Modernity,

andthe
Pluralism
of Meaning
Crisis
The Orientationof ModernMan

PeterL. Berger
ThomasLuckmann

BertelsmannFoundationPublishers
Gütersloh1995
 cIP-Fiihcns!!liJD!

Nlodcrnn),plünLLsnr lhoaissolneanLng rl,r

onenrarionor nulco tr, PqerL Bor-lcri
(i d.d.h : Bqldrmrn( l.Nn(d'on

01995tsedelsmrtrd
hridanon .iütersloh

Edio. Dr ndtrr Ktrhlmrnn

cory cdtor: ltisltr N!uPdh

Prodücriotr
cdnor sabr. Kltt'nr
cover designIIT(i !r(b.agqtrur, Rielereld
corerphoro Itobcd J)!Lru'11.K'eüro.n.i. I'r{l

Ns Yo'k. soloDu, R (lu$erh.hMdsün'

Latour andqpessr s dgtotrcn'bll, B,elercld

Print Fuldrer vun.g$Nax, !ulda
Contents

lletner lYeidenleld
Preface

PeterL. Betger,TbomasLuchmann
Modernity,pluralismandthe crisisof meaning-
what basichumanneedsof oricntation
m u sbt es a t i s f i e d l ............9
1. The foundationsof the meaningfulness
o f h n ml ai fne ............9
2. The meaningfuhre* ol .ocialrelrtion<hips.
the concurrence of meaningandthe
g e n e rcaol n d i t i of on rsc r i s eo sf n r e a n i n .g. . . . . . . . . . 1 8
3 . M o d e r n i at yn dt h ec r i s iosf m e a n i n g ......28
4 . T h el o s os f t h et a k e n - f o r - g r a n t e d ........40
5. Flabituatedmeaningandcrisesof rneaning . . . . . . . . . . 49
6. How societiesdealwith criscsof meaning:
illusionsandpossibilities 57
7 .O u t l o o k .......64

The authors 71
The project 73

3
Preface

Questionsof cultural orientatiooare amongthe most urgenrissues

of modernsociety.lndividualismand pluralismleadto the conse-
quencethat individualsmore anclmore facethe difficulty to define
standardsand valuesguiding their own lives. IndividuaLsrequire
thesevaluesto be ableto find orientationin a situationrvhichis de-
finedby optionsandthe necessity to takedecisions.
Three ccntral groups of questionsclelineatecrucial problems,
which the Bertelsmann Foumlationintendsto tackleby creatinga
newr,rngco[ pro:c,rson cuhuralorrcntation:
- llow can individuals realizemeaningful livesby chosingfrom
thc pluralisticrnultiplicityof optionsl
- How do humanbeingscoorclinate the numerousrolesandsocial
networksin which they interactl In other words:how do they
stabilizcthcir own identity)
V/hat value systemsguide thcir ideasof good and cvil? In as
much :s individualssharcconrnronvalue patternswe haveto
raisca consccutive question:*'hich communitiesdo suchindividu-
als fonn who sharcsimilar pattcrnsof mearingand judgetheir
lives by the samevalue systcrns? And finally: what do these
comnrunitiescontributc to thc integrationof the societyas a
wholeor to what extcntdo thcy endanger suchintegration?
How canmodernsocieties providedre requiredligaturesl
Individualswho havc acquircdstableorienrationspossess an cffcc-
tive panaceaagainstcxistentialthrcatsto their self-perception.
lhey
regardthemsclvesaspeoplewith an undoubtedidentity. And they
availthenxelves of ethicalstandards which enablethem to judge
their actionswith regardto their effecton societyasa whole
On all drreelevelsindividualshaveceased to act accordingto what
hestraditionallybeenregarrledasself-evident and takcnfor grantcd.
Thereforcthe lossof the taken-for-granted hasled to the possibility
and cven necessity to decide-hat is meaningful,good and sociaily
acceptablc. This decisionis an individualone and it is debatrbleif
thc cohesionof societysuffcrsasa consequence ofthesedecisions. In
addrtionthe pluraiisticabundance of suchdecisions allows commun-
itiesto emergewhich enjoythe loyalties of rheirmembers but do
not nccessarily takeinto eccountthe welfareof socictyasa whole.
'fhe "culnrralorientation"startedits seriesof
rangeof projectson
"'lhc lossof orientation- the
publicationswith a first volumeon
cohesioncrisisin modernsociety"(in Germanlanguageonly). In a
next phaseof the field of projectswc commissioned a number of
'lhomas
expcrtises.As a first result, Peter llerger (Boston)and
Lucknrann (Konstanz)presenttheir analysisof the mechanisms
which leadto a crisisof meaningin nodern society.lhis study
emergedfrom a contextof projectswhich are dealingwith orienta
tion in the immediatesocialneighborhoodand with the orientation
by communicationin a workplacc environmentand in company
hierarchies.other sub-projects focuson the legitimacyof political
iction and the limits to statecontrol of socialprocesses or on new
challenges due to the everincreasint complexity of knowledge and
the flow of informationwhich modernindividualsface.
PeterBergerand ThomasLucknranncount amongthe ceuses for
the moderncrisisof meaningprocesscs of modernization, pLuralism
and particularlywith regardto Buropeansocieties seculariza- -
tion. fhjs leadsto the conscqucnce that the validity of sharedmean-
ing is difficult to mailtain for largergroupsof individualsin society.
Patternsof meaningare being sharedand maintainedby smaller
communities.It is thereforecrucialto distinguishin which way in
dividualsunite to form thesecommunities.In addition,all of them
relateto the functionalmacrosysternsin societylike politics,eco-

6
nomy andscience. Interactionbetweentheselevelsand communities
is beingregulatedby intermediaryinstitutions,mediacommunica-
tion and moralizingstatements in everydaylife. It will needfurther
enquiryto establishdefinitcknowledgeon which institutionsareef-
fectivein this respectandhow they performtheir task.The resultof
such a study can be evidenceon the possibilityto counteracr
centripetaltendencies in society.

Prof.Dr. Verner \üeidenfeld

Memberof the Boardof the
BertelsmannFoundation
Modernity, pluralismandthe crisisof meaning-
what basichumanneedsof orientation
must be satisfied?
Peter [.. ßetger
TbomasLuchmann

1. The foundations
ofthe meaningfulness
ofhumanlife

It is not apparentwhethertalk aboutthe crisisof meaningin today's

world really corresponds to a new form of disorientationin the life
of modernpcopLe. Could it be that wc are merelyhearingthe Latest
repetitionof an old lament?Is ir the complaint*'hich cxpresses the
feeLingof distresswhich has againand againafflictedhumanity in
the faceof a worid becomeunstcady?Is this thc old lament,that
hurnanlife ls a life to*'ardsdcath?ls this the voiceof doubt,that this
life couldfind its meaningin a transcendent history of salvationlOr
is this despcrationaboutthe lack of sucha meaningl\Vc are distant
in time from thc book of the Ecclcsiastes ('everythingis noughtl
everything is in vainl")but not distantfrom the spiritof thc Chroni
cle of BishopC)tto von Frcisingwritten more than 850 ycarsago:
"ln alL,wc are so depressed by thc mcmory of thingspast,the pres'
surc of thc presentand the fearof futurevicissitudes that we accept
the sentenceof deaththat is in rrsand rnay becometired of lifc it-
self."It is evenfurther and all thc sanlenot so far betwecnthe con-
ceptionsof human fate in history from Thucydidesto Alben
Camus.
 On t,hat basisaremodern(andpost-modern) criticsof presentday
societyand culture convincedthat the crisisof our tirnesis funda-
mentally different from aLlpast mkeries?Theseobservershardly
startfrom the assumption that thcrehasbeena radicalchangein the
humancondition,the conditiohumana.Ratherthey seemto suspect
a new socialconstitutior of the meaningof human life in moder-
nity, which hasthrown meaning,and with it humanlife, into a his'
torically uniquecrisis.SuchspecüLations are powerfully suggestive
and may appearconvincing,that doesnot mean,however,that they
will actually stand up to cmpiricaLinvestigation.Contemporary
sociologicalanalysistendsfar too easily!o assumethe existence of
somethinglike meaningand meaningfulness as ä fiotive of human
actionandasa backdropagainstwhich the moderncrisisof meaning
is apparcnt.It is, therefore,necessary to beginwith sonreanthropo-
logicalpreliminaries.They shallseekto identify the generalcondi-
tions and basicstructuresof mexningfulhuman life. Only in this
way is it possibleto improveour understanding of chengesin par-
ticularstructures of meaning.
Meaningis constitutedin humanconsciousness: in the conscious
nessof the individual,who is individuatedin a body and who has
beensocializedasa person.Consciousness, individuation,the speci-
ficity of the body, societyand the historico'socialconstitutionof
pcrsonalidentity are charact€ristics of our species,the phylo- and
ontogenesis of which need not be considered-Flowever,we will
proviclea short sketchof the generaL performances of consciousness
from which the multi-layeredmeaningfulness of experience and ac-
tion in humanlife is built up.
Conscior.rsncsstakenin itself is nothing;it is alwaysconsciousness
ofsomething.It existsonly in so far asit directsits att€ntiontowerds
an object,towerdsa goal.This intentionalobjectis constitutedby
the varioussyntheticachievements of consciousness and appearsin
its gcner;l structure. qherher it bc perception. memoryor imagi
nation:aroundthe core,the theme' of the intentionalobject,
extendsa thematicfield that is delimitedby an open horizon.This

10
horizon in which consciousness of ones own body is always given
can älso be themxtizcd. The sequenceof interconnectedthemes -
lct us call them apprehensions'- is in itself stili without meaning.
It is however the foundation, on which rncaning can come into ex-
istence. For, apprehensionswhich do not occur simply and inde-
pendentLybut which the ego turns its attention lowards acquire a
higher degrecof thcmatic definition; thcy becomeclearly contoured
"expcrienccs".
Expericncestaken nrdividr.rallywouLd stili bc without mcaning
Ilowever, as a core of expcricncc cletachesitself from the back'
ground of apprehensions,consciousnessgraspsthe rclatioD of this
core to other expcnences.The srmplcst form of such relationships
"equal', 'simi1ar", "diffcrcnt", "equally "different
are good', and
worse" etc. Thus is constituted thc most elementary level of mean-
ing. Me:rning is nothing but a complex form of consciousness: it does
nor exist independently.k always has a point of reference.Meaning
is consciousnessof the fact th:t a relationship exists between
experiences. The inverseis alsotrue: the meaningof experiences -
and, as wiLl be shon'n, of actjons has to be constructed through
'
relational"performances of consciousness. 1he experience current
ar a particular monent can be rclated to one in the immediate or
distant past. GeneralLy,each expcrienceis related not to one other,
but to a type of experience,ä schenreof experience,a maxim, moral
legitimation ctc. won fron many experiencesand cither stored in
subjectiveknowiedge or täkcn fronl a social store of knowledge.
As convoluted as this phcnomcnology of multi-layered perform-
ancesof consciousness mxy scenr,its results are the simple elemeots
of meaning in our daily livcs. l-or cxample, in the apprehensionof a
flower a typical gestalt is tied in with a typical color connectedto a
typical quality of snell, touch, and use. In directed consciousness
this apprehensionbecomesexperience,this experienceis graspedin
relation to other experiences("so nrany flowcrs') or related to a clas'
sification taken from a social stock of knowledge ("an Alpine
flower') and may finally be intcgrated into a plan of action ("pick it
 and take it to my lovcd one!").In this processmultiple types("A1-
pine flower","lovedone') are integratecl into a processual scheme
('pick n and takeit to') and fusedinto a more complex,but still
everydayunit of meening.If finrlly this project is not simply put
into action becauseit confiicts with a morally founded maxim
("don't pick itl rare flowerl"), then a decisionis arrived at and a
higherlevelmeaningis constitutedthroughthe scquential evaiuation
of values andintcrcsts.
'l
his examplealreadyindicatesthe doublemeaningof 'acting"and
"action".Th€ meaning
of the currentact is constitutedprospective-
ly. A completcdactionis meaningfulin retrospect.Action is guided
by a viewto a prcconceived aim.Thisdesign is a utopiain whichthe
actor anticipatesa future stete,assesscs its desirabilityand urgency
and considersthe stepswhich will bring it about - insofaras the
process is not fanriliarthroughearliersimilaractionsand hasnot
bccomea habit.'Iherneaning ofthc acions,"in the acr",is consti-
tutedby their rclationto the goal.The completed acion, wherher
successful -
or not but alsothe actionprojectedascomplete- can
be comparedto other actions,can be undersroodasthe fulfillment
of maxims,can be explainedand justifiedesrhe executionof laws,
canbc excused asdefyinga norm,canbedeniedto othersandin the
limit alsoto oneself.l he doublemeaning andthe complexstructure
of meaningare characteristic of all action but in day-to-dayroutine
!he chxracteristics may appearblurred.
Socialaction,of course,sharesrhis structureof meaningbut ac-
quiresadditionalcharacteristic dimensions:it can be indirect or di-
rect,it can be mutualor unilateral.Socialactioncan be directedto-
wardsother pcoplepresentor absent,deador unborn.It canseekto
address them in their individuality,or associaltypesof differentde-
greesof anonynrity,or nrerclyassocialcategories. It can be directed
towardsobtaininga response or nor - theremay,or may not be,an
answer.It can bc intendedasuniqueor may aim to achieveregular
repetitionor to be prolongedthrough time. The complexmeaning

l2
of social action and social relations is constructed in thesedifferent
dimensionsof nreaning.
In speakingof the constitution of nreaningin thc consciousness of
the individual it rvas already clear that this could not neen the iso
lated subject, thc s'indowless monad. Daily life is full of manyfold
successions of sociirlactionand the personalidentity of the individ-
ual is formedonly in this action.Purcly subjective apprchensions are
the foundation of the constitution of meaning: simplc layers of
mcaning can bc created in thc s.rbjcctive expericnce of a Peison.
Higher laycrs of meaning and a more complex strucnrrc of meaning
dependon thc objectification of subjectivemeaning in social action.
The individuaLis only ableto make complicatedLogicalconnections
and initiate and control differentiated sequences of action if he or
she is ablc to draw on the vealth of experienceavaiiablein a social
contexr. In fact, elemcntsof meaning sirapedby older streamsof so-
cial action ("traditions'),flow even in the lowest levclsof meaning
'Iypification,
of nrdividLral cxperience. patternsof ex-
classification,
pcrienceand schcnleso{ ection are elcnrentsof subjectivcstoresof
knowledge that are largely takcn over ftom thc social stock of
knowledge.
Certainly, subjcctive constitution of meaning is the origin of all
social stocks of knowiedge, historicai rcservoirs of meaning, on
which peoplc born into a particular society in a particular epoch
may dral.'lhe neaning of an cxperienceol action was born
''somewherc
, once upon a timc in the conscious, problenl
soLving" action of an individuai relative to his or her natural and
social environnrcnt. Howeverl si ce most problenrs with which the
nrdividual is confronted also arise in thc lives of other pcople, the
solutions to these problems arc not just subjcctively but also
intcrsubjectively rclcvant.Either the problcIrrs themselves arise{rom
interactive social action, so that the solutions must also be found in
common. Ihcsc solutions can also be objectified in one of a number
of possible ways, through signs, tools, buildings, but above all

ll
 through thc cormnunicativefornx of a languagean<ithus made
availablealsoto othcrs.
In objectificarions the subjective meaning of experienccor action
is detached from the uniqueness of the originalsituationandoffers
itself as a typical meaningfor acceptance inro the socialstock of
knowledge.As differentpeoplercactto similarchallenges simiJarly,
it may cometo passthat they expcctdtesestandardrcactionsof one
anothcror evcnthat they obligatecachother to dcalwith this typi-
cal situationin this and no other way. That is the preconditionfor
actionsto bc transformedinto socialinstitutions.The emcrgence of
historicaL reservoirs of meaning andinstitutions relieves
the individ,
ual of rhe burden of solving problemsof experienceand action
which appearin parricularsituationsfrom scratch.If dre concrete
situationis Lrasically identicalwith constellations which are already
familiar, thcn the individualis ablc to resort to familiar and prac-
ticedformsof cxperience andaction.
However, just as all repctitiousactionsare not transformedinto
institutions all subjectivelyconstituted andintersubjectively oblecti-
fied meaningis not absorbed into socialsrocksof knowledge.Orher
processes are inrerposed,processes in which objecificd meaningis
socially "processed". Theseproccsses are ro a large extenr deter-
mined by thc dominantsociälrelarions.The existinginstitutionsof
dominationand labor,but aboveall the institutionswhich socialize
trensactions with unusualforcesdirect rhemselvcs towerdsrhe dif-
ferentlevclsandareasin whichmeaning is produced. With variable
succcss they attemprro influenccthis productionor to inrervenein
it. Thc differcncesin the degreeof control have beenand remain
enormousevenwithin a singleepoch.This is obviousif one com
paresthe supcrvisionof the productionof meaningin ancientEgypt
with that in IsraelandBabyion,or that in today'sIran with Sweden.
Even more significantarethe difierences one canobscrveacrosssuc,
cessiveepoches; evenif one assunres that up until the onserof mo,
dernity there was a comnon structuralcharacrerisric - the tend
encytowardsmonopolization.

