1.

PERPETUAL PEACE Immanuel Kant

2. What does "Perpetual Peace" mean?

3. Why did he write it? In 1795 Immanuel Kant wrote it inspired by the Peace between Prussia and
French. Kant thought to state a set of principles that could provide a stable and lasting peace. In his
book Kant asserts a series of preliminary articles, written in negative form, and of definitive articles,
written in positive form, in order to propose a peace program to all governments.

4. Preliminary articles

5. Preliminary articles •All the “preliminary articles” are designed, in Kant’s view, to make war less likely
and future peace more likely •Their specific content is based on Kant’s historical experience

6. Definitive articles

7. A Republican Constitution •A constitution where the people are only subject to laws it gives itself
•But the executive and legislative power are separate •Note that in Kant’s time such constitutions
hardly existed •When a people (through its representatives) has to decide on whether or not to go to
war, it will weigh its costs much more carefully than when a despotic ruler decides the question

8. What is a "Federation of free states"? •It is not a world state or a superstate •It is concerned only
with regulating international disputes among its members •A powerful free people may serve as the
nucleus of a federation, which might then grow •Or several regional federations might grow over time

9. What is the right of ospitality? •The right to visit and trade (not necessarily to live) How does it lead to
peace? •Trade is ultimately incompatible with war •It counteracts our natural “separating” tendencies
(via language, culture, etc.) and creates mutual understanding •Kant argues against “conquest” in the
name of trade

The Perpetual Peace Project : A philosophical pacifist manifesto

The work of Kant Perpetual Peace Project is one of the greatest works of political philosophy and politic
science.
Kant starts from the following point: states are either at war or living in a de facto peace, unstable and
precarious.
But peace makes not law.

Kant‘s intention is to get out states to their natural state, that is to say a state of conflict, permanent
war, of the fittest. Kantian realism, far from smug irenicism that often leads to Kant, is clear: war is
natural. But this does not make naturalness provided by legitimate or just or moral.
Kant does not present an immediate program of peace, but they represent a distant, yet achievable. He
wants to transform the state of peace in a state of law, juridicialisant relations between states.

Kant and the state of political nature:

“The state of peace is not a state of nature, which is rather a state of war, so must the state of peace is
established” (Kant quotes)
 States are naturally inclined to warmongering. Defense of sovereignty takes precedence over moral
issues. They know only the force and hostility, ignoring the law. Secrecy and reasons of state reign
supreme in diplomatic relations.

The state of nature means the reports of non-legal states among themselves, in which there is no higher
authority to resolve conflicts.

In the same way that individuals leave their natural state through the social contract, states can not be
satisfied with this belligerent and must enter into relations with other states.

Kant and the federation of states:

The main items donated by Kant for the gradual construction of perpetual peace:

– Civic constitution of each State shall be republican

– The right people must be based on a federalism of free states

– Cosmopolitan law should be limited to conditions of universal hospitality

Kant rejects outright the idea of a world state because it blurs the differences inherent in the cultures
and negate the concept of sovereignty. The idea of one people is absurd. Only an association, a
federation is possible.

To make possible the association of states, reform within states, by making them adopt a republican
constitution. Kant argues that only the republic is the rule of law, because it implies the separation of
the legislative and executive branches. If the people are associated with power, he can not want war
because they should suffer the consequences. In despotic regime, in which executive and legislative
powers are embodied in the person of Prince, the war only depends on the goodwill of the ruler, who
may despise the interests of his people. Therefore, peace can be built on the republicanization State

Then may be considered an alliance between sovereign states who work together in peace as
dependent on each other. Thus the spirit of commerce takes hold of peoples, which can not coexist with
war.

