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PHILOSOPH
QUARTERLY
VOL.25 No. 99 APRIL 1975
in terms of measuring. But, leaving this aside, let us look at what the theory
achieves. It demystifies counting: to count is not to relate counted groups
to the Platonist's abstract objects, numbers, but simply to fix on a type of
thing to use as unit, and then tell off those things using the numeral sequence.
Counting can be adequately explained without reference to abstract objects.
The one that we use in counting is not, as Plato thought, an independent
item; it is just a particular thing that we fix on as our unit, different in each
case. It might be a chair, or a colour, or any kind of thing.7
The main point of the Met. I passage, then, is to provide an anti-Platonist
alternative to the literal understanding of statements about number and
the idea that numbers are existing entities. Aristotle's ideas could be crudely
summed up as follows: In the world there are things, but there are not also
units and numbers over and above those things. There is only the fact that
those things can be counted.
I have suggested that the Met. I account is in the background of what
is said about number in Phys. A. There are three points that suggest this, even
before we come to the details of the way the idea of time as a number is applied.
Firstly, as already noted, 'number' and 'measure' are sometimes used inter-
changeably in Phys. A, and this needs some explanation. Secondly, Aris-
totle's theory has the awkward consequence that strictly speaking 1 is not
a number; in both Met. I and the Physics passage he notes this, but con-
tinues to use 1 as a number.8 Thirdly, he notes casually at 223b 13-5 that
things are counted by means of something of the same kind; this is totally
unexplained in Phys. A, but explained at length in Met. I at 1053a 24-30.
If Aristotle has the latter in mind in his treatment of time, and it is an
anti-Platonist account of number, this suggests that in saying that time is
a kind of number Aristotle may intend to give an anti-Platonist account of
time. I believe that this is so, and that the point of "Time is a kind of
number" is to make it possible to analyse statements about time in a non-
Platonist way.
Is Aristotle worried by the problem of whether time exists, as he clearly
is by the problem of whether numbers exist? I think that there are signs
that he is.
Firstly, he opens his account of time by asking whether or not it exists.
7The theory has another advantage: it explains how the unit can be indivisible.
Plato argues at Philebus 56-9 and 61-2 that because the things we count are never
indivisible, when we count in the strict sense we are counting not things but distinct
logically indivisible units. Aristotle's theory obviates this ontologically inflationary
move. Units are not abstract objects over and above counted objects: they just are
those counted objects, regarded as indivisible for purposes of counting. Mathematicians
regard their units as in every way indivisible (1052b 35-1053a 2), i.e., fission in the
physical world is not allowed to refute a calculation. This characterization of a unit
as what is taken to be indivisible turns up elsewhere in Aristotle (1089b 35, 1016b 25,
Physics 206b 30-1).
8Metaphysics 1056b 25, 1085b 10, Physics 220a 27-32. In spite of the fashionable
assumption that 1 was not naturally regarded as a number by the Greeks because
&pL0,66q connoted plurality, both Plato and Aristotle use 1 as a number (Laws 818c,
Sophist 238b, Categories 5a 31, Metaphysics 1080a 24, 1082b 35).
It is true that he opens his discussions of the infinite, place and the void in
the same way. But the enquiry into time opens with a different and stronger
expression: not just "Does time exist or not?" but "Is time among the things
which exist or among the things that don't exist?".9 And the first two
puzzles about time discussed by Aristotle concern the existence of time.10
It is also worth noting that Aristotle is careful to restrict time to the sphere
of motion and therefore to that of natural objects capable of motion and so
of coming into being and passing away. Items that exist eternally are not
in time." The whole structure of his account of time makes it derivative
from the natural objects which are what for him exist in the proper or
basic sense.
Moreover, it is only in the case of time that Aristotle explicitly raises
the question of its relation to soul. Would time exist if there were no soul
(223a 16-7, 21-9)? He answers that it would not. Many have found here a
radically "subjective" view of time.12 But the point is simply that time is
the countable aspect of motion, and there can be nothing countable without
someone to do some counting. For Aristotle the problem of whether time
would exist even if we were unaware of it is not a problem about subjectivity
or the phenomenology of time. His point is that since time is a kind of
number it has the sort of existence appropriate to a number: that is, it has
no existence independently of activities of counting. The clear implication
of this is that (as with number) it is misleading to say that time exists if
this is taken to imply that the existence of time is independent of that of
human activity-in this case the activity of time-keeping. Statements
about time lose their sense if they are cut adrift from the statements about
counting and measuring that specify their sense, just as statements about
numbers do. And this is true of time becauseit is true of number, since time
is explained as being a kind of number.
