
Accordingly, here, substantial justice and
equity allow the amendment of the trial courts
decision in declaring the parties' civil marriage null
and void, and in canceling the civil registry entries of
both civil and church marriages of the parties. For
the trial court to do otherwise, that is, to still keep the
civil registry entry of the civil marriage while
declaring the church marriage as null and void,
would be incongruous and not synchronized with
reality.
As correctly observed by the Honorable
Court of Appeals, the continued existence of the civil
wedding between the parties would make it
impossible to execute the final and executory
[decision] of the trial court. Therefore, the relief
sought for below by the petitioner herself to declare
the civil marriage between her and the herein
respondent spouse, which was eventually granted
by the trial court, would thus become unattainable
and futile if the instant petition would be granted by
this Honorable Court.
In fact, it is a wonder why the petitioner would
now question the amendment of the trial court's
decision to include the cancellation of her civil
marriage with the respondent when, in the first place,
she herself sought the declaration of her church
wedding as null and void. It would thus be absurd to
have the church wedding annulled while retaining
the civil wedding and allowing it to subsist. DcHSEa
xxx xxx xxx 3
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated January 7, 2014 in CA-G.R. CV No.
93049, is AFFIRMED. (Jardeleza, J., no part, due to his prior action
as Solicitor General; Perlas-Bernabe, J., designated additional
Member per Raffle dated September 1, 2014; Villarama, Jr., J., on
official leave; Mendoza, J., designated Acting Member, per Special
Order No. 1966 dated March 30, 2015).
SO ORDERED."
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 187462. June 1, 2016.]
RAQUEL G. KHO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES and VERONICA B.
KHO, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Challenged in the present petition for review
on certiorari are the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14,
2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA
Decision reversed and set aside the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case
No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed for
declaration of nullity of his marriage with private respondent, while
the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the RTC of Oras,
Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31,
1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio
Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of
the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to
arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers
were required for the intended marriage between
petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place
at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude
the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;
xxx xxx xxx 4
4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter
exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony
Certification 5 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
which actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock
Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local
before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there
was a public dance held in the town plaza which is
just situated adjacent to the church whereas the
venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished
at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June
1, 1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of
the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license
and had not seen much less signed any papers or
documents in connection with the procurement of a
marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness of period from
the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's
office was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the
afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the
purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the
moment the actual marriage was celebrated before
dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore
could have been validly issued, thereby rendering
the marriage solemnized on even date null and void
for want of the most essential requisite;
7. For all intents and purposes, thus,
Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated
was solemnized sans the required marriage license,
hence, null and void from the beginning and neither
was it performed under circumstances exempting
the requirement of such marriage license;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that
after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of marriage
between petitioner and respondent held on June 1,
1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab
initio and of no legal effect;
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a
Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license
issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage
celebrated on June 1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer 6 praying that the petition be
outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action because there is no
evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was
celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that, on the
contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared
before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license which
they presented before their marriage was solemnized.
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was
subsequently transferred to the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as
well as affidavits of witnesses.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision
granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the said Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Court hereby declares the marriage contracted
between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on
June 1, 1972 null and voidab initio, pursuant to
Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of
the Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice
to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of theFamily
Code.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar
for proper registration of this decree of nullity of
marriage.
SO ORDERED
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.]
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN
TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a
petition for review on certiorari 2under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen
who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on
November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due
to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for
Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt
and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition
for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario,
Canada granted Gerbert's petition for divorce on December 8,
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006. 5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
and Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series
of 1982. 6 IHDCcT
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage
as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead
a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerbert's petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file
a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert's.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied
Gerbert's petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the
proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order
for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. 9 Article
26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative
intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III; 10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse." 11
 THE PETITION
From the RTC's ruling, 12 Gerbert filed the present petition. 13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is
essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he,
thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into
account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to
the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the
petition only to the Filipino spouse — an interpretation he claims to
be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested
with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates,
involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments, 14 both support Gerbert's position. SAcaDE
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT'S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right
under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages — void 15 and voidable 16 marriages. In both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce,
on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union
for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our family laws do not
recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. 18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C.
Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution, 19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending
Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO
227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court's holding in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 21 In both
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse's
assertion of marital rights after a foreign court's divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that
the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between
the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillothat:
To maintain . . . that, under our laws, [the Filipino
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations . . . cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse]
should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 22 aCHDST
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in
the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent
is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. 24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot
be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family
Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis
for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated
the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by
his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and
the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only
the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion — i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in
favor of aliens — with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before
the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. This Section states: aTEScI
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order of
a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order
against a person, the judgment or
final order is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law. 27
 The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country." 28 This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain
a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section
24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
proving its authenticity, 30 but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this situation, we can, at this
point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case
to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law. DCASIT
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the
Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to
oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner's
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata 32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court. 33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by
the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect,
as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it
not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the
recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate
based on the mere presentation of the decree. 34 We consider
the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences
touching upon a person's legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such
as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or
not." 35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign
one, affecting a person's legal capacity and status that must be
recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or theLaw on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the
civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is
established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
 (c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces; EHDCAI
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars
shall keep and preserve in their offices the following
books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register.
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be
entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
change of name and naturalization
register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves
do not ipso facto authorize the decree's registration. The law
should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order
as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the strength alone
of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of
the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No.
4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181,
series of 1982 37 — both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce
decree does not, by itself, authorize thecancellation of the entry in
the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is
not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court,
for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. STHDAc
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order."
The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that
the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings; 39 and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation. 40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not
been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not
be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry — one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of
 the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding 41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can
be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review
on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its
February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the
trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling
above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160172. February 13, 2008.]
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166, 2 declaring that (1) Reianna
Tricia A. de Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2)
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until
properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for
that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in
1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage
license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in
October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When
the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed
an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the
civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child
named Reinna Tricia A. de Castro. Since the child's birth,
respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as
a government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial
court. 3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and
Reinna Tricia as his child." 4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming
that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated
by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her
pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from
his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never
lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor
acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, 5 the trial court ruled
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid
because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus
obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it
ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not,
and could not have been, his own child. TSEHcA
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the
rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared
that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the
parties' marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon
petitioner's refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity
and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time
he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioner's
"forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his
obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible." 6 Moreover,
the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed
by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the
legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an
action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the
marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very
same case. There was no participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion
between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for
declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that
the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can
be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have
been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and
his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily
entered into by petitioner and respondent.7 The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A.
de Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and
the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13
March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee
valid until properly annulled by a competent court in a
proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against
the appellant. 8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion
was denied by the Court of Appeals. 9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly
annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by the
evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was
celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit
they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false
narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived
together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be
allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage
license. 10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for
the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is
only an ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment
or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner
argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity
of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative
defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities, 11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the
subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute
another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for
declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would
be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would
be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden
of the courts. 12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity
of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the
child's paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required
respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their
respective comments on the petition. 13 SDECAI
In her Comment, 14 respondent claims that the instant
petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the
appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage
cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With
regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to
her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain,
if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from
the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to
DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation. 15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null and
void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for
support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog, 16 it states that courts
may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support,
since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of
a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the
proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage
license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at
least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly
held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
valid. 17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial
court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus
entitled to support. 18
 Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the
trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support
and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked. 19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose
is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void"
in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose
of remarriage. 20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 21 the Court ruled
that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of
two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death
benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon
the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. However, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. 22 cDHCAE
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas
a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable. 23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence
presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage
license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for
more than five years. 24 However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
cross-examination, thus —
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been
living together as husband and wife for the last
five years on or before March 13, 1995, you
signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir. 25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses
with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a
marriage license. 26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous
cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The
false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it
is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner's
illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children. 27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child,
or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. 28
The Certificate of Live Birth 29 of the child lists petitioner as
the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional
tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father
of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A.
DE CASTRO who was born on November 3,
1995 at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro
Manila; 30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the
trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with
the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of
the latter, but also by respondent's own admission in
the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that
petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were
sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter's
house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to
have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances,
petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to
their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While
respondent claims that he was merely forced to
undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of
the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-
3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-
1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2"
and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs.
"D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the
wedding ring on petitioner's finger and in another
picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen
in the act of kissing the petitioner. 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000
is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 103047. September 2, 1994.]
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE;
REQUISITES; ABSENCE; EFFECT. — At the time the subject
marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage
shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local
civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PROOF OF LACK OF RECORD;
EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. — Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where
they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license
was issued and such other relevant data. The certification of "due
search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search
and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue
marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
3. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF THE PETITIONER; WHEN
CORROBORATING TESTIMONY NOT NECESSARY; CASE AT BAR.
— The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in
support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The
failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly
due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered
that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of
a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as
a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used
to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the
relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The
records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was
initially unknown to the parents of the former. Surely, the fact that only
private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held
against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was dully served with
notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt
thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was
properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for
her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There
was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion
between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent
Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking
a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F.
Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license
was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their
marriage. LLjur
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer.
Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his
absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were
married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City
Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the
knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally
attended to the processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage
license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license
no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June
24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since
the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in
March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the
couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only
for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19,
1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother,
with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter,
Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the
States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar,
regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's
efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to
Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the
Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
"February 20, 1987
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F.
CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were
allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21,
1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on
June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license no.
3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio
(Sgd.) CENONA
D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil
Registry
Officer"
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or
before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she
sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the
marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City. LexLib
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification
was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage
license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It
ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage
license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate
court. She insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar
sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of
the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between the contracting
parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel
the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate
court erred when it ruled that the certification issued by the civil registrar
that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately
proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the
respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated
testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the
procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that
the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent
are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity
of a marriage. prLL
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties
as null and void, respondent appellate court disregarded the
presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar,
regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage
contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him
before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the
law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The
law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage
license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the
marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due
search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage
license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove
its non-issuance. cdphil
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is
sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz:
"Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written
statement signed by an officer having custody of an
official record or by his deputy, that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found
to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as
evidence that the records of his contain no such record
or entry."
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that
despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office
or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license
was issued and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion
and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate
of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did
not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in
support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The
failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly
due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered
that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of
a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as
a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used
to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the
relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The
records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was
initially unknown to the parents of the former. llcd

Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the
trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was
duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition.
Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to
answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot
be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the
proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that
there was collusion between private respondent and her husband
Cardenas.

It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that

the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of
a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious
marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig,
may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing
officer. LLphil

In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the

documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject
marriage license.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of

any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007.]
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying
petitioner's appeal and affirming the decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325
dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of
marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage 3 was filed by petitioner
against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December
1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a
person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who,
for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. 4 They got
married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent
went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit
Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged
marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the
marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with
the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985,
respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due
hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering
the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract 5 and
its entry on file. 6
Answering petitioner's petition for annulment of marriage,
respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that
there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to
petitioner's representation, respondent gave birth to their first child
named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another
daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October
1992. 7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three
children. 8 Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. 9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for
concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60. 10 Respondent prays that the petition
for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143,
rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is
rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the
sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per
month as support for their two (2) children on the first
five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs. 11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
dismissing the petitioner's appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April
2005. 12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the
parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not
presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the
parties' marriage contract being a public document is a prima
facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. 13
 In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following
issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it ruled that the Petition
for Annulment has no legal and factual basis
despite the evidence on record that there was
no marriage license at the precise moment of
the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it gave weight to the
Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact
that the same was not identified and offered as
evidence during the trial, and was not the
Marriage license number appearing on the
face of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling
laid down by this Honorable Court in the case
of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263,
12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it failed to relax the
observance of procedural rules to protect and
promote the substantial rights of the party
litigants. 14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with
the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because
he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a
"fixer" who arranged everything for them. 15 The wedding took place at
the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev.
Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs. 16 He and
respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was
issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the
place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that
"Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto
Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario" 17 but their marriage contract
bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8
December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the
law in effect at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void
ab initio pursuant to Article 80 (3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same
Code. 19
Article 53 of the Civil Code 20 which was the law applicable at
the time of the marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized
unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the
State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. 21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to
impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court
considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for
considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 22 the Local
Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to find a
record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was
issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due search
and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage
license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value,
he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said
certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license
that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cariño v. Cariño, 23 the Court considered the marriage of
therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino
as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the
certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the
marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals, 24 the marriage license was issued
on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place
on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion
is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage
license which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between
the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. 25 The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was
issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of
Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry
Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr.
Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on
December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the
request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve. 26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was
done in the regular conduct of official business. 27 The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in
support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer's act
being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness. 28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel,
admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona,
Cavite. 29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of
the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident
of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient
basis to annul petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of
the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the
absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period
for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the
validity of the marriage. 30 An irregularity in any of the formal requisites
of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. 31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the
marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties
is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage
license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this
argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same
is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage
contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the
marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore
does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and
issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with
clean hands, 32 petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible
or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place
without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil
marriage took place because he "initiated it." 33Petitioner is an
educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He
knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise,
knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He
cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from
the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer
palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance
such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of
marriage betrays his bad faith. 34
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony
twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage
license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding
ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything
was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent,
they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage
contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the
Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner's testimony as follows
—
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the
necessary document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to
produce? I am referring to the San Jose de
Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I don't remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage
License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have
already a Marriage Contract and I don't know if
it is good enough for the marriage and they
accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de
Manuguit church that you have with you
already a Marriage Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied
the same marriage License in the Marriage
Contract issued which Marriage License is
Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor. 35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a
willing participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the
church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby
cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. 36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner — that they appeared
before a "fixer" who arranged everything for them and who facilitated
the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the
Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel — will not strengthen his posture. The
authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a
marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to
the contrary. 37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer
needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent
official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that
said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting
parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. 38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is
always in favor of the validity of the marriage. 39 Every intendment of
the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The
Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 183896. January 30, 2013.]