14
 'lhe
subjective"solutions'for problenrsof experience and action,
"primary"
thc objcctificationsof rreeningrvhich becameintersuLr-
jcctivcly retrievablethrough conrrnunication with othcrsare social_
"paths"\ir'hichhave varied enormously
ly processed on different
"secondary'processes
acrosshistory. In institutionaLlycontrollerl
muchis ignoredastoo insignificant; otherthingsarediscarded asin
appropriateor even dangerous.A part of the objectificationsof
nrcanig drawn on for processing are nerely storedaway,dlose
*'hich arejudgedto be adequate or right are givena form of ordcr,
vhilc certainelements ac<lirethe funcrionof examples. lhc hier
archiesof knowledgeandvaluesystems thuscreated nraybe close-
Iy intcrconnccted - as in the premodernworld - or may develop
inrlcpcndentlyof one anodrer.llurthermore, those elemcntsof
nrcaningand systemsof rneaningwhich are retainedare cut into a
shapesuitablefor transmissionto futurc generations. There have
bccnspeciaLists for this function in all but the rnostsimplesocieties.
SpeciaLly trainedexpertstakc on thc functionof censorship, canoni-
zation,systenatization andpedagogy.
As the overallresulrof all of theseactivitiesthereeflergesthe spe-
cific historicalstructureof thc social reservoirof meaning.This
structurcis characterized by the proportion betweenthat which is
acccssible to all membersof the societyas generalknr-'wledge anrl
that specialist js
knowledgeto which äcccss limited.The portion of
thc reservoiro{ meaningwhich is gencralknowledgeforms the ker-
nel of everydaycommon scnsewrth which the individualhas to
'lhis
copc rvith the natural xnd sociel environmentof the time.
portion doesnot havean o"erarchingsystematicstructure.Never-
thclcss it is not withoutstructure: it contains areasof neaningwhich
mapthe regionsof day to day realitythet haveto be managed and
anothcrregionof meaning -hich plumsextraordinary reality.Somc
of theseareasof rneaningacquirea grcatcrdcgree of structure than
those limjted to the practicalroutines of everydaylife through
imports fron systemsof specialknc'wlcdgc.The everydayof mod-
'imports': massmedia
ern socicticsis increasinglyshrpcclby such
diffusccxpcrt knowledgein populariz,cd
form and peopleappropri-
arc picccsof this informationand ;ntegrate
it with thcir stockof

The arcasof rneaningare stratificd.The "lowest', simplesttypifi

cations,relatingto factsof namreandthe socialworld, arethc foun-
dationsof differentparternsof cxperienceand action.Stackedon
thcsctypificationsare schenesof action orientatcdby maxirnsof
action towardshigher values.Supcrordinate'conligurationsof va-
luc" hrvc bcendeveloped sincethe old high culturcsby rcligiousand
later phiJosophical experrsinto valuesystenN.Theseclainrto nrean,
ingfully cxplainand regulatcthc conductof life of thc inclividuaiin
relationto thc communityin both routinesof daily life and in over-
coming criscswith referencetowards realitiestransccndingevery
day lifc (thcodicy).
The claiurof superordinatc conligurationsof valuesand valuesys,
r e m sr " f i l l r h er n r i r " r yo f l i f ew r r hn r e r n i nig. n r o s r p p . r y g innl I
schenredrat bringstogethermodelsfor action in the most diverse
areasand fits them into a projectionof meaningthat srrerches from
birth to death.This schemeof mcaningrelatesthe totality of a life to
a time that transcends dre life of the individual(e.g. 'erernity").
Biographicalcatcgoriesof ncaning, as wc call thcm, endow the
mcxning of short-rangeactiols with long,tern significancc.1he
meaningof cvcrydayroutinesdoesnot disappearentirely but it is
subordinate to the "meanjng of lifc". \(c will narnehcre,amongst
the many historicalconstructionsof biographicalschcnrcs, only rhe
smallgenrcof the exemplary lifc' andthe largergenrcof theholy
life", rhc ancienthcroic cpic, and thc modern heroic legend
(e.g. Prince Eugene,Georgc Vashington,Baron von Richrhofen,
Antoine dc St. Exupöry,Rosal,uxemburg,Stakhanov).
All institrrtionsembodyan 'original' action-nealingwhich has
proveditselfin the definitivcrcgLrlation of socialactionin a parricu-
lar functionalarea.Of particularirlportanceare thoseinstiturions
whosetask includesthe sociaLprocessing of meaning-Most import,
ant of all are thoseinstitutionswhosemain functionsconsistin the

l6
coDtrolof the productionof mcaningandthe transmission of mean_
ing.Suchinstitutions haveexisted in almostall socicties otherthän
thc archaic.In dre old high culturcs,in the societiesof the earlymo'
dcrn period and latcr (e.g. in todaysIran) rcLigiousmoral instittr
tions havebcencloscLytied to thc apparatusof domination They
coLrldaim relativelysuccessfully at both the productionand distri'
butionof a relativclyconsistent hierarchyof meaning. If however
theconditions bothof production anddistribution of socialmeaning
approximatcro an opcn market,this hasconsidcrable consequcnces
for the 'nreaning budget'.In that casea nunrbcrof suPPliers of
mcaningcompctcfor the favor c,f a public that is confronted with
the clifficultyof choosingthe nrostsuitablemeaningfrom the wcalth
of me:nings available. Wc shallrenrrnto thislater.
Institutions havethetaskof storingandmakinga"ailable meaning
for the actionsof the individualboth in particularsituationsand for
en e[tire conductof lifc. This functionof institutionsis howevercs
scntiallyrelatedto tire rolc of dre individualasa consumerbut also
f i o n l * e ' o . , r r r . : p r o d uc, r o f l r c a n i n 6 .
This relationship canbe comparatively simplcLnboth archaic so-
cieticsand in mosttraditionalhigh cultures.In suchcivilizationsthe
mcaning of indivrrhraLsphcres of actions is integratcd withoutmajor
ruptures*ith thc o"erall meaningof life conductandthis is itselfrc
fcrredto a rclativelycoherentvaluesystcm.The conrmunication of
rneaningis joincd to thc control of the productionof mcanirg.Ildu
cation or direct incloctrinationsccksto ensurethat the lndividual
only thinks and doeswhat conforns to the basicnorms of thc so-
cicty. And thc corrtroland censorship of everythingthat is pubLicly
said,taughtor preachcdaimsto preventthe diffusionof dissidcnt
opinion.lnternalandexternal competition is auoided or eliminated
(not alwayssucccssfullyl). l he |re:rningo{ actionsandlife conductis
irlposedasa unquestioncd rule brndingon all. For examPle, the rc-
lationshipof marricd couplesand the relationshipof parentsto
childrcnis defincdunambiguously. Parentsand childrengenerally
conform;devianccis clearlydefincdasdcviancefrom thc norn.

17
 In modernsocietiesconditionsare different.Of course,there are
still institutionswhich conmunicatcthe meaningof actionsfor their
particularareaof action;there are still valuesystcmswhich are ad-
ministercdby someinstitutionsasnrcaningfulcategories of life con,
duct. Ho*'cver, as will be sho*'n, there are, by comparisonwith
premodernsocieties, differences
in the consisrencyof valuesystems
as in the internal and externalconpetition over the productionof
meaning,thc communicationof rneaning,and its imposition.To re-
turn oncemorc to the example:in modernsocietiesit would be dif-
ficult to find parcntsand children for whom the relationshipis
equallybindingon both partiesand is de{inedunquestioningly by a
firm valucsystem.

2. Thc meaningfulness of socialrelationships,

the concurrenceof meaningand the general
conditionsfor crisesof meaning

Sociallyobjcctifiedandprocesscd stocksof meaningare "preserved"

in historicalreservoirsof mcaningand "administered"by institu-
tions.The actionsof the individualareshapedby objectivemeaning
suppliedfrom socialstocksof knorvledgeandcommunicated by the
pressurefor compliancewhich emanates from institutions.In this
process, objectificdmeaningis constantlyin interactionwith subjec-
tively constitutcdmeaningand individualprojects{or acion. IIow-
ever,nreaningcan alsobe ascribed- one might evensay,aboveall
- to the intcr'subjcctivestructureof socialrelationsin which thc
individualac* andlives.
From the very beginninga child is incorporatedinto sociaLrela-
tionships:with its parentsand with other significantpersons.These
relationshipsdeveiopin regular,dircct and reciprocalactions.Strict-

l8
ly, an infant is not capableof action in the full meening of the word.
As an individuated organism i! has, however, the bodily and con-
sciouscapacitics inherentto thc human species which it employsin
its behaviortowards others.'Ihc actionsof others relativeto the
child are thcmseiveslargely dctennined by schemesof experience
and action that are drawn frotr s<xicty's reservoir of nrcaning l'he
chilcl progrcssivelylearns to comprchcnd the actions of its counter-
parts and to understandthcir meaning.Thus jt is able to understand
their actions as typical actions in thc light of historically given PäF
terns of expcrienceand action.The child placesitself in rclationto
socialstocksof meaning.In the proccssit progresslvely developsits
personal iclcntity. As soon as it understandsthe meaning of its
actions,it alrc understandsthat in principle it is held rcsponsiblefor
its own actions.Ancl that is what constitutesthe essenceof personal
identity: subjcctive control of action for which one is objectivcly
responsible.
Let us inragincfor this basicsituationof the communicationof
meaning ts o variants drawn as stylized ideal types. Let us flrst as-
sume rhat there is a 'alue system valid for all of society with which
the variors layers of the historical reservoir of meaning are well
coordinatcd. Let us furthcr assumcthat the parents and the other
important pcrsonalrclations o{ drc child have formed their pcrsonal
identities according to the patterns in the historical reservoir of
meaning. ln such a casethe bchavior of the child is mirrored con-
truently in thc actionsof the others.lf it knocksa plateoff the tablc
then it wlll not be rewarded by a smiLefrom one parent and pun
ished by thr: other with an angry glancc. Under such conditions the
identity of thc child will develop normally without special diffi'
"crises
culties - ler alonc of meaning" - in the sämc manncr as the
identity of the parents was forrned: in concordancewith the bio-
graphical catcgoriesand the value systcm of society's reservoir of
meaning.
For our sccondcaselet us assume,on the contrary, thxt there is no
generally binding value syste'n, no adapted reservoir of meaning

t9
 with biographical categoriesand schemesof action and rhar rhe
others who enter inro sociai rclations with the child do not nrirror
its behavior even approximatcly. The typical consequencesfor the
development o{ thc child arc predictable! Pcrfect concordancc, as
projcctedabove,is never achieved,but rrchaicsocieticsand the tra
ditional high cuitures were not far removed from it. The opposite
casehas hovever no correspondingreaLiry:a socierywithout any
kind of valuesystemand sithout stocksof mcaningadaptedto it is
hard to imagine as a "society . As a child one is born into commun-
, t r c .u f l i f e( l e b e n r t e m c i n r h a l r cw t r , h r r e - t o \ ä r y i n ge x i . n r s
nh
'lhat
also conmunities of meaning. means that even without a
univcrsally sharedstock of meaning adaptedto a single,closedvaluc
systen conrmonaltiesof meaning can be developcd in communities
or drawn from the historical rescrvoir o{ meaning. These comrlon
meaningscan then, of course,be contnrunicatedto children relative-
Iy consistently.
Communities oflife arecharactcrizedby regularly repeated,dircctly
reciprocalaction in durablc social rclationships.Thosc involved
place an institutionaily or other\r,isesecuredtrust in thc durability
of the cormnunity. Beyond thesebasiccommonaltiesthere are wide
differenccsbetween societiesin the differcnt forms of conrmunities
which are institutionalized in them. The universalbasicform are life
communities into which ole is born. However, there are also lifc
communities into which one is adoptcd and those which one joins,
such as partners in marriagc. Some cornmunities of life form
thcftselves through adapting oncs life to the continuation of sociaL
relations that were originally not intended to be prolonged, others
rcquire initiation. Thc examplcsinclude holy orders which also
constitutethemselvesas conrmunitiesof rneaning,leper colonies,
retlrctuent homes! and Prisons.
Comnunities of life presupposca minimum of cornmon meaning.
'fhis
measurccan in some societiesand for some forms of conrmu-
nity be very minimal: it may concern only the coincidcnce of the
objcctive ncaning of the schemcsof day to day social action, as per-

2A
haps in ancient slave householdsor in nrodern prisons. Commu'
nities of life may also aspireto complcte unison in all layersof mean-
lng including the categoriesof thc entire conduct o[ life as in some
monastic orders or in the ideal of certain tyPes of marriage. How
ever, most comntunities of life acrossdiffcrent soci€ticsand ePoches
aspire to a dcgree of shared nrcaning somevhere in between this
nlinimum and maxinrum.
l x p c . r : r o n .c l o < c, u l n c n r l r n r l l r r rr r e n r o s ct o n r n l o n, n c o r ' n . r l
nuies institution:rlizeclthrough force. lheir problems are hardiy
cvcr those of nreaning. tvcn where expectationsare considerably
above the minimurl and a ccrtain congruenceeven of higher lcveis
of mcaning is assumedto be constitutive for the life cornmunity it is
hardly likely thxt a real non-co grucnce in particularlayers of
meannrgvill create :rdditional difficulties beyond thc real life prob
lcms of the comnrunity - insofar asthe discrePancybetweencxPec-
tatiurs and pra.tical realization docs not becone too great Things
arc different if the valuc systenrof a society prescribesthat commu
nitiesof life and ncaning shouldbc coincident,i e. that all pcople
who live in commLrnities should also bring their modesof expcri-
ence ancl action lnto concurrence- ln such a case any apparently
trivial non concurrenceof meaning, any lack of agrccmentcan initi'
atc a crisisof meaningin the life conrmunity in which it appears.
A marriedcouplcfor insrance m:y follow the idealsofthesocietyin
rvhich it lives and may wish for a good and happy old agetogether'
l.ct us assumethat only the man experienc€stheir cornmon aging as
it actually occurs, in the objectificd sense, whercas the womxn
expcricncesa too large discrepancybetween the mcaningssuggested
by society and her own concrcte expcrience. If, in her society,
marriagesare not characterizedby a perfec! con1munity of meaning
thc non concurrcncein the intcrpretationof their common aging
between the two partners in nr:rrriagc may Leadto disputes and
serious arguments but it will hardly lead to a crisis of meaning
which threatens their life community. If, howevcr, it \ras the
assumptionof societythat a marriageshouldbe a completecommu

2l
 nity of meaningthen their disagreemenr would be painfulfor both
partncrsandthe crisisof meaningwould escalate into a life crisis.
Let us renrainfor an instantrvith our example.Let trsassumethe
wife encountcrsother agingnrarriedwomenwho havearrivedat a
similarperspcctive on theircommonaging,a perspective whichdoes
not agrec*ith the dominantviewssharedby their hLrsbancls. In ex-
changingthcir expericncesa conmunity of meaning might be
formed.In thc first variantof our examplethis communityof mean-
ing remainsaspartialasdoesthc rlisagreement with the husbandand
there{oreservcsascompensation ratherthan replaccment. In the se-
cond variant any partiaLdisagreement is interpretcdas "total" and
the new foundcommunityof meaningcouldtakethe placeof the
brokenrnarriage.
V h e r e ; rl i f * . o m m u n i r i cm\ l r \ lp r e \ u m ae nrinimrrn ..rmmuniry
of meanrng,the inverseis not true. Communiticsof meaningmay
under certaincircumstances becomecommunitiesof lifc, they may
howeverbc built up and naintainedexclusivelythrough nrediared,
reciprocalaction-Theseconrnrunities may be foundedon different
not directly practicalievelsof nreanrngand may concerndifferent
realmsof meaning,e. g. philosophical,suchas the humanistcircles
of the early modern period, scientific,such es the nlany E-Mail
cliquesof today, or the "meetingof souls"of which farnouscor-
respondenccs tell, suchasthar betweenH6loiseandAb6lard.
\Vehavescenthat undercertaincircunrstances problenrsmayoccur
in the intersubjective construction of the personal identityof the
child to which the term subjectivecrisisof meaningnray be appli-
cable.lf the behaviorof the child is constantlyconfronredin the
actionof significanradultswith incongruentreacrionsthe child will
be able to discernthc objecrivesocialmeaningof its actionsonly
with difficLrltyor not at all. If the child doesnor receivereasonably
concordant answers to the question"who am I? posedthroughout
its behavior,then ir nrust encounrergreatdifficultiesin taking on
responsibilityfor itself.Even if undertrore favorablccircumstances
the identity of a pcrsonhasbeenunproblemarically constructed, its

