Unjust VexationArticle 287 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 287.
Light coercions. ±
Any person, who by means of violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the
same to the payment of the debt, shallsuffer the penalty of
arresto mayor
in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.Any other
coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by
arresto menor
or a fineranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.
The second paragraph of the Article is broad enough to include any humanconduct which, although not productive of some
physical or material harm, couldunjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. Compulsion or restraint need not be alleged
in the Information, for the crime of unjust vexation may exist withoutcompulsion or restraint. However, in unjust vexation, being
a felony by
dolo
,malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a good defense to a chargefor unjust vexation because good faith
negates malice. The paramount question to be considered is whether the offender¶s act caused annoyance, irritation,
torment,distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. The main purpose of the law penalizing coercion
and unjust vexation is precisely to enforcethe principle that no person may take the law into his hands and that our government is
one of law, not of men. It is unlawful for any person to take into hisown hands the administration of justice.[
People v. Nebreja,
76 Phil. 119 (1946)]

An Unjustly Vexatious Law

Posted on May 21, 2002

If you are asked to avoid committing “unjust vexation” in the same way as you should avoid
committing theft, murder, rape or any other crime, would you know what to avoid? Would you
be in a position to know exactly what particular acts or omissions you should avoid? I guess you
wouldn’t! Unlike the crimes of theft, murder and rape that are specifically defined in the Revised
Penal Code, one may search for the definition of the crime of unjust vexation but it is
conspicuously absent. How can you therefore expect a person to avoid something that is not even
defined by our criminal statutes?

Unjust vexation is punished under the 2nd paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code
that says:

“Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging
from 5 pesos to 200 pesos, or both.”

Professors of Criminal Law justify this apparent lack of definition saying that unjust vexation is
a catch-all crime that applies whenever the act or omission complained of does not specifically
fall under any other provision of the Revised Penal Code. But we do not even allow common-
law crimes, so how could we countenance the existence of having catch-all crimes in the face of
the due process guaranty?catch-all crime that applies whenever the act or omission complained
of does not specifically fall under any other provision of the Revised Penal Code. But we do not
even allow common-law crimes, so how could we countenance the existence of having catch-all
crimes in the face of the due process guaranty?

An examination of the annals of our jurisprudence would show that Art. 287, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code has been used to punish a great variety of different acts:

 In People v. Reyes, 60 Phil. 369, August 23, 1934, Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code was used to punish the defendants for unjust vexation for the act of disturbing or
interrupting a ceremony of a religious character;

 In Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 983, January 30, 1947, it was used to prosecute the accused of
unjust vexation committed by stopping the jeep driven by the complainant in a
threatening attitude and without any just cause therefor and telling him to stop driving for
the City of Manila while the strike of city laborers was still going on;

 In People v. Reyes, 98 Phil. 646, March 23, 1956, it was held that the act of seizing,
taking and holding possession of passenger jeep belonging to complainant, without the
knowledge and consent of the latter, for the purpose of answering for the debt of the said
owner, constitutes unjust vexation;

 In People v. Yanga, 100 Phil. 385, November 28, 1956, accused was convicted of unjust
vexation for the act of compelling the complainant to do something against his will, by
holding the latter around the neck and dragging him from the latter’s residence to the
police outpost;

 In People v. Abuy, G.R. No. L-17616, May 30, 1962, the accused was prosecuted for
unjust vexation for the act of embracing and taking hold of the wrist of the complainant;

 In People v. Carreon, G.R. No. L-17920, May 30, 1962, accused was convicted of unjust
vexation for the act of threatening the complainant by holding and pushing his shoulder
and uttering to the latter in a threatening tone the following words: “What inspection did
you make to my sister in the mountain when you are not connected with the Bureau of
Education?”;

 In People v. Gilo, G.R. No. L-18202, April 30, 1964, the Court held that the absence of
an allegation of “lewd design” in a complaint for acts of lasciviousness converts the act
into unjust vexation;

 In Andal v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-29814, March 28, 1969, accused were
found guilty of unjust vexation under an information charging them with the offense of
offending religious feelings, by the performance of acts notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful;

 In People v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-47646, September 19, 1988, a accused was convicted
of unjust vexation for the act of grabbing the left breast of the complainant against her
will;
  Kwan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113006, November 23, 2000, the act of abruptly
cutting off the electric, water pipe and telephone lines of a business establishment causing
interruption of its business operations during peak hours was held as unjust vexation.

