Nitafan v.

Savellano
Notes: intent of the people that governs over the intent of

CIR vs Guerrero
CIR denied the claim of refund by the estate of Paul I. Gunn in the sum of P2,441.93, with Guerrero as
special administrator. Gunn operated an air transportation business named Philippine Aviation
Development

Claimed that “was entitled to the same rights and privileges as Filipino citizens operating public
utilities including privileges in the matter of taxation.”

PH enacted Trade Act of 1946, Sec 341 – ““the disposition, exploitation, development
and utilization” of all the natural resources of the Philippines as well as the operation of
public utilities.”

Embodied in Executive Agreement of July 4, 1946, signed by the President of the

Philippines (Roxas) and the President (Truman) of the US – appended to the Consti as
Ordinance

Recognition of right of US citizens to be the same condition as the citizens of the PH,
corporations, and associations owned or controlled by citizens of PH.

Commissioner on Internal Revenue disagreed: here must be a showing that the United States of
which the deceased was a citizen granted a similar exemption to Filipinos.

Court of Tax Appeals – no additional evidence introduced, viewed the ordinance differently– ordered
CIR to refund

WON the constitution entitles

No. tax exemption must be categorically declared in words that admit no doubt.

No such language may be found in the Ordinance.

Exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed. – STRICTISSIMI JURIS - the strictest
letter of the law. A process in which the rule of process shall be applied strictly or a document
interpreted strictly.

Strictly construed against the taxpayer

He who claims an exemption from his share of the common burden of taxation must
justify his claim by showing that the Legislature intended to exempt him by words too
plain to be mistaken.”
Vague implication such as is supposed to arise in this case from the omission from Act No. 1654 of any
reference to liability for tax

Established jurisprudence that exemption from taxation is not favor and never presumed. (Catholic
Church vs. Hastings to 1966, in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Customs)

First approach:
The categorical wording of the ordinance
- requires that all the rights and privileges thus granted to Americans and business
enterprises owned and controlled by them be respected, anything further would not be
warranted.

Another approach:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ORDIANCE
Justice Tuazon:

In April 1947 – strict rule against tax exemption was undisputed.

that a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light
and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. ‘Courts are bound to
presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing
laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they 8 express their
judgment and opinion in its adoption’
Justice Tuazon: “look to the history of the times, examine the state of things existing when the
Constitution was framed and adopted, x x x and interpret it 9 in the light of the law then in
operation.”

Early 1945 – American forces under General MacArthur, assisted by Filipino guerillas, ended the
Japanese Occupation in the Philippines.

Japanese Occupation – destruction of property and loss of lives. PH treasury was bankrupt and her
economy prostrate

There was a clear need of help from the US. US proposed by the gov’t and was accepted by the PH.
Philippine Trade Act of 1946 - “The disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all
resources (agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the) Philippines, and the
operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and
to all forms of business enterprises owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by 12 United States
citizens.”

Trade Act was embodied in Exec. Agreement – both the exploitation of natural resources and
operation of public utilities – reserved for Filipinos.

There was a need for an amendment.

Ordinance came into being at the time of the liberation of PH – game US vast reservoir of good will
that lasted long even to the date of the trials – even if there has been opposing views about the parity
rights –
"Parity rights" granting U.S. citizens and corporations rights to Philippine natural resources equal to
(in parity with) those of Philippine citizens, contrary to Article XIII in the 1935 Philippine Constitution,
necessitating a constitutional amendment.

Hence, the Ordinance (April 9, 1947)

Tax exemptions to Americans, based solely on the language of the ordinance, cannot be allowed.

Ordinance designed for a limited period to allow what the Constitution prohibits. – transitory
character

“states or ought to state not rules for the passing hour, but principles for an expanding future.”

should not be given an interpretation at war with the plain and explicit command of what is to
continue far into the future, unless there be some other principle of acknowledged primacy that
compels the 15 contrary.

