determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic,
in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET
AL., Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo
for respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH
ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS. — The
provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer
legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon
them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts
of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such
action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest."
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of
what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to
whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion
exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of
such discretion is the making of the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITY. — Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National
Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a
menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218).
To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen
should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty
which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring
its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism,
nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all
the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons,
and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer
of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition
against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works;
Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications;
Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez,
as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its
resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario
Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street,
from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and
along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that
the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director
of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940,
the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the
approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing
of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the
portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the
Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter
that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn
vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated,
for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police
of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and
regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement,
all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of
their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by
which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules
and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic
on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable.
As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39
Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the
early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a
multitude of cases, namely: ’The true distinction therefore is between
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion
as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’
(Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Comm’rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.)
Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10
Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed
the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead,
248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give
prominence to the ’necessity’ of the case."
cralaw virt ua1aw l ibra ry
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows: jgc: chan robles. com.ph
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on,
roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads
and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the
President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the
construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance
from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to
any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly
authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." cralaw
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the
Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under
which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is
not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out
the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to
wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or
by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is
not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application
of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on
the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or
the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and
interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion
of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law.
But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making
of the law. As was said in Locke’s Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that
a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event
or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public
welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet
developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper
distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or
intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop
the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and
useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-
making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and
determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U.
S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R. Nos. 46076 and
46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation
v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June
26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of
separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities
virtua1aw lib ra ry of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory
of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been
relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative
and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and
executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the
promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote
public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations
promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with
legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and
freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the
National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a
desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a
menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the
apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby
its preservation. denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.
was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49
L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one,
and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed
situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace
to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public
good." And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that
"advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state
today things which were not thought of as being within such power
yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing
population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on
the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for
the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the
police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so
considered."cralaw virt ua1aw library

