PEOPLE VS BALUTE

In Robbery With Homicide, The Intent To Rob Must Precede The Taking Of Human Life
But The Killing May Occur Before, During Or After The RobberY.

Facts: On March 22, 2002 at around 8:00 in the evening, while on a stop position at a
lighted area along road 10, Tondo, Manila, two persons approached SPO1 Raymundo
Manaois, who was then onboard his owner-type jeep with his wife Cristina and daughter
Blesilda. One man poked a gun at the side of SPOI Manaois, took his cellular phone and
shot him at the left side of his torso. He was unable to fire his firearm as fell to the
ground and died while being operated on at the Mary Johnston Hospital. The two men
were later identified as accused Arnel Balute, the man who shot SPOI Manaois, and a
certain Leo Blaster. A case for Robbery with Homicide was thereafter filed against
them. Arnel, on the other hand, denied liability, On the day in question, he said, he was
at the shop of a certain Leticia Nicol where he worked as pedicab welder and left it at
10:00 in the evening; he did not notice anything untoward as he was busy working the
entire time.

After trial, the RTC convicted Arnel as charged with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility
for parole, in lieu of the death penalty, as well as ordered him to pay the heirs of SPO1
Manaois the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P6,000.00 as compensatory
damages for the value of the stolen mobile phone, and P50,000.00 as moral damages,
with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum (p.a.) from the filing of the
Information. The CA modified the judgment by deleting the finding of the aggravating
circumstance of treachery as the prosecution failed to alleged it in the information.
Hence, Arnel elevated his case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Arnel is guilty of Robbery with Homicide.

Ruling: The appeal is bereft of merit.

It must be stressed that in criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court are generally
accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported
by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when
the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Court will re-calibrate
and evaluate the factual findings of the court below.⁠1 Guided by the foregoing
principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the RTC’s factual findings, as
affirmed by the CA.

In People v. Ibañez,⁠2 the Court exhaustively explained that “[a] special complex crime
of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or
on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude
that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of the malefactor and the killing
is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human
life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.”3 Homicide is said to
have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was
committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the
possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the
robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.⁠4

In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s finding that the prosecution was
able to establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter’s
mobile phone, and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical
intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and Blesilda’s positive identification of Balute
as the one who committed the crime as opposed to the latter’s denial and alibi which was
correctly considered by both the RTC and the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-
settled that “alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical,
consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the [eyewitnesses] testifying on
the matter.”⁠5 This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the relatives of the
victim – such as Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois,
respectively – since “[t]he natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in
securing the conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons
other than the true culprits.”⁠6

In sum, the RTC and the CA correctly convicted Balute of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the RPC, as amended.
However, the Court deems it appropriate to adjust the award of moral damages from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.⁠7 Further,
the Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in favor of the
heirs of SPO1 Manaois due to the highly reprehensible and/or outrageous conduct of
Balute in committing the aforesaid crime.⁠8

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 3, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05649 finding accused-appellant
ArnelBalutey Villanueva GUILTY beyond reasonable doubtof the crime of Robbery with
Homicide defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and is ordered to
pay the heirs of SPO1 Raymundo B. Manaois the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P140,413.53 as actual damages, and P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent(6%)
per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
PEOPLE VS OROSCO

PEOPLE VS BARRA
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the victim
refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have been
taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Accused can only be found guilty of
attempted robbery with homicide. The fact of asportation must be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Since this fact was not duly established, accused should be held liable
only for the crime of attempted robbery with homicide.

FRANSDILLA VS PEOPLE

PEOPLE VS NIELLES

ZAPANTA VS PEOPLE
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308
and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the
said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be
done without the owner’s consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of
confidence.18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, through
the prosecution’s eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner’s instruction, several pieces of
wide flange steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in
November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager,
repeatedly took construction materials from the project site, without the authority and
consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the construction materials.
CARGANILLO VS PEOPLE

CORPUZ VS PEOPLE

PEOPLE VS WAGAS
Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; elements. In order to constitute
estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the act of postdating or issuing
a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This
means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party
by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the
Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have
parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the
offender. The essential elements of this crime are the following: (a) a check is postdated
or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack
or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. People
of the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.
Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; what the law punishes is fraud
or deceit, not the mere issuance of a worthless check. In this case, the Prosecution
established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada because of the postdated check
the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for
payment because of the insufficiency of funds. In every criminal prosecution, however,
the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable
doubt that it was accused Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom
he was transacting over the telephone. Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did
not personally see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made the
demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over the telephone. Secondly,
the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash – this type of check was
payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an
indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to
Ligaray, but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to
Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the
time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for
and received the stocks of rice was Cañada. It bears stressing that the accused, to be
guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the complainant.
What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless
check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check
used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas
as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check. Thus, considering that
the circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice
did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up
to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. People of
the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA DE CARUNGCONG

VS PEOPLE
FACTS: William Sato, the son-in-law of Manolita Carungcong (who was already 79
years old and blind). induced the latter to sign and thumbmark an SPA in favor of his
daughter. Wendy. The old woman believed that the SPA involved only her taxes, while in
fact, it authorized Wendy, to sell Manolita’s properties.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the death of William’s wife and Manolita’s daughter, Zenaida,
extinguished the relationship by affinity between William and Manolita.
2. Whether or not William should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his
relationship to Manolita.

HELD:
1. No. Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the
deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of
whether the marriage produced children or not.
2. No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to
the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the
State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender
for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the
offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein.
The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies
exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not
apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another
crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the
offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the
offender against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to
civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is
achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public
interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter
instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a
paramount public interest.
PEOPLE VS TIBAYAN

HAO VS PEOPLE
https://www.scribd.com/doc/296768710/011-Hao-v-People

ONG VS PEOPLE

PEOPLE VS DIMAT
ANTI-FENCING LAW P.D. 1612
Facts: Sonia Delgado, wife of herein respondent, brought a Nissan Safari from Mel
Dimat. Spouses Delgado where driving along E. Rodriguez Ave. when they were
apprehended by the Traffic Management Group (TMG), afterwards they found out that
the vehicle was a stolen property. Samson and Mantequilla, the registered owner of the
vehicle, filed charges against Mel Dimat for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.

On his defense he claims that he did not know Mantequilla, and that he bought it in good
faith for value.

The RTC found him to guilty and which the CA affirms with modification.
Issue: Whether or not Dimat knowingly sold for gain the Nissan Safari which was earlier
stolen.

Ruling:
The elements of “fencing” are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused,
who took no part in the robbery or theft, “buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or
object taken” during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known
that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for
himself or for another. Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino
where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino
supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the
vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official
receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that
Tolentino’s failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way.
Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt.

Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not
properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration
and official receipt.

But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped,
Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his
promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan
Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who
apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. That she might
herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in the case.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
26, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR 29794.
SO ORDERED

PEOPLE VS LAGAT
FACTS: Renato Lagat and James Palalay were charged with the crime of Carnapping for
stealing Jose Biag’s motorcycle and killing him in the process. During custody, both of
them voluntarily answered where they dumped Biag's body.

After the prosecution rested its case, appellants filed a demurrer to evidence on the
ground that they are not guilty beyond reasonable doubt, citing that their rights during the
custodial investigation were impaired when no counsel arrived for them, making all the
testimonial evidence inadmissible.

Only circumstantial evidence were gathered by the prosecution like appellants were
caught in the possession of Biag's motorcycle, they ran after police came after them,
bloodstains of Big on his motorcycle. The CA ruled in favor of the prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether appellants are guilty.

RULING: The SC affirmed the lower court's decision.
Based on Rule 133, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence can be
sufficient for conviction based on aforementioned conditions. To justify a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven
in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding those that are
inadmissible, show that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a whole, effectively
establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay beyond reasonable doubt.
The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the
registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalays possession. Aside from this, the
prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the
Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat and
Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biags tricycle. Their unexplained
possession raises the presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking of
the tricycle.

BUEBOS & BUEBOS VS PEOPLE

FACTS: Adelina Borbe was in her house watching over her sick child. She heard some
nose, got up and saw the petitioners congregating in front of her hut. When she went out,
she saw the roof of her hut on fire. Instead of helping her, petitioners fled.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are liable for simple arson or for arson of an inhabited house
which merits a penalty of up to reclusion perpetua.

HELD: Petitioners should be liable for simple arson. The nature of destructive arson is
distinguished from simple arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the
offender. In the present case, the act committed by the petitioners neither appears to be
heinous nor represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness.

PEOPLE VS MACABANDO
Simple Arson v. Destructive Arson
In a small neighborhood one afternoon during the Christmas season, a man was found on
the road holding a lead pipe and breaking bottles. Shouting that he would get even, he
also declared that he would burn his house. That same night, a fire broke out in the
man’s house. Those living nearby tried to call for help and stop the fire but was
prevented by the owner of the house who stood outside his house and fired several gun
shots in the air. He also threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire. In
the process, other residential homes were also destroyed. Although no one actually saw
how the fire started, the Bureau of Fire Protection conducted an investigation and the
results revealed that the fire was intentionally started in the man’s home.