9Cf. 202b 35-6, 208a 28, 213a 13; compare 217b 31-2.
10217b 33-218a 3, 218a 3-8. These puzzles are not unequivocal support for my
thesis, however, since they pose the question of time's existence in terms of the non-
existence of past and future; the present moment exists in a way that these do not.
But although these puzzles cannot be identified with the problem which I claim is
Aristotle's main concern, it can be pointed out in mitigation that Aristotle does not
in fact answer these puzzles in his account of time which follows, at least not in the
form in which they are set up.
llTime is T xLVj6aeco (219a 9-10). Only changeable ("movable") things are in time;
nothing is in time that does not change or move (221b 23-222a 10). All change (motion)
is in time (222b 30-223a 15). These arguments should be carefully distinguished from
the point at 218b 21-219a 10, that perception of time is impossible without perception
of motion. It is wrong to take this passage as a claim that the existence of time depends
on the existence of motion (see J. Moreau, L'espace et le temps selon Aristote, pp. 101-8;
Conen, pp. 39-44). It would in fact be an error to make time logically derivative from
motion, because motion or change already involves time. Aristotle recognizes this at
222b 30-223a 15: all motion is (relatively) fast or slow, and this involves the notion
of covering a distance in more or less time. But he does not remain sufficiently aware
of this, or he would have suspected a covert circularity in the scheme in which before
and after in time is derived from before and after in motion and this in turn from a
primary before and after in space.
12See Conen, pp. 156-69, for discussion of such views.
existence of number, even though he does not consider time in the Meta-
physics, presumably because time is a concept involved in physics or the
study of nature.
Secondly, Aristotle's treatment involves quite close and specific attempts
to reduce apparent problems about time to problems about number that
have already been solved in a non-Platonist way. This is true not only of
the general application of the idea that time is a kind of number, but of
Aristotle's attempts to deal with the apparently Platonist idioms in which
it is natural to speak of time. So one at any rate of Aristotle's reasons for
saying that time is a kind of number is that the reduction of the problems
of time to those of number can be carriedout in a fairly systematic way. This
of course needs to be supported by an examination of the relevant passages.
If we look at the passages in Phys. A that offer most help in actual
application of the idea that time is a kind of number, it will become clearer
that the argument is analogous to that of Met. I. Important here is the
passage 220b 14-221a 9, where time is called the number of motion and some
attempt is then made to explain this by reference first to counting and then
to measuring. Aristotle shows no awareness that these are significantly
different (as we would expect if he has the Met. I analysis in mind), and we
shall see that what he wants to emphasize is something common to both of
them, namely the fact that a unit is involved.
The analogy of counting is brought in at 220b 18-24. When we say that
much or little time has passed, we are measuring it by the motion, just as
when we say a number is large or small we are measuring it by the units
counted. While Aristotle expands on this in the case of number, he makes
no helpfully specific application to time. (He contents himself with the
general comment that we measure time by motion and motion by time, and
say that the road is long if the journey is, and vice versa.) I think a parallel
can be drawn, however, and that it is not illegitimate to draw it if the
analogy is to be taken seriously..
We know whether there are many horses or few by knowing what the
number of them is, i.e., by knowing how many there are. But knowing this
involves just knowing that the unit in question is horse,i.e., that horses (rather
than, e.g., stallions or piebalds) are being counted. Knowing how many
there are in the group is not a matter of comparing it with some number
in a Platonist heaven. It is simply a matter of knowing how to count it,
i.e., of knowing what the unit is. If the analogy carries over to time, we
should get the following: to know how long a process took (or some other
kind of "motion" broadly understood) is not a matter of comparing it with
the passage of Time, as we might be tempted to think if we conceive of
Time as a something objectively progressing against which we can compare
processes as they occur. To know how long a process took is simply a matter
of being able to count or measure its duration (just as to know how large a
group is, is just a matter of being able to count its members). Doing this
II
So the analysis of Phys. A is meant to achieve a demystification of the
concept of time, by means of the similar account of number in Met. I. This
general point has been recognized already,14but the thoroughgoing nature
of the analogy has never been sufficiently stressed.l5 I have tried to show
that in one passage at least the argument is strikingly similar to that of
Met. I, and that both treatments are alike in their overall anti-Platonist
aim. It could be objected that I have made the treatment of time look
artificially like that of number by drawing out analogies which are not given
to us in the text. I must admit that the similarities between number and
time which I have concentrated on so far are indeed implicit in the text
rather than stated for us. But I think one can point to more than overall
likeness of aim between Physics A and Metaphysics I. Aristotle actually
applies his general definition of time as a kind of number at specific points.