22
strength can be endangcredlater Lry persistent,systematlcLrlconsrs-
tency in the rcflection of its actionsin the actionsof others
F u r l . . r n r r r . , w e h a ' e . e c nr h r r r r r r d c,re r t an i r c u n . r , r nc,. i n t e r _
subjecrivecriscs of meaning may occur. For different forms of
community of life different typicaLmcasuresof coherenceare to be
expected- and thesediffcr from society to society and from period
to period. 1hc condition for a crisis of meaning is that the mcnbers
of a particular life-community acceptunqüestioningly thc degreeof
coincidenccof neaning expectetlof them, but are unableto match
"is' 'should"
it. ^s was alreadystatcd,this discrcpancy between and
appearsparticularlyoften lf the idcals<-rf a life community insistthat
r r < h o u 1Id' e. r. u n ' p l e r .c o n r m u n r ruvl n r c ; n i n g .
li 'ubjc.ti' < andrnter-'ubje., ivc crr'c. ol meaningoicrrren nra-e in
a society so th:rt thcy develop into a gcneral social problem, then
one will hauc to seekthe causenot in the subjectitself nor in the
given inter-subjectivity of human existence.It is rather to be ex-
pected that the causesarc !o be found in thc sociäl structure itself
Let us, therefore,cnquirewhich partlcularstructuresof a historical
society counteract the dcvelopment of crisesof nre:rningand which
encouragcsuch a development. More precisely:what are the struc-
tural conditions for a sufficient dcgree of coincidcnce in inter-sub-
jective reflectionssuch that rhe foundation for the formation of per'
sonal idcntity *ith constant meärlrngis givenl \(hen do these pro-
cessescreate subjective criscs ol mcaningl And which structural
conditionspromote and which hindcr the sufFicient coincidcnceof
n f l r f Fc o m m u n i l i et(e ' r \ t ; n rI u
' o c r a rl e l . r r ' r n r t h rrr. h e l o u n d . r t ' " o
crisis?
\(e will attempt to answerthescquestionsin concretetcrms in the
light of thc historical developmcnt of nodcrn society. Flowever, we
wish to prcccdc this attempt with a fcw abstract,gencral considerx
tions. For it is possible- despitethe prxctically endlcssmultiPlicit/
and importance of differcnces between societies- to identify -
with respectto our qr.lestionabout the structural conditions for the

23
 cnrergcnce of crisisof meaning- trvo basictypesof socialstructure
acrossall cpoches-
'l
he first type not particularlysusceptible to crisesof merningare
socicties which havea singleandgenerallybindingvaluesysterninto
which the differentlayersand rcalmsof rncaningarewell intcgrxrcd:
from cveryclayschemes of expericnceand action to the superordi-
nate categoriesof lifc conduct and crisis managerncntdirected
tovards extraordinaryrealiries.l he totaLstockof meaningis stored
andmanaged in socialinstrtutions.
Because the schemes of actionobjcctifiedand mademandatoryin
social institutions are directedtowards a common value system
superordinate to the specificnreaningit is assured in this type of so-
cicty that the institutionssustainthc order of mcaningin basiccon-
cordancewith practicallife. lhcy do this directly and,so to speak,
in dctail,by imprinting thenlsclves or1thc meaningof many day to
day actions;thcy do this,so to spcak,in the largeby identifyingbio-
graphicalcategories of meaningwith communitiesof life, in particu-
lar thoses4richareentrusted wirh forrningthe personal identityof
. L r l d r cB
n r o r u r ni ngr on r e n r b cor f. . o c i c r y .
Differcntsocieties correspond to this basictypeto differentextents.
Archaicsocieties correspondlrost truely to this type. The complcx,
ancicnthigh culturesare slightlylessclosc,but essential characeris-
tics of this type are to be found cvenin the premodernsocieries of
modern times. Like all other societiesthesesocietieshave nrany
organizational problemsandtheir membershaveeverylife problem
inraginable: in dealingwith nature,work, domination,life and
death.Naturallythereare alsoqucslonsof meaningfor the indi-
vidual.But thesecomparatively stable,often evenstaticsocicries
communicatean order of meaningwhich is consistentto a large
extent through congruentprocesscs of sociaiizationand thc irxti-
tutionalizationof action.Thcseproccsses are locatedin meaning-
fully rclatedlife communitiesancldiffcrcnt socialspaces. This basic
type may be simplifiedas an ideal type, howeversocieticswhose
structureevenapproximates to this type provideno groundfor the

24
growth and extensionof subjectiveand inter+ubjectivecrisesof
meaning.
'l'hings in which sharedandbindingvalucs
arediffcrentin societics
arc no longer given for everyoncand structuraLlysecuredand in
which thesevalLrcs do not pcrmeate all spheresof life equallyand
bring them into concordancc. Thrs Lsthe basicconclitionfor the
spreadof both subjectiveand inter-subjective crisesof rneaning.In
"liableto crises"wc will again
formulating this basictype of socicty
neglectmany dctailsto identify in sinplificationits structuralchar-

In suchsocieties thcremay be a ualuesystcninheritedby tradition

as a stock ol nreaningfrom bygoneperiods.This valuesystemis
objectifiedin the socieralstockof knowledgeand is hereend there
'Ihere
still administeredby specialized (rcligious)institutions. may
"imported"fronr the stocksof
evenbc more than one setof valucs
the musäcimagin:rireof meanings.Not wanting to dexl with the
questionof so crlled pluralisn at this point we set to one sidethe
posibility that a multiplicityof valuesystems may coexistA society
may evenbe liableto crisis"if it contains only onesinglevalucsys-
tem, in the firll senseof the word, a singlesystemconsistingof ele
mentsof mcaning(frorn schemesof experienceand action all the
way to gener:rlcategories of life conduct)incorPoratingall spheres
of life arrangedsteprvise to{'ardssuperordinate valucs.
Evenin sucha societyavalue systcm wouldbebothPresent andnot
presen!.In such a societythe big instirutions(of the economy,
politics,and religion)haveseparated themselves from the superordi-
natevalucsysten and determinethe actionof the individualin the
functionalarcathat they administcr.Economicand politicalinstitu-
tions makeobligatorydre instmncntalrational,objcctivemeaning
of schemes of:ctjon in thoseareasfor whichthey areresponsible.
'On 'offer" value-
the sidc, so to spcak,religiouslnstitutions
rationaL(wcrtrational)categories for life conduct.S(eusethc term
' even in case,
assumed hcre, that societycontainsonly one
offer' thc
ordcr of meaningorientatedtowardssupcrordinätc valucs,not muf

25
 tiple, courpctingsystems.Because evenin this casereligiorrsinstitu-
tionstransmitthe higherordcrcategories capable of givingmeaning
to the entircconductof Life,but evenwithout competition from
othcr valucsystensthesec:tetoriesmay not be madcbindingand
may not be inposed on the conductof people.Overall,the institu-
tions of tilis type of societyno longercarry a well-orderedsrockof
meaningand value consistendyand bindingly into thc practiceof
life.
A socicty is rnthinkable entirely without common valuesand
sharedinterpretations of reality.Vhat is the natureof valuesin
sucha type of society,obvrouslytendingtowardsthe modern,and
wherc are they to be found) It is certainthat the scheDres of action
institutionalizedin the differentfunctionalsphereshavea binding
anclobjcctivemeaningfor thoseactingin them.In the organization
of action within a singlespherethere is definitelya communityof
meaning.1'harhoweveris not much by way of commonalties. The
objectivemeaningof institutionalizedschemesof :rctionis instru-
mentallyorientatedtowardsthe functionof this area.Apart from its
generalizable aspectas instrumentallyrariofialthis institutionalized
schemeof action cannot be transferredbetweensphercsand it
certainly cannot be integrated into superordinateschenresof
meaning.lhe objectivemeaningof acrioncannorin itself be inte-
gratedinto cätegoriesref€rringto rhe subjectand simultaneously
directcdtowardsa superordinate valuesystem.Only rcligiousand
'quasi'
religiousinstitutionscommunicate categoriesof meaning
with sucha claimro generality.This claimis howeverrefutedby the
objcctive meaning of the schemes of actionof the other "big"insti-
'lhese
tutions. meaningsdirecr t[e adion of the individualin most
arcasof daily lifc, whether rhey conform ro the superordinate
meaningsof schemes of life cornnrunicared,
for cxampleby religious
institutions,or not. The claiü to integrateones own life into a
superordinatcvalue systemcan be realizedessentiallyonly in a
spherenot touchedby the othcr 'big'institutions, in a sphereso-
cialiydefinedasthe privatesphere'.

26
 A minimumof sharedmeanings in a societyis contained in the
"firnctic,ning
of functions',ie. the
teneralagrccment givento the
agreementthat in eachareaof action condud shouldbe directed
towards instrumcntallyrational requircments.Ancl this minimal
consensus is sccuredby the generäläccePtance that in the Private
reservesof individual existenccand comnlunitiesof life separate
meaningsof Lifemay be pursucd,distinctfrom thoseof other indi
vidualsand groups.This minimum may be cxceedcdeven in this
"big" institutions
typc of societics.First, it is remarkablethat the
bind their spccific meanings- beyond the rationality of the
organizationof actionwithin thenr to generalvalucs,suchasfor
"drc interest".
I-xceeding the mininlLrm in thisway
example general
may fulfill abo"e all legitimatelypurposes while the schemes ol
action thenxclvcsmay remain untouched.Furthermore,secondly,
individr.ralsandcomrnunities of meaningmay attenPtto difcct their
'big' institution
action evcn within a sphereadnrinistcredby a
"values' going beyond its instrumentally
towards supcrordinate
rationalobjectivcmeaning.llowevcr, this canoccuronly in conflict
with the specificinstrumentalrationality.
'fhe valuesfor
attenrptsby institutionsto conn€ctto suPerordinatc
lcgitimatorypurposes may prodrrcc only vapid fonnLriac and value-
orientatedconductof life may bc limited to the reserveof the pri-
vate.This would add to the conditionsfor the spreadof subjective
anrlinter-subjectivc crisesof nrcaning. However,this alsocreates,
simultaneously, the precondrtionsfor somethingclse,nanely the
coexistence of differentvaluesystemsanclfragments of valuesystems
in the sanresocietyand thus the parallelexistence of quite different
communitiesof meaning.The statewhich resultsfronr th€sepre-
conditionscan be calledpluralism.If it itself becomesa suPerordi
natevaluefor a socictywe may speakof modernplLrralism

27
3. Modernity and the crisisof meaning

If pluralism rvere defined as a state in which people who lead their

lives in vcry different ways are to bc found in thc samesociety,one
would not be dealing with a spccificallymodern phenomenon. One
could find one or other variant o{ pluralism in almost all societies
other than the archaic. Ancient lndia as well as the India o{ today
was charactcrized by a pluralism of casts, medieval Europe by a
pluralism of estates-But in thcse examplcsthe different forms of life
would still be related to a common value systen and thc interaction
bctween the communities of life would remain limited and strictly
regulrtcd. Even if one defincd pluralisrn as a statein which dif{erent
forrns of lifc were to be found in a society without these different
forms of life being referrcd to a common value systemone would be
ablc to find examples,for instance the Roman Empire which in
economic and poLiticalterms was a single sociery.But even here the
interaction between thc different groups and peoples - insofar as
they werc not regionally separatcd- was reglllatedsuch that the dif-
fercnt supcrordinatestocks of nreaningwere uncoupled from the in-
stitutionalized schcmesof action of the functional spheres.The dif-
ferent groups could, therefore, interacr in the instrumentally ra-
tional sphereso[ action while at thc sametime remaining attachedto
their orvn value systems-For example,the relations ofJews to non,
'fence
Jewsrvereregulatedby the so-called ofthe law".
1f thescregulations are no longer,or canno longer,be nraintained,
then a ncw situation is created, widr serious implications for the
takcn-for granted starusof value systemsand overarching views of
the world. Thc ethnic, religious and orher groups and coDrmunities
of lifc, divided by different stocksof meaning,are no longcr spatially
.cp.]rrr.d(r. for o,amplein rrgrorr ut r rorierl or 'rrrc or in quar.
ters or thetrocs of a city), nor do they interact only through the
neutral tcrrain of strictly separatedsequences of action in institution-
alized functional spheres.Encountersor, under certain circum-

28
stances,clashesbetwcendiflerent välue systensänd views of the
world becomcinevitablc.
'l'hcre
ha'e bcenapproximations to this stateof affairsbefore,c. g.
in thc Ilellenic uorlcl. This form of pltralisrn is not necessarily
linkcdto thespreadof crises of meaning, thoughparticulariy in the
Hellcnic world there wcre alsosignsof this. This form of plLrralism
hasbecomefully flcdgedonly in modcrnsocietics. Here, the ccntral
structuralaspects of this pluralisnrhavcbeen raiseclto the stätusof
an cnlightencdvalucabovethe diffcrentcoexisting andcontpeting
"en-
value systcnx. So, for examplc,tc'leranceis rcckoned the
lightencd'virtue par cxcellence, sinceonLythroughtolerancecanin-
dividuaLs and conrmunitiesLivesideby sicleand with one anodler,
whilst directing üeir existencetowards different values. This
modcrnform of pluralisnis, ho*cvcr,alsothc Lrasic conditionfor
tire spreadof mbjcctiveand intersubjective crisesof meaning.
\Vhethcrmodernpluralismneccssarily lcadsto suchcrisesis en open
question.Howevcr,one can say with certaintythat in highly
devcloperl indusrrial countries, i-c. where mc,dernizationhas
progrcssecl furthcst and thc nülern form of pLuralismis fully
developcd,valuesystemsand stocksof meaningare no longcr the
'l
comnronproperty of ail membersc'f society. he individualgrows
up in a norld in which therearc neitherconrmonvalueswhich
deternrine actionin differentsphcres of life, nor a singlercality
identicallor all. The 'ndividualis incorporatedinto a suPcrordinate
systemof meaningby thc cornmunityof life in which it growsup.
Howcvcr, this canrot be assunedto bc the nrcaringsystemof odler
pcople(Mitmcnschen). l hcseothersmay ha"cbeenshaped by quhe
differentsysrens of nrcaning in the communities of life in which
they grew up. In Europc, sharedand overarchingsystemsof in-
terprctationwerc alreadyshakcnin the early phaseof modcrni-
zation. The history of totalitarianideologiesin the last hundred
ycarshasshorvnth:rt nothing, not cven radicalregrcssion, can re
store such interpretativcschemespcnnanentlyor make thcnr the
structLrralcharactcristic of a modernsociety.lt is, by the way, also
 questionable whctherfundamentalist attemptsin rhe countriesofthe
so calledThird Vorld will be more successlul regardless
of the in-
tensiry rvuh *'hrch overarchingand universallybinding stocksof
meaningaredefended today.
It hasbeennotcd that suchconditionspronrotethe spreadof sub-
jectiveand intcr-subjective crisesof meaning.ßut while somecondi-
tionsaccelerate suchcrisesthereare otherswhich hinderthem.The
palc superordinate valuesof modernpluralismdo not havethis
power.They nrayhaveother usefuleffectsin that they promotethe
peacefulcoexistence of diffcrent forms of life and value systems.
lhey are,howevcr,not suitableto dircctly counteractthe spreadof
crisesof meaning.They tell the inclividualhow to behavetowards
other peopleand groupswho differ in their view of life. They do
not, however,tell one how one shouldleadonc'slife when the un-
questioned validity of the traditionalorder is shaken.That may be
achievedby diffcrentmeans.As the degreeto which sociallyvalid
conditioningof sharedinterpretationsol reality decreases different
communitiesof life candevelopincreasingly into quasi-autononrous
comnunitiesof meaning.insofarasthesecommunitiesproverhem-
selvesrelativelystablethey may preservetheir nrembersfrom crises
of meaning.Stabilityis particularlyimportantfor the role playedby
suchlife communitiesin the coherentformationof personalidentity
of children grorvingup in them, who may thereby be protected
from subjective crisesof meaning. Concretecommunities of life as
qüasr'autonomous conmunitiesof nreaning,andnrorestable,"pure"
conrmurniticsof like minded peoplc (Gesinnungsgemeinschaften)
counteractthe pa demicspreadof crisesof meaning.However,they
cannottranscend the preconditions which prornotethe spreadoF
cnscsof meaninganchoredstructurally in modern society.Iiur-
themore, to rcpeatthis point, communitiesof ljfe nr which the dis,
crepäncybetweenthe expectcdand factualcommunityof mcaning
is too greatcan themselves becomethe trigger for inter-subjective
crises ofmeaning.
This dialecticalrelationshipbctweenthe lossof meaningand the

30
nev creation of nreaningor between the erosionof nrcaning andits
'lhis
rebuilding can most clcarly be observed in the case of religion.
is, in any case,thr: mostimportantform of a comprehensive pattern
of experiencc and values,systematically structurcdand rich in mean_
ing. For the largestpart of humanhistory a societywasunthinkable
without a single rcligion encompassing everythingand everyone
'lhc
godsof nry ancestors verc nanrrallyalso nry own gods;my
godswerenaturallyaLsothe godsof all the membersof my tribe or
ry town. Most archaicsocieties wcre like this. Acrosslong periods
of time high culnrreswith rnany differentiatedsocialinstitutions
wcrelikethisaswcll.Thenthisunitybetween the individual, his or
hersocietyandthegods,embodying thc highestauthority in the or-
dcr of vaiue,rvasshakenin diffcrcntpiacesand at diflerenttypesby
religiousschisms.This happenedlong beforethe beginningof mo-
dernity,asfor exarnplein the exodusof lsraelfrom the unifiedsym
bolic order of the MiddleEast,or evenmore radicallyin the separa-
tion of Christianityfrom the symbolicorder of classical antiquity.
After suchschisnrs therewere rcpeatedattemptsto restorea super
ordinatesysremof oreaningon a new basis,perhapsof a smaller
scope("subculture'insteadof culturc)- asin the unity of the tribe
of Israclwith its God or in the constantsearchfor thc unity of the
Christianchurch.
Vith the conceptof Christendomin the Europeanmiddleagesan
anemptwasmadeto irring togetherall the peoplein a certrin space
of power under a single,common and superordinatesystemol
meaning,and to h,-,ldthcm there.\Vc know that this attemPtwas
neverentircly successful. \üithin Christendomnrinoritiespreserved
their specialsymbolicsysterls-Jews, heretics,cultsderivingfrom a
paganpart.At ti'res thc symbolicunity of Christendomwasbroke
up from without(lslam)or from within (GreekOrthodoxy,Albin-
gensians). It wasmostseverelyshakcnby the Rcformation-The con-
sequences of thn quakewerenot intended,for the reformerswanted
to restoreand prcscrvea uni{iedChristendomon r ncw basis.The
schismof thc church foiled this attempt at thc Europeanlevel.