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is
"neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and
Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator
of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of
1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO
DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it
"does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise
of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article
XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits
as may be provided by law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is
contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is
claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment
clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing
the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary
lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar,
Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and
Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor
General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a
police power measure. The only question is whether or not it is
valid under the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction.
It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common
good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." 6
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it
does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power
and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and
sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.
Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, 7 refers to it
succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its
citizens." 8
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self-
protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming
necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 9
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According
to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing
the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 10 Significantly,
the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty
of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of
all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's
will." 11 It is subject to the far more overriding demands and
requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its
own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event,
it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance
the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private
interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of
the power. 12
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the
presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department
Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does
not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is
well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution 15does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all
men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same
class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference
for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy
plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially
domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked
by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid
tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even
rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government
action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court
is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty,
the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the
first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated
instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the
Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The
Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion
that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it
was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers
are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon
some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in
this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable
demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot,
however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There
is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state,
then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is
content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination
in this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are
generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the
executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts
decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by
which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws,
but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body,
the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief
Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself
has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be
effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the
fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that
Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers
granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact
that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own
persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment
ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to
the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed
objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for
Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that
in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have
suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good
and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather,
it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist.
This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the
administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the
host countries . . ."18), meaning to say that should the authorities
arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency,
the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a
necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each
case. Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. — The Secretary of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the
Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of
Filipino workers. 19
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable
to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to
"all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for unconstitutionality.
Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have
been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of
them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits
is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an
existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or
resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of
persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by
A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the
equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case
of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and
gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights
and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid
act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such
distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage
of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is
to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the
cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There
would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their
status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the
basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case,
it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal
protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords
protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total
ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the
Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been
contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment
of domestic helpers and workers of similar skills
defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized
under these guidelines and are exempted from the
suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate members
of the family of Heads of State and
Government;
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy
Minister and the other senior
government officials; and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the
diplomatic corps and duly
accredited international
organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in
countries with whom the
Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor
agreements or understanding.
xxx xxx xxx
7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND
WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing
domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills
shall be allowed to process with the POEA and
leave for worksite only if they are returning to the
same employer to finish an existing or partially
served employment contract. Those workers
returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall
be covered by the suspension and the provision of
these guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), lift the
suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or
understanding with the Philippines,
and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing
for sufficient safeguards to ensure
the welfare and protection of
Filipino workers. 24
xxx xxx xxx
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel
does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other
things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided
by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the
Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to
labor," 26 pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-
making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner
assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on
the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not
absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No.
1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that
police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean
that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have
mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor
and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
whereof. 28
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-taken. The right granted by
this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities
of the State's power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all. 30
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment
alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that
such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is
bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to
strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at
home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound
to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection,
personally and economically, while away from home. In this case,
the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot
seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and
as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on
deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not
indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it
has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries
as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the
petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the
Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction,
where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned
Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the
Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that
suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the
State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government
has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do
not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of
discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager
and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney
Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for
reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his
motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the
majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como
colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para
una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de
cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado
para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la
localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han
celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con
ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en
sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la
fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u
obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un
contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo
fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y
que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron
como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de
practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5
de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa
a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un
determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han
dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del
contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand,
prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of
this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26,
1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY
making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false
and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs
and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army
dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather
soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY
is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio
Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
(281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to
collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable.
(Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had
been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous
civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made
applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary
provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin
where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair
labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor
Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to
the respondents that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such
far-reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the
motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead
with reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not
necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the
Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for
new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however,
we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases
of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the
powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain
guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases
brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the
proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this
case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the
exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation
or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired
during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and
conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these
statements and expressions of views of counsel have no
evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions
are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act
No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which
is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked
and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will
appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative
and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the
relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take
cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and
settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards
wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or
tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such
industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the
Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the
controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and
proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be
dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section
4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of
such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them
to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section
4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall
investigate and study all industries established in a designated
locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of
fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or
share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be
paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section
5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system
of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to
determine specific controversies between labor and capital
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of
executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R.
No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to
joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No.
46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to
point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it
to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section
20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the
specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award,
order or decision any matter or determination which may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.
(section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals
to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to
carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
There are primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v.
U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the
liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in
Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed.
1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy,
22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it,
is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it
aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something
to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from
the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon
power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No.
45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G.
1335), but the evidence must be "substantial."
(Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national
labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648,
650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor
Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor
Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13,
15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute
provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious
purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical
rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be
deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not
invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568,
48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct.
185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and
Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But
this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a
basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4,
Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate
Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88,
33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and
meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract
from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and
for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of
securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and
relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be
appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining
the facts in any given case, but their report and decision
are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)
The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial
or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration
or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal.
a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation,
and may delegate to such board or public official such
powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial
 Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall
not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its
powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it
is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies
coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is
solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final decision,
with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our
case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from
the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient
to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between
the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix
A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual
basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of
law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a
new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc.,
it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio
Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged
all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and
this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the
"records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of
native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood
Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal."
Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to
the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and
that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far
reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and
its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable
discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of
justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and
such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.
The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and
under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental
issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should
be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this
case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as
may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and
Moran, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25003 October 23, 1981
LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS UNION, Affiliated with
the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS,
HERMOGENES ATRAZO, AQUILINO DISTOR, BENJAMIN
GUTIERREZ, JOSE RAMOS, TIBURCIO MARDO, ERNESTO
ALMARIO and DOMINGO LEANO, defendants-appellants.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila declaring permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in this case and condemning the defendants (herein
appellants) to pay plaintiff (herein appellee), the amount of
P10,152.42 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the
commencement of this action until fully paid, P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees and costs.
The case commenced when Liwayway Publications, Inc. brought
an action in the CFI-Manila against Permanent Concrete Workers
Union, et al. for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
for damages it incurred when its employees were prevented from
getting their daily supply of newsprint from its bodega.
Plaintiff alleged that it is a second sublessee of a part of the
premises of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. at 1000
Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila from Don Ramon Roces, a
first lessee from the aforesaid company. The premises of the
plaintiff is separated from the compound of Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. by a concrete and barbed wire fence with its own
entrance and road leading to the national road. This entrance is
separate and distinct from the entrance road of the Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. 1
Plaintiff further alleged that it has a bodega for its newsprint in the
sublet property which it uses for its printing and publishing
business. The daily supply of newsprint needed to feed its printing
plant is taken from this bodega.
On September 10, 1964, the employees of the Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. who are representatives and members of
the defendant union declared a strike against their company.
On October 3, 1964 for unknown reasons and without legal
justification, Permanent Concrete Workers Union and its members
picketed, stopped and prohibited plaintiff's truck from entering the
compound to load newsprint from its bodega. The union members
intimidated and threatened with bodily harm the employees who
were in the truck.
On October 6, 1964, union members stopped and prohibited the
general manager, personnel manager, bodega-in-charge and
other employees of the plaintiff from getting newsprint in their
bodega. 2
Plaintiff made repeated demands to the defendants not to
intimidate and threaten its employees with bodily harm and not to
blockade, picket or prohibit plaintiff's truck from getting newsprint
in their bodega. Defendants refused and continued to refuse to give
in to the demands of the plaintiff.
As a consequence thereof, plaintiff rented another bodega during
the time members of the defendant union prevented its employees
from entering its bodega in the compound of Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. and thus incurred expenses both in terms of bodega
rentals and in transporting newsprint from the pier to the temporary
bodega.
On December 14, 1964, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the defendants from:
(a) threatening and intimidating plaintiff's executive officers and
their representatives, who are going to its bodega as well as its
employees who are getting newsprint from it;
(b) ordering the defendants and their representatives not to
blockade and/or picket the compound and the gate of the plaintiff;
(c) ordering the defendants not to stop, prohibit, molest and
interfere with the free passage of the plaintiff in going in and out of
the bodega.
Defendant union moved to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:
1. That this case arose out of a labor dispute involving unfair labor
practices and, therefore, the Court of First Instance where this
action was brought has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction since
this case fans within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations;
2. That plaintiff is not the real party in interest in whose name the
present action may be prosecuted in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
On the first ground, defendants argued that the Court of Industrial
Relations is vested with the exclusive power to issue injunctions in
labor disputes involving unfair labor practices and that in the long
line of decisions, the Supreme Court hat, repeatedly held that
ordinary do not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction in any labor
dispute particularly when the Court of Industrial Relations has
already acquired jurisdiction over it.
As to the second ground, defendants argue that the real party in
interest in this case is the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc.
against whom the defendants' strike and picket activities were
directed and confined, and they point to cases between the real
parties in interest, namely: Permanent Concrete products, Inc. on
one hand and the Permanent Concrete Workers Union on the
other, pending before the Court of Industrial Relations docketed
therein as CIR Case No. 156-Inj., Charge 212-ULP and Charge
No. 1414-M.C.
Plaintiff Liwayway Publications, Inc. opposed the motion, alleging
that:
1. There is no employer-employee relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant;
2. There is no labor dispute between them;
3. Plaintiff's compound is separate and distinct from the compound
of the company where the defendant's are employed.
Defendants by way of reply to the abovementioned opposition
argued that even if there was no employer-employee relationship,
still the Court of First Instance would have no jurisdiction to issue
an injunction, citing several cases holding that there could be a
labor dispute regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
proximate relation of employer and employee and that peaceful
picketing is an extension of the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the Constitution, 3 a fundamental right granted to labor which
cannot be enjoined.
Since plaintiff averred in its complaint that "it is a second sublessee
of a part of the premises of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc.
at 1000 Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila from Don Ramon
Roces, first lessee from the aforementioned company, defendants
contend that plaintiff has no cause of action against them but
against Don Ramon Roces under the provisions of Article 1654 of
the New Civil Code which obliges the lessor to maintain the lessee
in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire
duration of the contract.
On October 22, 1964, the lower court issued an order denying the
motion to dismiss and motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction on the ground that there was no labor dispute between
the plaintiff and defendant of which the Court of Industrial Relations
may take cognizance.
On November 16, 1964, the court, on motion of the plaintiff,
declared defendants in default. Defendants prayed for the lifting of
the order of default, which plaintiff opposed. In the order of
December 16, 1964, the court denied the motion to lift the order of
default, and subsequently defendants' motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, the court rendered its decision dated February 16, 1965
which declared permanent the writ of preliminary injunction and
ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the
amount of ?10,152.42 with interest thereon at legal rate from the
commencement of the action until fully paid, Pl,000.00 as
attorney's fees and the costs. Copy of this decision was received
by defendants on July 20, 1965 and forthwith, defendants filed the
notice of appeal on July 26, 1965.
On October 12,1965, Liwayway Publications, Inc. filed with the
Supreme Court a petition praying that a writ of attachment be
issued on any sum of money which is owing from the company to
the union and to other defendants to be used to satisfy the
judgment in its favor should the same be affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
Defendants filed an opposition to the petition for attachment
alleging that even assuming that there is an amount owing to the
union from the company, such would be in the concept of
uncollected wages due the strikers and, therefore, cannot be
subject of attachment as provided by Art. 1708 of the New Civil
Code that the laborer's wages shall not be subject to execution or
attachment except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and
for medical attendance.
The Supreme Court denied the above petition for attachment but
without prejudice to the movant seeking remedy in the Court of
First Instance.
The sole issue raised in the instant appeal is whether or not the
lower court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
considering that there was a labor dispute between Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. and appellants for alleged unfair labor
practices committed by the former.
The first question that strikes Us to be of determinative significance
is whether or not this case involves or has arisen out of a labor
dispute. If it does, then with certainty, section 9 of Republic Act
875, the "Industrial Peace Act", would apply. If it does not, then the
Rules of Court will govern the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction because it will not partake the nature of a labor injunction
which the lower court has no jurisdiction to issue.
The record before Us reveals that appellant union and its members
picketed the gate leading to appellee's bodega. This gate is about
200 meters from the gate leading to the premises of the employer
of the appellants. Appellee is not in any way related to the striking
union except for the fact that it is the sublessee of a bodega in the
company's compound. The picketers belonging to the appellant
union had stopped and prohibited the truck of the appellee from
entering the compound to load newsprint from its bodega, the
union members intimidating and threatening with bodily harm the
employees of the appellee who were in the truck. The union
members also stopped and prohibited the general manager,
personnel manager including the man in-charge of the bodega and
other employees of the Liwayway Publications, Inc. from getting
newsprint in said bodega. The business of the appellee is
exclusively the publication of the magazines Bannawag Bisaya,
Hiligaynon and Liwayway weekly magazines which has absolutely
no relation or connection whatsoever with the cause of the strike
of the union against their company, much less with the terms,
conditions or demands of the strikers. In such a factual situation,
the query to be resolved is whether the appellee is a third party or
an "innocent bystander" whose right has been invaded and,
therefore, entitled to protection by the regular courts.
At this juncture it is well to cite and stress the pronouncements of
the Supreme Court on the right to picket. Thus, in the case of Phil.
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs. Judge Gaudencio
Cloribel et al., L-25878, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 465, 472, the
Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said:
The right to picket as a means of communicating
the facts of a labor dispute is a phrase of the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution.
If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even
in the absence of employer-employee relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While
peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an
exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are
not without power to confine or localize the sphere
of communication or the demonstration to the
parties to the labor dispute, including those with
related interest, and to insulate establishments or
persons with no industrial connection or having
interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute.
Thus, the right may be regulated at the instance of
third parties or "innocent. bystanders" if it appears
that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create
an impression that a labor dispute with which they
have no connection or interest exists between them
and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of
their rights. In one case decided by this Court, we
upheld a trial court's injunction prohibiting the union
from blocking the entrance to a feed mill located
within the compound of a flour mill with which the
union had a dispute. Although sustained on a
different ground, no connection was found other
than their being situated in the same premises. It is
to be noted that in the instances cited, peaceful
picketing has not been totally banned but merely
regulated. And in one American case, a picket by a
labor union in front of a motion picture theater with
which the union had a labor dispute was enjoined
by the court from being extended in front of the
main entrance of the building housing the theater
wherein other stores operated by third persons
were located.
The same case state clearly and succinctly the rationalization for
the court's regulation of the right to picket in the following wise and
manner:
Wellington and Galang are mere 'innocent
bystanders'. They are entitled to seek protection of
their rights from the courts and the courts may,
accordingly, legally extend the same. Moreover,
PAFLU's right to peacefully picket METBANK is not
curtailed by the injunctions issued by respondent
judge. The picket is merely regulated to protect the
rights of third parties. And the reason for this is not
far-fetched. If the law fails to afford said protection,
men will endeavor to safeguard their rights by their
own might, take the law in their own hands, and
commit acts which lead to breaches of the law.
'This should not be allowed to happen.
It may be conceded that the appellant Union has a labor dispute
with the Permanent Concrete Products company and that the
dispute is pending before the Court of Industrial Relations docket
therein as CIR Case No. 156-Inj., Charge 212-ULP and Charge
No. 1414-M.C. Nonetheless, the rule laid down in the case
of National Garment and Textile Workers' Union (PAFLU) vs. Hon.
Hermogenes Caluag, et al. G.R. No. L-9104, September 10, 1956,
cited by the appellants as authority holding that "where the Court
of Industrial Relations has already acquired jurisdiction over two
unfair labor practices cases and much later on as a consequence
thereof, the Court of First Instance cannot legally issue a writ of
preliminary injunction against the picketers. Besides, the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is exclusive. (Sec. 5-
a, Republic Act 875)" is not controlling, much less applicable to the
instant case where the facts are essentially and materially different.
Neither is the case of SMB Box factory Workers' Union vs. Hon.
Gustavo Victoriano, et al. G.R. No. L-12820, Dec. 29, 1957, where
We held that "the Court of First Instance cannot take cognizance
of an action for injunction where the issue involved is interwoven
with unfair labor practice cases pending in the Court of Industrial
Relations," nor the rule laid down in Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs.
Erlanger & Galinger Employees Association-NATU, G.R. No. L-
11907, June 24, 1958,104 Phil. 17, holding that "even if no unfair
labor practice suit has been filed at all by any of the parties in the
Court of Industrial Relations at the time the present petition for
injunction was filed in the court below, still the latter court would
have no jurisdiction to issue the temporary restraining order prayed
for if it is shown to its satisfaction that the labor dispute arose out
of unfair labor practices committed by any of the parties. The
parties would still have to institute the proper action in the Court of
Industrial Relations, and there ask for a temporary restraining order
under sec. 9 (d) of the Industrial peace Act. "
We cannot agree that the above rules cited by the appellants are
controlling in the instant case for as We said in Phil. Association of
Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et at. vs. Tan, 99 Phil. 854, that "with
regard to activities that may be enjoined, in order to ascertain what
court has jurisdiction to issue the injunction, it is necessary to
determine the nature of the controversy, " (emphasis supplied) We
find and hold that there is no connection between the appellee
Liwayway publications, Inc. and the striking Union, nor with the
company against whom the strikers staged the strike, and neither
are the acts of the driver of the appellee, its general manager,
personnel manager, the man in-charge of the bodega and other
employees of the appellee in reaching the bodega to obtain
newsprint therefrom to feed and supply its publishing business
interwoven with the labor dispute between the striking Union and
the Permanent Concrete Products company. If there is a
connection between appellee publishing company and the
Permanent Concrete Products company; it is that both are situated
in the same premises, which can hardly be considered as
interwoven with the labor dispute pending in the Court of Industrial
Relations between the strikers and their employer.
The contention of appellants that the court erred in denying their
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause
of action, is likewise without merit.
Article 1654 of the New Civil Code cited by the appellants in
support of their motion to dismiss, which obliges the lessor, among
others, to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract, and
therefore, the appellee publishing company should have brought
its complaint against the first sub-lessee, Don Ramon Roces, and
not against the appellant Union is not in point. The acts complained
of against the striking union members are properly called mere acts
of trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) such that following the
doctrine laid down in Goldstein vs. Roces, 34 Phil. 562, the lessor
shall not be obliged to answer for the mere fact of a trespass
(perturbacion de mero hecho) made by a third person in the use of
the estate leased but the lessee shag have a direct action against
the trespasser. The instant case fags squarely under the provisions
of Article 1664 of the New Civil Code which provides as follows:
Art. 1664. The lessor is not obliged to answer for a
mere act of trespass which a third person may
cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee
shall have a direct action against the intruder.
There is a mere act of trespass when the third
person claims no right whatever.
The Goldstein doctrine had been reiterated in Reyes vs. Caltex
(Phil). Inc., 84 Phil. 654; Lo Ching, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al. 81 Phil. 601; Afesa vs. Ayala y Cia 89 Phil. 292; Vda. de
Villaruel et al. vs. Manila Motor Co., Inc., et al. 104 Phil. 926; Heirs
of B.A. Crumb, et al. vs. Rodriguez, 105 Phil. 391.

The obligation of the lessor under Art. 1654, New Civil Code, to
maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
lease for the entire duration of the contract arises only when acts,
termed as legal trespass (perturbacion de derecho), disturb,
dispute, object to, or place difficulties in the way of the lessee's
peaceful enjoyment of the premises that in some manner or other
cast doubt upon the right of the lessor by virtue of which the lessor
himself executed the lease, in which case the lessor is obliged to
answer for said act of trespass.

The difference between simple trespass (perturbacion de mero

hecho and legal trespass (perturbacion de derecho) is simply but -
clearly stated in Goldstein vs. Roces case, supra, thus:

Briefly, if the act of trespass is not accompanied or

preceded by anything which reveals a really juridic
intention on the part of the trespasser, in such wise
that the lessee can only distinguish the material
fact, stripped of all legal form or reasons, we
understand it to be trespass in fact only (de mero
hecho). (pp. 566-567)

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision

appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Melencio-

Herrera, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines Membership in the Union shall be required as a
SUPREME COURT condition of employment for all permanent
Manila employees workers covered by this Agreement.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE
FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS'
UNION, defendant-appellant.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a
member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had
been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a
member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred
to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining
agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as
follows:
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but
was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to
its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not
precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such
labor organization is the representative of the employees." On
June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted,
introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of
section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of
its members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his
resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was
taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974.
Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking
the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact
that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The
management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his
counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory
arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained
to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee to file an
action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union
from dismissing Appellee.1 In its answer, the Union invoked the
"union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement;
assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and
contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and
(e).2 Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trial
conference, the Court a quo rendered its decision on August 26,
1965, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
rendered enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his
present employment and sentencing the defendant
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff
P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this
action.3
From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on
purely questions of law, assigning the following errors:
I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that
Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional.
II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced
appellant herein to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as
attorney's fees and the cost thereof.
In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
3350, the Union contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the
fundamental right to form lawful associations; that "the very
phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership in a labor
organization is banned to all those belonging to such religious sect
prohibiting affiliation with any labor organization"4 , "prohibits all the
members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if
such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto"5 ; and,
consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to
form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1
(6) of the 1935 Constitution. 6
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in that,
while the Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining
agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves
the employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the
maintenance of union membership as a condition of employment;
and that said Act, furthermore, impairs the Union's rights as it
deprives the union of dues from members who, under the Act, are
relieved from the obligation to continue as such members.7
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350
discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their
members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article Ill, Section
1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects
certain religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor
organizations.8
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the
constitutional provision that "no religious test shall be required for
the exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his civil
right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be
determined under the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that
conversely, if a worker has to sever his religious connection with a
sect that prohibits membership in a labor organization in order to
be able to join a labor organization, said Act would violate religious
freedom.9
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates
the "equal protection of laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a
discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the
operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni
Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages over their
fellow workers, for while the Act exempts them from union
obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same
time to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other
emoluments that the union might secure from the employer. 10
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates
the constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social
justice. 11
Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop
provision" in a collective bargaining agreement cannot be
considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for the
amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; 12and that unless
Republic Act No. 3350 is declared unconstitutional, trade unionism
in this country would be wiped out as employers would prefer to
hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do away
with labor organizations. 13
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that
Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the right to form lawful
associations, for the right to join associations includes the right not
to join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's conscience
does not allow his membership therein, and the Act has given
substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to
join labor organizations; 14 that said Act does not impair the
obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and was
incorporated into, the terms of the closed shop agreement; 15 that
the Act does not violate the establishment of religion clause or
separation of Church and State, for Congress, in enacting said law,
merely accommodated the religious needs of those workers whose
religion prohibits its members from joining labor unions, and
balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the
constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his chosen
religion; that the constitutional right to the free exercise of one's
religion has primacy and preference over union security measures
which are merely contractual 16; that said Act does not violate the
constitutional provision of equal protection, for the classification of
workers under the Act depending on their religious tenets is based
on substantial distinction, is germane to the purpose of the law, and
applies to all the members of a given class; 17 that said Act, finally,
does not violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said
Act was enacted precisely to equalize employment opportunities
for all citizens in the midst of the diversities of their religious
beliefs." 18
I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error,
it is necessary to premise that there are some thoroughly
established principles which must be followed in all cases where
questions of constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are
involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality;
one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove
its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt, that a law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable
basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be
upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the
courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be
adopted. 19
1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No.
3350 prohibits and bans the members of such religious sects that
forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from joining
labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No.
3350; neither can the same be deduced by necessary implication
therefrom. It is not surprising, therefore, that appellant, having thus
misread the Act, committed the error of contending that said Act is
obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of
association.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom
of association. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935,
as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide
that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their
own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the
Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee
is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the
different theories propounded by the different schools of
jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can
be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or
freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee
may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second,
power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain
from Joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who
should decide for himself whether he should join or not an
association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his
mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has
joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel
his membership with said organization at any time. 20 It is clear,
therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain
from joining any union. 21 Inasmuch as what both the Constitution
and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to
the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it
would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same
breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law
does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by
Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal
protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn
by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have
agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may
employ only member of the collective bargaining union, and the
employees must continue to be members of the union for the
duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4
(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by
Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization"
the employer is, however, not precluded "from making an
agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed
shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350,
if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be
employed or to keep his employment, he must become a member
of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said
employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement,
Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to
Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso:
"but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso
jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization.
What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions
even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members
of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed
from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed
Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of
association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the
members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It
still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or
not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious
beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with
the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their
religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does
not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from
joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them
to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for
impairing the obligation of its contract, specifically, the "union
security clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement
with the Company, by virtue of which "membership in the union
was required as a condition for employment for all permanent
employees workers". This agreement was already in existence at
the time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961,
and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated into
the agreement. But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as well
as others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed from his
job even if he should cease to be a member, or disaffiliate from the
Union, and the Company could continue employing him
notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the Union. The Act, therefore,
introduced a change into the express terms of the union security
clause; the Company was partly absolved by law from the
contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union
members in permanent positions, It cannot be denied, therefore,
that there was indeed an impairment of said union security clause.
According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the
express terms of the contract, or its legal construction, or its
validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement, impairs
the contract. The extent of the change is not material. It is not a
question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any
respect on its obligation or dispensing with any part of its force.
There is an impairment of the contract if either party is absolved by
law from its performance. 22 Impairment has also been predicated
on laws which, without destroying contracts, derogate from
substantial contractual rights. 23
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair
the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The
prohibition is general, affording a broad outline and requiring
construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to be read
with literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits
unreasonable impairment only. 24 In spite of the constitutional
prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard
the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to
safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts
already in effect. 25 For not only are existing laws read into contracts
in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read
into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All contracts made
with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under the
police power must be understood as made in reference to the
possible exercise of that power. 26 Otherwise, important and
valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device of
entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which
otherwise may be prohibited. The policy of protecting contracts
against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government
by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
and good order of society. The contract clause of the Constitution
must, therefore, be not only in harmony with, but also in
subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of
the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. It follows
that not all legislations, which have the effect of impairing a
contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to
impairment, and a statute passed in the legitimate exercise of
police power, although it incidentally destroys existing contract
rights, must be upheld by the courts. This has special application
to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor which
are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being
impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good. 27
In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against
impairing the obligations of contracts has no application to statutes
relating to public subjects within the domain of the general
legislative powers of the state involving public welfare. 28 Thus, this
Court also held that the Blue Sunday Law was not an infringement
of the obligation of a contract that required the employer to furnish
work on Sundays to his employees, the law having been enacted
to secure the well-being and happiness of the laboring class, and
being, furthermore, a legitimate exercise of the police power. 29
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs
contract obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all
times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of each
statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but
every case must be determined upon its own circumstances.
Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained
when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the
people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are
reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be
legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved power of the state
construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that
power. 30
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act
No. 3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion,
and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination
against those members of religious sects which prohibit their
members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their
natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which
work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their
own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that
said purpose is legitimate.
The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said
religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from
which the individual needs protection. The individual employee, at
various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates
of power — collective labor, directed by a union, and collective
capital, directed by management. The union, an institution
developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect
the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is,
paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new
source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with
management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength
from which the individual also needs protection — the collective
bargaining relationship. 31
The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen
in the Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 5859, which later became
Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:
It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing
a person who, on account of his religious beliefs
and convictions, cannot accept membership in a
labor organization although he possesses all the
qualifications for the job. This is tantamount to
punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he
has a right under the law to believe in. The law
would not allow discrimination to flourish to the