CTA – enlarged the scopr and operatio of the ordiance. Failed to abide by controlling precedents that
tax exemption is not presued and that if granted, it must be most strictly construed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to it, to
grant respondent Administrator the opportunity of proving. No such grant was apparent on the face
of the Ordinance. No such grant could be implied from its history, much less from its transitory
character. The Court of Tax Appeals went too far. That cannot be done.

whether the estate could claim the benefits of Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
allowing refund to citizens of foreign countries on a showing of reciprocity. With costs.

IBP v. Zamora
Puno – dissenting – for sir political opinion is dead!
It is true that the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
expressly gives the Court the power to review the suDciency of the factual bases used
by the President in the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
declaration of martial law. It does not follow, however, that just because the same
provision did not grant to this Court the power to review the exercise of the calling out
power by the President, ergo, this Court cannot pass upon the validity of its exercise.
Given the light of our constitutional history, this express grant of power merely means
that the Court cannot decline the exercise of its power because of the political question
doctrine as it did in the past. In >ne, the express grant simply stresses the mandatory
duty of this Court to check the exercise of the commander-in-chief powers of the
President. It eliminated the discretion of the Court not to wield its power of review thru
 the use of the political question doctrine. It may be conceded that the calling out power
may be a "lesser power" compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law. Even then, its exercise cannot be
left to the absolute discretion of the Chief Executive as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, as its impact on the rights of our people protected by the Constitution
cannot be downgraded. We cannot hold that acts of the commander-in-chief cannot be
reviewed on the ground that they have lesser impact on the civil and political rights of
our people. The exercise of the calling out power may be "benign" in the case at bar but
may not be so in future cases.

JM Tuazon

Limits to Eminent Domain:

Just Compensation - Market Value
For Public Use
Equal Protection
Due Process

Miguel Cauderno - ConCon Delegate - p.8

Manuel A. Roxas
Gregorio Perfection
CJ Marshal, CJ Stone, J. Cardozo

Dissenting Opinion J. Reyes and CJ Paras in BAYLOSIS Case - against the current case

Restrictive Construction

Land will be divided to families of no less than 1,500 heads - most of whom are veterans of World War
II

rapid increase of population in the area - demands efficient housing program

land-for-the-landless

Veteran’s subdivision

Petitioner did not disprove the above facts ^ the prove that equal protection and due process were
violated

On equal protection and due process in the case - 13-14

Civil Liberties Union v. Exec Sec

Magtoto
Three consolidated cases – inadmissibility of their confessions – obtained from custodial interrogation
from a detained person who had not been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel
under Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution.

Petitioners:
⁃ Consti given retroactive effect
Art 125(2) of RPC, added by RA1083 (1954)
argued to impliedly granted detained person right to counsel and to be
informed of such
ConCom is not aware of said RPC when they were deliberating
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
"Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same,"

Interpretation of said Constitution – such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if
the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after
January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the
accused the right to be so informed before that date.

REASONS:
1.. granted said right for the first time no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in
evidence although they were not informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel," "and to be
informed of such right," because, We repeat, no such right existed at the time.
No right had been violated as to render them inadmissible

2. Art 125(2) of RPC, added by RA1083 (1954)

argued to impliedly granted detained person right to counsel and to be informed of such
The cited remark of Sen. Cuenco regarding RA 1083 was only a personal opinion. If Contress had
wanted RA1083 to grant such right to a detained person, it should have been so worded. Congress did
not do so.
- None of these statutes requires that police investigators inform the detained person of his
"right" to counsel.
- only allow him to request to be given counsel
 3. History behind Sec20, Art IV of the New Consti - shows that the intention is to give it
prospective and not retroactive effect

- Sec 29, Rule 130 of Rules of Court, Sec 2, Rule 113 of RoC - extrajudicial confensssion
admissible - prosecution must shaw that said confession was freely and voluntarily made;
presumption that no one would declare anything against himself unless suck declarations
were true;
- Administrative Code of 1916 — burden of proof changed. Admissible as evidence even
without proof of voluntarily
- 1953, People v. Delos Santos - must not only prove that it was obtained w/out
violence/intimidation, but also that it is false and untrue
- Moncado v. Pp, evidence illegally obtained is Inadmissible
- Meanwhile in US, Miranda v. Arizona
- PH rejected the Miranda doctrine
- When ConCon deliberated, was aware that the SC rejected the Miranda doctrine
- Miranda-Escobedo rule was expressly included as a new right granted to a detained
person in the present provision of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution.
- expressly made of record that "we are adopting here the rulings of US Supreme Court
in the Miranda-Escobedo cases."
4. Giving retroactive effect - great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country.
The Constitutional Convention could not have intended such a disastrous consequence in the
administration of justice.
For if the cause of justice suffers when an innocent person is convicted, it equally suffers when a
guilty one is acquitted.

Regarding Art 22 of RPC – not applicable in the case - Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code refer to
substantive penal laws, while the constitutional provision in question is basically a procedural rule of
evidence involving the incompetency and inadmissibility of confessions and therefore cannot be
included in the term "penal laws; and third, because constitutional provisions as a rule should be
given a prospective effect

On Dissent:

Calderon v. Carale

Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was
approved.
“The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.”

e. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161,
series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed BARTOLOME CARALE, the Chairman and
Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors

Petitioners: RA 6715 – has in its favor the presumption of validity

Sec 16, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution

Commission on Appointments (CA for brevity) to confirm appointments, contained in the aforequoted
paragraph 1 Sec. 16, Art. VII

Jurisprudence shows that: (Sarmiento III v. Mison, Mary Conception Bautista v. Salonga, Deles v.
onstititional Commission)
- Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential
appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII

- Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint

RULING:

limits the President’s power to appoint by requiring CA confirmation hen the Consti limits CA’s
involvement through an enumeration. Positions not included in the enumeration are appointed solely
by the President. Legislative Act cannot add positions in the enumeration by the Consti.

Legislative Act cannot repeal or amend the constitution.

Court’s interpretation of a written law has the force of law. It is merely an interpretation of the intent
of the law

If the Congress disagrees when the SC declares a law unconstitutional, can the Congress enact laws
that would change the interpretation of a law that was already interpreted by the Commission?
YES! It is a Congress prerogative so that the SC can change its position later on. The foundation of the
SC decision is no longer the same, can no longer serve as stare decisis because the foundation is no
longer effective.

Can

D. AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION/Interpretation
Notes from internet:
- History
- Social, political, and economic developments, and scientific inventions
- Reference to other statutes
- Dictionaries
- Judicial decisions

Legaspi v. Minister of Finance

Legaspi, member of interim Basatang Pambansa, wants PD 1840 declared unconstitutional
- PD 1840 - “granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some
other purposes”
- Issued through the legislative power granted by Amendment No. 6.: gives president power to
issue necessary decrees, orders, Letter of Instruction which form part of the law of the land
- PD 1840 promulgated despite the fact that the 1981 Consti states that legislative power is
vested in a Batasang Pambansa. Pres. may grant amnesty only with concurrence of the BP
- Amendment No. 6 not one of the powers granted by the 1981 Consti. New consti (Sec16 o Art
7) states that: powers bested to the President in the 1935 consti and the laws that are not
provided in the new Consti are vested in the Pres UNLESS Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise.
- Reconfirmation of existing-powers do not include President’s legislative power under
Amendment No. 6
- PD 1840 passed without concurrence of BP. Hence, null and void.
- ALSO, Amendment No. 6 grants power to President (Prime Minister), there is not same
position in the current government because the President and the Prime Minister are now
separate positions.

Issue: WON 1973 Consti, as amended by the Plebiscite-Referendum of 1976, retained the
amendments particulary Amendment No. 6, after the Consti was again amended in the 1981
Plebiscite?

Legispi:
- Amendment No. 6 is rendered repealed by the plebiscite of April 7, 1981.
o Par. 3 of Amendment No. 6 - term “incumbent president” only refers to then President
Marcos
o Since Martial Law is lifted, the President can no longer enact laws.
- Consti provisions approved by the people in 1981 do not include the limited legislative powers
granted by Amendment No. 6 to the Pres. It is tantamount to WITHDRAWAL or DELETION of
suck grant

Ruling: Insufficient merit.

