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LECTURE NOTES ON
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
By: Prof. Ildefonso G. Mariquit
Public office is a public trust—this requires that all government officials and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Createdby:
1. The Constitution—e.g. Office of the President;
2. Valid statutory amendments;
3. By authority of law.
ElementsofPublicOffice:
1. Created by law or ordinance authorized by law;
2. Possesses sovereign functions of the government;
3. Functions defined expressly or impliedly by law;
4. Functions exercised by an officer directly under the control of law, not under a
superior officer unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office created
or authorized by the legislature, and by it placed under the general control of a
superior office or body; and
5. Must have permanency or continuity.
Characteristics:
1. Public office is a public trust;
2. Public office is not a property and is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
subject of a contract.
Under Sec. 2, RA 3019—the term includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified, unclassified or exempt
service, receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government.
Khan, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006, in the case
of officers/employees in GOCCs, they are deemed “public officers” if their corporations
are tasked to carry out governmental functions.
Two(2)Senses:
c. Age
d. Political Affiliation—as a rule, it is not a qualification.
Exceptions: in Party-List, Membership in the Electoral Tribunal, Commission
on appointment
Examples: Sec. 17 (2) Art. XIII (Human Rights)— The Commission shall be
composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office
and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be
provided by law.
Section 7 (2), Article VIII— The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications
of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he
is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
2. Statute—Congress has the plenary power to prescribe the qualification but such
must be:
a. Germane to the purpose of the office;
b. Not too specific so as to refer to only one individual.
In Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999, an oath of
office is a qualifying requirement for public office. Only when the public officer has satisfied
this prerequisite can his right to enter into the position be considered plenary and
complete. Until then, he has none at all, and for as long as he has not qualified, the
holdover officer is the rightful occupant. An oath of office taken before one who has no
authority to administer is no oath at all.
However, in Mendoza vs. Laxina, G. R. No. 146875, July 14, 2003, once
proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to
exercise the functions thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient
basis to enjoin him from assuming office or from discharging his functions.
Sec. 5 (1), Art. XVI—All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or
affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.
Q: A was elected/appointed to public office. He assumed office without taking the oath
of office as prescribed by the Constitution and relevant CSC rules and regulations. Are
his acts valid?
A: Yes, A’s acts are considered valid, insofar as third parties and the general public are
concerned/rely on his acts—acts of a De Facto officer.
(See the case of Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007)
DISQUALIFICATIONS
The legislature has the right to prescribe disqualifications in the same manner
that it can prescribe qualifications, provided that the prescribed disqualifications do not
violate the Constitution.
2. Sec. 13, Art. VI— No Senator or Member of the HOR may hold any other office
or employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. Neither, shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
5. Sec. 11, Art. XI—The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall not be qualified to run
for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.
6. Sec. 1, Art. IX-B; Art. IX-C; Sec. 1, Art. IX-D; Sec. 8, art. XI—Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment.
7. Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-B; Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-C; Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-D; Sec. 11, Art.
XI-- Members of the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his
Deputies are appointed to a term of seven (7) years without reappointment.
8. Sec. 13, Art. VII—the spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or
as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
GOCCs.
Public Interest Center, Inc. vs. Magdangal Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007, the
concurrent appointments of respondent as PCGG Chairman and Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel (CPLC) are unconstitutional. The concurrent appointment to these offices is
in violation of Section 7 (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution, since these are incompatible
offices. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on
the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and reviewing
investigations involving heads of executive departments. Since the actions of the
PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are subject to the review of the
CPLC, such appointments would be incompatible.
1. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
2. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
3. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
4. Those with dual citizenship;
5. Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
6. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
7. The insane or feeble-minded.
Caasi vs. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 229, to be qualified to run for elective office, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. The waiver should be manifested by
some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his certificate of candidacy for
elective office. The reason is that residence in the municipality where he intends to run for
elective office which is at least one (1) year at the time of the filing of his certificate
of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate must possess. The mere filing of
his COC for elective office in the country is not sufficient. The election of a candidate who
is a green card holder or who has not validly waived his status as a green card holder
is null and void.
Rodriguez vs. COMELEC, 259 SCRA 296, the term “fugitive from justice” includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged in the Philippines or abroad, flee to avoid prosecution. Intent to evade on the part
of a candidate must be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at
least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. He is not a fugitive from justice
when, at the time of departure from abroad to the Philippines, there is yet no complaint
filed against him abroad. In this case, it was established that the case was filed against
Rodriguez five (5) months after he had returned to the Philippines. What is controlling
is the intent to evade the California court.
DE FACTO OFFICERS—
One who has reputation of being an officer that he assumes to be, and yet is not
an officer in point of law.
Requisites:
a. Reputation or acquiescence;
acts are valid insofar as 3rd his acts are valid his acts are entirely void
parties and the general
public is concern but he is
not suppose to benefit from
his acts—against public
policy.
Q: Is a de-facto officer lawfully entitled to the salary of the office he is occupying?
A: No, he is not supposed to benefit from his acts. It is against public policy. Otherwise,
it will encourage other people to be a de facto officer that will result to chaos.
Exceptions:
c. If there is no de-jure officer claiming for the same salary;
d. If the assumption/act was done in good faith.
LegalEffectsofActs: Valid, binding and with full legal effect insofar as they affect the
public. It is intended for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in
the official acts of persons discharging the duties of a public office. (Monroy vs. CA, 20
SCRA 620)
General Manager, PPA vs. Monsarate, G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002, a rightful
incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the
latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto officer) occupied
the office in good faith and under color of title.
Dutiesofapublicofficer:
A. Constitutional Duties
a. To be accountable to the people; to serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency; to act with patriotism and justice; and to lead
modest lives (Section 1, Article XI).
b. To submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth
upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law
(Section 17, Article XI).
c. To owe the State and the Constitution allegiance at all times (Section 18,
Article XI).
B. Specific Cases:
a. The Solicitor General’s duty to represent the government, its offices and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents—except in criminal cases or
civil cases for damages arising from felony—is mandatory. Although he
has discretion in choosing whether or not to prosecute a case or even
withdraw therefrom, such discretion must be exercised within the
parameters set by law and with the best interest of the State as the
ultimate goal. (Gonzales vs. Chavez, 205 SCRA 817)
b. The government is not stopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more
so if they are erroneous or irregular (Sharp Int’l Mktg. vs. CA, 154
SCRA 88).
Prohibitions:
1. Engaging in partisan political party except to vote
2. Additional or double compensation
3. Prohibition against loans
4. Laborers—shall not be assigned to perform clerical duties
5. Detail or reassignment
6. Nepotism
Rightsofpublicofficers:
1. Right to office
2. Right to salary
3. Right to preference in promotion
4. Right to vacation and sick leave
5. Right to maternity leave
6. Right to retirement pay
7. Others—right to reimbursement for expenses incurred in the due performance of
his duty; right to be indemnified; right to longevity pay.
COMMENCEMENTOFOFFICIALRELATIONS
A. By Appointment
B. By Election
APPOINTMENT—
The selection, by authority vested with power, of individual who is to perform
functions of a given office. (Binamira vs. Garrucho, G.R. No. July 30, 1990)
Bermudez vs. Torres, 311 SCRA 733, the right of choice is the heart of the power
to appoint. In the exercise of power to appoint, discretion is an integral thereof.
Classificationofappointments:
2. Permanent—extended to a person possessing the requisite qualification for the
position and thus enjoys security of tenure.
3. Temporary—acting appointment given to a non-civil service eligible; is without a
definite tenure and is dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power;
4. Provisional—one which may be issued upon:
a. Prior authorization of the Commissioner of the Civil Service
b. To a person who has not qualified in an appropriate examination
c. But who otherwise meets the requirements for appointment to a regular position
in the competitive service
d. Whenever a vacancy occurs
e. The filing thereof is necessary in the interest of the service and
f. There is no appropriate register of those who are eligible at the time of
appointment.
5. Regular—one made by the President while Congress is in session and becomes
effective after the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointment and
continues until the end of the term.
6. Ad-interim—
a. Recess—one made while the Congress is not in session, before confirmation
by the Commission on Appointment; immediately effective; and ceases to
be valid if disapproved or bypassed by CA upon the next adjournment of
Congress;
b. Midnight—made by the President before his term expires, whether or not
it is confirmed by the CA
Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002—(See discussion under Article VII)
General Manager, PPA vs. Monsarate, G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002, once an
appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil
service under a complete appointment, he acquires legal, not merely equitable, right to
the position which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot
be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except
for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.
The next-in-rank rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial
duty on the appointing authority.
The next-in-rank rule applies only if the vacancy is filled by promotion
Elective local official—3 years and may serve only for 3 consecutive terms
----------------------
1988—Capco was a Vice-Mayor
1989—the Mayor (Borja, Sr.) died, Capco succeeded as Mayor
1992—Capco ran for Mayor and won
1995—he ran for re-election and won again
1998—Is he still qualified to run?
The SC held that Mayor Capco is still qualified in 1998 local election. The right to
be elected for 3 consecutive times for the same position was not present in this case.
Mayor Capco did not fully serve his term in 1989. He became a mayor thru succession
and not election. (Borja, jr. vs. COMELEC & Mayor Capco of Pateros)
-----------------------
1992
1995 X was elected Mayor
1998
----------------------
1992
1995 X was elected as Mayor
1998
On December 1, 2000, before his 3rd term ends, he was removed for misconduct.
He did not appeal the case. The administrative case attained finality. Is he qualified to run
again for mayor in the 2001 election?
No. he has been elected for 3 consecutive times for the same position. Section
40 (b) of the LGC provides for his disqualification—removed as a result of administrative
case. However, if he appealed, he is still qualified because there is no finality of
judgment yet.
----------------------
1992
1995 X was elected as Mayor
1998
Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 212 SCRA 768, a public official cannot be removed for
administrative conduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous conduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to
criminal cases pending against petitioner.
Mayor Alvin Garcia vs. Hon. Mojica, et al., G.R. No. 139043, September 10, 1999, a
re-elected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct
committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the
electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his
life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still
reelects him, such re-election is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
1992
1995 Hagedorn was elected as Mayor
1998
In 2001, Hagedorn ran for governor but lost. Socrates was elected as mayor.
June 30, 2001—end of Hagedorn’s term for mayor
Held: the three (3)-term limit rule found in Sec. 43-b, LGC has two (2) parts:
1. Three (3) consecutive terms
2. Any length of time will interrupt
The provision speaks of a regular election and not a special one. In this case, recall is
a special election. It is not considered as immediate election. The immediate election
that prohibits Hagedorn from running for mayor is the next regular election after his 3
consecutive terms has ended, the 2001 election.
He won in the September 2002 recall election. He will continue the term of Socrates.
His term will end on June 30, 2004—a term which is less than 3 years.
What if in:
2004
2007 he was elected as Mayor
May he run again in 2010?
No more. Recall election term is considered as one full term for purposes
of applying the disqualification. Otherwise, Hagedorn will be allowed to serve for
more than nine (9) years.
The above hypothetical problem was only an obiter dictum in the case of Socrates vs.
COMELEC.
The rule is, service of the recall term will not interrupt the 3-consecutive term rule. In the
case of Mendoza vs. COMELEC, the SC did not abandon the ruling in Socrates
because it was merely an obiter dictum.
---------------------------
1995—Francis Ong ran for mayor, he won
1998—He ran and won again. Alegre filed a protest.
2001—Ong ran and won again. The protest in 1998 was decided by the RTC on July 4,
2001 that it was Alegre who won in 1998 election.
2004—Ong ran again. Alegre questioned. Ong alleged that his proclamation as mayor-
elect in the May 1998 election was contested and eventually nullified by the RTC of
Daet.
Issue: Whether or not Ong’s assumption of office as Mayor from July 1, 1998 to June
30, 2001 may be considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive 3-
term limit rule?
Held: The assumption of office from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 constitutes “service
for the full term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the 3-
term limit prescribed by the Constitution and LGC, barring local elective officials from
being elected and serving more than 3-consecutive term for the same position. x x x His
proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the 3-term rule.
There was no interruption or break in the continuity of Ong’s service respecting the
1998-2001 term. Ong was never unseated during the term in question; he never ceased
discharging his duties and responsibilities as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for
the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
In the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999), Lonzanida was
elected and served for 2 consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to
the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995
elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor. However, an election protest was filed
before RTC of Zambales. In a decision dated July 9, 1997, it was held that there was a
failure of elections and the position for mayor as vacant. Lonzanida assumed the office
and performed his duties up to March 1998 only. During the 1998 elections, Lonzanida
ran again for mayor. A petition to disqualify under the three-term limit rule was filed
and was eventually granted. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. He
cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered
to vacate (and in fact vacated) his post before the expiration of the term. There was an
involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, therewasan
effectiveinterruptionofthecontinuityofservice.
Concept of Vacancy:
Two(2)Principlestoconsider:
1. One who illegally terminated, by legal fiction, is deemed not to have vacated his
position
2. One, no matter how qualified, may not filled a position which is not vacant
RuleonAutomaticSuccession (Section 44, LGC)
A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official:
1. Fills a higher vacant office;
2. Refuses to assume office;
3. Fails to qualify;
4. Dies;
5. Is removed from office;
6. Voluntarily resigns;
7. Or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
Ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district
in the immediately preceding local election.