detriment of those whose religion discards
membership in any labor organization. Likewise,
the law would not commend the deprivation of their
right to work and pursue a modest means of
livelihood, without in any manner violating their
religious faith and/or belief. 32
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the
Act to achieve that purpose — exempting the members of said
religious sects from coverage of union security agreements — is
reasonable.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of
religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case
of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The
Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several
occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include
freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional
system. 33 Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a
fundamental personal right and liberty, 34 and has a preferred
position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore,
must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious
freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary
to avoid the danger.
3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional, appellant Union averred that said Act
discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects in violation
of Section 1 (7) of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution, and which is
now Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which
provides:
 No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination and
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the
support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect,
thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed
or the practice of any form of worship, 35 but also assures the free
exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost
amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the
Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought
to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good. 36 Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect. 37 But if the stage regulates
conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for
its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the
statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance,
unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such
burden. 38
In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39 , this Court had occasion to state that the
government should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives
secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable
to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in
order to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must
have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion. 40 Assessed by these criteria,
Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional
inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the
Constitution.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and
temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was
intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that
certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be
dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue
a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security
agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment
whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their
families is a valid objective of the state. In fact, the state is enjoined,
in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and regulate
the relations between labor and capital and industry. 41 More so
now in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that "the State
shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between
workers and employers. 42
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements
in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members
from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said
employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining
agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their
religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic
insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the
health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also
promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption
from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly
advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion.
Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor
unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and
indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban
regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. 43 The
free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to
require that religious exercise be preferentially aided. 44
We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted
consistently with the spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted
merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a
burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was
Congress itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the
Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress,
if it so deems advisable, could take away the same burden. It is
certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the
laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some
"compelling state interest" intervenes. 45 In the instant case, We
see no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption.
Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects
members of certain religious sects, it leaves no right to, and is silent
as to the protection of, labor organizations. The purpose of
Republic Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The
rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No.
875 and the new Labor Code. As to the lamented silence of the Act
regarding the rights and protection of labor unions, suffice it to say,
first, that the validity of a statute is determined by its provisions, not
by its silence 46 ; and, second, the fact that the law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional. 47
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel
persons to join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs
in violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt, rather than help,
labor unions, Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors
lest their resistance spread to other workers, for religious
objections have contagious potentialities more than political and
philosophic objections.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to
the country, and a fortiori to a labor — union assuming that such
unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal
that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious
liberty. 48 A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350
violates the constitutional prohibition against requiring a religious
test for the exercise of a civil right or a political right, is not well
taken. The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for
joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion
or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with
a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union
as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union.
Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act.
Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious
affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under
this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a positive act —
to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is
exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. A
conscientious religious objector need not perform a positive act or
exercise the right of resigning from the labor union — he is
exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a
labor union may have entered into. How then can there be a
religious test required for the exercise of a right when no right need
be exercised?
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to
enact Republic Act No. 3350, and that its purpose was legal and in
consonance with the Constitution. It is never an illegal evasion of a
constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired
result, which is lawful in itself, by discovering or following a legal
way to do it. 49
5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is
a discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the members
of certain religious sects undue advantages over other workers,
thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution which
forbids the denial to any person of the equal protection of the
laws. 50
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state.
It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination
as to things that are different. 51 It does not prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars.
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. 52 The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. 53 All that is required of a valid classification is that
it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally
to each member of the class. 54 This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary. 55
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose
of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is
recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. 56 It is not
necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked
differences of things or in their relation. 57 Neither is it necessary
that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. 58 Hence
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow
distinctions, 59 for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude
the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and
legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the
aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees and
workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security
agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and
convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose
religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs,
feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe
in the same religious faith and different religions differ in their
dogmas and cannons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and
practices, though they are found in all places, and in all times, take
so many varied forms as to be almost beyond imagination. There
are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious
beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in which
beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be
articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in religion
than before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences
are important and should not be ignored.
Even from the phychological point of view, the classification is
based on real and important differences. Religious beliefs are not
mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they carry
with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain
rules. of human conduct and the justification of certain
acts. 60 Religious sentiment makes a man view things and events
in their relation to his God. It gives to human life its distinctive
character, its tone, its happiness or unhappiness its enjoyment or
irksomeness. Usually, a strong and passionate desire is involved
in a religious belief. To certain persons, no single factor of their
experience is more important to them than their religion, or their
not having any religion. Because of differences in religious belief
and sentiments, a very poor person may consider himself better
than the rich, and the man who even lacks the necessities of life
may be more cheerful than the one who has all possible luxuries.
Due to their religious beliefs people, like the martyrs, became
resigned to the inevitable and accepted cheerfully even the most
painful and excruciating pains. Because of differences in religious
beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution,
hatred, bloodshed and war, generated to a large extent by
members of sects who were intolerant of other religious beliefs.
The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore,
rests on substantial distinctions.
The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its
purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who
cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from
being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from
their work because of union shop security agreements.
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application
to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. The law does not
provide that it is to be effective for a certain period of time only. It
is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions to which
the law is applicable exist. As long as there are closed shop
agreements between an employer and a labor union, and there are
employees who are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with
labor unions, their exemption from the coverage of said
agreements continues.
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious
sects; this is evident from its provision. The fact that the law grants
a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by itself
render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act
only restores to them their freedom of association which closed
shop agreements have taken away, and puts them in the same
plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by their religion
from joining labor unions. The circumstance, that the other
employees, because they are differently situated, are not granted
the same privilege, does not render the law unconstitutional, for
every classification allowed by the Constitution by its nature
involves inequality.
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual
inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces
inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered
invalid. A classification otherwise reasonable does not offend the
constitution simply because in practice it results in some
inequality. 61 Anent this matter, it has been said that whenever it is
apparent from the scope of the law that its object is for the benefit
of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be obtained
are of public character, the law will be upheld even though
incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond those
enjoyed by the general public. 62
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350
violates the constitutional provision on social justice is also
baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the
people. 63 Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as
it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious
belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being
deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining
whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not
necessary that the entire state be directly benefited — it is sufficient
that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all component
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the
members of the community. 64 Republic Act No. 3350 insures
economic stability to the members of a religious sect, like the
Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for
it insures security in their employment, notwithstanding their failure
to join a labor union having a closed shop agreement with the
employer. The Act also advances the proper economic and social
equilibrium between labor unions and employees who cannot join
labor unions, for it exempts the latter from the compelling necessity
of joining labor unions that have closed shop agreements and
equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is concerned, those
whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions with those
whose religion does not prohibit said membership. Social justice
does not imply social equality, because social inequality will always
exist as long as social relations depend on personal or subjective
proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality because
legal equality, being a relative term, is necessarily premised on
differentiations based on personal or natural conditions. 65 Social
justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and this is precisely
what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish — it gives
laborers, irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity
for work.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for — in other
words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this
matter, it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is not,
for that reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the
constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are unconcerned
with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the legislation
in question. 67 Courts do inquire into the wisdom of
laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the people, are
presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of the
people, and it may change the laws accordingly. 69 The fear is
entertained by appellant that unless the Act is declared
unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor
unions, and thus be a fatal blow to unionism. We do not agree. The
threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees who
are members of the religious sects that control the demands of the
labor market. But there is really no occasion now to go further and
anticipate problems We cannot judge with the material now before
Us. At any rate, the validity of a statute is to be determined from its
general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end desired, not
from its effects on a particular case. 70 The essential basis for the
exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its
exertion, is the criterion by which the validity of a statute is to be
measured. 71
II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of
which the Union argued that the decision of the trial court ordering
the Union to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly contravenes
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875, for the instant action involves
an industrial dispute wherein the Union was a party, and said Union
merely acted in the exercise of its rights under the union shop
provision of its existing collective bargaining contract with the
Company; that said order also contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil
Code; that, furthermore, Appellee was never actually dismissed by
the defendant Company and did not therefore suffer any damage
at all . 72
In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in
the instant case there was really no industrial dispute involved in
the attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its membership in the
union under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by its act,
inflicted intentional harm on Appellee; that since Appellee was
compelled to institute an action to protect his right to work,
appellant could legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees under
Articles 1704 and 2208 of the Civil Code. 73
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which
is relied upon by appellant provides that:
No suit, action or other proceedings shall be
maintainable in any court against a labor
organization or any officer or member thereof for
any act done by or on behalf of such organization in
furtherance of an industrial dispute to which it is a
party, on the ground only that such act induces
some other person to break a contract of
employment or that it is in restraint of trade or
interferes with the trade, business or employment
of some other person or with the right of some other
person to dispose of his capital or labor. (Emphasis
supplied)
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be
disputed for appellant sought the discharge of respondent by virtue
of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic
Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of employment is included
in the term "labor dispute". 74 The discharge or the act of seeking it
is the labor dispute itself. It being the labor dispute itself, that very
same act of the Union in asking the employer to dismiss Appellee
cannot be "an act done ... in furtherance of an industrial
dispute". The mere fact that appellant is a labor union does not
necessarily mean that all its acts are in furtherance of an industrial
dispute. 75 Appellant Union, therefore, cannot invoke in its favor
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875. This case is not intertwined
with any unfair labor practice case existing at the time when
Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.

Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union,
serve as its shield. The article provides that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act
or omission has compelled the plaintiff ... to incur expenses to
protect his interest"; and "in any other case where the court deems
it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered". In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that
appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused
Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his
job. Costs according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court,
shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision,

dated August 26, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellant Union. It is so ordered.

Makalintal, C.J, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,

Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1573 March 29, 1948
KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA
PILIPINAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GOTAMCO SAW MILL, respondent-appellee.
Severino P. Izon for petitioner.
Romeo Perfecto for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the "Kaisahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas" prays, for the reasons therein
set forth, that we reverse and vacate the orders of the Court of
Industrial Relations dated September 23, 1946 (Annex A) and
March 28, 1947 (Annex B) and its resolution of July 11, 1947
(Annex C).
In the order of September 23, 1946, it is recited that the laborers in
the main case (case No. 31-V of the Court of Industrial Relations)
declared a strike on September 10, 1946, "which suspended all the
work in the respondent company"; that on September 19, 1946
(presumably after the case had been brought to the Court of
Industrial Relations) said court informed the parties that the
continuation of the strike would necessarily prejudice both parties,
and that a temporary solution, satisfactory to both parties, must be
found to put an end to it, at the same time, urging both parties to
be reasonable in their attitude towards each other; that ample
opportunity was given to both parties to iron out their differences
until September 21, 1946, when the court continued the
conference at which, among other things, the leader of the laborers
informed the court that, although said laborers were not exactly
satisfied with the arrangement, in order to cooperate with the court
and with the parties so that the laborers could return to work and
the company resume its operation, they had no objection to
accepting a temporary settlement of P3.50 without meal, as against
the proposal of the company of P2.00 without meal; that after a
series of conferences held on September 23, 1946, the date of the
order now under consideration, the labor leader decided to accept
a temporary arrangement of the wage problem as proposed by
management, that is, P2.00 over-all increase without meal to all
striking laborers; that Francisco Cruz, President of the Union,
manifested that he would have a hard time convincing the laborers,
but in view of their desire to preserve that harmony which used to
exist between the parties, they were going to accede to this
proposition, provided that the management would permit the
laborers to bring with them home, if available, small pieces of
lumber to be utilized as firewood; that the negotiations culminated
in an agreement by which the laborers would return to their work
on Tuesday, September 24, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning,
and the respondent company would resume its operation on said
date under the following conditions:
(1) That all the laborers and workingmen will receive an
over-all increase of P2.00 daily, without meal, over the
wages received by them before the strike;
(2) That the management will permit the laborers to bring
with them home, if available, small pieces of lumber to be
utilized as firewood; and
(3) That the foregoing increase and privilege will take effect
upon the return of the workingmen to work until the final
determination of the present controversy.
The same order then proceeds as follows:
 Finding the above temporary agreement between the
parties to be reasonable and advantageous to both, the
court approves the same and orders the striking laborers
of the respondent company to return to their work on
Tuesday, September 24, 1946 at 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, and the respondent company to resume its
operation and admit the striking laborers. The respondent
company is enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or dismiss any
laborer affiliated with the petitioning union, nor suspend the
operation of the temporary agreement, and the labor union
is enjoined not to stage a walk-out or strike during the
pendency of the hearing.
From the order of March 27, 1947, it appears that on January 7,
1947, the respondent Gotamco Saw Mill filed with the Court of
Industrial relations an urgent motion asking that the petitioning
union be held for contempt of court for having staged a strike during
the pendency of the main case "in violation of the order of this court
dated September 23, 1946"; that on January 9, 1947, petitioner
filed an answer with a counter-petition alleging, among other
things, that a representative of petitioner conferred with respondent
regarding certain discriminations obtaining in the respondent's saw
mill, but instead of entertaining their grievances said respondent in
a haughty and arbitrary manner ordered the stoppage of the work
and consequently the workers did then and there stop working; and
in the counter-petition said petitioner asked the respondent be held
for contempt for having employed four new Chinese laborers
during the pendency of the hearing of the main case, without
express authority of the court and in violation of section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended. It is also recited in the
said order of March 28, 1947, that on that same date, January 9,
1947, respondent filed with the court another urgent motion for
contempt against the petitioning union for picketing on the
premises of the respondent's saw mill and for grave threats which
prevented the remaining laborers from working.
Upon request of both parties, the court required the presentation
of evidence pertinent to the incidents thus raised. Thereafter, the
said order of March 28, 1947, was entered, and the court stated
therein the three questions to be determined as follows: first, if
there was a violation by the petitioning union of the order of said
court of September 23, 1946, which would warrant the
commencement of contempt proceedings; second, whether the
facts and circumstances attending the picketing constitute
contempt of court; third, whether there was a violation by the
respondent of section 19 of the Commonwealth Act No. 103, as
amended, in taking four Chinese laborers pending the hearing and
without express authority of the court; and fourth, whether the
dismissal of Maximino Millan was with or without just cause.
The court, passing upon these questions, found and held:
(1) That there was a violation of the order of the court dated
September 23, 1946, by the petitioning union and thereby
ordered Atty. Pastor T. Reyes, special agent of the court,
to take such action as may be warranted in the premises
against the person or persons responsible therefor for
contempt:
(2) That the question of picketing being closely and
intimately related to the strike which had been found illegal,
did not need to be passed upon, it being imbibed by
question No. 1;
(3) That there being no strong and clear proof on the
question of respondent having violated section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, respondent was
thereby exonerated from any liability in connection with the
alleged employment of four Chinamen;
(4) That Maximino Millan being of troublesome nature and
unworthy to work among his fellow laborers, his petition for
reinstatement contained in demand No. 5 of the main case
was thereby denied.
The above cited resolution of July 11, 1947, was entered by the
Court of Industrial Relations, sitting in banc, and denied
reconsideration of its order of March 28, 1947, as requested by the
petitioning union's contention is recited that the provisions of
section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, upon
which order of September 23, 1946, was based, had not been
complied with; in other words, that the said order was not issued in
conformity with the requisites of said section, because, it was said,
before its issuance there had been no proper hearing and there
was and there was no express finding by the court that public
interest required the return of the striking workers. The further
contention is therein recited that, granting that the order of
September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity with said section
19, said provision is unconstitutional for being in violation of the
organic proscription of involuntary servitude. Passing upon these
contentions, the Court of Industrial Relations said:
The order of September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity
with the provisions of section 19. Said order was proposed
and issued on the basis of the agreement entered into by
the parties after the preliminary hearings and conferences.
While it is true that the order of the Court now in question
did not make any express finding as to whether public
interest required the return of the striking workers, it is
undeniable, however, that until the numerous incidents
arising therefrom since the certification of the dispute
promptly, need not be stated in the said order because it is
a fact which is borne out by the entire record of the case. If
the petitioner was aggrieved by the terms of the order, it
could have objected right then and there and could have
appealed said order within the period prescribed by law,
and nor to wait after it had become final, definite, and
conclusive. The record shows that the petitioner in its
answer answer and counter-petition for contempt based its
complaint upon section 19 (incidental Case No. 31-V [4]).
It is, indeed, strange that after taking advantage of this
order and enjoyed (enjoying) the benefits thereunder, the
petitioner now comes to impugn and challenge the validity.
The second motion for reconsideration is the sad instance
where the petitioner attacks the validity of an order under
which it once took shelter.
The court believes that section 19 is constitutional. To start
with, this section is presumed to be constitutional. Several
laws promulgated which apparently infringe the human
rights of individuals were "subjected to regulation by the
State basically in the exercise of its paramount police
power". The provisions of Act No. 103 were inspired by the
constitutional injunction making it the concern of the State
to promote social justice to insure the well being and
economic security of all the people. In order to attain this
object, section 19 was promulgated which grants to labor
what it grants to capital and denies to labor what it denies
to capital. Section 19 complements the power of the Court
to settle industrial disputes and renders effective such
powers which are conferred upon it by the different
provisions of the Court's organic law, more particularly,
sections 1 and 4, and "other plenary powers conferred
upon the Court to enable it to settle all questions matters,
controversies or disputes arising between, and/or affecting
employers and employees", "to prevent non-pacific
methods in the determination of industrial or agricultural
disputes" (International HardWood and Venser Co. vs The
Pangil Federation of Laborers, G.R. No. 47178, cited in the
case of Mindanao Bus Co. vs. Mindanao Bus Co.
Employees' Association, 40 Off. Gaz., 115). Section 4 has
been upheld in the case aforecited. It appearing that the
power of this Court to execute its orders under section 19
is also the same power it possesses under section 4 of the
same act, it inferentially follows that section 19 is likewise
valid. (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor
Union, G.R. No. 47796.)
In Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine Labor
Union, supra, this Court said:
 In the first place, the ultimate effect of petitioner's theory is
to concede to the Court of Industrial Relations the power to
decide a case under section 19 but deny it, the power to
execute its decision thereon. The absurdity of this
proposition, is too evident to require argument. In the
second place considering that the jurisdiction of the Court
of Industrial Relations under section 19 is merely incidental
to the same jurisdiction it has previously acquired under
section 4 of the law, if follows that the power to execute its
orders under section 19 is also the same power that it
possesses under section 4. (40 Off. Gaz., [14th Supp.], No.
23, p. 178.)
Among the powers thus conferred is that to punish a violation of an
order such as those now under consideration as for contempt of
court.
We agree with the Court of Industrial Relations that section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 is constitutional. It does not offend
against the constitutional inhibition prescribing involuntary
servitude. An employee entering into a contract of employment
said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other
conditions, those prescribed in said section 19, among which is the
"implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or
landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted
to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration,
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or
decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or
walk out of his employment when so joined by the court after
hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already
done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court,
which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so
requires or when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly
decided or settled ...". (Emphasis supplied.) The voluntariness of
the employee's entering into such a contract of employment — he
has a free choice between entering into it or not — with such an
implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude
ensuing. The resolution of July 11, 1947, states that the order of
September 23, 1946, was issued after a series of
preliminary hearings or conferences, and we are satisfied that
these were "hearings" within the meaning of the above mentioned
section 19 of the law. The record certainly reveals that what was
done during and what resulted from said preliminary hearings or
conferences were reported to the court at a formal hearing. As to
public interest requiring that the court enjoin the strike or walk out,
or the return of striking laborers, aside from the legal presumption
that the Court of Industrial Relations complied with the provisions
of the law in this respect, we think that, considering the universally
known fact, of which this Court takes judicial notice, that as a result
of the destructions wrought by the late war, the economic and
social rehabilitation of the country urgently demands the
reconstruction work will inevitably tend to paralyze, impede or slow
down the country's program of rehabilitation which, for obvious and
natural reasons, the government is striving to accelerate as much
as is humanly possible.
Besides, the order of the court was for the striking workers to return
to their work. And that order was made after hearing, and,
moreover, section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, in providing
for an order of the court fro the return of striking workers, authorizes
such order, among other cases, "when the dispute can not, in its
opinion, be promptly decided or settled". The provision says: "...
and if he has already done so (struck or walked out),that he shall
forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued
only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the
dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled,
(emphasis supplied). In other words the order to return, if the
dispute can be promptly decided or settled, may be issued "only
after hearing when public interest so requires", but if in the court's
opinion the dispute can not be promptly decided or settled, then it
is also authorized after hearing to issue the order: we construe the
provision to mean that the very impossibility of prompt decision or
settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the power to issue
the order for the reason that the public has an interest in preventing
undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry. And, as
well stated by the court's resolution of July 11, 1947, this
impossibility of prompt decision or settlement was a fact which was
borne out by the entire record of the case and did not need express
statement in the order.

Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of fact

made by the Court of Industrial Relations (Commonwealth Act No.
103, section 15, as amended by Commonwealth Act 559, section
2; Rule 44, Rules of Court; National Labor Union vs. Phil. Match
Co., 40 Off. Gaz. 8th Supp. p. 134, Bardwell Brothers vs. Phil.
Labor Union, 39 Off. Gaz. 1032; Pasumil Workers' Union vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz. 6th Supp., p. 71).

However, Mr. Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly

reserve our opinion on the constitutionality of the above statutory
and reglementary provisions should it, in the future, become
necessary to decide it.