The aforementioned cases decided by the Philippine Supreme Court readily show that Art. 287,
Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code has not been used to prosecute a well-defined or specific
criminal act. Instead, it was used as a “catch-all” provision to prosecute acts which are not
expressly made criminal by any other provision of the Revised Penal Code. Isn’t this anathema
to criminal due process that requires notice of what specific act or omission is punished by
law?

It will not burn too much brain cells to realize that Article 287, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code that punishes “unjust vexation” suffers from congenital defects and should be declared
unconstitutional for the following reasons:

 Article 287, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code condemns no specific or definite
act or omission thus failing to define any crime or felony;

 Said penal provision is so indefinite, vague and overbroad as not to enable it to be

known what act is forbidden;

 Such vagueness and overbreadth result to violation of the due process clause and the
right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged; and

 Such vagueness and overbreadth likewise amount to an invalid delegation by

Congress of its legislative power to the courts to determine what acts should be held
criminal and punishable.

A CRIMINAL OR PENAL LEGISLATION MUST CLEARLY DEFINE OR SPECIFY

THE PARTICULAR ACT OR ACTS PUNISHED.

It is a well-established doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation must clearly define or specify
the particular acts or omissions punished. As early as 1916, in the case of UNITED STATES VS.
LULING, 34 Phil. 725, the Supreme Court had the occasion to hold that:

“In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what are known as common law
offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The state
having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations, has a
right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what act or acts shall
constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then
to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not
committed with any criminal intent or intention.” (cited in the fairly recent case of Dizon-
Pamintuan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994) (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Two years later, this was followed by a scholarly exposition by Justice Johnson in the case of In
re: R. MCCULLOCH DICK, 38 Phil. 41, April 16, 1918, where he stated that:

“In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by law. The law must specify
the particular act or acts constituting the crime. If that were not so, the inhabitants could not
know when they would be liable to be arrested, tried and punished. Otherwise the mandatory
provisions of the law, that all criminal laws shall be prescribed, would prove to be a pitfall and a
snare. The inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, whether citizens, denizens or friendly aliens,
have a right to know, in advance of arrest, trial and punishment, the particular acts for which they
may be so tried. They cannot be arrested and tried, and then be informed for the first time that
their acts have been subsequently made a crime, and be punished therefor. x x x” (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando in his concurring opinion in PEOPLE v. CABURAL, G.R.
No. L-34105, February 4, 1983, also made a similar observation, stating that:

“The maxim Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its roots in history. It is in accordance
with both centuries of civil law and common law tradition. Moreover, it is an indispensable
corollary to a regime of liberty enshrined in our Constitution. It is of the essence then that while
anti-social acts should be penalized, there must be a clear definition of the punishable offense
as well as the penalty that may be imposed – a penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by the
legislative body, and the legislative body alone. So constitutionalism mandates, with its stress on
jurisdictio rather than guvernaculum. The judiciary as the dispenser of justice through law must
be aware of the limitation on its own power.” (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The rationale of the doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation must clearly define or specify the
particular act or acts punished is ably explained by the United Stated Supreme Court in the case
of LANZETTA v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 306 U.S. 451, where it held that:

“It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns
against transgression. x x x No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the
State commands or forbids. x x x” (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

ARTICLE 287, PAR. 2 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE CONDEMNS NO SPECIFIC

ACT OR OMISSION! THEREFORE, IT DOES NOT DEFINE ANY CRIME OR
FELONY.

Paragraph 2 of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code does not define, much less specify, the
acts constituting or deemed included in the term “unjust vexations” resulting to making the said
provision a sort of a “catch-all” provision patently offensive to the due process clause.

The right to define and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty. Each State has the authority,
under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal
procedure. Pursuant to this power to define and punish crimes, the State may not punish an act as
a crime unless it is first defined in a criminal statute so that the people will be forewarned as to
what act is punishable. The people cannot be left guessing at the meaning of criminal
statutes.