Twice he carefully disinfects a potentially misleading time idiom. In both
cases it is very plausible that what is wrong is that the idiom might suggest
the Platonist concept of time. And in both cases the cure is found by show-
ing that the idioms should be analysed like the correspondingnumberidioms.
This suggests that Aristotle does himself regard the analysis of number as
more than a general analogue to the analysis of time, and that he does think
that the similarity of time and number can be pressed in detail to anti-
Platonist effect.
The first case is that of 'in time' (221a 9-30, 221b 14-6). Aristotle says
that 'to be in time ' has two possible senses. One, 'to be when time is', is
not a proper sense.'6 In its proper sense, 'to be in time' is to be explicated
as like 'being in number'. The latter expressions can have two senses.
Firstly, the now and before and after are in time in the way unit and odd
and even are in number. What this sense involves is the way that concepts
figure in the analysis of other concepts. The alternative sense of being in
number is to have a number, which is for a thing to have "its being" measured
by number. This sense comes down to saying that a thing can be counted.
A group of three apples is "in" the number 3 in this sense in that, if we talk
about the group in terms of 3 then we are talking about apples (and not
molecules, etc.); in this sense the "being" of the apples is measured by the
number. 'In time' is to be understood in the same way; the point, that is,
is being extended from objects to processes. A thing is "in number" if it
can be counted; a process is "in time" if it can be timed. So a play would
be "in" the period of time 3 hours if what lasted 3 hours was the play, rather
than, say, one of its acts.
14See W. Wieland, Die aristotelische Physik, Gottingen 1962, pp. 316-34.
15Aristotle even follows up fairly trivial likenesses of idiom. We judge more and
less by number, more and less motion by time (219b 4-5); time itself is not quick or slow
any more than number is (220b 3-5).
16At 221a 19-26 Aristotle says that it is clear that 'to be in time' does not mean
this; it is merely something that happens to be the case with things that are in time.
It seems rather odd to us that Aristotle worries at such length about this
expression 'in time', but it makes sense if we realize that his worry is the
Platonist picture of time that this expression suggests. It indicates that
Time is there already for events to be timed in, and independent of them,
in the way a house exists independently of what is in it. For Aristotle it is
important that we realize that this is a completely wrong picture. So we
are steered away from the misleading possibilities of the idiom by being
directed to the parallel idiom (parallel in Greek anyway, as it appears,
though Aristotle is our only source here) 'in number', which we are assumed
to know has already been given a suitably non-Platonist interpretation.
The deflationary intent of this is even clearer in the corollaries Aristotle
draws for connected idioms. Things are included in time only in the sense
in which they are included in number or space.17 Time is not in any sense
there already to include all the processes that can be timed, as the Platonist
picture suggests. There is a difficulty here for Aristotle's conception, as
there is in the equally natural assumption that there is a time greater than
anything in time (221a 26-7). How are we to understand them without the
Platonist picture? It appears that we are to understand the latter by refer-
ence to the possibility of saying that there is a number greater than any
given number.18 But Aristotle is never very explicit about the anti-Platonist
way of dealing with statements like this, though his general approach is
clear from his treatment of the infinite: they are not to be taken literally
as referring to strange entities, but rather to be interpreted in terms of the
possibility of continuing the process of counting or timing without ever
having to stop.
The second case in which the suggestions of a time idiom are deflated
by reference to the correct interpretation of number idioms is that of 'same
time' and 'same number', which comes up frequently.19 We often want to
say that two processes took the same time, because they began together
and ended together. But if time just is the measure or number of motion,
how can two different motions take the same time? We seem to be forced
into saying either that every motion is measured or numbered by its own
time, so that strictly no two motions can take the same time; or that if two
motions do take the same time, then the time they both take must be some-
thing that exists over and above the measurement of both of them (cf. 218b
17I follow Ross' text at 221a 17-26.
18The parallel is not explicitly drawn, but seems clear from the preceding bret 68
iaTtV o &v pLV
a0p) TOiv Xp6vc (221a 26) and the conclusion that things in time will be
included in time (28-30); we have seen how this is to be understood. At Physics 207b
13-5 it is made clear that there will be a number greater than any given number, but
not one "separate" from the process of counting.
19220a 21-4 (but the text is corrupt and confusing), 220b 5-14, 223b 1-12, 224a 2-15.
