Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 12

PAGARIGAN VS YAGUE

FACTS:
Anastacio Yague (Anastacio), the previous owner of a parcel of rice land located at Brgy. San Carlos, Paniqui, Tarlac,
had initially instituted his stepfather Macario Pagarigan (Macario) as tenant of the land.Macario, with the help of his
son Alfonso Pagarigan (Alfonso), cultivated the land and, as agreed upon, shared equally the land's yearly harvest with
Anastacio. Allegedly with Anastacio's consent, Alfonso became tenant of the land in place of his ailing father sometime
in 1957. Subsequently, Anastacio transferred the title of the subject rice land to his daughters, Angelita Yague and
Shirley Asuncion (respondents). The respondents were prompted to conduct an investigation when they did not
receive any share in the land's harvest in 1999 where they found out that the petitoner, Antonio Pagarigan, is the one
cultivating their land without their consent. The respondents demanded that the petitioner vacate the property. They
also argued that the petitioner's house and the two fishponds on the property were constructed without their
knowledge and consent,and that the petitioner even allowed his son to build a house on the property without first
seeking their permission.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that his father Anastacio consented to his institution as tenant of the land
and to the construction of his house on the property. He also argues that an implied tenancy was already created
between him and the respondents because of the latter's acceptance of his deliveries of palay.

Failure of the parties to reach a settlement before the barangay and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office resulted in
the ejectment complaint the respondents filed against the petitioner before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator, DARAB, Region III, which ruled in favor of the respondents. The said decision was affirmed by the
CA.

ISSUE: Is there an implied tenancy between the respondents and the petitioner?

RULING: None. The SC enumerated the essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship which are the
following: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the
relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. The SC
ruled that in the present case, the element of consent from the landowner to the petitioner's tenancy is absent.

The SC also held that occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land, no matter hew long, will not ipso facto make
one a de jure tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove personal cultivation, sharing of
harvest, or consent of the landowner. It emphasized that the presence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed
since the elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be done away with by mere conjectures. Leasehold
relationship is not brought about by the mere congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of
the parties to that relationship should be primordial.

CALUZOR vs. LLANILLO

FACTS:
Lorenzo Llanillo owned the parcel of land (land) situated in Loma de Gato, Marilao, Bulacan. The petitioner averred
that Lorenzo took him into the land as a tenant in 1970, giving to him a sketch that indicated the boundaries of the
portion he would be cultivating. To effectively till the land, the petitioner and his family were allowed to build a
makeshift shanty thereon. Even after the death of Lorenzo, the petitioner continued giving a share of his produce to
the family of Lorenzo through Ricardo Martin (Ricardo), Lorenzo’s overseer.

Respondent Deogracias Lanillo (Deogracias), the son of Lorenzo, offered to pay the petitioner P17,000.00/hectare of
the cultivated land in exchange for turning his tillage over to Deogracias. In the end, Deogracias did not pay the
petitioner. Instead, Deogracias and persons acting under his orders forcibly ejected the petitioner and his family by
levelling their shanty and plantation with the use of a bulldozer. The efforts of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council
to conciliate failed; hence, the authority to file a case was issued to the petitioner.
The petitioner instituted this case against Deogracias in the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) in Malolos, Bulacan, demanding the payment of disturbance compensation. He impleaded Moldex Realty
Corporation (Moldex) as an additional defendant upon discovering that the latter had entered the land to develop it
into a residential subdivision. He prayed for the restoration of his possession of the tilled land, and the payment of
disturbance compensation.

Deogracias denied that any tenancy relationship between him and the petitioner existed; and that the land in
controversy had not been tenanted.

ISSUE:
1. WON tenancy relationship exists between the petitioner and the respondent Deogracias.
2. WON the petitioner is entitled to the payment of disturbance compensation.
RULING:
1. According to the SC, For tenancy relationship to exist, therefore, the following elements must be shown to concur,
to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose is of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is
shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. The presence of all these elements must be proved
by substantial evidence; this means that the absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant.
Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure or to be
covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
The third and sixth elements of agricultural tenancy were not shown to be presented in this case. To prove the
element of consent between the parties, the petitioner testified that Lorenzo had allowed him to cultivate the
land by giving to him the sketch of the lot in order to delineate the portion for his tillage.
Yet, the sketch did not establish that Lorenzo had categorically taken the petitioner in as his agricultural tenant.
This element demanded that the landowner and the tenant should have agreed to the relationship freely and
voluntarily, with neither of them unduly imposing his will on the other. The petitioner did not make such a showing
of consent.

The sixth element was not also established. Even assuming that Lorenzo had verbally permitted the petitioner to
cultivate his land, no tenancy relationship between them thereby set in because they had not admittedly discussed
any fruit sharing scheme, with Lorenzo simply telling him simply that he would just ask his share from him.32 The
petitioner disclosed that he did not see Lorenzo again from the time he had received the sketch until Lorenzo’s
death.33 Although the petitioner asserted that he had continued sharing the fruits of his cultivation through Ricardo,
Lorenzo’s caretaker, even after Lorenzo’s death, producing the list of produce to support his claim,34 the list did not
indicate Ricardo’s receiving the fruits listed therein. The petitioner did not also contain Ricardo’s authority to receive
Leonardo’s share.
Harvest sharing is a vital element of every tenancy. Common sense dictated, indeed, that the petitioner, if he were
the de jure tenant that he represented himself to be, should fully know his arrangement with the landowner. But he
did not sufficiently and persuasively show such arrangement. His inability to specify the sharing arrangement was
inconceivable inasmuch as he had depended on the arrangement for his own sustenance and that of his own family.
The absence of the clear-cut sharing agreement between him and Lorenzo could only signify that the latter had merely
tolerated his having tilled the land sans tenancy.
It has been repeatedly held that occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make one a de
jure tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or
consent of the landowner. Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere
scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove the element of sharing. To prove
sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must be presented, because selfserving statements are
inadequate. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot
be done away with by conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not brought about by the mere congruence of facts but,
being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be primordial. For implied tenancy
to arise it is necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be present.
2. The petitioner was not entitled to disturbance compensation because he was not the de jure tenant of the
landowner. It is timely to remind that any claim for disturbance compensation to be validly made by a de jure
tenant must meet the procedural and substantive conditions listed in Section 25 of Republic Act No. 3844, to wit:

Section 25. Right to be Indemnified for Labor - The agricultural lessee shall have the right to be indemnified for the
cost and expenses incurred in the cultivation, planting or harvesting and other expenses incidental to the
improvement of his crop in case he surrenders or abandons his landholding for just cause or is eje ition, he has the
right to be indemnified for one-half of the necessary and useful improvements made by him on the landholding:
Provided, That these improvements are tangible and have not yet lost their utility at the time of surrender and/or
abandonment of the landholding, at which time their value shall be determined for the purpose of the indemnity
for improvements.

OFIDALA VS ANDAL

FACTS:
Irene, together with her husband Carlos Ofilada, bought from the heirs of Teresita Liwag a parcel of land located in
Barrio Puri, Tiaong, Quezon. The sale was brokered by Miraflor Andal, signed as the tenant of the said land. Two weeks
after the sale, Miraflor with the consent of her husband, Ruben Andal, executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein she
acknowledged Irene and Carlos as the new owners of the Property. On the Sinumpaang Salaysay, it is stated there
that Miraflor will continue to take care of the property and waived any tenacy rights that she and her husband might
haveover the land. Eventually, the land was registered in the names of Irene and Carlos.

8 years later, Irene filled a case for Ejectment against the spouses Andal. She said that the latter would not be
considered as tenants because the spouses Andal waived any tenacy rights in the said Sinumpaang Salaysay. However,
the spouses Andal claimed that they were tenants of Irene's predecessor-in-interest and continued to be such despite
the transfer of ownership of the properties to Irene. However, Irene stressed that the spouses Andal voluntarily
surrendered their rights as tenants as evidenced in the Sinumpaang Salaysay.

ISSUE: WON a new tenancy relationship between Irene and the spouses Andal was subsequently formed.

RULING: The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a
purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also legal relationship.

The fact alone of working on another’s landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural
tenancy. For tenancy to be proven, all indispensable elements must be established, the absence of one or more
requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto one. These are: 1)the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent by the landowner; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5)
there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of the harvests.

The Pagpapatunay and the Sinumpaang Salaysay both support Irene’s claim that she purchased the landholdings only
on the condition that there will be no tenants. Her refusal to give her consent to any tenancy relationship is glaring.
On the other hand, the spouses Andal, in their attempt to prove tenancy, submitted their copy of the February 27,
1997 Affidavit of Landholding, which contains an inserted statement that Irene and Carlos agree "that the same tenant
Miraflor Andal, will continue as tenant, over the said parcel of land." However, serious doubt is cast on the authenticity
of said inserted statement considering that it does not bear the respective initials/signatures of Carlos and Irene
attesting their conformity thereto. More importantly, Irene’s copy of the said document does not contain the same
insertion.

CABALLES VS DAR

FACTS: The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square meters was acquired by
the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes (petitioner) executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes (Andrea) in 1978. This
landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters, situated at Lawa-an, Talisay,
Cebu, which was also sold to the petioner spouses.
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house
on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of ₱2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner
likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both
on a fifty-fifty basis.

As new owners, the spouses asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying they needed the property, but Abajon
refused. On 1982, Yolanda Caballes filed a criminal case for malicious mischief against Abajon after the latter cut down
the banana plants on the property worth about ₱50.00.

The Regional Director of DAR held that there is the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. On appeal
by the petitioner, the Secretary of DAR, reversed the decision of the Regional Director. Upon motion for
reconsideration filed by the private respondent, the New DAR Secretary sets aside the previous decision and finds the
existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties (because of the 50-50 sharing of the crops ebtween Abajon
and Andrea. Invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, the MAR ruled that 'the new owners are legally bound to
respect the tenancy.

ISSUE: WoN the respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating only a 60-square meter
portion of a commercial lot of the petitioner

RULING: No. The SC ruled that RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm
land that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient
to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education with
possible allowance for payment of yearly instalments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly
fluctuations in income."

The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square meter lot. Thus, the
order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary to the declared policy of the said law. The SC also ruled that the fact
of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to
accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. All the requisites must concur
in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties.
Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of
agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a
caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a
garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion. Agricultural production as the
primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the private respondent was never a tenant of the
former owner, Andrea Millenes.

TRINIDAD GABRIEL vs. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN


FACTS:
The plaintiff seeks to eject the defendant from the fishpond which is under lease to the defendant in this case, who,
however, refuses to vacate. Instead, he has impugned the jurisdiction of the trial court of Pampanga contending that
the action should have been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations, which has original and exclusive jurisdiction,
as their relationship is one of leasehold tenancy.
It appears that the fishpond is presently in the possession of the defendant, who originally leased it from the father
of the plaintiff. Upon the death of the said father, the fishpond was inherited by the plaintiff.
It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of helpers the said fishpond since 1956
he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over. She testified that she helps her father in
administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan. Who is
residing near the fishpond, the other children of the defendant are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a
priest all residing in Manila. None of these persons has been seen working on the fishpond.
The trial court took cognizance of the case which ruled that The lease contract is manifestly a civil lease governed by
the New Civil Code considering the fact that neither the defendant, who is physically incapacitated, or his daughter is
Personally cultivating the fishpond or through the employment of mechanical farm implements, and the further fact
that the persons named above are not members of the immediate farm household of the defendant, the conclusion
is that no tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199
(par. Sec 4 and 9), as amended.
ISSUE: WON the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is that of a leasehold tenancy and not civil
law lease.
RULING: No. There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject
matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property.
As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the
agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose,
the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any
other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold
tenancy is governed by special laws.

There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which
refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus
Section 46(c) of said Act provides that "the consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds, salt beds and of lands
devoted to the raising of livestock shall be governed by stipulation between the parties". This Court has already ruled
that "land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land."5 The mere fact, however, that a person works
an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of section 4 of Republic
Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are complied with.

Assuming that appellant had previously entered in 1923 into an agreement of leasehold tenancy with Potenciano
Gabriel, appellee's father, such tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond
personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's immediate farm
household work the land in question. Only the members of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether
related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the farm
enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm household.”
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm
household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants;8
and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as
having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases
to enjoy the status, rights, and

OARDE and MOLAR VS CA

FACTS: Based on the survey in preparation to the Summary Lists of the tenant-tillers in Gotob, Camalig, Albay,
Zacarias Oarde was tilling two lots, Lots 17 and 18. He began to till the land in question when he got married to the
daughter of Francisco Molar. This was supported by the witness Gregorio Medina, President of the Samahang Nayon
of Gotob, stating that when Oarde register for membershipm he is informed that they are leaseholders. The
description of Zacarias is that he works in the field of others. Another witness, Gil Nabio, testified that he is the
neighbor of Zacarias and saw the latter tilling a land owned by Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero and saw him working on the
field. The wife of Zacarias, Melicia Oarde testified that as tenant-tillers, they gave owners share to Atty. Wilfredo
Guerrero.

On the claim of the plaintiff Presentacion Molar, she alleged that she is a tenant-lesee of the land in question
previously owned by Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero. She started tilling the land. She caused the land to be worked on Pakyaw
basis, hiring different persons for different work. She actually does not till the land. According to Zacarias Oarde who
testified in behalf of Presentaction (sic), the latter began tilling in 1968. She is not married and she only hires laborers
to till the land. It was Francisco Molar who distributed to his children the land they are farming. Presentacion hires
laborers to prepare and plant the land. She does not actually till the land

ISSUE: WON Molar is a lawful tenant.

RULING: The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are the following: (1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these must concur to establish the juridical
relationship of tenancy.

Markedly absent in the case of Petitioner Molar is the element of personal cultivation. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals found that Molar herself did not actually cultivate the land, nor did her immediate family or farm
household. Instead, she hired other people to do all phases of farm work. Even her co-petitioner testified that she did
not actually till the land and that she merely paid laborers to perform such task.

We agree with the trial court that We cannot have a case where a landlord is divested of his landholding and somebody
else is installed to become a new landlord.

We are not impressed by petitioners’ reliance on numerous certifications of administrative agencies that she was a
tenant of Lot 1. Assessing the evidence in hand, both lower courts concluded that Petitioner Molar was not a tenant.

QUA vs CA

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against private respondents claiming that she is the owner of
the 346 square meter residential land in Malinao, Albay, wherein the private respondents constructed an auto repair
shop and 3 houses. She further claims that the respondents' stay in the land was by mere tolerance and they are in
fact nothing but squatters who settled on the land without any agreement between her (sic), paying no rents to her
nor realty taxes to the government.

The private respondent Carmen Carillo, on the other hand, alleged that the lot in question is a farm lot [home lot]
because she and her late husband were tenants of the same including the two other lots adjoining the lot in question,
Lots No. 2060 and 2446, which also belong to petitioner; that as tenants, they could not just be ejected without cause;
that it was not petitioner who instituted them as tenants in the land in question but the former owner, Leovigildo
Peña who permitted the construction of the auto repair shop, the house of Carmen Carillo and the other two houses.

The Municipal Court found private respondents to be mere squatters and rendered judgment ordering them to vacate
and remove their houses and the auto repair shop. On appeal to respondent RTC, the judgment was modified by
ordering the case dismissed insofar as Carmen Carillo was concerned being qualified as an agricultural tenant and
declaring that the home lot and her house standing thereon should be respected.

ISSUE: WoN private respondents possess the status of agricultural tenants entitled to, among others, the use
and possession of a home lot.

RULING: No. The SC ruled that it is clear from the foregoing that the source of livelihood of private respondents
is not derived from the lots they are allegedly tenanting. This conclusion is further supported by private respondent
Carmen Carillo's assertion that the auto repair shop was constructed with the consent of petitioner's predecessor-in-
interest for whom her husband served as a driver-mechanic.

From private respondents' manner of caring for the lots, it is also apparent that making the same agriculturally viable
was not the main purpose of their occupancy, or else they should have immediately replanted coconut trees in place
of those that did not survive. Indeed, the location of their auto repair shop being near the poblacion and along the
highway, private respondents chose to neglect the cultivation and propagation of coconuts, having earned, through
the automobile repair shop, more than enough not only for their livelihood but also for the construction of two other
dwelling houses thereon.

The SC reiterated that the essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, thus: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) the purpose is agricultural production;
and (4) there is consideration. It is also understood that (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on the land, that
(6) there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the harvest. The situation
obtaining in this case still lacks, as discussed earlier, three of the afore-enumerated requisites, namely: agricultural
production, personal cultivation and sharing of harvests.

BEJASA VS CA

FACTS: The parcels of land in question are indisputably owned by Isabel Candelaria. Candelaria entered into a
three-year lease agreement over the land with Pio. In the contract, Malabanan agreed "to clear, clean and cultivate
the land, to purchase various seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants are thereon existing, to make the
necessary harvest of fruits, etc."
Subsequently, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it. The Bejasas claim that they planted
citrus, calamansi, rambutan and banana trees on the land and shouldered all expenses of production. Later, Candelaria
gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land, modifying their first agreement. As per the agreement, Malabanan
was under no obligation to share the harvests with Candelaria. When Malabanan died, Candelaria entered into a new
lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan,. The contract had a term of one year. Thereafter the Bejasas
agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with
a term of one year.

After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victorias demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the land
and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or a shared harvest. Candelaria and the
Dinglasans again entered into a three-year lease agreement over the land. Later, Jaime filed a complaint before the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems ("COSLAP"), Calapan, Oriental Mindoro seeking ejectment of the
Bejasas. The Bejasas filed with the RTC of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for "confirmation of leasehold and
home lot with recovery of damages against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan contending that a leasehold tenancy
was established.

ISSUE: WON there is tenancy relationship in favor of Bejasas.

RULING: None. True, Malabanan (as Candelarias usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas to stay on and cultivate the
land. However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give consent to the creation of a tenancy relation, still,
no such relation existed. There was no proof that they shared the harvests. Reynaldo Bejasa testified that as
consideration for the possession of the land, he agreed to deliver the landowners share (1/5 of the harvest) to
Malabanan. Only Reynaldo Bejasas word was presented to prove this. Even this is cast into suspicion. At one time
Reynaldo categorically stated that 25% of the harvest went to him, that 25% was for Malabanan and 50% went to the
landowner, Candelaria. Later on he stated that the landowners share was merely one fifth.

"Self serving statements ... are inadequate; proof must be adduced." Between Candelaria and the Bejasas, there is no
tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner never gave her consent. The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had
no contact with Candelaria. They acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanans
arrangement with them. True enough Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during Malabanans lease
possessed the land. However, the Bejasas claim that this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land
to the Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983. We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement,
consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the
Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such agreement did not create a tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease.
Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the land to bind
it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did.
Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between them is the "aryenduhan", which
states in no uncertain terms the monetary consideration to be paid, and the term of the contract.

SALMORIN VS ZALDIVAR

FACTS: On 15 July 15, respondent entered into an agreement with petitioner designating him as administrator
of the lot but did not comply with the terms of the agreement when he failed to till the vacant areas. Thus, Zaldivar
terminated his services and ejected him. When Salmorin refused, Zaldivar filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in
the MCTC (CC: 229-H). In his Answer, Salmorin alleged the existence of a tenancy relationship thus, the case was an
agrarian matter over which the MCTC had no jurisdiction.

MCTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction founding the case to be in the nature of an agrarian dispute. Upon
appeal, the RTC Antique found that consent of landowner and sharing of harvest (requisites for the existence of
tenancy relationship) did not exist thus, MCTC had jurisdiction and ordered the reinstatement of CC: 229-H.

ISSUE: WON tenacy relation exists between Zaldivar and Salmorin

RULING: Contrary to the findings of the MCTC, both the RTC and the CA found that there was no tenancy
relationship between Salmorin and Zaldivar. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. In Saul v. Suarez, we held:

There must be evidence to prove the tenancy relations such that all its indispensable elements must be
established, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is
sharing of the harvests. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or
more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.

All these elements must concur. It is not enough that they are alleged. To divest the MCTC of jurisdiction, these
elements must all be shown to be present.

Tenancy is a legal relationship established by the existence of particular facts as required by law. In this case,
the RTC and CA correctly found that the third and sixth elements, namely, consent of the landowner and sharing of
the harvests, respectively, were absent. We find no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and
the CA. The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of
agricultural tenancy. There must be substantial evidence on record adequate to prove the element of sharing.
Moreover, in Rivera v. Santiago, we stressed:

That it is not unusual for a landowner to receive the produce of the land from a caretaker who sows thereon.
The fact of receipt, without an agreed system of sharing, does not ipso facto create a tenancy. Salmorin attempt to
persuade us by way of a certification coming from the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee attesting that he was a
bona fide tenant of Zaldivar deserves scant consideration.

We note that agricultural share tenancy was declare contrary to public policy and, thus, abolished by the passage
of RA 3844, as amended. Share tenancy exists:

Whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the
land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant
cultivating the land personally with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the
produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant.

SAUL VS SUAREZ

FACTS: Petitioner Suarez owns a 23-hectare agricultural land in Poblacion Tboli, South Cotabato. a complaint
for reinstatement with preliminary mandatory injunction, recovery of possession and damages was filed against him
and Tboli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. (TADI) before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), by respondents Leo B. Saul et. al. Respondents alleged that they were
agricultural tenants in petitioners land on a 25-75 sharing agreement; that after two croppings, petitioner voluntarily
offered the land for sale to the government under a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and that they signed the documents
for the transfer of the land under the CARP as farmer-beneficiaries, and petitioner, as landowner; and that the sale
was approved by the local Land Valuation Office of the LBP

Respondents claimed that while the VOS was being processed, they were summarily ejected from the property by
TADI after the latter entered into a Grower Agreement with Contract to Buy with petitioner thereby depriving them
of their landholdings.

Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that respondents were installed as tenants, not by him, but by Wennie Gonzaga
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). He denied the existence of a growers contract between him and TADI
over the subject land. For its part, TADI claimed that its growers contract with petitioner covered parcels of land
different from those being claimed by respondents.

Subsequently, The Regional adjudicator found that respondents failed to prove their alleged tenancy over petitioners
land and that they only have an inchoate right to the land since its coverage under the CARP has yet to be completed.
On Appeal, the DARAB Central Office reversed the said decision and ruled that petitioner admitted that respondents
were his tenants. the DARAB and the appellate court relied solely on the alleged admission in petitioners answer to
the complaint That plaintiffs were instituted sometime in 1993 and were given three (3) hectares each respectively,
while for plaintiff Roger Brillo was given 2 hectares; the sharing of the parties involved was 25-75 in favor of the
tenants; after for two croppings defendant D. Suarez approached and offered the land by Voluntary Offer to Sale (VOS)
last November 1993 in our favor (plaintiffs-tenants) and the papers for VOS was processed in the office of Department
[of] Agrarian Reform (DAR) Koronadal, South Cotabato;
ISSUE: WoN respondents are bona fide agricultural tenants

RULING: No. The SC ruled that the said admission was taken out of context. While petitioner admitted that
respondents were tenants in the land, he qualified in paragraph 2 of his answer that it was Wennie Gonzaga of the
DAR who installed them as such. Clearly, it was the DAR who placed respondents in actual possession of the land upon
petitioners offer to transfer the same to the government. Other than this supposed admission, there is no evidence
on record to prove the tenancy relations. Respondents did not substantiate their claim with evidence to show that
they were agricultural tenants in petitioners land. They did not allege actual cultivation or specify the crop produced
thereby. Neither did they mention how much of the produce was delivered to petitioner or submit receipts to prove
the purported 25-75 sharing of harvests. They did not state, much less prove, the circumstances of their agreement
with petitioner as to the alleged tenancy relationship. Thus, there is no basis to the claim that they are agricultural
tenants on the property.

The SC held that a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove the tenancy
relations such that all its indispensable elements must be established, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests. All these requisites are necessary
to create tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de
facto tenant.

The DARABs reliance on the ruling in Tizon v. Cabagon, et al. that the landowner’s admission of the fact of
tenancy relationship is conclusive is misplaced. In Tizon, there was actual proof of tenancy relationship as the
landowner therein categorically admitted in the petition that respondents were her tenants. She also testified in open
court that respondents were managing or in charge of the lands. Respondents therein proved actual cultivation and
there was sharing of harvests.

Automat Realty vs Spouses Dela Cruz

FACTS: Petitioner Automat is the registered owner of the 2 subject parcel of lands located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
Since the land was not occupied, respondent Ofelia Dela Cruz volunteered her services to petitioner Lim (broker) as
caretaker to prevent informal settlers from entering the property. Automat agreed on the condition that Dela Cruz
would voluntarily vacate the premises upon Automat's demand.

Respondent spouses' family stayed in the property as rent-paying tenants. They cultivated and improved the land and
even shared the produced palay with Automat through petitioner Lito Cecilia.

Subsequently, Automat asked respondents to vacate the premises for them to start developing the property but the
respondents refused to do so claiming that they were agricultural tenants who enjoyed security of tenure under the
law. They argue that an implied contract of tenancy was created when they were allowed to till the land for 10 years.
Consequently, they are entitled to security of tenure as tenants. They add that the subsequent reclassification of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural [land] after the effectivity of the CARL does not automatically remove the land
from the coverage of the CARP [as a] valid certificate of exemption o[r] exclusion, or a duly approved conversion order,
must first be secured.

Respondent spouses filed a petition for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction and/or temporary restraining order against Automat before the PARAD for Laguna, which was dismissed.
The DARAB reversed and set aside the PARAD's decision. It declared respondent spouses as de jure tenants of the
landholding. The same was affirmed by the CA.

Petitioners now argue that (a) the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the property is not agricultural land, (b) the board's
finding that respondent spouses are de jure tenants was not supported by evidence, and (c) the essential requisites
for a valid agricultural tenancy relationship are not present.

ISSUE: WoN an agricultural tenancy exists between Automat and respondent spouses
RULING: No. The SC ruled that not all the elements to establish tenancy are present in the case.
The SC held that the land in the case is not an agricultural land. It is undisputed that the DAR Region IV-A CALABARZON
had already issued two orders exempting the property from CARP coverage. The exemption orders clearly provide
that the lands were reclassified to non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988, or prior to the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 6657 (CARL). Section 3(c) of the CARL defines agricultural land as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined
in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
"Agricultural land refers to those...not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for
residential, commercial or industrial use."

Note: Relationship between Automat and respondents is not agricultural tenancy but that of a Civil Lease. Article 1643
of the Civil Code provides that [i]n the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment
or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite. . . .

VICTOR G. VALENCIA vs COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

FACTS:
Victor Valencia is a government retiree who owns two parcels of land situated at Barangay Linothangan, Canlaon
City, Negros Oriental. One with an area of 23.7279 hectares and covered by TCT No. H-T-137 and another covering
6.4397 hectares under Homestead Application No. HA-231601. Valencia entered into a ten-year civil law lease
agreement with a certain Glicerio Henson. And later, into a five-year civil law lease agreement with Fr. Andres Flores.
The agreement was subject to a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering and against installing a leasehold
tenant without Valencia's consent.

Henson instituted Cresenciano Frias and Marciano Frias while Fr. Andres Flores designated fourteen others
together with the Friases to cultivate the land. Of the farmworkers, twelve became recipients of CLTs. Upon the
expiration of the lease agreements, Valencia demanded that the respondents vacate the premises but to no avail.
Valencia wanted to gain possession of his landholdings and had in fact designated Bernie Bautista to be his overseer.
Valencia filed a letter of protest but it was too late, the property was placed under the Operation Land Transfer
Program of the government and the CLTs were issued to the respondents. Valencia again protested but to no avail.

However, in February 1988, petitioner Valencia and Catalino Mantac entered into a profit sharing agreement.
No other respondent entered into any kind of agreement with the petitioner, Henson or Fr. Flores. Twelve years after
the filing of the protest, an administrative investigation was finally conducted. The report revealed that from 1975 to
1983, it was only Bautista who received the shares in the produce. Respondents only stopped paying when Bautista
refused to issue a receipt for such. Valencia did not receive a single cavan for the said years. to aggravate matters,
some of the respondents have even subleased their properties despite the pending protest of Valencia. While all this
was transpiring, Valencia and Catalino Mantac entered into a leasehold contract over a 0.0425 hectare of the 23.7279
hectares covered by TCT-H-T-137.

Valencia's protest was dismissed. The respondents were maintained in the landholding, prompting Valencia to
appeal to the Office of the President. However, the Order was affirmed with the modification that the Homestead be
excluded from the coverage of P.D. No. 27.

Valencia appealed to the CA but it was dismissed for having been filed out of time. His Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied. Hence, Valencia filed a Petition for Review or Certiorari under Rule 46 of the Rules
of Court.

ISSUE:
Can petitioner's civil law lessee, Fr. Flores, install tenants on the subject premises without express authority to
do so under Article 1649 of the Civil Code, more so when the lessee is expressly prohibited from doing so, as in the
instant case?

HELD:
A contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter
of the lease agreement. An extensive and correct discussion of the statutory interpretation of Section 6 of R.A. No.
3844, as amended, is provided by the minority view in Bernas vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 85041, 05 August 1993,
225 SCRA 119).

When Section 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes
the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally
cultivates the same, it assumes that there is already an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i.e., tenant or
agricultural lessee already works the land. The epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who are "Parties to Agricultural
Leasehold Relations", which assumes that there is already a leasehold tenant on the land; not until then.

From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a civil law lessee cannot automatically institute
tenants on the property under Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844. The correct view that must necessarily be adopted is that
the civil law lessee, although a legal possessor, may not install tenants on the property unless expressly authorized by
the lessor. And if a prohibition exists or is stipulated in the contract of lease, the occupants of the property are merely
civil law sublessees whose rights terminate upon the expiration of the civil law lease agreement.

LEASE AGREEMENT; Prohibition

Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant
without the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is
basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law. But certainly nowhere in Sec. 6 does it
say that a civil law lessee of a landholding is automatically authorized to install a tenant thereon. A different
interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation where a person who wants to be a tenant, and taking
advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a third person to become a civil law lessee of the landowner.
Incredibly, this tenant would technically have a better right over the property than the landowner himself. This tenant
would then gain security of tenure, and eventually become owner of the land by operation of law. This is most unfair
to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to realize
later on that he can no longer regain possession of his property due to the installation of a tenant by the civil law
lessee.

RETENTION; Homestead Grantees

With respect to the retention limits of land ownership by Valencia and his "direct descendants," the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law allows landowners whose lands have been covered by Pres. Decree No. 27 to
keep the area originally retained by them provided the original homestead grantees who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of Rep. Act No. 6657 shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate the homestead. The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall
pertain to the landowner, as a general rule. However, the factual determination of whether Valencia and his "direct
descendants" have complied with Sec. 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 should be addressed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform. Ascertaining if petitioner and his "direct descendants" are within the seven (7)-hectare retention limit
provided by Pres. Decree No. 27 requires the technical expertise of the administrative agency concerned.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP

In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals this Court ruled that the respondents' self-serving statements regarding
their tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship. The fact alone of working on another's landholding
does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence does not only entail the
presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be established; there must be concrete
evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing. Bejasa v. Court of Appeals similarly ruled that
to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented as self-serving statements are deemed
inadequate.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the relationship between Valencia and Henson, and subsequently,
Valencia and Fr. Flores, partook of a civil law lease. Henson and later Fr. Flores were not instituted as agricultural
lessees but as civil law lessees. As a finding of fact, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform held that a written civil law lease
contract between Valencia and Fr. Flores was on file which contained in clear and precise terms the stipulation
prohibiting the subleasing or encumbering of his parcels of land without the written consent of Valencia. The Secretary
even went as far as stating for the record that such stipulation barring the subletting of the property was violated by
Fr. Flores when he subleased the subject parcels of land to private respondents.
A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation. Hence, a perusal
of the records and documents is in order to determine whether there is substantial evidence to prove the allegation
that a tenancy relationship does exist between petitioner and private respondents.
The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the
parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied
with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.

Вам также может понравиться