The Regional Trial Court found the circumstances of the case constituted an unbroken
chain leading to the unavoidable conclusion that the man set fire to his own house, to the
exclusion of others. Thus, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of destructive
arson, punishable under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC judgment in toto.

The Supreme Court, on the other hand, modified the crime from destructive arson to
simple arson, punishable under Sec. 3(2), P.D. 1613. The Court explained that simple
arson was the proper crime committed since destructive arson “contemplates the
malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains,
vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments
by any person or group of persons” while simple arson contemplates “the malicious
burning of public and private structures, regardless of size” not punished under
destructive arson.

Under Sec. 3(2), two elements are required for simple arson: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. The
Court held that both elements were sufficiently proven in court. All property destroyed
in the fire were his own house and several other inhabited homes. Based on the facts, the
burning was clearly intentional.

Other cases of simple arson as provided in Sec. 3, P.D. 1613, include the burning of the
following property: 1) any building used as offices of the government or any of its
agencies; 2) any inhabited house or dwelling; 3) any industrial establishment, shipyard,
oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel; 4) any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing
crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest; any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or
mill central; and 6) any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.

Citing Buebos v. People, the Court made a distinction between simple and destructive
arson –

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of
the Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous
crimes “for being grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized, and ordered society.” On the other hand, acts committed under P.D. 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson (People v. Macabando, G.R. No 188708, 31 July 2013, J. Brion).

CAMPOS VS PEOPLE & FWCC

Ma. Rosario (“Rosario) obtained a loan of P50,000.00 from First Women’s Credit
Corporation. In return, she issued post-dated checks to FWCC as security for the loan.
Fourteen of these checks were dishonoured when presented to the drawee bank, hence,
FWCC filed cases for violation of BP 22 against Rosario. After her arraignment, she did
not attend anymore the hearings on the cases, hence, she was tried in absentia. The MeTC
after trial, convicted Rosario for violation of BP 22, hence she appealed her conviction to
the Regional Trial Court. In her appeal, she averred that she did not receive any notice of
dishonour. The prosecution only presented a demand letter through registered mail,
hence, not enough to convict her for violation of BP 22. Further, she made subsequent
arrangements for payments of the obligation to FWCC, which is tantamount to good
faith. Her appeal denied by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, she is now before the
Supreme Court to assail her conviction for violation of BP 22.

The Supreme Court:

“To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2)
the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by
Campos through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written
demand letter from FWCC, the entity in whose favor the dishonored checks were issued.
In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of such
notice of dishonor, although not as an element of the offense, but as a means to establish
that the issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the check
and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Section 2
of B.P. 22. Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult
to establish, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds, as it reads:

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing, and

issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days from the date of the
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC’s finding that the
required notice of dishonor from FWCC was received by Campos. Campos, nonetheless,
still maintains that her personal receipt of the notice was not sufficiently established,
considering that only a written copy of the letter and the registry return receipt covering it
were presented by the prosecution.

The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry return
receipts that cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of
dishonor had been sent to or served on issuers of checks. The authentication by affidavit
of the mailers was necessary in order for service by registered mail to be regarded as
clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and to predicate the existence of the
second element of the offense.

In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos’
defense that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the
checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI Family Bank. Campos
categorically declared in her petition that, “[she] has in her favor evidence to show that
she was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment of her obligations
subsequently after the dishonor of the checks.” Clearly, this statement was a confirmation
that she actually received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC. The evidence
referred to in her statement were receipts dated January 13, 1996, February 29, 1996,
April 22, 1998 and May 26, 1998 issued by FWCC to Campos for payments in various
amounts ranging from P2,500.00 to P15,700.00. Campos would not have entered into the
alleged arrangements beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if she had not received a
notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her
funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.

Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or
making arrangements for payment in full within five (5) days after receiving notice.
Unfortunately for Campos, these circumstances were not established in the instant case.
She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with FWCC, and
to establish that the same had been fully complied with so as to completely satisfy the
amounts covered by the subject checks. Moreover, documents to prove such fact should
have been presented before the MeTC during the trial, yet Campos opted to be tried in
absentia, and thus waived her right to present evidence. While Campos blamed her
former counsel for alleged negligence that led to her failure to be present during the
trial, it is settled that the negligence of counsel binds his or her client. Given the
circumstances, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA which
affirmed the conviction of Campos.”

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 187401, September 17, 2014, MA. ROSARIO P.
CAMPOS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FIRST
WOMEN’S CREDIT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.



LIM VS PEOPLE