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO
ABBAS, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which
reversed the Decision 2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October
5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and
the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-
Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I,
Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage
to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract 3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage
License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993,
was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is
crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria,
a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August
9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the Philippines
in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law's residence, located at 2676 F.
Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two
men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but
was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he
and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that
the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he
went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check
on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their
marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be
found. 5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion,
issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage
license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage
license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan. 6 Said certification reads as follows: DcSACE
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage
License filed in this office, Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO
GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on
January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been
issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar
Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may
serve. 7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases
against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not
there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a
letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967,
which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January
20, 1993. 9 Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for
marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically. 10 He testified that the certification dated July 11,
2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of
the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on
January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license
of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person. 11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented
Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May
Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of
the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to
solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 He testified that he
solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the
residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. 13 He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann
Ceriola. 14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since
1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements. 15 Rev. Dauz
further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the
day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was
prepared by his secretary. 16 After the solemnization of the marriage,
it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz
submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with
that office. 17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the
wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride,
Felicitas Goo. 18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured
the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. 19 He further
testified that he did not know where the marriage license was
obtained. 20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993,
signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of
the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the
other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. 21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar
Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding
ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She testified that
she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing
the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take
place, a male person went to their house with the application for
marriage license. 23 Three days later, the same person went back to
their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty.
Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. 24 She
further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage
license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained
from Carmona. 25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed
by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced
by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before
Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola's testimony, the counsels for both parties
stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria
Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the
wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said
photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and
Atty. Sanchez. cTCaEA
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and
presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as
proof. 27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in
securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors.
A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the
marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed
did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the
license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9,
1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June
15, 1993. 29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of
the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila. 30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August
9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been
celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were
Chinese. 31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan,
and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that
no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed. 32 It also
took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona,
Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in
violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. 33 As the marriage was not
one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of
a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring
as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is
hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property
relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was
acquired during their cohabitation by
reason of the nullity of the marriage of
the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the
Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to
cancel from their respective civil
registries the marriage contracted by
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on
January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED. 34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but
the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned
decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of
errors: aEcDTC
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE
ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE
WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID
MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK
PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE
CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL
DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER
AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF
NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL
AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON
THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY
RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW. 35
The CA gave credence to Gloria's arguments, and granted her appeal.
It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification
could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed
had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law. 37 It gave weight to the fact that Syed had
admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also
considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and
wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy. 38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and
Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed[sic] Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09
January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 but the CA denied it
in its Resolution data January 14, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to
wit:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-
CALLED "ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO
PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN
ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS
A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF
THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS
MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING
AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE
THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO
ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS
APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH
RESPONDENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER
DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY
OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES
OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING
WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED
PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT,
IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR
REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY
FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE. 10
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers
on the alleged failure of the CA to give due credence to petitioner's
evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license
at the time that petitioner and respondent's marriage was
solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the
case not on the basis of law and evidence but rather on the ground
of what the appellate court calls as ethical considerations as well as
on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), raises a procedural question by arguing that the
issues presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in
nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into these issues
in a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court does not agree.
The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and
application of existing law and prevailing jurisprudence. However,
intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of the
subject marriage license, which is a question of fact and one which
is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without
exceptions, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave
abuse of discretion;
 (4) When the judgment is based on a Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage
misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record. 11
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on
whether or not there was indeed a marriage license obtained by
petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for
this Court to review these findings.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated
on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. 12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly,
Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract, to wit:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized
unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage
of exceptional character. 13
shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local
civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article
75. 14 Under theCivil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These
marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of
death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3)
consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5)
religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's
marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Article 80 (3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a
marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is
void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract. 15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority
granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage. 16 Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a
marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. 17
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and
petitioner were able to secure a marriage license which they
presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was
performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is
always in favor of the validity of marriage and that any doubt should
be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of
this principle as well as of the Constitutional policy which protects
and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled
with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient
evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
 The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be
resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee
Cariño. 18 There, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was
adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. 19 It was
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties
had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party
alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and
that the required marriage license had been secured. 20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a
Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
"has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor
of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent]
whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972." 21 Thus, on the
basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes the
burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she
who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was
not able to discharge that burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged
marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In addition, the
Certificate of Marriage 22 issued by the officiating priest does not
contain any entry regarding the said marriage license, Respondent
could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the
National Archives and Records Section, where information
regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license
number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do so. The
Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with
petitioner's observation that the statements of the witnesses for
respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that
a marriage ceremony was conducted but neither one of them
testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and
respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she
and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to
present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that
one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence. 23
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any
evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license
was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be
said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the
requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the
marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the
subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a
marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage
license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG
further argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling in Sevilla v.
Cardenas, 24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar,
which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage license,
must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said
office despite diligent search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court considered the certification issued by the
Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to
find the record or entry sought by the parties despite the absence
of a categorical statement that "such document does not exist in
their records despite diligent search." The Court, citing Section
28, 26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the certification of
due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported
marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on
said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage
license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao
Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 27 this Court considered the marriage of the
petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by
the local civil registrar, their office has no record of such marriage
license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil
registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage
license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the the beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under
petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's
was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized as among the
Bangayan, Jr. 28 exceptions.
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his
Abbas, 29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v. CA 30 that, in marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives are less than
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was pure — that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his
lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued by the local civil alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same
registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could not does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they
be located as the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage
categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly
search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.
the Rules of Court does not require a categorical statement to this
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
duty has been regularly performed, absent Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.
held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
SO ORDERED.
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal
Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. . . . 31
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and
unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject marriage license
which rendered the marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported
by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties. 32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was
signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license. 33 As cited above, Article 80 (3) of the Civil Code clearly
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.]
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad
Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR.,petitioners,vs.NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
Roldan R. Mangubat for petitioners.
Daryll A. Amante for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that
the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was
filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. The lower
court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null
and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates
the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. Hence, this petition. AcTDaH
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the assailed
decision of the trial court. The Court ruled that the second marriage
involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement
of a marriage license, therefore, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element. According to the Court, it can not be said that
Pepito and respondent have lived with each other as husband and wife
for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's
first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent,
only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and
his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted
for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation
was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature
of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only
by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife."
The Court also ruled that petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their father's marriage void because a void marriage
can be attacked collaterally and can be questioned even after the death
of either party.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE; MARRIAGES OF
EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER; THE 5-YEAR COHABITATION
PERIOD CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 76 OF THE CIVIL CODE
SHOULD BE THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE DAY OF THE
MARRIAGE AND IT SHOULD BE A PERIOD OF COHABITATION
CHARACTERIZED BY EXCLUSIVITY MEANING NO THIRD PARTY
WAS INVOLVED AT ANY TIME WITHIN THE 5 YEARS AND
CONTINUITY THAT IS UNBROKEN. — Working on the assumption
that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five
years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the
union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be
noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar.
2. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;CASE AT BAR; THE FIVE-YEAR
COHABITATION OF PETITIONERS' FATHER AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WAS NOT THE COHABITATION CONTEMPLATED
BY LAW; THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE EVEN WHERE
THERE WAS ACTUAL SEVERANCE OF THE FILIAL
COMPANIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPOUSES CANNOT MAKE ANY
COHABITATION BY EITHER SPOUSE WITH ANY THIRD PARTY AS
BEING ONE AS "HUSBAND AND WIFE." — In this case, at the time of
Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the
time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that
is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when
he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from
his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there
was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as
being one as "husband and wife."
3. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY
TO FILE A PETITION TO DECLARE THEIR FATHER'S MARRIAGE
VOID EVEN AFTER HIS DEATH; VOID MARRIAGES CAN BE
ATTACKED COLLATERALLY AND CAN BE QUESTIONED EVEN
AFTER THE DEATH OF EITHER PARTY. — Contrary to respondent
judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by
analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second
ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before
the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annullable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be
the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by
free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death
of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no
legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of
the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as
well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September
26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa
was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year
and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's
death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of
a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the
persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code. LibLex
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the
Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of
action against defendant in asking for the declaration
of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father,
Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time
of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G.
Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of
plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and
void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from
assailing the validity of the second marriage after it
was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the
action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent
before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an
action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review
with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because
"the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the
allegations in the petition are 'true and correct.'" It was thus treated as
an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3,
Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this
Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation
to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the
State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitutionconsiders marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which
shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and
case law considers it not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13
However there are several instances recognized by the Civil
Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in
such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their
status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip
arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. cda
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the
age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what
nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code
to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the
future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to
their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the
five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity —
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on
the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should
not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement
and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within
the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Article 63:"....This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. ...."
Article 64:"Upon being advised of any alleged
impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining
persons under oath. ..."
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "....This notice shall
request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. ...."
Article 18 reads in part: "....In case of any
impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought
to his attention, he shall note down the particulars
thereof and his findings thereon in the application for
a marriage license. ...." cdrep
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present,
absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the
same person during the same period.Thus, any marriage subsequently
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the
prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more
marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law
sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming
that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both
Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be
in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito
had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of
the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
"husband and wife."
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this
case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void after
his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage
relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an
annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons
who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A
marriage that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never
to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can
be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage
can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages
can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if
the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its
effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article
50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived
before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent.
The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that
there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It
should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it
never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing. cdasia
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A
void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties
to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake
of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the
fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death
of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which
cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted
during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute
nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the
same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same
cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order
of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing
Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case
is ordered REINSTATED. cdtai
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 175581. March 28, 2008.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.
[G.R. No. 179474. March 28, 2008.]
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, petitioner, vs. JOSE
A. DAYOT, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581
and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between
Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio. CacHES
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and
Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was
solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. 2 In lieu of a marriage
license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, 3 also dated 24
November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of
maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife
for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which
led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced
to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a
boarder in Felisa's house, the latter being his landlady. Some three
weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay
City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by
her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-
arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of
paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign
the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He
initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him
that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had
learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces
of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in
February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted
marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying
on top of the table at the sala of Felisa's house. When he perused
the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract
with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned
ignorance. EAIaHD
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose's allegations
and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they
had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age
difference. 5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with
a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June
1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently,
she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of
the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of
the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. 6 The Ombudsman
found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from
service for one year without emolument. 7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 dismissing
the Complaint. It disposed:
 WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and
analysis of the evidence presented by both parties,
this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint
does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against
[Jose]. 9 caIETS
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence
presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24
November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose's version of the story
as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would
easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign
a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already
detected that something was amiss, unusual, as
they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for
[Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the
pieces of paper for the release of the said package.
Another indirect suggestion that could have put him
on guard was the fact that, by his own admission,
[Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he
will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or
less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of
paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the
marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that
ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in
for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose's] claim that he did not consent to the
marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he
wrote [Felisa's] name in the duly notarized statement
of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988,
one year after he discovered the marriage contract
he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose],
again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of
[Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of
emergency. This Court does not believe that the only
reason why her name was written in his company
I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is
just but a lame excuse because if he really considers
her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have
written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose's] sister was put into the witness
stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the
marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29,
1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily
affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N.
taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was
asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed
that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother
she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the
more belied his claim that his consent was procured
through fraud. 10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose's
action had prescribed. It cited Article 87 11 of the New Civil Code
which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the
discovery of the fraud. Thus: AECIaD
That granting even for the sake of argument
that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed
an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at
the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he
discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the
marriage at the earliest instance. . . . . 12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August
2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit.
The dispositive portion of the appellate court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED. 13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage
between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
marriage under Article 86 14 of the Civil Code did not exist in the
marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the
prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck
down Jose's appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud
or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment
thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5)
of the Civil Code provides that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the
consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or
intimidation must be commenced by said party within
four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and
within four (4) years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was
allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then
he had only until February, 1991 within which to file
an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was
only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for
annulment of his marriage to Felisa. 15 TaEIcS
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose's
assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under
Article 76 16 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with
the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the
affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect
the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was
misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the
Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the
solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate
court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of
marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their
marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose's argument
that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals,
Article 56 17 of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the
contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing
officer's church or religious sect. The prescription was established
only in Article 7 18 of the Family Code which does not govern the
parties' marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that
the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a
marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose's Motion for
Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an
Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, thefallo of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August
11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and
another one entered declaring the marriage between
Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab
initio. AICHaS
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to
the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City. 19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the
ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog, 20 and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting
parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had
attained the age of majority, that being unmarried,
they had lived together for at least five (5) years and
that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme
Court ruled as follows:
". . . In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-
year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be
a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity — meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would
be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those
who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected
as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not
be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the
same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in
order to notify the public that two persons are
about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make
it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a
marriage solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional
character, shall be void from the beginning.
Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and
Felisa is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initiobecause of the absence
of a marriage license. 21 AaHTIE
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but
to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution 22 dated 10
May 2007, denying Felisa's motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review
before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals' Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed
and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose
and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
assailing the appellate court's Amended Decision. On 1 August
2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the
interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought
before it for resolution. 23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE
PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT
WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM
ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE
FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E. 24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of
Appeals misapplied Niñal. 25 She differentiates the case at bar
from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her
cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only
sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for
bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in
order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity
of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability. cSIADH
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between
Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall
jointly tackle the related arguments vented by
petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several
circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage
exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the
claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage by citing this Court's ruling in Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals. 26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is
the Republic's position that the falsity of the statements in the
affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential
and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said
affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the
license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated
statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife
for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the
parties' marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized
under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the
parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary
evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition,
the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose's notarized
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he
wrote Felisa's name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993
issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of
Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose's company ID
card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa's name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on
the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union.
Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract: cTIESa
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized
unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage
of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58 27 makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by
the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. 28 Article 80 (3) 29 of
the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more
than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage contract. 30 This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law, 31 whereby the absence of a
marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for
the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code
is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage. 32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character
are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To
wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places,
(2) consular marriages, 33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4)
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages, and (6) mixed marriages. 34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital
cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
 ART. 76. No marriage license shall be
necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years, desire to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage. CHDAEc
The reason for the law, 35 as espoused by the Code
Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation
from legalizing their status. 36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and
Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof,
they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age
of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this
union, they desire to marry each other." 37 One of the central
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit
of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short
of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite
of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly 38 but reasonably
construed. 39 They extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
former or add to the latter by implication. 41 For the exception in
Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the
woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us
with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written.
The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since
the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five
years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language
of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid,
this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the
law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also
prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite
facts 42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage. TaISDA
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not
lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. TheRepublic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
months before the celebration of their marriage. 43 The Court of
Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced to
her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or
March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. 44 The appellate court also
cited Felisa's own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when
Jose commenced to live in her house. 45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether
they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A
question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts. 46 Under Rule 45, factual findings
are ordinarily not subject to this Court's review. 47 It is already well-
settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts
of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
 recognized exception to this rule is when the Court
of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court
or administrative body disagree. The factual findings
of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this
Court if such findings are supported by the record or
based on substantial evidence. 48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November
1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the
falsity of the statements in the parties' affidavit will not affect the
validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites
were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently,
it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in
Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of
a marriage license. AIDTHC
Anent petitioners' reliance on the presumption of marriage,
this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at
bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. 49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. 50 The present case does not involve
an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be
applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered
into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence,
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that
every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of
marriage will not salvage the parties' marriage, and extricate them
from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and
Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or
compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without
prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could
be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage. 52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well. 53 To permit a false affidavit to
take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that
violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of
the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated
by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the
parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law.
The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one.
Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of
the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose
and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage
as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot
be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the
law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then
it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is
as if there was no affidavit at all. caTIDE
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be
stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a
law. 54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of
nullity of the parties' marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability. 55
 The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error
that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose's
subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and
that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of
nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. 56 Jose and Felisa's marriage was celebrated sans
a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that
it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage
does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the
rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article
76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of a marriage. 57 It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at any time within
the five years — and continuity that is unbroken. 58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to
their criminal liability, if any. No costs. aAEIHC
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000.]
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN
DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-
Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent judge, whose jurisdiction covers the municipality of
Sta. Margarita-Tarangan- Pagsanjan, Samar was charged by
complainant with solemnizing marriage outside his jurisdiction. She
alleged that her marriage with Bernardito A. Yman was celebrated at
respondent's residence at Calbayog City and that respondent failed to
register their marriage contract with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar. Respondent, for his defense, claimed good faith that he did
so upon the request of complainant and her fiance as complainant, an
overseas worker, must fly to Manila for abroad the following day and
that he believed complainant deserved more ordinary official attention
as an overseas worker and that the loss of the 3 remaining copies
documents was the cause for his failure to register the marriage. The
Office of the Court Administrator, to which the case was referred to for
investigation, report and recommendation, found respondent guilty of
non-feasance in office and recommended a fine of P5,000.00.
The Court ruled that marriage may be solemnized by any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction.
However, marriage can be held outside the judge's jurisdiction where
any of the contracting parties is at the point of death, where the place
of marriage is located in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of
the Family Code or upon the written sworn request of both parties.
None of the exceptions applies in this case. Further, a judge should
exercise extra care in the celebration of marriage and must ensure that
the event is properly documented. His failure to register the marriage
on the ground that the documents were lost is not a valid justification. It
manifested that respondent was less than conscientious in handling
official documents. Thus, respondent's failure to register the marriage
and the solemnization of the marriage outside his jurisdiction
constitutes non-feasance in office. Respondent was FINED P5,000.00
and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
infractions will be dealt with more severely.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; A SOCIAL
INSTITUTION. — Jimenez v. Republic underscores the importance of
marriage as a social institution thus: "[M]arriage in this country is an
institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has
surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and
permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every member
of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would
shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHERE SOLEMNIZATION BY A
JUDGE MAY BE MADE OUTSIDE HIS JURISDICTION. — Articles 7
and 8 of the Family Code clearly states, a marriage can be held outside
the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.]
at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29,
or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement
to this effect.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In this case, there is no
pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written
request made by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the
marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than
his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was
prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and
Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who,
respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention
under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers
that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith
that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so
that it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get
married." cCAIDS
4. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; NOT ONLY BOUND BY
OATH TO APPLY THE LAW BUT MUST ALSO BE CONSCIENTIOUS
AND THOROUGH IN DOING SO. — A person presiding over a court
of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and
render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled
for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he must also
be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the
very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties.
5. ID.; ID.; PRESUMED TO KNOW CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
OF HIS JURISDICTION. — A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know
the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court.
6. ID.; ID.; SOLEMNIZATION OF MARRIAGE; MUST
OBSERVE EXTRA PRECAUTION TO ENSURE EVENT IS
PROPERLY DOCUMENTED. — From the nature of marriage, aside
from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra care in the
exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its
solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra precautions
to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with
Article 23 of the Family Code.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — We agree with the
evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was less than
conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with
exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and
official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events. However, the records show that
the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part.
8. ID.; ID.; MUST ADOPT A SYSTEM OF RECORD
MANAGEMENT. — Judges must adopt a system of record
management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt
and efficient dispatch of business.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands
charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-
Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge
Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his
jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering
the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging
—
"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee
(sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and our
marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan
Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in
Calbayog City, Samar; . . . prcd
b. That the ceremony was attended by
PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our principal
sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA
DEAN; . . .
c. That after our wedding, my husband
BERNARDINO YMAN abandoned me without any
reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did
was I went to Calbayog City and wrote the City Civil
Registrar to inquire regarding my Marriage Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the
Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that my marriage
was not registered; . . .
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil
Registrar, I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed
by Judge Daguman that all the copies of the Marriage
Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That no copy was retained by Judge
Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge
committed acts prejudicial to my interest such as:
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside
his jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy
and not registering our marriage before the
office of the local Civil Registrar."
 The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent
Judge for comment.
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida
Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be solemnized by
respondent in Calbayog City though outside his
territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar
due to the following and pressing circumstances:
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent
was physically indisposed and unable to report
to his station in Sta. Margarita. In the forenoon
of that date, without prior appointment,
complainant Beso and Mr. Yman unexpectedly
came to the residence of respondent in said
City, urgently requesting the celebration of
their marriage right then and there, first,
because complainants said she must leave
that same day to be able to fly from Manila for
abroad as scheduled; second, that for the
parties to go to another town for the marriage
would be expensive and would entail serious
problems of finding a solemnizing officer and
another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while in
fact former Undersecretary Pacifico
Maghacot, Sangguniang
Panlungsod [member] Ramon Dean were
already with them as sponsors; third, if they
failed to get married on August 28, 1997,
complainant would be out of the country for a
long period and their marriage license would
lapse and necessitate another publication of
notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their
plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant
feared it would complicate her employment
abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to
date and venue of marriage were considered
impracticable by the parties;
1.2. The contracting parties were ready
with the desired cocuments (sic) for a valid
marriage, which respondent found all in
order. cda
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited
Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent
realized, deserved more than ordinary official
attention under present Government policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the
marriage in question, he believed in good faith that by
so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the
law so that it may be not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married.
3. Another point brought up in the complaint
was the failure of registration of the duplicate and
triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which
failure was also occasioned by the following
circumstances beyond the control of respondent:
3.1. After handing to the husband the
first copy of the marriage certificate,
respondent left the three remaining copies on
top of the desk in his private office where the
marriage ceremonies were held, intending
later to register the duplicate and triplicate
copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his office.
3.2. After a few days following the
wedding, respondent gathered all the papers
relating to the said marriage but
notwithstanding diligent search in the premises
and private files, all the three last copies of the
certificate were missing. Promptly, respondent
invited by subpoena . . . Mr. Yman to shed light
on the missing documents and he said he saw
complainant Beso put the copies of the
marriage certificate in her bag during the
wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to
contact complainant for a confirmation of Mr.
Yman's claim.
3.3. Considering the futility of
contracting complainant now that she is out of
the country, a reasonable conclusion can be
 drawn on the basis of the established facts so
far in this dispute. If we believe the claim of
complainant that after August 28, 1997
marriage her husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned
her without any reason . . . but that said
husband admitted "he had another girl by the
name of LITA DANGUYAN" . . . it seems
reasonably clear who of the two marriage
contracting parties probably absconded with
the missing copies of the marriage certificate.
3.4. Under the facts above stated,
respondent has no other recourse but to
protect the public interest by trying all possible
means to recover custody of the missing
documents in some amicable way during the
expected hearing of the above mentioned civil
case in the City of Marikina, failing to do which
said respondent would confer with the Civil
Registrar General for possible registration of
reconstituted copies of said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation
report dated August 11, 1998 found that respondent Judge ". . .
committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission
of the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out
that:
"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta.
Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority
to solemnize marriage is only limited to those
municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog
City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.
Additionally, there are only three instances, as
provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a
marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his
chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting
parties is at the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is
located in a remote place;
(3) where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in
the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent
Judge neglected his duty when he failed to register the
marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to
Article 23 of the Family Code which provides: Cdpr
"It shall be the duty of the person
solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of
the contracting parties the original of the
marriage certificate referred to in Article 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies
of the certificates not later than fifteen days
after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of
the place where the marriage was solemnized.
. . ." (italics ours)
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not
only has the respondent Judge committed non-
feasance in office, he also undermined the very
foundation of marriage which is the basic social
institution in our society whose nature, consequences
and incidents are governed by law. Granting that
respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate
and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he
should have exerted more effort to locate or
reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive
position, he is expected to be conscientious in
handling official documents. His imputation that the
missing copies of the marriage certificate were taken
by Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures
and does not deserve consideration for being devoid
of proof."
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the
Court finds the evaluation report of the OCA well-taken.
 Jimenez v. Republic 1 underscores the importance of marriage
as a social institution thus: "[M]arriage in this country is an institution in
which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it
with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The
security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the
interest and duty of each and every member of the community to
prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation
and ultimately lead to its destruction."
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the
Family Code provides, among others, that —
"ARTICLE 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(i) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; . . . (Italics ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
ARTICLE 8. The marriage shall be
solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the
office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases
of marriages contracted at the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing
officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in
a sworn statement to that effect." (Italics ours)
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be
held outside the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance
with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso
or her fiance Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place.
Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting
parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside
his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears
on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to
solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was
"[a ]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than
ordinary official attention under present Government policy."
Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in
question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning
on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive
and complicated for citizens to get married." cdphil
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the
law but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times
without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. 2 A judge is not only
bound by oath to apply the law; 3 he must also
be conscientious and thorough in doing so. 4 Certainly, judges, by the
very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties. 5
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his
hurried solemnization of the marriage in this case only tends to degrade
the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of social
institutions in the country. They also betray respondent's cavalier
proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more disposed
towards an extended period of engagement prior to marriage and
frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws — let alone
that enacted in order to preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social
institution as marriage — and the stability of judicial doctrines laid down
by superior authority should have given respondent judge pause and
made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the
performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A Judge is,
furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority
or jurisdiction of his court. 6 Thus respondent Judge should be
reminded that —
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by
his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so
only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by
his Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice of
this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long
as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, Judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down
 in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to functions. 11
administrative liability. 7
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that
Considering that respondent Judge's jurisdiction covers the respondent Judge be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and
municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of more severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.
Calbayog. 8
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY
mandate that a judge should exercise extra care in the exercise of his WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt
authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is with more severely. cdasia
likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the
event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the SO ORDERED.
Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that —
ARTICLE 23. It shall be the duty of the person
solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties, the original of the marriage
contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not
later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local
civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the
local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The
solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the
quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the
original of the marriage license and, in proper cases,
the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the
solemnization of the marriage in a place other than
those mentioned in Article 8. (Italics supplied)
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the
OCA that respondent Judge was less than conscientious in handling
official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in
ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his
custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events. 9 However, the records show that the loss was
occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part. This Court
reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management and
organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business. 10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8014. March 14, 1955.]
PEDRO V. VILAR, petitioner-appellant, vs.
GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO, respondent-appellant.
Claro M. Recto and Jose Nava for petitioner and appellant.
Josefina R. Phodaca and Naomi P. Salvador for
respondent and appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. APPEALS; APPELLATE JURISDICTION WHERE BOTH
PARTIES APPEAL AND ONE OF THE APPEALS RAISES ONLY
QUESTIONS OF LAW. — Where the petitioner raises in his brief
only questions of law and the respondent, who is also an appellant,
raises both questions of law and fact, and the appeals of both
parties are indivisible in that they pertain to only one case, the
Supreme Court, under sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, may take cognizance of both appeals.