In Case of tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members—it shall
be resolved by the drawing of lots.
The successors shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.
Last-in-rank—the one who will replace him must come from the same political party of
the one who caused the vacancy, upon nomination of the party.
No political party, how shall the vacancy be filled? (Section 45-c, LGC)
The local chief executive shall appoint, upon recommendation of the sanggunian
concern, a qualified person to fill the vacancy.
Fariñas vs. Barba, the last-in-rank sangguniang bayan member resigned. Mayor
Barba, upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Bayan, appointed somebody.
However, Gov. Fariñas also appointed somebody, upon recommendation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The SC held that neither is entitled to occupy the vacancy.
It should have been Gov. Fariñas who should appoint but the sanggunian who
recommended should be the Sangguniang Bayan where the vacancy took place.
Mayor— Lakas-NUCD
V-Mayor— Lakas-NUCD
1. SB Member
2. SB Member
3. SB Member came from Reforma Party
4. SB Member
5. SB Member
6. SB Member—Lakas NUCD
7. SB Member—Reforma Party
8. SB Member—Lakas NUCD
The Mayor died. Vice Mayor succeeded. The #1 SB Member became the Vice Mayor.
The #8 slot became vacant. The Governor appointed somebody from Reforma Party. The
SC held that the appointment made by the governor is valid. The last ranking shall be
filled by Reforma Party to maintain party representation in the Sanggunian as willed by
the electorate.
Gamboa, Jr. vs. Aguirre, July 1999
The Vice-Governor acted as Governor. Can he (V-Governor) preside over the sessions
of Sangguniang Panlalawigan?
No. The creation of temporary vacancy in the office of the governor creates a
corresponding vacancy in the office of the vice-governor. Section 49-d, LGC, the
members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a
temporary presiding officer.
The rule on permanent vacancy should not be applied to temporary vacancy.
SituationscoveredbytheLawonNepotism:
One is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a. Appointing authority;
b. Recommending authority;
c. Chief of the bureau of office; and
d. Person exercising immediate supervision.
In the last situations (c and d), it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending
authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is
extended or issued in favor of a relative within the 3rd civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision
over the appointee. (CSC vs. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999)
Exemptions:
1. Persons employed in confidential capacity;
2. Teachers;
3. Physicians;
4. Members of the AFP;
5. Member of any family who, after his appointment to any position in an office or
bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which
event the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be
allowed.
In Section 79 of the Local Government Code, the prohibition is up to the 4th civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity.
Laurel V vs. CSC, Governor Laurel appointed his brother as Civilian Security Officer,
hence it is exempted, no violation as it is primarily confidential in character. However, the
governor subsequently designated the same brother as Acting Provincial Administrator.
The SC ruled that appointment and designation are two different matters. But for
purposes of the law on nepotism, the two are now the same. Hence, there is now a
violation of the law on nepotism.
Debulgado vs. CSC, it was alleged that the law applies only to original appointment
and not to promotional appointment. The SC did not agree. The law applies to all kinds
of appointment. The law does not distinguish.
TERMINATIONOFOFFICIALRELATIONSHIP:
1. Expiration of term or tenure
2. Reaching the age limit—compulsory retirement age: 70 years of age for members of the
Judiciary; 65 for other government officers and employees
3. Resignation
4. Recall
5. Removal
6. Abandonment
7. Acceptance of an incompatible office
8. Abolition of office
9. Prescription of the right to office
10. Impeachment
11. Death
12. Failure to assume elective office within 6 months from proclamation
13. Conviction of a crime
14. Filing a certificate of candidacy
Term—the period of time during which a public officer has the right to hold the public
office
Tenure—the period of time during which the public officer actually held office
Hold-over principle—[See the case of Lecaroz vs. SB (1999)]—in the absence of any
express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the public officer
is entitled to hold his office until his successor shall have been duly chosen and shall have
qualified. The purpose is to prevent a hiatus in public office.
It implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the
succeeding term. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant
upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume
it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified,
even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts generally indulge in
the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition
which may result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time,
wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is
founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is
specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering of a vacancy and to
avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions. (Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 397, March 25, 1999)
It is exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local
elective official subject to such recall belongs (Section 69, LGC)
Prohibitionfromresignation:
The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the
recall process is in progress.
