31.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs

JOSE O. VERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents

FACTS: The petitioners filed a petition against the respondents. The prosecutor filed a writ a prohibition against Vera.

Vera granted Cu Unjieng(guilty of falsification of files) probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221 which created a probation office in the
Department of Justice. The petitioners contended that the Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to
the executive, but also constitute an unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: WON the Act No. 4221 in unconstitutional.

HELD: Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any
pronouncement regarding costs.

Parole is the provisional release of a prisoner who agrees to certain conditions prior to the completion of the maximum sentence period

Probation in criminal law is a period of supervision over an offender, ordered by a court instead of serving time in prison. In others, probation
also includes supervision of those conditionally released from prison on parole.

A writ of prohibition is a writ directing a subordinate to stop doing something the law prohibits.

No. 36 PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL

15 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be
appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed
by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress.
Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt
from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated
such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68
lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate
has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean that the President may exercise such
power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place,
what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President
may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be
changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

No. 38. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held
on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and RenongBerhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of RenongBerhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner
and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by RenongBerhad in a letter to
GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17
October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
GSIS and consummated with RenongBerhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.
Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means
of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature
may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a
practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of
a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of
any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is
that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony
with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean
that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner
similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue
of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters
involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the
former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to RenongBerhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and
thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as
may be necessary for the purpose.

39. ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a
day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is
also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this
clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to
be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political
in nature

No. 41. Imbong v. COMELEC

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Constitutional Convention 1971.

IMBONG VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970
Ponente: Makasiar, J.

FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have two delegates from each representative district. On
June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with
at least two delegates from each representative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing
Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of
8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the parameters of such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing
details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a denial
of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of
delegates. The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not
arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic
constitutional rights remain substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by the
petitioners.