Chain of Custody Cases

March 27, 2017
G.R. No. 206590
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In criminal prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of shabu, primordial importance
must be given to "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."1
This is an appeal from the June 23, 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00744 that aft1rmed in toto the April 12, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Guiuan, Eastern Samar, Branch 3, in Criminal Case Nos. 2079 and 2078, finding Myrna
Gayoso y Arguelles (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 (illegal sale of
a dangerous drug) and 11 (illegal possession of a dangerous drug), Article II of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9165, respectively, and imposing upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱500,000.00 for selling shabu, and the indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum, for
possessing 0.53gram of shabu.
Factual Antecedents
The Information in Criminal Case No. 2078 contained the following accusatory allegations against
appellant:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:30 o'clock in the morning at Jetty, Brgy.
Hollywood, Guian, Eastern Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovementioned accused who acted without the necessary pennit from proper authorities
whatsoever, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and folonioμsly hi:i.ve in her possession, control
and custody eleven (11) x x x sachets (containing] Methamphdamme Hydrochloride commonly
known as "shabu" weighing 0.53 [gram], a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. 4
The Information in Criminal Case No. 2079 charged appellant in the following manner:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning at Jetty, Brgy.
Hollywood, Guian, Eastern Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, who acted without the necessary permit or authority whatsoever, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, deliver and dispense one (1) pc. small heat sealed
sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu" weighing 0.06 [gram], a
dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.5
During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of ''not guilty" in both cases. Joint trial then ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
Based on the testimonies of SP03 Victorino de Dios (SP03 De Dios), SP03 Rolando G. Salamida
(SP03 Sa1amida), P02 Rex Isip (P02 Isip), SP04 Josefina Bandoy (SP04 Bandoy), P/Insp. Eleazar
Barber, Jr. (PI Barber), PS/Insp. Benjamin Cruto (PSI Cruto ), and the documentary exhibits, the
following facts emerged:
PI Barber of the PNP6 Guiuan Police Station directed SP03 De Dios to conduct a surveillance on
appellant after receiving several reports that she was peddling prohibited drugs. Three weeks later,
SP03 De Dios confirmed that appellant was indeed engaged in illegal drug activities. PI Barber filed
for and was issued a search warrant. However, prior to implementing the search warrant, PI Barber
decided to conduct a "confirmatory test-buy" designating SP03 De Dios as poseur-buyer and giving
him ₱200.00 marked money for the operation.
On March 24, 2004, SP03 De Dios and a civilian asset proceeded to the house of appellant and
asked her if they could buy shabu. The sale was consummated when appellant took the marked
money from SP03 De Dios after giving him a sachet of shabu. SP03 De Dios immediately informed
PI Barber by text message about the successful "confirmatory test-buy". PI Barber and his team of
police officers who were positioned 100 meters away n1shed towards the house of appellant. He
also instructed SP03 De Dios and the civilian asset to summon the Barangay Chairman to witness
the search of the house. When he arrived together with a ko,gawad and a media representative,
SP03 Salamida read the search warrant to appellant.
During the search of the house, SP04 Bandoy found a tin foil under the mattress. SP03 De Dios took
it from SP04 Bandoy and gave it to SP03 Salamida who found seven sachets of shabu inside, in
addition to the four sachets of shabu found inside the right pocket of the short pants of appellant.
The search of the house also revealed several drug paraphernalia. An inventory of seized items was
prepared and the same was signed by the Barangay Chairman, P02 Isip, SP04 Bandoy, and
appellant. The sachets of shabu were brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
then to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination. The results of the examination verified
that the seized sachets contained shabu.
Version of Appellant
Appellant denied the charges against her. She claimed that on March 24, 2004, somebody forcibly
kicked the front door of her house and tried to break it open. When she opened the door, PI Barber
pushed her aside and told his companions to move quickly. They went directly to her room; when
P02 Isip emerged therefrom seconds later, he was holding a substance that looked like tawas. SP03
De Dios and SP03 Salamida went in and out of her house. She maintained that the search warrant
was shown to her only after an hour and that the sachets of shabu were planted. She argued that
the police officers fabricated the charges against her since her family had a quarrel with a police
officer named Riza1ina Cuantero regarding the fence separating their houses.
The Ruling of the' Regional Trial Court
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal possession
of shabu. It declared that the prosecution ably established the elements of illegal sale and
possession of shabu through the testimonies of its witnesses who arrested appellant after selling a
sachet of the illegal drug in a "test-buy operation" and for possessing 11 sachets of the same drug in
her house after enforcing a search watrant immediately thereafter. Appellant had no evidence that
she had license or authority to possess the shabu.
The RTC ruled that the evidence sufficiently established the chain of custody of the sachets
of shabu from the time they were bought from appellant and/or seized from her house, to its turn
over to the PDEA and submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The RTC rejected
appellant's defense of denial and frame-up in view of her positive identification by eyewitnesses as
the criminal offender.
The RTC therefore sentenced appellant to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 for the
illegal sale of shabu. It also sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate prison term of eight (8)
years and one (1) day, as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as
maximum and a fine of ₱300,000 for illegal possession of shabu.
From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA. In her Brief,7 she assailed the validity of the
search warrant claiming that it was not issued by the RTC upon determination of probable cause.
She argued that the "'confirmatory test-buy" conducted by the poseur buyer and the confidential
asset was not valid since they forced her to engage in a drug sale. She maintained that
the shabu presented during trial was inadmissible in evidence due to several gaps in its chain of
custody.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Brief for the Appellee8 praying for the affirmance of
the appealed Decision. It argued that the evidence on which the RTC based its determination of
probable cause was sufficient for the issuance of the search warrant. It asserted that the "test-buy
operation" was an entrapment and not an inducement. The OSG maintained that
the shabu confiscated from appellant was admissible in evidence since the prosecution established
the proper chain of custody.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling finding appellant guilty of unauthorized sale and possession
of shabu. The CA ruled that all the elements for the sale of shabu were established during the "test-
buy operation". It held that the illegal sale of shabu was proven by SP03 De Dios who participated in
said operation as the designated poseur buyer. His offer to buy shabu with marked money and
appellant's acceptance by delivering the illegal drug consummated the offense. The CA likewise
declared that the elements for possession of shabu were present in the case against appellant. After
appellant's arrest for illegal sale of shabu, a valid search resulted in the discovery of 11 sachets
of shabu inside her house, which were under her possession and control. She did not have legal
authority to possess the same and failed to overcome the presumption that she consciously knew
she was in possession of the illegal drug discovered in her home.
The CA noted that the examination by the trial judge established probable cause in issuing the
search warrant, The deposition of P03 Salamida shows that he had personal knowledge of
appellant's drug activities, and the same served as basis for the finding of probable cause for the
purpose of issuing a search warrant.
The CA was not swayed by appellant's contention that the "test-buy operation" amounted to
instigation since it is settled jurisprudence that a "decoy solicitation" is not tantamount to inducement
or instigation. The CA was also unconvinced by appellant's claim that the proof against her was
inadmissible since the prosecution failed to show strict compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 and
its implementing rules on the custody and disposition of the evidence.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.9 On July 15, 2013,10 the Court notified the parties to file their
supplemental briefs. However, appellant opted not to file a supplemental brief since she had
extensively argued her cause in her appellants' brief.11 For its part, the OSG manifested that it would
not file a supplemental brief since its appellee's brief filed in the CA had already discussed and
refuted the arguments raised by appellant.12
Our Ruling
The RTC Issued A Search Warrant After

Finding Probable Case
Appellant contends that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. She
claims that PI Barber had no personal knowledge of her alleged drug dealings.
There is no merit in this contention.
Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined "as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched."13 The probable
cause must be "determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."14 Probable cause does not mean actual and
positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable
cause is concerned only with the question of whether the affiant has reasonable wounds to believe
that the accused committed or is committing the crime charged.15
Here, the records reveal that the trial court issued the search warrar1t after deposing two witnesses,
namely PI Barber and SP03 Salamida. In particular, the disposition of SP03 Salamida shows that he
had personal knowledge of appellant's drug pushing activities which served as basis for the finding
of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Thus, whether or not PI Barber had
personal knowledge of the illegal drug activities committed by appellant will not adversely affect the
findings of probable cause for the purpose of issuance of search warrant.
Confirmatory test-buy solicitation does

not constitute instigation.
Appellant argues that the "confirmatory test-buy" by the police officers was not valid since she was
induced by the' designated poseur buyer, SP03 De Dios, and the confidential informant to sell the
seized shabu.
There is no merit in this argument.
In inducement or instigation - the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the
accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. The instigator
practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a
co-principal. ['This is distinguished from entrapment wherein] ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of capturing the lawbreaker inflagrante delicto.16
The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is not prohibited by law. It does not amount
to instigation. As in this case, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the poseur buyer merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.17 The police received an intelligence report that appellant
habitually deals with shabu. They designated a poseur buyer to confirm the report by engaging in a
drug transaction with appellant. There was no proof that the poseur buyer induced appellant to sell
illegal drugs to him.
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, appellant still deserves an acquittal as will be discussed
below.
The chain of custody of evidence was not established
Appellant impugns the prosecution's failure to establish the charges of illegal sale and possession
of shabu against her due to the gaps in the chain of custody and the assailable integrity of the
evidence in view of non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
There is merit in this protestation.
The offense of illegal sale of shabu has the following elements: "(1) the identities of the buyer and
the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor."18 On the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of shabu has the following
elements: "(l) the accused is in possession of an item or an object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed said drug."19 In the prosecution for illegal sale and possession of shabu, there
must be proof that these offenses were actually committed, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti.20
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of [ shabu,] conviction cannot be sustained if there is a
persistent doubt on the identity of said drug. The identity of the [shabu] must be established with
moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that
the [shabu] illegally possessed and sold x xx is the same [shabu] offered in court as exhibit must
likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.21
"The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."22
Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to
presentation in court for destruction."23 In People v. Havana,24 the Court expounded on the custodial
chain procedure in this wise:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time
of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same
standard obtains in case the evidence is susceptible of alteration, tampering, contamination and
even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tampering -without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates
the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
Thus, as a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must be
established:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.25
Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on
the items after they have been seized. It is the starting point in the custodial link. It is vital that the
seized items be marked immediately since the succeeding handlers thereof will use the markings as
reference.26 The chain of custody rule also requires that the marking of the seized contraband be
done "(l) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation."27
In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items with their
initials in the presence of appellant and immediately upon confiscation. While P02 Isip testified that
the seized sachets of shabu were marked in the police station,28 no evidence was presented to show
that the marking was accomplished in the presence of appellant. Moreover, the author of the
markings on said items was never identified. None of the police officers admitted placing the
markings. There was therefore a complete absence of evidence to prove authorship of the markings.
While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station, this contemplates a case of
warrantless searches and seizures.29 Here, the police officers secured a search warrant prior to their
operation. They therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its implementation.
However, the police officers failed to mark immediately the plastic sachets of shabu seized inside
appellant's house in spite of an Inventory of Property Seized that they prepared while still inside the
said house. The failure of the arresting officers to comply with the marking of evidence immediately
after confiscation constitutes the first gap in the chain of custody.
The turnover of the seized shabu from the arresting officers to the investigating officer in the police
station constitutes the second link in the chain of custody. In this regard, the Court takes note that
1âwphi 1
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person to whom the seized items
were turned over at the police station. While SP03 Salamida was identified as the property custodian
of the police station, this does not necessarily mean that he is also the investigating officer. There is
nothing in the records to substantiate this presumption. This total want of evidence gains importance
considering that none of the arresting officers presented as witnesses identified the shabu presented
during trial as the same shabu seized from appellant. Thus, the second link in the chain of custody is
missing.
The transfer of the seized shabu from the investigating officer to the forensic chemist in the crime
laboratory is the third link in the chain of custody. While the seized shabu was turned over by PI
Barber to the PDEA, he no longer had any personal knowledge of the manner it was handled
therein. He also did not identify the police officer in whose custody the seized sachets of shabu were
placed at the PDEA. He left it to the responsibility of the PDEA to forward the seized shabu to the
crime laboratory. The request for laboratory examination of the PDEA identifies the police officer
who delivered the seized shabu as a certain SPO1 Asis, but he was not presented to testify that
the shabu delivered to the crime laboratory was the same shabu confiscated from appellant. There is
a third break in the chain of custody.
Nothing also can be gained from the testimony of the forensic chemist PSI Cruto. His testimony is
not clear and positive since he failed to assert that the alleged packs of chemical substance
presented for laboratory examination and tested positive for shabu were the very same substance
allegedly recovered from appellant. His testimony was limited to the result of the examination he
conducted and not on the source of the substance.
From the foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was established at all. What we have here
are individual links with breaks in-between which could not be seamlessly woven or tied together.
The so-called links in the chain of custody show that the seized shabu was not handled properly
starting from the actual seizure, to its turnover in the police station and the PDEA, as well as its
transfer to the crime laboratory for examination. The Court therefore cannot conclude with moral
certainty that the shabu confiscated from appellant was the same as that presented for laboratory
examination and then presented in court.
It is indeed desirable that the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken. In reality
however, this rarely occurs. The legal standard that must therefore be observed "is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used
to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."30 Here, the Court finds that the
apprehending officers failed to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated shabu. There are just too many breaks and gaps to the effect that a chain of
custody could not be established at all. Failure of the prosecution to offer testimony to
establish a substantially complete chain of custody of the shabu and the inappropriate
manner of handling the evidence prior to its offer in court diminishes the government's
chance of successfully prosecuting a drug case.31
Aside from the failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody, another
procedural lapse casts farther uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the subject shabu. This
refers to the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the most basic procedural safeguards
relative to the custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165,
which reads as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drug shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
Corollarily, Section 2l(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides as follows:
Section 2l(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and a public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, farther, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizure of and custody over said items.
In this case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical inventory of the seized items at the
place where the search warrant was served in the presence of a representative of the Department of
Justice, nor did it photograph the same in the presence of appellant after their initial custody and
control of said drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same. Neither was an
explanation offered for such failure. While this directive of rigid compliance has been tempered in
certain cases, "such liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations can be applied
only when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved."32 Such an
exception does not obtain in this case. "Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of
the [shabu] in view of the broken linkages in the chain of custody. [Thus,] the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to the [apprehending officers] by the courts
below cannot arise."33
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00744 dated June 23, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Myrna
Gayoso y Arguelles is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges, her guilt not having been established
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Superintendent for the Correctional Institute for Women is hereby ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE the appellant from custody, unless she is held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice
Chairperson
(On official Leave)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
alfredo benjamin s. caguioa