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code defines FELONIES (delitos) as “acts or omissions”
punishable by law. Article 287, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code condemns no specific act or
omission! THEREFORE, IT DOES NOT DEFINE ANY CRIME OR FELONY! Instead, any
and all kind of acts that are not specifically covered by any other provision of the Revised Penal
Code and which may cause annoyance, irritation, vexation, torment, distress or disturbance to the
mind of the person to whom it is directed may be punished as unjust vexation.

ART. 287, PAR. 2 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE SUFFERS FROM A

CONGENITAL DEFECT OF VAGUENESS AND MUST BE STRUCK DOWN AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The term “unjust vexation” is a highly imprecise and relative term that has no common law
meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents. Thus, for its
vagueness and overbreadth, said provision violates due process in that it does not give fair
warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.

This kind of challenge to the constitutionality of a penal statute on ground of vagueness and
overbreadth is not entirely novel in our jurisdiction. In an en banc decision in the case of
GONZALES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, re: Constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 4880, the Supreme Court ruled that the terms “election campaign” and “partisan political
activity” which are punished in R.A. 4880 would have been void for their vagueness were it not
for the express enumeration of the acts deemed included in the said terms. The Supreme Court
held:

“The limitation on the period of “election campaign” or “partisan political activity” calls for a
more intensive scrutiny. According to Republic Act No. 4880: “It is unlawful for any person
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons, whether or not a
political party or political committee, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political
activity except during the period of one hundred twenty days immediately preceding an election
involving a public office voted for at large and ninety days immediately preceding an election for
any other elective public office. The term ‘candidate’ refers to any person aspiring for or seeking
an elective public office regardless of whether or not said person has already filed his certificate
of candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its candidate. The term ‘election
campaign’ of ‘partisan political activity’ refers to acts designed to have a candidate elected or not
or promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office . . .”

“If that is all there is to that provision, it suffers from the fatal constitutional infirmity of
vagueness and may be stricken down. x x x”

xxxxxxxxx

“There are still constitutional questions of a serious character then to be faced. The practices
which the act identifies with “election campaign” or “partisan political activity” must be such
that they are free from the taint of being violative of free speech, free press, freedom of
assembly, and freedom of association. What removes the sting from constitutional objection of
vagueness is the enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms “election campaign” or
“partisan political activity.” (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Article 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code punishes “unjust vexations” and that is all there is
to it! As such, applying the incontestable logic of the Supreme Court in said case of GONZALES
v. COMELEC would lead us to the inescapable conclusion that said penal provision suffers from
the fatal constitutional infirmity of vagueness and must be struck down as unconstitutional.

In the case of CONNALLY V. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO., 269 U.S. 385, cited by our
own Supreme Court en banc in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn., Inc.
v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967), the United States Supreme Court
ruled:

“That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a
well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled
rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.” (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In fact, it is worst in the case of the 2nd Paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code
because it punishes “unjust vexations” without even defining or enumerating the acts constituting
the said crime thus leaving men of common intelligence necessarily guessing at its meaning and
differing as to its application in complete disregard of constitutional due process.

Our Supreme Court in the case of U.S. v. NAG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1, held that one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law that fails to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. Said
ruling cites the landmark case of U.S. v. L. COHEN GROCERY CO., 255 U.S. 81, where the
United States Supreme Court in striking down Section 4 of the Federal Food Control Act of
August 10, 1917, as amended, as unconstitutional, declared that:

“The sole remaining inquiry, therefore, is the certainty or uncertainty of the text in question, that
is, whether the words ‘that it is hereby made unlawful for any person willfully … to make any
unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries,’
constituted a fixing by Congress of an ascertainable standard of guilt and are adequate to inform
persons accused of violation thereof of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. That
they are not, we are of opinion, so clearly results from their mere statement as to render
elaboration on the subject wholly unnecessary. OBSERVE THAT THE SECTION FORBIDS
NO SPECIFIC OR DEFINITE ACT. It confines the subject matter of the investigation which
it authorizes to no element essentially inhering in the transaction as to which it provides. It leaves
open, therefore, the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the
result of which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against. In fact, we see no reason to
doubt the soundness of the observation of the court below in its opinion to the effect that, to
attempt to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent of an effort to carry out a
statute which in terms merely penalized and punished all acts detrimental to the public
interest when unjust and unreasonable in the estimation of the court x x x” (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In COATES v. CITY OF CINCINNATI, 402 U.S. 611, the United States Supreme Court passed
upon the issue of constitutionality of a Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance that provides that:

“It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to assemble, except at a public meeting of
citizens, on any of the sidewalks, street corners, vacant lots, or mouths of alleys, and there
conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by, or occupants of adjacent
buildings. Whoever violates any of the provisions of this section shall be fined not exceeding
fifty dollars ($50.00), or be imprisoned not less than one (1) nor more than thirty (30) days or
both.” Section 901-L6, Code of Ordinances of the City of Cincinnati. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In hammering down the constitutionality of the above-cited Cincinnati, Ohio ordinance in its
landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court held that:

“Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague, not
in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible
normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. As a
result, “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.” Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391

“It is said that the ordinance is broad enough to encompass many types of conduct clearly within
the city’s constitutional power to prohibit. And so, indeed, it is. The city is free to prevent people
from blocking sidewalks, obstructing traffic, littering streets, committing assaults, or engaging in
countless other forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so through the enactment and enforcement
of ordinances directed with reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited. It cannot
constitutionally do so through the enactment and enforcement of an ordinance whose violation
may entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed. “ (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Same thing can be said of Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes “unjust
vexation.” As previously shown, the term “unjust vexation” is broad enough to encompass many
types of acts or conduct. But while these acts of types of conduct are within the State’s police
power to prohibit and punish, it cannot however constitutionally do so when its violation may
entirely depend upon whether or not another is vexed or annoyed by said act or conduct and
whether or not said act or conduct is unjust is the estimation of the court.

ARTICLE 287, PAR. 2 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS AN INVALID

DELEGATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER TO DEFINE WHAT ACTS SHOULD
BE HELD BE CRIMINAL AND PUNISHABLE
The failure of Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code to define or specify the act or omission
that it punishes likewise amounts to an invalid delegation by Congress of its legislative power to
the courts to determine what acts should be held criminal and punishable. Potestas delegata non
delegare potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the
ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed
by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening
mind of another (United States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327, 330).

Congress alone has power to define crimes. This power as an attribute of sovereignty may not be
delegated to the courts. When a criminal legislation leaves the halls of Congress, it must be
complete in itself in that it must clearly define and specify the acts or omissions deemed
punishable; and when it reaches the courts, there must be nothing left for the latter to do, except
to determine whether person or persons indicted are guilty of committing the said acts or
omissions defined and made punishable by Congress. Otherwise, borrowing the immortal words
of Justice Isagani Cruz in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (148 SCRA 659), the law
becomes a “roving commission,” a wide and sweeping authority that is not “canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing,” in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.

Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code fails to set an immutable and ascertainable standard of
guilt, but leaves such standard to the variant and changing views and notions of different judges
or courts which are called upon to enforce it. Instead of defining the specific acts or omissions
punished, it leaves to the courts the power to determine what acts or types of conduct constitute
“unjust vexation.” Moreover, liability under the said provision is also made dependent upon the
varying degrees of sensibility and emotions of people. It depends upon whether or not another is
vexed or annoyed by said act or conduct. As previously intimated, one cannot be convicted of a
violation of a law that fails to set up an immutable and an ascertainable standard of guilt.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it appears that the law that was intended to punish unjust vexation turns out
to be an unjustly vexatious law. Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes “unjust
vexations” is unconstitutional on its face for its fatal failure to forbid a specific or definite act or
conduct. It suffers from congenital vagueness and overbreadth which are anathema to
constitutional due process and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense
charged.

Moreover, by leaving it to the judiciary to determine the “justness” or “unjustness” of an act or

conduct that is not clearly defined or specified by law constitutes a fixing by Congress of an
unascertainable standard of guilt and therefore an invalid delegation, if not an abdication, of
legislative power.

As such, it is now high time that this unjustly vexatious law be declared unconstitutional and be
wiped out from our statute books. Lawyers defending a client for “unjust vexation” should raise
this constitutional challenge against this unjustly vexatious law and they are free to cite the
arguments articulated herein.
Art. 287, par. 2 cannot be a basis of any criminal prosecution, much less conviction. An
unspeakable injustice was therefore done to all those who were convicted under this unjustly
vexatious law. If this law is not declared unconstitutional by our Supreme Court or is not
immediately repealed by Congress, many persons would still fall prey to its snare unaware.