The last is a relevant passage about number which has been neglected or even omitted
on insufficient grounds. Wicksteed in the Loeb edition brackets it as "worthless"; his
only serious argument is that Themistius may not have read it. Cornford and Ross
both point out that Themistius does elsewhere refer to the "10 sheep" which are men-
tioned only here.
with a point. When Aristotle says that time is made continuous by the
now and divided at the now, he has in mind the analogy of a line and a
point, both magnitude and time being continuous.
This complex of ideas, resting on the elaborate arguments of Physics Z,
has no obvious connexion with the ideas of Metaphysics I, or the use of
these in Physics A. In the passage leading up to the definition of time as
a number Aristotle is clearly not thinking about the Metaphysics I require-
ments for number, but thinking rather of the type of argument in Physics
Z. Hence the odd omission of the essential Metaphysics I requirement of a
unit if there is to be counting, and so number.
But it does seem at any rate as though at this point in Physics Aristotle
has not been sufficiently careful in uniting the two approaches to time.
In his treatment of motion in Physics r he makes the anti-Platonist point
that there is no motion over and above the individual moving things (220b
32-201a 3, cf. Metaphysics 1077b 22-34), but it is hard to see how the
Physics treatment could accommodate the notion that motion is a kind of
number. There is more of a puzzle with magnitude, where there is no separate
treatment like that of motion. There seems to be little to prevent the ex-
tension of Aristotle's treatment of time as a number to magnitude or length,
which is a product of measuring space, and just as dependent on the avail-
ability of soul to do some measuring or counting. It would be of interest
to determine whether Aristotle has philosophical reasons for treating time
as a number, because it is the product of measuring procedures, but not
magnitude, or whether this merely reflects personal preferences. He cer-
tainly seems to find the existence of time more problematic than that of
magnitude (as opposed to unmeasured space), but it is hard to see why.
It should be noted that there are no corresponding difficulties in the case
of magnitude and motion, since Aristotle's treatment of them makes no use
of ideas from Met. I. This raises the interesting question of why Aristotle
makes his sole application of the Met. I ideas to time, and not to the other
continua; a question that cannot be properly pursued here.
Finally, I shall discuss some residual unclarities about the now, which
likewise seem traceable to the influence of ideas from Metaphysics I.
Aristotle's concept of the now in Phys. A is put forward clearly: the now
is not a period but the limit of a period, and does not itself have any duration.
A now determines time by marking off the future from the past, but without
taking up any time itself. Time is not made up of nows (218a 8), as it would
be were they periods. These assertions are argued for not in Phys. A but
in Phys. Z (especially ch. 3). There are, however, three passages where the
now seems to be compared rather to the unit of number and appears to
have the logic of a period rather than a durationless instant marking off a
period. This is, of course, consistent with the notion of time as a number
which I have been emphasizing, but it clashes with Aristotle's usual charac-
terization of the now. These passages are all incidental and raise difficulties
saying that the now stands to time as the unit stands to number:26a point
which fits well the characterization of time as a number, but clashes rather
obviously with Aristotle's other ideas about the now, notably the idea that
the now is like a point which divides the continuum of time. The now can
hardly be compared both to a point and to the discrete units making up a
number-not, at least, without a good deal of explanation, which Aristotle
never provides.
My interpretation of this passage can be contested on the grounds that
logically it makes time a number in the sense of number with which we count,
for it is this which is composed of discrete units. But Aristotle says at 219b
5-9 and 220b 8-9 that time is number not in this sense but in the sense of
number that is counted. This is not conclusive, however, for elsewhere
(220b 3-5) he goes against these statements by treating time as number
with which we count. These conflicts are not very surprising, for this dis-
tinction of two senses of 'number' seems to rest on a confusion of number
with numbered group, a confusion transcended by the Met. I analysis. The
real puzzle is why Aristotle insists on the distinction in Phys. A, which is
influenced by that analysis.
The second passage is 220b 5-12-again a passage which as it stands is
not very clear. "There is the same time everywhere at once, but not the
same time before and after, for while the present change is one, the change
which has happened and that which will happen are different. Time is not
number with which we count, but the number of things which are counted,
and this according as it occurs before or after is always different, for the
nows are different. And the number of a hundred horses and a hundred men
is the same, but the things numbered are different" (Oxford translation).
What is most unclear about this passage is exactly what Aristotle means
in saying that time is different insofar as it is time before and after. He
gives as a reason for this a difference between present change or motion
and future or past change or motion, but the nature of the distinction he
is drawing is not obvious.27 But even without settling this problem, some
things canl be clarified about the structure of the argument as a whole.
