1. NACAR vs. NISTAL
JAO v CA
G.R. No. L-33006
December 8, 1982
FACTS: Sometime in the year 1968 petitionerâs stepfather, Isabelo Nacar, incurred an
indebtedness with the respondent in the amount P2,791.00. Despite repeated
demands by the respondent, Isabelo was not able to pay. Thus, prompting the
respondent to file a civil action for the collection of money against Isabelo.
In the year 1970, Isabelo died. Respondent then filed a complaint in Civil Case and
entitled it "Claim Against the Estate Nicanor Nacar the Late Isabelo Nacar With
Preliminary Attachment".
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment, and to
order the return of the carabaos. In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction and absence of a cause of action. Mr. Nacar averred that
the indebtedness mentioned in the complaint was alleged to have been incurred by
the late Isabelo Nacar and not by Nicanor Nacar. There was, therefore, no cause of
action against him.
Private respondent Japitana filed an opposition to this motion while intervenor Antonio
Doloricon filed a complaint in intervention asserting that he was the owner of the
attached carabaos and that the certificates of ownership of large cattle were in his
name.
The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss prompting Mr. Nacar to come to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint against an heir of a decedent, who incurred
indebtedness, is the correct action for the collection of money?
HELD: The Court held in the negative. Under the circumstances of this case,
respondent Japitana has no cause of action against petitioner Nacar. The Court said
that, a cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of
the other. Its essential elements are, namely: (1) the existence of a legal right in the
plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant, and (3) an act or omission of the
defendant in violation of plaintiff's right with consequential injury or damage to the
plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief. Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to
recover an indebtedness due him, petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal
duty to pay the debt for the simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to
show that he incurred the debt or had anything to do with the creation of the liability.
As far as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the petitioner
had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with consequential injury or damage to
the latter as would create a cause of action against the former.
2.
GR 128314, May 29, 2002
FACTS: Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag
and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents
left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his
parents. Rodolfo moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of improper venue. He
argued that their parents did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at
the time of their deaths. Their actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, and
moved to Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for
medical treatment and hospitalization purposes.
Perico countered that their parents actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City
at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their
death certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia
Street, Quezon City. Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death
certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said
document.
The RTC denied Rodolfo’s motion to dismiss. The CA affirmed the RTC’s order.
ISSUE: Where should the settlement proceedings be had ---in Pampanga, where the
decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually
stayed before their demise?
HELD: Quezon City. In determining residence at the time of death, the following
factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had:
(a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice;
(b) physical presence at the place chosen; and
(c) intention to stay therein permanently.
There is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner’s Quezon
City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their
elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before they died in the
late 1980s.
The decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both residents of
Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who
filled up his late mother’s death certificate. This unqualifiedly shows that at that
time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mother’s residence to
be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death
certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, the Court clarified that the term “resides” means “
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile.”
In addition, there is no distinction between venue for ordinary civil actions and that for
special proceedings. They have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
“residence”, in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency.
3. Conde vs. Abaya
13 Phil 249
Facts: Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia
died on the 1899. Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and
Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya moved the settlement
of the intestate succession.
An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. However, Roman Abaya
brother of Casiano, came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for
himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased. The court declares Roman
Abaya to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya and to be therefore entitled to take
possession of all the property of said estate.
Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the
relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but that she considered her right was superior to
his and moved for a hearing on the matter. She prayed that she be declared to have
preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in the acknowledgment of
the natural child from Casiano Abaya.
Ruling: The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal
character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the child may exercise it at
any time during his lifetime. As exception, and in three cases only, it may be
transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit: if he or she died during his or her minority,
or while insane, or after action had already been instituted. Inasmuch as the right of
action accruing to the child to claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole
lifetime, he or she may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her
heirs. The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is not transmitted
to his ascendants or descendants.
4. Mabalot vs Madela
5. VIARDO vs. BELMONTE
FACTS: Spouses Pilar Belmonte and Bartolome Driz owned a land which was
the subject of acivil case. Upon the death of Bartolome Driz during the
pendency of the appeal in civilcase No. 161, these children were substituted as
parties.
ISSUE:WON the heirs can be personally liable for the civil case of their deceased
father?
HELD:No, the heirs cannot be held personally liable for in the civil case. Article 774
of the Civil Code provides, “Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of
which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of
the inherita nce, o f a p e r s o n a r e transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation oflaw.” Therefore, the heirs would only
be liable only to the extent of the value of the inheritance they have received.
The proper remedy of the plaintiff Viardo is to proceed against the estate of
Bartolome.
6. PAMPLONA vs. MORETO
FACTS:Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega, a husband and wife has a
property under theirname. They have 6 children and heirs who later became
co-heirs with respect to thespouse’s property. More than 6 yrs after
Monica Maniega’s death, Flaviano sold ap o r t i o n t o s p o u s e s
Pamplona without the consent of his heirs and without any
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The spouses Pamplona constructed their
house on the eastern part of. Flaviano died intestate and in 1961, the plaintiffs
demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house
and piggery on theground that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot which he sold to
Pamplona as the samebelongs to the conjugal partnershi p. The spouses
Pam plona refused to vacate thepremises, hence this suit.
ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners Pamplona are entitled to the full ownership of
theproperty in litigation?
HELD:Yes, they are entitled to full ownershi p of the property. According
to Art. 776, theinheritance which private respondents may receive from their
deceased parents includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by theirparent’s death. At the time of the sale, the co-
owner (Flaviano) as vendor pointed out itslocation and even indicated the
boundaries over which the fences were to be erected.Despite the fact that at the
time of sale, there was no partition of the subject propertybetween the co-
owners and Flaviano, as vendor, had ownership of an undeterminedportion of
the hereditary estate. Likewise, the heirs failed to assert their claim at
earliestpossible time and it even resulted to tolerance since for how many
years, they haveknown such sale. They are therefore obligated to deliver the property
to the petitioners.
7. Rabadilla vs CA
334 SCRA 522 – Civil Law – Succession – Transmissible Obligations
A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a
devisee to a 511, 855 hectare land. A condition was however imposed to the effect
that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the
lifetime of said Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants,
shall continue delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of
Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.
In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey
the said land to the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to
comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits;
and that the the land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a
violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja
pertains to the near descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr.
Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no
can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with the terms of the
Will left by Aleja Belleza.
HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The “near
descendants” being referred to in the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership
over the devised property was already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died.
Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same property was
transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights
Dr. Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time
of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the
estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon
his death. It is clear therefore, that Johnny should have continued complying with the
terms of the Will. His failure to do so shall give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey
the property to the estate of Aleja.
8. VDA. DE REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991
FACTS: During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of
approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located atSangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona,
Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens Systemof
registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been
issued to him. Theapplication was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was
the administrator of his property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6").
In the subdivisionplan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to
a specific heir. It appears thereinthat two lots, one of which is Lot No. 1A-14 (Exh. "6-
A"), were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino'schildren. Per testimony of Juan
Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations for theirrespective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of
title for the wholeproperty-OCT No. 255-was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan
Poblete, son-inlaw of Marcelo Reyes,who was by then already deceased. The heirs of
Gavino were not aware of this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431
square meters, moreor less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5").
According to the vendee, this parcelcorresponds to Lot No.1-A-14 of the subdivision
plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however, did notspecifically mention Lot No. I-A-
14. The vendee immediately took possession of the property and startedpaying the
land taxes therein.
In 1967, the surviving heirs gave effect to the subdivision plan created on 1936. They
formally partitionedthe property. Therefore, the heirs received their share of this land.
Including Rafael Reyes, Jr. Son of Rafael Sr. TCTs were issued to him representing
the land which should have been received by his father.
Now, the heirs of Rafael Jr. sued Gardiola, saying that they are the true owners of the
land, as shown by the torrens title over the land.
Gardiola’s defense was that he bought the land from Rafael Sr. and that Rafael Jr.
could not have inherited this land for it was disposed of by his father way before he
inherited it.
The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.’s heirs. Stating that there was no evidence
that the Gavino’s children had a written partition agreement. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA IS correct in reversing the trial court?
Held:
NO. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of
Gavino Reyes in 1936,although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that
requires partition among heirs to be in writing to bevalid.24 In Hernandez vs. Andal,
supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held thatthe
requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection ofcreditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. The object ofregistration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition notexecuted with
the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the
rights ofcreditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent
for the heirs of an estate to enterinto an agreement for distribution in a manner and
upon a plan different from those provided by law. There isnothing in said section from
which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to
thevalidity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
9. Suarez vs CA
10. Blas vs Santos
1 SCRA 899 – Succession – Promise
Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he had three
children. He also had grandchildren from his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta
Cruz died. In 1899, Blas married Maxima Santos (they had no children) but the
properties he and his former wife acquired during the first marriage were not
liquidated.
In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in favor of
Maxima the other half for payment of debts, Blas also named a few devisees and
legatees therein. In lieu of this, Maxima executed a document whereby she intimated
that she understands the will of her husband; that she promises that she’ll be giving,
upon her death, one-half of the properties she’ll be acquiring to the heirs and legatees
named in the will of his husband; that she can select or choose any of them depending
upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said
legatees/heirs/devisees.
In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became
administratrix of her estate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon
Blas in his first marriage, together with three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs
of Simeon Blas), learned that Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it was learned that
Maxima only disposed not even one-tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon
Blas.
The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas’ property
precisely because Maxima promised that they’ll be receiving properties upon her
death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of
Maxima.
HELD: Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a
will (it lacks the formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise
was actually executed to avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas’ estate) hence it is a
compromise.
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for
the reason that the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It
is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the
conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or
declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband.
Justice Bautista Angelo, dissenting:
It should be noted that Maxima Santos’ promise to transmit is predicated on the
condition that she can freely choose and select from among the heirs and legatees of
her husband those to whom she would like to give and bequeath depending on the
respect, service and companionship that they may render to her. Her commitment is
not an absolute promise to give to all but only to whom she may choose and select.
And here this promise has been substantially complied with when she disposed one-
tenth of the property to some legatees named in Simeon’s will.
11. Aruego Jr vs CA
264 SCRA 711 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Application of Laws – No retroactive
effect if vested rights are impaired
On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights was filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and
alleged the sister Evelyn Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The
complaint was opposed by the legitimate children of Jose Aruego Jr.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari was
then filed alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August
3, 1988 shall have a retroactive effect thereby the trial court lost jurisdiction over the
complaint on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive effect in the case.
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect in so far as the instant case is concerned as its application will prejudice the
vested rights of respondents to have her case be decided under Article 285 of the Civil
Code. It is a well settled reception that laws shall have a retroactive effect unless it
would impair vested rights. Therefore, the Family Code in this case cannot be given a
retroactive effect.
12. Acap vs CA
Facts: Felixberto Oruma sold his inherited land to Cosme Pido, which land is rented
by petitioner Teodoro Acap. When Cosme died intestate, his heirs executed a
“Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” in favor of private respondent Edy delos
Reyes. Respondent informed petitioner of his claim over the land, and petitioner paid
the rental to him in 1982. However in subsequent years, petitioner refused to pay the
rental, which prompted respondent to file a complaint for the recovery of possession
and damages. Petitioner averred that he continues to recognize Pido as the owner of
the land, and that he will pay the accumulated rentals to Pido’s widow upon her return
from abroad. The lower court ruled in favor of private respondent.
Issues:
(1) Whether the “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” is a recognized mode
of acquiring ownership by private respondent
(2) Whether the said document can be considered a deed of sale in favor of private
respondent
Held: An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a
juridical act, however justified, is not per sesufficient to give rise to ownership over
the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by
law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or
process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of
acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price
certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and
waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds
whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent
among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between
the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Hence, there is a marked difference
between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first
presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second
is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an
abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its
existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in
the succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme
Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the
waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or
any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered
owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in court at some future date, and is
no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in
court. It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven,
there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme
Pido's heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in
favor of private respondent. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the
tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the
OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent's name. Consequently, while
the transaction between Pido's heirs and private respondent may be binding on both
parties, the right of petitioner as a registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily
forfeited on a mere allegation of private respondent's ownership without the
corresponding proof thereof.