For all theses considerations, the orders and resolution of the Court
of Industrial Relations assailed by the instant petition are hereby
affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and

Tuason, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION GARCIA, J.:

YUSEN AIR AND G.R. No. 154060

SEA SERVICE Via this petition for review on certiorari under
PHILIPPINES, Present: Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Yusen Air
INCORPORATED, and Sea Service Philippines, Incorporated, urges
Petitioner, PANGANIBAN, J., us to annul and set aside the following orders of
Chairman the Regional Trial Court at Paraaque City, Branch
SANDOVAL- 258, in its Civil Case No. 02-0063, to wit:
GUTIERREZ,
CORONA, 1. Order dated March 20,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
[1]
2002, dismissing, on ground of
and lack of jurisdiction, petitioners
GARCIA, JJ. complaint for injunction and
damages with prayer for a temporary
restraining order filed by it against
herein respondent, Isagani A.
ISAGANI A. Promulgated: Villamor; and
VILLAMOR,
Respondent. 2. Order dated June 21,
August 16, 2005 [2]
2002, denying petitioners motion
x---------------------------------------------------------- for reconsideration.
------------------------x
The facts:
DECISION
Petitioner, a corporation organized and existing
under Philippines laws, is engaged in the business
of freight forwarding. As such, it is contracted by
clients to pick-up, unpack, consolidate, deliver,
transport and distribute all kinds of cargoes, acts
as cargo or freight accommodation and enters into
charter parties for the carriage of all kinds of
cargoes or freight.
On August 16, 1993, petitioner hired respondent
as branch manager in its Cebu Office. Later,
petitioner reclassified respondents position to that
of Division Manager, which position respondent
held until his resignation on February 1, 2002.
Immediately after his resignation,
respondent started working for Aspac
International, a corporation engaged in the same
line of business as that of petitioner.
On February 11, 2002, in the Regional Trial Court
at Paraaque City, petitioner filed against
respondent a complaint[3] for injunction and
damages with prayer for a temporary restraining
order. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 02-0063
which was raffled to Branch 258 of the court, the
complaint alleged, inter alia, as follows:
7. That [respondent] duly signed an
undertaking to abide by the policies
of the [Petitioner] which includes the
provision on the employees
responsibility and obligation in cases
of conflict of interest, which reads:
No employee may engage in
any business or undertaking
that is directly or indirectly in
competition with that of the
company and its affiliates or
engage directly or indirectly
in any undertaking or activity
prejudicial to the interests of
the company or to the
performance of his/her job or
work assignments. The same
provision will be
implemented for a period of
two (2) years from the date
of an employees resignation,
termination or separation
from the company.
 8. That in clear violation and breach of
his undertaking and agreement with
the policies of [petitioner],
[respondent] joined Aspac
International, within two years from
[his] date of resignation, whose
business is directly in conflict with
that of [petitioner]. (Underscoring
supplied; words in bracket ours).
Petitioner thus prayed for a judgment enjoining
respondent from further pursuing his work
at Aspac International, and awarding
it P2,000,000 as actual damages; P300,000 as
exemplary damages; and another P300,000 as
attorneys fees.
On March 4, 2002, apparently not to be
outdone, respondent filed against petitioner a
case for illegal dismissal before the National Labor
Relations Commission.
Meanwhile, instead of filing his answer in
Civil Case No. 02-0063, respondent filed a Motion
to Dismiss,[4] arguing that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of said case
because an employer-employee relationship is
involved.
On March 20, 2002, the trial court issued the
herein first assailed order dismissing petitioners
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter thereof on the ground that the action was
for damages arising from employer-employee
relations. Citing Article 217 of the Labor Code, the
trial court ruled that it is the labor arbiter which
had jurisdiction over petitioners complaint:
xxx the Court, after going over all the
assertions, averments and arguments of the
parties and after carefully evaluating the
same, is of the firm and honest opinion that
the arguments raised by [respondent]
movant are more in conformity with the
rules and jurisprudence as this case involves
an employer-employee relationship and is
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the NLRC pursuant to Art. 217 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines. Not only that, there
is even a pending case for illegal dismissal
against herein [petitioner] filed by
[respondent] before the Regional
Arbitration Branch VII in Cebu City.
 WHEREFORE, this case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket ours).
In time, petitioner moved for a
reconsideration but its motion was denied by the
trial court in its subsequent order of June 21,
2002.
Hence, petitioners present recourse, maintaining
that its cause of action did not arise from
employer-employee relations even if the claim
therein is based on a provision in its handbook,
and praying that Civil Case No. 02-0063 be
remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings.
The petition is impressed with merit.
At the outset, we take note of the fact that the 2-
year prohibition against employment in a
competing company which petitioner seeks to
enforce thru injunction, had already expired
sometime in February 2004. Necessarily, upon the
expiration of said period, a suit seeking the
issuance of a writ of injunction becomes functus
oficio and therefore moot. As things go, however,
it was not possible for us, due to the great number
of cases awaiting disposition, to have decided the
instant case earlier. However, the issue of
damages remains unresolved. In Philippine
National Bank v. CA,[5] we declared:
In the instant case, aside from the
principal action for damages, private
respondent sought the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the
foreclosure sale in order to prevent an
alleged irreparable injury to private
respondent. It is settled that these injunctive
reliefs are preservative remedies for the
protection of substantive rights and
interests. Injunction is not a cause of action
in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an
adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought
to be enjoined ha[s] become fait accompli,
only the prayer for provisional remedy
should be denied. However, the trial court
should still proceed with the determination
of the principal action so that an
adjudication of the rights of the parties can
be had.
Along similar vein, the damage aspect of the
present suit was never rendered moot by the
lapse of the 2-year prohibitive period against
employment in a competing company.
This brings us to the sole issue of whether
petitioner's claim for damages arose from
employer-employee relations between the parties.
We rule in the negative.
Actually, the present case is not one of first
impression. In a kindred case, Dai-Chi Electronics
Manufacturing vs. Villarama,[6] with a
substantially similar factual backdrop, we held
that an action for breach of contractual obligation
is intrinsically a civil dispute.
There, a complaint for damages was filed with the
regular court by an employer against a former
employee who allegedly violated the non-compete
provision of their employment contract when,
within two years from the date of the employees
resignation, he applied with, and was hired by a
corporation engaged in the same line of business
as that of his former employer. The employer
sought to recover liquidated damages. The trial
court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the controversy because the
complaint was for damages arising from
employer-employee relations, citing Article 217
(4) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No.
6715, which stated that it is the Labor Arbiter who
had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.
When the case was elevated to this Court, we held
that the claim for damages did not arise from
employer-employee relations, to wit:
Petitioner does not ask for any relief under
the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks
to recover damages agreed upon in the
contract as redress for private respondents
breach of his contractual obligation to its
damage and prejudice. Such cause of action
is within the realm of Civil Law, and
jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to
the regular courts. More so when we
consider that the stipulation refers to the
post-employment relations of the parties.
[W]hile seemingly the cause of action arose
from employer-employee relations, the
employers claim for damages is grounded
 on wanton failure and refusal without just
cause to report to duty coupled with the
averment that the employee maliciously
and with bad faith violated the terms and
conditions of the contract to the damage of
the employer. Such averments removed the
controversy from the coverage of the Labor
Code of the Philippines and brought it
within the purview of Civil Law.
Indeed, jurisprudence has evolved the rule that
claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article
217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must
have a reasonable causal connection with any of
the claims provided for in that article. Only if there
is such a connection with the other claims can a
claim for damages be considered as arising from
employer-employee relations.
Article 217, as amended by Section 9 of RA
6715, provides:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code, the
Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the
following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages
arising from the
employer-employee
relations;"
xxx xxx xxx
In San Miguel Corporation vs. National
Labor Relations Commission,[7] we had
occasion to construe Article 217, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 227. Article 217 then
provided that the Labor Arbiter had
jurisdiction over all money claims of
workers, but the phrase arising from
employer-employee relation was deleted.
We ruled thus:
 While paragraph 3 above refers to all
money claims of workers, it is not necessary
to suppose that the entire universe of money
claims that might be asserted by workers
against their employers has been absorbed
into the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of Labor Arbiters. In the first place,
paragraph 3 should be read not in isolation
from but rather within the context formed
by paragraph 1 (relating to unfair labor
practices), paragraph 2 (relating to claims
concerning terms and conditions of
employment), paragraph 4 (claims relating
to household services, a particular species
of employer-employee relations), and
paragraph 5 (relating to certain activities
prohibited to employees or employers). It is
evident that there is a unifying element
which runs through paragraph 1 to 5 and
that is, that they all refer to cases or disputes
arising out of or in connection with an
employer-employee relationship. This is, in
other words, a situation where the rule
of noscitur a sociis may be usefully
invoked in clarifying the scope of paragraph
3, and any other paragraph of Article 217 of
the Labor Code, as amended. We reach the
above conclusion from an examination of
the terms themselves of Article 217, as last
amended by B.P. Blg 227, and even though
earlier versions of Article 217 of the Labor
Code expressly brought within the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the
NLRC cases arising from employer-
employee relations, which clause was not
expressly carried over, in printers ink, in
Article 217 as it exists today. For it cannot
be presumed that money claims of workers
which do not arise out of or in connection
with their employer-employee relationship,
and which would therefore fall within the
general jurisdiction of regular courts of
justice, were intended by the legislative
authority to be taken away from the
jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with
Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis. The
Court, therefore, believes and so holds that
the money claims of workers referred to in
paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money
claims which arise out of or in connection
with the employer-employee relationship,
or some aspect or incident of such
relationship. Put a little differently, that
money claims of workers which now fall
within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those
money claims which have some reasonable
causal connection with the employer-
employee relationship.