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
On official leave.
1
People v. Mendoza, 683 Phil. 339, 350 (2012).
2
CA rollo, pp. 100-111; penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. and concurred
in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Gabriel T. Ingles.
3
Records (Criminal Case No. 2078), pp. 129-145; penned by Presiding Judge Rolando M.
Lacdo-o.
4
Id. at 1.
5
Records (Criminal Case No. 2079), p. 1.
6
Philippine National Police.
7
CA rollo, pp. 53-75.
8
Id. at 37-50.
9
Id. at 129.
10
Rollo, p. 18.
11
Id. at 41-42.
12
Id. at 21-24.
13
Dr. Prudente v, Executive Judge Dayrit, 259 Phil. 541, 549 (1989),
14
Id.
15
Columbia Pictures v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 875, 919 (1996),
16
Peoplev. Gatong-o, 250 Phil. 710, 711 (1988).
17
People v. Sta. Maria, 545 Phil. 520, 528-529 (2007).
18
People v. Lorenzo, 633 Phil. 393, 402 (2010).
19
Id. at 403.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
People v. Havana, G.R. No. 198450, January 11, 2016, 778 SCRA 524, 534.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 534-535.
25
People v. Nandi, 639 Phil. 134, 144-145 (2010).
26
People v. Alejandro, 671 Phil. 33, 46 (20 l1).
27
Id. at 47.
28
TSN, July 12, 2005, pp. 107-108.
29
People v. Alcuizar, 662 Phil. 794, 802 (201l).
30
People v. Mendoza, supra note 1.
31
People v. Havana, supra note 22 at 537.
32
Id. at 538-539.
33
Id. at 539.
March 1, 2017
G.R. No. 179749

vs
EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA, Accused-Apellant
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
When there is failure to comply with the requirements for proving the chain of custody in the
confiscation of contraband in a drug buy-bust operation, the State has the obligation to
credibly explain such noncompliance; otherwise, the proof of the corpus delicti is doubtful,
and the accused should be acquitted for failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The Case
Under review is the decision promulgated on September 26, 2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the decision rendered on May 18, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28,
in Mandaue City convicting the accused-appellant of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly.2
Antecedents
The accused-appellant was charged in the RTC with a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, as amended, following his arrest for selling a quantity of shabu worth ₱l00.00 to a police
officer-poseur buyer in the evening of August 10, 2002 during a buy-bust operation conducted in
Consuelo Village, Mandaue City.
P02 Rico Cabatingan, a witness for the Prosecution, declared that he and other police officers
conducted the buy-bust operation at about 9:30 in the evening of August 10, 2002 on the basis of
information received to the effect that the accused-appellant was engaged in the sale
of shabu.3 During the pre-operation conference, P02 Cabatingan was designated as the poseur
buyer, and his back-up officers were P02 Baylosis and P03 Ompad. P/Insp. Grado provided the buy-
bust money with marked serial number to P02 Cabatingan.4 The buy-bust team then proceeded to
Consuelo Village at about 9:10 of that evening on board a Suzuki multicab driven by P03 Ompad. At
the target area, P02 Cabatingan met with the accused-appellant, and informed the latter that he
wanted to buy shabu worth "a peso." Upon the accused-appellant's assent to his offer, P02
Cabatingan handed the buybust money to him, and in turn the latter gave to him a small sachet with
white colored contents. P02 Cabatingan then gave the pre-arranged signal by touching his head.
The other officers rushed forward and identified themselves to the accused-appellant as policemen.
They frisked and arrested him, and brought him to the police station.
P02 Cabatingan identified the sachet marked "EBM", which contained the white substance.5 He
confirmed the request for laboratory examination. He delivered the confiscated substance, along
with the request, to the crime laboratory, which later on found the substance to be positive for the
presence of methamphetarn i ne hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
P02 Cabatingan also identified the ₱l00.00 bill used as the buy-bust money. He asserted that he,
P03 Ompad and P02 Baylosis had conducted prior surveillance of the accused-appellant for three
nights, by which they had confirmed that he was really selling shabu. The results of their surveillance
also confirmed that the subject of their surveillance was the same person referred to by their
informant.6
In his defense, the accused-appellant declared that he was sitting alone near the chapel of Basak,
Mandaue City near their house in Consuelo Village at around 9:30 in the evening of August 10, 2002
when police officers suddenly came and arrested him. In undertaking his arrest, the officers pointed
their guns at him and forced him to go with them. They brought him to the police precinct on a
Suzuki multicab, and upon their reaching the station, the arresting officers searched his person and
found his ID inside his wallet. He was not informed of the reason for his arrest. He was subsequently
detained. The arresting officers only informed him of the charges against him on the next day.7
As stated, on May 18, 2004, the RTC rendered its decision8 convicting him as charged. It gave full
credence to the testimony of P02 Cabatingan; and ruled that the Prosecution thereby established
that the accused-appellant had sold shabu to P02 Cabatingan,9 to wit:
The court is aware of the procedure under Section 21, Article II of the new law on physical inventory
and photograph of the seized drug in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel, a
media representative and the Department of Justice and any elected official who must all sign the
inventory and furnished with a copy thereof. The same provision of law also directs the conduct of a
qualitative examination (in addition to the quantitative examination), ocular inspection of the seized
drug with 72 hours from filing of the criminal case and its destruction, saving only a representative
sample, within 24 hours thereafter in the presence of the accused and the persons enumerated
therein.
Although no evidence has been produced to prove compliance of the procedure, the Court believes
that it is not fatal to the State's cause on the validity of the entrapment. "In deciding cases, the
Supreme Court does not matter-of-factly apply and interpret laws in a vacuum, laws are interpreted
always in the context of peculiar factual situation of each case." The lack of readiness of the
government to implement these measures may not be an excuse for the non-observance of the
procedure but the same factual reality should not also be the sole basis to overcome the
presumption of regularity of performance of police duties where the testimonies of the policemen
concerned, P02 Cabatingan and P02 Baylosis, have been found to be credible. Section 21 relates to
the procedure after the accused has been arrested. It would be too sweeping to conclude that the
failure to comply with the instructions under Section 21 would necessarily result to a finding of
irregularity in the actual conduct of the buy-bust operation.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, this JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding the accused EDDIE BARTE Y
MENDOZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for sale of shabu, a dangerous drug. Pursuant to Section
5, Article II of RA 9165, this Court hereby imposes upon EDDIE MENDOZA, the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos [₱500,000.00] together with the
accessory penalties under Section 35, Article II thereof.
The pack of shabu is hereby ordered confiscated for proper disposition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the CA promulgated the assailed decision on September 26, 2006,11 holding and
decreeing:
In the instant case, it can well be stressed that the paramount consideration in transactions involving
sale of prohibited drugs was how the buy bust operation was conducted. It is worthy and important to
note as the trial court noted that the arresting officers acted within the bounds of law and
jurisprudence in the conduct of the buy-bust operation, which led to the appellant's arrest.
Consequently, the lower court properly and fittingly relied on the legal presumption that the official
duties had been regularly performed by the police officers and for which reason the conviction of the
accused has to be adjudged.
In essence, we find no cogent reason to disturb or reverse the conclusion of the trial court that the
appellant's guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 18 May 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
After the CA denied the accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration on August 8, 2007,12 he now
appeals.
Issue
Was the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime charged proved beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling of the Court
After thorough review, we consider the appeal to be impressed with merit. Thus, we acquit the
accused-appellant.
In this jurisdiction, we convict the accused only when his guilt is established beyond reasonable
doubt. Conformably with this standard, we are mandated as an appellate court to sift the records and
search for every error, though unassigned in the appeal, in order to ensure that the conviction is
warranted, and to correct every error that the lower court has committed in finding guilt against the
accused.13 In this instance, therefore, the Court is not limited to the assigned errors, but can consider
and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse the decision on grounds other than those
the parties raised as errors.14
Courts are cognizant of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of public
officers. This presumption can be overturned if evidence is presented to prove either of two things,
1âwphi1
namely: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any
improper motive.15 This case sprang from the buy-bust operation conducted by several police officers
against the accused-appellant based on the tip from a caller whose identification was only through
the alias of Ogis. Surveillance was made following such tip, but the same was unrecorded and no
other proof was presented to corroborate the policemen's conclusion that the man known
as Ogis was the same man they were looking for during the surveillance.
It is a matter of judicial notice that buy-bust operations are "susceptible to police abuse, the most
notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion."16 The high possibility of abuse was precisely the
reason why the procedural safeguards embodied in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 have been put up
as a means to minimize, if not eradicate such abuse. The procedural safeguards not only protect the
innocent from abuse and violation of their rights but also guide the law enforcers on ensuring the
integrity of the evidence to be presented in court.
In the prosecution of the crime of selling a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven,
to wit: (1) the identities of the buyer, seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other hand, the essential requisites of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs that must be established are the following, namely: (1) the accused
was in possession of the dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.17
Inasmuch as the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of both offenses, its identity
and integrity must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This means that on top of the
elements of possession or · illegal sale, the fact that the substance possessed or illegally sold was
the very substance presented in court must be established with the same exacting degree of
certitude as that required sustaining a conviction.18 The prosecution must account for each link in the
chain of custody of the dangerous drug, from the moment of seizure from the accused unti it was
presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti. In sh011, the chain of custody requirement ensures
that unnecessary doubts respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether
removed.19
The chain of custody as an imp011ant procedural safeguard is defined under Section l (b) of
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
from the time or seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.
The necessity of maintaining an unbroken chain of custody and the mechanics of the custodial chain
requirement were explained in Malillin v. People,20 thus:
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time
of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same
standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination
and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tampering - without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates
the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
Based on the foregoing, we regard and declare as unwarranted the RTC's position that the absence
of proof showing the compliance by the arresting lawmen with the procedure outlined under Section
21 of RA No. 9165 was not fatal to the entrapment. Such non-compliance with the procedural
safeguards under Section 21 was fatal because it cast doubt on the integrity of the evidence
presented in court and directly affected the validity of the buy-bust operation. It put into serious
question whether the sachet of shabu had really come from the accused-appellant, and whether the
sachet of shabu presented in court was the same sachet of shabu obtained from the accused-
appellant at the time of the arrest. Testimonies provided by the police officers and the presumption
of regularity in the performance of their duties did not override the non-compliance with the
procedural safeguards instituted by our laws. Indeed, anything short of observance and compliance
by the arresting lawmen with what the law required meant that the former did not regularly perform
their duties. The presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties then became
inapplicable. As such, the evidence of the State did not overturn the presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused-appellant.
Furthermore, although non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements would not
automatically render the seizure and custody of the contraband invalid, that is true only when there
is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved. Any departure from the prescribed procedure must then still be
reasonably justified, and must further be shown not to have affected the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated contraband. Otherwise, the non-compliance constitutes an irregularity, a red
flag, so to speak, that cast reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti.21
Here, the State's agents who entrapped the accused-appellant and confiscated the dangerous drug
from him did not tender any justifiable ground for the non-compliance with the requirement of
establishing each link in the chain of custody from the time of seizure to the time of presentation.
The conclusion that the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu confiscated were consequently
not preserved became unavoidable. The failure to prove the chain of custody should mean,
therefore, that the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the sachet
of shabu presented during the trial was the very same one delivered by the accused-appellant to the
poseur buyer.
WHEREFORE, the Court ACQUITS accused EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA of the violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; and DIRECTS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to forthwith release EDDIE BARTE y
MENDOZA from custody unless he is detained thereat for another lawful cause, and to rep011 on
his compliance herewith within five days from receipt.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
(On Leave)
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
BIENVENIDO L. REYES*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
On leave.
Designated as Fifth Member of the Third Division per Special Order No. 2417 elated
**
January 4, 2017.
1
Rollo, pp. 4-8; penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon (retired), and concurred in by
Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos (retired) and Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-
Padilla.
2
CA rol!o, pp. I 5-23; penned by Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap.
3
Id. at 15.
4
Id. at 15-16.
5
Id. at 16.
6
Id. at 17.
7
Id. at 19.
8
Supra note 2.
9
Id. at 20-21.
10
Id. at 22-23.
11
Supra note 1, at 7-8.
12
Rollo, pp. 10-11.
13
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 180177, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 148, 157; People
v. Feliciano. G.R. Nos. 127759-60, September 24, 2001, 365 SCRA 613, 629; People v.
Quimzon, G.R. No. 133541, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 261, 281; People v. Cu/a, G.R. No.
133146, March 28, 2000, 329 SCRA 101, 116.
14
Epifanio v. People, G.R. No. 157057, June 26, 2007, I SCRA 552, 560; Pangonorom v.
People, GR. No. 143380, April 11, 2005, 455 SCRA 211, 220; People v. Saludes, GR. No.
144157, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 590, 597-598; People v. Ulit, GR. Nos. 131799-80 I,
February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 374, 389; People v. Lucero, GR. Nos. 102407-08, March 26,
2001, 355 SCRA 93, 101-102; Eusebio-Calderon v. People, G.R. No. 158495, October 21,
2004, 441 SCRA 137, 146; People v. Alzona, GR. No. 132029, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA
461, 471; People v. Taiio, GR. No. 133872, May 5, 2000, 331 SCRA 449, 460; People v.
llaguno, G.R. No. 91262, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 124, 147; People v. Atop, G.R. Nos.
124303-05, February 10, 1998, 286 SCRA I 57, I 74.
15
People v. Remarata, G.R. No. 147230, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 753, 754.
16
People v Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259, 267.
17
Peop!ev. Enriquez, GR. No. 197550, Scptcmbcr25, 2013. 706 SCRA337, 349-350.
18
People v. Adrid, GR. No. 201845, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 683, 697.
19
Supra note 17 at 350.
20
GR. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 632-633.
21
Supra note 17,at353-354.
February 20, 2017
G.R. No. 208093

vs.
SALIM ISMAEL y RADANG, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the June 14, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C.
No. 00902, which affirmed the August 31, 2010 Judgment2 of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Zamboanga City in Criminal Case Nos. 5021 (19952) and 5022 (19953), finding appellant Salim
Ismael y Radang (Salim) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. In Criminal Case No. 5021 (19952), Salim was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165; and in Criminal Case No. 5022 (19953), he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years and pay a fine of
₱300,000.00 for illegal possession of shabu under Section 11 of the said law.
Factual Antecedents
Salim was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 for selling and
possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The twin Informations3 instituted therefor
alleged:
In Criminal Case No. 5021 (19952)
That on or about August 25, 2003, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver,
transport, distribute or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, sell and deliver to SPO1 Roberto Alberto Santiago, PNP, Culianan Police
Station, who acted as poseur buyer, one (1) small size transparent plastic pack containing white
crystalline substance as certified to by PO1 Rodolfo Dagalea Tan as METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU), said accused knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 5022 (19953)
That on or about August 25, 2003, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control, two (2)
small size heat-sealed transparent plastic packs each containing white crystalline substance as
certified to by PO1 Rodolfo Dagalea Tan asMETHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU),
said accused knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arraigned on July 6, 2004, Salim, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges. Upon
termination of the joint pre-trial conference, trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
Culled from the records4 were the following operative facts:
On August 25, 2003, at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a confidential informant reported to
SPO4 Menardo Araneta [SPO4 Araneta], Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Culianan Police
Station4 [at Zamboanga City], that a certain "Ismael Salim" was engaged in
selling shabu at Barangay Talabaan near the Muslim [c]emetery [in that city.
To verify the report, SPO4 Araneta instructed the said informant to [monitor] the area. After the
informant confim1ed that the said Ismael Salim was indeed selling illegal drugs in the reported area,
SPO4 Araneta formed a buy-bust team composed of SPO1 Enriquez, SPO1 Eduardo N. Rodriguez
(SPO1 Rodriguez), SPO1 Roberto A. Santiago (SPO1 Santiago) and PO2 Rodolfo Dagalea Tan
(PO2 Tan). It was then agreed that SPO1 Santiago would act as poseur buyer with SPO1 Rodriguez
as back-up. For the purpose, SPO4 Araneta gave SPO1 Santiago a [₱100] bill bearing Serial No.
M419145 as marked money [to be used] in the buy-bust operation.
Upon arrival at Barangay Talabaan, the team parked their service vehicle along the road. SPO1
Santiago, the confidential informant and SPO1 Rodriguez alighted from the vehicle and walked
towards the [area fronting] the Muslim cemetery. As they approached the area, the informant pointed
to a man wearing a brown T-shirt and black short pants with white towel around his neck [whom he
identified] as appellant Ismael Salim, the target of the operation.
SPO1 Santiago then [walked] towards appellant and [told] the latter that he [wanted] to buy shabu; to
this appellant replied "how much?" SPO1 Santiago answered that he [wanted to buy ₱100.00 worth
of the shabu, and gave appellant] the ₱100.00 marked money; [whereupon appellant] took from his
left pocket one plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance [which he] handed over to
SPO1 Santiago.
Upon seeing the exchange, SPO1 Rodriguez, who was positioned [some 10] meters away, rushed in
and arrested appellant[.] SPO1 Rodriguez made a precautionary search of appellant's body for any
concealed weapon[, and found none]. Instead, SPO1 Rodriguez found, tucked inside [appellant's left
front pocket the ₱100.00] marked money and two (2) more plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance wrapped in a golden cigarette paper.
The police officers then brought appellant to the Culianan Police Station [in Zamboanga City] with
SPO1 Santiago keeping personal custody of the items confiscated from [him]. At the [police] station,
the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance subject of the buy-bust operation, the two
(2) plastic sachets also containing white crystalline substance[, and the ₱100.00] marked money
bearing Serial No. M419145 recovered from appellant's left pocket, were respectively turned over by
SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez to the Desk Officer, PO3 Floro Napalcruz [PO3 Napalcruz],
who likewise turned [these over] to the Duty Investigator, [PO2 Tan]. PO2 Tan then placed his initial
"RDT" on the items recovered from appellant.
PO2 Tan also prepared a request to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory 9, [at] Zamboanga City for
laboratory examination of the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance subject of the
sale between appellant and SPO1 Santiago, and the other two (2) plastic sachet[s] found inside
appellant's pocket by SPO1 Rodriguez.
After conducting qualitative examination on the said specimens, Police Chief Inspector [PCI]
Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist [Forensic Chemist Diestro], issued Chemistry Report No. D-
367-2003 dated August 25, 2003, finding [the above-mentioned] plastic sachets positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) a dangerous drug.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. Appellant denied both charges; he denied
selling shabu to SPO1 Santiago, just as he denied having shabu in his possession when he was
arrested on August 25, 2003.
According to appellant, on August 25, 2003, he went to a store to buy cellphone load so that he
could call his wife. After buying the cellphone load, he went back to his house on board a sikad-
sikad, a bicycle-driven vehicle with a sidecar. When he was about 160 meters away from the Muslim
cemetery in Barangay Talabaan, he was arrested by five persons in civilian attire who introduced
themselves as police officers. The police officers conducted a search on his person but did not find
any dangerous dn1gs. Thereafter, he was brought to Culianan Police Station where he was detained
for two days. Appellant insisted that he never sold shabu to the police officers who arrested him. He
said that the first time he saw the alleged shabu was when it was presented before the trial court. He
denied that the police officers had confiscated a cellular phone from him. He also asserted that all
these police officers took away from him was his money and that he had never met the said police
officers prior to his arrest.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 31, 2010, the RTC of Zamboanga City, Branch 12 rendered its Judgment finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Sections 5 and 11,Article II of RA 9165.
The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez who
conducted the buy-bust operation against appellant; it rejected appellant's defense of denial and
frame-up. The RTC noted that the defense of frame-up is easily concocted and is commonly used as
a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the comprehensive
dangerous drugs act.5 Moreover, other than the self-serving statements of appellant, no clear and
convincing exculpatory evidence was presented in the present case.
The dispositive part of the Judgment of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING; this Court hereby finds the accused herein,
SALIM ISMAEL y RADANG guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both cases, for violation of Sections 5
and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 and hereby sentences the said accused, in Criminal Case No. 5021 (19952) for
Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00), and in Criminal
Case No. 5022 (19953) for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to suffer the
penalty of Imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS and to
pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The dangerous drugs seized and recovered from the accused in these cases are hereby ordered
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 and its in1plementing rules and guidelines.
Cost against the accused.

SO ORDERED.6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Dissatisfied with the RTC's verdict, appellant appealed to the CA, but on June 14, 2013, the CA
affirmed in toto the RTC's Judgment. The CA held that the elements of both illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs had been duly proven in the instant case. The CA joined the RTC in
giving full credence to the testimonies of the aforementioned police officers, as they are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, no evidence to the contrary having been adduced
in the twin cases. Moreover, the CA found that in these cases, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized drugs had not at all been compromised, but were in fact duly preserved.
The CA disposed as fol1ows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch 12,
Zamboanga City finding accused-appellant Salim Ismael y Radang guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.7
Taking exception to the CA's Decision, appellant instituted the present appeal before this Court and
in his Appellant's Brief8 argues that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN

[HIS] GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.9
It is appellant's contention that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because the
prosecution: (1) failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs allegedly seized from him and;
(2) likewise failed to comply with the strict requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165.
Our Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, 1he
prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.10 What is important is that the sale transaction of drugs actually took place and that the
object of the transaction is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same
drugs seized from the accused.
On the other hand, for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be
established: "[1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such possession was not
authorized by law; and [3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of
dangerous drugs."11
In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug seized from
the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the
integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved. "The chain of
custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed."12
After a careful examination of the records of the case, we find that the prosecution failed to establish
an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs in violation of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
The pertinent provisions of Section 21 state:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment-The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
a copy thereof;
Similarly, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) further elaborate on the proper procedure
to be followed in Section 21(a) of RA 9165. It states:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, inm1ediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further that non-compliance with these requirement" under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
In Mallillin v. People,13 the Court explained the chain of custody rule as follows:
proponent clain1s it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which
it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same. (Emphasis supplied)
The first link in the chain is the marking of the seized drug. We have previously held that:
x x x Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized
contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, obviating switching, 'planting,' or
contamination of evidence.14
It is important that the seized drugs be immediately marked, if possible, as soon as they are seized
from the accused.
Furthermore, in People v. Gonzales,15 the Court explained that:
The first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related
items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying
signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon
arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of
dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to
set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the moment
they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby
forestalling switching, planting or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately
upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the
preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, SPO1 Rodriguez testified on the seizure of the sachets of shabu he found in appellant's
possession alter the latter was arrested. SPO1 Rodriguez shared the details of how the seized drugs
were handled following its confiscation as follows:
RSP II Ivan C. Mendoza, Jr.:
Q: You are telling the Honorable Court that instead of finding concealed weapon, yon x x x found two
small sized heat-sealed transparent plastic bag[s]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where [were] these two small[-]sized heat-sealed transparent plastic [packs] found?
A: [In] his left-front pocket.
Q: Were they wrapped further in another piece of paper or were they just found in that pocket?
A: [They were] wrapped in a [golden-colored] cigarette paper.
Q: Would you x x x be able to remember that [golden- colored] cigarette paper? The wrapper of
plastic pack?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why will you be able to remember it?

A: Because I turned it over to the desk officer and the desk officer turned it over to the
investigator, the investigator marked it.
Q: Who is the investigator?
A: PO2 Rodolfo Tan.
Q: So did you see anything that the investigator Rodolfo Tan do in that golden paper?
A: He marked his initial [sic].
Q: Ah, you saw him [mark] an initial?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you see him [mark] on the paper?
A: RDT.
Q: And do you know the meaning of RDT?
A: Yes, Rodolfo Dagalea Tan. 16
The testimony of SPO l Rodriguez on the chain of custody of the seized drugs leaves much to be
desired. It is evident that there was a break in the very first link of the chain when he failed to mark
the sachet'3 of shabu immediately upon seizing them from the appellant. According to SPO1
Rodriguez, after finding sachets of shabu in appellant's possession, he turned the drugs over to the
desk officer. SPO1 Rodriguez did not even explain why he failed to mark or why he could not have
marked the seized items immediately upon confiscation. Allegedly, the desk officer, after receiving
the seized items from SPO1 Rodriguez, in turn handed them over to PO2 Tan. Notably, this desk
officer was not presented in court thereby creating another break in the chain of custody. Again, no
explanation was offered for the non-presentation of the desk officer or why he himself did not mark
the seized items. It was only upon receipt by PO2 Tan, allegedly from the desk officer, of the seized
chugs that the same were marked at the police station. This means that from the time the drugs
were seized from appellant until the time PO2 Tan marked the same, there was already a significant
gap in the chain of custody. Because of this gap, there is no certainty that the sachets of drugs
presented as evidence in the trial court were the same drugs found in appellant's possession.
SPO1 Santiago, the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, was presented to corroborate the
testimony of SPO1 Rodriguez. However, his testimony likewise showed that the arresting officers did
not mark the seized drugs immediately after the arrest and in the presence of the appellant.
Similarly, no explanation was given for the lapse. SPO1 Santiago testified as follows:
Q: So what did you do with the small transparent sachet after police officer Rodriguez came to assist
you?
A: After the arrest of a certain Ismael we proceeded to our police station when we arrived
there I turnover [sic] the transparent sachet to our desk officer.
Q: Who was the desk officer?

A: At that time it was PO3 Floro Napalcruz.
Q: Did you notice anything that he did with the specimen that you turnover [sic] to him, if any?
COURT: You are referring to the desk officer?
RSPII IVAN C. MENDOZA, JR.: Yes, Your Honor.
A: During that time, Your Honor, I gave to him the, [sic] which I buy from him [sic] the one (1) piece
of transparent small sachet of shabu then after that I get [sic] out from the office.17
During cross-examination, SPO1 Santiago reiterated that he did not mark the seized drugs. The
sachets were marked after they were received by PO2 Tan.
Q: Now, you said that this plastic sachet taken from the suspect, you turned it over to the desk
officer of the police station?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After turning it over, you left?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You do not know what happened to the sachet?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not place your markings there?
A: None, sir.18
It is clear from the above that SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago did not mark the seized drugs
immediately after they were confiscated from appellant. No explanations were given why markings
were not immediately made. At this stage in the chain, there was already a significant break such
that there can be no assurance against switching, planting, or contamination. The Court has
previously held that, "failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the accused
casts doubt on the prosecution evidence warranting an acquittal on reasonable doubt."19
Both arresting officers testified that they turned over the sachets of shabu to a desk officer in the
person of PO3 Napalcruz at the police station. Notably, PO3 Napalcruz was not presented in court to
testify on the circumstances surrounding the alleged receipt of the seized drugs. This failure to
present PO3 Napalcruz is another fatal defect in an already broken chain of custody. Every person
who takes possession of seized drugs must show how it was handled and preserved while in his or
her custody to prevent any switching or replacement.
After PO3 Napalcruz, the seized drugs were then turned over to PO2 Tan. It was only at this point
that marking was done on the seized drugs. He revealed in his testimony the following:
4th ACP RAY Z. BONGABONG:

Q: [After the apprehension] of the accused in this case, what happened?
A: SPO1 Roberto Santiago turned over to the Desk Officer one (1) small size heat-sealed
transparent plastic pack containing shabu, allegedly a buy[-]bust stuff confiscated from the subject
person and marked money while SPO1 Eduardo Rodriguez turned over two (2) small size heat[-
]sealed transparent plastic packs allegedly confiscated from the possession of the subject person
during a body search conducted and one (1) Nokia cellphone 3310 and cash money of ₱710.00.
x x xx
Q: You as investigator of the case what did you do, if any, upon the turn over of those items?
A: I prepared a request for laboratory examination addressed to the Chief PNP Crime Laboratory 9,
R. T. Lim Boulevard, this City.
Q: This small heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet if you can see this again, will you be able to
identify the same?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How?
A: Through my initial, Sir.
Q: What initial?
A: RDT
Q: What does RDT stands [sic] for?
A: It stands for my name Rodolfo Dagalea Tan.20
In fine, PO2 Tan claimed during his direct examination that he received the seized items from the
desk officer.
During cross-examination, however, PO2 Tan contradicted his previous statement on who turned
over the sachets of shabu to him, viz.:
ATTY. EDGARDO D. GONZALES:
Q: Santiago told you that he was the poseur buyer?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: He turned over to you, what?
A: He turned over to me small size heat[-]sealed transparent plastic pack containing white
crystalline substance, containing shabu.
x x xx
Q: You also identified two other pieces of sachet, correct, Sir?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Who turned over to you?
A: SPO1 Eduardo Rodriguez.21
Due to the apparent breaks in the chain of custody, it was possible that the seized item subject of
the sale transaction was switched with the seized items subject of the illegal possession case. This
is material considering that the imposable penalty for illegal possession of shabu depends on the
quantity or weight of the seized drug.
Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the arresting officers also
failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the presence of the appellant. This
requirement must not be brushed aside as a mere technicality. It must be shown that the marking
was done in the presence of the accused to assure that the identity and integrity of the drugs were
properly preserved. Failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to the prosecution's case.
The requirements of making an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs were
likewise omitted without offering an explanation for its non-compliance. This break in the chain
tainted the integrity of the seized drugs presented in court; the very identity of the seized drugs
became highly questionable.
To recap, based on the evidence of the prosecution, it is clear that no markings were made
immediately after the arrest of the appellant. The seized drugs were allegedly turned over to desk
1âwphi1
officer PO3 Napalcruz but the prosecution did not bother to present him to testify on the identity of
the items he received from SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago. PO3 Napalcruz supposedly turned
over the drugs to PO2 Tan who marked the same at the police station. During his direct testimony,
PO2 Tan claimed that he received the drugs from PO3 Napalcruz. However, during his cross-
examination, PO2 Tan contradicted himself when he admitted receipt of the seized drugs from SPO1
Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez. Aside from these glaring infirmities, there was no inventory made, or
photographs taken, of the seized drugs in the presence of the accused or his representative, or in
the presence of any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any elected official,
who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory as required by RA 9165 and its IRR.
Lastly, we note that the trial court, in its November 12, 2007 Order, already denied the admission of
Exhibits ''B-1" and "B-2" or the dn1gs subject of the illegal possession case. The relevant portions of
the Order are as follows:
Plaintiff's Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2" however are DENIED admission on the grounds that Exhibit "B-1"
submitted by the prosecution in evidence is merely a cigarette foil, whereas Exhibit "B-2" is a heat
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.0135 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride which
are inconsistent with its offer that Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2" are two (2) plastic heat sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing shabu with a total weight of 0.0310 gram.22
Surprisingly, however, the trial court rendered a verdict convicting the appellant of violating Section
11, RA 9165 on illegal possession of dangerous drugs based on the same pieces of evidence it
previously denied.
In sum, we find that the prosecution failed to: (1) overcome the presumption of innocence which
appellai1t enjoys; (2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime; (3) establish an unbroken chain of
custody of the seized drugs; and (3) offer any explanation why the provisions of Section 21, RA 9165
were not complied with. This Court is thus constrained to acquit the appellant based on reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed June 14, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CR HC No. 00902, which affirmed the August 31, 2010 Judgment of Branch 12,
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City in Criminal Case Nos. 5021 (19952) and 5022 (19953)
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, appellant Salim R. Ismael is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant,
unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform the Court of the date of his
release or reason for his continued confinement within five days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. caguioa

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
of the Court’s Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
CA rollo, pp. 101-109; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren and concurred in by
Associate Justices Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and Edward B. Contreras.
2
Records, pp. 88-101; penned by Presiding Judge Gregorio V. De La Pena, III.
3
Id. at 1-2.
4
5
Records, p. 98.
6
Id. at 100.
7
CA rollo, p. 108.
8
Id. at 14-34.
9
Id. at 16.
10
People v. Alberto, 625 Phil. 545, 554 (2010) citing People v. Dumlao, 584 Phil. 732, 739
(2009).
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 686 Phil. 137, 148 (2012) citing People v. Sembrano, 642 Phil.
11
476, 490-491 (2010).
Fajardo v. People, 691 Phil. 752, 758-759 (2012) citing People v. Gutierrez, 614 Phil. 285,
12
293 (2009).
13
576 Phil. 576, 587 (2008).
14
People v. Coreche, 612 Phil. 1238, l 244 (2009).
15
708 Phil. 121, 130-131 (2013).
16
TSN, December 8, 2006, pp. 7-8.
17
TSN, March 8, 2007, pp. 23-24.
18
TSN, March 9, 2007, p. 27.
People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1050 (2012), citing People v. Coreche, supra note
19
14; People v. Laxa, 414 Phil. 156 (2001); People v. Casimiro, 432 Phil. 966 (2002).
20
TSN, July 13, 2007, pp. 14-17.
21
Id. at 42-48.
22
Records, p. 68.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185715
Appellee,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
ERLINDA CAPUNO y TISON, January 19, 2011
Appellant.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review the May 27, 2008 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 30215, affirming with modification the April 3, 2006 decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal. The RTC decision found
Erlinda Capuno y Tison (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale
of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states:
That on or about the 21st day of July 2002, in the Municipality of Rodriguez,
Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.04
gram which was found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, and which substance produces a physiological action similar to
amphetamine or other compound thereof providing similar physiological effects.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[4] The prosecution presented
Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jose Gordon Antonio and PO1 Fortunato Jiro III at the trial.
The appellant and Maria Cecilia Salvador took the witness stand for the defense.
PO1 Antonio narrated that at around 11:10 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at
the Rodriguez Police Station when a civilian informant arrived and told him that a
woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan
Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. Upon receiving this information, he,
PO1 Joseph G. Fernandez, and PO1 Jiro planned an entrapment operation: he (PO1
Antonio) was designated as the poseur-buyer, while his two companions would act
as back-up. Before leaving the police station, they asked the desk officer to record
their operation.[5] They went to Manggahan Street, and when they were near this
place, the informant pointed to them the appellant. PO1 Antonio alighted from the
vehicle, approached the appellant, and told her, Paiskor ng halagang piso; he then
handed the pre-marked one hundred peso bill to her. The appellant pulled out a
plastic sachet from her left pocket and gave it to PO1 Antonio. PO1 Antonio
immediately held the appellants arm, introduced himself to her, and stated her
constitutional rights. It was at this time that PO1 Fernandez and PO1 Jiro approached
them; PO1 Jiro recovered the marked money from the appellant. They brought the
appellant to the police station for investigation.[6] According to PO1 Antonio, the
police forwarded the seized item to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for
examination.[7]
PO1 Jiro testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the
Rodriguez Police Station when a confidential asset called and informed the police
that he saw one alias Erlinda selling illegal drugs. The police planned a buy-bust
operation wherein they prepared a one hundred peso bill (P100.00) marked money,
and designated PO1 Antonio as the poseur buyer. Afterwards, PO1 Jiro, PO1
Antonio, PO1 Fernandez, and the confidential asset left the police station and
proceeded to Manahan Street. On their arrival there, the confidential asset pointed
to them the appellant.[8] PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the
appellant, and talked to her. Thereafter, PO1 Antonio handed the marked money to
the appellant; the appellant took something from her pocket and handed it to PO1
Antonio.[9] Immediately after, PO1 Antonio arrested the appellant. He (PO1 Jiro)
and PO1 Fernandez approached the appellant; he recovered the marked money from
the appellants left pocket. They brought the appellant to the police station and asked
the duty officer to blotter the incident. Afterwards, they brought the appellant to the
police investigator; they also made a request for a laboratory examination.[10]
On cross-examination, PO1 Jiro stated that he was 10 meters away from PO1
Antonio when the latter was transacting with the appellant. He maintained that the
buy-bust operation took place outside the appellants house.[11] He recalled that the
appellant had two other companions when they arrived. When they arrested the
appellant, some residents of the area started a commotion and tried to grab her.[12]
The testimony of Police Inspector Abraham Tecson, the Forensic Chemist,

was dispensed with after both parties stipulated on the result of the examination
conducted on the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory.
On the hearing of April 14, 2004, the prosecution offered the following as
exhibits:
Exhibit A the Sinumpaang Salaysay of PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1
Fernandez
Exhibit B the request for laboratory examination
Exhibit C Chemistry Report No. D-1373-02E
Exhibit D the buy-bust money
Exhibit E Chemistry Report No. RD-78-03
Exhibit F the specimen confiscated from the appellant
Exhibit G Police Blotter[13]
The defense presented a different version of the events.

The appellant testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, she was
inside her house and lying on the bed, together with her 15-year old daughter, when
two persons, who introduced themselves as police officers, entered her house. They
wore maong pants and sando. They asked her if she was Erlinda Capuno and when
she answered in the affirmative, they searched her house.[14] They invited the
appellant and her daughter to the Municipal Hall of Montalban, Rizal when they did
not find anything in the house. Upon arriving there, the police told her to reveal the
identity of the person who gave her shabu. When she answered that she had no idea
what they were talking about, the police put her in jail.[15] The appellant further stated
that she saw the seized specimen only in court.[16]
On cross-examination, the appellant denied that she had been selling illegal
drugs. She explained that she consented to the search because she believed that the
two persons who entered her house were policemen.[17]
Maria, the appellants daughter, corroborated her mothers testimony on

material points, but stated that the two policemen did not search their house but
merely looked around.[18]
The RTC, in its decision[19] of April 3, 2006, convicted the appellant of the
crime charged, and sentenced her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days. The RTC likewise ordered the appellant to pay
a P100,000.00 fine.
The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. The
CA, in its decision[20] dated May 27, 2008, affirmed the RTC decision with the
modification that the appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment, and that the
amount of fine be increased to P500,000.00.
The CA found unmeritorious the appellants claim that the prosecution

witnesses were not credible due to their conflicting statements regarding the place
of the buy-bust operation. As the records bore, PO1 Antonio stated that they
conducted the entrapment operation on Manggahan Street; PO1 Jiro testified that it
was held on Manahan Street. The CA, nevertheless, ruled that PO1 Jiro made a slip
of the tongue as there was no Manahan Street in Barangay Burgos, Montalban,
Rizal.[21]
The CA added that despite the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO1
Antonio and PO1 Jiro, the records do not show that they were ever motivated by any
ulterior motive other than their desire to help wipe out the drug menace. It added
that the appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the
prosecution witnesses, who, as police officers, performed their duties in a regular
manner.[22]
Finally, the CA held that all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
had been established.[23]
In her brief,[24] the appellant claims that the lower courts erred in convicting
her of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. She harps on the fact that PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro gave
conflicting statements on how they came to know of her alleged illegal activities. On
one hand, PO1 Antonio claimed that an informant went to the police station and told
them that the appellant was openly selling illegal drugs; PO1 Jiro, on the other hand,
stated that a civilian informant called the police and informed them of the appellants
illegal activities. The appellant also alleges that the testimonies of these two
witnesses differ as regards the actual place of the entrapment operation. She further
argues that the police did not coordinate with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) in conducting the buy-bust operation.
The appellant likewise contends that the prosecution failed to show an

unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized specimen. She claims that
the apprehending team did not mark the seized items upon confiscation. Moreover,
there was no showing that the police inventoried or photographed the seized items
in her presence or her counsel, a representative of the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official.[25]
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the
argument that the testimonies of the police officers prevail over the appellants bare
denial, more so since there was nothing in the records to show that they were
motivated by any evil motive other than their desire to curb the vicious drug trade.[26]
The OSG added that when the buy-bust operation took place on July 21, 2002,
there was no institution yet known as the PDEA, as the Implementing Rules of R.A.
No. 9165 (IRR) took effect only on November 27, 2002.[27] It further claimed that
the failure to comply with the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulations was not fatal to
the prosecution of drug cases.[28]
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecutions
failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting
perspective on the status of the accused in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.[29] The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the
prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the
defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case,
the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.[30]
The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21

of Article II of R.A. No. 9165
In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of

R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been
committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. To remove
any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence
must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug
actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or
for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.[31]
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in

Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof[.]
This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the
members of the buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had
extended reasonable efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in
handling the evidence. The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the
trial:
FISCAL ROMNIEL MACAPAGAL:
Q: Upon arrival at Manggahan Street, what did x x x your group do?
PO1 JOSE GORDON ANTONIO:
A: We proceeded to the place and before we reach[ed] that place[,] our

civilian asset pointed to us the suspect.
Q: After your civilian informer pointed to the suspect, what did your group
do?
A: I alighted from our private vehicle at the time and I was the one who
talked to Erlinda Capuno.
Q: You said [that] you talked to Erlinda Capuno, what did you tell her when
you approached her?
A: I told her Paiskor ng halagang piso.

Q: When you told this to Erlinda that you buy one Hundred Peso of shabu,
what did he do? [sic]
A: When I gave her on [sic] piece of the marked money[,] he [sic] pulled
out something from her pocket.
Q: What is the denomination of the marked money?
A: One Hundred Peso bill.
Q: Upon receiving the plastic sachet, what did you do next?
A: After she gave me the suspected shabu, I held her by the arm and my two
companions who [were] then seeing me approached me. [sic]
Q: What is the purpose of holding the hands of Erlinda when you received
this plastic sachet?
A: When I took the plastic sachet that was the time I held her and after that
I introduced myself and explained to her Constitutional rights. [sic]
Q: After arresting Erlinda, where did you proceed?
A: We brought her to the Police Station for investigation where she gave
her full name and also turned over the suspected items[.]
Q: Who recovered the buy-bust money?
A: Police Officer Hero [sic], Sir.
Q: You stated you were the one who handed the buy bust money to Erlinda.
Do you have that buy bust money with you?
A: After I gave the marked money to her[,] she picked from her left pocket
the suspected shabu and Police Officer Hero recovered the money.
[sic]
xxxx
Q: The alleged specimen you got from Erlinda, where is it now?
A: We brought it to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for

examination.
Q: Were you able to know the result of this examination?

A: Yes, Sir. When we returned we already have the result.[32]
From the foregoing exchanges, it is clear that the apprehending team, upon
confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the seized specimen
to the police station. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items
were taken in the presence of the appellant or her counsel, a representative
from the media and the DOJ, and an elective official. We stress that PO1
Antonios testimony was corroborated by another member of the apprehending team,
PO1 Jiro, who narrated that after arresting the appellant, they brought her and the
seized item to the police station. At no time during PO1 Jiros testimony did he even
intimate that they inventoried or photographed the confiscated item.
A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, shows
that this Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions for failure to follow the
proper procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No.
9165, the Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of
1974.[33] Section 1 of this Regulation requires the apprehending team, having
initial custody and control of the seized drugs, to immediately inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused and/or his representatives,
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
The Court remained vigilant in ensuring that the prescribed procedures

in the handling of the seized drugs were observed after the passage of R.A. No.
9165. In People v. Lorenzo,[34] we acquitted the accused for failure of the buy-bust
team to photograph and inventory the seized items. People v. Garcia[35] likewise
resulted in an acquittal because no physical inventory was
ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was
taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165. In Bondad, Jr. v.
People,[36] we also acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to conduct an
inventory and to photograph the seized item, without justifiable grounds.
We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez,[37] People v.
Denoman,[38] People v. Partoza,[39] People v. Robles,[40] and People v. dela
Cruz,[41] where we emphasized the importance of complying with the required
procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in

complying with the express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,"non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]" This saving clause, however,
applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and, thereafter,
explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution established that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.[42]
These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not
even attempt to offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed
procedures in the handling of the seized items.
The Chain of Custody Requirement
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be

observed in establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the
confiscated illicit drug.Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust
operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.[43]
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as "the duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction." As a method of authenticating evidence, the
chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would, thus, include a testimony about the every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it was offered in court
as evidence, such that every person who handled the same would admit as to how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the
evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented
in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused.[44]
In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that
would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen
seized from the appellant.
The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the
plastic sachet from the appellant. From the testimonies and joint affidavit of PO1
Antonio and PO1 Jiro, it is clear that the police did not mark the confiscated sachet
upon confiscation. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link,
thus it is vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimen will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar
or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.[45]
The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from PO1 Antonio to
the police station. Both PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro testified that they brought the
appellant and the seized item to the police station. They, however, failed to identify
the person to whose custody the seized item was given. Although the records show
that the request for laboratory examination of the seized item was prepared by the
Chief of Police, Police Senior Inspector Anastacio Benzon, the evidence does not
show that he was the official who received the marked plastic sachet from PO1
Antonio.
As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the
seized item was forwarded to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory by a
certain PO1 Sanchez. We stress, however, that PO1 Sanchez forwarded the said
specimen only on the next day, or on July 22, 2002. To harp back to what we earlier
discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of the seized drug after it left the
hands of PO1 Antonio. We cannot, therefore, presume that PO1 Sanchez had
custody of the specimen in the interim. We also stress that the identity of the person
who received the seized item at the crime laboratory was not clearly identified.
Due to the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over
the identification of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced into evidence.
In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged,
creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.
Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
We likewise cannot acquiesce to the credibility accorded to the prosecution

witnesses by the courts a quo. Contrary to the lower courts ruling, the
inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses are substantial, not
trivial. To recall, PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1 Fernandez stated in
their Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay[46] that a civilian asset arrived at the
police station on July 21, 2002, and informed them that one alias Erlinda was
selling illegal drugs on Manahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal. PO1
Antonio reiterated this fact when he testified in court that a civilian
informant arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002 and told them that a
woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan
Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. PO1 Jiro, however, changed his story
in court and testified that the confidential informant called the police and informed
then that one alias Erlinda was selling illegal drugs.
We are at a loss how PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro could have given different
accounts regarding how the confidential asset informed them of the appellants illegal
activities when both of them were present at the police station on July 21, 2002.
What baffles us even more is why PO1 Jiros gave conflicting statements in his joint
affidavit and in his court testimony. To us, the conflicting statements and
declarations of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro destroyed their credibility; it made their
testimonies unreliable. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.[47]
Presumption of Regularity in the

Performance of Official Duties
In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA also relied on the evidentiary

presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it
must be stressed, is not conclusive. It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance
and should make the presumption unavailable.[48] The presumption, in other words,
obtains only when nothing in the records suggests that the law enforcers involved
deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. But
where the official act in question is irregular on its face, as in this case, an adverse
presumption arises as a matter of course.[49] As we explained in People v. Sanchez:
While the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by
itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming
accused-appellant's conviction because "First, the presumption is precisely just that
- a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot
be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of
innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt." The
presumption also cannot prevail over positive averments concerning violations of
the constitutional rights of the accused. In short, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of
innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.[50]
All told, we find merit in the appellant's claim that the prosecution failed to
discharge its burden of proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, due to the
unreliability of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and substantial gaps in
the chain of custody, raising reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus
delicti.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the May 27, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
30215. Appellant Erlinda Capuno y Tison is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for another lawful
cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional

Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate implementation. The
Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to report the
action she has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, and concurred in by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam
and Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr; rollo, pp. 3-12.
[2]
Penned by Judge Elizabeth Balquin-Reyes; CA rollo, pp. 9-17.
[3]
Records, p. 1.
[4]
Id. at 23-24.
[5]
TSN, October 30, 2002, pp. 2-3.
[6]
Id. at 3-5.
[7]
Id. at 6.
[8]
TSN, March 5, 2003, pp. 3-4.
[9]
Id. at 5-6.
[10]
Id. at 6-7.
[11]
TSN, March 31, 2003, pp. 5-6.
[12]
Id. at 9-10.
[13]
Records, pp. 120-121.
[14]
TSN, January 24, 2004, pp. 3-4.
[15]
Id. at 5.
[16]
Id. at 8.
[17]
Id. at 8-9.
[18]
TSN, July 13, 2005, pp. 1-11.
[19]
Supra note 2.
[20]
Supra note 1.
[21]
Rollo, p. 8.
[22]
Id. at 9-10.
[23]
Id. at 10.
[24]
[25]
Id. at 33-38.
[26]
Id. at 62-64.
[27]
Id. at 69.
[28]
Id. at 69-71.
[29]
People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 207.
[30]
People v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 177222, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 273, 283.
[31]
See People v. Pagaduan, G.R. No. 179029, August 12, 2010.
[32]
Supra note 5, at 3-6.
[33]
See People v. Magat, G.R. No. 179939, September 29, 2008, 567 SCRA 86, 95.
[34]
G.R. No. 184760, April 23, 2010.
[35]
G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259.
[36]
G.R. No. 173804, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 497.
[37]
G.R. No. 179213, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 92.
[38]
G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 257.
[39]
G.R. No. 182418, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 809.
[40]
G.R. No. 177220, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 647.
[41]
G.R. No. 181545, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 273.
[42]
People v. Garcia, supra note 35.
[43]
People v. Sanchez, supra note 29, citing People v. Kimura, 428 SCRA 51 (2004) and Lopez v. People, 553 SCRA
619 (2008).
[44]
See People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 140, 149.
[45]
See People v. Coreche, G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 350, 357.
[46]
Records, p. 10.
[47]
See also Zarraga v. People, G.R. No. 162064, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 639, a case that, although not squarely
in point, underscores the importance of consistency in the statements of the members of the buy-bust team. In the
said case, the Court reversed a guilty verdict for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 largely due to the conflicting
testimonies of the police officers who conducted the operation on when and where the seized drugs were marked.
[48]
People v. Pagaduan, supra note 31.
[49]
Cario v. People, G.R. No. 178757, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 388, 406.
[50]
Supra note 29, at 221.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 184954
Appellee,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
JAY LORENA y LABAG, Promulgated:

Appellant.
January 10, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The instant appeal assails the Decision[1] dated November 22, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC. No. 01620 which affirmed with
modification the August 30, 2005 judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 25, of Naga City, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information[3] dated July 10, 2003, appellant Jay Lorena y Labag was
charged as follows:
That on or about February 9, 2003, at about 7:30 oclock (sic) in the evening, at Pier
Site, Sta. Rosa, Pasacao, Camarines Sur, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell Methamphetamine Hydrocholoride, with
a total weight of 0.21 gram[,] a dangerous drug, contained in a plastic sachet, to a
poseur[-]buyer, without authority of law, and one (1) Five Hundred Peso bill with
serial number MS [979614][4] was confiscated from the accused, to the damage and
prejudice of the People of the Philippines.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
During pre-trial, the prosecution and defense stipulated on the following facts:
1. Identity of the accused;
2. That the arresting officers were organic members of the PNP Pasacao,
Camarines Sur;
3. That the accused was within the premises of [P]ier [S]ite, Sta. Rosa, Pasacao,
Camarines Sur on February 9, 2003 at around 7:30 oclock (sic) in the evening;
and
4. That the accused knew a certain Iris Mae Cleofe.[5]
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.[6] In the ensuing trial, the
prosecution presented seven witnesses: P/Insp. Mauro E. Solero, SPO1 Constantino
Espiritu, SPO2 Ernesto Ayen, P/Insp. Josephine Macura Clemen, P/Insp. Ma.
Cristina Nobleza, Police Chief Insp. Jerry Bearis, and P/Insp. Nelson del Socorro.
Taken altogether, the evidence for the prosecution tried to establish the following
facts:
On February 9, 2003, around 8:00 in the morning, Iris Mae Cleofe (Iris), a
civilian informant, came to the Pasacao Police Station to report appellants alleged
drug trafficking activities. Acting on said information, Pasacao Police Station
Officer-in-Charge Police Chief Insp. Jerry Bearis (Bearis) directed P/Insp. Mauro E.
Solero (Solero), SPO3 Tomas Llamado, SPO3 Oscar Angel, SPO2 Ernesto Ayen
(Ayen) and SPO1 Constantino Espiritu (Espiritu), all members of Task Force Ubash,
a unit charged with monitoring drug trafficking activities in the area, to go with Iris
and conduct a surveillance upon appellant. Around 5:00 in the afternoon, after their
surveillance yielded a positive result, Task Force Ubash coordinated by phone with
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Office in Naga City for the
conduct of the buy-bust operation which will take place that same night at the house
of one Edgar Saar (Saar) located in Pier Site, Pasacao. Thereafter, Solero,
Commander of Task Force Ubash, gave a briefing to the members of the buy-bust
team. They were likewise instructed to synchronize their watches because at
exactly 7:30 in the evening, they will enter the place immediately after Iris, the
designated poseur-buyer, utters the words Uya na ang bayad ko (Here is my
payment) as a signal that the transaction has been perfected.
Around 7:00 in the evening, when it was already dark, the buy-bust team
arrived in the area and positioned themselves infront of the house of Saar. They were
approximately five meters away hiding in the dark behind the plants but had a good
view of the well-lit porch of Saars house. Moments later, Iris arrived and
entered Saars house. She immediately proceeded with the transaction and handed
over the marked P500-bill to appellant who was then sitting down. While handing
over the money, Iris uttered the words O, uya na an bayad ko kaiyan ha, baad kun
wara-waraon mo iyan, uya na an bayad ko ha (This is my payment, you might
misplace it), her voice deliberately made louder for the buy-bust team to hear.
Simultaneously, appellant handed over a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance to Iris. At that point, Solero, Espiritu and Ayen rushed to the porch,
arrested appellant and handcuffed him. Ayen recovered from appellants pocket
the P500-bill while Iris turned over the sachet of shabu to Espiritu. Then they
brought appellant to the police station where he was detained. The sachet containing
white crystalline substance was thereafter personally submitted by Bearis to the
Camarines Sur Provincial Crime Laboratory, where it was tested by P/Insp. Ma.
Cristina D. Nobleza.
The initial field test showed that the white crystalline substance contained in
the sachet was Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu. Thus, it was submitted
to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 5 for confirmatory testing by P/Insp.
Josephine Macura Clemen, a forensic chemist. There, the specimen likewise tested
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
The defense, for its part, presented an entirely different version. Testifying as
sole witness for the defense, appellant tried to establish the following facts:
During the first week of February 2003, appellant, a resident of San
Felipe, Naga City, went to Pasacao to find a job. While in Pasacao, he stayed in the
house of his friend Saar, in Pier Site.
On February 9, 2003, around 7:00 in the evening, while appellant was lying
on a hammock near Saars residence, he saw Iris enter the yard and go into Saars
house. A little later, she went out of the house so appellant asked her who she was
looking for. Iris replied that she was looking for one Bongbong Ditsuso. Appellant
told Iris to just wait for Bongbong inside the house. In the meantime, he went to the
kitchen to cook rice. A little while later, he returned to the living room to talk to Iris.
While they were talking, several men barged in and Iris suddenly gave him
something which he later found out to be crumpled money when it fell on the floor.
The men then handcuffed him after punching him and hitting him with a Caliber .45
in the nape. Afterwards, they boarded him on an owner-type jeep and brought him
to the police station where he was detained.
On August 30, 2005, the RTC promulgated its judgment finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and
sentencing him to life imprisonment. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused JAY LORENA y Labag, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
Violation of Sec. 5, [Article] II of R.A. 9165. This court hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
Since the accused has been undergoing preventive detention during the
pendency of the trial of this case, let the same be credited in the service of his
sentence.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The trial court found the prosecution evidence credible and sufficient to prove
appellants culpability beyond reasonable doubt. It held that even if the prosecution
failed to present the poseur-buyer by reason of her death, her failure to testify was
not fatal to the prosecutions evidence since prosecution witnesses Solero, Espiritu
and Ayen were able to observe the transaction between Iris and appellant, and
the shabu and buy-bust money recovered from him were presented as evidence to
prove the sale. The trial court also ruled that the police officers are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of evidence that they were
motivated by spite, ill will, or other evil motive. The trial court did not give credence
to appellants defense of denial, frame-up and maltreatment. It held that his claim
cannot prevail over the positive identification made by credible prosecution
witnesses and in light of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
of law enforcers.
Appellant appealed to the CA. In his brief, appellant alleged that:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY [OF] VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF
R.A. 9165 [DESPITE] THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[8]
On November 22, 2007, the CA rendered a decision affirming with

modification the RTC decision and disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING WITH
MODIFICATION the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 25. Appellant Jay Lorena y Labag is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
Since the accused has been undergoing preventive detention during the
pendency of the trial of this case, let the same be credited in the service of his
sentence.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Aggrieved, appellant filed the instant appeal.
On December 15, 2008, the Court directed the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs if they so desire.[10] The Office of the Solicitor General
manifested[11] that it is dispensing with the filing of a supplemental brief as it finds
no new issues to raise before this Court. Appellant, on the other hand, in addition to
the lone assignment of errors he raised before the CA, raised the following errors in
his Supplemental Brief:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE BUY-BUST TEAMS
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 21, R.A. NO. 9165.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[12]
Appellant questions the validity of his warrantless arrest, contending that none
of the circumstances provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, which justify a warrantless arrest is present. He
likewise points out that the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer coupled with the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and their testimony
to the effect that they did not see the sale itself, taint the credibility of the buy-bust
operation. He adds that the lower court misapplied the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official function, especially since the arresting officers failed to
comply with the guidelines prescribed by the law regarding the custody and control
of the seized drugs as mandated by Section 21, R.A. No. 9165.
We reverse appellants conviction.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A.

No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been
committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.[13]
Further, considering the illegal drugs unique characteristic rendering it

indistinct, not readily identifiable and easily open to tampering, alteration or
substitution either by accident or otherwise, there is a need to comply strictly with
procedure in its seizure and custody.[14] Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 provides such procedure:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Evident from the records of this case, however, is the fact that the members
of the buy-bust team did not comply with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165. Nothing in the testimony of Solero, Commander of Task Force
Ubash, would show that the procedure was complied with. He even admitted that he
has not seen the inventory of the confiscated drugs allegedly prepared by the police
officers and that he only read a little of R.A. No. 9165:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, did you prepare an inventory insofar as the apprehension of
the shabu allegedly taken from the suspect?
A That is the work of the Investigator, sir, we were just after the buy-bust operation.
Q Was there any inventory prepared insofar as the operation is concerned?

A Yes, sir.
Q Where is that inventory?

A At the Investigation Section, sir.
Q Are you sure that there was indeed an inventory prepared?

A Yes, sir.
Q So, you are telling this court that the shabu that was allegedly taken from Jay
Lorena was endorsed to the Investigation Section?
A To the desk officer on duty first for the recording.
Q Do you know what is investigation, Mr. Witness?

A The details, the money involved including the suspect.
Q This case was filed in the year 2003 and I suppose you are already aware of Rep.
Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the persons who prepare the inventory are the persons who apprehended,
are you aware of that?
A Yes sir, but the desk officer is also a member of the police station.
Q So, you turned over the shabu to the desk officer?

A Yes sir, including the suspect.
Q And to your own knowledge, there was an inventory prepared by the desk
officer?
A The Investigation Section, sir.
Q And in that inventory, Insp. Del Socorro signed?

A No, sir.
Q Or the local elected official signed that inventory?

A I did not see the inventory, sir.
Q So, you are talking about a particular document which you have not seen?
A But I know it was inventoried.
Q Now, during the supposed buy-bust operation, upon apprehending Jay Lorena
and the shabu that your group allegedly taken from him, was there any
photograph taken?
A None, sir.
Q Was there any police officer from the Pasacao Police Station or even the Chief
of Police himself instructed your group about the requirements prescribed
under Rep. Act No. 9165?
A None, sir.
Q But personally you are aware of Rep. Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act?
A Yes, sir.
Q Have you read that?

A A little.[15]
Nonetheless, People v. Pringas[16] teaches that non-compliance by the

apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not necessarily fatal. Its non-
compliance will not automatically render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.[17] We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section
21 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under
varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures
in the handling of confiscated evidence.[18] As provided in Section 21, Article II of
the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Even so, for the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution
should explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses and that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.[19] It must be shown
that the illegal drug presented in court is the very same specimen seized from the
accused. This function is performed by the chain of custody requirement to erase all
doubts as to the identity of the seized drugs by establishing its movement from the
accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist and finally to the court.[20] Section 1(b)
of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defines chain of custody
as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs
or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.][21]
In this case, there was no compliance with the inventory and photographing of the
seized dangerous drug and marked money immediately after the buy-bust
operation. We have held that such non-compliance does not necessarily render void
and invalid the seizure of the dangerous drugs. There must, however, be justifiable
grounds to warrant exception therefrom, and provided that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/s.[22] While a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to achieve,
an unbroken chain becomes indispensable and essential in the prosecution of drug
cases owing to its susceptibility to alteration, tampering, contamination and even
substitution and exchange. Hence, every link must be accounted for.[23]
Prosecution witnesses Solero, Ayen and Espiritu were united in testifying that after
the consummation of the transaction and immediately upon appellants apprehension,
Iris turned over the plastic sachet to Espiritu. It was likewise clear that Espiritu
turned over to Solero the specimen allegedly seized from appellant at the police
station.
However, as to the subsequent handling of said specimen at the police station until
it was presented in court, the prosecution failed to clearly account for each link in
the chain due to the vagueness and patent inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.
Solero testified that after he got hold of the specimen, the same was turned
over to the desk officer whose name he cannot remember.[24] During his direct
examination, he promised that he will find out who the desk officer was during that
particular day.[25] He however failed to name the said desk officer when he came
back on another hearing date for his cross examination and still referred to him or
her as the desk officer on duty.[26] And when asked what their office did to the
specimen, he declared that what he knows is that it was brought to the provincial
crime laboratory for testing but cannot remember who brought it to the provincial
crime laboratory.[27]
Bearis, on the other hand, testified that it was he who brought the specimen to
the provincial crime laboratory and when asked from whom he got the specimen, he
stated that it was Solero who handed it over to him (Bearis).[28] He identified in court
that it was the same specimen he brought to the provincial crime laboratory since it
had the marking MES, presumably corresponding to the initials of Solero, and
claimed that it was marked in his presence.[29] There was no evidence to show,
however, if Solero indeed made said marking in the presence of Bearis since there
was no mention of this when Solero testified. We find Soleros failure to mention the
supposed marking as consistent with his claim that he turned over the specimen to
the unidentified desk officer and not to Bearis. It is thus unclear whether after Solero,
the next person who came into possession of the specimen was the unidentified desk
officer OR Bearis, given the latters testimony that he directly got the same from
Solero.
Also unaccounted for is the transfer of the specimen from the provincial crime
laboratory to the regional crime laboratory. Nobleza, who received the specimen
from Bearis and conducted the initial field test on it, testified that after the
examination and preparing the result, she turned over the same to the evidence
custodian, SPO3 Augusto Basagre.[30] Clemen, the chemist who conducted the
confirmatory test at the regional crime laboratory, testified that she received the
specimen from one P/Insp. Alfredo Lopez,[31] Deputy Provincial Officer of the
Provincial Crime Laboratory, the signatory of the memorandum for request for
laboratory examination.[32] The prosecution failed to present evidence to show how
the specimen was transferred from Basagre to Lopez.
Given the foregoing lapses committed by the apprehending officers, the

saving clause cannot apply to the case at bar. Not only did the prosecution fail to
offer any justifiable ground why the procedure required by law was not complied
with, it was also unable to establish the chain of custody of the shabu allegedly taken
from appellant. The obvious gaps in the chain of custody created a reasonable doubt
as to whether the specimen seized from appellant was the same specimen brought to
the crime laboratories and eventually offered in court as evidence. Without adequate
proof of the corpus delicti, appellants conviction cannot stand.
As a result of the irregularities and lapses in the chain of custody requirement

which unfortunately the trial and appellate courts overlooked, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties cannot be used against appellant. It
needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the
performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof.
The presumption, in other words, obtains only where nothing in the records is
suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard
conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. Otherwise, where the official act
in question is irregular on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of
course.[33]
WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the November 22,