Paras vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996, it was held that the
SK Election is not a regular election within the contemplation of the LGC as
would bar the holding of a recall election. Neither will the recall election of the
Mayor be barred by the Barangay Election.
Angobung vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 126571, March 5, 1997, the “regular local
election” referred to in Section 74, LGC, means that the approaching local
election must be one where the position of the official to be recalled is actually
contested and to be filled by the electorate.
The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the revised Penal Code.
(Sanggguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes vs. CA, 284 SCRA 276)
Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, resignation is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: theremustbeanintenttoresignandthe intent
mustbecoupledbyactsofrelinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by
any formal requirement as to for. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can
be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
ABOLITION OF OFFICE—it connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and
permanently, as the word “abolished” denotes. Where one office is abolished and
replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.
In the case of UP Board of Regents vs. Rasul, the renaming and restructuring
of the PGH and its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of
the position of PGH Director. This is because where the abolished office and the offices
created in its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good faith. The abolition
which merely changes the nomenclature of positions is invalid and does not result in the
removal of the incumbent.
The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the position of the
PGH Director and the creation of the UP-PGH Medical center Director are valid, the
removal of the incumbent is still not justified for the reason that the duties and functions
of the two positions are basically the same.
Canonizado vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, January 25, 2000, the substantial identity
in the functions between the two offices was indicia of bad faith in the removal of petitioner
pursuant to a re-organization.
REORGANIZATION—takes place when there is alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally,
it may result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of an office.
To be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith.
GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL AND SUSPENSION—(Section 23, Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of 1987 Administrative Code)
1. Grave Offenses
2. Less Grave offenses
3. Light Offenses
Preventive Suspension—
It is not a penalty itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee
who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged
misfeasance while the same is being investigated. It is not an action by itself but merely
an incident in an action.
Governing Laws:
1. Preventive Suspension in Administrative Cases
Gloria vs. CA (199), there are two (2) kinds of preventive suspension under
CSC:
i. Pending investigation
ii. Pending appeal & the respondent is exonerated on appeal
Gov. Plaza vs. CA, G.R. No. 138464, January 18, 2008, the law provides for
preventive suspension of appointive local official and employees pending investigation
of the charges against them. The suspension given to private respondents, cannot,
therefore, be considered unjustified for it is one of those sacrifices which holding a
public office requires for the public good. To be entitled to back salaries, private
respondents must not only be found innocent of the charges, but their suspension must
likewise be unjustified.
Authoritytoimpose:
In the case of Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, since the law is silent, apply
by analogy the Civil Service Law, the maximum duration would be 90 days.
Deloso vs. SB Section 13, RA 3019 does not state that the public
officer may be suspended in the office where he
committed
Bayot vs. SB the crime.
Segovia vs. SB The term “office” indicates that it applies to “any other
Santiago vs. SB office”.
Sectio
n 1,
Article
XI
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
Impeachment of President—the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court will preside; the
Senate/HOR will prosecute
Groundsforimpeachment:
1. Culpable violation of the constitution
2. Treason
3. Bribery
4. Betrayal of public trust
5. Graft and corruption
6. Other high crimes
Procedure in
Impeachment—
Initiation:
The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.
Process:
1. Verified complaint filed by any member of the House or
any citizen upon resolution of endorsement by any member
thereof;
2. Included in the order of business within ten (10) session days;
3. Referred to the proper committee within three (3) session days of its inclusion.
If the verified complaint is filed by at least 1/3 of all its members, the same
shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
.
4. The Committee, after hearing, and by majority vote of all its
members, shall submit its report to the House together with the
corresponding resolution;
5. Placing on calendar the Committee resolution within ten (10)
days from submission;
6. Discussion on the floor of the report;
7. A vote of at least 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles
of Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary
resolution.
Trial
and
Decisi
on—
1. The Senators take an oath or affirmation;
2. When the president is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside but shall not vote;
3. A decision of conviction must be concurred in by at least 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate.
Effect of
Convicti
on—
1. Removal from office;
2. Disqualification to hold any other office under the Republic of the Philippines;
3. Party convicted shall be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law.
Limitation:
1. Not more than one impeachment case shall be initiated against the
same official within a period of one (1) year.
2. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142476, March 20, 2001, the
Republic of the Philippines cannot be held liable under an “Agreement”
entered into by the PCGG with another party where the republic did not
authorize the PCGG to enter into such contract. Where the sale of an
aircraft to a third party by the PCGG is void, it follows that the “Agreement”
between the PCGG and the third party is likewise a nullity, and there can
be no cause of action against the Republic.