RULE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: “The meaning and understanding conveyed by the

language, albeit plain, of any of its provisions do not only portray the influence of current events and
developments but likewise the inescapable imperative considerations rooted in the historical
background and environment at the time of its adoption and thereby caused their being written as
part and pah rcel thereof.”

1. Batasang Pambansa is still the Interim Batasang Pambansa created in 1976.

o Art VII, Sec 1, which gives exclusive legislative power to BP
 BP referred to is the regular assembly to be elected in May 1984
o Hence, it’s legislative authority cannot be more exclusive after the 1981 amendment
than when it was originally created in 1976. It still has the same function, responsilibty,
rights, etc.
o meaning of the text, albeit plain, of any consti provision do not portray the influence of
current events. it reflects the imperative considerations rooted in the historical bg and
environment at the time of its adoption.
o Legislative power vested to the Interim Batasan by Amendment No. 2 is read together
with the provisions of 1974 Consti (Sec 1 of Art 17 and Sec 1 of Art 8) is subject to the
external concurrent legislative prerogative vested to the President by Amendment No. 6
 (Review: Amendment 2 – created the interim Batasan Pambasa; Amendment 6 –
Gave legislative power to pres)

2. On the amendment in the Transitory Provision of 1973 (Sec1 and 2 of Art 17) automatically
making old congress the interim assembly
o People rejected in the referendum
o SC can readily imagine the people’s reaction would be the same if the 1981 proposed
Consti amendment affecting the Batasan would again have been denied by the people

3. On the argument that Amendment 6 gives power to the President (who also serves as the
Prime Minister) does not give the same power to the current President do not serve the Prime
Minister anymore
a. Again, the Consti is not merely a literal document that must always be read in its plain
and ordinary meaning of its words.
b. Must consider the political and economic situations prevailing at the time of the
inclusion of the provision/amendment
i. Amendment 6 - an addition to the four built-in measures to cope w/ crises and
emergencies [to make it practically unnecessary to proclaim martial law (unless
manifest extreme stituations that demand it) but nevertheless enable the gov’t
to meed emergencies effectively]
1. other four: (a) emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan; (b)
call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the
barracks; (c) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
(d) martial law.
2. Amendment 6 can only be exercised in two occasions (1) grave emergency
exists, there is threat or imminence thereof (2)whenever the interim BP or
regular BP fails to act adequately on any matter that requires immediate
action.
 a. Hence, may be exercised even when the Batasan is in session.
Allows to be delegated to him by Batasan in times of emergencies

Critics: Amendment No.6 and Martially is the same dog with merely a different collar. Martial Law in
disguise.
SC: Amendment No. 6 – limited, restricted, subject to conditions, temporary

How does Amendment 6 fit in the 1981 amendments, which abolish the dual position of President
Marcos of President-PM and separated these two positions?
- The phrase “the President (Prime Minister) is intended to refer to the person whom is vested
the total executive power under the government. Hence power vested by Amendment 6 is
conferred only to President-Prime Minister Marcos, but also to future Presidents.
- The parenthetical mention of Prime Minister in Amendment 6 is necessary to do so given the
governmental system that is existing at the time it was written

PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6

Vera v. Avelino
Pendatum against elected Senatorial candidates after claims of terrorism during the election in some
provinces, which led to their victory.

Did the Senate exceeded its powers when it prohibited senatorial candidates from assuming their
positions? Is it not the Electoral Tribunal who should judge on the validity of the election of the
Sentariables and consequently bar them from assuming the positions

RULING: Senate has the constitutional power to adopt its own rules for their proceedings. Senate has
the power to suspend, investigate, exclude and defer oath-taking over any of its members. These
powers and their exercise are presumed to be constitutionally valid and the burden belongs to the
petitioners to prove otherwise.

Section 12 of the Commonwealth Act obliges the winning candidates to come to Manila and hold
office. However, it does not remove any powers from the Senate to defer the oath-taking of any of its
members. Moreover, this provision should logically apply only to candidates with clear, unclouded
electoral victories. Given the issue of lawlessness in those four provinces (which affected their
certification of canvass),

Con Construction:

CONCON PROCEEDINGS is LESS CONCLUSIVE of the proper construction of the constitution than
LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS of the proper construction of a statute.

Concon proceedings – seeking the intent of the people though discussions/deliberations of their
representatives
Legislative proceedings – seeking the intent of the legislature
Writings of the delegates (book of Delegate Aruego) – have persuasive force BUT their persional
opinion on the matter expressed during the deliberation stand on a different footing. Their
conclusions may not be a better shade than in the eyes of the law simply on the account of their
membership in the Convention.
- If based on a fact known to them but not duly established or judicially congnizable – it is
immaterial. It is prejudicial to the party adversely affected, who had no chance of rebuttal.
- Compared the Constitution’s enactment to drama or in actual life
o Sometimes actors are fulfilling their emotional roles that they fail to watch other scenes
and look at the larger aspects of the whole performance.
o Perspective and disinterestedness by outside parties (non-members of the ConCom)
greatly help in examining actions and occurences

Perfecto dissent
Dissenting members: Delegates of the ConCon were co-authors of the Constitution and are in the
better positon to interpret the same Constitution
1. Power to judge “all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications” of senators
and reps is EXCLUSIVELY lodged in the respective Electoral Tribunal – emphasized by the word
SOLE by the drafters of the constitution
2. Drafters are in the better position to construe the very document they created
3. On Legislative Proceeding – intent of the legislature; ConCon – intent of the people through the
discussions w/ representatives
a. In neither the ConCon or the Legislature – people speak through their delegates and
representatives. Intent of the people may only be gathered from the utterances of said
delegates and representatives.
b. Both indistinguishable for all practical purposes. Intent of the people is identified with
the intent of their representatives.
c. No essential difference between the parliamentary role of representatives in the legis.
Branch and delegates in the ConCon. They have common character as representatives of
the people. In either the Consti or in ordinary statutes, it is the will of the people that is
expressed.
4. No one may pretend to know the meaning of the expressions uttered or of the provisions
written better than the very persons who poured on them their own thoughts and decisions.
5. On ConCon being influenced by personal opinions and convictions:
a. Either in a constitution or in ordinary laws are their own personal opinions and
convictions, their own individual and personal thoughts and wills, although in doing so
they act in their representative capacity.

De Castro v. JBC
Compulsory Retirement of CJ Puno – seven days after the Presidential Elections
Sec 15 of Art 7(Executive Department) – prohibits appointments two months before the next election
Sec 4(1) of Art 8 – vacancy in SC shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof.
De Castro Peralta – mandamus compelling JBC to submit to Pres list of at least 3 nominees

SolGen Argues: Prohibition on appointments only covers appointments to executive positions!

Valenzuela case applies even though it involves RTC. There is also imperative need for an
appointment during the period of ban – reduced membership of the SC – it will have no quorum or
should the voting on a particular important question requiring expeditions resolution be divided”

Petitioners’ & Intervenors - Arguments: Prohibition against midnight appointments also apply to
appointments to the Judiciary be the pres! Absense of CJ or even an AJ does not cause epic
damage/absolute disruption in the operations of the Judiciary. SC is allowed to sit and adjudge en
back, or in divisions of 3, 5, or 7, at its discretion. Full membership of the court not necessary. De
Castro’s fear is based on mere possibility. MORE IMPORTANTLY, (1) Sec 15 Art 7 makes no distinction
between the kinds of appointments made by the President (2) Valenzuela case ruled that
appointments by the President during the prohibition period were void.

On Locus Standi: Sues as Citizen and Taxpayers; Transcendental Importance

Justiciability: there is actual case/controversy. JBC already commenced with the selection of
nominees. Need not wait for actual vacancy considering that short list of nominees must be
submitted before the vacancy actually occurs on May 17, 2010

On the alleged conflicting provisions of the Consti: SC ruled that prohibition against presidential
appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
1. Records of the deliberations of ConCom
a. Devoted time meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Consti
b. Separation of the three departments per Article – true recognition of the principle of
separation of powers
c. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibitions contained in Sec 15 Art 7, They
could have have explicitly done son
d. Establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of
candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC
ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
i. it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of
the enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of
the enactment, because the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed
considerable light on "the law of the statute
ii. enactment should be construed with reference to its intended scope and
purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to
defeat it.
iii. JBC created to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of
the Commission on Appointments
2. Valenzuela doctrine did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the ConCom – Valenzuela
doctrine then reversed
 a. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the
framers rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
3. Use of word “shall” in Section 4(1) of Art 8 – imposes duty and should not be disregarded
4. Non-applicability of Sec 15 of Art 7 to the judiciary was confirmed by Senior Associate Justice
Regalado to the JBC
5. 3 provisions in Art VII regarding the power to appoint (Sec 14, 15, 16). Given that Sec 14 and 16
is clearly limited to the executive branch, Sec 15 is also limited to the exec branch – every part
of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. Every part must be
considered with the other parts.
a. Sec 14 – allowing succeeding Pres. To revoke appointments made by the acting pres –
also limited to the exec. Branch. No need to worry that appointment as CJ will be of
temporary nature when the Consti intends it to be permanent (prior to their retirement,
only removable through impeachment)

On Judiciary Act of 1948 – calls for an Acting Chief Justice in the event of a vacancy – No need for the
Pres. to appoint successor of CJ Puno immediately. Next president can appoint the Succession
SC Argument against this:
o Sec 4(1) and 9 of Art 8 – Appointment to the CJ is never an acting capacity. Framers
intent that the position of CJ to be permanent, not to be occupied in an acting or
temporary capacity.
o Judiciary Act – enacted under 1935 Consti where there is need for CA confirmation, and
the confirmation might take longer than expected

Carpio-Morales Dissent
Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving at a constitutional
construction
1. Cited Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Exec Secretary
a. Inferences drawn from title, chapter or section headings are entitled to very little
weight. And so must reliance on sub-headings, or the lack thereof, to support a
strained deduction be given the weight of helium.
b. Its interpretation fails to clearly establish that the so-called "ordering" or
arrangement of provisions in the Constitution was consciously adopted to imply a
signiHcation in terms of government hierarchy from where a constitutional
mandate can per se be derived or asserted. It fails to demonstrate that the "
ordering" or layout was not simply a matter of style in constitutional drafting but
one of intention in government structuring
c. Section sequencing alone of Sections 14, 15 and 16 of Article VII, as explained in
the fourth ratiocination , does not suffice to signify functional structuring.
2. That the power of judicial appointment was lodged in the President is a recognized
measure of limitation on the power of the judiciary, which measure, however, is
counterbalanced by the election ban due to the need to insulate the judiciary from the
political climate of presidential elections. To abandon this interplay of checks and
balances on the mere inference that the establishment of the JBC could depoliticize the
process of judicial appointments lacks constitutional monitoring.
3. Establishment of JBC not sufficient to curtail evils of midnight appointments in judiciary
 a. CONCON – fond tha the establishment of JBC is not enough safeguard from
politicization
i. Prohibition in Sec 15 found its roots in the case of Aytona v. Castillo
1. Among the midnight/last minute appointments were 1 SC justice
and 2 CA justice
ii. Clear intent of framers is thus for the ban on midnight appointments to
apply to the judiciary
4. General rule is clear, prohibition applies to all kinds of midnight appointments.
5. On Ponentia’s argument that JBC has until May 17 to submit President the list of
nominees for the position of CJ and that JBC should start before the occurrence of
vacancy
a. Takes the application and nomination stages in isolation from the whole
appointment process. For the ponentia, the filling of the vacancy involves only
the President. JBC not considered in the 90-days count
b. What if vacancy occurs because of death of a member of SC – JBC could never
anticipate the vacancy and could never submit a lit before the 90-day period
6. On ponentia’s implication that SC can function without a sitting CJ (p.37)
a. If Puno retires, SC will hve 14 members left, more than enough to form a quorum
b. Fundamental principle that there is only 1 SC. While most of the CS’s is
performed by its 3 divisions, SC remains one court.
c. One-member, one-vote basis whenever it sits enbanc.
NEXT NEETING. LEGASPI v. MINISTER OF FINANCE to TOBIAS v. ABALOS