2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC. No. 01620.
Appellant JAY LORENA y LABAG is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and
ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any
other lawful cause/s.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this
Decision with deliberate dispatch and to report to this Court the action taken hereon
within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-9. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
and Vicente S.E. Veloso concurring.
[2]
Records, pp. 236-241. Penned by Judge Jaime E. Contreras.
[3]
Id. at 1.
[4]
Id. at 180.
[5]
Id. at 43.
[6]
Id. at 29.
[7]
Id. at 241.
[8]
CA rollo, p. 65.
[9]
Rollo, p. 8.
[10]
Id. at 15.
[11]
Id. at 17-18.
[12]
Id. at 24.
[13]
People v. Pagaduan, G.R. No. 179029, August 9, 2010, p. 7, citing People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February
25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259, 266.
[14]
People v. Kamad, G.R. No.174198, January 19, 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 304-305.
[15]
TSN, January 12, 2004, pp. 17-19.
[16]
G.R. No. 175928, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828.
[17]
Id. at 842-843.
[18]
People v. Pagaduan, supra note 13 at 10-11.
[19]
People v. Almorfe, G.R. No. 181831, March 29, 2010, 617 SCRA 52, 60, citing People v. Sanchez, G.R. No.
175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 212.
[20]
People v. Almorfe, id. at 60-61, citing Malillin v. People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619.
[21]
See People v. Denoman, G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2000, 596 SCRA 257, 271.
[22]
People v. Almorfe, supra note 19 at 59, citing Sec. 21(a), Art. II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 9165.
[23]
Id. at 61-62, citing Malillin v. People, supra note 20 at 633.
[24]
TSN, January 9, 2004, pp. 14-15.
[25]
Id. at 15.
[26]
TSN, January 12, 2004, p. 17.
[27]
TSN, January 9, 2004, p. 15.
[28]
TSN, June 8, 2004, pp. 14-15.
[29]
Id. at 13.
[30]
Id. at 5.
[31]
Lauta in the TSN.
[32]
TSN, May 6, 2004, p. 5.
[33]
People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 1
G.R. No. 188698 July 22, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SONIA BERNEL NUARIN, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal filed by appellant Sonia Bemel Nuarin (appellant) from the April 28, 2009
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02886.
The appealed decision affirmed the May 25, 2007 joint decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 80, Quezon City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
Background Facts
The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Sections 53 and 11,4 respectively, of R.A. No.
9165 before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-03-114918 and Q-03-114919. The
appellant was duly arraigned; she pleaded not guilty to the charges laid. The prosecution presented
Police Officer 1 (PO1) Roberto Manalo at the trial on the merits that followed, while the parties
stipulated5 the testimony of Forensic Chemist, Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Bernardino
Banac. The appellant took the witness stand for the defense.
PO1 Manalo testified that on February 2, 2003, members of the District Drug Enforcement Group of
the Central Police District, composed of himself, PO1 Filnar Mutia, PO3 Cleto Montenegro, PO3
Eduardo Datul, and PO3 Rommel Bautista went to Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City, to conduct a
buy-bust operation against the appellant.6When they arrived there at around 12:30 p.m., the
informant introduced PO1 Manalo to the appellant. PO1 Manalo told the appellant that he wanted to
buy ₱100.00 worth of shabu. The appellant handed a sachet containing white crystalline substances
to PO1 Manalo who, in turn, gave him the marked money. Immediately after, PO1 Manalo made the
prearranged signal to his companions.7 The other members of the entrapment team rushed to the
scene and introduced themselves as policemen; PO1 Mutia searched the appellant and found two
other plastic sachets inside the appellant’s coin purse. Thereafter, the police brought the appellant
and the seized items to the police station.8
The defense presented a different picture of the events. The appellant’s testimony was aptly
summarized by the CA as follows:
On February 2, 2003, at about 12:30 in the afternoon, accused-appellant was at home with her son
John Bernel and friends Jan Ticson and Rebecca Agana. They had just finished eating lunch and
accused appellant was, then, washing the dishes when she heard a knock on the door. At the door
were PO3 Cleto Montenegro, PO1 Filnar Mutia and two others. They were looking for a certain
Bogart. When accused-appellant said that she did not know where Bogart was, the police officers
entered the house and searched the premises for about an hour. When the search did not yield
anything incriminatory, the police brought accused-appellant and the other occupants of the house to
Camp Karingal In Quezon City. There, the police extorted ₱40,000.00 in exchange of accused-
appellant’s release. When the money was not produced, accused-appellant was charged by the
police officers.9
In its joint decision10 of May 25, 2007, the RTC found the appellant guilty of the illegal sale of 0.03
gram of shabu penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC held that the
prosecution was able to prove, through testimonial and documentary evidence, that an illegal sale of
drugs took place between the appellant and the poseur-buyer, PO1 Manalo. It added that the police
were presumed to have regularly performed their official duties in the absence of any evidence to
rebut this presumption. The RTC likewise found no merit in the appellant’s defenses of denial and
extortion as she failed to substantiate these. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment, and ordered her to pay a ₱500,000.00 fine. The RTC, however,
acquitted the appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs in Criminal Case No. Q-03-114919
for insufficiency of evidence.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA held that the prosecution successfully
proved all the elements of illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. It further
ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu had been preserved. The CA
also disregarded the appellant’s denial in the light of the positive identification made by PO1 Manalo.
In her brief on appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court gravely erred in convicting her of the
crime charged despite the prosecution’s failure to establish that a buy-bust operation took place. She
also maintained that the chain of custody over the seized shabu had been broken. For the State, the
office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the prosecution was able to establish that the sale
of shabu between the appellant and the poseur-buyer was consummated. It also maintained that the
nonpresentation in court of the original marked money, the forensic chemist, the informant, and the
original marked money was not fatal in the prosecution for illegal drugs.
Our Ruling
After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecution’s failure to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
A successful prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs requires more than the perfunctory presentation
of evidence establishing each element of the crime: the identities of the buyer and seller, the
transaction or sale of the illegal drug, and the existence of the corpus delicti.
In securing or sustaining a conviction under R.A. No. 9165, the intrinsic worth of these pieces of
evidence, especially the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, must definitely be shown to have
been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug’s unique characteristic that
renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration, or substitution
either by accident or otherwise.
Thus, to remove any doubt on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely
show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the
accused-appellant.11 It is in this respect that the prosecution failed.
The ‘Marking’ Requirement vis-à-vis the Chain of Custody Rule
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165, defines
chain of custody as "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction."
A crucial step in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized
contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence.12
In the present case, the prosecution’s lone witness, PO1 Manalo, gave conflicting statements as to
who marked the seized sachets. In his direct testimony, he claimed that it was the desk officer who
marked the sachets, thus:
PROSECUTOR JOSEPHUS ASIS:
Q: After you were able to arrest the accused and while going travelling (sic) to your office[,] who was
holding the drug that you were able to buy from the accused?
PO1 MANALO:
A: I, Sir.
Q: After the recovered money by PO1 Mutia and after you arrived at the station[,] what did you do?
A: We turned it over to the desk officer and the desk officer put the initial RM.
Q: After the marking[,] what happened next?
A: The investigator prepared a request to the crime laboratory and brought the drug to the crime lab.
Q: Who brought it if you know?
A: I can no longer remember.13
In the latter part of his direct examination, however, PO1 Manalo claimed that he was the one who
marked the sachets. To directly quote from the records:
PROSECUTOR JOSEPHUS ASIS:
Q: Now you mentioned that you were able to purchase drug from the accused. If the drug will be
shown to you[,] would you be able to identify it?
PO1 MANALO:
A: I have my marking there[,] sir.
Q: Will you please go over the same and tell me what is the relation of the said sachet with the
substance with the one you were able to buy (sic)?
Q: This is the same stuff that I bought, this is my marking.
PROS ASIS:
Witness identified the sachet previously marked Exhibit "F-3." May we request that the marking
placed by the witness in the sachet be marked as Exhibit "F-3-B."
xxxx
Q: How sure are you that the sachet that you have just identified is also the sachet that you
recovered during the operation?
A: Nobody held it except me.
Q: How did you identify the sachet?
A: The marking that I made.14 [emphasis supplied]
In his cross-examination, PO1 Manalo again stated that he was the one who marked the confiscated
plastic sachets with "RM."
We point out that succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the initial markings as reference. If at
the first instance or opportunity, there are already doubts on who really placed the markings on the
seized sachets (or if the markings were made in accordance with the required procedure), serious
uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced into
evidence.
In addition, the records do not show that the sachets were marked in the presence of the appellant.
In People v. Sanchez,15 we explained that the "marking" of the seized items to truly ensure that they
are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence should be
done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.16 We
explained therein that [t]his step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious
and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits
based on planting of evidence under Section 29and on allegations of robbery or theft.
Significantly, PO1 Manalo and PO1 Mutia did not even mention that they marked the seized plastic
sachet in their Joint Affidavit of Arrest.
In People of the Philippines v. Merlita Palomares y Costuna,17 the Court acquitted the accused for the
prosecution’s failure to clearly establish the identity of the person who marked the seized drugs; the
place where marking was made; and whether the marking had been made in the accused’s
presence.
As to the subsequent links in the chain of custody, PO1 Manalo stated that he handed the seized
plastic sachets to the desk officer at the police station. Curiously, the identity of this desk officer was
1âw phi 1
never revealed during trial. This is particularly significant since no reference was ever made as to the
person who submitted the seized specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. PO1
Manalo, in fact, testified that he could not remember the person who brought the seized plastic
sachets to the crime laboratory. Notably, the specimen was forwarded to the crime laboratory only at
10:35 p.m. It was not clear, therefore, who had temporary custody of the seized items when they left
the hands of PO1 Manalo until they were brought to the crime laboratory for qualitative analysis.
The stipulation on the testimony of the forensic chemist does nothing to help fill the gap as regards
the custody and possession of the sachets from the police station to the crime laboratory. To recall,
the parties merely stipulated that P/Sr. Insp. Banac received a request for laboratory examination,
together with the specimen to be examined; that he recorded the receipt of the sachets in the
logbook and conducted a physical, chemical, and confirmatory test on the submitted specimen; that
he found them positive for the presence of shabu; and that he put his markings on the sachet and
placed it in an improvised envelope before forwarding it to the evidence custodian. Notably, the RTC
held that P/Sr. Insp. Banac "has no personal knowledge from whom the subject specimen presented
before this court was taken (sic)."18 Simply put, the stipulated testimony of the forensic chemical
officer has no bearing on the question of whether the specimen submitted for chemical analysis and
subsequently presented in court were the same as that seized from the appellant.
The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21

of Article II of R.A. No. 9165
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph
1,Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
a copy thereof. [emphasis ours]
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 9165, which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
[emphasis ours]
This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-
bust team, asPO1 Manalo himself admitted that the police did not make an inventory and
photograph the seized items either at the place of seizure or at the police station. In addition, the
police did not offer any acceptable reason why they failed to do a basic requirement like a physical
inventory of the seized drugs, considering that there were only three (3) sachets taken from the
appellant.
In the recent case of People of the Philippines v. Rosalinda Casabuena,19 we acquitted the accused
for failure of the police to make an inventory and to photograph the seized shabu. We explained that
strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug's unique
characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration,
or substitution either by accident or otherwise.
No Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties
The courts a quo erred in giving weight to the presumption of regularity in performance that a police
officer enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of ill motive that would induce him to
falsify his testimony. The regularity of the performance of the police officers’ duties leaves much to
be desired in this case given the lapses in their handling of the allegedly confiscated shabu. The
totality of all the procedural lapses we previously discussed effectively produced serious doubts on
the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame up and
extortion. We have previously held that these lapses negate the presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed by the police officers. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole
performance and should make the presumption unavailable.20 We also entertain serious doubts on
PO1 Manalo’s claim that they coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
before the buy-bust operation, as he admitted that there was no pre-operation report or coordination
sheet prepared by the police. Significantly, PO1 Manalo likewise admitted that the police did not
coordinate with the barangay officials of the subject area. To our mind, these circumstances vis-à-vis
the lapses made in the handling and safekeeping of the alleged sachets of shabu puts in doubt the
claim of the police that they had conducted a legitimate buy-bust operation.
In fine, the totality of evidence presented in the instant case does not support the appellant's
conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense. We reiterate that the prosecution’s failure
to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of
this Act, compromised the identity of the item seized, which is the corpus delicti of the crime charged
against appellant. Following the constitutional mandate, when the guilt of the appellant has not been
proven with moral certainty, as in this case, the presumption of innocence prevails and his
exoneration should be granted as a matter of right.21
A final note.
We are mindful of the pernicious effects of drugs in our society; they are lingering maladies that
destroy families and relationships, and engender crimes. The Court is one with all the agencies
concerned in pursuing an intensive and unrelenting campaign against this social dilemma.
Regardless of our desire to curb this menace, we cannot disregard the protection provided by the
Constitution, most particularly on the presumption of innocence bestowed on the appellant. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome this
constitutional presumption. If the prosecution has not proved, in the first place, all the elements of
the crime charged, which in this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant deserves no less than
an acquittal.22
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the April 28, 2009 decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02886. Sonia Bemel Nuarin is hereby ACQUITTED for
the failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institution for Women,
Mandaluyong City, for immediate implementation. The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution
for Women is directed to report the action she has taken to this Court within five (5) days from
receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza, per raffle
dated July 6, 2015.
1
Rollo, pp. 2-7; penned by Associate Justice Ramon Bato, Jr., and concurred in by
Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a
member of this Court).
2
CA rollo, pp. 104-112. In this Joint Decision, the RTC also acquitted the appellant in
Criminal Case No. Q-03-114919 (possession of dangerous drugs) for insufficiency of
evidence.
3
Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
4
Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
5
That he is a Forensic Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police, Crime Laboratory,
Camp Crame, Quezon City. That while performing his duties and functions, he received a
request for laboratory examination together with the specimen for examination. After
receiving the same, he recorded it in the logbook and proceeded to the physical, chemical,
and confirmatory test. After which, he was able to determine the specimen as
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. After his examination, he put his
markings on the sachet and placed it in the improvised envelope where he put his markings
and forwarded it to the evidence custodian and retrieved it for presenting at the hearing.
6
TSN, April 4, 2006, p. 2; see also Joint Affidavit of Arrest, Records, p. 5.
7
Id. at 4.
8
Id. at 5-6; Records, p. 5.
9
CA Decision, CA rollo, p. 90.
10
Id. at 12-20.
11
People v. Denoman, G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 257, 267.
12
See People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 176350, August 10, 2011, 655 SCRA 279, 289-290.
13
TSN, April 4, 2006, p. 5.
14
Id. at 6.
15
590 Phil. 214, 241 (2008), citations omitted.
The Court held in People v. Resurreccion (G.R. No. 186380, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA
16
510) that "marking" upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team.
17
G.R. No. 200915, February 12, 2014.
18
Records, p. 70.
19
G.R. No. 186455, November 19, 2014.
20
See People of the Philippines v. Jerry Caranto y Propeta, G.R. No. 193768, March 5, 2014.
Supra note 12, at 298, citing People v. Cantalejo, G.R. No. 182790, April 24, 2009, 586
21
SCRA 777, 783.
22
People v. Pagaduan, G.R. No. 179029, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 308, 326-327.

Chain of Custody Cases

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March 27, 2017

G.R. No. 206590

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Version of the Prosecution

The Ruling of the' Regional Trial Court

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The RTC Issued A Search Warrant After

There is no merit in this contention.

Confirmatory test-buy solicitation does

There is no merit in this argument.

The chain of custody of evidence was not established

There is merit in this protestation.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

(On official Leave)

alfredo benjamin s. caguioa

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

G.R. No. 179749

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

The pack of shabu is hereby ordered confiscated for proper disposition.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 18 May 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Ruling of the Court

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Acting Chief Justice

G.R. No. 208093

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. 5021 (19952)

In Criminal Case No. 5022 (19953)

Version of the Prosecution

Culled from the records4 were the following operative facts:

Version of the Defense

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The dispositive part of the Judgment of the RTC reads:

Cost against the accused.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA disposed as fol1ows:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN

The appeal is meritorious.

The pertinent provisions of Section 21 state:

Furthermore, in People v. Gonzales,15 the Court explained that:

RSP II Ivan C. Mendoza, Jr.:

A: [In] his left-front pocket.

A: [They were] wrapped in a [golden-colored] cigarette paper.

Q: Why will you be able to remember it?

Q: Who is the investigator?

A: PO2 Rodolfo Tan.

A: He marked his initial [sic].

Q: Ah, you saw him [mark] an initial?

Q: What did you see him [mark] on the paper?

Q: And do you know the meaning of RDT?

A: Yes, Rodolfo Dagalea Tan. 16

Q: Who was the desk officer?

COURT: You are referring to the desk officer?

RSPII IVAN C. MENDOZA, JR.: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: After turning it over, you left?

Q: You do not know what happened to the sachet?

Q: You did not place your markings there?

4th ACP RAY Z. BONGABONG:

A: Through my initial, Sir.

Q: What does RDT stands [sic] for?