Estrada vs.

Arroyo
G.R. No. 146738
March 2, 2001

FACTS:
- Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the
Philippines on June 30, 1998 (commencement of their six-year term) with Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as his Vice President.
- On October 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a longtime friend of the President,
alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from “jueteng” hidden in a bank
account known as “Jose Velarde”.
- On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by
115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the
Senate.
- On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner.
- On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the
second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in
a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous
outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the
PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.
- On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press
statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter
stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and
duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be
the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President
Pimentel on the same day.
- After his fall from the pedestal of power, several cases previously filed against him, which he
countered by filing GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any
further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also
prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable question.
2.) Whether or not the petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
3.) Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
4.) Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
5.) Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity.
HELD:
Issue # 1: Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable question.

This Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, defines political questions as
“those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the EDSA People Power I in Aquino government involves the exercise of the people
power of revolution which overthrew the old government entirely, the EDSA People Power II in Arroyo
government on the other hand was a government exercising the people power of freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the
office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that
resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President
are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require
the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,
and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 11 of Article VII.
The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the
correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case
of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ."

Issue # 2: Whether or not the petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

The issue is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a
high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be
an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It
can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act
and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous
and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, the Court hold that petitioner resigned as President.

a.) The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an
indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.

b.) The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as
to open the second envelop to clear his name.
c.) During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only
unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after
transition period.

d.) His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his
final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic
albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of
the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not
say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency
as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’
the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of
a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release
was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

Issue # 3: Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to Act as President.

The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President. Section 11 of Article VII which states:
“Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions.”

Aforementioned is the law. Now, the operative facts:

1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President
and Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20,
2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175

Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. On the same date, the
House of Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176 which states:

“RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION

INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER
ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.”
The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states:

“RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN.

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”
It is implicitly clear in that recognition that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not
resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Issue # 4: Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.

For the first submission, the Court rejects the petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for
the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss
of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
"Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."Since, the Impeachment Court is now
functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation
than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be
the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it
clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President,
the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.

The Court also ruled In Re: Saturnino Bermudez states “that incumbent Presidents are immune from
suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been
aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua
non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he can be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings.

For the second submission, the petitioner as a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold
that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. As for civil immunity, it
means immunity from civil damages only covers “official acts”.

Issue # 5: Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity.

The petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting an
investigation of the cases filed against him for he has already developed a bias against the petitioner. He
submits that it is a violation of due process. There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of
thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high
profile cases. The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a
jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial
suffers a threat. The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the
potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. During cases like such, the
test of actual prejudice shall be applied. The test shows that there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. The
Court rules that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than
hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.

According to the records, it was the petitioner who assailed the biasness of the Ombudsman. The
petitioner alleges that there were news reports which said that the Ombudsman had already prejudged
the cases against him. The Court rules that the evidence presented is insufficient. The Court also
cannot adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent
Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. Investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking
slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner
and the latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the
remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de
jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.