l1
 Alongsidethc Orthodox church two new "Christcndoms"emerged
- onc C:rtholic,the othcr Protcstant.The formula rvirh which the
religiouswarsin centralEuropcwereended- cuiusrcgio,eiusreli-
gio - wis thc foundationfor an attcnrptto restorcsymbolicunity at
leastwithinsmallspaces of rule.Llowcver, dueto the onsetof mod
ernizationcven this territorial solution was only shortlived. In-
dustrialization,urtranization,nrigrationand masscommunications
could not be clcanlydividedinto Catholicand Protestantchannels.
In nodcrn centralEuropc Catholicsand Protestants(and increas-
ingly membcrsof manyfaiths,not to speakof incrcasingnumbersof
peoplenithoLureligion)encounter eachother and are mixedup,
e.g. throughrrarriage.
The conccptofregio in thc formulaof the Peaceof Vestphaliathus
losesits spatial meäning.ltcgio becomesthe sphcre of cotrmu
nication for a community of meaningand convictionrrsuallynot
limited to a particular area. One is Catholic by belongingto a
Catholic rcligiouscommunity and taking part in other Catholic
institutions evcnif one'sneighbors 'lhese
are protestants. subcuf
tures, generallyvoluntary conrntunitiesof convrction,no longer
offer the securityof earliercomnrunitiesof life and nreaningwhich
were embcddedin societaiordcrs of value and meaning.Never,
rheless,through variousfornrs of comnrunicationand socialrela-
tions they can savethe individual from unmasterablccrisesof
meaning.If they do not turn radicallyagainstsocictyand are at ieast
toieratedby it, they act,so to spcak,on aggregate to stenrthe spread
of crisesof mcaningin society.linlightenedrulerswcre wiseenough
to recognizcthis and left their subjectsto seekhappinesswhere
they find it". It turned out that the hope tirat Catholicscould be
loyal supportersof the Prussiancrorvnwaswell founded.
Vhat hasbeensaidaboutreligionholds,mutatismutandis,for other
conprehcnsiveorders of meaning.Moderniz-ationhas made the
assertion ol thc monopolyof localizedsysrems of nreaningandvalue
acrossentire socictiesmore tlifficult if not entirely impossible.Ar
the safle time it has creatcdüe posibility for the formation of

32
communiticsof convictiontranscending spacc(e.g. through com-
prchcnsiveideologies) and from drcsestocksof meaningthe shared
nreanings of smallercoolmunitiesmxy be derived.Despitethis pos
sibility the overalldeuelopmcntcngenders, aboveall, a greatdegree
of insecurity;both in the orientationof individualactionsand the
entiredirection of l;fe.
Nevertheless, it 'ould bemislcading to drawtheconclusion, from
this alone,that nrodernsocieties sufferfrom comprehensive crisesof
rneaning.Therearestill peoplewho cvenundertheseconditionsare
ableto establisha meaningfulrelationshipbetweenthe experiences
of thcir own livesandthe variousinterpretivepossibilities offcredto
them and who are thereforeable to conducttheir lives relatively
meaningfully.Furthertrore,there are the institntions,sub-cultures
and communitiesof convictiol wirich transporttranscendent values
and stocksof mcaninginto concretesocialrelationshipsand life
conrmunities andsupportrhenrthere.The succcss of modernsocicty
beyondthcse"islands of meaning"is duc to a legalization of the
rules of social iife and its "old fashionednrorality", lurthermore
through the formal moralizationof certainmore or lessprofession-
alizcdsphercsof action-Legalizationmeansthat the functionaLsys-
tem is rcgulatcdby abstractnonns,fixed in writing and bindingon
ali membersof a society.Moralizationis an attemptto solvecon-
crcte cthical qucstionsthat appearin individualspheresof action.
|or example,in the USA academicdisciplinessuch as "mcdical
etirics' or "business ethics' havecmerged.Legalizationignoresthe
differentvaluesystenrsof thosc affected.The nroralizationof pro-
fessionalspheresdoeswithout a conrprehensive order of meaning.
Iloth creatcthc conditionsin which peoplemanagetheir daily lives
withouta comprehensive andshared nroralrty.
Sucha societycanbe comparcdrvith a systemof traffic rules.One
stopson red and driveson grcenand the maintenance of theserrrles
is in the intcrestof all participants.One canthereforenormallyrely
on peopleabidingby the ruleswithout the rulesthemselves being
legitinratedin deepmoral tcnns. If the rulesare inlringed, one can

33
bring thosewho haveinfringcdthc 'traffic rules"to reason,by laws
or by non staterules,rlaintainedby tradeassociations or medicalas-
sociations.Char:rcteristically, groups with rival interestin demo-
cräticsocietiesattcmptto havcthe "trafficrules' which aremostim-
portant for them legalizcdby thc state.Obviously,the analogyis
only partial: 'traffic rul""s"can rcfcr only to the practicalissuesof
individual spheresof social lifc. Lven there a moralizing,value-
orientaredrhetoricmustbc enrployed.
Particularlyif groupswith an intcrestin a particularset of rules
wish to usethe denrocraticproccssto legalizetheserules,then they
mustseekto legitimize theserulcsby reference to vxluesrelevant to
all of society- howevervaguelythescmay be formulated.
Beyondtheinfluence "ethics'
of thelawandthe ofparticular sphere
individualsare lcft to their own devices.Systemsof ethics let
alonethe lawswhich rcgulateconductin professional life or in the
publicsphere - arcof linlerrsein overcoming crisesof meaning and
conflictsin person:llifc. I lowcvcr,evenif we ignorethe factthat
the analogywnh traffic rulcs is incomplete,it is in any casevalid
only for thc 'normalcase. Vhat docsthat mean?h means that the
analogyassumcs a societywhich hasachievcda high degreeof eco-
nomic prospcrity,experiences no inrDlcdiatcthreatfrom outsideand
hasnetotiatedrelationsbetwccndiffcrentgroup interestsrelatively
peacefully.h is one of thc saddcningexperiences of this centurythat
such"normality'is alwaysfragile.lf conditions are"abnormal" and
particularlyif it is dcmandedof individualsthat they shouldplace
their interestsbchindthoseof socictyasa whole,then "trafficru1es"
are no longcr cnough.In sucha situation,an overarchingmorality,
regardless of how it is founded,bccorncs e societalimperative.
\{rhat we havejust claimeddraws on a tradition of sociological
theory which can be tracedbackabovcall to Emile Durkheim and
the Frenchschoolfoundedby hin. Flowever,it rejectsone of their
basicassumptions. Durkheim bclicvedthat no societycan survive
without an overarching morality; ire named that overarching
morat-symbolic c,rder'religion".\üe divergefrorn Durkheim in that
wc clo not acceptthis necessity for thc "norrnalcase".lhe dialogue
with Durkheirnrcquiresus to specifythis "normal case"more pre
cisely.Durkheim devotedmuch effort to the study of the phenom-
enon of sacrificebecause he considercd that the willingnessto sacri'
ficc oncsown interestsandin extrcnrisoneslife for thc socialwhole
was a decisivecharacteristic for thc ability of a societyto survivc.
Durkhcinr'sassumption holdsfor a societyrvhichis exposcd to an
cxistcntial üreat. But it rs preciselythß threatwhich is missingin
thc normalcase. The trafficpartlcrpants needto follow the ruies
in thcir orr,n interest;no willingncssior sacrificeis presumed.
Modcrnizationmakesthe occurrcrrce "normal
of such cases"nruch
morc 1ikelythan it wasin carlicrpcriocls:rnodernizarion bringswith
it cconomicgrowth which is typicallyassociared with rclativepoliti-
cal stability.The citizenry is much lcsstcnrptedto questionthe le-
gitinracy of an order lvhcn its survival is sccuredby matcrirl
prosperiy. However, it shouldbc cmphasized that it would be a
gravccrror to assumethat this statccould be regardedassecureand
irreversible.
'l
hc rveakeningand eventhe collapse of an overarching orderof
nrcaning with the onsetof modernityis hardlya noveltheme.The
cnlishtcnmcntand its successors n,clconrcdthis processasthc over-
turc for thc crcationof a new onler bascdon freedomand rcason.
'l
hc postrevohLtionary Frenchtraclitioralistsand other conservative
thinkers havebewailedthe sameproc€ssas decadence and declinc.
Vhcthcr modcrnity and its conset1ucnce arc welcomedor rcjected
thcrc ;s widespread conscnsus on tbe factsof the matter.!üe feelthet
this conscnsus though not complctclyunfounded doesundulysinr
'lhcrc
plify a conrplcxsituation. is widespread consensus not only
anrong* expertsbut alsoin conrnxrnsenseunderstanding aboutthe
cause,perhapseven the main crusc of this breakingapart of the
'l
conrprehensive order of meaning. his is to be found in the retreat
of religion. Religion here is not understoodin the wider sense
enployedby DLrrkheim,i.e.asany comprehensive orderof meaning
and world order, but rather in the narrower more corventionäl

t5
mcaning- religion,asbeliefin god,in anotherworld, salvationand
the bcyond.$(ith reference to thc n)odern\Vestthis impliesthat the
declincof Christianityhascauscdthc moderncrisisof meenint.
This nor very originalinterpretationwasaccepted asfact andwel-
comedby progrcssivephilosophersanrl intellectualsand mourned
by almostall conservative ideologicalthinkers.Put simply the main
thesisof this argument,well established in the socioiogyof religion
"secularizetion
as the thesis'is that modernhyleadsinescapably to
sccularization secularization in the senseof a lossof influenceof
religiousinstitutionson socictyas well as the iossof credibilityof
religiousinterpretations in peoplc'sconsciousness. Thus comesinto
beinga historicallynew species: "the
nrodernperson"who believes
that onecancopeboth in onesown life and in socialexistence with-
out religion.
The confrontation with this 'nrodernperson"hesbecomean im-
portanttopicfor wholegcnerations of Christiantheologians and a
centralpointin theprogranrme of the Christian churches in western
countries. l;or thisthesis,aswell,a nLrmber of argrrmen* canbe de-
ployed.Ilistoricalevidence suggcsts that at Leastsincethe 18thcen-
tury the socialinfluence of thc churchhasdeclined, at leasrin wes-
tern Europe, (e.
andthat importantinstitutions g. the enrireeduca-
tional systcm)haveliberatedthcmselvcs from their earlierreligious
ties.In addition,the term 'modern person"is not entirelydivorccd
from reality. It is likcly that there are a considerablcnumber of
peoplcwho copewith thcir liveswithout religiousfaith (in the sense
definedcarlier)or religiouspractice.Vhether this type of secular
exjstence is an absolutenoveltyis questionable. It is likely that there
have alwaysbeen pcople who have found thcir happinessin this
v'orld without churches- before and after they came into ex-
istence.But evendisregarding this, dre equationof modernity and
secularization must be treatedskeptically.I{ the secularization thesis
appliesanywhcre,then in westcrn l-urope. (Even there it would
have to be questionedsr'hethcrthc institutional retreat of the
churchescan be equatcdwith the rctreatof rcligiousinterpretations

36
in consciousness.) Observers of the Europeanreligiousscene(incLLrd-
ing one of the two authorsof this study) have for a long time
pointed out that declericalization shouLdlot be confusedwith the
lossof religion.In any casethe convcntionalsecularizalion dlesis
rapidlylosescredibilityassoo asoue leaves\Western Europc.
A particularirritant for this theory is the stateof religion in the
United States.American societycrn hardly be describedas un-
modern.I Io*'ever,religionis forccfullyaliveandpresenttherc.And
this is trueboth at the institutional leuelasq'ellasin the conscious-
nessanrl life conductof millionsof peoplc.There are fcw signsthat
this situationis changingin thc dircctionsuggcsted by the scculariza-
tion thesis.Outside l:,uropeand North America it is in any case
nonscnse. The so calledl'hird Vorlcl is in fact shakenby thc onrush
of religiousrnovements. The Islauricrereissxnce hasattractedmost
attentionbut it is far from bcingthe only case. \Vorldwide one can
traccthc success story of evangelicalProtestantism, the moststriking
chapterof which is Evangelism. l his new Protestantism spreads like
a prairie fire - in s-idestretchesof Eastand Southeastern Asia, in
Africasouthof the Sahara and mostsurprisingly - in all coun-
trics of Latin America.Often it is preciselythoselayersof society
most touchedby modernizationwhich are most susceptible to reli
giouscndrusiasm. The troops of todaysreligiousmassmovcnrents
arc to bc found in the new citicsof the Third Vorld, not in thc tra-
ditionalvillages.Peopletraincd at tbe nrodernuniversiticsare olten
the lcading cadres ofthismovemcnt.
ln short: the Europeanmodel of secularized modernity hasonly
limitedexportvalLre. The mostinrportantfactorin the creationof
crisesof meaningin socictyas in dre lilc of the individualis prob-
ably not the supposedly modcrrrsecularity but modernpluralisnr.
Modcrnity meansa quantitativeaslvellasqualitativeincrease in plu
'fhe
raliz:uion. structuralcauses of this fact arewell known: popula-
tion growth and migrationand, associated with this, urbanization;
pluralizationin the physical,dcrrogr:rphicsense;the market eco-
nomy and inclustriaLization which throw together people of the
 mostdifferenthindsand forcethem to dealwith eachother reason-
ably peacefully;the rule of law and denrocracywhich provideinsti-
tutional guarantces for this peacefulcoexhtence. The mediaof mass
communication constantlyand empharicaLly paradea pluraliryof
ways of life and thinking: both prlnted materialriding on massli,
teracyspreadacrossthe entirepopulationby compulsoryschooling
and the nes-estelectronicmedia.If the interactionsenabledby this
pluralizationare not restrictedby 'fenccs' of one kind or another,
rhis plurälismtakesfull effect,bringing with it one of its conse-
quencesr the "structural'crisisof meaning.
'lhe "fence
of the law" wasalrcadymentioned.RabbinicalJudaism
erectedthis fenceto distinguishpracticingJewsfrom their profane
surroundings. It wasthis 'fence"which madepossiblethe survivalof
the Jewish community over many centuriesin a mainly hostile
Christianor Islamicsociety-One nlight alsosey:the "fenceof the
law" protectedthose peoplelivnrg within it from pluralism.This
protectioncollapsedwith the emancipationof the Jewsin wesrern
societiesand the people affcctedwere consequentlyparticularly
liableto crisesof meaning.It is not merehappenstance lhat modern
Jewish thinkers andwriters have concerned th emselvesparticularly
in-
tensivelywith suchcrisesof meaning.Converselyone can saythat
any group that wishesto protect itself from the consequences of
pluralismmust erectits own 'fenceof the law'. As wasmentioned,
there havebeen instances of pluralisurthroughouthistory, for in,
stxncein the large towns of late antiquity and probably at times
alongthe trade routesand the urban cenrersof Asia. The modern
processes of pluralizationdistinguishthemselves from their pred-
ccessors not only by their immenseextent(muchwider circlesare
affectedby them),they are alsodistinguished by their acceleration:
whiLsttheir effectsprogressively extendto "new" countries,they do
not remain static,in alreadyhighly modernizedsocietiesthey are
accelerating.
Modern pluralismleadsto a thoroughrelativizationof systemsof
valuesand schemes of intcrpretation.Put differently:the old value

38
 ' '.
systemsandschemes of interpretationarc decenonizedThe result-
ing disorientationof the individual and of whole groupshas for
yearsbccnthe main themeof socixland culturalcriticism.Catego-
"anorrie'
ries suchas 'alienation"and arc proposedto charäctcrize
thc difficulty experienccd by peopletrying to find their way in the
modcrnworld. fhe weakness of suchcommonplaceconcePtions is
not that they exaggerate the crisisof meaning. Their weakness is
their blindncss towardsthe capacity aswell asdiffer
of individuals
ent conrmunitiesof life and meaningto preserve
their own values
and intcrpretations.Existentialphilosophy from Kicrkegaardto
Sartrchasdeveloped the mostimprcssiveconceptionof the alienatcd
human being.Other versionsxrc to be found throughoütrecent
\festcrn literanrre(oneneedmentiononly Kafka).However,it can-
not bc doubtedthat this imagcof humanityappliesto only a small
portion of the populationin rnodernsocieties(thoughthis portion
may be in certäinrespecrs an importantone).Most peoplein these
societiesdo not vander around likc charactersin a Kafha novel.
They arenot plaguedby fearand arenot temptedto makedesperate
"condemnedto
lcapsof faith , nor do they co sider themselves
frcedonr'-One x-ay or anothcr,with or without religion,they cope
with their lives.It is importantto understand how they mänagcthis.
But beforewe attempt!o pursuethis questionwe wish to return
oncc more to or.rrclain that pluralismis the causeof the crisisof
mcaningir modernity.We must cxaminemore closelythe signifi'
cancefor the stock of meaningend the processthrough which
meaningis lost, of the socialpsychologicalstatusof meaningand
knowlcdgeastaken'forgranted.

J9
4. The lossof the taken-for-granted

lf communities of life and mc:ning rcally overlap to the extent that

is demandedby social cxpectariols, rhen social life and the existence
of thc individualproccedhabitu:lly alnrost"by themselves". This
doesnot necessarilyimply drat drc individuals have no life problems
or that they are happy with thcir fate. However, rhey a! least
"kno\ir"
about the world, how tr-,bchave in it, what is reasonableto
cxpect and, iast but not least, indiviclLralsknow who they are. For
exrmple, the role of a slavc was presurnably never a pleasantone.
Nevertheless,however unpleasantit may have been the individuals
who occupied this role livcd in a steady and clearly identifiable
world in which they could orientate their behavior, rheir expecta-
tions and their iden!ity rvith sonrc dcgreeof confidence.They were
not lorced to daily rcdefine the nrcaningof their existence.This un
anbiguous definitionof exntcncein the world was sharedby the
siavesard their owners, though it must be assurnedthat the latter
felt more at easein their cxistencethan did the slaves.Neither rhe
slavc nor the slavcorvner were, as Sartre rvould say, "condemnedto
freedom". (Thc possibilrty that the slavesmight rebel or the slave
on'ner abandon his property to bccome a monk nccd not concern us
here - quite apart from the f:ct that such caseswere rare.)
Modern pluralism undcrmines this conrnron-sense"knowledge".
The world, society, life and personai identity are called ever more
into question. They may be subjcct to nrultiple interpretations and
cxch interpretation defines its own perspcctivcsof possibleaction.
No irterpretrtion, no rangc of possiblcactionscan any longer be ac
ceptedasthe only true and unquestionablyright one. lodividuals are
thus frequently faced with thc question whether they should not
have iived their lives in a completely different manner than they
have hitherto. 1'his is expericncedon dre one hand as a great libera-
tion, as an opening of new horizons and possibilitiesof life, leading
out of the confines of the old, unquestionedmode of existence.The

40
sanreprocessis, however, often exPeriencedas oPPressive(often by
the sanrepeoplc) - as a pressureon individuals to repeatedlymake
senscof the new and the unfamiliar in their realities. Thcre are
pcople who withstand tllis pressure;thcre are some who evcn seem
to rclish it. One might call thcnr v,rtuosos of pluralism. However,
the najority of people feel insccure and lost in a confusing world
full of possibilitiesof interpretation of l'hich some arc linked to al
rernativewaysof life.
The conceptsdevelopedby Arnold Gehlenin his theory of institLr
lions help us to understand this anrbivaLentsituation. Vc have al-
ready made rcfcrence to this body of theory in the introductory
cirapter with referencetc, the inrportmce of institutions for hunran
oricntation in reality. Institutions are designedto relieve individuals
of thc nccessityof reinventing thc world and reoricntatiog thcm
'programmes"
selvesin it evcry day. Instittltions create for the con
'execution"
duct of social interaction and for the of particular cur-
riculum vitae.They provide tcstcdparternstowardswhich peoPle
may rlirectbehavior.By practicingthese prescribed"nodes of be'
havior the individuallearnsto natch the expectations that go with
ccrtain roles: c. g. as husbancl,father, employec, tL\ Paycrl Particr'
pant in traffic, consumer. If institutions are functioning reasonably
norm:rlly, thcn individuals fuLfill the roles assignedto them by so'
cicty in the form of institutionalizcd schemesof action and leadtheir
livcs accorclingto insritutionally sccurcd, socially shaped curricula
which arc largely acceptedunqucstioningly.
in their effcctsinstitutions are substitutesfor instincts: they allow
action nithcrut a1lalternatives havingto be considered. Many soci-
etally inportant socialintcractionsarc carriedout quasiautomati
calLy.Every timc slavesreceive an order from their mastcr they do
not need to consider whcthcr to obey or Dot. Nor does the slave
orvner pauseto consider whether he is entitled to give orclersto his
slaves.Neither the slavesnor the släveowner queslion their own ac-
tions or the actronsof dre other; typicälly, their action is unreflec-
tivc. Connecting Gehlen's theory of institutions with the social
 psychologyof GeorgcI Icrbert Mcadc(to which the precedingdis-
cussionof the formation of pcrsonalidcntity is alsoindebted)one
can saythat the institutional"programmcs'are ' internaiized' ir in-
dividualconsciousness anddircctthc indivldual'sacrionsnot asalicn
but as the individual's 'Programmes"
own mcanings. are internal-
ized in multi-laycredproccsscs: first in "primary
sociälizätion",in
which the Ioundationsare laid for the formationof personaliden-
tityi then in "sccondxrysocializ-ation" which directsthe individual
towardsthe rolcsof socialrcality,aboveall in the world of work.
The structurcsof societybccomcstructuresof consciousness. Slave
and masterdo not mcrcly behavein conformity with their roles,
they think, feel and concciveof thcnxclvesin waysthat conformto
'I
their rolc behavior. hc srrbjectivc world of the individualdoesnot
necessari)y haveto coincidecomplctclys,ith sociallyobjectifiedrea-
lity - this is impossible.In the processof socializationthere are if
not realbreaksthen at leastsnrallcracks.In the fornrationof person-
ality there can be at best an :pproxinrationto the completecon-
gruenceof meanings. A scanrless transitionfrom primaryto sec
ondarysocialization js thc cxceprioin nrostsocieties, not the rule.
The individual has idiosyncratrcinrpulsesand daresro transfer
dreamsinto day to day life and to seekadventures outsidethe pro-
grammesof socicty.Neverthclcss,even üis can be spokenof as
''nonnatity'.
Deviations from the institutional programmes anddi-
vergences from the society'shistoricalrescrvoirsof meaning(andre
servesof meaning)arerelativc)yrareand remainlimited to the indi-
vrrlrul:and rhi' rncan'th:u rl .y Jo nor enrerinro communicarrve
processcs anri that "censordlip"opcraresevenat the lowestlevel of
objectificationand conrmunicationof "dangerous"thoughrs.If
"censorship"
is unableto containthe deviationwithin the interior
life of the individualthcn specialinstitutionalprogrammesare ap-
pliedin the treatmentof the deviant.'lhis rrearmenthasboth an ex-
ternaland an internalaspect.DxternalLy tllc rangeof treatmentsex-
tendsfrom the physicalliquidationof thosewho havedeviatedfrom
the true path to loving spiritualcarefor "lost sheep".One way or

42
anotherthe deviantbchaviormustbc renderedharmless - harmless
for the executionof thc progrannre. fhe obstacleto the smooth
functioningof the machinerymustbe removed.The internalaspect
of this processof socialcontroLis the attemptto stop deviant
thought and to restorcthe previoLrs'mindless"acceptance of nor
malrty.
Instinrtionsdraw thcir power from the naintcnanceol unqlres-
tioned vaLidity.An institutionis endangered fronr the moment in
which the peopleLivingwithin it or with it beginto think aboutin-
stitutional roles, identities,schenresof interpretation,valuesand
ways of viewingthc worlcl.Conscrvativephilosophershavealways
senseddris;seniorpolicemcn know it from practicalexperiencc. In
the normalcase"dangerous thoughtcanbe reasonably controiled.
'Ihere
However,pluralismmakesthis controLmore difficult. is here
a cLearsociafpsychological -
dialectic from liberationto burden-
somefrccdom:it is extremelyhardto be forcedto leadonesown life
without beingableto hold on to' unquestioned pattersof interpre-
tationand normsof bchavior.This leadsto a clamorous nostalgia
for the good oLd daysof unfreedom.Liberation is an xmbituous
thing. As GehLenputs it: freedomis born out of alienation- and

Modernliteraturc isfull of examples ofthis.Oneneedthinkonlyof

thc themeof "provincialism", of thc biographicaldialecticbetween
town and city, of thc many possiblc 'paths to freedom' (Arthur
Schnitzlcr).MadameBovarysuffersin her narrow,provincialworld.
But if shehad had the chanceto moveto Parisshewould not have
remained happyfor long.Alienatlonwouldhavebeenthe priceof
"roorlc-
her grcrter lre"dom. rhe l-,''clr. br"r cen,rrnlylrer
chilclrcnwould probably haveconceivedthe ideathat the old pro-
vincial world had its goodsidesafter all which at the time were so
takenfor grantcddratthey werenot noticedat ali. A physicalreturn
to that world is usuallyno longer possible.There is howeverno
shortagcof suggested routesfor an internal return (religious,po'
litical, therapeutic),*.aysof healingthe pain of alienation.Projects

43
 "old
aimed at restoring the good world" almost always include the
suppressionor linitation of pluralism - and with good reason:
pluralism constantly suggcstsalternatives,alternativesforce people
to think, thinking undermincs the foundation of all versions of a
"good
oLdworld'; the assumptiono[ its unquestionedexistence.
Modernization inplies the radrcal transformatjon of all external
conditions of hunan existence.l he motor of this giant transforma-
tion, as has often been said, is drc science-based technology of the
last centuries. In purely matcrial terms this dcvclopment hes
brought rvith it a huge expansion of the range of possibilities.
Vhereas in thc past a few technologies,passedon from generation
to generalion, wcre the foundation of material cxistence,there is
now an apparently endlessand constantly improving plurality of
technologicalsystems.Both individuals and huge organizationsface
the nccessityof choosing one or other option from amongst this
plurality. This conpulsion for choice extendsfronr trivial consumer
goods (which brand of tooth pastel) to basic technological alterna
tives (which raw nTaterialfor the motor vehicle industryl). The in-
creasein the rangc of options also extendsto the social and intellcc-
tual sphere. I Icrc, nodernization meam the change from an exist-
ence dctermined by fate to onc consistingof a long seriesof possible
choices.l:ate previously determined almost atl phasesof life, the in-
dividual movcd frorr phaseto phascaccordingto prcdeterminedpat-
terns, childhood, rites of passagc,employment, marriage,child rear
ing, ageing,illncss and death. Fate also determined the internal life
of the individual: feelings,interpret;rtions of the world, values and
personal identity. The gods were "already preselt" at birth, as was
the sequenceof social roles that followed. Put diffcrently: the range
of pregiven, unqucstioned assumptionsexrendcdto lhe largestpart
ofhuman existence.
Modernization fundamentalLychangedthis. Birth and deathare still
- only just - determined by fate. In parallel to the plurality of pos-
sible choiccs at a natcrial level multilayered processesof moderni-
zation open up x rarge of options at thc social and intellectuallevcl:

44
which job should I take up) Vhom shall I marry? Ifow shorrld I
bring up nry children? Even the gods can be sclectedfronr a range of
possible options. I can change my rcligious allcgiance,my citizen-
ship, ny life style, my image of nrysclf and my sexual habitus. The
rangc of taken for-granted assumptionsshrinks to a relatively small
'l
core which is hard to define. hc technological economicfounda
tions of this changcare at the levcl of the matcrial,but its socialdi-
nrcnsionsare intensified, aboveall, by pluralism.Pluralismnot only
pcrmitsone to rnakc choices(job, hud;andor ivife,religion,party),it
forces one to do so as the moclcrn range o[ consumer goods forccs
onc to choosc (Persil or ArieL, VV or Saab).One can no longcr
choosc not to choose:it has bccome in)possibleto close ones eyesto
the frct that a decision that onc nrirkescould also have been made
diffcrcndy. Two central instirutions of modern society Promote this
transition from rhe possibility of choice to the comPulsion to
choosc: the ruarket econorny and denrocracy.Both institr.ltionsare
foundcdon the aggregation of individualchoice- and themselves
cncoüragecont;ououschoiceand sclcctron. Thc ethosof dcmocracy
nrakcschoiceinto a fundamental humannght.
f ire taken-for-granredresidesin thc reaLmof unquestioned,securc
knowledge. lhe loss of the taken for-granted unsettlesthis realm: I
know lessand lcss.InsteadI have :r ralge of opinions. Someof thesc
opinious condcnscinto sornething that one night call bclief. Thesc
are opinions for vhich I an prcparcd to make sacrificesin the lirrrit,
even today, to sacrificemy lifc, but probably no longer unquestion-
'normal" life of so
ingly. It lics in the nature of thingsthat in the
cicty and the individualsuch linrit cascsare relativelyrare ln the
'nornral
processof modernizationi anr in any case no longer
forceclto decidev.hcther I am preparcd to wager my life for faith or
evcn nrcre opinions. Unqucstioncd, secureknor'ledge dissolvesinto
a no longer very compclLing aggrcgate of loosely connccted
opinions.Firm interpretations of reaiity bccomehypotheses. Con-
victions become matters of tastc. Conrmandments become sugges

45
 tions.Thesechanges in consciousness crcatcthe impression of a cer-
tain'flaüress.
One can rmagincthe conscioLrsncss of the individualas different
levclslayeredon top of eachothcr. In the "depths"(this term is not
r.rscdherein thc |reudian scnscof depthpsychology)lie thoseinter-
prctationsdrat arc taken for granted.This is the sphereof unques-
tioned,certainknowlcdge.Alfrcd Schtitzcalleddris the levelof the
"world-taken
for-grantcd';Robcrt and Ilelen Lynd meant some-
thing of the samekind with their conceptof "of-course-statements".
The other pole,thc uppermostlcvcl of consciousness (uppermostin
the senscof closestto thc "surfacc'),is the sphereof insecurity,that
which is not taken for grantcd,opinionswhich I am in principle
preparedto reviseor evcnretract.This sphcreis ruled by the motto
"chacrrnä
son göut . In this layerrlodel, thc modernizationof con-
sciousness appears as a lossof 'depth'.More engagingly one can
view consciousness as a huge coffeenraker the contentsof con
sciousnessof all types have evaporatedupwards, the residual
grounds hassenously shrunken, thc coffcehasbecome prertyrhin.
Thelossofthetakcn-for-granted rvithallitssocialandpsychological
consequerces rs mostpronounced - asonewouid expect- in the
sphereof religion. Modern pluralismhas undercutthe monopoly
enjoyedby religiousinstiturions.Vhether they like it or not the
religiousinstitutions:rc suppliersin a nrarketof religiousoptions.
The "church-goingpeoplc has drvindlcdto a mernbershipwhich
can in nany churchesbc countcd on the fingers of two hands.
Membershipin a particulxrchurch is no longcr taken for granted,
bur ratherdre resultof a delibcratechoice.Evcnthosewho decideto
renain with thc confessionof their parcnts are making such a
choice:they could, after all, havcchangedconfcssionor religionor
simply left the church altogethcr.This fundamentallychangesthe
socialpositionof the churchcs,whethertheir theologicalself-image
is willing to acknowledge dris stateof aff:rirsor not. If they wish to
survive,churchesincreasnrgly necdto considerthe wishesof their
membcrs.The church must provc irself in the free markct. The
 'buy"
pcoplc x'ho a particular faith become a group of consuners.
Regardlcssof how stubbornly the thcologiansrefuseto acknowledge
"the
it, the wisdom of thc old connercial nraxirn - customer is al-
ways right' - has forced itself on the churchcs.They do not always
abidc by this maxirn, but often enoughthey do.
'l
hc churcheshaveincreasing difficulty in hangingc'ntounmarket-
ablc dogmasand practices.lhc sanreprocesschangesthe relation
ship of thc churchesto one anothcr.They can no longercount on
thc statccitherto drive the flock into churchservices or to deelwith
their rivals. The pluralistic situxti<>llforces thc rival churchcs to get
aLong.Initially, this forced tolcr:rnce is grLrdging,later it is lcgiti-
ruized theologically (it bccomcsoecunrenical).The American church
'dcnollinx-
historian Richard Niebuhr introducecl the corcept of
tions" which hc definedas follows:'A denominationis a church,
which has achnowlcdgcddre right of othcr chr.rrchesto exist." It is
"dcnon)rDation"
no accidentthat the term originatedin thc USA -
fronr a societyrvhich can be secnas rhe p;oneerof modern plural-
isnr. lhc increasingsimilarity of thc religioussiruationin othcr
modernsocicticsn ith rhe situationin the USA cannotbe explaincd
by a proccssof cultural Anericanization- as somc, for obvious
idcological reasons,wish to bclicve. The simiLarity is only superfi-
cially due to American inflLrences.I* real causeis the global sprcad
of nrodernpluralism.
'l
hLsshift hasi* correspondentrt the level of individual conscious-
ncs. Religion also "evaporatcsrrpwards'; it loscsits statusas taken
'possibility",
for granted. This shift creatcs for faith the status of
'l
bascLlon the sentencc: I do rot halc !o bclievevhat I know. his
religious possibility' is usually ovcrlooked when theologians
lanrcntthc trivializationof religion in modernity.Ilowever, such
drcologians are not keento ednlit that they might wish to scea situ-
ation in which one could bc * Christian in the same taken'for-
grantcd way in which one is man or woman, one hasbrown or blue
cycs and suffersfrom hay fevcr since birdr. This posibility of faith
müst howcvcr be plausible particularly to protestant theologians.

47
Protestantisnr, fronr Lrrther's comprchensionof conscience(Ver
ständnisdesGe\\'lsscns) to Kierkcgord's lcapof faith', hasbeenthe
modern religion par cxcelience.Ihcologianscould acknowledge
theseideaswith hopc ratherthal pessimisl.From thc socialscienti
fic perspectiveone nru$ howrvcr recotnize that modcrn society has
not scen a great accumulation of Kierkegaardirn "knighCs of fairh .
More typical is a typc of pcrson l,ith "Ohristian opinions" - a per
'
son who belongs sonrchow' to r church, but in a loose way, which
for theologiansmust be r.rnconlfortablyclosc to other realmsof con-
sun]ption. People with 'rcligious opinions change their opinions
relatively easily evcn if they do not thcrcforc aLwayschange their
"denomrnatiou
membershipin a . lraditional Christian churches,
particularly il F.uropc, stiLl h.rvc grcrt difficulty in accepting this
change.They, in fact, wLshto closctheir eyesto it. For examplc,the
Roman Catholic ChLrrchrefuscsto understandi*elf as a "denomina-
tion . Thosebranchesof Protcstantism which stillunderstandthem
selvcsasappealingto thc populationat largehavesimilardifficulties.
The exceprionare disest:blishcd churches,aboveall in the Anglo-
sa-ronworld, *'hich have exisredin a pluralistic situation from the

The loss of depth in religious consciousness can be traced (not co-

'l
incidentally) in the ^nerican languagc. he nost common exprcs-
sion for belonging to a religion in thc United Statesis "religious
prcfcrence",asin 'my rcligiousprcfcrcnccis I-utheran";in German
this transLatesinto: "ich 7-jehees vor, l,uthcrancr zu sein". By com-
parison, the expressionstill comnrcn in Contincntal Europe is 'con,
"I
fession"- anr of the Luthcran confession".The exprcssion'con
fession" refcrs to bearing witness, cven to the wilLingnessto make
the sacrjfice of a martyr. .lhe American cxprcssion, by contrast,
comesfrom thc realm of the languagcof consunption (and from the
realm of economic sciencc- "prcferences' and "prcferencescales"
detenninc the market for a commodity or a service).k implies a lack
of comnltment and refersto the possibilityof prcferringsomething
else in future. It is a historical irony of the current European situa

48
 "re-
tion, that, for cxarnple,Gennans also mean nothing more than a
ligious prefercncc' when they say that they are of the Luthcran con-
fession.Thc Ioss of the takcnJor-granted is today a global phenom-

5. Habituatcd meaningand crisesof mcaning

Day-to day actionsare carriedon habitually.Their implicit rneaning

is untouched.Hard, thrcateningrinrescan leadto the eppearance of
crisesof nreaningin some areasof life. Even then orher arcasremain
under the inflLLcnccof old habinratcd rneanings.liven during civil
wars and earthquakcspeople bmsh thcir teeth if thc water supply
has not beer cut off. Thc litcratrrrc c,n such periods, c. g. memoirs
about Gcrnrany in the last years of the war and its imnrediate after
n1athcont^in impressive testimonyof the rvay in which apocalypse
and norm:rlity coexistside'by side.
Even in hard tirnes, crisesof meaning rarely afflict all arcasof life
sinultaneously and vith dre same forcc. Particularly when habitu-
ated action has becomedifficult or irnpossiblein many areas,it pro-
tects x8ainstcrisesof meaning in those areaswhere one can continue
according to habit. In societiesin rvhich crisesof meaning occr.rrnot
in the rvakc of serious catastrophcsand total wars the range of ha-
bitual norrnalityvhich is maintaincdis of coursemuch wider. But
takenJor-grantedhabits are not just thrextenedby serious eventsin
thc fate of the collectivity, but also by radical changc in the life of
the individual. In all societiesthere arc certain typical changcswhich
may unlcashcrisesof meaning if thcy are not socially acknowledged.
In archaic and traditional societicsthere are ritcs of passagewhich
give mcaning to thesechanges.Puberty, sexualinitiation, cntry into
a job, agc and death could be cxpccted with lessuncertainty because
codesof behavior existedfor dealing with thesebiographical breaks.

49
l he societalfoundationof tue:ningc suredthat thesechanges were
not experielcedby the incli"idualpcrson as deepcriseslet alone
'lhc
existcntialthreats. weakenirgor evencompleteabsence of such
ritcs of passage in modernsocieties can be readasa symptom- and
a co-cause - of a slowly risingcrisisof meaning.In part, this devel-
o p r r r . nr t. w e l li . o u e dr o m o J e r np l u r a l i z r t i o n .
'lo
clarify what hasbeensaicl,let us considertwo spheres of life in
the existence of the indjvidualthat are particularlyimportantbur
alsocrisisridden:sexualityand occupatlon. That humansexuality
couLl alv'ays and everywherelcadto crisesof meaningis adequately
documentedin popularsayingsandthe entiretyof humanliteramre.
'l
he main themeof popularsongsin all countriesis lovc, love sick-
ncssand disappointed love. The institutionsthat were fonncriy re-
rluiredto dealwith suchtroublesarestill in business today,foretrost
amongstthesethe churches.Ve will return to this point. Churches
were,however,neverthe only institutionswhich were and havere-
nrainedactivein this area.Relarional nerworksof interection -
rvhcrever thcy continueto cxist- belongto the socialinsritutions
which scrvefor the producrionand communication of nreaning.
Young pcoplein this or that fornr of sexualtroublemey still rürn to
a well treaning uncle, aunt, grand-parentor godparent.However
hereas wcll, like for the churchcs,there hasbeena decidedlossof
crcdlbility.Geographicandsocialmobility hasvery muchweakenerl
the network of relationalintcraction.Furthermore,it is more and
more likely that, for example,the well-meaning unclenot only lives
far away but is alsohopelesslyconfusedby his own love life. The
samecan be saidfor problemsin the arcaof work - worricsabout
suitable rraining,troubLes with the bossandwith colleagues, unem-
ploymentandat somepoint,usuallyin the middleof a career,the
incscapable rcalizationthat cvcrythinghasbecnachievedthat could
be hopedfor and that from can at bcst hope ro evoid
downwardsocialmobility.
In both areas,modernsocictyhas 'invented"new institutionsfor
the productionandcommunicationof meaning- psychotherapy of

50
differentsorts,sexualandprofessional counsellors(both alreadypre-
sent within schools),specialcourscsand seminarsfor adult educa-
tion, departrnents of the welfarestate,psychologically trained(or ra-
ther,halftrarned) personnei officcrs,andl:st but no! leasrthe mass
media.The piest and the old aunt may sometimessti1lbe heLpfuL.
But it is more probablethat 'modernpcople turn towardsthe new
institutionsof orientation.For this purposeone often doesnot even
haveto visit an office,an institutionor a practice.Simplyturning on
the television,one is facedwith a widc rangeof therapeuticpro-
granrmes. ^lternatively one goesto thc bookshopandchooses from
the shelvespackedwith Self-Helplitcraturethe volume that is best
tunedto onescürrentdifficulties,whcthcr they be in onesouter or
inner life.
A word on the mcdiaof massconrnrunication from publishingto
tclcvision:ashasoften and rightly beensaidtheseinstitutionsplay a
kcy rolc in modernmcaningfulorientation- or more preciselyin
the communicationof meaning.lhey mediatebetweencollective
and individualexperience by providingtypicalinterprerations for
problemswhicharedcfincdastypical.Vhateverotherinstitutions
providcby way of intcrprctätions of realityand values, the media
selectandpeckage theseproducts,transformthem in the processand
decideon the form of dissemination.
Modernsocietyhasa nunber ofspecialized insritutionsfor the pro-
duction and communicationof nrcaning.Even though an adequate
typologyof theseinstitutionsandnn enalysisof their modeof opera-
tion would be helpful,socialscicntistshaveonly tentativelybegun
to deal -ith this problem. lly way of a first approximationone
could distinguishbetwecnthoscinstittrtionswhich offer their inter
pretivcscrviceson an opcn nrarkct(e.g. psychotherapy) and those
institutionswhich cater to a smaller,often strictly closedcommu-
nity of mcaningandspirit(sccts, cultsandcommunes with strictly
definedstylesof life). The distinctioninto new and old institutions
of meaning-production hasits uscs.There are old institutions(the
mos! important are the churchct who continueto cultivatetheir

51
establishedinterpretations of rcality as best as thcy can and to offer
them competitivelyin a pluralisticsituation.Newer instiutions
"advantage"
have to start from scratch,but thcy h;rve the that they
can take unrestraincdly fronr the traditional meaningsof the differ-
ent cr.rlturesand epochcs.llven though such institutions xre free to
draw on a single, well tlefined, ancicnt stock of meaning, they are
without exception highly syncrctic. Techniques of meditation
imporrcd from Asia are to be found alongsidethe newest practices
of psychotherapy,dizzryingscxual cxperiments alongsidea restricted
petit-bourgeois ideal of f:rmily happiness.And all of this can be
distributed through the massadvcrtising nrcthods of late capitalism.
Juggling with these discrepant intcrpretations of reality requires a
ccrtain skill and consequentlya number of professionshave emcrged
"know-
specializedin this aptitude. These are the professionsof the
ledgeindustries", as econonlistscall this sector.Helmut Schelskyhas
characterizedthem as occupations which arc conccrned with the
education,counseliingand plannirg of other people-
The institutionsof meaningproduction have a rangeof possible
options. Hos'ever, in tcrnrs of the strategy they chose to enforce
their inrerpretive perspectivein society they are limited to two main
possibilities. On thc onc hand thcy may enterthe market in which
they must survive m compctition with old and new suppliers. On
the other hand they may mobiliz-ethe state for their purposes.Pro-
duccrs nray acquire a monopoly position through lcgislation- only
qualified psychologistsmay practice psychotherapy or their pro
duction attracts a statc subsidy - public health insurance pays for
psychotherapy - or thcir product may be dlstributed by meansof
state - certain categoricsof delinqrrcntsare obliged to submit to a
psychotherapisttreatment. lhis dcvclopnrentdoes nor lack a certain
irony. The monopoly position which was taken from the churches
by the democratic, law-bound statc is now confcrrcd by thc demo-
cratic w€lfare state on a number of new institutions for the produc-
tion of meaning.There arc no longcr establishedchurchesin the old
sense.Instcad there is official therapy, to paraphrasePhilip Rief, a

52
 'Ihis
therapeuticstate. observation, however,leadsto considerations
which lie beyondthe themeof this essay.
One candcscribeall theseinstitutionselsoin Arnold Gehlen'ster-
minology as "secondaryinstitutions".lly this is mcant that these
institutionsno longer,asin the past,standat the centreof society-
"in
asthe churchoncedid thc nriddleof the village. Instead, they
pcrfonn limited and often highly specialized functions.A further
distinctionmay bc uscfulin this contcxt:on the one sidewe find in-
stitruionswhich cnableindividualsto transporttheir pcrsonalvaiues
from privatc lifc into differentsphcresof societyand to applythem
in sLrcha way as to nrakcthem a forcc shapingthe rest of society.
On the othersidcthereare institutions whichtrcat the individual
merclyas a more or lesspassive objectof their symbolicserviccs.
Only the first mcntionedare 'intcrrnediaryinstitutions' as they
have been known to sociologysinceDurkheim. lhcy are "inter-
mediary"in thc sense that they rucdiate betwcenthe individueländ
the pattcrnsof cxperience andactionestablished in society.Through
thcsc instirurlons,indi"idualpcopleactivelycorltributcto the pro-
ductionandprocessing of the socialstockof meaning.It is the effect
of theseinstitutionsthat the existingstock of mcining is not ex-
periencedas rüthoritatively given and prescribcdlrut as an rep-
ertoire of possibilitiesthat has bcen shapedby the individual
membersof socictyandwhich is opcnfor further chauSes.
-l'he
distinctionbetseenintcrnrcdiary andnon-rnternrcdiary insti
tutionscennotbc madein the abstract.It hasto bc madethroughthe
cmpiricialanalysisof the concretcmodeof operationof a sphereof
action.A local parishcommunity,a psychotherapist group,evenan
agencyof the wclfarestatcmay be a true, mediatingstructurein the
midstof the pcoplc associated wilh it. l hc samefornr of institution
rlay, however,alsoappearasimposed,asa force alienor evenhos
tile to the iife world of thosc indivLduals with it. Both
associatecl
"secolclary",
forms are both conrnrunicate meaning-I Iowever,only
in the first mentionedfornr arc thcy suitablcto softenthe negative
aspects of moclernization ("alicnation", "anomie")or cvento over-

53
 conrecrisesof meaning.If such institutionstake the sccondform,
theycontribute to "alicnation'.
One fLrrtherrcmark shouldL'cmadeaboutthe churches.Amongst
the prinrary institutions"of practicallyall premodernsocieticsre
ligion takesa centralplace.This centralitywas essenrial to Durk-
heirl's conceptionof "religion". Religion was a symbolic remedy
spreacling throughoutall of society,collectingall sharedinterpreta-
tions of reality (repr6sentations collectives) into a cohercntview of
the world, and in the processprovidingthe foundationfor e societxl
morality (conscience collecti"e)- both consciousness and con-
sciencc.As was alreadynrentioned,rcligiousinstitutionsin modern
societics canno longerclaimthisposition.They are no longerthe
'fhey
solcbcarersof supcrordinate ordcrsof valueand meaning. are
increasinglyreducedto secondaryinstitutions.They are pushed
from the centreto rhe peripheryof the 'village".The pompouscer-
emonialbuildingsthat stiil standappcf,ras museumsand the theo-
logicaliylegitimizedself-definitions ("Catholicism", "una sancta',
"peoplc's
church")no longerfit the empiricalfacts.The chLrrches
abandonüeir (empty)public rolc and take on a privaterole in the
lives of thoscwho still continueto be membersof the church or
who havcrecentlyjoincd. lhis changein role neednot be judgcd
merely ncgatively.Despitclosingits centralrole in societyoverall
- in somecasespreciselybecause of this loss- the churchcanstill
perfornl ao cxtremelypositivcfunction as an intermcdiaryinstitu-
tion, positivcboth in termsof the life of the individualandthat of
societyasx whole.For thc indiviclLraL the churchcanbe the most
importantcommunityof meaning; throughthe churchthc individ'
ual may establisha meaningfulbridgebetweenprivateJifeand par-
'lhe
ticipationin socieralinstitutions. churchprovidesmcaningboth
to family life and to citizenship.The church makesen important
contribution for societyas a whole. It supportsthe stability and
crcdibility of the "big' institutions(aboveall the statc)and reduces
the 'alienation"of individualsfrom society.That was of course
alwaysthc big socialrole of religion.Flowever,today,when the

54
churchperfornlsits function as an intcrrnediaryinstitution,it does
so without compulsion.By contrastwith its former role, that is ä
significantdifference.
The churchmay alsofulfill an important,purelyreligiousfunction
with no or minimal associated soci:l functions.This is true in the
caseof a lonelyold person,withoutfamilyanda job andwith poli-
ticaLinterestslimited to occasional readingof a newspaper. For thcsc
peopleparticipationin churchLifenraybe of decisiveimportxncc-
in the churchscrvice,in prayer,rn bible classand in other actions
which transccndsociallydefnredrolcs,suchpeoplcmay exPerience
thenselvesas mcmbersof a comrlrrnity of nreaning.If the church
alsofulfiLlssocialfunctions,theseuraycommunicatemeaningin the
manncrdiscussed above,or may rcmail effectiveonly in thc private
sphercof thc church'smembers.I hc iatterfunctionswerefor a long
time cultivatedby the Pietistand cvangelical branchesof Protestänt
isrl. But even such 'privatizcd" religion may have indirect social
conscqucnces and thesemay be inrportant(asMa-x\fleber already
rvasaware).For example,it is an open questionto what extent a
famLlylife regulated by religious valuesmay influence'on the iob'
behavior(andthusthc economy) t,r bcha"iorin the politicalrealm.
in any case,the churchasan intermcdiaryinstitutionhasimmcdiate
socialconscquences by directingthc rndividuaL!o think his Public
rolc through the church'sview of the world and then to act in
ptLblicin concertwith othcr nrenrbcrs of thc religiouscornmunityof
mcaning.This role of the churchotrvic,uslyhasa particularimPor-
tancc in dernocratically constitutcdsocieties. Alexis de Tocqueville
alrcadyarrivedat this conclusioniu his worh on democracyin the
UnitedStates.
Lct us sLrmmarizelThe structurel con(litions for the spread of sub-
jcc!i!c andinter-subjective crisrsof rncaning that we havededuccd
lrom thcorcticalconsiderations arc to be found in a1lwesternsoci-
clics of the present, though thcy manifestthemselves quite differ-
cndy. The most irnport:nt oi thescconditionsis modernpluralism,
sinccit tcndsto destabilize the takcn-for-granted slatusof the systcnl

55
 of meaningandvaluethat oricntatcs actionandunderpins idcntity.
Neverthcless, modern socicticstlo not "normally" experiencethe
drarnaticspreadof criscsof mcaning.Both subjcctiveand inter-
subjectivccrisesof meaningoccur much more cornmonlyin such
societies,however they do not conclcnseinto a generalcrisis of
'I'his
meaningaffectingal1 of society. characteristiccondition of
'nornrality"
in modern societicsDtay bc termed a latent crisis of
mcaning.The reasonsfor this condition are the various factors
which act xgainstthc conscqnences of nrodcrnpluralisnrmost liable
to producecrisesof mcaning.In our opinion thc mostinportant of
thesefactorsis a basicstockof intermediaryinstitutions.Theseinsti,
'Uriorr...rvc ro generLrem"*rrrng'.rnJr" .rrpportexisring meanings
in the livesof individu:rls andin the cohesion of communities. They
providepeoplcwith orientationcvcn whensocietyas a whole no
longer supportsan overarchingordcr of meaningand values,but
insteadactsasa kind of rcgulatinginstancefor thc differenrsystens
'lhose
of value. ruleswhich arc valld for all of socieryservero
enablethe coexistcnce and neccssary cooperation of differentcom-
munltres of nreaning, withoutinrposing on thema comnonorderof
values.
Vc thereforesuggcstdre hypothesisdtat as long as the immune
systenrof intermediaryinstitutionsrer:rainseffective,"normal" mo-
dern societies will not sufferthe pandenricspreadof crisesof mean,
ing. As long as thrs condition holds, the crisis-of-rneaning virus
which is at home in the organismof all modern socictieswill be
suppressed. Howcver,if the immunesystemis sufficientlyweakened
by othcr influences, thcre is nothing to stopthe spreadof the virus.
(Characteristically, it is the statewhich hclpsto weakeninrermcdi
ary institutions- asa form of corlpetition?)This hypothesisseems
plausibleto us,howcvcrsimplificdits formulation,but it, of course,
rcquirescarefulcmpiricalinvcstigation. In the lastsectionwe return
to this.

56
 illusionsand possibilities

"decay
Complaintsabout the of cülture", the loss of meaningin
moderniry",the' alicnationof hunranityin latecapitalism',the'in-
flation of mc:rningin masssociety",'the disorientationof peoplcin
thc irodern rvorld" and suchlike arc hardly new. Theokrgians,phi-
losophcrs, sociol;gists, quitc apart fronr non academjcmoral entre-
preneurs fronr far right to farleft havc been making thcse com
pLaintslor r nl.rmberof Benerations. Under different ideological
signsall inuginable renredieshave bccn advertiscdfor thesc illnesses
of the individualand society,from dre nroral strcngthening of the
individLralto the revolutionary transformation of the entire poiiti-
"diag'
cal econonric system.C)ur doubts about the most cxaggcrated
noses"c,f thc cultural conrlition were hintcd at in the introductory
"therapies"
section. Lct us add here that q."erceard the proposed
with equalskepticism borh the radical-collectivist optionswhich
are in the r:nd always totalitarirn as *eli as radical individualism
which is in thc cnd a solipsism.
'Lo
seewhethcr a core of truth is to be found behind the ex:rggcra-
tions and whedrer thc diagnosisrrrs only in the seriousnessof the
specificallynrodcrn crisis, we havc attempted to describcthe organ-
isn in its healthy state.Ve first refcrrcd to the meaningfulness<-,fac-
tion and life constimtiveof the humanspecies and the way in which
it is conditionecl by social processcsand structures.In a sccond step
we could then clefinethe historicaLchangeswhich definc the specifi-
cally nodcrn construction, conrrnunication and sccuring of the
rncaning of life ud acrion nr nrodcrnity. Before formuLating our
"thcrapeutic'
own, co]nparatircly modest suggestions,we will
" d r ; g n . r . i'
b r i c f l y . u , r ' , r r , r i , . r l -r ,c . u . , , l o r r r .
Allsocictiesareinvolvedin proccsses ofgeneratingn)eaning, evenif
they hxvc not de"elc,pedspccializedinstitutions for the prodüction
of neaning. In any case,thcy control the processthrough which

57
 clcments of meaning are absorbcclinto social stocks of knowledge
and organizethe conrnlunicarion of historicaLstocksof meaningto
the membersof society,adaptingto cw needs.Through institurions
societiespreservethe basic elenrcnrsof their stocks of mcaning.
They communicatemeaningto rhc individualand to the commu,
nities of lifc in vhich thc individual grows up, works and dies. l hey
determine subjective neaning in rvide areas of acrion, whilst the
objcctified meaning of theseactionsis dictatedby the big institutions
of domination and the econorly. All dris gocs on in all socieriesin
one way or another, but it occurs with diffcring degreesof succcss.
Vc therefore first pursued the qucstior whethcr there are gencral
reasonsfbr thesediffcrences.
Our first concern was wirh pcrson:rl identity, the individual refe-
rence point of the mcaning of action and life. The personalidentity
of dre child is shaped through sccing its behavior mirrored in the
actions of those closc to it. A certäin congruencein the actions of
these personsis thereforc the nrosr ir:rportant condition for the un
troubled developmentof pcrsonalidentity. If rhis condition is not
nrct, the probabiiity of subjective criscs of meaning incrcases.Fur-
thermore, we have attcmpred to show rhat communities of life re,
quire a minimal ovcrlap in intcrprctations of reality. Only under
this condition can conmunities takc on a supporting role in the gc-
neration and sustenanceof rDcannrgin the life of their melrbcrs.
'lhe
degree of congruencc betwccn the expected community of
mca ing ard the community actually rcalized appearedof particular
inrportance. \ffc suggesrthat the greatcr the degreeof discrepancy,
the larger is the likelihood that intcr subjective crises of meaning
will result.
'When
we turned our atrention to nrodern societiesit becameclcar
thxt it is those featureswhich make them different from their prcd-
ecessors rvhichalsopreventthc stabilizationof meaning.the mrin
tenance ol congruence ln thosc processesthrough which personal
identity is shapedbccomesmorc difficult as docs the promotion of
sharedmeaningsin life communitics. I'he frequency of both subjcc-

58
tive :rnd inter subjectivc criscs of nreaning is intelligiblc once we
considcrthc consequences of the structural charecteristicsof nrodern
societies,in particular modern western societies.Taik of identity
crisesand the mounting figurcs of the divorcc statisticsconfirm both

A gencral,fundamentalfeature of modern societiesis the thorough

differentiationof actions(that 1n othcr types of societieswere still
connectedand related in meaning) into their own institutional
spheres:eachof drcseairls for, anclis largely successfulin achieving,
autonomy in setting its own orrls, i. e. enrancipationfronr super-
ordinate social valLres.Schernesr-,f actjon defined by these sets of
instinrtions (economy, political clourin:uion,reLigion)have an objec-
tificd meaning that is related tc, thcir main function. Since,with thc
except;onof rcLigionthis 1rea[ing is instrumentaliy rätional, it must
bc uncouplcd from subjectiveschtrlcs for nrterpreting life. lndivid'
rrals nrust subordinate themselvesto the goals of the organization
rathcr than adaptingthe demandsmadc on them to thcir own con-
ccptionsof yalue.The structuraldifferentiationof modern socictics
is thus not compatiblerith thc continuedexistence ofsuperordinatc
and generally binding systemsof meaning and value. This is, how-
cver, the condition for a socially guaranteedcongruencein the for-
malion of personalidentity and fc,r a hi6h degreeof sharedmeanings
'
1 lile comnunities.
To this rnust be added a furthcr characteristicof the structurc of
modern, above all western socictics,th:rt is ciosely related to thcir
basiccharacteristic.This is nrodcrn pluralism, a pluralism, in 'vhich
the protectivc fcnccsaround the stocksof mcaning within commun-
'fences
itics oI lifc (thc of the 1aw') can no longer be completely
maintained.Through the gapsin the fencepeoplepear at what lies
beyond. l his lcadsto the lossof the takcn-for-granted statusin cer'
t:rin layers of rncaning which orientateaction and life. \Ve hope to
have shown thar this is a typical causeof the outbreakof crisesof
'l-here
oleaning, are t\|o extremc allcl contradictory reactionsto no-
dern pluralism.

59
 One might say that thcre $,hcre some desperatelyattcnrpt to close
the holcs in the protectivc fcncc, othcrs rvish to tear down trore of
the fence.These reactionsare forrndcdi| trvo diffcrcnt attitudes,not
only in individuals, but also in institutions, cornmunities and social
movcments. The "fundanrcutalist"position aims ro rcconquer all of
society for the old valLrcsand traditions. Politicians have again and
again attcmpted to exploit thc attitude link to this affect for their
own purpose, in westcrn socictieswith little succcss.Prine Minister
'back
John Major wnh his to basics"is only the rnostrecentpoliti-
cian to have discoveredthrs to his cost. Ily "contrast', reiativist posi-
tions abandonthe attempt to asscrtany kincl of common valucs and
stocks of meaning. Postnrodernthcorists nlake a virrue of necessity
and displacethe pluralismof socictycvcn to within the harassed in-
dividual.
Both reactionsare wrong and may cven becontc dangerous.In irs
radicalvariantthc fund;rnrentalist positionlcadsto selfdestruction
*'hen it determinesthc action of weak groups.Thc'other'is de-
stroyedif strong groupsput this attitudeintir action.In its moder-
atedform this attimrleleadsto thc ghcttoizationof the 'own' group
within societyrs a B,holc. ihis rs hard to achieveand is associated
l'ith variablecosts,as thc cxamplesof rhe Pcnnsylvania Amish, the
jn
HassidicIews in Nes, York, the Algcrians lirance,the Turks in
Berlin-Kreuzbergetc. dcnronstratc.Neither thc "fundamentalist"
'relativist"
nor the position can bc rcconciled with practical reason.
"relativist"
But the position is cvcn internally inconsistent.If it rvere
put into actionjt would leadto thc individualleavingsocicty.A per
son who cqually accepts quite different mutually contradictory
norms will not be capablc of cohercnt acrion for which he or she
can assumeresponsibility. Sucha pcrsonwillnot be ableto givc rea
sons for acting in onc rvay r:lthcr thitn anodlcr; his or her actions
must appearcompletcly arbitrary ald no onc would be able to
expect that hc or she *-ould not conrplctely change in character in
thc next moment. lhcrefore, inclividuals no longer responsible for
their ac!ionscannot maintain rhc urutuaLobligationo{ socialrela-

60
tionships.'fhc nrinimum of nutual respectthat is essentialfor thc
existetce of communities of life and therefore for the whole of a so'
"fundamentalist' act on their
cicty would be lost. Howevcr, whcreas
'rclativists"
beliefs, remainedconfincdto tatt<.
To considcr how the crisis of nreaningof modern societiesmay bc
countered,if at all, it is essenrial to rcalizethat two quite different
strr.rcturalcharaclcrislicsof modern society have quite different con
scquences.Stmctural differentiation of function (and thcir instru-
mentaLly-rationalorganization in thc economy, administration and
La-r')ancl modern pluralism are amongst the preconditions for the
long list of advantageswhich nrodern socictiesare able to offer their
mcmbers:economic prospcrity and the not merely material, but also
psychic security of a law'bc,uud welfare state and parliamentary
denrocracy.The samestructural charicteristics are however also rc_
sponsiblc for the co[dition drat nodern societiesare no longer to
perfc,rm a basic anthropological function rvhich all societieshavc
fulfilled, namcly rhe generationof lreaning, communicationof
mcannrgand preservation of meanLng, or, at least,modern societies
no longer perfornr this fLurction in thc same, relatively successfrrl
rvay in which orher, earlier so.ial formations did. Modern societics
may havc spccializedinstitutions for the production and cornmuni-
cation of nreaning,or have permittcdthe devclopmentof such in-
' r'.rriorrb . .u r , r e n " l o n g , r a h l ( l u . o r r r r r , u n i ( a locr P r r \ c r v c\ y _
tcnx of rneaning and valuc to all r-rfsociety in a gcnerally binding
fashion. The srructure c,f mcrdcm societics alongside wealth and
othcr advantagesalso createsthc conditions for the enrcrgenceof
s n j c . t r v er n d r r r r e n u b r r r. . c . r , ' ' u f n , r ; n i n g .
lf there *'ere no proccsscsand structures in modern society that
coLrnteracted the en)crgcnccand sprcadof crisesof meaning,then
thesesocicticswould be the most fcrtilehostsfor pandemiccrisesof
nreaning.lhat would certainlybc a high price which rnodernsoci
etiespaid for thc blessingsand securitiesthat rest on the sxmecauses
1s the criscs.lly focusing exclLrsiveiyon this high price and iSnoring
thc advantagesachieved at thc same tirne, radical cures have been

6l
 proposedfor thc supposedlyscriousillnessof modern society.ln
those casesin g,hich such curcs l crc acnrally atternptedby regimes
of totalitarian rcgression,it turncd out that the cures wcre more
deadlythan the discasc.
Ilouever, one nccd not ever'rattcmpt to judge the advantagesand
disadvantages of such a calcularion even handcdly, sinceits premises
are false.The reconstrüction of prernodern structurcs with a singie,
generally valid and t:rkel for-grantcclstock of meanings and values
cannot be contrastedwith a socicty whose material wcalth is washed
over by a general crises of nrcaning. The artenrpts to restore pre-
modern structuresof socicry, which are possiblc only with modern
means of compulsion, havc all failed in the short- or long run. But
this point is less important in this contcxt than the fact that the
image of the characterof modern socicticsis distorted. Precisely,in
those societiesrvhosebasicstrucnrre provides thc conditions for the
emergenceof crisesof mcaningand thc possibilityo{ thesecrises
spreading,specificcountcracring processcshave produced structures
ivhich have preventedthe unhindcredspreadof crisesof meaning
and preventeda crisisof mcaningaffectingall of society.The most
importantof thesestrucmressc havcattcnptedto understandusing
the conceptof intermediaryinstitutions. 1he previoussectiondis-
cussedtheir strengths and weaknesses.To simplify: the basic struc-
turc of modern societiesis thc causcof incipient criscs of meaning-
In nodern societiesthcre are, howcvcr, also parrial srructures,above
"intermediary
all the institutiorls" that prcvent thesecrisesof mean
'Ihey
ing flaring up into criscsof the cntirc socicty. are norc or less
successfuldepending on their quality and qLrantity in modern soci-
eties.Given similar basicstmi:tural conditions the failure of counter
ecting forces to develop or their dccisivc rveakeningcan lead to the
spreadof crisesof meaning, whereasstrengtheningthese forces can
help to dam thc crisis.
Irronr this argunrentwe can dcrlrrceone ofthe fcw, reasonablyreaLis-
tic methodswith which socicticscan deal 'drcrapeutically"with
crises of meaning. One should have no illusions about the main

62
causeof crisesof mcaning,i. e- the basicstructuresof modcrn so
'lherc
ciety. is no antidoteto diffcrentiation and pluralim which
has not revealcditself to be a deadlypoison.Intermediaryinstitu'
tions canonly administerhonrcopathicdoscs.Thesecannotrenrove
the caüscs,howeverthey may softcn the äppearance of the illness
and incrcasethe po-er of resistancc to it. They kccp the crisisof
meaning'n its incipicntform andprcvcntit from fLaringup. fhe pa
ticnt is kcpt alivein a states'hich apartfrom the constanttendency
to crises of mcaning is not partjcularly disagreeable.
Benecnthcimpossibility ofthc rclativistic" reaction to moderniy
and the frighteningpossibiliticsof funrlamentalism' , there is an-
otherposition.As bestone can,onereconciles oneself to the nega-
tive consequenccs of structuraldiffcrentiationand modcrn Plural-
ism. Onc opposesthe dangcrof the destructionof modernsocicty
by totalitarianrcgression, but seesno reasonto join in thc celebrx_
rion of,lodern plLrralism. This programme is modcst,but, wc feel,
realisticr intermediary institutions shouldbe supportcd whercthey
do not cnrbodyfundatrentalist attitudes, $'herethey supportthe
''little
lifc *orlds" (a term coinedby BenitaLuckmannnrAnyye{rs
ago)of conrmunitiesof meaningand faith and where thcy develoP
' "little
theirnrcrnbcrs ascarriers of a pluralisticcivil society'.In the
life worlds" thc variousmeaningsolferedby agcncies for commr.rni-
"consumed'; räthcr they arc appro-
catingnlcanin8sarc not simply
priatedcommunicativelyand selectivelyprocessed into elcmentsof
the comnrunityof meaningand lifc.This unspectacular bnt by no
meanspassivc basicpositionalsohasimplications for mcdiapolicy
rv:rybcyondthe socialandcuhuralpoiiciesof the stätc.lt is the
' , ' p o n . l , r h " I r h , l e a J e r ' ot fl . . ' g c r . , r ' . o r n n r u n i . r t irrrr'gc . r r r i r r g .
1
c. t. the missnredia,to supporrirtcrnrcdiaryinstitutionswithin the
context r:f :r dcrcgulatedmarket in mcaning.And this is a policy
which licswithin the rcalm of the possible.In termsof contentthey
nus! stcl'r a middle -ay bctwccnthe dogmaticcollectivisnrof the
''firndrnrcntalists" "postmodcrnity". In
ard dre latrilcsolipsism of
nodern s,cstcrn societies socialand culturalpolicy have nrany, in

63
part contradictoryfunctions.If our considerarions are closeto thc
mark, it shoulclbe clearin which directionthe main socialand
culnrral policy efforts of the srate- and rcsponsibieand capable
non-state agencies- shouldbeciirccted in dealing
with theincipicnt
crlsisof meaning:to thc promotion and developmentof the intcr-
mediaryinstirutions of a plurrlistic"civiLsociety"andtowardssup-
portingthem as sourccsof meaningfor communities of life and
faith.
As was alreadysaid,thc idcntificationof inrermediaryinstitutions
is not aLways easy.Thcy can be rccognizcdin their effects,bur not
by thc way in which they refer to thcmsclves. Furthermore,thcrc is
no simpleformulawhich tclls us how sLrchinslirtrtionscan most ef-
fcctivelybe supported.Howcvcr, thesetwin problemsseemopento
solutionby empiricalresearch.l(hcther thereis the will to actually
supporttheseintcrrnediaryinstitttions is anothermatter.This de
pendson both the big ideologiesand thc little day,todaypolicicsof
the partiesand thc comfiercial interestsof the agencies responsible
lor comnuricating rneanings.A.adcnlicscan at best gcncraterhe
rvill of politicsand business,thcy cannotbe responsible for actually
directing sucha commitment.

