Thayer Consultancy Background Brief

ABN # 65 648 097 123

U.S.-Vietnam Relations in
Retrospect
August 30, 2018

In light of the passing of Senator John McCain we request an historical overview of

what strategic and other factors drove former enemies to become friends and the role
of Senator McCain in this process.
Q1. At what point did the United States and Vietnam recognize the value of closer ties
with each other, and why?
ANSWER: In January 1973 the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace
was signed in Paris. It made provision for a cease-fire between the contending
Vietnamese parties, the withdrawal of U.S. military forces, and the return of captured
military and civilian personnel. Under Article 21, the United States committed itself
“to contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the
Democratic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.”
When the cease-fire broke down the United States declared that because of
communist violations it was no longer bound by this agreement. This meant that the
U.S. withdrew from its obligation to “heal the wounds of war” such as disposal of
unexploded ordnance and remediation of the effects of Agent Orange (dioxin).
After reunification in 1975 the possible normalization of relations between United
States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were poisoned by the issue of whether
or not Hanoi released all American prisoners of war (POW) and was cooperating to
provide a full accounting for American soldiers missing in action (MIA). In addition,
two other issues arose that prevented early normalization: the outpouring of boat
people/asylum seekers from Vietnam and Vietnam’s decade-long intervention and
occupation of Cambodia.
In the mid-1980s, Vietnam was included in the International Trafficking in Arms
Regulation (ITAR). These regulations were applied to countries already under a U.S.
embargo and to countries that the U.S. judged were not contributing to international
peace and security.
The United States first gave consideration to normalization with Vietnam under the
presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-81). Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke
played a pivotal role in discussions with his Vietnamese counterparts. Agreement was
reached in principle to normalize relations in 1978 but this fell through when the U.S.
Congress passed a law halting payment of any reparations to Vietnam, later amended
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to include preventing the United States from approving funding for Vietnam by
international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.
The normalization of relations between Washington and Hanoi only became possible
when Vietnam withdrew its military forces from Cambodia in September 1989 and
agreed to support a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian conflict in October
1991.
The end of the Cold War changed the strategic setting in which both Vietnam and the
United States viewed each other. The collapse of socialist regimes in central Europe
and later the Soviet Union in late 1991 created an international environment that
facilitated the development of relations between Vietnam and the United States.
Normalization of relations was a two-way street. Vietnam’s cooperation on the POW-
MIA issue resulted in U.S. efforts to engage Vietnam. In July 1991, the U.S. opened an
Office for MIA Affairs in Hanoi. In February 1992 the Task Force Full Accounting was
created. In 1994, President Bill Clinton lifted the trade embargo on Vietnam and six
years later visited Vietnam. (November 2000). In April 1991 the George H.W. Bush
Administration presented Hanoi with a “roadmap” plan for phased normalization of
relations.
On the other side, no development was more decisive than Vietnam’s mid-1991
decision to diversify and multilateralize first its economic and then political-diplomatic
relations with all countries, including the United States. In sum, both Washington and
Hanoi were disposed to developing their relations. It was not coincidental that in July
1995 Vietnam normalized it relations with the United States and joined the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the same week.
At first it was economic relations that drove this process. Major turning points were
reached with the lifting of the U.S. trade embargo (994), the negotiation of a Bilateral
Trade Agreement (signed December 2001), the U.S. grant of Permanent Normal Trade
Relations to Vietnam thus facilitating Vietnam’s membership in the World Trade
Organization (2006). In 2007 Vietnam and the United States signed a Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).
Cooperation on economic ties spilled over to political relations as the two sides hosted
reciprocal high-level visits. In June 2005, President George W. Bush hosted Phan Van
Khai, the first visit by a Vietnamese Prime Minister since the end of the Vietnam War.
The following year President Bush made an official visit to Hanoi. In June 2007
President Nguyen Minh Triet paid a reciprocal visit to Washington. In June 2008, Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung was received officially in the U.S.
Vietnam became increasingly important to the United States politically as a
constructive member of ASEAN and as a non-permanent member of the UN Security
Council for the 2008-2009 term.
In July 2013, Vietnam and the United States adopted the Joint Statement on
Comprehensive Partnership during the state visit by President Truong Tan Sang to
Washington. In 2015, in a major development, President Barack Obama received the
Nguyen Phu Trong, the Secretary General of the Vietnam Communist Party, at the
White House. In May 2016, President Obama paid an official visit to Hanoi. President
Donald Trump reinforced continuity in U.S.-Vietnam relations by receiving Prime
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Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc in The White House in May 2017 and paying an official
visit to Vietnam in November after attending the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Da Nang.
The development of defense ties was also a two-way street. Once Vietnam shed its
pariah status by withdrawing from Cambodia, the Pentagon and the U.S. Pacific
Command sought to engage Vietnam. In March 2000, William Cohen made the first
visit to Hanoi by a U.S. Defense Secretary since the end of the Vietnam War.
A major turning point was reached in 2003 when the Vietnam Communist Party
adopted a resolution setting out a policy of cooperation and struggle (vừa hợp tác vừa
đấu tranh) in its external relations. Late that year Vietnam’s Minister of National
Defence General Pham Van Tra visited Washington for the first time, and inaugurated
an alternating triennial visits by defence ministers. In June 2006, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld made an official visit to Hanoi and in late 2009 General Phung Quang
Thanh, Minister of National Defense, visited the United States. Three years later, in
June 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, visited Vietnam.
In 2014 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel cancelled a visit to Vietnam, and in June the
following year, his successor, Ashton Carter visited Hanoi. In August 2017 and January
2018, Vietnam’s current Minister of National Defense, General Ngo Xuan Lich and his
counter-part Defence Secretary James Mattis exchanged visits, respectively.
In November 2003, Vietnam hosted the first visit by a U.S. Navy ship since the Vietnam
War initiating annual visits up to the present. It was only in October 2008 that Vietnam
and the U.S. conducted their first strategic dialogue on political, security, defense and
humanitarian cooperation issues in Hanoi.
In 2011, Vietnam and the U.S. signed a landmark Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation. The MOU set out five priority
areas for cooperation: maritime security, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief, exchanges between defense universities and research institutes,
and UN peacekeeping operations. This MOU remains the foundation for U.S.-Vietnam
defence engagement up to the present
Q2. What role did Senator John McCain play in the development of bilateral relations
between the United States and Vietnam?
ANSWER: Senator John McCain played a substantial role in developing bilateral
relations between the United States and Vietnam primarily through his bipartisan
approach in the U.S. Congress. Senator McCain was able to play this role for a variety
of reasons: his family legacy, his father and grandfather were both high-profile four-
star admirals in the U.S. Navy; his status as a Vietnam War veteran and prisoner of
war; and his stature as a five-term Senator and Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee (2015-18).
It is important to note, however, that other Vietnam War veterans and U.S. officials
played a more important and decisive role in the development of U.S. relations with
Vietnam. Foremost was John Kerry, leader of a group of influential anti-Vietnam War
veterans. Kerry became more influential as a Senator (1985-2013), and then as
Secretary of State (2013-17). In June 1995, the Veterans of Foreign Wars announced
their support for normalization of U.S. diplomatic relations with Vietnam. In April
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2004, the Congressional U.S.-Vietnam Caucus was established to promote bilateral

