Prepared By: Claudine Sumalinog (XU LAW-LLB)

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Prepared by: Claudine Sumalinog (XU LAW-LLB)
IN RE: ATTY. RUFILLO D. BUCANA
Respondent Notary Public Rufillo D. Bucana was required by SC to show why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for having notarized an Agreement executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and
Luisa Sorongon wherein the afore-mentioned spouses agreed therein that "in case anyone of them will
remarry both parties offer no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them" and that the
afore-mentioned Agreement was "entered into for the purpose of agreement to allow each and everyone
of them to remarry without objection or reservation ...", which affidavit is contrary to law because it
sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose.
Respondent’s explanation:
Admitting that he notarized the afore-mentioned document and that the Agreement is "immoral and against
public policy", but in mitigation he asserted that the document in question was Prepared by his clerk, Lucia D.
Doctolero without his previous knowledge; that when said document was presented to him for signature after it
was signed by the parties, he vehemently refused to sign it and informed the parties that the document was
immoral; that he placed the said document on his table among his files and more than a week later, he asked his
clerk where the document was for the purpose of destroying it, but to his surprise he found that the same was
notarized by him as per his file copies in the office; that he dispatched his clerk to get the copy from the parties,
but the afore-mentioned parties could not be found in their respective residences; that he must have
inadvertently notarized the same in view of the numerous documents on his table and at that time he was
emotionally disturbed as his father (now deceased) was then seriously ill. The foregoing contentions of
respondent were corroborated substantially by the separate sworn statements of his clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero
and Angela Drilon Baltazar, both dated April 20, 1976.
There is no question that the afore-mentioned Agreement is contrary to law, morals and good customs.
Marriage is an inviolable social institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested for it is the foundation of the family and of society without which there could be neither
civilization nor progress.
The contract, in substance, purports to formulate an agreement between the husband and the wife to take
unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relations with another man, without
opposition from either one, and what is more, it induces each party to commit bigamy.
This is not only immoral but in effect abets the commission of a crime.
A notary public, by virtue of the nature of his office, is required to exercise his duties with due care and with
due regard to the provisions of existing law.
In the case at bar, respondent in effect pleads for clemency, claiming that the notarization of the
questioned document was due to his negligence. We find, however, that the aforementioned document
could not have been notarized if the respondent had only exercised the requisite care required by law in
the exercise of his duties as notary public.
SC found respondent Rufillo D. Bucana guilty of malpractice which suspended the latter from the office
for a period of six (6) months.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
REPUBLIC vs CAGANDAHAN
FACTS:
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed
to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both
male and female characteristics.
She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries.
At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has
no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind
and emotion, she has become a male person.
Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and
her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued
a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH.
He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her
female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that
this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female
hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is
permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted
to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition. Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition
known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
RULING:
YES.
1. PROCEDURAL ISSUE
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the
Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the
person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by
an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and
shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three
(3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the
court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an
election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The
Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government
of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such
order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court
shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge
that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be
furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is
situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c)
deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting
the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required
to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly
notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the
rules. The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons
who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Respondent, however, invokes Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall
construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the matters brought before it.
We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the
petition to the local civil registrar.
2. SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes.
In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No.
9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters
can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of
such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate appearance
of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a
male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris
with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2)
normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian
tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial
hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century,
medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either
male or female. The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a
living thing of a gonochoristicspecies whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics
are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most

societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role. Since the
rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia
have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals. More commonly,
an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder which is almost always recommended to be
treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is
some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor
truly female. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either
as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change
in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific
development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subject’s birth
certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of
male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a
male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his
body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its
due course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to
undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider
respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a
female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to
fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right
to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation.
In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection
under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of
being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual
deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male.
Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a
feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will
conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes
made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of
a sex reassignment surgery?
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a PETITION FOR the CHANGE OF HIS FIRST NAME
AND SEX IN HIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio
and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962.
His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.
Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman"
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He
was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal
basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex
reassignment through surgery.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles
407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
ISSUE:
WON should be allowed to change his first name and sex in his birth certificate
RULING:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
NO.
1. A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by
the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present
sex.
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil
registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.
In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048
provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.
It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers.
The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure.
In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name
or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
HOWEVER, A CHANGE OF NAME DOES NOT ALTER ONE’S LEGAL CAPACITY OR CIVIL
STATUS.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the
civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum:
1. the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not
within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048.
2. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
3. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice
him at all.
For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his
first name was concerned.
2. No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to
the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical
or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.
However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."
The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding
to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship,
civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name).
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws.
In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent
in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his
being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of
legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as
birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession. (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal
to petitioner’s cause.
Under the Civil Register Law (Act 3753), a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error, is immutable.
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence
of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law
and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary.
In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male
from a female" or "the distinction between male and female."
Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."
Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone
sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it
cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that
allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for
that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his
birth certificate.
3. Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It
believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences.
First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual
marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.
To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor
Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others.
These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof
must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of
that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized
as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that
matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or
interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and
that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
WIEGEL vs. SEMPIO-DIY
FACTS:
In an action filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, herein respondent Karl
Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva
Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion.
Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null
and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said
marital union.
In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage
(assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it
merely voidable?
Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present
evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on
both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of the respondent Judge-
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based
on "agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against
both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85,
Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly
married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded
as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel);
accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in
Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977.
However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their
marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.
The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the
parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty,
herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay.
On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying
that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they
got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated
that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.
The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil
marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
ISSUE:
WON the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered
into validly
RULING:
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private respondent null
and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private respondent and
Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioners claim that People v. Mendoza and People v. Aragon are
applicable in this case.
For these cases held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must
be read into the provisions of law previously obtaining.
In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case. Although
decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the now-repealed provisions of the
Civil Code, as in the instant case.
xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .[6]
At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second marriages contracted in 1977
and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present
at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles
390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by
a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains
no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity
of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man,
Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to
Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra,
concluded that:[18]
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings
in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40
of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992) the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary.
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the
case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering
into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced
into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the
children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code,
there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel.
At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon.
The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need
for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage.
In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private
respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now
has raised this matter properly.
Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner but
they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was the same
license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites.
Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage.
As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary
effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as
affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court
from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the
inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality.
In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal
requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two
ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract
from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold
that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
GUEVARRA vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA
FACTS:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli
Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary
Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from respondent
cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at
Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of
the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts,
she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
Complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted
them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
Complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately.
Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings,
pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You"
on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter the day of his wedding to Irene,
reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for
you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal
pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for
the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to
love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we
spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until
the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime.
Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE
YOU'LL BE!"
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing.
He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with
respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter
was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they
attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the
couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega
Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed
together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is
attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting
their adulterous relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged
in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile
and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far
as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne
Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep
his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of
paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of
her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now they
are.6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding

his adulterousrelationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit
to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not
under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in
fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special
friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten
letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with
respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution
regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec.
2).9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a
lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife,
he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage,
commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being
that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount
to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.11(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case for lack of merit.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Eala is guilty of gross immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath
RULING:
YES.
The petition is impressed with merit.
As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published
in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is
carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on
record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the
following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being
[that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the
reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal
and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to
grossly immoral conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special"
relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that
there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the
child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child.
Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to
believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It
should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of
Samantha Louise Irene Moje. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void." (Italics
supplied)
What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and
known only to the immediate members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language
and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that
the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha
Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent – a "lawyer," 38
years old – as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information
on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the
same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied
being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old
and a lawyer.
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by
more than clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and
credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 – which is the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is
all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
"grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances."
Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall
have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should
be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." The case at
bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of
extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has
been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of
an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges
which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution andobey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man
for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law."
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void. As a
lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for
an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct,
violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
BESO vs. DAGUMAN
FACTS:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge is charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of
Authority.
Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his
jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the
office of the Local Civil Registrar.
Beso and her fiancee BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and their marriage was solemnized by judge
Juan Daguman in his residence in Calbayog City, Samar.
After the wedding, the husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned Beso without any reason at all.
When Beso went to Calbayog City to inquire regarding her Marriage Contract, she was informed by the
Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that her marriage was not registered
When Beso wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to inquire she was informed by Judge Daguman that all the
copies of the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman) and no copy was retained by
Judge Daguman.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that respondent Judge "committed non-feasance in
office" and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
ISSUE:
WON Judge Daguman is guilty of non-feasance in office and should be held liable
RULING:
YES.
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation report of the
OCA well-taken.
DOCTRINE
 Jimenez v. Republic underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus: "[M]arriage
in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded
it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the
state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every member of the
community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and
ultimately lead to its destruction."
 A marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following instances:
1) at the point of death;
2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
3) upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
 A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so
only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop.
 An appellate court justice or a Justice of SC has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
 However, Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond.
 Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
SC:
1. In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was at the point
of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting
parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place
other than his sala.
What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize
the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent
realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy."
Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith
that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married."
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the marriage in
this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of social
institutions in the country.
They also betray respondent’s cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more disposed
towards an extended period of engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed
marital unions.
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to preserve so sacrosanct
an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines laid down by superior
authority should have given respondent judge pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his
authority and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed
to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court.
2. Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-
Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in
the City of Calbayog.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra
care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise
commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance
with Article 23 of the Family Code.
CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was less than
conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring
that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events. However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judge’s part.
Respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
ARAES vs. OCCIANO

FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law.
Petitioner alleges:
1. respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia WITHOUT
THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is OUTSIDE HIS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
2. Since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was
not recognized and she was deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of
the Philippine Navy.
Respondent judge averred:
1. he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo to solemnize the marriage of the parties.
2. However, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the
rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua.
Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which
request he acceded.
3. before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to him by
petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he
refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested it’s resetting to another date.
4. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He
also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who
just suffered from a stroke.
5. after the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties
that their failure to give it would render the marriage void.
6. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon
of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter
only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance with the Office of the Court Administrator.
She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment
filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
It appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It
was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However,
neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of
such marriage that allegedly took place.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification
dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no
record of their marriage.
Petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent
judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur.
A Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the
marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of
P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
RULING:
YES.
The authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
JURISPRUDENCE
 A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop.
 An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with.
 However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond.
 Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability.
His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license.
JURISPRUDENCE
 A marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
 Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the
prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined.
Respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
NIAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG
FACTS:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones.
Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death.
One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license.
In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
1. May the parties to the second marriage be exempted from the requirement of a marriage license by
reason of five-year common-law cohabitation?
2. May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death?
RULING:
1. NO.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.
REASON FOR REQUIRING MARRIAGE LICENSE
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58.
The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution."
Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
family life which shall be protected by the State. This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special
contract of permanent union" and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."
REASON FOR THE EXEMPTION FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE
There are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage.
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. To
preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt
them from that requirement.
SC:
1. There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to
marry each other."
The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under
Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license.
DOCTRINE
Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless
of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have
either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years
without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.
This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on
the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify
their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception.
It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of
the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
SC:
1. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day.
From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.
It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by
the absence of the marriage contract.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial
that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
2. YES.
The Family Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
VOID vs. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Voidable and void marriages are not identical.
 A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights.
 The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can
never be ratified.
 A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage
can be attacked collaterally.
 Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes.
 Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.
 Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well
as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of
a marriage.
It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted
during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio.
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
However, OTHER THAN FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family
Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
BORJA-MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ
FACTS:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R.
Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan.
Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator.
Complainant avers:
1. she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano and four children were born out of that marriage.
2. however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge.
3. when respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void
and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge claims:
1. when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was
legally married.
2. what he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already
without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.
3. had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again;
otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy.
Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting
aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits of the
late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his
instruction.
In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were
married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages
had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or
communicated with their spouses anymore.
Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
RULING:
YES.
JURISPRUDENCE
For Article 34 of the Family Code on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
SC:
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar.
It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in
their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.
In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of
Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time
already is immaterial.
Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the MARRIAGE BONDS ARE NOT SEVERED.
Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This
holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation,
free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to
marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a
justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a
prior existing marriage.
CLEARLY, RESPONDENT JUDGE DEMONSTRATED GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
WHEN HE SOLEMNIZED A VOID AND BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the
amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
REPUBLIC v. DAYOT
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall.
The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.
In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained
the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years.
Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the
parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to
Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his
landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so
she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-
arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them.,They were told that
Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do
so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who
had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He
alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the
same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the
latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She
declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early
part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.
In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina).
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose
with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct,
and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling
on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a
valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa.
For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.
To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24
November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they
used in lieu of a marriage license.
It is the Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity
of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not
required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained.
The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated
statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years.
In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was
solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence
of marriage.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained
the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts
in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law, as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage
license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that
being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this
union, they desire to marry each other.
ISSUE:
Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of
the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license.
RULING:
YES
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of
the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general
rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule
is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
implication. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman
must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years.
1. A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written.
The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law.
For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is
embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is
worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The
Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisas own
testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite
is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts. Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt
them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with.
The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose
and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa
meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
2. Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar.
Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima

facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be
applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24
November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the
validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the
law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with
the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration
of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by
making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. To permit a
false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court
is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the
legal measures set forth in our laws.
3. Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage
not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years
as required by law. The contrast is flagrant.
The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of
one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter
in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if
there was no affidavit at all.
4. In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose
should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
application where there is a law. There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is
set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent
that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.
5. The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of
nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be
reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not
prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity
- meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
DE CASTRO vs. ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166, declaring that
(1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied
for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994.
They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already
expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit
dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years.
The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s
birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her
private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City trial court.
In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the
marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant
state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that
they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license.
However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child
was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals
frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his
refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners
forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward him of his being
irresponsible. Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner,
wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial
court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion
between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an
action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should
have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage
apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second
2. Whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
RULING:
1. the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent
The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.
Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.
In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that
they had been living together for more than five years.
However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
cross-examination, thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the
last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage.
The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicants name for a marriage license.
In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at
all.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage
void ab initio.
2. Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore
entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the
child.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
SY vs. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the
Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.
Both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll.
Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in
the custody of their mother.
However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence and from then on, lived with his father.
Filipina filed a petition for legal separation.
Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the
grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than
one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983,
containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership.
Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of
properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses.
The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina.
Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband.
Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo,
Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando,
Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family
computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance,
Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also
claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought
she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the
blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She
said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent on the following grounds: (1)
repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4)
abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
The Regional Trial Court granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity,
and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and
their son Frederick to respondent.
Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her
favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical
violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of
psychological incapacity.
She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual
alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and
(3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges
that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and
became manifest thereafter.
The Regional Trial Court denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute
psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological
incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal
and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in
1973.
It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten
years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living
together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to
be in accordance with law and the evidence on record.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of
a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to
warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage
license at the time of its celebration. It appears that according to her, the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different
and incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, when
substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities
should not be subject to cavil.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage between
Fillipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license,
in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note,
however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their
effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage
before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the
marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning,
she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court.
The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in
their marriage contract.
The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15,
1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent.
These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license.
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition,
the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona,
Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly
state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the
marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage
license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code[31] is
clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage
between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79of
the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and
private respondent is void from the beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of
their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during
the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with
no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was
interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in
evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of
the facts contained therein.
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us. It is
mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW I
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage
celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is
hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to
costs.

Prepared By: Claudine Sumalinog (XU LAW-LLB)

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Prepared By: Claudine Sumalinog (XU LAW-LLB)

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

Prepared by: Claudine Sumalinog (XU LAW-LLB)

IN RE: ATTY. RUFILLO D. BUCANA

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

(c) The name asked for.

IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

1. A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

WIEGEL vs. SEMPIO-DIY

We find the petition devoid of merit.

TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

GUEVARRA vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

Hence, the present petition.

The petition is impressed with merit.

As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

under scandalous circumstances.

Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:

BESO vs. DAGUMAN

1) at the point of death;

2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or

ARAES vs. OCCIANO

NIAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones.

Pepito died in a car accident.

REASON FOR REQUIRING MARRIAGE LICENSE

REASON FOR THE EXEMPTION FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE

VOID vs. VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

Voidable and void marriages are not identical.

However, OTHER THAN FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE, no judicial action is necessary to

BORJA-MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ

Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall.

The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.

Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.

DE CASTRO vs. ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.

Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held: