Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature RICHARD RORTY Princeton University Press Princeton, New JerseyCoppeieh © 1979 by Princeton University Pes Fabled Wy Princeton Unierty Pe, Princeton, New Jere AllRghe Reserved tery of Gn Catalog Pb Da TS Paloophy. 2 Phiowphy Modern 5. Mind and tady. 4 Repesniaton loopy) 5. Anat {Pano 6 catnip Te IstNoberonas6 ISBN o-6p-080167 pk Pubcon of this book as en se by grant from ‘This took has bees composedin Linotype Buserile ‘Princeton Universi Pes books are printed on aie paper and neve gine or permanence sod diab of he Commer oo ‘es Cnn rook Lng oft Cnn on ibe Sand pring, ith rcs, 19 nt Pinon Popa pining 1980‘When we think about the fatute of the world, we always have a mind its being 2 the place where would be tH contineed to move ar we vee it moving now. We 40 Rot Fealce that it move ao ins straight ling, but in carve et that it direction consanny changes, Philosophy hax made no progres? If somebody wratches there iitthes, does that count as progres? Lot does that sean ie watt am auieniiescrateh? Not an authentic ch? Coulda this response to the stimulus go on for quite 2 ong tie wails seme fo icing i found? ‘Wenn wis an die Zukunft der Welt denken, x meinen wit sree en en, en een ha le eh EStuane ander (dug Witgenaein, VermichteBemer. INongen, Frnkers Sonn) ble Pilowphie fat Ieinen Forde gemach? Wenn Finer Simm iin echt Kesey oder Hen hes Joe Und hes ‘he dee Resiton tf de Reng lange Zee 0 welergeen, ‘hein Mitel og das Juke etme, wit? Ib pp "e6)Contents Preface Introduction Our Glassy Essence tz The Invention ofthe Mind ‘TE FUNCTIONAL, THE PHENOMENAL, Persons Without Minds [sTEMOLOGY AND “THE PHILOSOPHY Mirroring ‘The Idea of a"Theory of Knowledge” ug 311 2 3% 4 peer went justincarion Privileged Representations Epistemology and Empirical Prychology Epistemology and Philosophy of Language ‘raixine axour? ag 39 Ms 155 165 165, 3 se ge a5 215 250 4 231 "37 275 284 295 Philosophy 38 From Epistemology to Hermeneutics 315 ‘COMMENSURATION AND CONVIRBATION $35, KUHN AND INCOMMEENSURABIEETY 32 (OBJECTIVITY 48 CORREAPONDINER [AND AS AGREEMENT 333 SPREE AND NATURE Ms Philosophy Without Mirrors sor HERMENEUTICS AND BDIFLCATION 337 sourvine ruttocorny ss conjecrive rauvs a7 | IFICATION AND NATURAEINE 3 OF MANKIND 39 Index 395Preface ‘Austost as soon as I began to study philosophy, I as isn prewed by the way in which philosophical problems ap- peared, disappeared, or change shape, as 4 result of new assumptions or vocabularies From Richard McKeon and Robert Brumbaugh I leaned to view the history of philos ‘phy 252 series, not of altemative solutions to the same problems, but of quite diferent sets of problems, From Rudolph Carnap and Carl Hempel I learned how predo- ‘problems could be revealed as such by restating them in the formal mode of speech. From Charles Haruhorne and Paul ‘Weiss I learned how they could be so revealed by being. ‘wanslated into Whiteheadian or Hegelian terms. T vas ‘very fortunate in having these men as my teachers, but, for Detter or worse, I weated them all as saying the same thing: that “philosophical problem” was a predict ofthe ‘unconscious adoption of assumptions built into the vocabu- lary in which the problem was stated—assumptions which were to be questioned before the problem isef was taken seriously. Somewhat later on, I began to read the work of Willd Sellars. Sellars attack on the Myth of the Given teemed to me to render doubiful the assumptions behind most of ‘modem philosophy. Stil late, T began to take Quine’s Skeptical approach tothe language-fact dstintion seriously, and to try 10 combine Quine’s point of view with Sellars Since then, T have been trying to iolate more of the a ‘sumptions behind the problematic of modern philosophy, Jn the hope of generalizing and extending Sellars and Quine’s criticams of traditional empiricism. Getting back to these assumptions, and making clear that they are op- tional, I believed, would be “therapeutic” in the way itwich Carmaps original divolution of tandard textbook Problems wat "therapeutic" Ths book i he esl ofthat “The book has been ong in the making. Princeton Uni verity it remarkably generous with rexach ime and stb Satis, sof ebarrsnng to confess that without the further anisance of the American Coun of Learned Societies nthe Jon Sinon Guggenheim Menai Foun dation I should probably never ave writen it began chinking out plot wile lingam ACLS Fellowship in ‘ofiugy, and wrote the bul of theft draft while Rol ings Guggetei Fellowship in oy. 1am mont rate fal fo all tre isttions for ther anitance. Many people—nsdent at Princeton and cewher, aud est papers ivan at aro coalxenes, cleats and ftiendb—have read or linen to various dats of vatious fecions of thi book. I'made many changes of both sabe Stance and syle in esponse othe objections and am very fratfl I regret that ny memory oo poor ois cren the ft porn naan of ach ep, bot Tope that here nd there readers may recognize the benei ress of thei wn comment 1 do wish however thank wo peo pleMiche! Wills and Richard Berstin--who nade tery helpal comments on the penultimate version of the fntre book, did an anonymous reader forthe Princeton University Pros. Iam ako grateful to Raymond Geus, David Hoy and Jey Stout. wo took time out to elp me resolve latminte doubt about the Binal chapter, Final should like eo hank Lavra Bel, Per! Cav: aig, Lee Ritin, Carol Roan, Sanford Thatcher, Jean ‘Tllrand Dovid Velleman for patient help in wanstoring ‘hat I wroe from rough copy into a printed volume Portions of Chapter IV appeared in Neue Hefte fir Philosophie 14 (1978). Portions of Chapter V appeared in Body, Mind and Method: Essays in Honor of Virgil C Aldrich, ef. Donald F. Gustafson and Bangs L. Tapscott (Dordrecht, 1979)- Other portions of that chapter appeared in Philosophical Studies s+ (1977) Portions of Chapter VIL appeated in Acta Philorophica Fennica, 1979. Lam gratetat to the editors and publishers concerned for permision to eprint this materialPhilosophy and the Mirror of NatureIntroduction Pratosomrs usually think of their discipline as one which ‘discusses perennial, eternal problems—problems which frie a soon as one reflects. Some of these concern the di. ference between human beings and other beings, and are cstallzed in questions concerning the relation between the ‘mind and the body. Other problems concern the legitimation ‘of claims to know, and are crystallized in questions concern: ing the “foundations” of knowledge. To discover these foun dations is to discover something about the mind, and com versely, Philosophy as 2 discipline thus sees itself a8 the ‘attempt to underwrite oF debunk claims to knowledge made by science, morality, art, or religion. It purports to do this ‘on the basis of its spedial understanding of the mature of knowledge and of mind. Philosophy can be foundational in respect to the rest of culture because culture is the as semblage of claims to knowledge, and philosophy adjudi fates sich claims. Te can do so because it understands the foundations of knowledge, and it Snds these foundations in a sudy of manasknower, of the “mental proceses” or the “activity of representation” which make knowledge posi- ble. To know is represent accurately what is outside the ‘mind; 40 to understand the posibility and nature of know! ‘ge isto understand the way in which the mind i able to Construct such representations. Philosophy’ eentral concern is to bea general thery of reprevemation, theory which will divide culture up into the areas which represent reality Well, those which represent it less well, and those which do fot represent it at all (espite their pretense of doing so) ‘We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge” based on an understanding of "mental processes” to the seventeenth century, and expecially to Locke. We ove the notion of 8“he mind” asa separate entity in which “proce” oe to the sme period aod especialy t Dewars. We ove the notion of plowphy a ribanal of pure reson, pol ing er denying the chins ofthe ret of caler, fo the tightenth century and espeialy to Kant, but this Kanan tution prsuppoed Renal asent to Lochean notions of Inenal proces and Cartesian notions of mental bance In the nineteenth centr, she notion of philosophy 2 foundational dsipline which “grounds” knowledges vas omoldated tn the writings of the neoRantans. Oc Cavomal prot against this coneption of cltore asin ‘eed of “runing and against the pretensions of theory tt tnowledge to perform thi task (in, for example, Ni Cache and Wilt Jame) went arpelyonbear. “Phi Iosopiy" became forthe intellect» substi for rl Fon Hwan te area of ealtare where one touched betor, Where one found the soeabulary and the convictions which erie one ta explain and jsly one activity a an rales, and tho to dicover the sgiance of one ite, “Atte beginning of our centary this aim was efi by philsophere ootably Revel and Huser) who were ontrned to Keep philnophy "rigorous and “iene” But there was note of daperaton in their woes, for By this time the triumph o the tela over the Claims of rl fjon was slmos complete, Thus the phionopher could no Ienger see himoelf asin the ftlectal avantgarde, or a4 protecting men aint the Fores of sperion’ Further Brahe couve of te ninccenth century, a new form of fattre had arsenate coltre of the man of Teter the ileal who wrote poems and novels and pole Creates and rites of other peoples poems an novel fd tren, Dest, Locke, apd Kant had writen i ¢ 1 ers th hel a “en holo hi ek, ve an sins oe eit Seno woe 4 period in which the secularization of culture was being made possible by the success of natural science, But by the ‘early twentieth century the scientists had become a remote from most intellectuals as had the theologians. Poets and ‘novelists had taken the place of both preachers and philo- ‘ophers as the moral teachers of the youth, The result was hat the more “scientific” and “vigorous” philosophy be ‘ame, the les it had to do with the ret of culeure and the ‘more absurd its traditional pretensions seemed. The a tempts of both analyti philosophers and phenomenologits to “ground” this and “eritcize” that were shrugged off by those whove activities were purportedly being grounded ot criticized, Philosophy as a whole was shrugged off by those ‘who wanted an ideology or a seltimage. Tis against this background that we should se the work of the three most important philosophers of our century— Witigenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey. Each tried, in carly years, to find a new way of making philosophy “foun: dtional"—a new way of formulating an ultimate context for thought. Witigenstein tried to construct a new theory of representation which would have nothing to do with men talism, Heidegger to construct 2 new set of philosophical categories which would have nothing to do with science, epistemology, or the Caresian quest for certainty, and Dewey to construct a naturalized version of Hegel's vision of history. Each of the three came to see his earlier effort as seldeceptive, a8 an attempt to retain a certain concep- tion of philosophy after the notions needed to fesh out that conception (the seventeenth century notions of knowledge ‘and mind) had been discarded. Each of the three, in his Tater work, broke free ofthe Kantian conception of philoe ‘phy as foundational, and spent his time warming us against ‘howe very temptations to which he himself had once suc ‘aumbed. Thus their later work is therapeutic rather than ‘constructive, edifying rather than systematic, designed to ‘make the reader question his own motives for philosophis. 5ing rather than to supply him with 2 new philosophical rogram. ‘Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey are in agreement that the notion of knowledge as accurate representation, made posible by special mental proceses, and intelligible Uhrough a general theory of representation, needs to be bandoned. For all three, the notions of "foundations of knowledge” and of philosophy as revolving around the Cartesian attempt to answer the epistemological skeptic are set aside. Further, they set aside the notion of “the ‘mind” common to Descartes, Locke, and Kant—as a special subject of study, located in inner space, containing elements for proceses which make knowledge possible. This i not to ‘Sy that they have alternative “theories of knowledge” oF “philowophies of mind.” They set asde epistemology and metaphysics as possible disciplines. I sy “set aside” rather than "argue against” because their attitude toward the tuaditional problematic is like the attitude of seventeenth. century philosophers toward the scholastic problematic. ‘They do not devote themselves to discovering false propos sions or bad arguments in the works of their predecesors (though they occasionally do’ that to). Rather, they ‘limpic the posbility of 2 form of intellectual life in Which the vocabulary of philosophical reflection inherited from the seventeenth centiry would seem as pointless asthe thirteenth century philosophical vocabulary had seemed to the Enlighenment. To asert the possibility of a post ‘Kantian culture, one in which there is no allencompasing discipline which legitimizes or grounds the others, is not ‘necessarily to argue against any particular Kantian doctrine, any more than 1o glimpse the possibility of a culture in ‘which religion ether did not exist, or had no connection with scence oF politics, was necesarily to argue against ‘Aquinas's daim that God's existence can be proved by natural reason. Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey have Drought us into a period of “revolutionary” philosophy (in the sense of Kulin’s “revolutionary” science) by inwoducing 6 new maps of the terrain (viz, of the whole panorama of Jnuman activities) which simply do not include thore fea tures which previously seemed 10 dominate, This book isa survey of some recent development in. hi losophy, especially analyte philosophy, from the point of View’ of the anti Cartesian and anti-Kantian evolution which have just described. The aim of the book is to undermine the reader's confidence in “the mind” as something about which one should have 4 “philosophical” view, in "know- erige" as something about which there ought to be a “the ory” and which has “foundations,” and in “philorophy” as it has been conceived since Kant. Thus the reader in search ‘of a new theory on any of the subjects discussed will be dit appointed. Although I discuss “solutions to the mind body problem” this isnot in order to propose one bat to illus: trate why Ido not think there isa problem. Agu, although 1 discuss “theories of reference" T do not offer one, but ofr only suggestions about why the search for such 3 the ony is misguided, The book, like the writings of the phils ‘ophers I most admire, is therapeutic rather than construc: tive. The therapy offered is, nevertheless, parasitic upon the ‘constructive eflots ofthe very analytic philosophers whore frame of reference 1 am uying to put in question. Thus ‘most of the particular critcims of the tradition which I coffer are borrowed from such systematic philosophers as Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Ryle, Malcolm, Kuhn, and Putnam, Tam as much indebted to these philosophers for the means I employ as 1 am to Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey for the ends to which these means are put I hope to convince the reader that the dialectic within analytic philosophy, which has carried philosophy of mind from Broad to Smart, philosophy of language from Frege to Davidson, epistemology from Russell o Sellars, and. phi losophy of science from Carnap 10 Kuhn, needs o be ear ted afew steps further, These additional steps will, I chink, 1‘put ws in a postion to criticize the very notion of “analytic Philosophy,” and indeed of “philosophy” ill as it has Deen understood since the time of Kant. From the standpoint 1 am adopting, indeed, the difer- cence between “analytic” and other sorts of philosophy is relatively unimportant—a matter of style and taditon rather than a difference of “method” or of first principles. The reazon why the book is largely written in the vorabu- lary of contemporary analytic philosophers, and with refer- ‘ence to problems discussed in the analyte literature, i merely autobiographical. They are the vocabulary and the literature with which I am mos familiar, apd to which 1 ‘owe what grasp I have of philosophical isues. Had I been tqually familiar with other contemporary modes of writing philosophy, this would have been a better and more useful book, although an even longer one. As see it, the kind of Philosophy which stems from Ruseliand Frege isi sical Hussertian phenomenology, simply one more attempt to put philosophy in the postion which Kant wished it to hhave—that of judging other areas of caltue on the bass of its special knowledge of the “foundations” of these areas “Analytic” philosophy is one more variant of Kantian phi- lovophy, a variant marked principally by thinking of rep- resentation as linguistic rather than mental, and of phils ophy of language rather than “transcendental critique,” or psychology, 26 the discipline which exhibits the “founda: tions of knowledge.” This emphasis on language, I shall be arguing in chapters four and sx, doesnot essentially change ‘the Gartesian-Kantian problematie, and thus doesnot eal tive philosophy a new selfimage, For analytic philosophy it fll committed to the construction ofa permanent, neutral framework for inquiry, and thus forall of culture, Tt is the notion that human activity (@nd inquiry, the search for knowledge, in particular) takes place within a framework which can be iolated prior 1 the conelusion of inquiry—a set of presuppositions discoverable a priori— ‘which links contemporary philosophy 0 the Descartes 8 Locke Kant tradition. For the notion that there is such a framework only makes sense if we think of this framework as imposed by the mature of the knowing subject, by the nature of his faculties or by the nature ofthe anediusn with Jn which he works: The very ides of “philosophy” as some: thing distinct from “science” would make litle sense with ‘out the Cartesian claim that by turning inward we could find ineluctable truth, and the Kantian claim that this ‘ruth impotes limits on the possible rests of empirical in. 4quiy. The notion that there could be such x thing as “foun dations of knowledge” (all knowledge—in every fel, pat, present, and future) or “theory of representation” (all representation, in familiar vocabularies and thore not yet reamed of) depends on the assumption that there is some ‘uch a priori constraint. IE we have a Deweyan conception fof knowledge, as what we ate justified in believing, then we ‘will not imagine that there are enduring constraints on ‘what can count as knowledge, since we will sce "justifies tion” as a social phenomenon rather than a tansaetion be- tween “the knowing subject” and “reality.” If we have a Wittgensteinian notion of language as tool rather than rirrar, we will not look for necessity conditions of the possibilty of linguistic representation. If we have a Heideg ferian conception of philowophy, we will see the attempt tomake the nature of the knowing subject a sowree of necee sary truths as one more selfleceptive attempt to substicute “technical” and determinate question for that opennes to ted to begin thinking. ‘One way to see how analytic philosophy fs within the tr ditional Cartesian Kantian pattern is to see waditional phi losophy as an attempt to escape ftom history—an attempt to find nonhistorical conditions of any posible historical de- velopment. From this perspective, the common mesage of ‘Wittgenstein, Dewey, and Heidegger is a historcist one Each of the three reminds us that investigations of the foundations of knowledge or morality or language or society 9may be simply apologetics, attempts to eternalize a certain ‘contemporary language game, socal practice, or seltimage. ‘The moral ofthis book is alo bistoriist, andthe three parts into whieh it is divided are intended to put the notions of “ming,” of “knowledge,” and of “philosophy,” respectively, in historial perspective. Part 1 is concerned with philos- ‘phy of mind, and in chapter one I ry to show that the #o- called intuitions which Iie behind Cartesian dualism are ‘ones which have » historical origin. In chapter two, I try to show how these intuitions would be changed if physiological methods of prediction and contrl took the place of psy- chological methods ‘Pat it is concerned with epistemology and with recent attempts find “succesor subjects” to epistemology. Chap- ter three decrbes the genesis of the notion of “epstemol cogy” in the seventeenth century, and its connection with the Cartesian notions of “mind dscusted in chapter one 1k presents "theory of knowledge” a8 a notion based upon 4 confusion between the justifation of knowiedgeclaims find their causal explanation—between, roughly, social practices and postulated prychologial processes. Chapter four is the central chapter of the book—the one in which the ideas which led to its being written are presented. These ideas are those of Sellars and of Quine, and in that chapter 1 interpret Sellas’s attack on "givenness” and Quine's at tack on “necenity” asthe crucial steps in undermining the pouibilty of a “theory of knowledge.” The holism and [pragmatism common to both philosophers, and which they share with the later Wittgenstein, are the lines of thought within analytic philosophy which I wish to extend. 