When, as here, the cause of action is
based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no
reasonable causal connection with any of
the claims provided for in Article 217,
jurisdiction over the action is with the
regular courts.[8]
As it is, petitioner does not ask for any relief
under the Labor Code. It merely seeks to recover
damages based on the parties contract of
employment as redress for respondent's breach
thereof. Such cause of action is within the realm
of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy
belongs to the regular courts. More so must this
be in the present case, what with the reality that
the stipulation refers to the post-employment
relations of the parties.
complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim
asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only
after and as a result of a trial. Neither can
jurisdiction of a court be made to depend upon
the defenses made by a defendant in his answer
or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely upon the defendant.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed orders of the lower
court are SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 02-
0063 REMANDED to it for trial on the merits of
the main claim for damages.
SO ORDERED.

For sure, a plain and cursory reading of the

complaint will readily reveal that the subject
matter is one of claim for damages arising from a
breach of contract, which is within the ambit of
the regular courts jurisdiction.[9]

It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter

is determined upon the allegations made in the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO,
JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY,
SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO
MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
(SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98,
QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.
CORTES, J:
Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the
Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security System
Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the
striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or
not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right
to strike.
The antecedents are as follows:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike
and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-
striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to
the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work;
and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The
complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to
enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work;
that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to
act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the
provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime
pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary
or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service
into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the
same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of
P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the
salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of
discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-241].
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining
order pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this motion, the SSS filed an
opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July 22,1987, in a four-page
order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted
the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after
finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As petitioners'
motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also
denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before this
Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a
resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third
Division, resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its
pendency the Court of Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its
decision on the referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners
moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime,
the Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for reconsideration
in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners'
motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was also
denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for
reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141- 143]. Hence, the instant petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners from staging
another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989
and to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152].
The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and
supplemental reply filed by petitioners, considered the issues
joined and the case submitted for decision.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had
no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue
the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as
jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or
the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves
a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the
ground that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service
laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they
do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the
NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court
may enjoin the employees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held
that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees,
they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional
Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for
damages, from continuing with their strike.
Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in
deciding whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in excess of
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case and enjoined the
strike are as follows:
1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case
initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with
the strike and to order them to return to work?
These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim
I
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all
workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to
strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission,
it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also
provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those employed in
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art.
III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution
recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is
silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to
strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes
helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A
reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that
drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the
right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations
only, without including the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the
provision that "[tlhe right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the
apprehensions expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla,
Vice-President of the Commission, explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not
take that long. When we proposed this amendment
providing for self-organization of government
employees, it does not mean that because they
have the right to organize, they also have the right
to strike. That is a different matter. We are only
talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With
regard to the right to strike, everyone will remember
that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision that the
right to form associations or societies whose
purpose is not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit
the strikes coming from employees exercising
government functions, that could be done because
the moment that is prohibited, then the union which
will go on strike will be an illegal union. And that
provision is carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic
Act 875, workers, including those from the
government-owned and controlled, are allowed to
organize but they are prohibited from striking. So,
the fear of our honorable Vice- President is
unfounded. It does not mean that because we
approve this resolution, it carries with it the right to
strike. That is a different matter. As a matter of fact,
that subject is now being discussed in the
Committee on Social Justice because we are trying
to find a solution to this problem. We know that this
problem exist; that the moment we allow anybody
in the government to strike, then what will happen
if the members of the Armed Forces will go on
strike? What will happen to those people trying to
protect us? So that is a matter of discussion in the
Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right
to form an organization does not carry with it the
right to strike. [Record of the Constitutional
Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which
was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly
banned strikes by employees in the Government, including
instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but excluding
entities entrusted with proprietary functions:
.Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the
Government. — The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are
governed by law and it is declared to be the policy
of this Act that employees therein shall not strike
for the purpose of securing changes or modification
in their terms and conditions of employment. Such
employees may belong to any labor organization
 which does not impose the obligation to strike or to
join in strike: Provided, however, That this section
shall apply only to employees employed in
governmental functions and not those employed in
proprietary functions of the Government including
but not limited to governmental corporations.
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one
time it recognized the right of employees of government
corporations established under the Corporation Code to organize
and bargain collectively and those in the civil service to "form
organizations for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its
amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided
that "[t]he terms and conditions of employment of all government
employees, including employees of government owned and
controlled corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the Labor
Code is silent as to whether or not government employees may
strike, for such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the
Civil Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the
right of government employees to organize, the President issued
E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right
to organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is
provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The
President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6,
s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987
which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees ... enjoins under pain
of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees
from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and
other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage
or disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the
confusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing
government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or
regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from
striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and
as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that
the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against
strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that
under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also
Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part
of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295,
November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the
case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v.
Minister of Labor and Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3,
1:983, 124 SCRA 11 is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for
distinguishing between workers in the private sector and
government employees with regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present
is that 'the terms and conditions of employment in
the Government, including any political subdivision
or instrumentality thereof are governed by law"
(Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875,
as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D.
No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and
conditions of government employment are fixed by
law, government workers cannot use the same
weapons employed by workers in the private sector
 to secure concessions from their employers. The
principle behind labor unionism in private industry
is that industrial peace cannot be secured through
compulsion by law. Relations between private
employers and their employees rest on an
essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and
welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of
employment in the unionized private sector are
settled through the process of collective
bargaining. In government employment, however,
it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through statutes
or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations,
not through collective bargaining agreements. [At
p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil
Service, in his position paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and quoted with approval by the Court in Alliance, to
wit:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by
reason of the nature of the public employer and the
peculiar character of the public service, it must
necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions
in private industry as not applying to public
employees and civil service employees. It has been
stated that the Government, in contrast to the
private employer, protects the interest of all people
in the public service, and that accordingly, such
conflicting interests as are present in private labor
relations could not exist in the relations between
government and those whom they employ. [At pp.
16-17; also quoted in National Housing
Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313, January
17,1985,134 SCRA 172,178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right
to organize of government employees, while clinging to the same
philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation
where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not
among those fixed by law. Thus:
.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of
employment or improvements thereof, except
those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of
negotiations between duly recognized employees'
organizations and appropriate government
authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general
mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes in the public sector
to wit:
.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and
procedures, whenever applicable, shall be followed
in the resolution of complaints, grievances and
cases involving government employees. In case
any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting
all the available remedies under existing laws and
procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute
to the [Public Sector Labor- Management] Council
for appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the
terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies
for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be
any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action.
But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-
outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the
private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their
demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government-
Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant
dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the
government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof and government- owned and controlled corporations with
original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall
not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to
petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be
issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the
Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction
enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself
provides that terms and conditions of employment of government
employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction over
unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec.
16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for
damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike
the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not
been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not
the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort
to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction
to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or
overzealousness, for in fact it had proceeded with caution. Thus,
after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the
strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the
respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to
refer the unresolved controversies emanating from their employer-
employee relationship to the Public Sector Labor - Management
Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].
III
In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory
Injunction," and reiterated in their reply and supplemental reply,
petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld bonuses and
benefits due the individual petitioners and they pray that the Court
issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and mandatory injunction to
restrain the SSS and its agents from withholding payment thereof
and to compel the SSS to pay them. In their supplemental reply,
petitioners annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission,
dated May 5, 1989, which ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who
are not preventively suspended and who are reporting for work
pending the resolution of the administrative cases against them are
entitled to their salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe
benefits and affirmed the previous order of the Merit Systems
Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court,
it is Our view that petitioners' remedy is not to petition this Court to
issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of the aforesaid
order, if it has already become final.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the
Court of Appeals, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED
and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application
for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December
13,1988 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.