GO ONG VS.

CA
G.R. No. 75884
September 24, 1987
FACTS: 2 parcels of land under 1 TCT are owned by alfredo and when he died, his wife
julita go ong was appointed administratrix of his estate. Julita thereafter mortgaged 1 lot
to Allied Banking Corp. to secure a loan obtained by JK Exports, annotated as a lien on
the original TCT, with the following notation: “mortgagee’s consent necessary in case of
subsequent alienation or encumbrance of the property…”
On the loan there was due a sum and Allied tried to collect it from Julita. Hence, the
complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the bank had
allegedly promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank averred that
it was Julita who promised to secure the court’s approval.

Trial court ruled for Julita, stating that the contract is valid. CA affirmed with
modification the lower court’s decision

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL

OF LAND UNDER PETITIONER’S ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT
OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL.

HELD: Contract is valid

Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court . The CA aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89
of the Rules of Court is not applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in her
personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband.
Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code applies in a case where judicial approval has to be
sought in connection with, for instance, the sale or mortgage of property under
administration for the payment, say of a conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and
hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite judicial approval for the
reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is caused
others, including the government.

Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the CA cannot be faulted in ruling
that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under administration, by
authority of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, with
respect to her conjugal share and to her hereditary rights.

Petitioner cited cases arguing that in the settlement proceedings of the estate of the
deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property of the marriage is under
administration. While such may be in a sense true, that fact alone is not sufficient to
invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily entered into by the petitioner..
Under similar circumstances, this Court applied the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil
Code, where the heirs as co-owners shall each have the full ownership of his part and
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership

The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot
adversely affect the substantive rights of private respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not
inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husband’s death, and her
hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil
Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed between her and the other
heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.).

ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANUEL UY a SONS, INC., defendant-

appellee

Facts: Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located
at Sta. Cruz, Manila. Other owners are Marie GarnierVda. de Ramirez, 1/6; José V.
Ramirez, 1/6; José E. Ramirez, 1/6; Belen T. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita De Ramirez, 1/6; and
José Ma. Ramirez, 1/6.

On October 20, 1951. José V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding No.
15026 was instituted to settle his estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share
in the aforementioned property. His last will and testament has been admitted to probate,
wherein he bequeathed his estate to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of
the free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant. The
Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed judicial administrator.

Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie GarnierVda. de Ramirez, one of the co-
owners of the late José V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share
to Manuel Uy& Sons, Inc., defendant-appellee herein, for the sum of P500,000.00. After
the execution an affidavit to the effect that formal notices of the sale had been sent to all
possible redemptioners, the deed of sale was duly registered and the old TCT was
cancelled in lieu of which a new one was issued in the name of the vendee and the other-
co-owners.

On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uya l Son Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of
the Philippine Islands as judicial administrator of the estate of the late José V. Ramirez
informing it of the above-mentioned sale. This letter, together with that of the bank, was
forwarded by the latter to Mrs. Butte.

On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, sent a letter and a Philippine National Bank
cashier’s check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy a l Sons, Inc. offering to
redeem share sold by Mrs. Marie GarnierVda. de Ramirez. This tender having been
refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and filed the
corresponding action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by the
court of the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold which she alleged to be
grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for actual, moral
and exemplary damages.

May 13, 1959, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint.

Issue: WON the plaintiff in the case at bar has a right to redeem the property

Held: By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased person are transmitted to his
heirs from the moment of his death, and the right of succession includes all property,
rights and obligations that survive the decedent so from the instant of Jose Ramirez’
death, his heirs became co-owners of an undivided share and co-owner of the whole
property thus they became entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption as soon as
another co-owner has sold his undivided share to a stranger. The presence of the judicial
administrator is of no moment because the rights of the administrator of possession and
administration of the real and personal estate of the deceased do not include the right
of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to Manuel Uy and Sons because the right
to redeem only
came into existence when the sale was perfected 8 years from the death of Jose Ramir
ez. Theadministrator cannot exercise the right of redemption since the land was sold
AFTER the death of Ramirez. The administrator may exercise the right to redeem only if
the right pertains to the estate, and this can only happen if the sale of said portion to Uy
was done before the death of Ramirez.

HEIRS OF PEDRO REGANON, JOVENCIA REGANON, MENCIA REGANON,

JOSEFA REGANON, VIOLETA REGANON, and FLORA REGANON, plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
RUFINO IMPERIAL, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

On February 22, 1963, the heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of about one-hectare portion of a parcel of land situated at
Miasi, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte with damages, against Rufino Imperial. Since the
defendant failed to answer within the reglementary period, the plaintiffs filed a motion to
declare the former in default that the trial court granted the motion. The court rendered a
decision declaring the plaintiffs lawful owners of the land in question and entitled to its
peaceful possession and enjoyment; ordering defendant immediately to vacate the
portion occupied by him and to restore the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs; and
 sentencing defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of P1,929.20 and the costs. The
plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution and of an
order directing the manager, or the representative, of the Philippine National Bank-
Dipolog Branch, to hold the share of defendant and deliver the same to the provincial
sheriff of the province to be applied to the satisfaction of the balance of the money
judgment. This was granted by the trial court. The Deputy Provincial Sheriff issued a
sheriffs notification for levy addressed to defendant, giving notice of the garnishment of
the rights, interests, shares and participation that defendant may have over the
residuary estate of the late Eulogio Imperial, consisting of the money deposited in the
Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch. The defendant first and second motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court.

ISSUES:

1. Upon the death of a ward, is the money accumulated in his guardianship proceedings
and deposited in a bank, still considered in custodia legisand therefore cannot be
attached?
2. Is the residuary estate of a U.S. veteran, which consist in the aggregate accumulated
sum from the monthly allowances given him by the United States Veterans
Administration (USVA) during his lifetime, exempt from execution?

RULING:

1.No, because the new Rules of Court now specifically provides for the procedure to be
followed in case what is attached is in custodia legis. The clear import of this new
provision is that property under custodia legis is now attachable, subject to the mode set
forth in said rule. Besides, the ward having died, the guardianship proceedings no
longer subsist: “The death of the ward necessarily terminates the guardianship, and
thereupon all powers and duties of the guardian cease, except the duty, which remains,
to make a proper accounting and settlement in the probate court. ” When Eulogio
Imperial died on September 13, 1962, the rights to his succession — from the moment
of his death — were transmitted to his heirs, one of whom is his son and heir,
defendant-appellant herein. This automatic transmission cannot but proceed with
greater ease and certainty than in this case where the parties agree that the residuary
estate is not burdened with any debt. “The rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of death, and where, as in this case, the heir is of
legal age and the estate is not burdened with any debts, said heir immediately
succeeds, by force of law, to the dominion, ownership, and possession of the
properties of his predecessor and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the
latter. ” That the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person may be attached
for purposes of execution, even if the estate is in the process of settlement before the
courts, is already a settled matter in this jurisdiction. It is admitted that the heirs of
Eulogio Imperial, including herein defendant-appellant, have on May 25, 1964 executed
a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. This instrument suffices to settle the entire estate of
the decedent — provided all the requisites for its validity are fulfilled — even without the
approval of the court. Therefore, the estate for all practical purposes have been settled.
2. It is defendant-appellant’s position that the residuary estate of Eulogio Imperial, a former
U.S. veteran, having been set aside from the monthly allowances given him by the
United States Veterans Administration (USVA) during his lifetime, is exempt from
execution. Any pension, annuity, or gratuity granted by a Government to its officers or
employees in recognition of past services rendered, is primordially aimed at tiding them
over during their old age and/or disability. This is therefore a rightpersonalissima, purely
personal because founded on necessity. It requires no argument to show that where the
recipient dies, the necessity motivating or underlying its grant necessarily ceases to be.
Even more so in this case where the law providing for the exemption is calculated to
benefit U.S. veterans residing here, and is therefore merely a manifestation of comity.
Besides, the heirs of Eulogio Imperial, one of whom is appellant, have already executed
a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition — the end result of which is that the property is no
longer the property of the estate but of the individual heirs. And it is settled that: “When
the heirs by mutual agreement have divided the estate among themselves, one of the
heirs cannot therefore secure the appointment of an administrator to take charge of and
administer the estate or a part thereof. The property is no longer the property of the
estate, but of the individual heirs, whether it remains undivided or not.”

RAMIREZ v. BALTAZAR
GR No.L-25049, August 30, 1968
22 SCRA 918

FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar,

defendants in this case. Upon demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the
deceased, filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate, alleging
further that plaintiffs Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs of the deceased. Felimon
was later appointed as adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio Diawan was
appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. The mortgagees then filed a foreclosure
of the property in question and succeeded, after Diawan failed to file an answer against
the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the property was bought by the mortgagees
themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court. Felimon sued for the annulment of
the entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the failure of the judicial
administrator to protect their interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs have no legal
capacity to sue and hava no cause of action.

ISSUE: Have plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?

HELD: Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically
transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule,
the formal declaration or recognition to such successional rights needs judicial
confirmation, this Court has, under special circumstances, protected these rights from
encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual,
it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court upon the commencement
of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as "when the
administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in his place."
NOCEDA vs CA
[G.R. No. 119730. September 2, 1999]

FACTS: Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the
daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo extrajudicially
settled a parcel of land located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, which was
said to have an area of 66,530 square meters. Plaintiff Directo’s share was 11,426
square meters, defendant Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810
square meters went to Maria Arbizo. Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her
share to defendant Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister,
Carolina. However, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed
by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land
went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth
each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032
over Lot 1121 in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land was said
to have an area of only 29,845 square meters.
Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him
by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial
settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in
1985, defendant Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo,
occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her
consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the
latter refused.

Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of possession
and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before
the lower court.

Trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff Directo ordering the revocation of the donation.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner Noceda’s acts of usurpation constitute an act of ingratitude

sufficient to grant the revocation of the donation?
HELD: YES. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion
donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the
whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner’s act of
occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latter’s
knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property
of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor.[31]
The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be
proved in the action for revocation.
Nufable vs. Nufable
G.R. No. 126950, 02 July 1999
Facts:
Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of land located at Poblacion, Manjuyod,
Negros Oriental, consisting of 948 square meters, more or less. He died on August 9,
1965 and was survived by his children, namely: Angel Custodio, Generosa, Vilfor and
Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable. Upon petition for probate filed by said heirs and after due
publication and hearing, the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch II)
issued an Order dated March 30, 1966 admitting to probate the last will and testament
executed by the deceased Edras Nufable. However, one of the heirs, Angel actually
mortgaged the entire property to DBP two months prior to the settlement which property
was eventually foreclosed. Thereafter, Nelson, son of the mortgagors, purchased said
property from DBP.
The other heirs now filed for the annulment of sale in favor of Nelson. The Court
of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting one-fourth of the property to Nelson
and the other three-fourths to the other heirs. Petitioners filed this present petition
contending that the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Edras Nufable did not
determine the ownership of the land in question as against third parties.

Issue:
Whether or not the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable and its subsequent
probate are pertinent and material to the question of the right of ownership of petitioner
Nelson Nufable who purchased the land in question from, and as acquired property of,
the Development Bank of the Philippines.

Ruling:
No, the Last Will and Testament of Edras and its subsequent probate do not affect
the title of Nelson. At the time when the entire property was mortgaged, the other heirs of
Edras had already acquired successional rights over the said property. This is so because
the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Accordingly, for the purpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether
the Last Will and Testament of the late Esdras Nufable was admitted or that the
Settlement of Estate was approved. It is to be noted that the probated will of the late
Esdras Nufable specifically referred to the subject property in stating that "the land
situated in the Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, should not be divided because this
must remain in common for them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of them brothers
and sisters to construct a house therein." It was therefor the will of the decedent that the
subject property should undivided, although the restriction should not exceed twenty (20)
years pursuant to Article 870 of the Civil Code.
 Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouses mortgaged the subject property to DBP
on March 15, 1966, they had no right to mortgage the entire property. Angel's right over
the subject property was limited only to 1/4 pro indivisoshare. As co-owner of the subject
property, Angel's right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited to that portion that may be
allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a
co-owner can only alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. Hence, The
Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Angel Custodio Nufable "had no right to
mortgage the subject property in its entirety. His right to encumber said property was
limited only to 1/4 pro indiviso share of the property in question."