/- (rutlook

In the precedingdiscussionwe have on a number of occasions

pointed to questionswhich could be ansveredonly by extensivc
empiricalresearch.Our discussiondealt with a many layeredand
complexproblematic: the strLrctureof meaningin modernsocieties,
from the anthropologicalbasisof the constitutionof meaningin
humanactionand life ro the spccificconditionsof crisesof meaning
in thc modernworld. It is, thercforc,hardlysurprisingthat the statc
of researchin most of the varior.rs
problernareasis characterized by

64
open rathcr than ansrvered questions.That meansthat aPartfron1
the rescarch questions \\,hich s'e havc already referred !o, a long
seriesof problcrnsrequireclarificati<,n throughemPiricalenquiry.
At the beginningof this enquiry *e clescribed thc constitutionof
meaning,frorn the separationof individualexperiences in the gen-
eral strcam of consciousncssto thc processthrough which they are
related to othcr experiences.\Ve have said thet thc meaning of indi-
vidualexpcricnces liesin schcrresof expcricnce, that the mcaningof
schemesof cxpcriencelies in pattcrnsof action and the mcaningof
patternsof actionis locatedin gencralcategories of the conductof
life. Vc have seenthat drc meaningof the differentschemes, Pat-
terns and catcgoricsis located et different distancesfrom thc super
ordinatc configuration of vaiues.One can say that the meaningof all
expericncc and action and certainly the meaning of lifc conduct is
deternrincd rvith reference to supcrordinate values, i. e. that it is
morally relevxnt.llowever, thc ureaningof some schemesof ex'
perienccand actionis explicitlyand directlyrelatedto vxlues,whilst
in oüer casesthc rclationto supcrordinate valLresis indirectand im
plicit- Thc moral relevanceof thc latter can only be madt cle:rrby
anaLyzingthe links n'hich leall from the schemeto the suPerordinxte
vaLr.resancl by makilg the inplicit relations of valuc expLicit.The
"If
moraL ciraracterof an action which is in breach of the maxnl I
find a wallct on the street I hand it in at the lost property office" is
"'lhe
obvious. Ily conträst, if someonenrakcs the comment soup is
hot thc (rroral) implication is clcar only if one knorvs that the
speakcrhasnot cookedthc soupand the cook is within earshot l he
"You've
issuewould be clearerif the speakcrhad saidr givenme my
souproo hot againl"
Such dLstinctionswith rcgard to thc moral connotations of differ-
cnt scheüesof expcrienceand action are useful 1f one wishesto ana_
lysc systcms of rneaning and valuc and one is centrally concerned
with thc moral aspeclsof meanint. These distinctions are useful in
allowing one to trace the transformation of superordinateconfigura-

65
 tiols of value into norrns of :rctionsand maxinr, step lor step down
to the level of ordinary, cvcrlday action.
The analysisof systcnrsof valuc and meaning in rnodern societies
hasto overcomeparticuiardifficultics.We have seenthrt it is not
possibleto speak in modern socictiesof a single and generally bind-
ing order of values.k may be true that beyondthe legalizedsystenl
of behavioralnorns there are still clcnlentsof a generalmorality.
However, qithout careful research it is not easy to decide -hat
these might consist of and whetlrer togcther they make up a frame-
work of establishedmorality. lt ccrtainly seernsthat there are a
multiplicity of moralities, distributed acrossdifferent communities
of lifc ancl faith, which can bc iclcntified in the form of "partial cat-
echisms"and particularistic idcological programmes.To what extcnt
these diffcrent moralitics - we spcak here not o{ the ethics of par
ticular functional sphercs(medical ethics,businessethicsetc.), which
*c h rve ;lready di'cu*.d - r.rre clcrrrenr.in c,rmmon rr an open
qucstion, to vhich the existing researchhas not given a satisfactory
answer.Even if rherewere no such comnron elements:it doesnot
follon' that people in modern socicticsdo not orientate their action
antl conduct of life towards supcrordinatevalues,valueswhich havc
validity in their communities of Iife anct faith. Lven those acting
"immorally"
will generally conform to the prevailing morality by
attempting to hide or make excoscsfor their breach of the noflIs
(hypocrisy is hotrage paid by vice to virtue).
In any case,individuals in modern society have to overcornc both
insecurity of meaning and uncertainty in moral jusrification. First,
thcy cannot assumethat t hat they consider good and right is con-
sidcred good and right by others; sccond,individuals do not always
knov what is good and right cvcn for themselves. The insti,
tutionshavetheir instrumentallyrationalorganizationwhlch objec-
tively dctermines action and pcrhaps some kind of specific cthics.
(lommunities of life vith diffcrcnr stocksof meaning are not divided
from onc another by high protcctive walls and communities of faith
run, so to spcak,crisscrossacrosssociety.Furdrermore, through thc

66
meansof masscommunication thc different stocks o[ rneaninghave
h".^-" """",. .,.""..ih1"
Researchnrust be directed towards three levels c'f the production,
\ o r n m u n i c r l i o n; r r J r e . e p r i o ro f r r l e a n i n Sm: , l \ \ L o n r D l u n i c r l i o n :
day-to'dayconrmunicationRithin communities;internediary in-
, r i rr r . o n 'w h r , h r r ' c d r r rbe. r w . r n t l r " b , g i r . r . r l i o n . . c o m m u r , r . " '
and the indivitlual.
'I
he ievelof m:lssconrmunication:the cofltentsof masscommunica-
tion arc morally chargcd, in part implicitly ft. g. in advertisingand
news reporting), sometimesmore direcdy (e. g. in police films and
nature films), ancl sometirnesmoral :spectsof individual life and so'
ciety arc consciouslyaddressed (c. g. televisionsermons,political
con1mentary). In this respcct there are some differenccs between
public" media organizations and purely private media, but we do
not yet kno{'how big this differencc really is. It is, however, clcar
that the nredii of nrasscommunicatioo are employed explicitly by
moral cntreprerrerrrsof different dcgreesfor thcir own purposes,by
the state,by churches,by voluntary associationsasrcpresentativesof
cornmunities of opinion *'ith qLrite diversc progranrmes (environ-
mentalism,protcction of cthnic, sexualor other mi11oritics).
The levci of the individual in thc daily life of commr.rnitiesof vari-
ous kinds: in evcryday verbal conrmunication (in thc family, at the
bar, in conversationsbetl'een ncighbors, at the workPlace and in
commLlnitics of opinion to thc extentthat theseare not alreadyin_
termediaryinstitutionsof a higher lcvcLof organizationand therc-
fore to bc treated xt the next state) thcre is constant moralizing: in
conrpLaints,apologics,referencesto specificsetsof norms, gossipctc.
The moral aspcctsof conmunication may refer to thosc present
(e. g. in munral rccrimination) or may be directed towerds absent
others (e. g. in gossip)or nray rcfer rn a general way to examples
(e. g. in argunrcntsbet*-eenmcnrbcrsof a famiiy ovcr a caseon tele-
vision,e. g. Maradona).
The lcvcLof intermediary institlrtions: this qucstion is, as was af
rcady argued, particularly problcnlatic since one must first answer

67
 the qucstionas to what belongsto this category,but c:nnot do so
unctluivocally prior to bcginningrcscirch.Vith somcconfidence
onc cansaythat the intcrnediaryinstitutions includecommunitics
of opinion organizedlocally, e. g. ecologicalgroups;institutions
srrchas the church,to the cxtcnr that they havelocal roots strong
cnougllto serveassourcesof mcaningfor communitiesof lifc; pos-
sibly loctl party organizations; associations of variouskinds.Vhich
of thescorganizations deservcs the title intermediäryinstitutioncan
onLy be decidedwhen their local mode of operationhas beenex-
amined. If thcy do not mcdiatebctrvccn the biginstitution of society
andthe individuals in theirlife communities rhenrheyerenor true
intcrnrediaryinstitutions.
In the idealcaseintermcdiaq,insrirutionsareJanus 'l'hey
faced. look
"upwards'to the '
big institutionsand downwards'to rhe cxisrence
of the individual. lhen rhcy comrnunicatcnot iust srocks of
meaningfrorn thc "top' to drc "bottorn"but also,asis suggestecl by
the idcaof "civil society',fronr thc "bonom" 'up'. k appears as
thoughthis is quiterare;an examination of this sphereshouldbe
ableto concluder','hetherthc generalskepticisnis justifiedequally
in diffcrcnt societies. An answerto this qucsrionwould bc inrporr-
art. On the basisof sornercscarchand prior considerations it seems
that onc nrustassumethere arc usuallylargediscrepancics between
the moralitiesoffcredby thc state,the churchand othcr'moral
entrcpreneurs',which reachdre individualvia the nr:rssnlcdia,and
the valucshcldby the indivicluals themselves- On the levelof däyro
dayconrnrunication, e. g. in fanrilies, '
rhcse moraloptions'are not
nerely consumcd. They arc processed conrmunicativcly, selected,
rejectecl and adaptcdto individual'sown circumstances. Still the gap
that ya\,Dsbetweenthe moral recornmendations of thc mediaand
day to day rcality should not bc ünderestimated. If tolcranceis
preachcd"from above"it rarely bccomessignificantin thc attitucles
of indivicluals if it hasnot beenabsorbed inro the sharedmcaningsof
"their' conmunity
throughcc'nrmoncommunicative effort.
With rcfcrence to intermediary instirutions theimportantqucstion

68
is, as was already said: do they really mediatexnd do they mediate in
both dircctionsl fhc empirical anss,/erto this question will deter-
rrrinc whcthcr, on thc whole, rnodern societiescan reign-in the ever
Iatcnt crisis of mcaning, as wc suspectthey probably can. Only if
intcrmediary institutions cnsurcthat the subjectivepatternsofexperi-
ence and action of the individuals contribute to the social negotia-
tion and objectification of meaning, will individuals not find thcm'
selvesin the modern world ascomplete strangcrs;and only then will
it be possibleto avoid the identity of the individual person and thc
intcr-sr.rbjcctivecohcrcnce of socicty being threatened or even de-
stroyed by crisis ridden modernity.

69
The authors

Pcter L. Berger
llronr 195556 ResearchDircctor, Acadenry of the Protestant
Church, Bad Bo1l, Germany; fron 195658 ?rofessor at thc
\(oman's College,University of Nordr Carolina; frorn 195863
Director at the Institute of ChLrrchand Community, Hartford
TheologicalInstilutc of Church anrl Conrmunity,Hartford Theo-
logicalSenrinary;frarn 19637aProfessorat thc GraduateFaculty,
Ncw Schoolfor SocialResearch, Ncw York; from 1920-79 Professor
at thc l{utgersUniversity; from 1979-81Prolessorat the Boston
Collegc;sincc1981Professor at the DostonUniversity;since1985
I)irector of the Institutefor the Snrdyof EconomicCul!üre,Boston
University.
Publicrtions:
Invitationto Sociology:A LlumarristicPerspectivc, 1963;The Social
Constructionof Reality (with TironrasLuckmann),1966;The Se'
crcdCanopy:Elements lheory ofReligion,1967iA
of a Sociological
Rtrmorof Ängels:ModernSocictyandthe Rcdiscovery of thc Su-
pernatural,1969;The IlomelessMind; Modernization and Con-
sciousncss(with Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner), 1973;
Pyramidsof Sacrifice:Pc,liticalUthics and Social Change,19l5;
'thc
Heretical Imperative, 1979; Sociolc,gyReinterpreted(with
I Iansfried Kellner); The l(ar Over the Family (with Brigitte
Bergcr), 1983;The Capitalist 1986;A FarGLory,1992.
Rev<.rlution,

7l
ThomasLucknann
I:ro r 195860 Professor at the I IobartCoLlege,
Department of An-
thropologyandSociology,Gencva,N.Y.; from 1960-65 Professorat
the GraduateFaculty, Departnrcntof Sociology,New Schoolfor
Social Rescarch,New York; lrom 196365 Co-Director of thc
N.l.M.H. Fellos'shipl'rogram; from 1965-/0?rofessorfor Sociolo-
gy andDirector of the Departrncntof Sociology,from 1966-68 Man'
aging Director of the Departmcnt of Sociologyat the Johann-
\f olfgangGoethe-University, FrankfLrrt/Main;since1970Professor
of Sociology,Univcrsityof Konstanz.
Publications:
The SocialConstructionof l{eality (with PeterL. Berger),1966;The
InvisibleReligion, 1970; Ihc Structurcsof the Life-\üorld I (with
Alfred schütz),1973,II, 1984isociologyof Language, 1975;LebeDs-
wclt und Gesellschaft,
1980;TheorieclessozialenHandelns,1992.

72
The project

The Bertekmann lourulation ts targeted to be an operative, con-

cepnrallynorking foundation.lt is obliged by its statutesand its
mandatcto promoteinnovation,raisencw idcasto the levelof prac
'l
tice, help to identifysolruionsto pressingproblemsof our time. he
projectsare beingconccptualizcd and inrtiatedby thc foundationit-
se1f.Startingfronr thc dcfinitionof the problem to the practicalim-
plementationthe foundationruns its projectsin closecooperation
l,ith competentpartnersin acadcnric, stateand privateinstitutions.
Followint rhis intcntion the Berrelsn)annFoundation has initiated
the project Cuhrral Orientation.h wrll rnakeefforts to elaborateso
Irrtions and conccpts in repll to thc crisesof modern societieswhich
can be summariz-cdas a decline of orientation. It will be one of the
questionsdecisivcfor our firture how we can overcome these crises
related to the transition of values änLl the loss of patterns of
mcaning.
Certainties of oricntation are erodrng, identities are being ques
tioned- Thc increasingvelocity of social dcvelopmenr gives rise to
this tendcncy by an intensifiecl changc of familiar structures and
experience-bascd ccrtainties.Traclitional k'rowledge, which is being
passedon from one generationto thc next by the church, the state,
'.hool. or funrlic.. bc.orn.. .rrrrJatcJir rn evertrowing pr.e.
'fhe
traditionalinstitutrons
of orientationare beingsupplemented
by recentlycnrcrgcdones.Conflictsbctrvccncompetingorienta
"market",different
tions on thc supplyside are rcsolvcdat the
definitionsof one'slivesmay Lrcincompatible.Functionalelitesare
being calledupon to contributc their shareto dre stabilizationof
socialfunrre. Effectiveorientationhas to masterthe challengeof
reconcilingindividuallymeaningfulconceptsfor life and necessities
to maintainthe cohesionof socicty.
The BertelsmannFoundation is ainrilg at responsesto three
crucixlquestions:
- \fhat canbc an cxplanationof this dcclincof orientation?
- $(hichinstiutions contributeto coherentandstableoricntations?
- How cana solutionto dre oricntationcrisisbe designed)
"cultural
As a first stepin thc field of projectson orientation"the
volum on 'The lossof oricntation the cohesioncrisisin modern
society"(in Germanlanguage only)wasreleascd to opena series of
publications.The next phaseconsistcdof a serieso{ expertisesof
which the presentsnrdyby Pctcr L. Ilergerand ThomasLuckmann
was completedin the first instancc.\farnfried Detding (Munich)
will presenthis conceptof thc immediatesocialenvironmentand
orientationin cornmLrnication with ncighborsin a few monthstime.
Other sub-projec*consistof a study by Gerhard Schmidtchen
(Universityof Zurich) on oricntationin intra-firm communication,
an expertiseby Martin Grciffcnhegen(Universityof Snrttgart)on
politicallegitimationand thc liuritsof strtecontrol and an investiga-
tiofl of the episte[rological
conclitionsof orientationunder condi-
tions of an increased complexityof knowlcdgeand informationby
cerhard Schulze(Universityof ßanrberg).
The Bertelsnann Foundation publishes this volumein the inten-
tion to providea forum for a dcbateon the future of modernsociety
andperspectives of developnlent.

74
acnninties oforicntrtionarceroding. identiliesarcbeing
qucslioned.Thc incrcasingvelocit)'ofsocial devclopmentSrvcs
risc to this tendencyby äDintcnsifiedchxngcoffamiliar struclurcs
andexpcricnce-bascd ocrtaintics.liaditional knowledgc,which
is bcing passedon fronr onegencrationto the ncxt bythc church.
thc statc.schoolsor fanrilics.becomcsouldalcdrn an ever-
grolring pace.-fhelradrlionälinstitulionsol orientationarebcing
supplcmcnted by rcccntlyemergedones.ConllictsbciYeen
compctingorientationon thc supplysideüe rcsolvedat the
"mlrrkcl",diflerentdefinitionsofonc's Livesmay be incompatible
funclionaLelitesrrc beil1gcalleduponto oontribulctheir shareto
thc shbilizationoi sociirllirture.Eilectivc orientationhas
to nrastcrthe challcngcol'rcconcilingindividuallymeaninglül
conceptsfor lile and neccssities to mainlaintbc cohesiono1'

PctcrL. tsergerand I homasLuclmann countämongthe causes

lor thc modemcrisisofmcaningprocesses ofnodemizatjon,
pluraiismand particularlywilh rcgard1oliuropeansocrctlcs-
As a pfoblcm solvingstratcgy,the authorssuggcst
secularization.
ihcir conceptofintcrmedialeinstitulionswhich ücdjate bclwccn
thc individualand socicly.

:
a

BertelsmannF oundationPublishers