First Section: Which Contains the Preliminary Articles of a Perpetual Peace between States” (93-97)
These are six “prohibitive laws” (97)
The strict laws – which are valid immediately and regardless of circumstance – are laws 1, 5, and 6. (97)
The subjective laws – which can be implemented later and provide some flexibility in their
determination – are laws 2, 3, and 4. (97)
1. No declaration of peace is valid if there are plans for a future war (93)
 This is a truce, a temporary halt in hostilities, not indefinite peace (93)
 Peace is for there to be no privately held reason for future war (93)
 Exhaustion, with an eye to future conflict, is not true peace (94)
2. No states can be coopted by “inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift” (94)
 A state is no possession but a society (94)
 The society alone should determine its fate (94)
 To treat this society as property, trading it and violating its agency, turns the state into a commodity,
contradicting the “original contract” (94)
 Moreover, inheriting foreign states, marrying to unite two states, and contracting a state’s army abroad
are all practically dangerous (94)
 This law applies to future acquisitions, and does not seek to rectify the current composition of states
(97)
3. “Standing armies will gradually be abolished” (94)
 By existing, standing armies threaten other states (94)
 Other states fear the possibility of war, and this spurs arms races (94)
 At a certain level of armament, short wars become less costly than peace (94)
 The army then becomes the principal cause of war in an effort to end the expense of its own existence!
(95) The security dilemma is absurd …
 Moreover, hiring man to kill man makes him a machine of the state, which has different notions of right
than individual rights (95)
 Voluntary military training is practical for defense and not as easily manipulated (95)
 Thus the army is one of three powers – army, alliance, and money – that foments insecurity abroad and
encourages aggression at home (95)
 If we could make transparent the economic endowments of states, for example, there would be less
uncertainty and thus incentive for war (95)
4. Foreign affairs will not contribute to the national debt (95)
 Credit is good if used for constructive purposes, like infrastructure development or as a famine hedge
(95)
 Credit, when funding aggression, is extremely dangerous (95)
 The short-term debts are never demanded by creditors, allowing debts and thus military expenditures to
grow larger than the constraints of the treasury, and this can continue for an indefinite period of time
(95)
 This practice ends only when tax revenue cannot keep up with interest payments, and even this end can
be delayed through other economic means (95)
 This makes war easy, which combines with the warlike inclinations of rulers to lead to near perpetual
wars (95)
 The result is national bankruptcy, thus dragging other states, who must incur costs, into the role of
stabilizers (95)
 These states are justified in preventing their involvement in and harm from such a crisis (95)
5. States will not interfere with each other’s “constitutions and governments” (96)
 Very little can justify interference, especially not “sense of scandal or offense” between peoples (96)
 Interventions should only “serve as a warning to others” against internal chaos and “lawlessness” (96)
 However, if a state has split into different states, then intervention on the side of one or the other is
justified because these are new states, not an one old one (96)
 Until a state is so divided, intervention is still interference into the affairs of a struggling but unitary
state (96)
 This intervention is unjustified and is a dangerous precedent (96)
 6. States at war will not act to make reconciliation and trust impossible, such as through the use of
“assassins … poisoners … breach of agreements, the instigation of treason,” and spies (96)
 These tactics are “dishonorable” because even in war states should be able to trust the enemy to honor
its commitment to the end of hostilities (96)
 Without this trust, we have not war but “extermination” (96)
 War is simply the method of enforcing a society’s rights against another in the state of nature without
the court of law (96)
 Without a court and its judge, no party can be declared justified (except maybe in the retrospective
“judgment of God”) (96)
 Since states are equal, with none superior or inferior, wars of punishment are inconceivable (96)
 Therefore wars of extermination lead to a perpetual peace only when humanity is destroyed (96)
 The means and tactics of this war, because the outcome is so terrible, should be prohibited (96)
 The tactics mentioned (assassins, poisons, breach of agreements, treason) not only remove a chance for
trust after war but can also be applied outside of open war, turning truce and peace into hostilities (97)

The Athenians offer the Melians an ultimatum: surrender and pay tribute to Athens, or be destroyed.
The Athenians do not wish to waste time arguing over the morality of the situation, because in practice
might makes right—or, in their own words, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they
must".[25]
The Melians argue that they are a neutral city and not an enemy, so Athens has no need to conquer
them. The Athenians counter that if they accept Melos' neutrality and independence, they would look
weak: Their subjects would think that they left Melos alone because they were not strong enough to
conquer it.
The Melians argue that an invasion will alarm the other neutral Greek states, who will become hostile to
Athens for fear of being invaded themselves. The Athenians counter that the Greek states on the
mainland are unlikely to act this way. It is the independent island states and the disgruntled subjects
that Athens has already conquered that are more likely to take up arms against Athens.
The Melians argue that it would be shameful and cowardly of them to submit without a fight. The
Athenians counter that it is only shameful to submit to an opponent whom one has a reasonable chance
of defeating. There is no shame in submitting to an overwhelmingly superior opponent like Athens.
The Melians argue that though the Athenians are far stronger, there is at least a slim chance that the
Melians could win, and they will regret not trying their luck. The Athenians counter that this argument is
emotional and short-sighted. If the Melians lose, which is highly likely, they will come to bitterly regret
their foolish optimism.
The Melians believe that they will have the assistance of the gods because their position is morally just.
The Athenians counter that the gods will not intervene because it is the natural order of things for the
strong to dominate the weak.
The Melians argue that their Spartan kin will come to their defense. The Athenians counter that the
Spartans are a practical people who never put themselves at risk when their interests are not at stake,
and rescuing Melos would be especially risky since Athens has the stronger navy.
The Athenians express their shock at the Melians' lack of realism. They say that there is no shame in
submitting to a stronger enemy, especially one who is offering reasonable terms. They also argue that it
is sensible to submit to one's superiors, stand firm against one's equals, and be moderate to one's
inferiors. The Melians do not change their minds and politely dismiss the envoys.