BLAS VS SANTOS et al
1 SCRA 899 – Succession – Promise
FACTS:
Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he had three
children. He also had grandchildren from his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta
Cruz died. In 1899, Blas married Maxima Santos (they had no children) but the properties
he and his former wife acquired during the first marriage were not liquidated.
In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in favor of Maxima
the other half for payment of debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein.
In lieu of this, Maxima executed a document whereby she intimated that she understands
the will of her husband; that she promises that she’ll be giving, upon her death, one-half
of the properties she’ll be acquiring to the heirs and legatees named in the will of his
husband; that she can select or choose any of them depending upon the respect, service,
and treatment accorded to her by said legatees/heirs/devisees.
In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became
administratrix of her estate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas
in his first marriage, together with three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of
Simeon Blas), learned that Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it was learned that
Maxima only disposed not even one-tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon
Blas.
The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas’ property precisely
because Maxima promised that they’ll be receiving properties upon her death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of
Maxima.
HELD: Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a will
(it lacks the formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was
actually executed to avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas’ estate) hence it is a
compromise.
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the
reason that the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an
obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal
properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be
conjugal properties in the will of the husband.
Justice Bautista Angelo, dissenting:
It should be noted that Maxima Santos’ promise to transmit is predicated on the condition
that she can freely choose and select from among the heirs and legatees of her husband
those to whom she would like to give and bequeath depending on the respect, service
and companionship that they may render to her. Her commitment is not an absolute
promise to give to all but only to whom she may choose and select. And here this promise
has been substantially complied with when she disposed one-tenth of the property to
some legatees named in Simeon’s will.

Neri vs. Akutin

G.R. No. L-47799, 13 June 1941
Facts:
Agripino Neri contracted two marriages wherein he had by his first marriage six
children named: Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina; and by his
second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children named: Gracia, Godofredo, Violeta,
Estela Maria, and Emma. Her daughter in the first marriage, Getulia, died a little less than
eight years before the death of Agripino, and was survived by seven children named
Remedios, Encarnacion, Carmen, Trinidad, Luz, Alberto and Minda. Clause 8 in a will left
by Agripino was invoked by petitioners, wherein the testator made the statement that the
children by his first marriage had already received their shares in his property excluding
what he had given them as aid during their financial troubles.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that contrary to what the
testator had declared in his will [that all his children by the first and second marriages are
intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the improvements
introduced in the properties during the existence of the last conjugal partnership, which
should belong to Ignacia Akutin] but with the modification that the will was valid with
respect to the two-thirds part which the testator could freely dispose of. It ruled that there
is no preterition but disinheritance in this case.

Issue:
Whether or not there exists preterition with respect to the children by the first
marriage of the decedent.

Ruling:
Yes, there is preterition. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of
the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In
the instant case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will, they
were not accorded any share in the hereditary property, without expressly being
disinherited. It is, therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The
omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a
preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest.
Preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession
except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not
inofficious" (art. 814 of the Civil Code), In the instant case, no such legacies or
betterments have been made by the testator. "Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly
provided, according to articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code, and where no express
provision therefore is made in the will, the law would presume that the testator had no
intention to that effect. In the will subject of this case, no express betterment is made in
favor of the children by the first marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly made in
their behalf consisting of the third available for free disposal. The whole inheritance is
accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the
first marriage have already received their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the
testator's intention, as may be clearly inferred from his will, would have been to divide his
property equally among all his children.