relations.
Q3. As the United States and Vietnam each came to realize the benefit of developing
their bilateral relations, relations developed gradually. What factors drove them
together and what factors provoked discord?
There were domestic factors in both Vietnam and the United States that mitigated
against a trouble-free and rapid normalization of relations. There was distrust on both
sides. Some Vietnamese leaders feared that the U.S. was pursuing a policy of peaceful
evolution by stressing human rights and democracy promotion. Others insisted that
in exchange for cooperation with Vietnam the United States should contribute to
addressing war legacy issues such as unexploded ordnance and dioxin poisoning from
Agent Orange.
On the U.S. side a domestic group, the Families of POWs and MIAs, constantly opposed
the development of relations with Vietnam until there was a full accounting for all
American prisoners of war and missing in action. They formed an influential lobby
group in the U.S. Congress. In July 1991 the United States Office for MIA Affairs was
officially opened in Hanoi.
Anti-communist Vietnamese-Americans (Viet kieu) also constituted an important
domestic pressure group that criticized the Vietnamese government’s violation of
human rights and democratic freedoms. They received political support by their
representatives in Congress such as Loretta Sanzhez (D-California).
Both the POW-MIA and Vietnamese-American lobby groups delayed the lifting of
legislation, such as the trade embargo and ITAR restriction, even as the U.S.
government sought to raise relations with Vietnam. It was only in February 1994 that
President Bill Clinton lifted the U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam.
Q4. Is the South China Sea the first big test in security ties?
ANSWER: The South China Sea dispute first surfaced as an important issue in bilateral
relations in 2010 when China declared that the South China Sea was a core interest.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton opposed this and insisted that the U.S. had a national
interest in the South China Sea. It was Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea
that prompted U.S. security concerns.
The South China Sea dispute, however, did not result in practical cooperation between
Vietnam and the United States to oppose China. Many senior Vietnamese officials held
the view that this issue was not as important to the United States as it was to Vietnam.
Further, these officials held the view that the U.S. could easily pivot and turn to China
at Vietnam’s expense.
Vietnam and the United States, in principle, share similar views on disputes in the
South China Sea. Both oppose the threat or use of force to settle disputes. Both
support the role of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. Both support freedom of navigation and overflights. And both urge
the full implementation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea (DOC) and the early conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).
And both support “legal and diplomatic” processes to settle disputes, a reference to
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the Award by the Arbitral Tribunal that ruled in the case brought by the Philippines
against China.
Vietnam regularly expresses its support for U.S. freedom of navigation patrols as long
as they contribute to regional peace and security. President Trump’s hosting of a visit
by Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc and his meeting in Hanoi with President Tran Dai
Quang both resulted in joint statements that included a lengthy paragraph on the
South China Sea setting out their areas of agreement.
Disputes in the South China Sea, per se, are not a test of security ties. Vietnam’s
defence policy of “three no’s” serves as a brake on joint military exercises as opposed
to naval engagement activities.
The real test of bilateral defence and security ties lies in what will Vietnam do now
that the arms embargo has been lifted. The persistence of the arms embargo led some
Vietnamese officials to oppose the rapid development of defence cooperation until it
was lifted. They felt Vietnam was being arbitrarily discriminated against. Now the ball
is in Vietnam’s court. Will it begin to make substantial purchases of U.S. military
equipment, technology and weapons?

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “U.S.-Vietnam Relations in Retrospect,” Thayer

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