IBP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]
FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff
and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to
direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty
to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical
support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly
argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover,
the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an
“insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in
violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
DAZA VS SINGSON
FACTS: The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several
political parties represented in that chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing
their former party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its
representation in the CoA by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this
to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and
including therein Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the
assumption of his seat by the Singson. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition
and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO that same day to
prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.
Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election
thereto is permanent. He claimed that the reorganization of the House
representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment
because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained
political stability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in
nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
RULING: No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar.
The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House of
Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in
nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of
that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments.
The term political question refers to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
Tanada v. Angara
Facts: On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its
Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry signed the Final Act
binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective competent
authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek
approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was
adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it
violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant
and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII,
providing for the “Filipino first” policy.
Issue: Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement
is unconstitutional
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not
unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the
need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy.
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent
national economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic
seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.”
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land”. The Supreme
Court gave due respect to an equal department in government. It
presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is
convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result,
the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness
of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay
74 SCRA 661 – Political Law – Ministerial vs Discretionary Functions –
Mandamus | Constitutional Law – Right to a Healthful Ecology
In 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CROMB)
filed an action for mandamus to compel the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) and other government agencies to clean
up the Manila Bay. CROMB argued that the environmental state of the
Manila Bay is already dangerous to their health and the inaction of MMDA
and the other concerned government agencies violates their rights to life,
health, and a balanced ecology guaranteed by the Constitution. CROMB
also averred under the Environmental Code, it is MMDA’s duty to clean up
the Manila Bay.
The trial court agreed with CROMB and ordered MMDA et al to
clean up the Manila Bay. MMDA assailed the decision on the ground that
MMDA’s duty under the Environmental Code is merely a discretionary
duty hence it cannot be compelled by mandamus. Further, MMDA argued
that the RTC’s order was for a general clean up of the Manila Bay yet
under the Environmental Code, MMDA was only tasked to attend to
specific incidents of pollution and not to undertake a massive clean up
such as that ordered by the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA may be compelled by mandamus to clean
up Manila Bay.
HELD: Yes. It is true that in order for MMDA to implement laws like the
Environmental Code, the process of implementing usually involves the
exercise of discretion i.e., where to set up landfills. But this does not mean
that their function or mandate under the law is already discretionary.
Looking closer, MMDA’s function to alleviate the problem on solid and
liquid waste disposal problems is a ministerial function. In short, MMDA
does not have the discretion to whether or not alleviate the garbage
disposal problem in Metro Manila, particularly in the Manila Bay
area. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail
a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of
doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus.
Anent the issue on whether or not MMDA’s task under the Environmental
Code involves a general clean up, the Supreme Court ruled that MMDA’s
mandate under the Environmental Code is to perform cleaning in general
and not just to attend to specific incidents of pollution. Hence, MMDA,
together with the other government agencies, must act to clean up the
Manila Bay as ordered by the RTC.