22. Rayray vs Chae Kyung Lee, G.R No.

18176 (October 26, 1966)

Facts:
Rayray married Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the marriage, Lee was able to secure a marriage
license which is a requirement in Korea prior to marrying. They lived together until 1955. Rayray
however later found out that Lee had previously lived with 2 Americans and a Korean. Lee answered by
saying that it is not unusual in Korea for a woman to have more than one partner and that it is legally
permissive for them to do so and that there is no legal impediment to her marriage with Rayray.
Eventually they pursued their separate ways. Rayray later filed before lower court of Manila for an
action to annul his marriage with Lee because Lee’s whereabouts cannot be determined and that his
consent in marrying Lee would have not been for the marriage had he known prior that Lee had been
living with other men. His action for annulment had been duly published and summons were made
known to Lee but due to her absence Rayray moved to have Lee be declared in default. The lower court
denied Rayray’s action stating that since the marriage was celebrated in Korea the court cannot take
cognizance of the case and that the facts presented by Rayray is not sufficient to debunk his marriage
with Lee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rayray’s marriage with Lee is null and void.
HELD: The lower court erred in ruling that Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over the case. As far
as marriage status is concerned, the nationality principle is controlling NOT lex loci celebracionis. The
lower court is however correct in ruling that Rayray’s evidence is not sufficient to render his marriage
with Lee null and void. Rayray said that the police clearance secured by Lee is meant to allow her to
marry after her subsequent cohabitation/s with the other men – which is considered bigamous in
Philippine law. The SC ruled that the police clearance is wanting for it lacks the signature of the person
who prepared it and there is no competent document to establish the identity of the same. Also,
through Rayray himself, Lee averred that it is ok in Korea for a person who cohabited with other men
before to marry another man. This is an indication that Lee herself is aware that if it were a previous
marriage that is concerned then that could be a legal impediment to any subsequent marriage. Rayray
cannot be given credence in claiming that his consent could have been otherwise altered had he known
all these facts prior to the marriage because he would lie to every opportunity given him by the Court so
as to suit his case.

23. Van Dorn vs Romillo, JR. 39 SCRA 139

Facts:

Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a
citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced in Nevada,
United States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred
by previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged
that they had no community property. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that
the property involved is located in the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.

(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.

Held:

As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As he is bound by the Decision
of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over
the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. Alicia Reyes
under our National law is still considered married to private respondent. However, petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

24. Pilapil vs Ibay – Somera, 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then
filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on
January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

25. Quita VS CA 174 SCRA 653

Facts:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. No
children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31,
1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning
the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to
be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the
petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death
of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void
since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issues:

1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

Held:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to
the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there
are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them
as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.

Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito
under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

26. Elmar O Pereez vs CA, CANTINDIIG, January 27, 2006

Facts:
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig[5] twice on May 16, 1968. The first
marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita,
Manila while the second took place at the Lourdes Catholic
Church in La Loma, Quezon City.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to separate from each
other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the Dominican
Republic ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily.
Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the
complete separation of properties between Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States[7]
and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the
Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine... law.
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention[10] claiming that she has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation
Issues:
the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the annulment
case... between Tristan and Lily.
Ruling:
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The
divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage
bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and... duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.[19]
Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws
with... respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity.
Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition
abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes... successful in getting an
absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.
When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code[21] which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano[22] we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party... by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)
Thus, petitioner's claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks
merit.
Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is
based.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Principles:
Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws
with... respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity.
Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition
abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes... successful in getting an
absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.

27 San Luis vs San Luis, February 6, 2007

Facts:

During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luis’s dad) contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11,
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad, Rodolfo sought the
dissolution of their Felicisimo’s conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she
was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26
of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate Felicidad’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad may file for letters of administration over Felicisimo’s estate.
HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under
the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

28. Felicitas Amor-Catalan vs CA and Orlando Catalan and Merope Braganza 514 SCRA 607 (Feb 6,
2007)

FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized
citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months
after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio
Bristol, petitioner Amor-Catalan filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in
the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was
allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC – Dagupan: declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E.
Braganza void on the ground of bigamy.
(2) CA: reversed RTC.
 ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens
and whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.
(2) Whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of
the respondents on the ground of bigamy

RULING:
(1) The records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce. Before it can
be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.
(2) Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of
whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all,
she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes
absolute.

29. ATCI Overseas Corp. vs Echin, Gr No/ 178551, Oct 11, 2010

Facts:
1. Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its pr
incipal co-
petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical tech
nologist under a twoyear contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a
monthly salary of US$1,200.00.

2. Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of 1

year and are covered by Kuwaits Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.

3. Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on Febru
ary 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.

4. As the Ministry denied respondents reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17
, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.

5. Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint

for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitio
ner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.

6. Labor Arbiter: finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant
respondents dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a
regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioner
s to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her
contract.

7. On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision
8. MR denied.
They appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign governme
nt agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that respond
ent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one
year period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal
should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.

9. CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution and noted

that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the impleme
ntation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and
severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment.

10. As to Ikdals liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the
Migrant and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, corporate officers, directors and partners of a recruit
ment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for
money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.

11. MR denied, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed.

12. Petitioners Contention:

a. maintain that they should not be held liable because respondents employment contract specifical
ly stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of K
uwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate cour
t to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the present
case.

b. that even the POEA Rules relative to master employment contracts accord respect to
the customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host country.

c. Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given
that the foreign principal is
a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing
to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the
Ministrys liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.

Issue:

Held:
The petition fails. Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the
money claims of
OFWs which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a
government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principals liability must
first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and
alleviate the plight of the working class.[9] Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity
from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principals
liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.

As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on

probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in respondents emplo
yment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be g
overned by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules
accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not
substantiated.

Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establi
sh stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws w
hich they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners
failed to discharge. The Courts ruling in EDI<Staffbuilders Intl., v. NLRC[10] illuminates:

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor
Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for
termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci
intentiones) to
apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of
the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied
to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as
a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take
judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed
to know only domestic or forum law. Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent
Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed*identity approach or processual presumptioncomes into
play.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that f
oreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues pr
esented before us.

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws,

hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party in
voking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the R
evised Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official p
ublication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
 by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate t
hat such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (
emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court

30. Tuna Processing vs PHI. Kingford, Gr 185582, Febraury 29, 2012

FACTS:

Kanemitsu Yamaoka, co-patentee of a US Patent, Philippine Letters Patent, and an Indonesian Patent,
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with five Philippine tuna processors including
Respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc. (KINGFORD). The MOA provides for the enforcing of the
abovementioned patents, granting licenses under the same, and collecting royalties, and for the
establishment of herein Petitioner Tuna Processors, Inc. (TPI).

Due to a series of events not mentioned in the Petition, the tuna processors, including Respondent
KINGFORD, withdrew from Petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their obligations. Petitioner
TPI submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the
State of California, United States and won the case against Respondent KINGFORD.

To enforce the award, Petitioner TPI filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. Respondent KINGFORD filed a Motion to Dismiss,
which the RTC denied for lack of merit. Respondent KINGFORD then sought for the inhibition of the RTC
judge, Judge Alameda, and moved for the reconsideration of the order denying the Motion. Judge
Alameda inhibited himself notwithstanding “[t]he unfounded allegations and unsubstantiated assertions
in the motion.” Judge Ruiz, to which the case was re-raffled, in turn, granted Respondent
KINGFORDS’s Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the Petition on the ground that Petitioner TPI
lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines. Petitioner TPI is a corporation established in the State of
California and not licensed to do business in the Philippines.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but which collects
royalties from entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?
ARGUMENT:

Petitioner TPI contends that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and enforcement of the subject
foreign arbitral award in accordance with RA No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004),
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the
United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law), as none of these
specifically requires that the party seeking for the enforcement should have legal capacity to sue.

RULING:

YES. Petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and
enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004. A foreign corporation’s capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material insofar
as the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.
The Resolution of the RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides that the opposing party in an
application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may raise only those grounds that
were enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention, to wit:
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom
it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and
enforcement is sought, proof that:

a. The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under the law applicable to them,
under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made;
b. The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment
of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case;
c. The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from
those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration may be recognized and enforced;
d. The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with
the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the
country where the arbitration took place; or
e. The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by
a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.

2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in
the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
a. The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law
of that country; or
 b. The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that
country.

Not one of the abovementioned exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the party
seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.

Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution, which was
promulgated by the Supreme Court, likewise support this position.

Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that “[a]ny party to a foreign arbitration may petition the court
to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award.” The contents of such petition are enumerated in
Rule 13.5. Capacity to sue is not included. Oppositely, in the rule on local arbitral awards or arbitrations
in instances where “the place of arbitration is in the Philippines,” it is specifically required that a petition
“to determine any question concerning the existence, validity and enforceability of such arbitration
agreement” available to the parties before the commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for
“judicial relief from the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding or declining its
jurisdiction” after arbitration has already commenced should state “[t]he facts showing that the persons
named as petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to sue or be sued.”

Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, the
Court deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do
business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in Philippine courts. When a party enters into a
contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this case, in fact submits itself to
arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration,
conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the contract, participate in the
arbitration and cause the implementation of the result. Although not on all fours with the instant case,
also worthy to consider is the wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her Dissenting
Opinion in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals [1998], to wit:

xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining adherents in legal and judicial
circles here and abroad. If its tested mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved party, one who,
it must be stressed, voluntarily and actively participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very
beginning, it will destroy the very essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.

Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not because it is
favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any
conflict of law question.

Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the RTC correctly observed that the Model
Law, not the New York Convention, governs the subject arbitral award, Petitioner TPI may still seek
recognition and enforcement of the award in Philippine court, since the Model Law prescribes
substantially identical exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement.

31. Amos vs Bellis, 20 SCRA 358

FACTS:
 Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate
children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who
survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and
properties to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of
partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according
to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed
by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate
children’s successional rights

RULING:

Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should
be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which
deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas
law, which is the national law of the deceased.

32. Tayag vs Benguet Consolidated, GR L-23145, Nov 29 1968

o PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of Shares of Stock: domicile of the corporation

o SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies,
leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of
assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
o SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary
administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the
Philippines.

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among others, two stock
certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary
administrator of Perkins’ estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock
certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator, refused to part with
them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock
certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing
Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost
as they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:

The appeal lacks merit.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all assets of the
decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier case, set
forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate.
When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign
country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's
last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the
ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex
proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an
administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last
domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual
debts or to be distributed among his heirs."

Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock
certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right
to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant]
Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine
corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of
stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds application. "In the
instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled
[here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not
dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.
 33. Kazuhiro Hasegawa vs Kitamura, Gr No. 149177, November 12, 2007

In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a Japanese firm, was contracted by the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to supervise the construction of the Southern
Tagalog Access Road. In April 1999, Nippon entered into an independent contractor agreement (ICA)
with Minoru Kitamura for the latter to head the said project. The ICA was entered into in Japan and is
effective for a period of 1 year (so until April 2000). In January 2000, DPWH awarded the Bongabon-
Baler Road project to Nippon. Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the road project. But in
February 2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the general manager of Nippon informed Kitamura that they are
pre-terminating his contract. Kitamura sought Nippon to reconsider but Nippon refused to negotiate.
Kitamura then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract was entered in Japan hence,
applying the principle of lex loci celebracionis, cases arising from the contract should be cognizable only
by Japanese courts. The trial court denied the motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court.
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this time invoking forum non conveniens; that the
RTC is an inconvenient forum because the parties are Japanese nationals who entered into a contract in
Japan. Kitamura on the other hand invokes the trial court’s ruling which states that matters connected
with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance, so
since the obligations in the ICA are executed in the Philippines, courts here have jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against Nippon should be dismissed.
HELD: No. The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of it.
In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for specific performance and damages. Such
case is incapable of pecuniary estimation; such cases are within the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court.
Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. However, such ground is
not one of those provided for by the Rules as a ground for dismissing a civil case.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that Japanese laws should apply is premature.
In conflicts cases, there are three phases and each next phase commences when one is settled, to wit:

1. Jurisdiction – Where should litigation be initiated? Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the parties, the issues, the property, the res. Also considers, whether it is fair to cause a defendant to
travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law
which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
2. Choice of Law – Which law will the court apply? Once a local court takes cognizance, it does not mean
that the local laws must automatically apply. The court must determine which substantive law when
applied to the merits will be fair to both parties.
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment – Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?

This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the RTC’s taking cognizance of the case,
Hasegawa immediately filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. He filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was also denied. Then he bypassed the proper procedure by immediately filing a
petition for certiorari. The question of which law should be applied should have been settled in the trial
court had Hasegawa not improperly appealed the interlocutory order denying his MFR.

34. Raytheon vs Rouzie, GR 162894. February 26, 2008

FACTS

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized & existing under the laws of
Connecticut, &Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract

BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects
in thePhilippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.

Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Rep. of Phil. on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt.Pinatubo eruption & mudflows.

Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International (Rust) for alleged nonpayment
of commissions, illegal termination, & breach of employment contract.

The Labor Arbiter order

ed BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s money claims.

Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed & dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Rouzie filed an action for damages before the RTC of La Union (where he was a resident) against
Raytheon International. He reiterated that he was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo
dredging project w/c hesecured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI, RUST and
Raytheon had combined & functioned as 1 company.

RAYTHEON SOUGHT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF FAILURE TO STATE
ACAUSE OF ACTION & FORUM NON CONVENIENS & PRAYED FOR DAMAGES BY WAY OF COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIM. THE RTC DENIED RAYTHEON’S MOTION. THE CA AFFIRMED.

Raytheon’s contention: The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included a valid choice of law
clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also
mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute, namely that the parties & witnesses involved
are American corporations & citizens & the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines,
that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. The foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the
immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

ISSUES(a) W/N the RTC had jurisdiction.(b) W/N the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
forum non conveniens.

RULING
(a) YES.