Aristotle is saying that time is in one way the same and in another way
different, and explaining this by the way a number can be said to be in one
26That is, it can only be sensibly understood in the context of the analogy dominating
this passage. There are other possible interpretations, as that the now is being treated
as one thing, but this is obvious and weak. Conen's comment (p. 101: "[das Jetzt]
entspricht . . . dem Ding, das sich als eine Einheit bewegt; es ist gewissermassen die
Einheit des Dinges insofern, als dieses seine Einheit wihrend der Bewegung beibehalt")
is unconvincing; can we not time an explosion? The general problem of finding a sense
for "unit" outside the context of the analogy is that here the unity of the object is
irrelevant and the unity of the now is pointless.
27The argument is best understood, I think, in the light of the similar arguments
about 'same time' and 'same number' (see fn. 19). But there is undoubtedly an extra
problem in this argument, because of the obscurity of the way in which time and num-
ber are said to be different. Any account which builds on the difference between present,
future and past tends to leave it obscure how this is to be illuminated by reference to
number.
way the same and in another different. Aristotle appeals to number to show
firstly how it is that time is different, and then how it is that time is the
same.28 While it is not very clear how number and time are different in the
sense required, the way in which they are the same is familiar, and has been
discussed above. A number can be the same, e.g., 100, even if the units
counted are different, e.g., horses and men. Similarly, time is the same even
though the nows are different. Here again we find that in the context of
an analogy, here between time and number, the now is made parallel with
a unit. It is true that here it is not obvious how we are to understand "the
nows are different", and Aristotle may not mean that periods of time are
different.29 Nonetheless, we find that in the service of an analogy Aristotle
is prepared to compare the now with a unit, and this raises the same question
as the first passage: how, without more explanation, are we to reconcile this
with the repeated assertions that nows are not like tiny little periods, but
are rather comparable to durationless points?
Thirdly, there is an odd passage at 219b 11-2, where Aristotle says that
the now measures time qua earlier and later.30 To do so it would have to be
a period with some duration, for something with no duration could hardly
measure something with duration. This passage stands in striking contra-
diction to the concept of the now as durationless, and in particular to 218a
6 ff., where Aristotle denies that the now is a part of time on the ground that
a part of something measures the whole. Because of this conflict, Ross in
the Oxford Classical Text removes the offending reference to measuring.31
(The Oxford translation, however, retains the MSS reading.) Since, how-
ever, there are no good grounds for emending the text apart from a desire
to eliminate the inconsistency, it is surely better to retain it as a minor
point of friction between the idea that the now correspondsto a point divid-
ing a continuum, and the idea that the now corresponds to the unit of
number, time being a number.
These problems do not affect any of Aristotle's main points about time,
but they do indicate that it is not altogether simple to combine Aristotle's
28Here I agree with Conen's interpretation of the structure of the argument (pp.
94-5). Aristotle sets out the problem: time is the same in one way, different in another;
then (as often) he deals with the points in reverse order, the difference in 11. 8-10, the
sameness in 11. 10-12.
29Aristotle could avoid making nows into periods here by saying that what are
different are the durationless instants which mark off different periods. But in fact he
makes no move to free his analogy from the dangerous implication that the now is a
period, since it stands to time as the unit stands to number.
30The "qua earlier and later" clause seems to echo the definition of time as the num-
ber (or measure) of motion in respect of before and after, and so does not provide any
problems for the reading "measures" (though it would also suit Ross' emendation).
31Ross emends izeTpzeto op~zEL, though Jzerpetis read by all the MSS but one (E)
and by all the Greek commentators. It might be claimed that 'the now measures time'
is an odd phrase, but at 218a 6-7 a part measures the whole, and at 221a 1 time measures
motion. Euclid says of a number that is a fraction of another number that it xocTaisTpeL
that number, and since Aristotle uses pzETpeZo0ain this sense (at Metaphysics 1092b
32-5) there seems to be little difference between terpeZv and xaraoctppeZv, in spite of
221a 1-2.
two ways of looking at time: that deriving from the arguments of Physics
Z and relating time as a continuum to the other continua of motion and
magnitude, and that deriving from the ideas in Metaphysics I and finding
expression in the thesis that time is a number. Interesting questions suggest
themselves here about the consistency and viability of Aristotle's different
approaches to the problems of time and measurement; but these questions
go beyond the scope of this paper.
St Hugh's College,Oxford