TAÑADA V.

TUVERA
No. L-63915
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

Facts: In procuring the enforcement of public duty, a petition was sought by Tañada, Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc (MABINI)
seeking a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. There is a need for Publication of Laws to strengthen its
binding force and effect: giving access to legislative records, giving awareness to the public of the law promulgated. The Official Gazette, however, does not contain publications
of administrative and executive orders that affect only a particular class of persons. The Official Gazette, as mandated by law, presents all presidential issuances “of a public
nature” or “of general applicability.” Also, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly recognized that the rule as to laws takes effect after 15 days unless it is otherwise (for some do
specify the date of effectivity) following the completion of the publication in the Official Gazette. However, the decree has been misread by many; for it has no juridical force,
but a mere legislative enactment of RA 386.

Issue: WON to provide publications of the law elsewhere, aside from the Official Gazette, as it would be essential to the effectivity of the said legislative or executive act that regulates
the acts and conduct of people as citizens.

Held: Respondents were granted petition to publish all unpublished issuances in the Official Gazette, serving as a response to the maxim “ignorance as an excuse for noncompliance.”
The effectivity of laws shall follow the notice to parties concerned, for such is a public right. There will be no retroactive effect for laws with dates which applied the 15-day rule
of publication in the Official Gazette.

Felisa de Roy v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the
death of Bernal’s daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand but that she was ignored.

In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roy’s counsel filed
a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.

De Roy’s counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable because said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can be binding.

HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.

People vs Que Po Lay

TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954

FACTS:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as
required under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months
imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:

It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published
before becoming

effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be
officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties.

Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

NPC v. Pinatubo Commercial

Facts:

Napocor questions the decision rendered bt RTC of Mandaluyong City Branch 213 declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 9 9-75 unconstitutional, which allows only partnership or
corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material to participate in the bidding disposal of ACSR wires for being violative of substantial due process, EPC, and restraining
competitive free trade and commerce.

NPC Circular No. 99-75 set the guidelines in the disposal of ACSRS to maintain good housekeeping in NPC installations and to generate additional income for NPC.

In April 2003, NPC invited bidders for public sale of its scrap ACSR. Pinatubo submitted a pre-qualification form but was denied, and asked for reconsideration and again was denied.
Pinatubo then filed a petition in RTC for the annulment of NPC Circular No. 99—75, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order & or writ of preliminary injunction.

RTC upheld Pinatubo’s position:

Substantive due process: circular had not been published

EPC: favored manufacturers and processors of aluminum scrap

Free trade and commerce: it only allowed a certain sector to participate in the bidding

NPC insists that there was no need to publish the circular since it was not of general application and was addressed only to particular persons or class of persons, namely the disposal
committees, head of offices, regional and all other officials involved in the disposition of ACSRs. It also contends that there was a substantial distinction between manufacturers and traders
of aluminum scrap.

Issue: Whether NPC Circular No. 99-75 must be published

Held:

NPC Circular No, 99-75 was merely an internal rule or regulation. It did not affect the rights of the public or any other persons not involved in the bidding process. It was merely a directive
issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 dated June 30, 2006 and resolution dated November 20, 2006 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.MC-03-
2179 for the annulment of NPC Circular No. 99-75 is hereby DISMISSED.

Pimentel V. Senate Committee of the Whole

Facts: Before the Court is a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order filed by
Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
(Senator Pimentel), Manuel
B. Villar (Senator Villar), Joker P. Arroyo, Francis N. Pangilinan, Pia S. Cayetano, and Alan Peter S. Cayetano (petitioners).

Petitioners seek to prompt the Senate Committee of the Whole (respondent) from conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal (Senator
Madrigal) against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on the alleged double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008
General Appropriations Act.

Petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would constitute the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were
adopted. On 14 May 2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

Issue: Whether or not publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity

Held: The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent
upon the Senate to publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in the subsequent
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.

The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the S enate that affect only their members are internal to the House or
Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.

In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings involve the Senates exercise of its disciplinary power over
one of its members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
provides that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee
of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. Respondent cannot dispense with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics
Committee had already been published in the Official Gazette. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are
affected.

NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

FACTS:

On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s
Republic of China.

The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that
Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions
on:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.

ISSUE:

Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

HELD:

The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine
of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”

2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation
and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters
relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
“received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third,
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26
hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subjec t to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Neri v. Senate

FACTS: In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions
relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the
NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that
Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and
that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of
the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo’s cabinet. And

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

TITLE: Aquilino Pimentel vs. Senate Committee of the Whole, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011

FACTS:

 On Sept. 15, 2008, Senator Pimentel called to attention the double insertion of 200Million appropriated separately for the construction of Carlos P. Garcia Ave and C-5 Road
which was said to cover the same stretch.
 Lacson further stated that when he investigated on the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then Senate President.
 On October 8, 2008 Senator Madrigal introduce P.S. Resolution 706, which states that there was indeed double entry of said project, with overwhelming evidence of abuse of
authority of the Senate President (Villar) to profit from such project.
 It also stated that the acts of the Senate President are indeirect violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical standards
of Public Officers.
 Therefore it was resolved to direct the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to investigate the conduct of Senate President Villar.
 On Nov. 17, 2008, Senator Enrile was elected Senate President and the Ethics Committee was reorganized with the Election of Lacson as Chairperson.
 On Dec. 16, 2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives.
 After consultation, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no members from the Minority in the Ethics Committee
 On Jan. 26, 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their representative to the Ethics Committee.
 Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand of the Minority no to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee.
 Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on the Ethics and Privileges.
 On April 20, 2009, Senator Villar on a privilege speech where he stated that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee.
 On Apr. 27, 2009, Senator Lacson stated that the Ethics Committee is not a kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with
fairness on Senator Villar’s Case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by Senate, acting as a whole.
 The motion was approved with ten members voting in favour, none against, and five absentation.

ISSUE:

1. WON the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of the Senator Villar’s right to equal
protection;
2. WON the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villar’s right to due process and the majority
quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint by the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon
publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

RATION DECIND:

1. The court does not agree with the Petitioners. – The rules of the Ethics Committee provide that “all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity
and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges”. However, in this case, the refusal of
the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members’ alleged irregular or
unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented if from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their
members to the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the
Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate.
2. The court also disagrees. It was reiterated that, considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of
the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villar’s right to due process.
The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceeding has been recognized and affirmed by the court.

Section 16(3), Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution: “Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.

This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules.
As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power
as will constitute a denial of due process.

x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted
authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and
publication.23

The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are
complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.
 VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 164815 February 22, 2008

VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 164815 February 22, 2008

(focusing on PROSPECTIVITY)
Petitioner: PSINSP JERRY C VALEROSO
Respondent: The People of the Philippines

FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Section Division, Central Police District Command received a dispatch order which directed him and three (3) other
personnel to serve a warrant of arrest against petitioner in a case for kidnapping with ransom. After briefing, team conducted necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts in
Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan. Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle.
SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner. They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. Found tucked in his waist was a Charter
Arms, bearing Serial Number 52315 with five (5) live ammunition.

Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to the
petitioner but to another person. Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD No. 1866 as amended.

On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitionerguilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine. Petitioner moved to reconsider but his
motion was denied. He appealed to the CA. On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition.

SC affirmed CAs decision.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into account that the commission of the offense was on July 10, 1996 wherein the governing law was PD 1866 which provides
the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

HELD:
(1) YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The law looks forward, never backward (prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non respicit. A
new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.(Exception and exception to
the exception on effectivity of laws).

PNB vs. Office of the President G.R. No. 164815

Effect of Retroactive Laws of Curative and Remedial in Nature

G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009

Philippine National Bank, Petitioner

Office of the President, et.al, Respondent

FACTS:

Private respondents are buyers on installment of subdivision. However, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lands in favor of the petitioner even though the sale of land was already
executed. Unaware of the foregoing facts, the private respondents continued to comply with their obligation as buyers. The subdivision developer later on defaulted and PNB foreclosed on
the mortgage and became the owner of the lots. A decision by the HLURB and OAALA ruled that PNB may collect from private respondents only the remaining amortization payment and
cannot compel them to pay again for the lots they had already bought from the subdivision developer. The Office of the President affir med this decision by declaring Presidential Decree
957*.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Presidential Decree 957 applies to sale of land prior to its enactment

HELD/DECISION:

Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, there shall be no retroactive effect of the law unless the contrary is provided. PD 957, though implied, intended to include real estate mortgages executed
prior to its enactment and therefore must take effect to protect the innocent purchasers from swindling and fraudulent manipulations and illegal scheme of subdivision developers. The
court ascertained that they will not follow the letter of the statue if it will not reflect the intent and purpose of the legislature, which is to uphold social justice and the protection of human
rights. It would also be illogical if PD 957 which seeks to oust the fraudulent practices would not be applied to existing mortgage contract due to some a technicality.

*Section 18: Mortgages. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it
is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such
utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his
option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being
paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereto.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC. G.R. No. 168129. April 24, 2007

FACTS:

On 1987, CIR issued VAT Ruling No. 231-88 stating that Philhealth, as a provider of medical services, is exempt from the VAT coverage. When RA 8424 or the new Tax Code
was implemented it adopted the provisions of VAT and E-VAT. On 1999, the BIR sent Philhealth an assessment notice for deficiency VAT and documentary stamp taxes for
taxable years 1996 and 1997. After CIR did not act on it, Philhealth filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA withdrew the VAT assessment. The CIR then filed an
appeal with the CA which was denied.
 ISSUES:

1. Whether Philhealth is subject to VAT.

2. Whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting Philhealth from payment of VAT has retroactive application.

RULING:

YES. Section 103 of the NIRC exempts taxpayers engaged in the performance of medical, dental, hospital, and veterinary services from VAT. But, in Philhealth's letter
requesting of its VAT-exempt status, it was held that it showed Philhealth provides medical service only between their members and their accredited hospitals, that it
only provides for the provision of pre-need health care services, it contracts the services of medical practitioners and establishments for their members in the delivery of health
services.

Thus, Philhealth does not fall under the exemptions provided in Section 103, but merely arranges for such, making Philhealth not VAT-exempt. YES. Generally, the NIRC has
no retroactive application except when:

1. where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based, or
3. where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.

The Court held that Philhealth acted in good faith. The term health maintenance organization was first recorded in the Philippine statute books in 1995. It is apparent that
when VAT Ruling No. 231-88 was issued in Philhealth's favor, the term health maintenance organization was unknown and had no significance for taxation
purposes. Philhealth, therefore, believed in good faith that it was VAT exempt for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 on the basis of VAT Ruling No. 231-88. The rule is that the
BIR rulings have no retroactive effect where a grossly unfair deal would result to the prejudice of the taxpayer.

GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001

Consunji vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May
9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The
employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
widow Maria Juego.

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.

2. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the

Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the

negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,

RULING:

1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established

without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur

unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the

injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa

loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the

inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.

2. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further

claims under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived theirknown right

of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of

petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to avail of a better

remedy than that of which she already had.

G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961

EMETERIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

Facts:

Emeterio Cui enrolled in the defendant university where plaintiff finished his law studies in the up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which
plaintiff was studying law in defendant Law College, he was awarded scholarship grants and his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after ends of the semester. Plaintiff left the
defendant's law college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos Un iversity graduating from the college of law of the latter university.
He applied to take the bar examination in which he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University. The defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87,
noting the contract that he signed which stated that in consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the University, he waives his right to transfer to another school without having
refunded to the defendant the equivalent of the scholarship cash and followed by Memorandum No. 38 that the Director of Private Schools issued.

Issue:

Whether or not the contract between Cui and the respondent university, whereby the former waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the defendant the
equivalent of the scholarship cash valid or not?

Held:

The contract of waiver between the plaintiff and respondent on September 10, 1951, is a direct violation of Memorandum No. 38 and hence null and void. The contract was contrary to
sound policy and civic honesty. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such
scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they
decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.

Mecano v. COA, GR No. 103982

11 December 1992, Campos, Jr., J.

Facts:

Antonio Mecano, petitioner, a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation, filed a petition for certoriari to nullify the decision of Commission of Audit (COA) in the 7th Indorsement
denying him of reimbursement anchored on the provisions of Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) in the amount of Php 40,831.00. Earlier, the petitioner was hospitalized
because of cholecystitis and incurred the abovementioned amount. Under Sec. 699 of RAC, he is entitled to allowances in case of injury, sickness, death incurred in the performance of duty.
Hence, the petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses to NBI Director Alfredo Lim forwarding the request to the Secretary of Justice. The request was returned due to the comments
of the COA Chairman stating that the RAC being relied upon was already repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. The petitioner resubmitted the request asserting that the Administrative
Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the RAC, including Section 699. Director Lim transmitted the request to the Justice Secretary who recommended the payment to the
COA Chairman. The COA Chairman again denied the request asserting the same reason and furthered that Section 699 was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of
1987. According to the COA Chairman, the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of
the Administrative Code of 1987. Eventually, the request was again returned to Director Lim with an advice of elevating the matter in the Supreme Court if he so desires.

Issue:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

Ruling:

No. The legislature did not intend, in enacting the new Code, to repeal Sec. 699 of the old code. The new Code did not expressly repeal the old as the new Code fails to identify or designate the
act to be repealed.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The
intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so
far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is
against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should
be read in pari materia.

G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.

Facts:

On December 3, 1965, Rafael Licera was charged with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle by the Chief of Police on the municipal court of Abra de Ilog, Occidental
Mindoro. In August 14, 1968, the court acquitted Licera on the charge of assault upon an agent ofa person in authority, but c onvicting him of illegal possession of firearm under the Mapa
rule (1967). In 1974, Licera appeal to the Court of Appeals invoking his legal justification to possess the Winchester rifle because he was appointed as secret agent by Governor Feliciano
Leviste on December 11, 1961 pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in People vs Macarandang . People vs Macarandang (1959) – the appointment of civilian as “secret agent” whom
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in the application of Mapa rule retrospectively?
Held: Yes, at the time of Licera’s designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his
apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit thereof in 1965, the Macarandang rule formed part of the jurisprudence and, hence,
of this jurisdiction’s legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967.

Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the
said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.

Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates and old rule, the new doctrine should operate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those
who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof.

G.R. No. L-10010 August 1, 1916

CHU JAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUCIO BERNAS, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant when on their cockfight match on the afternoon of June 26, 1913, defendant Lucio Bernas was declared the winner. Each
of said persons had to put up a wager of P160 before the cockfight. Plaintiff prayed before the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, that his own rooster be declared
the winner. Justice of the peace court decided that bout was a draw. Defendant appealed to Court of First Instance. Plaintiff filed his complaint, praying before the court to
render judgment ordering defendant to abide and comply with rules and regulations governing cockfights, to the stipulated wager of P160 and return the other amount which is
in safekeeping of the Cockpit owner. Defendant denied all allegations and moved to dismiss cost against plaintiff. On September 11, 1913, the Court of First Instance
dismissed the appeal without special findings. Defendant excepted to this judgment as well as to an order dictated by the same court on November 8th of the same year, on
the plaintiff’s motion, an order ordering provincial treasurer and if possible, Municipal Treasurer of Tabaco to release deposit of P160 and return to plaintiff Chu Jan.
Proceedings was forwarded to Supreme Court by means of proper bill of exceptions.

Issue:

Whether or not insufficiency of the laws is an acceptable ground for a judge or court to dismiss a case without deciding the issues.

Held:

Ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable
to a certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve
to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, are reversed and to
record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from where they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. In case of doubt, obscurity or insufficiency of the
laws, the court can resort to observe the customs known to the place and in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.

86 SCRA 542

G.R. No. L-42050-66

PEOPLE v. PURISIMA (1978)

DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE, SEC. 8, RULE 110

FACTS OF THE CASE:

There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed
by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the
Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential
element of the crime.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short)
No. 9?

There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood;
and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or
public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction.

HELD:

COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction
of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence.

S.D. Martinez and his wife, Carmen Ong de Martinez, plaintiffs and appellees,vs. William Van Buskirk, defendant andappellant

Facts:
Both parties agree that on the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila. When a delivery wagon owned by the
defendant which was used for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached, was coming from the opposite direction, the carromata in which the plaintiff
was seated went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of passing by, the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff
with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the plaintiff’s head and injuring the carromata. However, the defendant contends that the cochero, who was
driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was
tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the
purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee
failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground. From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited
a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code:

Finally, masters of directors or arts and trades are liable for the damages causedby their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver.

Held:
It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts
or performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved by the society, are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as
unreasonable or imprudent. The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone
negligent because of some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances. The court holds
that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in
the manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries. The judgment is
therefore reversed

Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales

FACTS: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the Philippines.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The
petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of Yao
Kee. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not proven valid in accordance with the
laws of China. Both parties moved for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws.

HELD: No. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other
fact. To establish the validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

In this case, for failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts.

CIR vs. Primetown Property Group, Inc

G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007

Facts: Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997.He claimed that because
explained because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes. Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of P26,318,398.32. Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit.

Revenue officer required respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim. Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. It filed a petition for review in
the CTA.
However, the CTA the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit as provided in Sec. 229 of the NIRC.
In addition, the tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each….

Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000
was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA and the CA reversed the decision of the CTA. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Art. 13 of the Civil Code should be applicable in computing the legal periods or Sec. 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987

Ruling: E.O. 292 should be applied in computing the legal period being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal
periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is
composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return.
Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.

Facts:

Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got
divorced in Nevada, United States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before
Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in
the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.

Held:

As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the allegedconjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered
married to private respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA
174 SCRA 653
FACTS: On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and the respondent to the case, and Erich Geiling, a German natio nal, were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal
Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated
a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child,Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to respondent, petitioner had a n affair with a certain William Chia and Jesus Chua
sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled
date, petitioner moved for the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied the motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both accused.
Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and fined.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent’s adultery charges against the petitioner is still valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing of charges.

HELD: The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should only be the offended spouse. The fact that private
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country in 1983, is admitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, with relation to the status of Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the
legal separation of the petitioner and respondent has been finalized through the courts in Germany and the RTC in Manila, the marriage of the couple were already finished, thus giving no
merit to the charges the respondent filed against the petitioner. Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner holds no legal merit to commence the adultery case as the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The temporary restraining order issued in this case was made permanent.

San Luis v. San Luis

During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luis’s dad) contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children.
On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974,
Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad, Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their Felicisimo’s conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993,
Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was
only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by
virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.

Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate Felicidad’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad may file for letters of administration over Felicisimo’s estate.

HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition
as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law
Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as
they must be alleged and proved.

The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.