2. ELECTION CONTESTS; MUNICIPAL OFFICE;
ECCLESIASTIC INELIGIBLE TO HOLD MUNICIPAL OFFICE;
WHO ARE ECCLESIASTICS. — An ecclesiastic is ineligible to hold
a municipal office under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative
Code. An Ordained minister of the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines registered as such in the Bureau of Public Libraries with
authority to solemnize marriages, is an ecclesiastic and ineligible to
hold the office of the Municipal Mayor. Resignation as such minister
and acceptance thereof by the cabinet of his church, are but self-
serving evidence if the resignation and its acceptance are not
registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. If a candidate to a
municipal office is a minister of a church with license to solemnize
marriages, it is his duty (and not of his church) to secure from the
Bureau of Public Libraries the cancellation of his resignation as
minister and to attach to his certificate of candidacy a copy of such
resignation.
3. ID.; IMPORTANCE AND PURPOSE OF
REGISTRATION WITH THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC LIBRARIES. —
The importance of registration cannot be underestimated. The
purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of
the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions but
equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This
information is necessary for the protection of the public. This is
especially so with regard to the authority to solemnize marriages,
the registration of which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-
96, New Civil Code).
4. ID.; ELECTION FOR MUNICIPAL MAYOR; IF PERSON
ELECTED IS INELIGIBLE, CANDIDATE OCCUPYING SECOND
PLACE CANNOT BE DECLARED BY COURT ELECTED. — When
the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the
candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he
were eligible. (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645; Llamoso vs. Ferrer,
47 Off. Gaz., No. 2, p. 727.)
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:
In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro
V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the candidates
registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija.
After the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while
Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal board of
canvassers proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly elected with a
plurality of 41 votes. However, contending that Paraiso was
ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was
disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present quo
warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to
assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared
null and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected
mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso.
 Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and
claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his resignation was
accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in
Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was
not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected to
take his place.
After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for
the office of mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and, consequently, it
declared his proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from
declaring petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal
grounds to do so. From this decision both parties have appealed,
respondent from that portion finding him ineligible, and petitioner
from that portion holding he cannot be declared elected as mayor
for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.
The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals.
However, as the latter court found that while petitioner raises in his
brief only questions of law respondent raises both questions of law
and fact, and both appeals are indivisible in that they pertain to only
one case, that court resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to
the provisions of sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
upon the theory that one of the appeals is exclusively cognizable by
the Supreme Court.
The only issue before us is whether respondent, being an
ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code, or whether he actually resigned as
minister before the date of the elections, and his resignation duly
accepted, as claimed, thereby removing his disability. As may be
noted, this is a question of fact the determination of which much
depends upon the credibility and weight of the evidence of both
parties.
The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent
was ordained as minister of the Evangelical Church of the
Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to solemnize
marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that since 1944 up to
1950 he acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija,
continuously and without interruption and has been renewing his
license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by the regulations of
the Bureau of Public Libraries; that on April 19, 1950, respondent
transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, having
been assigned to work in the same place and chapel during the
years 1944-1950; that on April 7, 1951, respondent applied for, and
was issued, a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of
Public Libraries as minister of the new church up to the end of April,
1952; that said license has never been cancelled, as neither the
head of the united church nor respondent has requested for its
cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly known as
minister of the United Church of Christ, but he has not attached to
his certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as
minister.
The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tends
to show that while he was formerly a minister of the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines, he, however, filed his resignation as
such minister on August 21, 1951, because of his desire to engage
in politics; that said resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his
church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27,
1951; that respondent turned over his chapel and his office to the
elder members of his religious order on August 21, 1951, and since
then he considered himself separated from his order and in fact he
has refrained ever since from conducting any religious services
pertaining to that order.
Which of these versions is correct?
After carefully examining the evidence of record, and after
weighing its credibility and probative value, we have not found any
reason for deviating from the finding of the trial court that
respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he
belonged and that the resignation he claims to have filed months
before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent
the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run
for a municipal office. Indeed, if respondent really and sincerely
intended to resign as minister of the religious organization to which
he belonged for the purpose of launching his candidacy why did he
not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation
registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. 1 The importance of
resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of registration
is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the
minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it
informed of any change in his religious status. This information is
necessary for the protection of the public. This is especially so with
regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of
which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil
Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the
cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not upon
respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the
official in charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the
reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes
upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation,
who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to
do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of
candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing full
well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.
It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his claim
by submitting as evidence certain documents purporting to show
the alleged resignation and its acceptance by the cabinet of his
church at a meeting held on August 27, 1951, but, considering said
documents in the light of the shortcomings we have pointed out
above, one cannot help but brand them as self-serving or as
documents merely prepared to serve the political designs of
respondent in an attempt to obviate his disqualification under the
law. And this feeling appears strengthened if we examine the so-
called minute book wherein, according to witness Jose Agpalo, are
entered the minutes of all the meetings of the church, because upon
an examination thereof one would at once get the impression that it
was prepared haphazardly and not with such seriousness and
solemnity that should characterize the religious activities of a well
established religious order. As the trial court aptly remarked "All
these lead the court to believe with the petitioner, that the supposed
resignation and acceptance were made at a later date to cure the
ineligibility of the respondent." We are therefore constrained to hold
that respondent is disqualified to hold the office of mayor as found
by the trial court.
elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only
authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the
person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has
presented his certificate of candidacy." (Nuval vs.
Guray, 52 Phil., 645.)
"Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known
as the Revised Election Code, does not provide that if
the contestee is declared ineligible the contestant will
be proclaimed. Indeed it may be gathered that the law
contemplates no such result, because it permits the
filing of the contest by any registered candidate
irrespective of whether the latter occupied the next
highest place or the lowest in the election returns."
(Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil., 489, 47 Off. Gaz.,
[No. 2] p. 727.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Paras C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes,
A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.
||| (Vilar v. Paraiso, G.R. No. L-8014, [March 14, 1955], 96 PHIL 659-
665)

As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible,

petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained second place in
the elections, our answer is simple: this Court has already declared
that this cannot be done in the absence of an express provision
authorizing such declaration. Our law not only does not contain any
such provision but apparently seems to prohibit it. This is what we
said in at least two cases where we laid down a ruling which is
decisive of the present case.
". . . In the first case when the person elected
is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the
candidate occupying the second place has been
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 9920. August 30, 2016.]
[Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691]
OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. FORMER
JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM p:
A judge should know, or ought to know, his or her role as a
solemnizing officer.
This disbarment complaint is an offshoot of our Decision
in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et
al. 1 Respondent Former Judge Rosabella M.Tormis (Tormis),
together with other judges and employees of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Cebu City, was dismissed for turning the
solemnization of marriages into a business. 2 Tormis was
dismissed from the service for the second time, and this Court
directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate disbarment
proceedings against her.
On July 3, 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial
Supervisor, led the judicial audit team created by the Office of the
Court Administrator to investigate Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City for alleged misdeeds in
the solemnization of marriages. 3
Two (2) undercover agents from the judicial audit team,
posing as a couple, went to the Palace of Justice to ask about the
marriage application process. 4 They were told by the guard on
duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy." 5
Fearing that the male undercover would be recognized by
the court employees in Branch 4, the two agreed that only the
female undercover would go inside the court. 6 She was then
assisted by a woman named Helen. Helen assured the female
undercover that their marriage process could be hurried. 7 She also
claimed that it was possible for the marriage to be solemnized the
next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated when the
marriage license became available. 8
The Office of the Court Administrator found that the
respondent judges in that case connived with the court personnel,
who acted as "fixers" in solemnizing marriages. 9 The judges
heedlessly kept solemnizing marriages despite irregularities in the
requirements provided under the law. 10 CAIHTE
In the Resolution dated July 10, 2007, this Court treated the
judicial audit team's memorandum as an administrative complaint
against the respondent judges, including Tormis. 11 The judges
were directed to file their comments on the charges against
them. 12 They were also suspended pending resolution of the
case. 13
On August 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator
Zenaida N. Elepaño of the Office of the Court Administrator
submitted a Memorandum dated August 29, 2007 and
Supplemental Report. 14 The Report stated that:
Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates
were examined by the judicial audit team. The team
reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates
examined, 280 marriages were solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code. The logbooks of the
MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of
solemnized marriages than the number of marriage
certificates in the courts' custody. There is also an
unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from
the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and
Liloan, Cebu. There were even marriages
solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses
obtained on the same day. The town of Barili, Cebu
is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu
City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours.
Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten
(10) kilometers away from Cebu City. 15 (Citations
omitted)
 The Report included the court employees' admissions of
their participation in the alleged misdeeds. The following personnel
substantiated the charges againstTormis:
(1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, confirmed that she
would personally assist couples who wished to be
married by checking that their documents were
complete before referring them to the judges,
including Tormis; 16
(2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer of Branch 6 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City,
"narrated several anomalies involving foreign
nationals and their acquisition of marriage licenses
from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu despite
the fact that parties were not residents of
Barili." 17 These marriages were solemnized
by Tormis; 18
(3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City, would aid couples in the solemnization of
their marriages by referring them to the judges; 19
(4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III of Branch 18
of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, "admitted that
she assisted couples seeking to get married and that
most of the marriage licenses were obtained from
the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu
because the registrars in those towns were not strict
about couples' attendance in the family planning
seminar"; 20
(5) Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer of Branch 4 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, admitted
that she would assist couples and refer them to the
judges, including Tormis. 21 She added that "during
the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the month, seven (7) to
eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage
solemnization"; 22
(6) Rebecca L. Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, admitted
that "she usually referred couples to Judges
Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to get
married under Article 34 of the Family Code were
advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint
cohabitation for ten pesos (P10)"; 23 and
(7) Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu,
admitted that she did not examine marriage
applications. 24 Couples who were not Barili
residents could obtain a marriage license from her,
provided that they had relatives residing in Barili; 25
Affidavits of private individuals were also attached to the
records. 26 Among these individuals was Jacqui Lou Baguio-
Manera (Baguio-Manera), a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu.
Baguio-Manera claimed that her marriage was solemnized
by Tormis with the aid of "Meloy," who asked for a fee of
P1,500.00. 27 She and her then fiancé were not required to present
a marriage license; they were only directed to bring their birth
certificates. 28 She averred that while Article 34 29 did not apply to
them, their marriage certificate was marked with the annotation, "No
marriage license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized
under Article 34 of Executive Order No. 209." 30
On November 27, 2007, this Court En Banc issued the
Resolution requiring all the judges involved, including Tormis, to
comment on the Supplemental Report. 31The Resolution also
directed the Process Servicing Unit to furnish all the judges with a
copy of the Report. 32 Further, all the court personnel involved
were asked to show cause why they should not be disciplined for
their misconduct. 33
In her comment, Tormis denied the charges against
her. 34 She claimed that the action of the Office of the Court
Administrator was an "entrapment." 35 According to her, there was
nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the same date the
marriage license was issued. 36 In view of the pro forma affidavits
of cohabitation, she relied on the presumption of
regularity. 37 Tormis asserted that she should not be blamed for
assuming that the affidavits were true since judges are not
handwriting experts. 38
Tormis also claimed that Baguio-Manera's affidavit was
hearsay. 39 She averred that when Baguio-Manera and her
husband was asked about the affidavit, they confirmed the
truthfulness of their statements, particularly that they had been
living together for five (5) years. 40 Lastly, Tormis blamed the filing
clerks for the irregularities in the number of marriages solemnized
in her sala. 41 DETACa
On November 12, 2007, Tormis, together with Judge
Edgemelo C. Rosales, filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for
Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of the
Case. 42 This Court lifted the suspension of the judges but forbade
them from solemnizing marriages. 43
On December 7, 2007, both judges moved for early
resolution with a waiver of formal and/or further investigation and to
dismiss. 44 This Court noted their Motion and affirmed the relief
they sought, thus allowing the payment of the judges' unpaid
salaries and benefits from July 9, 2007. 45
The Office of the Court Administrator, through
memorandum dated June 15, 2010, found Tormis guilty of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing
marriages with questionable documents, for failure
to make sure that the solemnization fee has been
paid, for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the
contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a
mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the
required certificate from the embassy and for
solemnizing a marriage with an expired license. 46
This Court upheld the findings of the Office of the Court
Administrator and noted the individual liability of the judges:
Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one
hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to
2007 based on the marriage certificates actually
examined. However, the monthly report of cases
showed that she solemnized three hundred five
(305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007.
The OCA report also noted that it was only in July
2007 that her court started to use a logbook to keep
track of marriages.
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven
(37) marriages with incomplete or missing
documents such as the marriage license, certificate
of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of
cohabitation. In several instances, only affidavits
were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the
certificate of legal capacity to marry.
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13)
marriages despite the questionable character of the
validity of the required documents particularly the
marriage license. The judicial audit team found
numerous erasures and superimpositions on entries
with regard to the parties' place of residence. In one
instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex
Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B. Laranio on 28
December 2006 despite the marriage license
containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS
a LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note
saying "12/28/06" under it.
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven
(47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code wherein the marriage requirements'
authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances
of the cohabitation of the parties and the given
address of the parties. These irregularities were
evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R.
Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who were married on
25 May 2007. The residential address of the couple
in the marriage certificate is "Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan,
Cebu City." However, there was an application for
marriage license attached to the marriage certificate
showing that Secuya's address is "F. Lopez Comp.
Morga St., Cebu City." 47
This Court ruled that:
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,
Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the
law and that she would have
been DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except
leave credits, if any, and disqualified from
 reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or -
controlled corporation, had she not been
previously dismissed from service in A.M.
No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-
30-MTCC);
xxx xxx xxx
The case against Judge Rosabella
M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of
Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna, should
be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
the purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings
against the judge. 48 (Emphasis in the original)
The affidavits of Celerina Plaza (Plaza) and Crisanto Dela
Cerna (Dela Cerna) resulted from Marilou Cabañes' (Cabañes) and
Helen Mongaya's (Mongaya) separate supplemental comments on
the charges against them. 49 Cabañes, then Court Stenographer of
Branch 4, named Plaza as Tormis' assistant, in charge of meeting
couples at their lobby. 50 On the other hand, Mongaya, then Court
Interpreter of Branch 4, attached Dela Cerna's affidavit to her
comment. 51
Plaza claimed to be Tormis' personal aide since
2002. 52 She alleged that after Tormis' suspension in 2006, she
was directed to find couples who wanted to get married. 53 She
was also told to direct the parties to Branch 4 and find Cabañes or
"Meloy." 54
In his affidavit, Dela Cerna stated that he was employed
as Tormis' personal aide. 55 He claimed that during the
investigation, Tormis directed him and Tormis' children to bring all
the marriage certificates from her office to her house. 56
In view of Judge Necessario, et al., the Office of the Bar
Confidant recommended that the case be docketed as A.C. No.
9920 (Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691) and entitled Office of the
Court Administrator v. Former Judge Rosabella
M. Tormis. 57 aDSIHc
On June 18, 2013, this Court approved the docketing of the
case and directed respondent Former Judge Rosabella
M. Tormis to comment on the disbarment charge against her. 58
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification 59 dated
August 12, 2013 asking the Office of the Court Administrator to state
the particular Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that she had violated as basis for her disbarment.
In the Resolution 60 dated September 10, 2013, this Court
noted the Urgent Motion for Clarification and directed the Office of
the Bar Confidant to inform respondent of the particular Canons that
she had violated.
On November 29, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant sent
respondent a letter informing her that the charges in her
administrative cases as a judge were the grounds for her
disbarment. 61 It cited A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, 62 which provides
that administrative cases against judges shall also be considered
as disciplinary charges against them as members of the
bar. 63 Some administrative cases against judges stand on
grounds that similarly violate the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
or on other breaches long recognized as grounds for discipline of
lawyers. The Office of the Bar Confident nreiterated that, in those
cases, the respondent judge may be directed to comment on the
complaint and explain why he or she should not be punished as a
member of the bar. 64
The letter cited the previous administrative charges against
respondent, thus:
(a) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, 65 where respondent was
dismissed from service, had she not been previously
dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-
1817 66 for gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and
gross ignorance of the law by turning solemnization
of marriage into a business; 67
(b) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692, 68 where respondent was
suspended for six (6) months without salary for gross
misconduct for repeatedly disregarding the
directives of this Court to furnish the complainant
with her comment; 69
(c) A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC 70 and A.M. No. 04-7-374-
RTC, 71 where respondent was fined P5,000.00 for
gross violation of Rule 114, Section 17 72 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure by
 inappropriately approving the bail posted by an
accused in a criminal case; 73
(d) A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609, 74 where respondent was
severely reprimanded for her "unauthorized receipt
of cash bond and keeping the same in her
house"; 75
(e) A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, 76 where respondent was
dismissed from service for gross inefficiency,
violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars, and gross ignorance of the law; 77 and
(f) A.M. No. MTJ-001337, 78 where respondent was
reprimanded after being found "guilty of improper
conduct for trying to influence the course of litigation
in Criminal Case No. 99796-12." 79 She, together
with another judge, was admonished for her
"unbecoming conduct as dispensers of justice." 80
Respondent filed her one-page Comment 81 on January
10, 2014, asking this Court to grant her peace of mind. 82 She
states that she is adopting her Motion for Reconsideration 83 in
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 as her Comment on the disbarment case
against her. 84 In this Motion, respondent enumerates her previous
administrative cases with her justifications.
For A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692, respondent claims that she had
furnished the complainant with a copy of her comment three (3)
times. 85 She avers that the complainant even acknowledged the
receipt of her comment through her manifestation, as noted in this
Court's July 30, 2003 Resolution. 86 Despite this, she was still fined
P2,000.00 for her repeated defiance to this Court's directive to
furnish the complainant with a copy of her comment. 87 She
believed that the case ended upon resolution and upon this Court's
noting her payment of the fine. However, she claims that:
[The Supreme Court] made an underground
evaluation of the case and made it appear that when
she complied with their Resolution in 2 March 2005
to impose a fine of P2,000.00, it was already an
admission that "[s]he (respondent) refused to
present proof of service to complainant of her
Comment or she did not furnish complainant with
said document[.]" 88
For A.M. No. 04-7-373 RTC and A.M. No. 04-7-374-
RTC, respondent claims that this Court "obviously ignored" her
explanation. 89 She asserts that she was the only available judge
at that time since she was working from Mondays through
Saturdays and even Sundays due to her load of cases. 90
For A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609, respondent questions why this
Court ruled that she deliberately made untruthful statements in her
Comment with the intent to deceive this Court. 91
For A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, respondent claims that the
audit was conducted one (1) day after she had served a prior
suspension. 92 She argues that since she was not in her court for
a long time, she cannot be faulted for knowing nothing about what
has been happening in her sala during her absence. 93 She alleges
that the Clerk of Court, her co-respondent in the case, "could have
manipulated it so that even if the cases had already been disposed
of some years back he made it appear that this had remained
unacted upon." 94 ETHIDa
For A.M. No. MTJ-001337, respondent claims that the
dismissal of the judges was based on an alleged "entrapment." She
argues that it was impossible for her to act on the marriage of the
undercover agents because she was in Tacloban City for her high
school reunion. 95 She was merely indicted based on the
statements of Plaza and Dela Cerna, who had been intimidated by
Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Office of the Court Administrator judicial audit
team head. 96
On March 18, 2014, this Court noted respondent's Comment
and resolved to refer the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
investigation, report, and recommendation. 97
In its Report and Recommendation 98 dated August 24,
2015, the Office of the Bar Confidant noted that the Office of the
Court Administrator, represented by Atty. Miguel Mergal, presented
Plaza and Dela Cerna as their witnesses. 99 Respondent also
requested Atty. Rullyn Garcia's presence in the proceedings. 100
However, none of the witnesses participated in the
proceedings. Hence, the parties were required to just submit their
respective memoranda for evaluation. 101
The Office of the Court Administrator filed a
memorandum 102 dated February 27, 2015 quoting the facts and
ruling in Judge Necessario, et al. It avers that Plaza's and Dela
Cerna's testimonies "are beside the point and these have been
rendered moot because of their failure to appear at the hearings
scheduled by the Office of the Bar Confidant." 103
The Office of the Court Administrator argues that
respondent should be disbarred due to gross misconduct for her
participation in the solemnization of marriages.104 It points out that
the various administrative charges against respondent "clearly
shows that she does not possess high standards of competence
and reliability required of a practicing lawyer." 105
On the other hand, respondent's memorandum 106 dated
February 26, 2015 mainly anchored on the claim that Atty. Rullyn
Garcia's report submitted was falsified.107 Respondent claims that
Atty. Rullyn Garcia intimidated the court employees and caused
them to "admit whatever allegations he brought up during the
investigation."108 She prays that the case be dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence since Plaza's and Dela Cerna's affidavits were
not personally attested to by the affiants. 109
The Office of the Bar Confidant, after conducting the
proceedings and considering the memoranda of the parties,
recommended that the disbarment case against respondent be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 110 It emphasized that
formal investigation is indispensable in disbarment proceedings:
For the charge of gross misconduct for
the irregularities in the solemnization of
marriages as the basis for this disbarment
proceedings.
This case was set for hearing. During the
scheduled hearing, the representative
from OCA manifested that they are presenting two
(2) witnesses in the persons of Celerina Plaza and
Crisanto Dela Cerna. The purposes of their
testimonies are for them to substantiate the
allegations against former Judge Tormis, identify
and authenticate the existence and veracity of their
respective affidavits submitted to the Court.
However, the two witnesses failed to appear during
the proceedings of this case. Thus, their affidavits
are considered hearsay and inadmissible in
evidence . . . in this proceeding. The affidavit
are [sic] not entirely reliable evidence in court due to
their incompleteness and inaccuracies that may
have attended in their formulation. The affidavit does
not purport to contain a complete narration of facts
and that court testimonies are generally viewed as
more reliable as they are subjected to cross
examination from the opposing party. . . . Likewise,
Atty. Rullyn Garcia, the OCA audit team head, failed
to appear. The purpose of his testimony would be to
shed light more on whether the alleged affidavits
executed by Celerina Plaza and Crisanto Dela
Cerna were actually and voluntarily submitted to the
Court and, if so, who required them to execute and
submit the same to the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The determination of the merit of th[ese]
disbarment proceedings may not be relied upon
solely on the premise of the dismissal from the
service of former JudgeTormis. As earlier discussed,
the grounds for dismissal from the service of former
Judge Tormis, in her capacity as presiding judge, in
administrative matter is different from this
disbarment proceedings against her. Otherwise, the
Court would have ruled on the disbarment aspect,
which shall be incorporated in the decision of
dismissal from the service of former Judge Tormis in
one decision only. As provided for under the
constitutional right to due process, former
Judge Tormis should be given full opportunity to be
heard and confront witnesses against her in th[ese]
disbarment proceedings. This constitutional right
should not be denied to former Judge Tormis, who
cried for due process since her dismissal from the
service.
xxx xxx xxx
For the dismissal from the service, in her
capacity as judge, for gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law
in performance of her duties as presiding judge.
Former Judge Tormis cried for justice in
dismissing her from service, as presiding judge,
 without according her due process. She was not
given the opportunity to be heard but the only basis
of her dismissal from the service was the
testimonies/allegations against her of some
courts [sic] personnel, who were allegedly
intimidated by the judicial audit team, during the
judicial audit. She was not given the chance to
confront nor furnished copies of the said court
personnel's testimonies. She was denied her
constitutional right against searches and seizures of
documents from her sala when the audit team
obtained documents and records, as evidence
against her, when they conducted the investigation
in her sala, since she was not informed of the said
audit. cSEDTC
In A.M. No. P-08-2519 and A.M. No. P-08-
2520, the Court held that the rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures as provided
under Section 2, Article III in the Constitution may be
invoked even in administrative proceedings. The
exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Art. III of the
Constitution also bars the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of such right. The fact that the
present case is administrative in nature, does not
render the above principle inoperative. As
expounded inZulueta vs. C.A., any violation of the
aforestated constitutional right renders the evidence
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
Records show that all the administrative
sanctions against former Judge Tormis were all for
simple gross inefficiency or neglect of duties and
gross ignorance of the law in the discharge of her
duties and responsibilities as the presiding judge of
the MTCC, Br. 4, Cebu City. Neither of these findings
held her for gross misconduct, which constitute
immoral conduct, that would tend to affect her
standing and moral character as an officer of the
court and as a member of the Bar. Further, she has
never been found guilty for graft and corruption
during her entire service in the judiciary as a member
of the bench in the lower court that would cause her
automatically disbarred from the practice of law.
Finally, the counter-charges of former
Judge Tormis against Atty. Rullyn Garcia may not be
given due course in th[ese] proceedings for lack of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
premises, it is respectfully recommended that the
disbarment case against former JUDGE
ROSABELLA M. TORMIS beDISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence. 111 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)
The issues for resolution are as follows:
First, whether the alleged irregularities committed by
respondent in the solemnization of marriages, where she was found
guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance
of the law, constitute gross misconduct warranting her disbarment;
Second, whether Plaza's and Dela Cerna's affidavits are
indispensable in finding that respondent's acts constitute gross
misconduct and merit the penalty of disbarment; and
Lastly, whether respondent's long line of administrative
sanctions should affect her standing as a member of the bar.
Although this Court recognizes the indispensability of the
appearance of Plaza and Dela Cerna in the proceedings before the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the disbarment case cannot be
dismissed solely based on this.
An affidavit is commonly recognized as hearsay
evidence. 112 Since it is often prepared not by the affiant but by
another person who makes use of his or her own language in writing
the statements, it is generally rejected unless the affiant is placed
on the witness stand to testify. 113 "Courts take judicial notice of
the fact that an affidavit does not purport to contain a complete
narration of facts." 114 Court testimonies, therefore, are favored
because these can be subjected to cross examination. 115
Plaza and Dela Cerna failed to appear in the proceedings
before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The Office of the Bar
Confidant noted that their testimonies would have supposedly
confirmed the charge against respondent regarding the alleged
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages. 116 Plaza's and
Dela Cerna's testimonies would have likewise verified the existence
and veracity of their affidavits. 117
Similarly, Atty. Rullyn Garcia failed to appear in the
proceedings. His purported testimony would have disproved the
accusation that Plaza's and Dela Cerna's testimonies were
executed with his intimidation. 118 Due to their absence, Plaza's
and Dela Cerna's allegations in their affidavits were rendered
inadmissible. 119
Nevertheless, despite the inadmissibility of the affidavits,
this Court in Judge Necessario, et al., upheld the finding of the
judicial audit team that respondent committed irregularities in the
solemnization of marriages. This Court ruled that these findings had
sufficient basis and were supported by evidence, pertinent laws,
and jurisprudence. 120 Respondent was held guilty of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law
warranting her dismissal, had she not been previously dismissed
from service in another case. 121
The administrative case against respondent in Judge
Necessario, et al., should likewise be considered as a disciplinary
proceeding against her under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which
provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices
of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
judges of regular and special courts; and court
officials who are lawyers are based on grounds
which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action
of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other
forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline
of lawyers. SDAaTC
In any of the foregoing instances, the
administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent Justice,
judge or court official concerned as a member of the
Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to
comment on the complaint and show cause why he
should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of
the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution.
(Emphasis supplied)
While respondent blatantly violated particular Canons of
Judicial Ethics with her participation in the alleged marriage scam,
she similarly breached the following Canons on the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03. — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law[.]
Membership in the bar is an essential requirement for
membership in the bench. 122 "[T]he moral fitness of a judge also
reflects his [or her] moral fitness as a lawyer." 123 Consequently, a
judge who violates the code of judicial conduct similarly violates his
or her lawyer's oath. 124
Respondent's act of heedlessly solemnizing marriages in
utter disregard of the law and jurisprudence clearly constitutes
gross misconduct. The repetitiveness of her act shows her clear
intent to violate the law. She disregarded the lawyer's oath, which
mandates lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. In
view of this, either the penalty of suspension or disbarment is
warranted. Rule 138, Section 27 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
 of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied) AaCTcI
Gross misconduct is an "improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." 125 To consider
gross misconduct "the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be
manifest[.]" 126
The Supplemental Report of the Office of the Court
Administrator made the following findings:
III. On Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
1. Based on the documents, i.e., marriage
certificates and other supporting documents,
actually examined, she solemnized a total of one
hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to
2007, while the monthly reports of cases reflected a
total of three hundred and five (305) marriages she
solemnized from 2004 to 2007.
2. It was only last July that her court started
using a logbook to record the marriages she
solemnized, which, as of the date of the judicial audit
and investigation, reflected a total of sixty-three (63)
marriages for that month.
3. Of the 181 marriages she solemnized, one
hundred thirty-one (131), or 72.38% were
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code,
while fifty (50), or 27.62% were with marriage
licenses.
4. Of the 50 marriages with marriage license,
forty (40), or 80% marriage licenses were obtained
from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, while the
remaining ten (10), or 20%, were obtained from
other local civil registrars.
5. The following marriages were solemnized
by her with no or incomplete supporting documents:
xxx xxx xxx
6. The following marriages were solemnized
by her even if the validity of the supporting
documents, especially the marriage licenses
presented, appear to be questionable[.]
xxx xxx xxx
7. The authenticity of the requirements for
the following marriages under Article 34 of
the Family Code, by reason of the (a) circumstances
of the cohabitation, (b) minority during the period of
cohabitation, and (c) given address of the
contracting parties, appears to be questionable:
xxx xxx xxx
8. In almost all of the marriages solemnized
by her, there was no proof that the solemnization fee
of P300.000, n as required under Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, was paid by the contacting
parties. 127
The act of solemnizing marriages without the required
marriage license constitutes misconduct. 128 The positive
testimonies substantiate that respondent solemnized marriages
without previously issued licenses; hence, respondent's act
deviates from the established rule. 129 In Arañes v. Occiano: 130
[A] marriage which preceded the issuance of the
marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even
add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that
gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage. 131
Tupal v. Rojo 132 explained the role of a judge as a
solemnizing officer:
 Before performing the marriage ceremony,
the judge must personally interview the contracting
parties and examine the requirements they
submitted. The parties must have complied with all
the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
Among these formal requisites is a marriage license.
A marriage license is issued by the local civil
registrar to parties who have all the qualifications
and none of the legal disqualifications to contract
marriage. Before performing the marriage
ceremony, the judge must personally examine the
marriage license presented.
If the contracting parties have cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years and have no
legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Instead, the parties
must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to
before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer, must
personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to
the parties having lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and the absence of any
legal impediment to marry each other. The judge
must also execute a sworn statement that he
personally ascertained the parties' qualifications to
marry and found no legal impediment to the
marriage. Article 34 of the Family Code of the
Philippines provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be
necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of
the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to the
marriage. 133 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Although it is true that marriages under Article 34 of
the Family Code merit exemption from a marriage license,
respondent should have complied with the mandate of personally
ascertaining the circumstances of cohabitation of the parties.
Records reveal that the declarations embodied in the required joint
affidavit of cohabitation of the parties do not actually represent the
accurate circumstances of their alleged cohabitation. 134 EcTCAD
In addition, there were marriages solemnized by respondent
involving foreigners who only submitted affidavits in lieu of a
certificate of legal capacity to marry. 135In cases where one or both
of the contracting parties are foreigners, Article 21 136 of
the Family Code provides that a certificate of legal capacity to marry
is necessary before the acquisition of a marriage license. As the
solemnizing officer, respondent should have ensured that pertinent
requirements were secured before the issuance of the marriage
license. Thus, the absence of a certificate of legal capacity to marry
should have prompted her to question the propriety of the issuance.
The connivance between respondent and the court
employees is settled. The court employees acted as "'fixers' and
'facilitators'" 137 that mediated between the judges and the
contacting parties. Apparent are the superimpositions and erasures
in the addresses of the contracting parties so they would appear to
be residents of either Barili or Liloan, Cebu. 138 For the contracting
parties to easily obtain their marriage license, discrepancies
between their true addresses as declared in their marriage
certificates and their addresses in their marriage licenses were
made. The contracting parties were able to get married despite
incomplete requirements. Thus, the handwritten marginal notes of
monetary figures attached to the marriage certificates show the
presence of consideration. 139
Marriage is recognized under the law as an inviolable social
institution, which is the foundation of the family. 140 In Beso v.
Daguman: 141
[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the
community is deeply interested. The state has
surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. The security and
 stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It
is the interest and duty of each and every member
of the community to prevent the bringing about of a
condition that would shake its foundation and
ultimately lead to its destruction. 142
Respondent used her authority as a judge to make a
mockery of marriage. As a judicial officer, she is expected to know
the law on solemnization of marriages. 143"A judge is not only
bound by oath to apply the law; he [or she] must also be
conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the
very delicate nature of their office[,] should be more circumspect in
the performance of their duties." 144
Similarly, as a lawyer who is an officer of the court,
respondent should have not permitted herself to be an instrument
of any violation of law. Her careless attention in dispensing with the
necessary requirements of marriage and in conniving with court
employees to further monetary interests underscores her utter
disregard of the sanctity of marriage.
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his or her
professional dealings or in a private capacity, is basis for
suspension or disbarment. 145 Possession of good character is a
fundamental requirement not only for admission to the bar but also
for the continuance of exercising the privilege to practice
law. 146 However, as a rule, disbarment is only warranted in cases
of misconduct that "seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court." 147
Respondent's undue haste in repeatedly solemnizing
marriages despite incomplete and irregular requirements shows
indifference to her role as an officer of the court. The repetitiveness
of her acts shows her proclivity in transgressing the law and
protecting these violations with her authority. A lawyer, as an officer
and an essential partner of the court in the solemn task of giving
justice, is given the grave obligation of maintaining the integrity of
the courts. 148 This is especially so with judges. A judge is "the
visible representation of law and justice from whom the people draw
their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that
regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave an
example for the others to follow." 149 In Samson v. Caballero: 150
The first step towards the successful
implementation of the Court's relentless drive to
purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials
and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid
set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is
extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the
visible representation of the law, they should set a
good example to the bench, bar and students of the
law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is —
and should be — higher than that of the average
person for it is their integrity that gives them the right
to judge. 151
Respondent was involved in infractions that warranted her
prior administrative sanctions. Her long line of cases shows her
depravity of character, in that she remained undeterred by the past
penalties she had incurred. Considering that she was repeatedly
involved in administrative charges, the severe penalty of
disbarment should be meted against her.
Disbarment does not equate to a sanction stripping a lawyer
of his or her source of living. 152 It is intended to "protect the
administration of justice that those who exercise this function should
be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and
clients may rightly repose confidence in them." 153 As held
in Foronda v. Guerrero: 154
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality and faithful compliance with the rules of
legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. 155 HSAcaE
Respondent's conduct has fallen short of the strict standards
required by the legal profession. Hence, her repeated failure to live
up to the values expected of her as an officer of the court renders
her unfit to be a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent former Judge Rosabella
M. Tormis is DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant to be attached to respondent's personal records, to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for dissemination to its
chapters and members and all administrative and quasi-judicial
agencies, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19671. November 29, 1965.]
REYES, J. B. L., J p:
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendants-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. HUSBAND AND WIFE; FOREIGN DIVORCE BETWEEN
FILIPINO CITIZENS DECREED AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE; REMARRIAGE OF DIVORCED
CONSORT. — A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought
and decreed after the effectivity of the new Civil Code (Republic Act
No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in the Philippines;
and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce
entitled to validity in this country.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INNOCENT CONSORT ENTITLED TO
LEGAL SEPARATION. — The remarriage of the divorced wife and
her cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband
entitles the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to
Philippine law.
3. ID.; ID,; ID.; INVALID DIVORCE ENTITLES INNOCENT
CONSORT TO RECOVER DAMAGES. — The desertion and
securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the
other to recover damages.
4. ID.; ACTION FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS
AGAINST PARENTS OF ONE CONSORT; ABSENCE OF PROOF
OF MALICE. — An action for alienation of affection against the
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice
or unworthy motives on their part.
DECISION
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No.
R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B.
Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages
against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees,
Vicente, Mamerto and Mena 1 , all surnamed "Escaño"
respectively. 2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the
following:
Missing her late-afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in
the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then
enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño,
27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino
family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged
marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an
engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the
knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises
Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The
marriage was the culmination of previous love affair and was duly
registered with the local civil registrar.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the
marriage indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with
a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had
planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the
governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy
bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement
was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted
another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she
pleaded for his return and they reconciled. This time they planned
to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta
had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St.
Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage,
the elopement did not, however, materialize because when Vicenta
went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got
wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the
college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had
already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were
surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicenta, and
were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine
marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. 111, pp. 1105-06). The
following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice.
Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he
believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the
parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage.
The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948
Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he
does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos
College students and disclosing an amorous relationship between
Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to
her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage.
Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar
Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents
while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March
1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was
not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable
disposition and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being
called a "jellyfish". She was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor (Exh. 1-Escaño"), but her letters
became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the
newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had
gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal
that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for
her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul
her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case
was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at
the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she
applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was
single, that her purpose was to study, that she was domiciled in
Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The
application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22
August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character". On 21 October 1950, a decree
of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said
tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the
Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor
(Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D-2").
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American,
Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California,
and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the
proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño,
her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed
the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and
one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from
plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband,
Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in
anyway influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for
moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation,
but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of
Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the
following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and
in dismissing the complaint;
2. In not holding the defendant parents Don Mamerto
Escaño and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for
damages;
 3. In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to
pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaim; and
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief
sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor
Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were
validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is
clearly established by the record before us. Both parties were then
above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both
consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic
priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent
witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly
authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization
from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law,
is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of
the Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine
Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time)
expressly provided that —
"SEC. 1. Ecclesiastical Requisites.—
Essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacityof the contracting parties and
their consent." (Italics supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only
a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the
marriage civil effects 3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said
marriage act, which provided the following:
"SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal
requirements:—No marriage shall be declared
invalid because of the absence of one or several
of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it
was performed, the spouses or one of them
believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was
perfectly legal."
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence
the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is
positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at
bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only
after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father
Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of
Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and
subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her
marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted
the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel,
whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant
Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that
contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by
fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her
marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage
remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was
never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the
Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-
prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage
between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained
subsisting and undissolved under Philippine Law, notwithstanding
the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on
21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe
County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character". At the time the divorce decree was issued,
Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. 4 She
was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines (Republic Act. No. 386), already in force at the
time, expressly provided:
"Laws relating to family rights and duties
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
person are binding upon the citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad."
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not
admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact it
does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive
policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that
admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce,
the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV,
Book K, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106,
subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition
or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of
the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the
Civil Code that prescribes the following:
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country."
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such
foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and
scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the
detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not
permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside
the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor
Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court.
Primarily because the policy of our law can not be nullified by acts
of private parties (Civil Code, Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally,
because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort can not
confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Arca vs.
Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as
a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's
divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid;
for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be
existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her
desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through
her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated
charge of deceit, nor an anonymous letter charging immorality
against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate
excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo
Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband"
from the standpoint of Philippine law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the
basis of adultery (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a
remarriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous
doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those
that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the
absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a
matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective: and the
present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute
divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject
prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil
Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now fully
applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855,
is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
"As the divorce granted by the French
Court must be ignored, it results that the
marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro,
celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize
their relations; and the circumstance that they
afterwards passed for husband and wife in
Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the Mory children to
participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must
therefore de rejected. The right to inherit is
limited to legitimate, legitimated and
acknowledged natural children. The children of
adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The
word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of
the Civil Code can not be interpreted to include
illegitimates born of adulterous relations." (Italics
supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the
children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the
invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case
is authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this
jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on
the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands
undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court
committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations
where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would
depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this
kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was
given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
"The hardships of the existing divorce
laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to
the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of
the Courts to enforce laws of divorce as written
by the Legislature if they are constitutional.
Courts have no right to say that such laws are
too strict or too liberal." (p.72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore,
sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's
parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena
Escaño, alienated the affection of their daughter and influenced her
conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible
evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's
animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and
exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before
this suit was begun (Exh. "2- Escaño" and "2-Vicenta", Rec. on App.
pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the
defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness"
caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride" "effrontery and
audacity" (sic). Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit
and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he
would not have been accepted to marry Vicenta had he openly
asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded.
Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their
shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed
and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity
with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one
was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage
ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño
and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That
the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter
to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that
they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation
of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her
money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that
they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did
not concur in their decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. pp.
130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of
improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment,
or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted
independently and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was
best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents,
in so doing, certainly can not be charged with alienation of affections
in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been
shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is
proved.
"Sec. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians
or kin. — The law distinguishes between the
right of a parent to interest himself in the marital
affairs of his child and the absence of right in a
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However,
such distinction between the liability of parents
and that of strangers is only in regard to what will
justify interference. A parent is liable for
alienation of affections resulting from his own
malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully
entices his son or daughter to leave his or her
spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts
maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts
and advises his child in good faith with respect
to his child's marital relations, in the interest of
his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child
not terminating his right and liberty to interest
himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his
child's welfare and happiness, even where his
conduct and advice suggest or result in the
separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a
divorce or annulment, or where he acts under
mistake or misinformation, or where his advice
 or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate,
although it has been held that the parent is liable
for consequences resulting from recklessness.
He may in good faith take his child into his home
and afford him or her protection and support, so
long as he has not maliciously enticed his child
away, or does not maliciously entice or cause
him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse.
This rule has more frequently been applied in the
case of advice given to a married daughter, but
it is equally applicable in the case of advice given
to a son."
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged
parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted
efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to
recover damages. While his suit may not have been impelled by
actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the
proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established
for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by
appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicenta Escaño, it is
proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim
for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated
in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue
humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally
agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise
was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact
is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that
appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of
her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion
that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral
damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the
defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court
below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this
unfounded suit have wounded said defendant's feelings and
caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously
injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits
having become a common occurrence in present society. What is
important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the
court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper
conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore,
reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought
and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in this country.
(2) That the remarriage of the divorced wife and her
cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the
latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice
or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby
modified, as follows:
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled
to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages
and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the
appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased
Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorney's fee.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon,
Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 182438. July 2, 2014.]
RENE RONULO, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by
petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008 decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos
Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that 3 Joey Umadac and
Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29,
2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating
priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon
learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a
recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire,
clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and
guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians,
also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an
Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed
despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage
certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the
couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence
of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary
sponsors and the rest of their invited guests. 4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC),as amended, was filed against the petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly
performing an illegal marriage ceremony. 5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime
charged on arraignment.
The prosecution's witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere,
testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor
while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne
testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the
couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a
document. 6 She heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors
to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception,
had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also
identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey. 7 STHDAc
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the
couple declare during the ceremony that they take each other as
husband and wife. 8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal
local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R.
Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license
was issued to the couple. 9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony,
denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a
solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. 10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a P200.00 fine pursuant to
Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner's act of giving a
blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church
recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife. 11 It
further ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the
couple's marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of
the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or
the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage
Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that
is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated,
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of
the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and
provides the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these laws,
the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of P200.00. 12
 The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the
circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing" the
couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It
further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses
deserve more credence than the petitioner's negative
statements. 13 The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine
should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling. The CA observed
that although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in
determining whether a marriage ceremony has been
conducted, viz.:(1) the contracting parties must appear personally
before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they
take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two
witnesses of legal age. 14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly
proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage
certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony. 15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner's criminal liability
under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on
whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350
of the same Code. 16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the
imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it covers
violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such
as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following
grounds: SDHITE
First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does
not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming
that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in
Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these
provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take each other
as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and
attested to by the solemnizing officer. 17 The petitioner likewise
maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and
wife. 18
Second,under the principle of separation of church and State,
the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the
administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the
"blessing" into a "marriage ceremony." 19
Third,the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the
"blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to the
couple. 20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in
violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing
of the present case against him. 21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide
for a penalty. The present case is not covered by Section 44 of
the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions
nor a regulation promulgated thereafter. 22
THE COURT'S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime
punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, were proven by
the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized
solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of
the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage
ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has
authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be
resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which
is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically
define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal"
performance, Articles 3 (3) and 6 of theFamily Code are clear on these
matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55 23 of the New
Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 24 of the Marriage
Law with no substantial amendments.
Article 6 25 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It
shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that
they take each other as husband and wife." 26
Pertinently, Article 3 (3) 27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family
Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes
place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form of
religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However,
as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements
constituting a marriage ceremony: first,there should be the personal
appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer;
and second,their declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the
parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses.
On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner's
allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of
Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take
each other as husband and wife. cDSAEI
The petitioner's allegation that the court asked insinuating and
leading questions to Florida fails to persuade us. A judge may examine
or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions
to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek
to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may
tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It
cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds
happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one
party. 28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the
judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it from
belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even
the petitioner's admission regarding the circumstances of the
ceremony, support Florida's testimony that there had indeed been the
declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and
wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and
wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces of evidence.
Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses,
Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the
petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of
separation of church and State precludes the State from qualifying the
church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner's
allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of
the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious
rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement
gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core
requirements of law be observed. CTSHDI
We emphasize at this point that Article 15 29 of
the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution
and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its
constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage.
To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of
acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner
conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements
set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely
as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive
of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3 (3) of the Family Code and
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the
petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
 Under Article 3 (3) of the Family Code, one of the essential
requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In
the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple
had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their
relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage
ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal
requirements of marriage set by law were lacking.The marriage
ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner's knowledge of the
absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a
marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present case. For
purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted,
a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by
Article 3 (3) of the Family Code, as discussed above. DaAISH
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the
couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall be
imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The
penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which
provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of
Marriage. — Any priest or minister solemnizing
marriage without being authorized by the Director of
the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the
authorization in force when called upon to do so by the
parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or
persons having charge and any bishop or officer,
priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the
regulations and practices whereof require banns or
publications previous to the solemnization of a
marriage in accordance with section ten, who
authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage
that is subsequently declared illegal;or any officer,
priest or minister solemnizing marriage in
violation of this act,shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more
than two years, or by a fine of not less than two
hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos.
[emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause. — Any
violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated
by the proper authorities,shall be punished by a fine
of not more than two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in
the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in
the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the
present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of
the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not
include the present case. As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner
was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article
352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for
the violation of this provision which is referred to theMarriage Law. On
this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44
of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is
one of such regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of
P200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE,we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 4904. February 5, 1909.]
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.
Domingo Franco, for appellant.
Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; MARRIAGE BY JUSTICE
OF THE PEACE. — A man and woman appeared before a justice
of the peace and there signed a statement setting forth that they
had agreed to marry each other and asked the justice to solemnize
the marriage. Another document was then signed by them, by the
justice and by two witnesses, stating that the man and woman
appeared before the justice and ratified all that was contained in the
preceding instrument and insisted upon the marriage. After the
signing of these documents the justice announced to the man and
woman that they were married: Held, That, under the
circumstances in this case, there was a sufficient compliance with
section 6 of General Orders, No. 68, to constitute a valid marriage.
2. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ANSWER; AMENDMENT
DURING TRIAL. — Held, That the court did not err in allowing the
defendant to amend his answer during the progress of the trial.
DECISION
WILLARD, J p:
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff
and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September,
1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of
Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called
an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and
consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated
on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the
defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to
enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the peace, and
ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a
document dated on the same day, signed by the justice of the
peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero
and Pacita Ballori. It states the presentation of the petition above
mentioned; that the persons who signed it were actually present in
the office of the justice on the day named; that they ratified under
oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in that they
had there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce
witnesses of the marriage, they presented Zacarias Esmero as a
witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife.
Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the
peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated
the 25th day of September, 1907, in which it is stated that the
plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the
peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.
The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant,
holding that the parties were legally married on the day named. The
evidence in support of that decision is: First. The document itself,
which the plaintiff admits that she signed. Second. The evidence of
the defendant, who testifies that he and the plaintiff appeared
before the justice of the peace at the time named, together with the
witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all
signed the document above mentioned. Third. The evidence of
Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies
that the plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before
the justice at the time named and did sign the document referred to.
Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified to the same
effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the court
of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the
defendant, the two witnesses above-named, and the justice of the
peace were all present in the office of the justice of the peace at the
time mentioned.
 The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own
testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the peace
and never was married to the defendant. She admits that she
signed the document in question, but says that she signed it in her
own home, without reading it, and at the request of the defendant,
who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask the consent
of her parents to the marriage.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims
supports her case, but which we think, when properly considered,
is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting,
in the town of Palompon, her married brother and was there for
about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified
that the plaintiff never left the house except in her company. But she
admitted on cross-examination that she herself went to school
every morning and that on one occasion the plaintiff had gone to
church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its
force when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says
that at the request of the defendant on the day named, about 5
o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese named
Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she
asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany
her, the witness, to her own house for the purpose of examining
some dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two
girls left the store, but instead of going to the house of the witness
they went directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the
ceremony took place; that after the ceremony had taken place, one
came advising them that the mother was approaching, and that they
thereupon hurriedly left the office of the justice and went to the
house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found them.
The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain
statements made by the justice of the peace, who died after the
ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain
statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome the
positive testimony of the witnesses for the defendant.
The testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by
counsel for the appellant in his brief. It appears that during her first
examination she was seized with an hysterical attack and practically
collapsed at the trial. Her examination was adjourned to a future
day and was completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It
is claimed by counsel that her collapse was due to the fact that she
recognized that she testified falsely in stating that the office of the
justice of the peace was at the time in the municipal building, when,
in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the record
justifies the claim of the appellant. The statement as to the location
of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards corrected by
the witness and we are satisfied that she told the facts substantially
as they occurred.
There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which
satisfies us that the plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said
she did not appear before the justice of the peace. This evidence
consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were all written
by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters numbered
2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was proven. No. 9 is as
follows:
"ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father;
but I know that he is very angry and if he be informed
that we have been married civilly, I am sure that he will
turn me out of the house.
"Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't
know what to do.
"Should I be able to go tomorrow to Merida, I
shall do so, because I can not remain here.
"Yours, ROSAL"
Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly
was written on the morning of the 25th of September, is as follows:
"Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
"ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the
house of Veles this morning because my sister-in-law
w ill not let me go there; if it suits you, I believe that
this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.
"Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for
the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at
the Chinese store, because I don't like to go without
Pacita.
"The house must be one belonging to prudent
people, and no one should know anything about it.
"Yours, ROSAL."
 It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the
testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the
afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also
undated, but was evidently written after the marriage before the
justice of the peace. It is as follows:
"Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
"ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother,
who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or
10, when you see that the tide is high because my
brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of
loading lumber.
"Don't tell her that we have been civilly married,
but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate the
marriage at this time, because I don't like her to know
to-day that we have been at the court-house,
inasmuch as she told me this morning that she heard
that we would go to the court, and that we must not
cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being
married I must do it right.
"Tell her also that you have asked me to marry
you.
"I send you herewith the letter of your brother,
in order that you may do what he wishes.
"Yours, ROSAL."
Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage
and is in part as follows:
"Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
"ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to
Ormoc on Sunday on the steamer Rosa, for the
purpose of asking my father's permission for our
marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall
do what we deem proper, and, if he does not wish us
to marry without his permission, you must request his
consent.
"Tell me who said that my sister-in-law knows
that we are civilly married; my brother's ill treatment is
a matter of no importance, as every thing may be
carried out, with patience."
It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc
on the steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the plaintiff
was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had
no communication with the defendant during the voyage. The
plaintiff and the defendant never lived together as husband and
wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after consulting with her family,
she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was brought
for the purpose of procuring the cancellation of the certificate of
marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in
favor of the decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff
appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the
justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the
defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General
Orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
"No particular form for the ceremony of
marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in
the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage,
that they take each other as husband and wife."
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon
the occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing until
after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the
plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married." The petition
signed by the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement
that they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the
justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document
signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace,
stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents
of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A
marriage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the
peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificate gives
rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in
due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that
they took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is
proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the
admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the
marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which
admission can only mean that the parties mutually agreed to unite
in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document
which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized the
 same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were
able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew
the contents of the document which they signed; and under the
circumstances in this particular case we are satisfied, and so hold,
that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.
The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the
allegations contained in the complaint. Among these allegations
was a statement that the parties had agreed to be married on
condition that the defendant obtain previously the consent of the
plaintiff's parents. The defendant was afterwards allowed to amend
his answer so that it was a denial of all the allegations of the
complaint except that relating to the condition in regard to the
consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this
amendment. After the trial had commenced the defendant was
again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an
admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part
which related to the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this
second amendment destroyed completely the first amendment and
the defendant's lawyer stated that what he had alleged in his
second amendment was what he intended to allege in his first
amendment, but by reason of the haste with which the first
amendment was drawn he had unintentionally made it exactly the
opposite of what he had intended to state. After argument the court
allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in this
allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how
the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial
of the case without asking for a continuance.
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of
the complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson,
JJ., concur.

||| (Martinez v. Tan, G.R. No. 4904, [February 5, 1909], 12 PHIL 731-
739)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145226. February 6, 2004.]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the
decision 1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment 2 dated August 5, 1996 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case
No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a
prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to
six (6) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor as maximum. Also
assailed in this petition is the resolution 3 of the appellate court, dated
September 25, 2000, denying Morigo's motion for
reconsideration.CTAIHc
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as
follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four
(4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive
a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but
left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada,
they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines
and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were
married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to
her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the
Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court on
January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17,
1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo
married Maria Jececha Lumbago 4 at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among
others, the declaration of nullity of accused's marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place. cHESAD
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged
with Bigamy in an Information 5 filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol. 6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with
Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was
granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by
the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
 On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment
in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months
of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years
and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted
petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab
initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 8 the trial court ruled that
want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court
cited Ramirez v. Gmur, 9 which held that the court of a country in which
neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses
may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no
jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such,
a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.
Debunking Lucio's defense of good faith in contracting the second
marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v.
Bitdu, 10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one
does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not
exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No.
20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered
a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio
and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took
place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final
and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the
appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED. 11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate
court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio's
marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The
reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 12 of the
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before
the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that
the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in
a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree
obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded
validity in the Philippines, pursuant toArticle 15 13 of the Civil Code and
given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under
Article 17 14 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be
rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s
decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People, 15 allows
mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign
divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith. CIAHaT
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion
for lack of merit. 16 However, the denial was by a split vote.
The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared
by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first
marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first
marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date
of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the
law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our
resolution:
A.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF
CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN
PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE
TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT
EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING
THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. 17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not
petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith
is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying
in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights
the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly,
which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner
further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction
or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other
felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and
hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete
defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does
not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage
is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy
excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis
v. Bobis, 18 which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted
provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 19 of
the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party
may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article
40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG
counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because
he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his
act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack
of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of
bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 20 we laid
down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid
had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that
during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol
Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment
of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo
and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol
and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar,
Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage
contract.
SO ORDERED. 21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer.
Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract
by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court
thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance withArticles
3 22 and 4 23 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, “This simply means that there was no
marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to
the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage
as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the
accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married." 24 The
records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final
and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused
must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married “from the
beginning.” The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.IAETSC
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished
from Mercado v. Tan. 25 In the latter case, the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second
marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle
applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as "void." 26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was
actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where
a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later
before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage
appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab
initio. ASHEca
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia
Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere
private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he
first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a
subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to
liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh
every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure
that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we
held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that
we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith
or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated
September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the
ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 32473. October 6, 1930.]
MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his
guardian ad litem, Pedro Madridejo, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. GONZALO DE LEON ET
AL., defendants-appellants.
L. D. Abaya and S. C. Pamatmat for appellants.
Aurelio Palileo for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. NATURAL CHILDREN; LEGITIMATION BY
SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE. — According to the Civil Code, in
order that a natural child may be legitimated by subsequent
marriage, the natural child born before the celebration of marriage
must have been acknowledged by the parents either before of after
its celebration.
2. MARRIAGE; FORWARDING OF CERTIFICATE TO
MUNICIPAL SECRETARY. — The mere fact that the parish priest
who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter
was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said
marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all
requisites for its validity were not present, and the forwarding of a
copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites.
DECISION
VILLA-REAL, J p
This is a rehearing of the appeal taken by the defendants,
Gonzalo de Leon et al. from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna holding as follows:
"Wherefore, the court finds that Melecio
Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next of kin, and
hereby orders the defendant's in case No. 5258 to
restore and deliver the ownership and possession of
the property described in the complaint filed in the
aforesaid case, to Melecio Madridejo, without costs.
So ordered."
In support of their appeal the defendants assign the
following alleged errors as committed by the trial court, to wit:
"1. The lower court erred in holding that the
marriage between Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana
Perez is valid.
"2. The lower court also erred in declaring that
solely because of the subsequent marriage of his
parents, the appellee Melecio Madridejo, a natural
child, was legitimated.
"3. The lower court lastly erred in not rendering
judgment in favor of the defendants and appellants."
The relevant facts necessary for the decision of all the
questions of fact and of law raised herein are as follows:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but
one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de
Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana
Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births
of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917,
a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was
named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by
Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit B). On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child
was christened Melecio Perez at the parish church of Siniloan,
Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the
father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's
door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age,
by the parish priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the following
day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de
Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her
alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died
on the 2nd of May, 1928.
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact
that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the
marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential
requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the
ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate
is not one of said essential requisites.
Touching the second assignment of error, there has been
no attempt to deny that Melecio Madridejo, the plaintiff-appellee, is
the natural son of Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. The only
question to be decided is whether the subsequent marriage of his
parents legitimated him.
Article 121 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 121. Children shall be considered as
legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they
have been acknowledged by the parents before or
after the celebration thereof."
According to this legal provision, in order that a subsequent
marriage may be effective as a legitimation, the natural children
born out of wedlock must have been acknowledged by the parents
either before or after its celebration. The Civil Code has established
two kinds of acknowledgment: voluntary and compulsory. Article
131 provides for the voluntary acknowledgment by the father or
mother as follows:
"Art. 131. The Acknowledgment of a natural
child must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or
in some other public document."
Article 135 provides for the compulsory acknowledgment by
the father, thus:
"Art. 135. The father may be compelled to
acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
"1. When an indisputable paper written by him,
expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.
"2. When the child has been in the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural
child of the defendant father himself or that of his
family.
"In cases of rape, seduction, or abduction, the
provisions of the Penal Code with regard to the
acknowledgment of the issue, shall be observed."
Article 136 providing for the compulsory acknowledgment by
the mother, reads:
"Art. 136. The mother may be compelled to
acknowledge her natural child:
"1. When the child is, with respect to the
mother, included in any of the cases mentioned in the
next preceding article.
"2. When the fact of the birth and the identity of
the child are fully proven."
Let us see whether the plaintiff-appellee, Melecio Madridejo,
has been acknowledged by his parents Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, under any of the provisions above quoted.
To begin with the father, no document has been adduced to
show that he has voluntarily acknowledged Melecio Madridejo as
his son, except the registry certificate of birth, Exhibit B. This, of
course, is not the record of birth mentioned in the law, for it lacks
the requisites of article 48 of the Law of Civil Registry. It no doubt,
is a public instrument, but it has neither been executed nor signed
by Pedro Madridejo, and contains no statement by which he
acknowledges Melecio Madridejo to be his son. Although as Pedro
Madridejo testified, he furnished the municipal secretary of Siniloan
with the necessary data for recording the birth of Melecio Madridejo,
and although said official inscribed the data thus given in the civil
registry of births this is not sufficient to bring it under the legal
provision regarding acknowledgment by a public document.
As to the mother, it does not appear that Flaviana Perez
supplied the data set forth in the civil registry of births, Exhibit B, or
in the baptismal register, whereof Exhibit 2 in a certificate, and
which constitutes final proof only of the baptism, and not of the
kinship or percentage of the person baptized (Adriano vs. De Jesus,
28 Phil. 350). Furthermore, church registers of baptism are no
longer considered public documents (United States vs. Evangelists,
29 Phil., 215).
Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily acknowledged
by Pedro Madridejo or Flaviana Perez, either before or after their
marriage.
Did Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio Madridejo as his
son, by compulsion?
The compulsory acknowledgment by the father established
in article 135 of the Civil Code, and by the mother according to
article 136, requires that the natural child take judicial action against
the father or mother, or against the persons setting themselves up
as the heirs of both, for the purpose of compelling them to
acknowledge him as a natural son through a judgment of the court.
In the instant action brought by Melecio Madridejo not only
has he not demanded to be acknowledged as a natural child, which
is the condition precedent to establishing his legitimation by the
subsequent marriage and his right to the estate of his uterine
brother, Domingo de Leon, but he has not even impleaded either
his father, Pedro Madridejo, or the heirs of his mother, Flaviana
Perez, in order that the court might have authority to make a valid
and effective pronouncement of his being a natural child, and to
compel them to acknowledge him as such.
The plaintiff-appellee alleges that the second paragraph of
the defendant's answer amounts to an admission that he is indeed
Flaviana Perez's son, and relieves him of the burden of proving that
his mother acknowledged him as a son before her marriage. Such
an admission would have been effective if the present action had
been brought for the purpose of compelling Flaviana Perez or her
heirs to acknowledge the appellee as her son.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo
has not been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana
Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their
marriage, and therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.
Wherefore the judgment is reversed, the complaint
dismissed, and the defendants absolved with costs against the
appellee without prejudice to any right he may have to establish or
compel his acknowledgment as the natural son of Pedro Madridejo
and Flaviana Perez. So ordered.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 61873. October 31, 1984.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Fil C. Veloso for defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; PERSONS
LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE PRESUMED
MARRIED; REASONS. — Persons living together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant
violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216)
The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known in
law. The law presumes morality, and not immorality: marriage, and not
concubinage, legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption
that persons living together as husband and wife are married to each
other. The reason for this presumption of marriage is ·well stated in
Perido vs. Perido 63 SCRA 97. thus: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is not only a
civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently every intendment
of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. . . "
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE. OF RECORD IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
DOES NOT VALIDATE MARRIAGE WHERE ALL REQUISITES FOR
VALIDITY ARE PRESENT DURING ITS CELEBRATIONS. — The
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of
marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the
celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one
of said requisites (Pugeda vs. Trias. 4 SCRA 849).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMISSION BY HUSBAND OF EXISTENCE OF
MARRIAGE, BEST EVIDENCE THEREOF, CASE AT BAR. — The
main issue raised by him is that he and Susana were not legally married
and therefore the crime committed is not parricide, but homicide. Other
than the stand of appellant's counsel against the existence of marriage
in order to lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his client,
accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim was
his legitimate wife. There is no better proof of marriage than the
admission of the accused of the existence of such marriage
(Tolentino vs. Paras, 122 SCRA 525).
4. CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; PENALTY IMPOSABLE. — The
penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death (Article 246,
Revised Penal Code) Paragraph 3, Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, provides that where the law prescribes a penalty composed of
two indivisible penalties and the commission of the act is attended by
some mitigating circumstances, with no aggravating circumstance, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus, assuming the presence of the
mitigating circumstances of provocation or obfuscation and voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same,
the penalty is still reclusion perpetua.
DECISION
RELOVA, J p:
Appeal from the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court, Fourteenth
Judicial District, Cebu-Bohol (now Regional Trial Court), finding
accused Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Susana Taborada-Borromeo, in the sum of
P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
to pay the costs.
Records show that at high noon of July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece
of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada, mother
of Susana, that Susana was shouting frantically for help because Elias
was killing her. The 71-year old Matilde Taborada told the child to go to
Geronimo Taborada, her son, who was then working in their mango
plantation. Upon hearing the report of the child, Geronimo informed his
father and together they went to Susana's hut. The windows and the
door were closed and Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo
slats at the wall where he saw Susana lying down, motionless,
apparently dead beside her one-month old child who was crying. Elias
Borromeo was lying near Susana still holding on to a bloody kitchen
bolo.
Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a few minutes,
police officer Fernando C. Abella and three policemen arrived. The
peace officers shouted and ordered Elias to open the door. Elias
answered calmly that he would smoke first before he would open the
door. When he did, the peace officers found Susana already dead, her
intestine having spilled out of her abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was
at her side.
When questioned, the accused Elias Borromeo could only mumble
incoherent words. LexLib
not legally married and therefore the crime committed is not parricide,
but homicide.
Other than the stand of appellant's counsel against the existence of
marriage in order to lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his
client, accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-
victim was his legitimate wife. Hereunder is his testimony on this point:
"Q Please state your name, age and other personal
circumstances.
A ELIAS BORROMEO, 40 years old, married, farmer,
resident of Putingbato, Babag, Cebu City.
The COURT:
Q You say you are married, who is your wife?
A Susana Taborada.
Q When did you get married with Susana Taborada?
A I forgot.

Dr. Jesus Serna, police medico-legal officer, submitted his necropsy Q Where did you get married?
report (Exhibits "A" & "B") which states that the cause of death was A Near the RCPI station in Babag.
"stab wounds, multiple chest, abdomen, left supraclavicular region and
left shoulder." There were five (5) incised wounds and six (6) stab Q There is a church there?
wounds on the deceased. A There is a chapel.
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred (1) in Q Were you married by a priest or a minister?
holding as it did that appellant and Susana Taborada (the deceased)
were legally and validly married in a church wedding ceremony, when A By a priest.
the officiating priest testified otherwise and there was no marriage
Q Who is this priest?
contract executed on the occasion or later on; hence, the accused could
only be liable for homicide; (2) in failing to appreciate in favor of A Father Binghay of Guadalupe.
appellant the mitigating circumstances of provocation or obfuscation
and voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to Q Do you have any children with Susana Taborada?
offset the same; and, (3) in convicting appellant of the crime of parricide A We have one.
and in imposing upon him the penultimate penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Q How old is the child?
Appellant in his brief, page 9, concurs with "the trial court's finding to A I already forgot, I have been here for quite a long
the effect that he killed Susana Taborada (the deceased) without legal time already." (pp. 4-5, tsn., December 12,
justification." The man issue raised by him is that he and Susana were 1981 hearing)
There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused SO ORDERED.
of the existence of such marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras, 122 SCRA
525).
Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law.
(Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216) The presumption in favor of
matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The law presumes
morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage;
legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption that persons
living together as husband and wife are married to each other. The
reason for this presumption of marriage is well stated in Perido vs.
Perido, 63 SCRA 97, thus: Cdpr
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is that of marriage. Marriage is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. . . "
And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the
registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in
the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not
one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849).
Anent the second and third assigned errors, suffice it to say that the
penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. (Article 246,
Revised Penal Code) Paragraph 3, Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, provides that where the law prescribed a penalty composed of
two indivisible penalties and the commission of the act is attended by
some mitigating circumstances, with no aggravating circumstance, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus, assuming the presence of the
mitigating circumstances of provocation or obfuscation and voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same,
the penalty is still reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the indemnity of P12,000.00 is increased to
P30,000.00. With costs.