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court
and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can
proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a
foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law
& by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is entitled to recover all
or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The case file was an action for damages arising from an
alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed
are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Rouzi upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired by its voluntary
appearance in court.

That THE SUBJECT CONTRACT INCLUDED A STIPULATION THAT THE SAME SHALL BE GOVERNED BYTHE
LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE PHILIPPINE COURTS,
OR ANY OTHER FOREIGN TRIBUNAL FOR THAT MATTER, ARE PRECLUDED FROM HEARING THE CIVIL ACTI
ON.

JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW ARE 2 DISTINCT CONCEPTS. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to
cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application
of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law
stipulation will be come relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is,
after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

(b) NO.

UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A COURT, IN CONFLICTS-OF-LAWS CASES, MAY
REFUSE IMPOSITIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT IS NOT THE MOST “CONVENIENT” OR
AVAILABLE FORUM AND THE PARTIES ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE.
Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over
the case and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is w/c the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only
after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance.

35. Tenchavez vs Escaño, 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married
on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic
chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was
duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-
between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student
where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in
a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad ,
he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went
back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the
United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued
by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage
to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has
begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on
foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil
Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the
legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is
the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of
an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

36. Globe Mackay Cable Radio Corp. vs CA 176 SCRA 778

Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations
manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior
Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day
after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced
leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a “crook” and a “swindler”,
ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials
for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still
incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and
from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the
Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were
dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective
December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry
wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias,
then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive
acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes
rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand
pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages,
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
attorney’s fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds
that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private
respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess
or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry)
scornful remarks about Filipinos (“You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against Tobias (“crook”,
and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay
due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these
reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause
damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment
during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of
the Civil Code.

The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be
confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their
right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
37. Far East Bank, vs Pacilan Jr. 465 SCRA 372

Facts:
1. Pacilan maintains a current account with petitioner bank (now BPI). He issued several postdated
checks, the last one being check no. 2434886 amounting to P680. The said check was presented to
petitioner bank for payment on April 4, 1988 but was dishonored. It appeared that the account of
Pacilan has been closed on the evening of April 4 on the ground that it was 'improperly handled'.

2. It appeared that the plaintiff issued four checks from March 30 - April 4, 1988 amounting in total to
P7,410, on one hand, his funds in the bank only amounted to P6,981.43, thus an overdraft of P 428.57
resulted therefrom. Consequently, the last check was dishonored despite the fact that plaintiff
deposited the amount the following day.

3. Pacilan wrote a complaint to the bank but after the bank did not reply, he filed an action for damages
against it and the employee (Villadelgado) who closed the account. The plaintiff alleged that the
immediate closure of his account was malicious and intended to embarrass him.

4. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded actual damages (P100,000) and exemplary
damages (P50,000). The bank appealed, but the CA affirmed the lower court's decision with
modifications and held that the closure of the bank of plaintiff's account despite its rules and regulation
allowing a re-clearing of a check returned for insufficiency of funds, is patently malicious and
unjustifiable. Hence, this appeal.

5. The petitioner contended that in closing the account, it acted in good faith and in accordance with
the pertinent banking rules and regulations governing the operations of a regular demand deposit,
allowing it to close an account if the depositor frequently draws checks against insufficient funds or
uncollected deposits.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages

NO. The award of damages under Art. 19 of the Civil Code is unjustifiable. The petitioner has the right to
close the account of plaintiff based on the rules and regulations on regular demand deposits. The facts
do not show that the petitioner abused its rights in the exercise of its duties. The evidence negates the
existence of bad faith and malice on the part of the petitioner bank, which are the second and third
elements necessary to prove an abuse of right in violation of Art. 19.

The records also showed that indeed plaintiff has mishandled his account by issuing checks previously
against insufficient funds not just once, but more than a hundred times.

Moreover, the acceptance by the bank of the deposit the day after the closure of the account cannot be
considered as bad faith nor done with malice but a mere simple negligence of its personnel.
As a result, whatever damage the plaintiff has suffered (by virtue of the subsequent dishonor of the
other checks he issued) should be borne by him alone as these was the result of his own act in
irregularly handling his account.

38. Bunag, Jr vs CA, 211 SCRA 440

FACTS:
On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a
motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought
plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila,
where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September
10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a
marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after
leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application
for a marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag,
Jr., together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios
Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped.
ISSUE:
Whether, since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.
RULING:
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to
marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding
and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10
of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral
damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and
is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private
respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry
her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with
her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constituteacts contrary to morals and good customs. These are
grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify
the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10,
Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the
basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the
complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil
liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is
the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere
resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in
any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense
because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the
same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there
are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil
proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his
cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not
now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment
before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment.