Coates v. City of Cincinnati (402 U.S. 611, 1971)
82511, March 3, 1992
Facts. Appellant was a student involved in a demonstration and the other Appellants
were pickets involved in a labor dispute. They were later convicted of violating a
Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance that makes it a criminal offense for three or more people to
assemble on any of the sidewalks of the city and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to passers by. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld Appellants’ convictions.
Issue(s): Whether the ordinance is facially unconstitutional as being void for
vagueness under 1stand 14th Amends?
Holding: Yes, it is unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right
of assembly to an unascertainable standard, and it is unconstitutionally broad because
it authorizes the punishment of Constitutionally protected conduct.
Procedure: Cincinnati ordinance criminalized assembly of three or more on any
sidewalk in manner that annoyed others passing by. Coates was convicted. OHSCt
Affirmed. USSCt Reversed.
Rule(s): 1st and 14th Amend
Rationale: Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus this
ordinance is vague in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. As a
result, ordinary people would be required to guess at its meaning.
The City cannot constitutionally enact or enforce an ordinance where a determination
of violation rests entirely upon whether an official is annoyed or not.
The problem with this law is not just that it violates the DP standards of vagueness, it
also violates the constitutional protection for speech and assembly. Mere public
intolerance or animosity are not the basis for restriction of these rights. The 1 st and
14th Amend do not allow a state to criminalize the exercise of either merely b/c that
exercise may be annoying to some. This ordinance is aimed directly at protected
constitutional freedoms and make a crime out of activities which cannot be a crime
under the Const.
G.R. No.
PETITIONER: GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION
(GMCR)
 RESPONDENT: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC)
and IMELDA SALAZAR
FACTS OF THE CASE
Parties Involved/Characters:
• Imelda Salazar – General System Analyst of GMCR 

• Delfin Saldivar – Manager for Technical Operations’ support of 
 GMCR 

• Agustin Maramara – Company’s Internal Auditor 

• Richard Yambao – Owner and Manager of Elecon Engineering 
 which is a
supplier of GMCR
- It is alleged that Salazar and Saldivar are very close. It is also mentioned that they
share an apartment. 
 1984, reports shows that the company equipment and sare
parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing. A report
prepared by Maramara indicated that: 

- Saldivar entered into a partnership with Yambao 

- Saldivar recommended Elecon 

- The missing aircon was used by Saldivar for personal use 
 (recovered by
replevin)
- Salazar (respondent) got involved because she is a signed witness 
 of the
Articles of Partnership of the two 

- She knows where the missing aircon is, failed to report it.
(1984) Because of those, Salazar was suspended and was given time to explain
herself (for 30 days/one month). After 3 days she already filed a complaint against
GMCR for illegal dismissal (illegal suspension at first then it escalated to that).
(1985) Heared by Labor Arbiter – in favor of Imelda Salazar, awarded her Legis]

reinstatement, backwages and other benefits plus moral damages. (Additional, away from statcon, she is not in a fiduciary position so she can be

(1987) NLRC – affirmed Labor Arbiter decision but backwages of 2 years only; no reinstated because “strained relations” aren’t relevant in her position)

moral damages Disposition

Thus this petition by GMCR before SC NLRC decision AFFIRMED Reinstated Imelda, backwaged of 2 years.

Issue DOCTRINE: Verba Legis

Plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est
Is she illegally dismissed based on the Labor Code and Constitutional guarantee?
(speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
Held
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and
She was illegally dismissed. preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know

The Court pointed out Art 279 of the Labor Code, which talks about the Security of the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its

intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
tenure for regular employees which states that:
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither
xxx An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
does the provision admit of any quali cation. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
be a ground or grounds for non- application of the above-cited provision, this should
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent xxx be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to

ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee. (Copy pasted
Corollary to it is the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code (IRR)
from the GMCR v. NLRC case)
stating that employer cannot terminate regular employees without just cause or
1 IMPORTANT PROVISION Labor Code Art. 279
authorized by laws and if such employeed get illegally dismissed, he or she will be
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
entitled to be back in his/her position or be reinstated without loss of seniority rights
2 terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by
plus backwages
this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
The priority is clearly leaned towards the employee or to labor. The Court pointed out reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full

the opening paragraph on Labor and the 1973 Constitution on Article 2 which backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other bene ts or their monetary

enshrines “full protection” to labor. In the 1986 ConCom, they have designed Social equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the

Justice an Human rights to reduce social, economic and political inequalities. time of his actual reinstatement

IRR on Labor Code

Court held that the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous. Under statcon, if the
"Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall
law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be applied literally [Verba
 him and the deceased and the fact that the murderer is his son-in-law, there
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the was basis for finding that he was “probably guilty.”
Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws. 7. Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor
Rep. Act No. 7309, however, provides for review by certiorari of the
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance
of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a special
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages."' civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
(Emphasis supplied)
Issue:
Whether or not the term "unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but
WHEN THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW IS CLEAR, IT SHOULD BE GIVEN ITS
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal" refer to all kinds of
NATURAL MEANING
accusation and conviction.
Ruling:
Felicito Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice
 Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an
GR No. 109445, November 7, 1994
accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the
Involved: theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of
Law: RA No. 7309 – provides compensation for persons who are unjustly sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that
accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural
ordered released. meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word
Petitioner: Felicito Basbacio, Wilfredo Balderrama (son-in-law) "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following may file
claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
Facts: acquittal."
1. Felicito Basbacio and Wilfredo Balderrama were convicted of frustrated  But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and]
murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is
Boyon and wounding of the latter’s wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An
Calnuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the
the killing was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside.
petitioner. The petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment
 Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of
and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.
which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust
2. Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed but only petitioner's appeal
accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in
proceeded to judgment. However, the appeal of the other accused was consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is
dismissed for failure to file his brief. important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the
3. On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting
accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability,
petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy
also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction
between him and his son-in-law.
even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal
4. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion
cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
of Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and without warning
 The petition is dismissed.
started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did
nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient
to show conspiracy.
5. Upon his acquittal, Basbacio filed a claim under RA No. 7309, Sec. 3 (a),
which provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was
unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue
of a judgment of acquittal."
6. The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Deparment of Justice,
but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner’s presence at
the scene of the killing was not sufficient to prove him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was a land dispute between
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) represented
by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE GAMING JURISDICTION INCORPORATED (PEJI), ZAMBOANGA
CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, et al., Respondent.
G.R. No. 177333 April 24, 2009
FACTS:
1. Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on February
23, 1995, created the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone
(ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things,
the law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power “To operate on its own,
either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related
activities, including games, amusements and recreational and sports
facilities”under Sec. 7 (f).
2. Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public
respondent ZAMBOECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 dated
August 19, 2006 approving the application of private respondent Philippine E-
Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master Licensor/Regulator of on-
line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance.
3. PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself as
such licensor/regulator to the international business and gaming community,
drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the
present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of
games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
4. PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f) thereof, does not
give power or authority to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or
regulate the operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE. Citing three
(3) statutes, which it claims are in pari materia with R.A. No. 7903 as it likewise
created economic zones and provided for the powers and functions of their
respective governing and administrative authorities, PAGCOR posits that the grant
therein of authority to operate games of chance is clearly expressed, but it is not
similarly so in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903. The mentioned provisions are
Republic Act No. 7227 Section 13 (b) (7), Republic Act No. 7922 Section 6 (f), and
Republic Act No. 7916 Section 51 (see laws/provisions below).
5. PAGCOR maintains that, compared with the mentioned provisions of the ecozone-
related statutes, Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 does not categorically empower the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or authorize entities to operate
games of chance in the area, as the words "games" and "amusement" employed
therein do not include "games of chance”.
6. ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, in its Comment, contends that PAGCOR has no
personality to file the present petition as it failed to cite a superior law which proves
its claim of having been granted exclusive right and authority to license and
regulate all games of chance within the Philippines; and that, contrary to
PAGCOR’s assertion, the words "games" and "amusements" in Section 7(f) of R.A.
No. 7903 include "games of chance" as was the intention of the lawmakers when
they enacted the law.
ISSUE:
WON Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 empowers the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to
operate, license, or authorize entities to operate “games of chance” even if it was not
specifically mentioned in the statute or WON the words “games” and “amusement” in
the said statute can be interpreted to include “games of chance”.
HELD:
NO. The court finds that under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the
ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself unless
expressly authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing the same.
APPLICATION/ANALYSIS:
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate
on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-
related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities."
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law
which are clearly different from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense,
a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest; while an "amusement" is a pleasurable
occupation of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment. On the other hand, a "game of
chance" is "a game in which chance rather than skill determines the outcome," while
"gambling" is defined as "making a bet" or "a play for value against an uncertain event
in hope of gaining something of value.
A comparison of the phraseology of Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 with similar provisions
in the three cited statutes creating ECOZONES shows that while the three statutes,
particularly R.A. No. 7922 which authorized the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority to
directly or indirectly operate gambling and casinos within its jurisdiction, categorically
stated that such power was being vested in their respective administrative bodies, R.A.
No. 7903 did not.
The ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of tourism-related activities
including games and amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its
grant of authority to ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the grant to CEZA (one of
the 3 cited provisions) included such activities as horse-racing, dog-racing and
gambling casinos.
Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of the
President, the latter’s interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and deserves
respect under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical construction. In
applying said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as
bases thereof – factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in
particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors include the
respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their
competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that
they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the
one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out
of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique
opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or
improvements in the statute.
In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to
operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
LAWS/PROVISIONS:
R.A. No. 7903 Section 7:
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to
others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and
sports facilities
Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and Development Authority Act"
Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. – The Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority, otherwise known as the Subic Authority, shall have the following
powers and functions:
(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism-related activities subject to
priorities and standards set by the Subic Authority including games and amusements,
except horse-racing, dog-racing and casino gambling which shall continue to be
licensed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) upon
recommendation of the Conversion Authority; to maintain and preserve the forested
areas as a national park
Republic Act No. 7922 or the "Cagayan Economic Zone Act of 1995"
Section 6. Powers and Functions of the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority – The
Cagayan Economic Zone Authority shall have the following powers and functions:
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to
others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements, recreational and
sports facilities such as horse-racing, dog-racing gambling, casinos, golf courses, and
others, under priorities and standards set by the CEZA;
Republic Act No. 7916 or the "Special Economic Zone Act of 1995
Section 51. Ipso Facto Clause. - All privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions
granted to special economic zones under Republic Act No. 7227 shall ipso facto be
accorded to special economic zones already created or to be created under this Act.
The free port status shall not be vested upon the new special economic zones.
JMM Promotions & Management, Inc., petitioner, vs. National Labor Relations
Commission and Ulpiano L. De Los Santos, respondents.
G.R. NO. 109835 | NOVEMBER 22, 1993
Ponente: Cruz, J.
Facts:
1. Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the petitioner, a
recruiting agency, made the following:
a. Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)
b. Posted a cash bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4)
c. Placed money in escrow worth 200k (Sec. 17)
2. The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) to the respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed the appeal
because of failure of the petitioner to post an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule V,
Book VII of the POEA Rules. The decision being appealed involved a monetary
award.
3. The petitioner contended that its payment of a license fee, posting of cash bond and
surety bond, and placement of money in escrow are enough; posting an appeal bond
is unnecessary. According to Sec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and
legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license,
and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. On the other hand, according to
Sec. 17, the escrow shall answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a
result of recruitment violations or money claims.
4. Sec. 6 reads:
“In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond…”
The bonds required here are different from the bonds required in Sec. 4.
Issue: Was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact that it
has posted bonds of P150,000 and placed P200,000 in escrow before?
Ruling:
Yes. It is possible for the monetary reward in favor of the employee to exceed the
amount of 350,000 because of the stringent requirements posed upon recruiters. The
reason for such is that overseas employees are subjected to greater risks and hence,
the money will be used to insure more care on the part of the local recruiter in its choice
of foreign principal to whom the worker will be sent.
Doctrine: Construction:
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as
in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory
that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. “That the thing may rather have effect
than be destroyed.”
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be
avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. With regard to the present
case, the doctrine can be applied when the Court found that Sec. 6 complements Sec.
4 and Sec. 17.
In the POEA Rules, the bonds required in Sec. 4 Rule 2, Book 2 and the escrow
required in Sec. 17 Rule 2, Book 2have different purposes from the appeal bond
required in Sec. 6, Rule 5 Book 7.
The bonds in Sec. 4 are made to answer for all claims against the employer, which is
not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have
been violated.
The escrow agreement in Sec. 17 is used only as a last resort in claiming against the
employer.
On the other hand, Sec. 6 requires an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award. Indeed, this appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of
the monetary award. Also, it is possible that the monetary award may exceed the
bonds posted previously and the money placed in escrow. If such a case happens,
where will the excess be sourced? To solve such a dilemma, an appeal bond
equivalent to the amount of the monetary award is required by Sec. 6.
Radiola Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 75222, July 18, 1991
Facts: On March 4, 1980, Petitioner obtained a levy of attachment against the
properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan for a collection of sum of money
before the RTC of Pasig. On July 2, 1950, Three creditors, herein respondents filed a
petition for involuntary insolvency of spouses Gatmaytan in Pampanga and Angeles
City.
On December 10, 1980, Petitioner obtained a favorable judgment as the writ of
execution was issued in its favor. On September 21, 1981, the court ordered the
consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said properties. However, the Sheriff of
Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of the petitioner in view
of the insolvency proceedings before the Pampanga and Angeles RTC.
Issue: Whether or Not the levy of attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by
the insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses, commenced four months
after said attachment.
Held: The Provision of Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act. No. 1956) is very clear
that attachments dissolved are those levied within one month next proceeding the
commencement of insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and set aside, are
judgments entered in any action, including judgment entered by default or consent of
the debtor, where the action was filed within 30 days immediately prior to the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut-off period - 1
month in attachment cases and 30 days in judgments entered in actions commenced
prior to insolvency proceedings. Section 79 relied upon by private respondent is not in
conflict with that provision invoked by petitioner.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute,
courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, it at all
possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, UT RES MAGIS VALEN QUAM PEREAT
or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute. Its
every word. Hence, when a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation the
court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the
provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.
G.R. No. 162059 | January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December
21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000
and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of
Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. Petitioner with her siblings and relatives, registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial assistance
for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student
regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, consequently filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D.
Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.
Issue: W/N Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged (the issue related
to the topic)
Ruling: No. The petition cannot be granted
Rationale:
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes

committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public
officials in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed
by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Interpretatio talis in
ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to
each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention
of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of
the act is to be taken into view.