1 argue ‘that when extended in 2 certain way they let us see truth 28, in James’ phrace, “what its beter for us to believe,” rather than as “the accurate representation of reality.” Or, to put the point les provocatively, they show us that the notion fof “accurate representation” is simply an automatic and ‘empty compliment which we pay to those beliefs which are ‘sucesful in helping us do what we want to-do. In chapters 0 five and six I discuss and eriticize what I regard as reaction attempts to teat empirical psychology or philosophy of guage as “succesor subjects" to epistemology. I argue that only the notion of knowledge at “accuracy of repre sentation” persuades us that the study of peychological pro: ‘ses or of language—qua media of representation can do ‘what epistemology filed to do, The moral of part tt a5 4 ‘whole is that the notion of knowledge as the atemblage of accurate representations is optional-—that it may be re. placed by & pragmatist conception of knowledge which climinates the Greek contrast between contemplation and action, between representing the world and coping with i AA historical epoch dominated by Greek ocular metaphors ‘may, I suggest, yield to one in which the philosophical vocabulary incorporating these metaphors seems as quaint 4s the animistic Yoeabulary of preclatsical times. In part I ake up the idea of "philosophy" more ex plicily. Chapter seven interpret the traditional distinction between the search for “objective knowledge” and other, less privileged, areas of human activity as merely the dis tinction between “normal discourse” and “abnormal dis course” Normal discourse (a generalization of Kuhn's notion of “normal science”) i any discourse (cent, polit ica, theological, or whatever) which embodies agreed-upon caiteria for reaching agreement; abnormal discourse is any which Iaeks such criteria. I argue thatthe attempt. (which representation is a selfdeceptive ello to eternalie the ‘normal discourse ofthe day, and that, since the Greeks, phi loophy's selfimage has been dominated by this attempt. In ‘chapter eight T ue some ideas drawn from Gadamet and. Sartte to develop a contrast between “systematic” and “edi fying” philosophy, and to show how “abnormal” philos ‘ophy which does not conform to the traditional Cartesian Kantian matrix is related to “normal” philosophy. I present ‘Witigenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey as philosophers whose nsim isto etify—to help thei readers, or society asa whole, break free from outworn vocabularies and atitudes, rather than to provide “grounding” for the intuitions and customs of the present, hope that what Ihave been saying has made clear why 1 chore “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” as a ttle, Ie is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine mos of our philosophical ‘convictions. The picture which holds waditional philosophy ‘captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing atious representatione—eome accurate, some not—and Capable of being studied by pure, nonempirical methods. Without the notion of the mind as mirror, the notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation would not have suggested itelf, Without this later notion, the strategy ‘common to Descartes and Kant—getting more accurate representations by inspecting, repairing, and polishing the mirror, #0 t0 speak would not have made sense. ‘Without thie strategy in mind, recent claims that philos- ‘ophy could consist of “conceptual analysis” or "phenom fenological analysis” or “explication of meanings” or ‘examination of the logic of our language” or of "the struc tute ofthe constituting activity of consciousness” would not Ihave made sense, It was such claims as these which Wietgen sein mocked in the Philosophical Investigations, and it is by following Wittgenscin’s lead that analytic philosophy [nts progresed toward the "post-postivistie™ stance it pres- ently occupies. But Wittgenstein’ fair for deconstructing Captivating pictures needs to be supplemented by historical awareness—awareness of the source of all this mirror Imagery—and that seems to me Heidegger's greatest con- tribution. Heidegger's way of recounting history of philos ‘phy lets us sce the beginnings of dhe Cartesian imagery in the Greeks and the metamorphoses of this imagery during the last three centuries. He thus lets us “distance” ourselves from the tradition. Yet neither Heidegger nor Witigen- ira stein lets us see the historical phenomenon of mirror imagery, the story of the domination of the mind of the Westby ocular metaphors, within a socal perspective. Both ‘men are concerned with the rarely favored individual rather than with society—with the chances of Keeping oneselt apart from the banal velfeception typical ofthe later days ‘of a decaying tradition. Dewey, on the other hand, though he had neither Wittgenstein’ dialectical acuity nor Heideg. fers historical learning, wrote his polemics against tradi tonal mirorimagery out of 2 vison of « new kid of society. In his ideal socery, culture is no longer dominated by the ideal of objective cognition but by that of aesthetic enhancement. In that culture, as he sid, the ats and the sciences would be “the unforced fowers of life” I would hhope that we are now in 2 position to sce the charges of ‘relativism’ and “irrational” once leveled against Dewey as merely the mindless defensive reflexes ofthe philosophi- cal tradition which he attacked, Sach charges have no weight if one takes seriouly the criticisms of mirror. Jiagery which he, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger make, This ‘ook has little to add to these eritciams, but I hope that it presents some of them in a way which will help pierce ‘through that crust of philosophical convention which Dewey vainly hoped to shatter. 13PART ONE Our Glassy Essence‘The Invention of the Mind 1. Caren oF tie Menta Discussions inthe philosophy of mind usually start off by assuming that everybody has always known how to divide the world into the mental and the physical—that this di tinction is common sensical and intuitive, even if that be- tween two sors of “stuf,” material and immaterial, philo- Sophical and baling So when Ryle suggests that to talk of rental entities is to talk of dispositions to behave, or when Smare suggest tha i is to talk of neural states, they have ‘sco strikes against them, For why, if anything like behavior fm of materialism is ue, should there be anything like this intuitive distinction? ‘We veem to have no doubt tha pains, moods, images, and sentences which “fash before the mind,” dreams, hallucina- ions, elit, attitudes, desires, and intentions all count at “mental” whereas the contractions of the stomach which cause the pain, the neural proceses which accompany it, and everything else which an be given a fem location ‘within the body count a3 nonmental. Our unhesitating dlasiiation suggests that not only have we a clear intuition ‘of what “mentality, bat that it has something to do with onspatiality and with the notion that even if the body ‘were destroyed the mental entities or states might somehow linger on. Even if we discard the notion of "mind stuf.” even if we drop the notion of ves cogitens ab subject of pred ‘ation, we sem able co distinguish mind from body none. theless, and to do s0 in « more oF les Cartesian way. "These purported intuitions serve to keep something like Cartesian dualism alive. Pose Witgensteinian philosophers ‘who oppose behaviors and materialism tend to grant to 7Wingenscin and Stowion hat in some seme there is Ioihng thee but te human onsnism and that we mut {fre up the notion ofthis organ a made tof» bit of Fes cogitans nonspaialyasocaed thst of Yr exten Bas, they sty, the Cartan intuition that the ment ‘iy ditincon isunbrdgetle by empl mean hat fNnentlwate sno more ike position tan ei ikea euron, and that no siete dicovery ex reveal aiden try emai, This ititon sem to them enough to exab- Tshanunbridgenble gop. Bot sch eo dualint philovophers are cnbarraed by thet own conclsions since although ‘heir metaphyseal Into ce tobe Cartesian, they are tot clear whether they are eed to ave such things s “MBetapyal intuions" They ten to be umbappy with theumvon ofa method of knowing about the world prin t0 ind untoudble by enpiia scene Tn this situation, iti tempting forthe duaist co gp Linguistic and begin talking about “diferent vocabularies” or alternative Geeipions This jargon suggests thatthe Ghats intaion in question i merely one of the diet “nces beeen way of talking sbowt the te phenomenon, Sh thus eens to etd one ffm someting like dain to Something like Spinoz’s Goublespect theory. Bot the {Tucion two derpions of what” maker this «dia tion to hold onto. To reply “two descriptions of {unis scm all igh nl weak "Ar orgie phys Stor Tethere more to organi, een human organs, than the actual and posible diponiions oftheir par Neodualns are ally happy to concede whole rit of Inemal sates co Rye, and to sy that belt, desires, at tes, and intention (not to mension shill vey, and Ino) areal merely ways af talking sbout organism, hee par and the ata snd posible movement those pars {Bar they may int, lowing Brentano and Chisholm, that no Rylan necesary and tient conditions can be ovided), Bu when they come to pins, mental mage, and Sreurrent thoughts—shortterm mental sates which loo, so 10 speak, eventlike rather than disposition like—they hesitate, And well they should. For the diference between ‘dualism and materialism would vanish if once they sid that to describe an organism as in pain is simply one way of talking about a state ofits parts These parts, remember, must be physical parts, since once we have Kantied and Surawonized Descartes the notion of “mental part” will no Tonger even seem to make sense. What more could de- fender of mind-body identity ask for than the admission that talk of how one fels is just an alternative way of re porting on how suitable partons of one's anatomy (pre- Sumably neurons) are? ‘We thus have the following dilemma: either neodualists ‘ust construct an epistemological account of how we know «priori tha emis fll under two iredcibly distinct omto- logical species or else they must find some way of expressing their dualism which relies on neither the notion of “onto logical gap" nor that of “alternative description.” But belore casting about for ways of resolving this dilemma, we should look more closay at the notion of “ontological species” or “ontological gap.” What sort of notion is this? Do we have any other examples of ontological gape? Any other case in which we know a priori that no empirical Inquiry can identity two entities? We know, perhaps, that ro empirical inquiry can identify two spatiotemporal ent ties which have diffrent locations, but that knowledge seems too trivial to be relevant. Is there any other case in Which we knove a priori about natural ontological kinds? ‘The only examples which I can think of ae the distinctions between finite and infinite, between human and divine, and between particular and universal. Nothing, we inti, could cross thote divides But these examples do-not seem very helpful. We are inclined to sy that we do not know what 1 ‘would be for something infinite to exist. If we try to datily the orthodox notion of “the divine” we sem to have either a merely negative conception, or cle one explicted in terms of the notions of “infinity” and “immateiality.” 19Since ference to nity explain the obcne by the more incur, we are let with immaterial. We feel vaguely COnfden that deine cou ex he the univer ‘shoul only be exemple by the immaterial Ii makes fy sense fo speak ofthe exitence of univers, i would scr tha hey st ex mately, and thet By they (Gn never be ientied with spatiotemporal paula But what does "immaterial" mean? I he same ting as "eta? Even though is bard oe more in the nation oi being “phys” than’ being. material” or "ype Temporal” ne ar tht "wena and "inmate re Syuony shy were, then sch dipates tat aboot the sata of univers between concepts and reals ould look even silier than they do, Nevertele, he op oie of “mental” i "phpia™ andthe opponie of “in neil” ip "material "Phy and “water” em Sponymous, How can two dict concepts have syhon) ous oppotiee ‘ti pom we maybe tenpt 9 eur Ka explain thet he mental is temporal but not pail where in immterathe mystery tej the bounds ee is neither sal nor tpl This se to give wa er teat tvectld distinction the physi spatiotemporal the poyhoegcal is nonspatal but temporal he me le a er tera ea ht In aay the apparent syonyny of physical” and Ghai" ma eonfsion between “aoopychologiel” and “onmetpysial” "The only tcoble it at Kant and Strawion have piven convinclag arguments forthe lin Ghat we can oly entity mental sates 8 ates of spatially Tocted persons Since we have given up “minds” we ze bound to take these mguments vero. This rings ox mow fll cide for now we want to know what sense i ce Kant "Refutation of Malwa” at Ka. Bag and 2. sara, Tina (London, sgh chp and Tae Bounds of Sen (Landon 968), pp 60. 0 makes to say that some states of spatial entity are spatial and some are not Its no help to be told that these are its functional states—for a person's beauty and his build and his fame and his health are functional states, yet intuition tells us that they are not mental stats either. To clarify our intuition, we have to identify a feature shared by our pains and beliefs but not by our beasty or our health, Te will not help to identity the mental as that which can survive death for the destruction ofthe body since one's beauty can survive death and one's fame can survive the destruction of one's body. If we say that one’s beauty or one's fame exits only ‘elationaly, in the eyes or the opinion of others rather than as sates of oneself, then we get sticky problems about how to distinguish merely relational properties of perions from their intrinsic states. We get equally sticky probleme about a person’s unconscious beliels, which may be discovered only after his death by psychobiographers, but which are presumably as much his mental states as those beliefs which hhe was aware of having during his lifetime. There may bea way of explaining why a person's beauty is a nonintrinsie relational property wherets his unconscious paranoia is a nonrelational intrinsic state: but that would seem to be ‘explaining the abicare bythe more obscure T conclude that we cannot make nonspatiality the ci terion of mental states, if only because the notion of “state” is sufciently obscure chat nether the term spatial site nor the erm nonspatial state seems wie. The notion of mental entities as nonspatial and of physical entities as spatial, if jt makes any sense at all, makes sense for particulars, for subjects of predication, rather than for the potesion of properties by such subjects. We can make some dim sort of preKantian sense out of bits of matter and bits of mind- stuff, but we cannot make any post Kantian sense out of spatial and nonspatial stats of spatial particulars. We get a vague sense of explanatory power when we are told that, Ihuman bodies move as they do because they are inhabited aboy ghosts, but mone at all when we are told that persons have nonepatial states Thope that I have sid enough to show that we are not ‘entitled to begin talking about the mind body problem, of bout the posible identity oF necesary nomidentity of Inental and. physical states, without first asking what we ‘mean by "mental." I would hope further to have incited the ‘uspcion that ovr socalled intuition about what is mental may be merely our readines to fll in with a specifically philosophical language game. This, in fact, the view that Twant to defend. 1 think that this socalled intuition is no ‘more than the ability to command a certain technical vo- ‘abulary—one which has no us ouside of philosophy books land which links up with no isses in dally life, empirical ‘cience, morals, of religion. In later sections of this chapter T shall sketch a historical account of how this technical vocabulary emerged, bu before doing so, I shall beat some neighboring bushes. These are the possibilities of defining “mental” in terms of the notion of "intentionality" and in terms of the notion of being “phenomenal” —of having a characterise appearance, an appearance somehow exhaus tive of reality 2. Tite Funcrionat, 11 PHENOMENAL, 400-THE DNOMATERAL, “The obvious objection to defining the mental as the in- tentional is that pains are not intentional—they do not represen, they are nat about anything. The obvious objec: tion to defining the mental as "the phenomenal” is that Deliefs don’t fet like anything~they don't have phenome- nal properties, and a. person’ real beliefs are not always ‘what they appear to be. The attempt to hitch pains and beliefs together seems ad hoc—they don't seem to have anything in common except our refusal to call them “physi Cal” We.can gerymander, of course, s0 a8 to make pain the scquistion ofa belief that one of one's tissues is damaged, ‘construing pain reports as Pitcher and Armstrong construe 2 perceptual reports? But such a tactic still leaves us with something like « dualistic intuition on our hands—the in tuition that there is "something more” to being conscious of 4 pain or a sensation of rednew than being tempted to acquite a belief that there is tissuedamage of a red object in the vicinity. Alternatively, we can gerrymander the other ‘way and simply confine the term mental to what does have phenomenal properties, abandoning beliefs and desires to Armstrong to identify with the physical. But thae tate ‘uns up agains the intuition that whatever the mind-body problem is, its not the eeling-neuron problem. If we expel representations intentional states, from the mind we are left ‘with something like a problem ofthe relation between lite and nonlife, rather than a mind body problem, Still another tactic would be simply to define “mental” disjunctively as “either phenomenal or intentional.” This ‘suggestion leaves i entirely obicre how an abbreviation for this disjunction got entrenched in the language, or atleast in philosophical jargon. Stl, it does diret our attention to the possibility that the various “mental” items are held together by family resemblances. If we consider thoughts— ‘occurrent thoughts, fashing before the mind in particular words-—or mental images, then we vem to have something which isa lite ik a pain i being phenomenal and a litle like a belief in being intentional. The words make the ‘thoughts phenomenal and the color and shapes make the Images phenomenal, yet both of them are of something in ‘the required intentional sense. IT suddenly and slenly say to myself, “Good Lord, Left my wallet on that cafetable in Vienna,” or if Ihave an image of the wallet on the table, then Tam representing Vienna, che wallet, the table, ete hhave all these as intentional objects. So perhaps we should ‘think of thoughts and mental images as the paradigmatic See Geone Picer, A Theor of Feeption (Peinstn, 197) DM, Armen, Perception and the Ponca Wed london thd ‘ew York, ght) and A Matraist Theory of the Mind (Lats 2 New York, 1958 a‘mental entities, Then we can say that pains and beliefs get Clawsifed 2s mental through their resemblance to these para- figms, eventhough the resemblance is in two quite different respects The relationship between the various candidates for mentality could then be illustrated by the following diagram: wih phenomenal without pheomens ropes propenien a caren ough epcoenatinal | ental ges, somites, | mi fedomee. wine mesiy ‘Sonprenatoa! | paneand what babies | pyc fore objec ‘Suppose forthe moment that we sete for this “family resemblance” answer tothe question “what makes the men- fal mental?’—vir, tha i one or another family resem- blance to the paradigmatically mental. Now let us turn back to our original question, and ask what makes us fll in the fourth box with “the merely physical?” Does “physical sean merely “what doesn't fit in the other three boxes?” Is ita notion which is entirely parasitic on that of “mental?” ‘Or does it somehow tie in with “material” and “spatial,” and how does it do 102 “To answer this, we have to ask two subquestions: “Why in the intentional nonmaverial?” and "Why isthe phenome- fal nonmaterial?” The fst question may seem to have a fairly straightforward answer. If we take “the material” to De "the neural," for example, we can say that no amount of inspetion ofthe brain will reveal the intentional character ‘of the pictures and inscriptions found there. Suppose that all persons sruck by the thought "left my wallet on a cafetable in Vienna,” in those very English words, have an dential series of ‘neural events concomitant with the u thought. This seems 2 plausible (Qhough probably false) Inypothesis. But it isnot plausible that all those who acquire ‘he belief that they have lef their wallet on a cafe in Vienna have this series of events, for they may formulate ther belie in quite other words or in quite other language. 1k would be odd if a Japanese and an English thought ‘should have the some neural correlate, Itis equally plausible ‘hat all those who suddenly see the same missing wallet on the same distane table in their mind's eye should share a second series of neural events, though one quite diferent from that correlated with the thinking of the English sen tence. Even such neat concomitance would not tempt us to identify” the intentional and the neurological properties fof the thought or the image, any more than we identify the ‘ypographical and the intentional properties ofthe sentence “Tieft my wallet ona cafetable in Vienna” when we meet it on the printed page. Again, the concomitance of pictures, ‘of wallets on eafe tables against a Viennese background with certain properties ofthe surfaces of paper and canat does ‘ot identify the intentional property “being about Vienna” ‘with the arrangement of pigments in space. So we can see ‘why one might sy that intentional properties are not phys- cal properties. But, on the other hand, this comparison between neurological and typographical properties suggests that there is no intersting problem about intentionality [Nobody wants to make philorophical heavy weather out of the fact that you can't tell merely fom the way it looks what a sentence means, or that you can't recognize a picture of X asa picture of X without being familiar with the rele ‘vane pictorial convention. It seems perfectly clea, at leas since Wittgenstein and Sellars, that the “meaning” of typo- traphical inscriptions is not an extra “immaterial” property they have, but just ther place in 2 context of surrounding events in a anguage game, in a form of life, This goes for braininscriptions a5 well To say that we cannot observe intentional properties by looking at the brain i ike saying that we cannot See a propesition when we look at a Mayan %UR GLASSY ESSENCE codex—we simply do not know what to look for, because ‘we do not yet know how to relate what we ee to 4 symbol. system. The relation between an inscription—on paper or, tgiven the hypothesized concomitance, in the brain—and ‘what it means is no more mysterious than the relation between a functional state of 2 person, such as his beauty or is health, and the parts of his body. I is just those parts seen in a given context ‘So the answer to the question “Why is the intentional ‘nonmateial” ig “because any functional state—any state ‘which can only be grasped by relating what i observed to 2 larger context—is, in a trivial sense, nonmaterial.” The problem is in trying to relate thi trivial notion of being “yonmaterial”—wvhich means merely something like “not immediately evident to all who look”—with the philosophi- ly pregnant sense of “immaterality.” To put it another ‘way, Why should we be troubled by Leibni’s point chat if the brain were blown up tothe size ofa factory, so that we ‘could stroll through it, we should not see thoughts? If we know enough neural’ correlations, we shall indeed see ‘houghts—in the sense that our vison will reveal tous what thoughts the possessor ofthe brain is having. If we do not, ‘we shall not, but then if we stroll through ony factory Without having frst learned about its parts and their ela. tions to one another, we shall not see what is going on Further, even if we could find no such neural correlations, ‘even if cerebral localization of thoughts was a complete failure, why would we want to say that a person's thoughts ‘or mental images were nonphysical simply because we can- not give an account of them i terms of his parts? To use an example from Hilary Putnam, one cannot give an ac. count of why square pegs do not ft into round holes in terms ofthe elementary particles which constitute the peg and the hole but nobody finds a perplexing ontological gap between macrosructure and microstructure. 1 think chat we cam link the trivial sense of “nonmater (Gehich applies to any funetional, 26 opposed to observable, 6 state) with the pregnant sense of “immaterial” only by resurrecting Locke's view of how meaning attaches (0 in- scriptions—the view which Wittgenstein and Sellars attack. For Locke the meaningfulnese—the intentional characer— of an inscription wa the result of its production by, or em coding of, an idea. An ida, in turn, was “what i before & ‘man’s mind when he thinks." So the way to 4 the inten tional asthe immaterial isto say that neither a sequence of process in the brain nor some ink on paper can represent anything unless an idea, something of which we are aware in that “immediate” way in which we are aware of pains, has impregnated it. In a Lockean view, when we walk through Leibniy’s factory we do not see thoughts not be- cause, as for Witigenstein, we cannot yet translate brain iting, but because we cannot see those invisible (becaQse nonspatial) entities which infuse the visible with inten Uonality. For Witigenstein, what makes things represents. tional or intentional isthe part they play ina Target context in invraction with large numbers of other vile things For Locke, what makes things representational is a special causal chrust—what Chisholm describes a8 the phenomenon fof sentences deriving intentionality from thoughts as the ‘moon derives is light from che sun So our answer to the question “How can we convince ‘ourselves cha the intentional must be immaterial?” is “First ‘we must convince ourselves, following Locke and Chisholm and pace Wiigenstein and Sellars, that intentionality is intrinsic only in phenomenal items—items direct before the mind.” If we accept that answer, however, we are all, only part of the way to resolving the isue. For since the problem with which we have been wresding has been ‘caused. prectely by the fact that beliefs do not have phe ‘nomenal properties, we now have to ask hov Locke, follow: ing Descartes, ean conflate pains and beliefs under the ‘common term idee-—how he can convince himself that a Rodrik Cito, “Tovntomalty athe Menta Minneste Swuis i the Philo of ene 2 (a5) 58 abelief is something which is "before the mind” in the way jn which a mental image is, how he can we the same ocular imagery for mental images and for judgments. I shall dis ‘use the origin of this Carteian-Lockean use of the term {dea below. But for the moment I shall pass over the issue land come to the second subdivision of the question “Why Should the mental be thought of as immaterial?"—namely, ‘why should the phenomenal be thought of as immaterial? ‘Why do some neo-dualist philosophers ay that how some. thing feels, what i is like to be something, cannot be iden tical with any physical property, or at Jest any physical property which we know anything about? ‘A trivial answer to this question would be that we can now all about something's physial properties and not know how it felt—especially if we cant talk to it. Consider the claim that babies and bats and Martians and God and panpeychisically viewed rocks all may inhabit diferent Phenomenal “quality spaces” from those we inhabit $0 they may. But what doer thie have to do with non phys. tality? Presumably those who say that the phenomenal is “This aim has teen presented very frceuly in Thomas Nages wit sit be to Be a tat" Phlpheal Review 5 (9). 8S [Gort have lene agent deal fom Nagel work im phony ‘Bind aldo Tdoager Barty wih him om mos every point Think hate fleece Bete ews et ac othe Gueson {raked mo py by Witgensn) of whether “phlei! Ie ‘Shr ave more ha roidono inguin paces Bt Tm not are tow is nue Ino be debated. Nages neon i at “tae about hike be an X are very pclae” (pay, wherens think ‘Bat they lok pele onl i lowing Nagel sb the Caren ta Aion me old tat" physio I to be defended, the ene ologial fetres mt themes be given pial scone (Gan Inte ects ofthis hope, Lexy ace the tory of the plop! Ioqange ame fn which the cai i at ome For the Dasdemlanreannsofeed in chapter four, ston, below, Ido "think physi abject wo such zestrai Patio, Tague ‘her. probably eve (ut wrineesing) i comttocd at predicting ‘let een nee spcetine region under mm destpin oot, tc obvanaly aw i conaracd te dam tomy everything tre 2 onphyscal are not complaining tat being told how the teats he ac an do i a ip et ies bat Understanding sows the phsiotgy of pun dct ‘ox elp ue! pa but why held We exe fny more than ndentanding teredyeamica wil belp os fs? How can we get rom the undoubted face hat knowing tow to se» psologial term fg. "simulation of C fier) will ot neal hep us ea phenomenelogcal term (eg. "ain fo an ontclogial gap betwen the re erens othe two terme How ca we ge from the fat that mowing Martian phyolgy doesnot help ws trate what the Marian sys when we damage hi ses tothe Claim that he has gt women immaterial we have ot How, to come tothe pint, do'we know when we have to ‘aye of talking about the sae thing "a perion, or hi Brain rather than descriptions of two diferent thing? And why arene duals ao certain that feelings and. newons ‘are an instance of the latter? rd think thatthe only reply such philosophers have to afer iso point out ta nth eof phenomenal proper fier there fenoappearancerelity istncion, This amounts to dening «pial propery sone wich anybody could be mintaben i atributing to omething, anda phenomenal propery atone which a ein peso cot be misaten out (Eq. the peron who hat the pain canot be mit taken abow how the pain fs) Given ths deiniton of course, is ivaly te cae that no plenomenal proper tan bea pial one. But why should this epateni ding ton eet an ontologi diinion? Why shold the et emi privilege we al hav of being incorngle show how things Sem oon ref « daineon Reentry ‘of being? The annwer presumably Kas to go something ike thi Feelings jum art appearances The realty i exhausted fn how thy ecm, They se poe aemings.Aoything that i fo nog (tg he intentional oe at for the tones is ml phcl—tat its tmching which 2can appear other than i is. The world comes divided into things whose nature is exhausted by how they appear and ‘things whose nature # not. But if a philosopher gives this answer he isin danger of changing (rom a neodualist into a plain oldfashioned Cartesian duals, “mind stu” and all, For now he har stopped talking about pains as states of people or properties predicate of people and started «alk Ing about pains as paticulass a special sort of particular whose nature is exhausted by a single property. Of what ‘ould sucha particular be made, ave mindstull? Or, to put it another way, what could mindstull be save something ‘out of which rach thin, wispy, and translucent things can bbe made? As long a feeling painful is property of a person fof of brainfibers, there sems no reason forthe epistemic Aiflerence between reports of how things fel and reports fof anything else 19 produce an ontological gap. But as soon. fs there isan ontological gap, we are no longer talking About states or properties but about distinc. particulars disinet subjects of predication. The neodualist who iden: tiles a pain with how it fels to bein pain i hypostaizing 2 property—painfulnes—ino a special sort of particular, a particular of that special sort whose esse is percipi and trhose reality is exhausted in our intial acquaincance with it, The neodualist is no longer talking about how people feel but about feelings a lite selEsubsstent entities, float ing fre of people inthe way in which univesals fat fee of the instantiations. He has, in fact, modeled pains on uni versal. Its po wonder, then, that he can “intuit” that pains can exist separately from the body, for this intuition is ‘imply the intsition that universls can exist independently ‘of particulars. That special sort of subject of predication ‘whose appearance is its reality—phenomenal pain—turs ‘ut to be simply the painfulnes of the pain abstracted from the person having the pain. It is in shor, the universal ‘painjulnes itself. To put it oxymoronically, mental par- ticalars, unlike mental states of people, turn out to be vuniversals. “This then isthe answer I want to give to the question: Why do we dhink of the phenomenal as immaterial? We dso because, as Ryle put it, we inset on thinking of having 2 pain in ocular metaphorsas having a funay sort of par ticular before the eye of the mind, That particular cums ‘out to be a universal, a quality hypostatized into a subject fof predicaton. Thus when neo-duslsts say that how pains Jeet are esential to what pains are, and then criticize Smart for thinking ofthe causal role of certain neurons as what is ‘sential to pain, they are changing the subject. Smart is talking about what is esential to people being in pain, ‘wheress neo-lualists like Kripke are talking about what is ‘sential for something’ being a pain. Neodualiss fel una {raid ofthe question "What isthe epistemological basi your claim to know what isan esentil property of pain {or they have arranged things so that pains have only one intrinsic property—namely, feeling painful—and so the choice of which propertis ate to count as esental to them is obvious ‘Let me now summarize the results ofthis section. I have said thatthe only way to associate the intentional with the immaterial isto identify it with the phenomenal, and that the only way to identify the phenomenal with the im- material is to hyposttize univers and think of them as particulars rather than abstractions from particulars—thus tiving them a nonspatiotemporal habitation. I cura out, {in other words, that the universal particular distinction is the only metaphysical distinction we have got, the only one ‘which moves anything at all outside of space, much less ‘Outside of spacetime. ‘The mental-physical distinction then is parasitic on the universlparticular distinction, rather than conversely. Further, the notion of mind-stull as that ‘oat of which paine and beliefs are made makes exactly at ‘much of a litte sense as the notion of “that of which uni wetsals ate made.” The battle between realists and concep- alist over the satus of unversls is thus empty because ‘we have no idea of what a mind is ave that itis made of 31‘whatever univerias are made of, In constructing both a Lockean idea and a Platonic Form we go through exactly the same process—we simply Hit of 4 single property from romething (the property of being ed, or painful, or good) ind then treat ita fi self were a subject of predication, and perhaps also a locus of cata eficacy. A Platonic Form is merely 4 property considered in wolation and considered 25 capable of sustaining causal relations. A’ phenomenal centity is precisely that ae well. 3. THE Diveastry oF Mivo-Booy PRontrns At this point we might want to say that we have dissolved. the mind ody problem. For, oughly speaking, all that is necded to find this problem unintelligible is for us to be rominalists to refuse fray to hypostatize individual prop- ‘erties. Then we shall not be fooled by the notion that there are entities called pains which, because phenomenal, cannot toe physical. Following Wittgenstein, we shall teat the fact that there is no such thing 24 "a misleading appearance of pin” not asa strange fact about special ontological genus called the mental, but just aa remark about a language- igame—the remark that we have the convention of taking people's word for what they are feeling. From this “lan ‘guage game” point of view, the fact that a man ie feeling ‘whatever he thinks he's feling has no more ontological Significance than the fact that che Constitution is what the Supreme Court thinks iti or that the ball is foul if the umpire thinks it. Again following Witgenstein, we shall, treat the intentional 2s merely a subspecies of the func tional, and the functional as merely the sort of property whose atribution depends upon a knowledge of context rather than being observable right of the bat. We shall se ‘the intentional 25 having no connection with the phenome- ‘al, and the phenomenal as a matter of how we talk. The ‘mind body problem, we can now say, was merely a reslt of ‘Locke's unfortunate mistake about how words get meaning. 32 combined with his and Plato's muddled attempt to talk About adjectives af they were nouns. ‘A fst disalutions of philosophical problems go, this one thas ie points. But it woul be silly to think that we had resolved anything by arriving at this diagnosis. Its as if paychiatrist were to explain to a patient that his unhappi ‘est ex result of his mistaken belief that his mother wanted to casuate him, together with his muddted attempt to think ‘of himself as identical with his father. What the patient needs is not alist of his mistakes and confusions but rather an understanding of how he came tommake these mistakes and, Dbecome involved in these confusions. If we are going to get rid ofthe mind-body problem we need to be able to answer such questions ae the following How did these rather dusty litle questions about the posible identity of pains and neurons ever get mixed up ‘withthe question of whether man “differed in kind” from the brates—whether he had digaity rather than merely value? Given that people thought that they survived the destruc. tion oftheir bodies long before Locke and Plato began to ‘make specifically philosophical confusions, haven't we Jett something out when we teat the mind as simply an assemblage of phenomenal and intentional states? Isn't there some connection between our ability t have knowledge and our having minds, and is this accounted for by referring imply to the fact that persons like i scriptions, have intentional properties? A these are good questions, and nothing that I have ii so far helps answer them. To answer them, T think, nothing will serve save the history of ideas. Just as the patient needs to relive his past to antwer his questions, 0 philosophy needs to relive its past in order to answer its questions. So far I have, in the customary manner of contemporary philosophers of mind, been Ainging around terms like “phenomenal,” “functional,” “intentional,” “spatial” and 38the like as if these formed the obvious vocabulary in which, to discuss the topic. But of course the philosophers who created the language which gave us the mind-body problem ddid not use this vocabulary, oF anything close to it. If we fe to understand how we got the intuitions which make us think that there mutt be a ral, indssouble, philosophical problem somewhere in the neighborhood, we have to set Side our uptodate jargon and think in the vocabulary of the philosophers whose books gave us those intuitions. In iy Wittgensteinian view, an intuition is never anything more or les than familiarity with a language game, 0 to siscover the source of our intuitions isto relive the history fof the philosophical languagegame we find ourselves playing, “The “mind-body problem” which I have just “dissolved” concerns only a few of the notions which, emerging at diferent points inthe history of thought, have intertwined to produce a tangle of interrelated problems. Questions lke “How are intentional states of consciousness related to ‘neural states?” and "How are phenomenal properties such 1 painfulness related to neurological properties?" are parts of what T shall call the "problem of consciousness.” This problem is distinct from such prephilosophical problems About personhood as "Am I really only this mast of flesh fand bone?” and from such Greek philosophical problems about knowledge as "How can we have certainty about the changing?” "How can knowledge be of the unchanging?” fand "How can the unchanging become internal 10 us b Deing known?” Let us call the “problem of personhood that of what more a human being is than flesh. This prob Jem has one form in the prepphilosophical craving for im ‘mortality, and another in the Kantian and romantic asser. tion of human dignitybut both cravings are quite distinc. from problems about conciousness and about knowledge. oth are ways of expressing our claim to be something quite diferent from the beasts that perish. Let us ell the “prob- Tem of reason” that of how to spell out the Greek claim that M the crucial dilference between men and beasts is that we can know-—that we ean know not merely singular facts but universal cruths, numbers, esenoss, the eternal. This prob lem takes different forms in Aristotle's hylomorphic account of knowing, Spinora’s rationalist account, and Kant’s wan Seendental account. But these issues are distinct both from. those about the interrelations between two sorts of things (one spatial and the other nonspatial) and from ises om cerning immortality and moral dignity. The problem of ‘consciousness centers around the brain, ra feels, and bodily ‘motions. The problem of reon center around the topics of knowledge, language, and intelligence—all our “higher powers" The problem of personhood centers around atti. bations of freedom and of moral responsibil Tn order to sort out some of the relations among these three problems, I shall of a ist of ways of isolating beings which have minds in contrast to the “merely physical"— “the body,” “matter,” the central nervous system, “nature” for “the subject matter of the positive sciences" Here are Some, though hardly all, ofthe features which philosophers Ihave, atone time of snother, taken as marks ofthe mental: ability to know itself incorrigibly (‘privileged acces”) bility to exit veparately from the body rnonspatiality (having a nonspatal part or “element”) abiigy to grasp univerals ability to sustain relations to the inexistent ("inten tionality") oa 9, inability to be identifed with any object “in the swore” ‘This isa tong lit, and it could easily be lengthened But sce Herbert Fl The “Ment” and the “Physic” (aneapali tyr sta fs fo ominuting commento herein hip Seween the mri teme 3itis import to go though thee various suggestions bout wha ito havea mind for ech of ther has helped pilesophes to insist on an unbridgable dualism between Inind and body, Philosophers have constantly sized upon tome distinctive featare of human life in order t give out intuition of our uniquenes a "rm philosophical basi.” Because these frm bases aes ared, atoralons and mate Falla, when not shrugged of a hopeles attempts 10 jump 2 vst ontlogial (or epistemological, or Lingus) ful are often treated as trivially true but pointless They tre pointes, ti explained, becuse out uniqueness as noting whatever odo with whichever abyss the naturalist. tas laoriooly filled, bur everything to do with some ter abye which has all the while been gaping just behind his backs In partcatar, the point isoten made that exen {te aetiled al questions abou the relation Between pains dnd neurons and similar questions arising ow of incorrgs biey() abore—wve should ail have deat, at Bot, only ‘with (2) and (3) among the other marks ofthe mental. We {Boul ll have left everthing relevant to reason (otably {g} [5] and [6)) and everything relevant 10. pertonood (ootably 78) and [gas obscae as ever. Think that this poin is quite right, and further, tha i ic had been spprecated ener the problem of concious res would not have loomed 10 lrg abit has in recent Pilowopiy. Inthe sete of having pains a well a neurons, fre ae ons par with many i not all ofthe Brute, whereas te presumably sare neither reason nor penonbood with them. Ie only if we assume that poweson of any nos piyseal inner wate i womehow, via (@), conneced with {y) or () that we will think that light shed upon raw {Ess would reflect off onto representational mental sate, and thereby illuminate our capacity to minor the world Sound us. Again only the asumpion that ie al (even that ofthe fetus, the brain dhmaged human, dhe bat oF the caterpillar has a special sani akin to personhood would make us think that understanding raw fea might Rep uso 36 undertand our moral responsibilities, Both assum sre, however, often made, Understanding. why they are Inade requires an understanding of inlecual Misery father than an understanding of the meanings of the rele ‘ant frm, or at analysis of the concepts they sigaly. By Setching a lie of te history of dscusions ofthe mind, Thope to show thatthe problem of son cannot be stated Without retum to epistemological views which no one realy wihes to resurrect. Further, T want (supply some {round fora suggestion which I shall develop ater: that the problem of personhood isnot a “problem” but a de scription ofthe Human condition, that i isnot a mater fr plilowophical “solution” but a misleading way of expose tng on the ierelevance of traditional philosophy to the T shall not, however, discuss all the items on the list above in this chapter, but only (2), (3) and (4)—separation from the body, non-spatiality, and the grasp of universal. ‘Whae I want fo say abou the other items will come in other chapters I shall discuss (1)~privileged acces—in the fol- Towing chapter, and 1 shall be disewsing (3) and (6)— intentionality and the ability o use anguage—in chapters four and six. While the items bearing on personhood—(), @ and ()—will not be discussed separately, shall be sketching the way in which I think the notion of person- hood should be treated in chapter four, section 4, again in chapter seven, section 4, and in chapter eight, section 3. In the present chapter, I'want to stick as closely as posible to the question: Why should consciousness seem to have anything todo with reason or with perionhood? By sticking ta the three topics of grasping universal, separation from the body, and nonspatiality I shall move toward my con- clusion that if we hold these last three historically distinct notions apart, then we shall no longer be tempted by the notion that knowledge is made posible by a special Glassy Eswence which enables human beings tO mirror nature. ‘Thus we shall not be tempted to think thatthe posiesion of aan inner life, a stream of consciousness, is relevant to reson. ‘Once consciowsness and reason are separated out in this ‘way, then personhood can be sen for what I claim i s—a Inatier of decision rather than knowledge, an acceptance ‘of another being into fellowship rather than a recognition ‘of s-common essence 4. Mino as nue Grase oF Uxivensats ‘There would not have been thought to be a problem about the mature of reaton had our race confined itself to pointing out particular states of affars—warning of ifs And rain, celebrating individval births and deaths. But poetry speaks of man, birth, and death as such, and mathe- atic prides itelf on overlooking individual details. When poetry and mathematics had come to self-consciousness— ‘when men like Ton and Thesetetus could identify them- selves with their subjects—the time had come for something fgeneral to be ssid about knowledge of universas. Phi- Towophy undertook to examine the difference between know: ing that there were parallel mountain ranges 19 the west and knowing that infinitely extended parallel lines never meet, the diference between knowing that Socrates was good and knowing what goodness wat. So the question rose: What are the analogies between knowing. about ‘mountains and knowing about line, between knowing Socrates and knowing the Good? When this question was answered in terms ofthe distinction between the eye of the body and the Bye of the Mind, w-—thought, intellect, insight was identied as what separates men from beats. ‘There was, we moderns may say with the ingratitude of hindsight, no particular reason why this ocular metaphor seized the imagination of the founders of Western thought But it dd, and contemporary philosophers ae ill working ‘out its comequences, analyzing the problems it created, land asking whether there may not be Something to it after All. The notion of “contemplation,” of knowledge of uni- versal concepts or truths at @apia, makes the Bye of the Mind the inescapable model for de better sort of know! edge. Bu itis frites to ask whether the Greek language for Greek economic conditions, oF the idle fancy of some nameless pre Socratic, is responsible for viewing this sort of knowledge as looking at something (rather than, sa, rub bing up against it, or crushing it underfoot, or having sexual intercourse with i) (Given this model, and with it the Mind’ Eye, what must the mind be? Presumably something as diferent from the body at invisible paraleiness is trom visible mountain ridges Something like that was ready to hand, for poetry fand religion suggested that something humanoid leaves the body at death and goes off on its own. Parallelness Dewey set the metaphor of the Eye of the Mind asthe rent of the prior son tat Kode st be of the unchangeable “The theory of knowing modeled ater what as spp 0 take Dine in te acto wean, The objet teat ight ted en (Gabe dfernc so the ad tothe pero hang 3. opal 3 {orth but net the ing men. "The rea bjt the jet [ted In ke sept alotoen th ee» hing to any Belding mind {hat my Be apn I A specter they of Enotes he ae bate” (The Qu or Certainty [New Yo) P23) 1tshard to know whether the opt metaphor determine the nation thatthe object of toe hve so be eer and atl oF fre AO, Lovejoy, The Greet Chain of Being. (Cambege, Mas, Tog hap The que for serait ap the pte metaphor pe ie hover oot he notion of metab and eal een Upctor cumple, rend argument wo aase-data onthe ound St mohing pias etre my mid te ery hr to unde land why the pony should sem peal rather than of say her Shape” Geintifc Thought (Landon, 13-2. 84) nthe cmeton ef york shadow, aud breath, wee GA. van eanen, Boy, Su, Spr (Oxised 96) p. 88 and aap. 7 psi, ogee wih he foseges Brine Smells Dicoery of the Mind (Gonbrige, Mam, tgp and RB. Ondine The Origin of Buropere ‘Though (Cambri, Miss, 191) which Yan eure telere Ont teva oe in re de ae 30OUR GLASY ESSENCE ‘an be thought of asthe very breath of paallels—the shad: ‘ow remaining when the mountains are no more, The more wispy the mind, the more ft to catch sight of such invisible femttis as parallelnest. So even Aristotle, who spent his ie pouring cold water on the metaphysical extravagances of his predecessor, suggests that there probably is something to the notion that the intellect is “separable.” even though nothing else about the soul i. Aristode has been praised by Ryleans and Deweyans for having resisted dualism by think- ing of “sou!” as no more ontologically distinet from the Ihuman body than were the frog’ abilities to catch fies and flee snakes ontologically distinct from the fro’ body. But this “naturalistic” view of soul did not prevent Aris. toll from arguing that since the intellect had the power of receiving the form of, for example, froghood (skimming fff the universal from the clearly known particular frog, so to speak) and taking it on itself without thereby becoming 4 frog, the intellect (vs) must be something very special Indeed. It must be something immaterial—even though no such strange quasisubsance need be postulated to explain, ‘most human activity, any more than it need be postulated to explain the frog ‘much with Fein, wx, and movement fea, On the enon of {ose two aoa to wit im Ihe prephilnphial peso, ce Sell ‘ap, Hawkee Pst docriptin Sf ry a8 the eye of the aa it ‘Set and expsned by reference to thea a frac he AP st images Yor our pups the important hig fhe ily whe the etion of so tomate aed ive bjt of Kw (on the knowing ofthe pometer comes slang tats cea Saito te ‘nen, an Peuat “inner a ower Words get developed evan Posen. pp tr “rt do no tink Aro eve explicly giver thie armament for lsming dat the iets epartie ind te del abot the re Tans beeen the sve andthe ante ntti De Anima ‘ne W anos imponible toate whether Be intended) But hit folowers have amumed th this was the argent whic fe hi wo site De Anima yb go and yah 48 ad Ihave to Der esti. See Mrtner Adler, The Diferece of Man end the Diference 0 Philosophers have often wished that Aristotle had never en in With Plato's talk of universals and his spectator theory of knowledge, or that his Entwicklung had lasted Jong enough for such passages as De Ania m, 5 nd Meta physics x1 to be expunged as juvenalin? But once again, there is no point in uying to pin the blame on Aristotle ‘or his interpreters The metaphor of knowing general uths by internalizing universals, just as the eye of the body knows particulars by internalizing their individual colors And shapes, was, once suggested, sufciently powerful co be ‘come the intellectuals substitute for the peasant’ belie in life among the shades. In varied forms, running the gamit between neo Platonic notions of knowledge asa direct com nection with (emanation fom, reflection of) the Godhetd fon the one hand, and downoearth neo-Aristotelian hy. lomorphic accounts of abstraction of the other, the soul as immateril-beenivecapableotcontemplating universal. re mained the Western philosopher's answer to the question “Why is man unique?” for some two thousand years. “The tension thus eatablished between the roses of ou being found conventionalized expresiion in passages like Isabell's “ape and estence' speech 1 Mater (New York 1p. as6, cing ape obey a adam Datng the andar Thome argument fom the hylomorpie pansion af sharon. For Deweyan erount of arparblley” at Minton wild sot” ck}. Rancall Artal (New York, 19, fd the teatnent ty Werte Jace whic Rall refer See alan Mase Grene, 4 Porat of rite (London, 1) pp. ash T stave Gene's ballement om he pot ‘or an teroting contrary ew, eT. H, Gree, “The Piboophy sii Ce Wes mio} 8, Gree heen al, acide, compliments Ariaote GA p. 8) on appre fing the diference between “senmtion abd the inlet cous est of sna” which Locke tly fered pet ho, flo {ng Kenny, tat Laces mise vs 2 consequence of Dest tat fermatin tthe motion othe mind. aBut man, proud man Dressed ina lite brief authority Mos ignorantof what he's mos assured — His glassy essence—Iike an angry ape, Plays such fantastic treks before high Heaven ‘Asmake the angels weepho, with our spleens, ‘Would all laugh themselves mora ‘Our Glassy Exence—the “intellectual soul” of the scholas- ticeir also Bacon's “inind of man" which “far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence is rather like an enchanted glas, full of superstition and imposture, if i be not delivered and reduced."* These ‘eaty seventeenth century conceits expres a division within ‘ourselves which was felt long before the New Science, Descartes division between thinking and extended sub- ‘tance, the veil of ideas, and “modern philosophy.” Our Glasry Essence was not 2 philorophical doctrine, but a pic- Cod" The OD. doesnt give thie of "py." Dt Connngham S peaive aed owed bythe eters of the Arden Shaker (towhich lowe the releence 9 Cannings) Stakepeare hr me iy erga, rater than ung mack trope Thee appa. hyo lesion to the “pect eben” pungent Se Paul of ny other standard notions For the istory of alps beeen he ‘Sut anda minor, se Herbert Caen Speculum, Mirr und Laing ‘Giass (Tubingen, vos), pp. sal. ("Ges Seles at Spiga"). The pms mo lay eee as Rink npg by CS oer ina se smay of tht tle onthe "msec ty of pte num whih Pee mrangey though important in conkening the iow ta "a prem i thing bat spel ivrng& general Hen” nd in exrbiting the cxitnce of "poup inde Cllced ‘Works cd Chale Harare and Paul Wei (Camis, Mase "au aro. tirana Buco, Adsencment of Laring Don Works, Jame Spting and Robt Ells anon, 18), 8 2 ture which literate men found presupposed by every page they read. Ie is glasj—mirrorlike—for two reasons. First, it takes on new forms without being changed—Dut intel. Teetual forms, rather than sensible ones as material mirrors do, Second, mirrors are made of a rubstance which is purer, finer grained, more subtle, and more delicate than most Unlike ove spleen, which, in combination with other equal: ly gross and visibie organs, accounted for the bulk of our behavior, our Glassy Essence is something we share with the angels, even though they weep for our ignorance of its nature. The supernatural world, for sixienth-eentury in- tellecuals, was modeled upon Plato's world of Ideas, just as our contact with it was modeled upon his metaphor of "There are few believers in Platonic Ideas today, nor even ‘many who make a distinction between the sensitive and the intellectual soul. But the image of our Glasy Essence re- rains with us, as does Isabella's lament that we cannot ‘grasp it A sense of moral failure mixes with a sense of {grievance that philosophy—the discipline supremely con- ferned with “the higher””—has not made us more aware of four own nature, That navore, i is stil felt, makes is dis- tinctive character most dearly felt in a certain sort of knowledge—hnowledge of the highest and purest things: ‘mathematic, philosophy itself, theoretical physics, any thing which contemplates univers. To suggest that there fare no universals—that they are flatus vocis—is to endanger ‘our uniquenes. To suggest thatthe mind isthe brain is to {86th age for co's nm that "eel the spl of subtances” He tes « Lace, paaage fom Ver ia pp porwmpoe relia | wetheeum sex aque sural tmp ign (aencil yq The min tate wl a be made we ey ‘pert fie ged materi in onder tobe capable of cee oct Taw Anmngres, Anily wavered Between vy a tel nee pov ud as made sme ry spel vry pure ater Sach water Tee wat inva given te animaglabily of the monavie pul an the neta that enon mis oemBle the no-priemgora {oem aa which pe 4suggest thit we secrete theorems and symphonies as our spleen secretes dark humors. Professional philosophers shy away from these “crude pictures” because they have other pictures—thoughe to be less crude—which were painted in the later seventeenth century. But the sense thatthe nature of reaton isa “permanent problem” and that anyone who doubts our uniqueness should study mathematics persists. ‘The Sys which quickened the Homeric heroes, St. Paul's reps, and Aquinas's active intellect, are all quite different notions. But for present parposes we can coalesce them, 25, Isabella does, in'the phrase: Glassy Essence, They are all things which corpses do not have and which are distine- tively human. The powers manifested by Achilles were not those of Theaetetus or the Apostles or St. Thomas, but the “intellectual essence” of the scholastics inherited the duais tic notions which gathered foree between Homer and An saxagoras, were given canonical form by Plato, were toned. down by Aristole, and then became entangled (in St.Paul) ‘with a new and determinedly otherworldly religious cule ‘The vague comme sn dnlim of bdy and sol which ytd tw hand for Dsartes was product of te vrabuley of vermacl trandatons of the ie at much ato anying es oo tert fr how recent nd patch the Caan ceintion worth foving ht the thos of the Bible dst no hve anhing ih the init. On evi conerpion and thei afuence om Se Pal ce ‘Onlsns, Onin of Eurepeen Thewpht pp. glo On Se Paul hit ‘is ut to note tat lite modern ween pilesphy of mind. he does wo etsy ody pa) mth what bled air death The ‘ur wis (at) where, scoring to TAT. Robison, "ie 3 the nara equalent of oar word penmaley" (The Hoy: 4 Stuy in Pine Torslogy (Wonton, ngs pat oatean Kekn Campbell, ‘Body and Mind [New York, 199) pa: "Provided you know wh ou fe thea toy what your dy ie what he underers bury Shen chey ary your) Av Robin tye (pt), Ro ha ee nd gee tinct ports of man batter "We whole man Scr ‘ly epnted” "Te notion of am edd into prt doesnt come ‘Satay wo ne-pilonpber even ser Pht seven Pee, Dy, Soul pnt, cup 6 For exper of he Caen way which ine ee fy a0 vpn ae we ral see + Cornhins bse “ Tn the “mieror” images of the Renaissance humanists, the dliferences between Homer and Augustine, Plotinus and. ‘Thomas, were fattened out to produce a vague but em: pphatie dualism—ape and estence—which everyone knew Philosophers were supposed to know about, even though few could guess what they might hope to say about it. Re ‘ent philosophy of mind has tended to lump this vague congiomerate-—man's Glassy Emence—together with the post Cartesian notions of “consciousness” or “awareness Jn the next section I shall ty to show how different they 5, Anuuy ro Exusr SEPARATELY FROME TH Bony ‘The only point in the previous section at which argu sment intruded was in the mention of the Thomistic (and possibly Aristotelian) inference to the “separable.” immate- rial character of see from a hylomorphic conception of knowledge—a conception according to which knowledge is not the posession of accurate representations of an object but rather the subject's becoming identical with the object “To se the difference between this argument andthe various Cartesian and contemporary arguments for dualism, we need to see how very diferent these two epistemologis are Both lend themselves to the imagery of the Mirror of "Nature. But in Aristotle's conception intellect is not a ror inspected by an inner eye Its both mireor and eye in fone. The tetnal image i itzelf the model forthe “intellect ‘which becomes all dings.” whereas in the Cartesian model, the intllee inspects emtties modeled on retinal images ‘The substantial forms of frogness and staress get right into the Aristotelian intellect, and are there in just the same way they are in the fogs and the stars—not in the way in Which frogs and stars are reflected in mirrors. In Descater's ‘conception the one which became the bass for “modern” epistemology—ie is representations which are in the “mind,” The Inner Bye surveys these representations hop- ing to find some mark which will testify to their fidelity. 45Wheres sepia in the ancient wold had been a mater On ral nae,» sea ie rention to the Pe tcvon af the nel hin of the ay septic ithe manner of Descartes Fis Meditation wat per taty dene, proce, preestna™ qurton” How do te Enow thai ying whi i ment represents 3. hich sot men? How do we know whether what the Bye ofthe Mind sess mir een 8 ie tnimoran enchanted gis) or a wel The notion of Thowldge a Inner repesenaon is natura that Iron mol may vcom merely quant, and Cason {2s opposed to Pyonan “prt sepia scm 0 auch a par of what ito “dink phlophially” hae we ate amaed iat Plato ot Ale never con trnted ic dveci, Bur it we see hat the two models~the Iromorphic ad the repre ate ely oponl vrtups'e can se the Inference to minty an ht tam om exch jn a opiona nan article called "Why inthe Bind ody Problem ote ip Fain Ge pin a “enenoine pa sah Ted iy toe “a sn ng a ar Slt eet omens tt pg Sth meses tl non le nd ad hn in ne hate ha te wa” apn hn tn Col ‘Seren cm ra wt he mn Kant ndidon made it cena Charlo Swuph (Geek Seelam ek 20 Sere Po vit gute 3 Sie” Monee to ar tat gages tyme ie 8 Laken Un. yh incopy tere he mins party metal sinply be ‘Gi TecrepiblyEnow, The vat ancient thought sem to cme (o'r oon of dam af Icrigiby Reowabe mental enti I the Soe dctne of eratyrie soar Soog, pp. 4), but ss Setnod a1 5 reprenntation cacy coepcnding wo i Objet 2d therfore compelingasest, whieh Is hardy Laces notion. Se ako Jonah. Gouks, "Bing the Word aod appearence in Fay Skin nt Some Other Cred Pllmphers” Review of Metapher =7 (tea 26-88 exec pp 7 6 Ancient" Wallace Matson has noted the principal point which divides Greek from seventeenth-centuty ways af lok: ing atthe separation of mind from body ‘The Greeks did not lack a concept of mind, even of a ‘mind separable from the body. But from Homer to Ari®- totle, the line beeween mind and bod, when drawn at all, was drawn so a8 to put the processes of sense pereep- tion on the body side, ‘That i one reson why the Greeks hhad no mindbody problem. Another is that itis dificale, almost imposible, to translate such a sentence as “What js the relation of sensation to mind (or soul)?" into Greek, The diffculty isin finding a Greek equivalent for “Sensation” in the sense philosophers make ft best "Sensation" was introduced into philosophy precisely 0 rake it posible to speak of 4 conscious sate without committing oneself as tothe nature or even existence of ‘external simul One can sum up both of Matson’s points by saying tha in Greek there is no way to divide "conscious states” or “tates of consciousnes"—-events in an inner life—from events in an “external world.” Descartes, on the other hand, used ought” to cover doubting, understanding, firming, denying, willing, refusing, imagining, and feeling, and sid ‘alice Mata, Why av the Mind-ody Problem Ancient” In Mind, Mater end Meade Esays in Philowphy nd Scene tn Honor of Herbert Feige. Paal Feyerabend and Grover Masel (Binnespaic 16) pp. 0 ‘sun, "Mindy Problem: p vor. He goes on to argue tat either atvtoa ser sebsn wl ot an quent of “eaton ‘oraren it tempting Posty, but een fo tte Ara ‘tic mena Hage nts sspicen, sod one cule x et 2 pain lorerga On te eyo eterpretng Aan natn hantama, tee Antony” Kenny, “Inlet nd Tagan nt "Thomas" in duinas 4 Collection of Cte Bay Remy (a dem City, NY 1) pong. "Te plot Mates skein the fa Serene of shin quan bathed up by ‘Thames Reis scone of "he tem “sent” See ht Ey on the Fela Powe of Mon (Cambridge Mas, 16g 49 and ey pes, athat even if dream that I se light ‘property speaking this in me i alld feling, and wed inthis precise sense tha is no other thing than thinking” Once Descartes had en: trenched this way of speaking i was possible for Locke to tse "idea" in a way which has no Greek equivalent at all, ts meaning “whatsoever is the object of the understanding ‘when a man thinks” or “every immediate object ofthe mind In thinking."" As Kenny puts it, the modern use of the in Mettation w Devattes ware by defaing 2 “tog which shake” ante mind na, ov a endettandng oF a raw” Gt gins, Heme soe amas, eft, ss rte) 2nd qty pcs onto" tng bh think Ta hing hich Brive dean fia, denies will ees, ad li tages ‘in feel lace adds “Nempe dubs, tigen, fans, ne uns cen nln, magna quogue teen. Then he cnt ‘win the acto pug ied above (hoe et frptie quod in me enue opel gu he prove mmm i oi tu Se Ae pS ni Aguas gi) volt gp tas in lo the Hale Set ‘Row nai, Soe aio Pinas fy meg “By the word Toght funded all tata which we te comeions af operating in'os ou! ce gue fit en now detest que now Capers omédsement pr nasa) hat why nt ony waded ing wing, imagining, bot sls fling, Gen) ate hee the me gs Bot Cee Popham: Han over McRae "Denartey efeion of Though in Cates Sues, SLR] Baler (Owore, sos) pp. 37> ‘a Tic equation erm ey (6) and dhe second fom se -Soond Later the Bop of Were Tamene asthe at ff ie mental ith he rein of medic) beg incorrgii) Teme an ungeeioned prepestion in ploy becuse fs) fumgess tien Ar m oer pliloophy, elite sage Became Tent efan underaasding of aiainetvdy pilsphia ops abd ‘Sows Tins wend Hume yng "alle concons, which he ‘ie form onder hs Benne ey contay to those which are ‘omirmed by philoophy. For phloophy Sora uy, tha eveything Stic appar ote mind sting ut perception, and itr pct, net dependent on tne mind whereas de rugs conoand pe fon and sje and sebute + diet continued exience te Ihe wey thing ef and se (Treats, 3). Joon Benet tote at "Lrhc'’ thought doit by tmp tow ee? 48 word idea derives through Locke from Descartes, “and Descartes was consciously giving ica new sense it was a new departure to wwe i systematically for the comtents of 4 human mind." More important, there had been no term, “rial ta Hey tem in hi acouis of perception and of ean iri tordand, hi of ie to cover both sensed a cor ane ektoy and Hae sone in te emp adn, of samt Ing the tenory fr too ln) to the itloan” (Benet, eck, ‘ere Hume: Corel Themes (Onor, up 4) Tit mie Ioweve, gous tack to Deate and vat embodied equally inthe T= ons eadvon iis part what Wid sells el he “kame. ‘ont ef giennes” cmon oth tadons, and as alvays bee The tare thn induced by Hegel CL Slain Scene, Pereton uaa. (Loom and New York, pp. e719 Sl. Its and ence compo ae pret by HL. Price, and be fore hin by TH. Cree, hom 1 dase rey Below in ape he, ‘ton = Te Aniony Kenny, “Desaris on Wes” in Decare: A Cleon of ‘ria Bay Will Dey (Cate City, NX. 196), pa, Se ‘Deseret dfnion fens ou ce et eee eh NaS. jer mown somes midntement connaimat and of "6 a ‘ce fre de acne denon rs pur peeption imme Ae lagu nous aoe onnalance de es mle pense (plies to Sond Objection, lg eitn, 1.58, Jobe Yotan,nowee, es ie with Renny and with Algeid and oer commeniatrs who ake the ndinal newb Tam aking Meret Dexares doctrine Stren cat tan rp isi ek owldge in seventeenth Gentry Phowphy Journal of the Hie {ory af Prienphy 19 [ans 45st) be ces Dears actin thn of ake ar "une mae fag de poser” im tbe Third Med ation (Agi 4) ekence at Desares a an "ae teary ties hich was tmp with adele diet rain. Here #60 {hr oher wens Yolen far sagged thatthe wal ory (emo fo, Ce Bene, Gina and JH Randall) show the emergence of ‘Poteet eps out of «tery of represeaive pereption ‘rucd by Dasari and Lode my be too simplemide. Asia line is taken by Ban O'Nell in APisemalgel Diet Retin in Dexane Phivphy (lager, NM 194) psa Dexa Tong topic wana ett rain andrea teoy of ese ob Serum and Une dacae of ample natzea” Nel xpos wih Jan 49ven of philosophical atin the Grek and medieval trad Slom costemie with the DesarerLace ae 0 "ea [Nor hal there been the conception ofthe human ming as 2ninner space in which both ain apd clear and distin iat ped in tvew Belote singe Inner Bye. There wer lobe srg the non of ting ace hough, form ing reseltions in foro intero, ad the ike The novelty wr the notion of gle inner space in which boy and erect sensaont confaed idea of tense ad agi ion" in Deters pha, mathenatea! ths, orl hls the de of God, mons of depres, all the rest hat we now cal "ental" were objects of quasieb Seration Such an inner rena with i ane obvever bad ‘cn sogesel a vaous po in ancient and medieval thought bu bad never ben taken erin long enough to Yom the bas fora problematc™ But the seventeenth ‘Watt dat Dares “alt exprine les dex conceptions fndamentes (1 antnoniqes da vel the oe based tng the Tho. Shan and te cher bdo wshing Te ov of ea ome of ‘ic arne the own tera) a eprenains. TE Yao re Tideeulating of ade snd ecaerse eet then on el Tareto ok tte along in hisy fr he erence of ha mo hugh ofa the cpap probleme eented by. Deets Here howee, am ong song wh Kenny's ore falar scent ice for eampl Pin, Soph EA (ipo of Nan p.m) ages with Maton tat -vinin the tmeos of heen meapiyae a poly {het be no min? boy problem bat a at "ato am Kitts he Coan pron of mind and body ele eons othe byt nul ose owen ht hee re Siteence ben Piso abd Arne on thi points Maton’ pin fps eq wel wo bot On tc ocr and have to dit hat {Shes outing fo Gon ew hat ese gy ae oe hse ‘Scmens te Aopotnsn triton wih Tomas hd bed Are ‘Guetw och Sole Glaigean oe between Pato a Arle {ies mn rons Far e mage im hopin eh ae ‘analy dle to puongs eal ched om Deva 0 siw the 50 ‘century took it seriously enough to permit it to pose the problem of the veil of ideas, the problem which made epistemology central to philosophy. ‘Once Descartes ha invented that “precise sense” of “ee! Jing” im which it was "no other than thinking,” we began. to lote touch with the Aristotelian distinction between reasonasgrasp of univers and the living body which taker cite of ensation and motion. A new mind-body dis- tinction was required the one whieh we all that "be- tween consciousness and what is not consciousness” This was not a distinction between human faculties but a distine- tion between two series of events, sch that many events in fone series shared many characterises with many events in “igi of i notion of “hnking” to over Yoh ese and loc. ‘Gareth Matthews Go “Conaiosnen and Lite” Philp (oP) ‘gee asking caample rom Contra deaemicon 3, ‘hap a6 and commen “The pire of man Beings as taing both an “imide” nd'an ‘ute itm commonplace. x may teem 1 os) common. femal that we Bd card vee how singly modern 2D appre is modernity one ed ly et abet for te tena far than Dewatcn One dered Itreing nt fans of cn Augen, bu nt toch ale, ad po mh be {ack te notion ofthe po i the machine eker an merely ‘Ginosan Kinney, Such a cin made, for example. by Start ampere Stuy” of The Conept of ind, Mind 39 [bao asyasy ep aa) On the other hand Hamp ein Itaceytoenc by the segetion (nate tome in convertion by Micae Frts) tat the apparent nowy of Catean docrines ok {praca preps aid of homam blog "ner mac” In ite fied tone rade Hellenic plop aid appreciate role of {Ee Sein Reatvne thought Sree srg nd eget It atin eal ton te fue diced bore note, hen ere Ae many ve continues inthe hisry of phibopic dlaaion at ‘hee tole than the sory Tm elling ich i brome om the Cin Randall terol dion) would slow. 5the other, while nonetheless differing toto caelo because fone was an event in extended, and the other in nonextend- fd, subwance, Ie was more like a distinction between two worlds than like a distinction between two sides, or even partsof a human being. The “Ideal World” of philosophers like Royee inherits the prestige and the mystery of the Glasy Essence of che Renaissance, but it is self-contained in a way in which a part of a man could never be? To show that mind was imaginable apart from body was thus an entirely different project from that found in the tra- dition which stemmed from Arstoe. In Aristotle, the fac ‘ulty which received univers without embodying them in matter was “separable” and it was hard (without some help from extra-philosophical concerns, sich a8 Christianity) toy whether one should view i as a special power which the body had, a separate substance attached to each mature Ihoman body, of perhaps a single substance which was somehow shared among as many men and angels as chere happened to be. Aristotle vacilated between the fist and second options, with the second having the usual attrac See Reyes deiption of Carton ject a4 “The Radin covery ote Inner Lie (e te of haper i of i The Spit of Modern Poi (New York, 6g) abl s opening te way toa oertanding ta the el word ute “men (he cocoon he ‘dra rmpbanly in Caper) er ao ehaper tof Loveys The Rew sgsint Dats (ha Salle HL, gu) which Laney nis ‘eine thaw ho would drone Dexa, tat the vel of Hea i praem which aie forall who held {he primary and mow uniter! fth of man, his nespagneta- ‘itr wood bel that he on te one ad inthe mite of ‘lies whic are not himelf nor mee stele shadow o him ‘Sit bnng and, on the other hand, at he ean himsl somo {etc beyond the confines and ing these exer exec i ‘he compas of his ova Ie, yt witout annulment of tie tan coon “To Aritoe, Aquinas, Dewey, of Asin thi “elim” woud sem fe od fetched ws Roper ein. 52 ions offered by the posbility of surviving death, Medieval philosophy vacilated between the second and third. But In all these disputes the controversy was not about the sr vival of “consciousness” but about che indestructbility of ‘reason: Once mind is no longer synonymous with rea!on, 28 Ths Augutine leas of hit teatie “Om the Immoral ofthe ‘cat with wate rps atthe simple and om deve age tment of il the sul mera Deane i tthe obj oer the ssn) of sence, which eee In duper for exempe eaye “The human boy i abe an vaso sastable Fr al Wh der nt exit alae the sme mode mtb, bt that tae ‘oar our exists aay In theme mole «This of reson ing hea, inmate Teco, eam roma (Consang the Teacher and On the Immortality ofthe So tae Cage Laie {New Wor, 198 6). Betwen P's Phoed andthe trent entry, the sanrd phlei! suoen fo tmmonaly ed a ‘rye revolved around our aby t 60 what bea canon ‘hanging cus rater than jut prea fet en Deas. a {tgif opene the ode eam ently new cncepton ofthe Aiterece beween mind and body, was Indibe to tack to the Standard poston and ay thatthe fey wat reponse fora the ton which we tre wh betes ter example fight tom ange ‘hate Furth Raft he wy ha len aon a, “light reflected fom the body of 2 wlf In the eyes ofa sep should ‘we apile fencing » motion of Nght” (Overen Phouphigue, el Algie. Spi: Hllane se Rot, 24) Bat hie temo f {ectingsra sro thinking oad emt och in the prado ‘Sl ct (ohh teiter Atul or Auponine would have ay sa Son't make) tht the teling of tor which aclompanio oar igh ‘ota parallel within he sep. See the rumen neo Henry More ean 5, 169) stp B85 of ol of the Al eien In uch page tig the amity of "thought" betwen reasoning {nd “rclouinet comer hea. Dexares neds the fortes {o'avoadpeadon and wo natn Kink with te trate, and the ‘Ser seu to exblih = dunn of extended se nested Stance For atv of loan Cartes tents and 4 ond aco af the input of Demat vio on ltr pomp, se Noman Mal ‘sim, Toop Hrten" Proedingy and areas ofthe Aer ‘in Palwphes Action 4b (979) $4, aloe, however, iss ‘dae inyquetin of why Desa repacage pine sd ouphr 22 58then something other than our grasp of universal truths smut serve a the mark of mind Te loo in Dena for common actor which pains dreams nemoryages ae veri and hallucinatory er tepvons share wth concepts of (ad jdgments about) Co ‘number, and the ultimate consents of mater, we find hovexplict doctrine: Descartes el um that we havea ear {rasp the distinction between the extended and she non ‘Senda owe do (i tes which Se might claim a lear grasp ofthe ditntion between the Ente nd the inte, but tis does not lp with the borderline ese (ensory grap of particulars) which are, rit happens the heat of the matter, or Kis just the Stas of the “confsed ens of sense and imagination” ‘thich mates the difrence between mindasreson and Inns consciousness “The amet I should Tike to give to the question “What common factor did Descartes "a indubiaiy.” chat {eithe fact that pains ike thoughts and mose bli, ae Such tha he subject onnot doubt that he he the, where Ssdoubt is possible about everything physeal. IF we give thisammwe, then we can see wht Royce led "Desearess redicovery of the inner ile” ax the Ubavery of the tue to nde them within he we wbtnce i anor by saying dat hat tcommon to imagining ingen. fling te tho {Rhett "herein am sje of eaves” (Males ‘rool Tat Hr Eoens ts Thinking in Deere 4 cole ‘al Euayr, of. Wiis Dene, p 190) th oter word Mal thinks ‘Fac icon ait to ate ll the things which Dexarer fan to unter cpio an pede oo hk that this ll “Tottori In any tw i ane opeter the genuine intetior Wingate epesentatne aod the personaly fox Sliee (ts I) of ents whic Aguas Nept spe Ts ist thi on ence by Dewars which ness espnation Or. to pot i 3 ‘ther way nhac neds explanation the orign ofthe notion of earch pine vobjet of atesen™ On the diinion ‘eueengeaine sed poeonetioaliy, ae Slats Being 0 Be- I Know in Sen, Pereton and Rey. cy cesence of consciousness—that there is no distinction be tween appearance and reality, whereas everywhere else there is. The trouble with offering thie answer, however, is that itis never explicitly given by Descartes himself. 50 the best Tean do to justiy it i to say that something is needed to explain Descartes repackaging of the various items which Aristotle and Aquinas had separated, that nothing ese seems to do, and that indubitability was 20 close to the heat of the author ofthe Fist Meditation that it seems a natural motive for his conceptual revolution. Margaret Wilson has noted that we can find in Descartes an argument for mindbody dualism (@ dualism drawn long the revisionist lines Ihave been describing) which is simple “argument from doubt.” This argument says that what we can doubt exists cannot, by Leibai’'s lave, be identical with what we cannot doubt exist, As Wilson says, this argument is “universally recognized to be fal ious" Ie is fallacious, if for no other reaton, becaute Leibni' law does not apply to intentional properties. But, ‘Wilson continues, the argument for dualism in the Sixth Meditation is not version of this fallacious argument. It turns instead on the notion of “a complete thing” (which seems the same as the notion of “substance” in the sense of the term in which Descartes will admit only three aub- stances—thought, extension, and God). The crucial premise is "T can clearly and distinally understand that something can be a complete thing if it has x (@ prychological prop: ‘erty even if i lacks g (a physical property)" (p. 14) think that Wilson's analysis is right, and that she is also right when she says tha this argument 2s a whole “is no better than the distinction between clear and distinct perception and ‘mere’ perception,” concerning which she doubts whether “recent essentials’ appeals to intuition” are on better ground (p. 14) In my view, however, the prin- See Manpret Wile, Deeares: the Epitemoloial Argument for Mind Rody Disininn” Now 10 (09) 7% Tam much deed {2 Wile for cll sed pel comment om» dat ft chapter 55cipal question raised by her analysis is how Descartes man- “aged to convince himself that something which included both pains and mathematical knowledge was “a complete thing” rather than two things. This in turn reduces to the {question of how he was able to give “penser” the extended ente of “consciousness” while still seeing it as the name of 4 separate substance, in the way in which sie and intel lectus had been made familiar as the names of separate substances. In my view, at I have said, “essentialist intu tions” and “clear and distinet pereeptions” are always ap- peals to linguistic habits entrenched in the language by our Dredecesors, So what needs explanation is how Descartes twas able to convince himself that his repackaging was Granted that the “argument from doubt” has no merit, 1 think that nevertheles itis one of those cases of "finding ‘bad reasons for what we believe on instinet” which serves as a dlue to the instincts which actually do the convincing. ‘The hunch in question here was, think, that the indubi: tably known mathematical truths (once their proofs had been worked through #0 as to make them clearly and di tinetly perceived with a sort of “phenomenal” vividness and nondiscursivenes) and the indubitable momentary States of consciousness had something ia common—yome- thing permitting them to be packaged inside of one sub- ssance, ‘Thus Descartes sas: Now as to what concerns ideas, if we consider them only in themselves and do not relate them to anything else beyond themclves, they cannot properly speaking be fale; for whether I imagine a goator a chimera, itis not the lew te that T imagine the one rather than the other Speaking of the imaginary beings created by painters, he says that even if Mediation I, Agi don, 198 56 their work represents a thing purely Gettious and abs solutely fase, it is certain all the same that the colors ff which this is composed are necesaily real. And for the same reason, although these general things (geteralia) fuch ar eyes, a head, hands, and soon, may be imaginary, itis evertheles necessary that there be some mote simple land univers (queedam adue magi simplicia et univer: salia) things out of which all these are made—just as ‘out of colors all the images of things (rerum imagine’). Whether wie oF fase, which are in our thought (quae in ‘cogitetione nostra sunt) are made" In these passages, I think Descartes is dimly envisaging 2 similarity Between the "simple natures” which we know in ‘mathematical physics (which may be the quaedam simplicia ‘et universalia in question) and the colors themselves, Color, in his oficial, Galilean, metaphysical view, are secondary qualities waiting upon analysis into simples, but epstemo: logically they seem ike pain, to have the same sort of primi tive inescapability as the simple matures themiclves, He could not make the analogy explicit without setting his foot on the road toward Lackean empiriciem, But nether could he give it up without falling back into the old Aris- totelian distinctions between the sensitive and the intel. Iectual souls. This would have brought back all the pre- Galilean metaphysics which he wanted to avoid, not to mention » hylomorphie epistemology impossibly dificult to reconcile with the explanatory power of Galilean me- chanics" In this dificult situation, Re allowed, T think, Metta 1, lg tn. 79, 1 think Dexarter woud ave lied toner atthe ft sone isthe thinking thing the wextended Immaterial pulsar, a tribuing toe bly aint, ean eli Bat he a, ‘Gone bythe Ene iene property ofthe kale rs contelon ‘ttmnde of mater cot bea property ofthat eoneliatin of ‘Bode mater tha the aman DoS pore pn and all he minder of sur imaedse expence mun be dumped ite the 37most of the work of changing the notion of “mind” to be done under the table, not by any explicit argument but Simply by verbal mancuvers which reshufled the deck ‘igh, and slightly diferenly, at each passage in which the mind body distinction came 10 the fore™ TET am right in thinking that Descartes badly argued Inunch, the one which made him able to see pains and thoughts as modes of a single substance, was that indubi tabiliy was the common factor they shared with nothing physica, then we can see Rim as working his way around foward view in which indbitabiity is mo longer the mark of eternaity, but rather of something for which the Greeks had no naine-—consiousness Whereas previous philoso pers had more or les followed Plato in thinking that only the exemal was hnown with certainty, Descartes was sub: Situting “dear and distinct peeeption”"—that is, the sort of unconfused knowledge gained by going through 2 proc fs of analysis—for “indubiabiiy” as a mark of eternal teuths, This lee indubutabilty fee to serve as criterion fof the mental. For although the thought that Tam in pain foes not count asa clear and distin’ pereeption, it can no more be succesfully doubted than the thought that Text. Wheiess Plato and the tradition had made the lines be tween confusion and catty, dubitability and indubitabil fy, and the mind and the body coincide, Descartes was ‘ol saat Ooceaing the Thoin and Cartesian Dla ST Render to Frac Mouane Journal of PREOPRY 54 (7 Mek uncnious seightottand, when priced by men of Dewar lnc of iagann, is cs fo grate cet than crue No post pope at led and no ince ostaon oud See witout Hen *Rehon termi, wo ‘clan cm sceed hh employs 2 vrabulry commenarble ‘inte land ho ne cm sed ycplyig argument which Ba Sei wn of tera red with eda wom. So Eee‘srpuuents for brane honcher mont tee precede the eraliaton of 2 new weabulary wie Inport he hutch ‘Gen tn ary suit beter sige bem oie low then wl avs be flown qoeio-begng by he een iti. 58 now rearranging them. ‘The result was that from Descartes fon we have to distinguish between the special metaphysical ground for our certainty about our inner states (‘nothing {s loser to the mind than sult") and the various epistemo- logical reasons which ground our certainties about anything clse. This is why, once this distinction was drawn dearly, and once Descartss own confusion between certainty that something exists and certainty about its nature was diss pated, empiricism began to edge out rationalism. For our ‘ertainty that our concept of "paintul” or “blue” signifies something real edges out our certainty that we have a clear land distinct peresption of such simple natures a8 “sub: stance," “thought,” and “motion.” With Lockean empii ‘sm, foundationalis epistemology emerged asthe paradigm ‘of philosophy.” Descartes himuelf was forever trying to hold onto standard Platonic and scholastic dstinetions with one hand while constructing them with the other. Thus we find him, ‘when challenged by Hobbes using the pineal gland to ‘9The doer of the poniiity ofan empiri fountatinalisn Is conned with what Ia Hsing Bas denied fn The Emergence of roa amie, Came Unie Pr) he which wuss penqulate for foundations. projec and fron Tor copicnn Tis ives, ts well tthe eval timp of fcupirie, wa comneid wi the Snicton ete the igh aod low adenes fc Hacking psp 20d T-S Kahn, The Fuente Tenson {Ching il cap. 3)°4 fller acount of thew Caren ts ‘ould ring thew eer together. Ser his dain chat Hobbes confer Seas propeny so-called with es images der chon meinen depente ea a inte enpae ‘he ltr being the pln plan in Replies to Third Objection ‘Ait elon 1" Maret Wien “Carin aon” Descartes Ciel and Improve Eye. e& Michal Hear, ‘moe 9p) seston te bss of 2h page, hat we sold be ‘uous abot stibtng fo him the ew Wat "we deny and ie {Un preie our seatns apt fom any py ate fc once" Catan te nerd elle for, DU this a to myth there S'USy of making Deters dena of hi cee consent wih te ‘more “tailine™ dense pages in the Meditation. (hi ay of ‘Wins alan maker the weal pine the Dexter Mm, we 59reintroduce the distinction between the sensitive and intl- Tective souls, and using it again to recreate the standard Pauline asiociation between the passions and the flesh in The Passions ofthe Soul But this dissimulation was laughed ‘out of cour by, for example, Spinors, who saw clearly that 4 confused, but purely mental, idea could do everything ‘which animal sprite of “la fantaie corporelle” could do™ ‘Once such second.generation Cartesians, who viewed Des cartes himself as having one foot all implanted in the Scholastic mud, iad purified and “normalized” Cartesian ‘doctrine, we got the full edged version of the "idea" idea." the one which made it possible for Berkeley to think of ex tended substance as & hypothesis of which we had no need ‘This thought could never have occurred to a preCartesian bishop, struggling with the flesh rather than with intel lectual confusion. With this full edged "idea idea” there came the posbility of philosophy as a discipline which cen tered around, of all things, epistemology, rather than round God and morality» Even for Descartes himself, the Gavend, Hobles and Spine, did aot ele in pchophysal fall and thus dl ope te see that empha fren oper Sed inthe mind wish made posible wo pred boughs pao ieee) See Spica, thc, the Set an ee pargrap of pare and the dicaon fatima pti the pretae to pat Seth ultdged "Hey sen” funy prepped by Hime the poses te isonet aoe) i the ene Red depatingy pro eed suis inthiv pote be was reed by Areauld apd sc (ede in Inter centres by TH. Gren a by Jobo Austin. Jn {Yton hs pointed outs ea psnge in Aan De ori te ‘Joust Ore, aie ad Laws, 780, p19) wach Seg nthe mor mae ng bch Pt, Reuben) at ‘Shc al men were at tnt and ince they then ete ocd umtcre, they opens Tong time whowt ining of ay other San (me) thin the cope, shih they abate to dhl eee “They could not so tl to tT at me {Sry cat the abject be bloe ur eye Heat to we fe Thi Cy matter ofthe relation between body and soul was not some- ‘thing for philosophy; philosophy had, so to speak, risen above the practical wisdom sought by the ancients and had ‘become profesional, almost ax profesional ae mathematics, ‘whose subject symbolized the indubitablity characteristic of the mind, "Ie is only in daly life and ordinary discourse, abstaining fom meditating and studying matters which ‘excite the imagination, that one learns to grasp (concevoir) the union of body and soul -. that union which everyone experiences without philosophising"”™ The Cartesian ‘change from mindasveason to minvl-asinnerarena was not the triumph of the prideful individual subject freed from Scholastic shackles so much as the triumph of the quest for certainty over the quest for wisdom. From that time for ward, the way was open for philosophers either to atain, the rigor of the mathematician or the mathematical physi ist OF to explain the appearance of rigor in these fields, rather than to help people attain peace of mind. Science, rather than living, Deeame philosophy’s subject, and epis temology ite center, 6, Data aN *MivoSrure” can summarize the result of the previous section by saying the notion of the "separation between mind and ‘Tn dey eal prone Qredne) and thie makes them roped he roence othe jc se cena) for sght. The wand at at Ie sometimes we vibe thingy in mor of in wae. in er ‘Binge whit speomn hem, The they aleve, wrongly at they (Sethe ete gr hemley bat only th image Compare Attn on te phlowpherd we of "ety preve’™ Gense Su Sein [Oxtrd gh), i) ad om mor ager (iG, pp ‘sos Fora alle wey of posCaredan account of what Des er ould have meant Oy "en" Gncding Aru’ Tati ‘emptor en st ct nthe msner of Brentano, Huser a GLE Monte me Retort Mea," sts Phono Sm te es 28 (a) 5 Jane 8,49 (Aldon, 4), ced in van Pees, Body Sou Si. 6body" means different things, and is proved by different philosophical arguments, before and after Descartes. The Iylomorphie epistemology which thought of grasping uni- versals as instancing in one’s intellect what the frog in anced in its flesh was, thanks to the rte of mathematical physics, being replaced by a lawevent framework which Explained froghood as powibly a merely “nominal” es- ‘ence, So the notion of reason a «faculty of grasping unt ‘ersals was not available for use in a premise proving the distinctnes ofthe mind from the body. The notion which would define what could "have a distinet existence from the body” was one which would draw a line between the ‘ramps in one’s stomach and the associated feeling in one's ‘mind. have suggested that the only criterion which will draw this line is indubitabiliy—that doseness to the Inner Eye which permita Descartes to say (ina ventence which would have astonished [sabella and antiquity) that “nothing is casier for the mind to know than jtsl{" But this may fcem strange, since the obvious Cartesian candidate for such a mark would seem to be non spatiality. Descartes in tints over and over again that we aan separate mind from “extended substance,” thereby viewing i as nonextended substance, Further, the Bist and most common-sensical re. Duttal offered to contemporary philosophers who suggest ‘that pains might be identical with brain process is drawn, straight from Descartes: vit, pains “ia” amputated Limbs fre nonepatial—the argument being that if they had any spatial location they would be in an arm, but since there ino arm, they must be ofa quite diferent ontological sor. Ths ange oc nape non sequitur lowing he ext pe of the pits of mot in Mediation nr kne een bod are m0 own “propriby ee or imagination bu ony eet dent tha ni fn at rent mee mente ae me perp (AQ, tn igi Haldane apd Row 15) ‘The argument depends Upon 6 Faso teen the eopto prot of my einen aed a elton say cue 6 Philosophers stil insist chat “it maker no sense at all to locate the occurrence of a thought at some place within your body," and they tend to attribute this insight to Descartes. But, as 1 have argued in section above, we vould hardly think of a thought or a pain as 4 thing (4 particular distinct from a person, rather than a sate of person) which was not locatable wnlese we already had the notion of a nonextended substance of which ie might be & portion. No intuition that pains and thoughts are non: spatial antedates, or can ground an argument for, the Car- tesian notion of the mind as a dstine substance (a nom spatial one). There is, however, more to be said about how the notion of “nonspacial substance,” and thus of “mind- stuff" entered philosophy, and thus about why contempo- rary philosophy of mind finds its alking about pains and Deliefs rather than people having. pains or belies. Going ‘over this further material wil, I hope, make clearer how very diferent Cartesian dualism is from the “dualism” of contemporary discussions. We need to bear in mind that the nonspatial substance which Kant and Strawson reject as an incoherent notion, was a seventeenth-eentury notion, and that it is a com- ‘monplace of intellectual history that strange things hap- ‘pened t0 the notion of “substance” in that century. For Aristotle, and sill for St. Thomas, the paradigm of a sub- ‘ance was an individual man or frog. Detached parts of ‘men oF fogs were, like dumps of cur oF pailsul of water, dubious borderline cases—they were “capable of existing separately" in one sense (spatial separation), but they did ‘not have the functional unity or “nature” which proper substances should have. Aristotle, when worried about sich ‘eases, was wont to dismiss them 25 “mere potencies”—as either accidents, like the frog's color, nor proper actual 1 Jerome Staller, Pop of Min. (Englewood Cli, J. 98 posh e Norman Maki, “Sletfe Matera and the Tey “Theory” Disoge $d 5385leaping frog itelE** Descartes pretends that he is using "aistiner substance” in the standard sense fof "capable of separate existence” but he does not mean Cither spatial separation or functional unity. He means Something like “capable of having everything else disappear for be "thought away") and still being around." ‘This efinition of “capacity for separate existence” fis the One, the Platonic Ideas, and Aristotle's Unmoved Movers, but almost nothing else. Given such a definition, it is hardly surprising that there should turn out to be, at most, only {three substances—God, mind, and matter. Nori it surpri- ing that Malebranche and Berkeley should begin to have doubts about the third candidate, and Spinora about both third and second, It would not have occurred to Aristotle to think that frog, stars, and men were simply so many ac ‘dents of one big substance merely on the ground that if ties, ike the liv Ht Mepis oe $3000 hep de he eon be scene iter tng bane exe {hath en oe Maer in Exes ond rgamen Sadie move Phispy i Hoar of Gregoy Ven evar Net Sa Dodie “rng id ats man hod whether a ot deuce 1 pay pod erp of mance CPowth Repos (Aa, ‘Siti hve hee ne ian incmple siting” ingot sod 9 mere) © we often wl inne om ey ober hing” (nn ream on fer pat apes compte non gel een ren nt debe aac ont re men eau som (Eine thew of the Cop de, ‘mate eying 1 put new woe it od ote, to expen the Catena dctine ie ‘ehajal language ofthe bole ot we imagine all she other bodies in the world (eg, estth Sin ai) amiated the frog and the human could harly be imagined to survive. Bu precely thi notion of one big substance was what was need to provide» "phiasphial foundation” of Galilean mechanic wile heaping scm on traditional fylomorphic explanations When inter at aMltheatoms or vortices) prtiogeter replaced mer potentiality, was promowed to the rank of subtance {absorbing sl the old nohoroan Arsoteiansabancs Int itself) and lee only Aristo’ “pure actly” (he sich the Une vy od mya be ihn rom the separable” in ndideal men) a8 0 posible rival in hat rank Pee ‘We contemporary inherits ofthe Cartesian dition between mind and matter have lon touch withthe notion of “ruta nt svete ces denon, Te no tion of exience «ve wae never iteligible tothe vagan tnd Kane need nahin nttligble even wo protesional philosopher. So when we awent to the dim that there i an obwiowsdisinton between category of things which can exis im apace ad another category of hinge which etano, se are not asenting to Deere tlsin that mind tnd matter ave dine! ees “which depend on nothing else for their existence” Many con temporay pilowphers who agee That it nonene to C6 EA, Bat Metepyal Foundations of Modern Plo! Seiece (Canton iy, NY, vps ebap te At 7 Bate ye Te ‘ae and tis of coal importance for our whole my, Dear ta eterion isnot permanence but the posiy of mathemati ‘handing is ca, th Caen the whole cure of hi woah fom is adstecent mdi on hired Bim to the noon hit we ow objets ely in mathemati tert” "The Tealingditnton Seen iy cry gin np he me ‘Cr Fourth Responses (Algut Wt 66r Hanne and Row 98) were esas sy ut “ontwir pleinement” a0 “enc gu est une chow compte” see syommoa, 2 plat whlch he thinks ‘dpe eplin ow we grap hat soul aed oly ate tro bn 6speak of the location of a pain of a thought nevertheless isi, pece Descartes, sha a stream of consciousness without 4 body is unimaginable. Such philosophers are content 10 ‘think of mental entities a tates of persons rather than “bits of ghostly stuf" and to let nonlocaability bea sign ofthe ‘adjectival tausof sate rather than ofthe peculiar makeup of certin particulars. Since man's build, personality, ‘weigh, hilarity, or charm is not capable of being pinpointed in space, why should his beliefs and desires be? So it seems plausible o say that Descarter's insight was merely a recog nition of the difference between parts of persons or states ‘of thote parts (eg, cramps of their stomachs) on the one hand and certain sats of the whole perion on the other, tmisleadingly stated in a corrupted scholastic vocabulary as 4 disinction of “substance.” “This account of what it means to say that the mind is non spatial provides a convenient way of simultaneously tating {nd disolving one mind-body problem. For few people are wortied by an ontological gap between what is signitied by Tames and what is signified by adjectives. However, like most behavioriatayle solutions to the mind-body problem, this one as difficulties with thoughts and raw feels—events ts opposed to dispositions. 1t seat to view beliefs and de, sires and moods at (in Ryle's phrase) “alts of intellect and Claracer” which require no nonmaterial medium 38 sub- Strate but only the man himself eis harder wo chink of raw feels, mental images, and thoughts this way: They sugges ‘an immaterial stream of consciousnes rushing invisibly and inungibly dhough the interstices of the brain, perhaps— ‘The pot it made In vero way by Hamphire, Ain and ‘yer in hee epee vein of The Concept of Mind reprinted i Be Cateon of real Bang, e O. Fe Wood at Coorg che (Carden iy, 8 ty Forays of etending Ryle metho fo pocepos sod the sceted aw fee, me Pier, Theory of Tet nin io i oe he eon Mont ew Haven, try see slo Raaed Rory, “ocriy the Ms othe Meat” Jour of Phinpy y(P #- 66 because it seems so natural to regard them a things rather than states of things. So contemporary philosophers, return ing o an Aristowlian and vulgar notion of “hing” instead of Descattss sophisticated and extravagant notion of “b= stance," are inclined to spit the diference between Aristotle and Descartes. That is, they think that Aristotle neglected certain particulars—for example, pains and raw feele— whereas Descartes pointlssly took them to be accidents of ‘one big nonextended substance, just as he took frogs and atoms to be accidental configurations of one big extended substance called Matter. This permits contemporary philos- ophers to have mental entities without the soul, and thus without appearing to be haunted by the Invisible and Intangible Man of religious belief (@ notion which they read into Descartes—not without some encouragement [om Descartes himself. ‘This dualism based on “separate existence from the body” = fourth sort—is quite diferent from the dualism between 4 person and his gost, or between a person and his Aris totelian passive intellect, or between rer cogitans and rer ‘extensa But itis also a partial dvalism-—as pari, in equal and opposite ways, as that of the ancients. Whereas the Ancients took only the universal gratping part of Descartes nonextended substance at “separately existing,” conter- porary dualists (conceding beliefs. desires, and the like 0 Ryle as ways of speaking of dispositions) take only event lke ‘andidates for mentality as “separately existing” Whereas ‘Thomists, for example, accuse Descartes of having. point. lesly endowed sense with the immateriaity which ' the prerogative of reason, contemporary dualists accuse him of hhaving pointlessy endowed mathematical knowledge and Secisons on conduct withthe immaterial thinghood which belongs to pains, afterimages, and occurrent thoughts. For the ancients, the mind was most obviously capable of sep. arate existence when it contemplated the unchanging and. was itelf unchanging. For the moderns, i is most obviously ‘0 capable when tis a blooming, buzzing collection of raw eofccls*# Whoever is right, is lear that neither ancients nor moderns share Descartes “clear and distinct perception” of the separability ofa the items he lumped together under “ehinking.” Descartes’ only improvement on the Homeric notion of an Invisible and Intangible Man was to strip the intruder fof humanoid form. By thus making the possible intruders among bodies leis easily identifiable, he made them more Philosophical. They were more philosophical in that, like the jis of Aristotle and the Glassy Essence of Isabella, they ‘were not shady homuncul, but rather esentially unpic tural entities. Since to be concerned with philosophical matters was tobe concerned with that which the eye cannot senor the ear ear, both seventeenth-century nonextended. substance and contemporary nonlocatable thoughts and feels were thought t0 be mare philosophically respectable than the ghorts for whose peace religious believers pray. But ‘contemporary philosophers, having updated Descartes, can Dedualists without their dualism making the slightest differ cence to any humin interest or concern, without interfering ‘with scence of lending any support to religion. For insofar as dualism reduces to the bare insistence that pains and thoughts have no places, nothing whatever hangs a the dis- tinction between mind and body. Let me now remind the reader of the course I have fl: lowed inthis chapter. In sections 1-2 I argued that we could makeno tent of the notion of "mental entities” asa distinct, ‘ontological genus without invoking the notion of "phenome. nal entities” such as pains, entities whose being was ex- Ihausted by the single property of, for example, painfulnes, Frelsimed that the real problem was not to abjure such ‘whereas, ot Pato, ratboal oughts were the panama secveo the cs ou enent athe, toa a Wings srenow smug those {ply tested piled dicen ‘arma erent” Gaepwom Kiran and te Gers of he Mee” Shee or 39) typosatiaed univenats bot to explain why anyone had taken them seriou, and how thoy tame to sce tera to discuss ofthe nature of personhood and of reason. [ hope that sections 9-4 have given an en of how T thik thee historical questions can be answered. although 1 am pinflly aareof te lca i the sory Ihave weld) My Ese othe question “Why dow tendo lump the inten, tional an the phenomenal togeter ste mental hat Deseartes ued the notion of the “ncongibly known” to ‘widge the gap beoween thom. So I how hed to spel out sore flly my own antiCaresin, Wigensteinian, view tthe nature “os pve a To the mena” the following chapter therefore, I put aide pee sonhood and’ tein, and. discus conscounen alent ‘xclsively T sll tr co show thatthe purportedly mete Physi "problem of consciousness sno move and ho tes than the epistemological “probe of privileged aceon" ad thao thin qutons sou dst vers ma ‘eile oe tet nero 6Persons Without Minds 1, Ta: ANnipooeans Far away, on the other side of our galaxy, there was 2 planet on ‘which lived beings like ourselves—featherlss Fipeds who built houses and bombs, and wrote poems and computer programs. These Beings did not know that they hhad minds. They had notions ike “wanting to” and “in tending to" and "believing that” and “feeling terrible” and feeling marvelous.” But they had no notion that these signified mental states—staes of a peculiar and distinct fort—quite different from “siting down,” “having a cold fnd “being sexually aroused." Although they used the no tions of believing and knowing and wanting and being moody of their pets and ther robots at well as of themselves, they didnot regard pets or robots as included in what was ‘meant when they said, "We all believe «..” or "We never do such things as..." That 3s to say, they treated only Inembers oftheir own species as persons. But they did not ‘explain the difference between persons and non persons by Sach notions as “mind,” “consciousness.” “piety” or any thing of the sort. They did not explain i ata; they just treated it at the difference between "us" and everything. tlse. They believed in immortality for themselves, and a few believed that this would be shared by the pets or the robots, ‘or both. But this immortality didnot involve the notion ofa “Son” which separated from the body. It was a straightor- ward matter of bodily resurrection followed by mysterious {nd instantaneous motion to what they referred to as “a place above the heavens" for good people, and toa sort of ye, beneath the planet's surface, for the wicked. Their philosophers were concerned primarily with four topics: the hare of Being, proofs of the existence ofa Benevolent and nm ; ‘ i ‘ Omnipotent Being who would carry out arrangements for the resurrection, problems arising out of discourse about nonexistent objects, and the reconciliation of conicting ‘mora intuitions, But these philowphers had not formulated the problem of subject and object, nor that of mind and ‘matter. There waea tradition of Pyrhonian skepticism, bi Locke's “veil of ideas” was unknown, since the notion of an “ides” oF “perception” or "mental representation” was so unknown. Some of their philosophers predicted that the beliefs about immortality which had been central in earlier periods of history, and which were still held by all but th {ntelligentsia, would someday be replaced by a "positvistic™ ccalture purged of all superstitions (out_these philos- ‘ophers made no mention of an intervening “metaphysical” age). Tn most respects, then, the language, life, technology, and philosophy of this race were much Inke our. But there was ‘one important difference. Neurology and biochemistry had ‘heen the first diciplincs in which technological, break ‘hroughs had been achieved, and a large part of the com ‘eration of these people concerned the tate of their nerves. ‘When their infants veered toward hot stoves, mothers ried out, "Hell simulate his C-fibers” When people were given Clever visual illusions to look at, they said, "How odd! T. ‘makes neuronie bundle G-14 quiver, but when T look at it from the side Ican se that is nota red rectangle at “Their knowledge of physiology was such that each well formed sentence in the language which anybody bothered to form could exsily be correlated with a readily identifiable ‘neural state. This state occurred whenever someone uttered, fr was tempted to utter, or heard, the sentence. This state also sometimes occurred in solitude and people reported such occasions with remarks like "I was suddenly in state S296, s0 T put out the milk botles” Sometimes they ‘would say things like “Te looked like an elephant, but then iesruck me that elephants don’ oceut on this continent, s0 [realized that it must be a mastodon.” But they would also nsometioes say, in just the same circumstances, things like ‘Thad G-qz together with F-1, but then I had $-147, 90 1 realized that it must be a mastodon.” They thought of ‘mastodons and milk bottles ax objects of beliefs and desires, tnd as casing certain neural processes. They viewed these neural processes as interacting causally with beliefs and esirerin just the same way 28 the mastodons and milk Doles did. Certain neural process could be deliberately seltinduced, and some people were more skillful than others in inducing certain neural states in themselves Others were shill at detecting certain special sates which most people ‘could not recognize in themselves. Tn the middle of the twenty-first century, an expedition from Earth landed on this planet. ‘The expedition included philosophers, as well as representatives of every other learned discipline. The philosophers thought that the most, interesting thing about the natives was theit lack of the concept of mind. They joked among themselves that they had landed among a bunch of materialist, and suggested the mime Antipodea for the planet—in reference to an almost forgotten school of philosophers, centering in Aus tralia and. New Zealand, who in the previous century had attempted one of the many fatile revolts against Cartesian ‘ualiam in the history of Terran philosophy. The mame stuck, and so the new race of intelligent beings came to be known as Antipodeans. The Terran neurologists and bio- chemists were fascinated by the wealth of knowledge in ‘her feld which the Antipodeans exhibited. Since technical conversation on these subjects was conducted almost en: ticely in offhand references to neural states, the Terran experts eventually picked up the ability to eport their own neural states (without conscious inference) instead of re- porting their thoughts, perceptions, and raw feels. (The physiologies of the two species were, fortunately. almost ‘emtical) Everything went swimmingly, except for the Aificulties met by the philosopher ‘The philosophers who had come on the expedition were, n as usual, divided into two warring camps: the tender ‘minded ones who thought philosophy should aim at Sig nlfeance, and the toughminded philosophers who thougt that it should aim ac Truth. The philosophers of the fst sort felt that there was no real problem about whether the ‘Antipodeans had minds. They held that what was im [portant in understanding other beings was a grasp oftheir ‘mode of beinginheworld. It became evident that, what ever Bxisentiale the Antipodeans were using, they certainly {did not include any of thove which, a centuty eatlier, Hei ddegger ad criticized as “subjectvis.” ‘The whole notion of “the epistemological subject.” or the person as spirit, had no place in their selfdesrptions, nor in their philosophies Some of the tenderminded. philosophers fet that this showed that the Antipodeans had nat yet broken out of Nature into Spirit, or, more charitably, had not yet pro- ‘greved from Consciousness to SelfConsciousness. These philosophers became town-criers of inwardnes, attempting to bully the Antipodeans across an invisible line and into the Realm of Spirit. Others, however, felt that the Anti: podeans exhibited the praiseworthy grasp of the union of ihezos and dior which was lost to Western Terran con- feiousnes through Plato's assimilation of winia to Bie. The ‘Antipodesn failure to grasp the notion of mind, inthe view ofthis set of philosophers, showed their closeness to Being fand their fresdom fom the temptations to which Terran ‘thought had long since succumbed. Inthe contest between these two views, equally tendersminded as both were, dis ccstion tended to he inconclusive. The Antipodeans them Selves were not much help, because they had 30 much trouble translating the background reading necesary to ap, preciate the problem-—Plato's Theuetetus, Descarters Medi fations, Hume's Treatise, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Hegel's Phenomenology, Strawson's Individuals, te ‘The tough minded philosophers, as usual, found 2 much more straightforward. and clean-cut question to discus. ‘They did not care what the Antipodeans thought about %‘themselves, bt rather focused on the question: Do they in fact have minds? In thei precise way, they narrowed this ‘question down to: Do they in fact have sensations It was ‘hought that if t became clear whether they had, sa, sensa- tions of pain, as well a stimulated C-fibers, when touching, hot stoves, everything else would be plain sailing. Tt was ‘leat thatthe Antipodeans had the same behavioral dispos. ‘ions toward hot stoves, muscle eramps, torture, and the like as humans. They loathed having their Cibers stimulated. ‘But the tough-minded philosophers asked themselves: Does {heir experience contain the same phenomenal properties as ‘ours? Does the stimulation of C-bers feel painful? Or does it feel vome other, ally awful, way? Or does feeling not come into itat all? There philosophers were nt surprised thatthe ‘Antipodeans could offer noninferenial reports of their own, rneural states, since it had been learned long since that psjchophysiologists could rain human subjects to report Apha-rhythms, ab well as various other physiologically de- scribable cortical states. But they fle bad by the question: ‘Are some phenomenal properties being detected by an Ant podean who says, “Its my Cibers agnin-—you know, the fnes that go of everytime you get burned oF hit or have a tooth pulled. Is just awful”? Te was suggested that the question could only be answered experimentally, and so they arranged with the neurologists that one of their number should be wired up to an Ants podean volunteer so as to switch earrents back and forth between various regions of the two brains. This, i was ‘thought, would alio enable the philosophers to insure that the Antipodeans did not have an inverted spectrum, oF anything else which might confuse the issue. As it turned. ‘out, however, the experiment produced no interesting re- sults, The dificuley was that when the Anipodean speech enter got an input from the CSbers of the Earthling brain slways talked only about its Cibers, whereas when the Earthling speech center was in contol it always talked only about pain: When the Antipodean speech center was asked " what the C-fibers felt ike isi that it didn’t quite get the notion of “feeling.” but that stimulated Cibers were, of ‘course, terrible things to have. The samme sort of thing hap- pened for the questions about inverted spectra and other [pereeptual qualities. When asked to call off the colors on 3 chart, both speech centers called of the usual colornames in ‘the sme order. But the Atipodean speech center could a0 call off the various neuronic bundles activated by each pateh ‘om the chart (no matter which visual cortex i happened to be hooked up to). When the Earthling spocch center was asked what the colots were like when wansinited to the ‘Antipodan visual corte, it sid that they seemed jutt as “This experiment seemed not to have helped. For it was sill obscure whether the Antipodeans had pains. It was ‘equally obscure whether they had one or wo ray feels when Indigo light streamed onto their retinas (one of indigo, and one of neural state C-92)~or whether they had no raw fees atall. The Antipodeans were repeatedly questioned about hhow they knew it was indigo, They replied that they could see that it was. When asked how they knew they were in (Coa, they sid chey “just knew" it. When it was suggested to them that they might have unconsciously iferred that it was indigo on the buss of the C-6ge fel, they semed unable to understand what unconscious inference was, or what “feels” were. When it wa suggested to them th they might hhave made the same inference to the fact that they were in state C62 on the bass ofthe raw feel of indigo, they were, ‘of course, equally bafled, When they were asked whether the neural state appeared indigo, they replied that it did ‘not—the light was indigo—and that the questioner must be making some sort of category mistake. When they were asked whether they could imagine having C92 and not ‘ecing indigo, they said they could not, When asked whether ‘twas a conceptual truth or an empirical generalization that these two experiences went together they replied that they ‘were not ‘ure how to tell the diference. When asked %whether they could be wrong about whether they were ‘ecing indigo, they replied that they of course could, but ‘ould not be wrong about whether they seemed to be seeing indigo. When asked whether they could be wrong about ‘whether they were in state C2, they replied in exactly the same way. Finally, skillful philosophical dialectic brought them to realize that what they could not imagine ‘was seeming tose indigo and filing to seem to be in state Cége, But this result id not seem to help with the ques Lions: "Raw fel?” “Two raw fels or one?" "Two referents ‘or one referent under two descriptions?” Nor did any ofthis help with the question about the way in which simulated (Cibers appeared to them, When they were asked whether they could be mistaken in thinking that their C-fibers were stimulated, they replied that ofcourse they could—but that they could not imagine being mistaken about whether their Cibers seemed to be stimulated ‘At this point, it occurred to someone to ask whether they could detect the neural state whieh was the concomitant of “seeming to have their Cfbers stimulated.” Antipodeans replied that there was, of cours, the state T-435 which was the constant neural concomitant of the utterance of the sentence "My Cbers seem to be stimulated,” state T.497 which went with "I's just as if my C-ibers were being stim lated,” state T-298 which went with “Stimulated Cefbes!” and various other neural states which were coneomitants of ‘atious other roughly synonymous sentenees—but that there tvas.no further neural state which they were aware of in ‘dition to these. Cases in which Antipodeans had T-35, ‘but no stimulation of C-fibers included those in which, for example, they were strapped to what they were falsely in- formed was a torture machine, a switeh was theatrically turned on, but nothing else was done Discusion among the philosophers now switched to the topic: Could the Antipadeans be mistaken about the T- series of neural sates (the ones which were concomitants of understanding or uttering sentences)? Could they seem to 6 bbe having T435 but not really be? Yes, the Antipodeans sid, cerebroscopes indicated tha srt of thing occasionally Inappened. Was there any explanation of the ease in which it happened—any pattern to them? No, there did not seem. to be. It was just one of thoie odd things that turned up ‘occasionally. Neurophysiology had not yet been abe to find Another sort of neural sate, outside the Tstries, which vas 4 concomitant of such weitd illusions, any more than for certain perceptual illusions, but perhaps ic would someday. ‘This answer lef the philosophers stl in dificaltes on the {question of whether the Antipodeans had sensations of pain, ‘or anything else. For there now seemed tobe nothing which the Antipodeans were incorrigible about except how things seemed to them. But it was not clear that "how things seemed to them” was a matter of what raw fels they had, as opposed to what they were inclined to say. If they had the raw fee of painfulnes, then they had minds. But a raw feel is (or has) 4 phenomenal property—one which you cannot have the ilusion of having (because, so to speak, having the ‘usion of itis itself to have i). The difference between stimulated CeSihers and pains was that you could have the illusion of stimulated C-ibers (could have, eg. T-435) without having stimulated C-fibers, but could not have the ilusion of pain without having pain. There was nothing which the Antipodeane could not be wrong about except how things seemed to them. But the fact that they eould not “merely sem to have it sem to them that ..” was of no fnterest in determining whether they had minds. The fact that “seems to sem." isan expression without a we it fact about the notion of “appearance,” not a ipo to the presence of "phenomenal properties.” For the appearance reality dstinesion is not based on a distinetion between subjective representations and objective stats of affairs iis merely 4 matter of getting something wrong, having a false ‘elie So the Antipodeans Bre grayp ofthe Former distine- tion did not help philosophers tell whether to ascribe the latter to them, n2, Prewonwat. Prorenriss Coming back now to the present, what should we say about the Antipodeans? The frst thing 10 do, presumably, i to look more closely at the notion of “phenomenal prop. ey,” and in particular atthe disanalogy between appre- hhending a physical phenomenon in 2 misleading way and apprehending 1 mental phenomenon in 2 misleading way. Kripke’ account of the distinction sums up the intition fon which defenders of dualism have usually relied, so we ‘aay begin a clover look by trying to apply his terminology Someone can be in the same epistemic situation as he ‘would be if there were heat, even in the absence of heat, simply by feeling the sensation of heat; and even in the presence of heat, he can have the same evidence as he would have in the absence of heat simply by lacking the ensation S, No such posbility exits in the cae of pain ‘or in other mental phenomena. To be in the same epi temic situation that would obtain if one had & pain ist have a pain: to be in the same epistemic situation that ‘would obtain in the absence of 2 pain i not to have a pain... The trouble is chat the notion of an epistemic Eituation qualitatively identical to one ia which the ob- ferver had a sensation S simply is one in which the ob- Server had that senstion. The same point can be made in terms of the notion of what picks out the reference of a rigid designator [an expression which designates the same ‘object im all the posible worlds in which i designates at all) In the cae of identity of heat with molecular motion the important consideration was that although “heat” is a rigid. designator, the reference of that designator ws etermined by an accidental property of the referent, ‘namely the property of producing in us the sensation S. Prin, on the other hand, is not picked out by one of its acidental properties; rather it is picked out by the property of being pain isl, by its immediate phenomeno- logical quality. Thus pain, unlike hat, is not only rigidly B ~rceetanse Aesignated by “pin” but the reference ofthe designator is dletctmined by an esental property ofthe referent. Thus itis not possible to say that although pain is necesarily ‘dential with a certain physical state, «certain phenome ron can be picked out in the same way we pick out pain hout being correlated with that physical state. If any ‘Phenomenon is picked out in exactly the same way that Wwe pick out pain, then that phenomenon is pain ‘These considerations suggest thatthe real question is: Do the Antipodeane pick out mental phenomena by accidental properties If we asume for the moment that they do have pains, could they pechape miss the “immediate phenomeno- fogiea! quality” and note only the accidental feature of ‘being constantly accompanied by stimulated C-fibers? Or, if they cannot exactly mits an immediate phenomenological ‘quality, might they perhaps fail to have a name for it, and thus fail to pick out the entity that has the quality by an tseential property? To put it another way, since the Anti podeans do not pick cut pain “in exactly the same way that ‘we pick out pain,” can we conclude that whatever they have iis not pain? Is one's epistemic relation to one’s raw feels necessary as well a suficent co establish the existence of the ‘aw feel in question? Or should we say that actully they do pick out pain in exactly the way that we do—because when they say, “Ooh! Stimulated Cibers!” they feel exactly what wwe feel when we say "Paint"? Actoally, pechaps they were feeling pain and calling that feling "the state of seeming to have one's Csibers stimulated,” and they are in the same epistemic situation relative t seeming to have their Cibers ‘Simulated as we ae in seeming to se something red, and to all other such incorrigible states. saul Kripke, "Naming aod Neve” im Semants of Nawal “Lenpuage ef Dol Daido and ibe Harman (Dore) prose Foren of Kepe’sdscusion of dali and ete ie Fed enn “Ropu om the Tent Theo.” and Wl fm tyan “Kip aed the Maternity” bth io Journal of Philp iy 7 (79 85% 1”It now looks a8 if what we need is some quite general criterion for deciding when two things are “really” the same thing described in two diferent ways. For there seems nothing distinctive about the present conundrum which ‘makes it depend pon the pectliarities of the mental. If ‘we agree that what counts in deciding whether the Ant: podeans have raw feels ie incoriibilitythe inability +o have an illusion of ...—the general problem about alterna tive descriptions will will prevent us from applying this criterion and thus resolving the isue. This problem is not fone which is going to receive a neat, clear-cut, readily ap- plicable solution, For nothing general will resolve every tension between saying, You're talking about X's allright, but pracialy every ‘thing you say about them i false and saying instead, Since practically nothing you sy is true of X's, you can't be taking about X's, Bat et spt aide this dificaley for the moment (return {ng tit in chapter sin) and consider the sll more depress ing point that anyone who even tried to slate general teria for assinilating or ditinguishing referens of ex pressions would need some general ontological categorie — ome fim, if coarse, way of Blocking thing out justo et farted Te would help, in particular, to have a distinction between mental entites and pial entities But the prob lem about the Antipedeans pts tht whole distinction in doubt. To se why it does 10, suppose that there are-no criteria for “mental phenomenon” save Kripke’ epistemic Gne* This supposition identifies “the mental” with raw fees, pasing thoughts and mental images. 1 excludes such 1 dled» gull fo of his sppotton i "Tncosigiy Suto aewon Kissa sd the ites ote Mena Syn a 965 36 20 ‘things a5 beliefs, moods, and the like (which, though in dubitably “higher” are nonetheless not parts of out incor. rigibly reportable inner life, and hence mot such as 10 encourage the Cartesian kind of distinction between 0 ‘ontological realms) The supporal amounts, in other words, to the claim that (1) iis sliient for being a mental state thatthe thing in question be incorrigibly knowable by its poseesor, and (2) we do not literally attribute any now physial states (eg. belils) to beings which fail to have Some such incorrgibly knowable sates. (This conforms to AAntipodean practice, s well as to our intuition that dogs hhave nonphysical sttes simply by virtue of having pains, whereas computers do not, even by virtue of offering us novel and exciting truths) On this supposition, then, there will be nothing to answer to the question “When they ‘report chat their Cfibers seem to be firing, are hey report ing a feeling (perhaps the same feling that we report by “pint”) of ate they just making the noises which are tig gered by their neurons being in certain states?” And if this {Sto, since the role played in our lives by reports of feelings isthe sime as the role played in Antipodean lives by reports ‘of neurons, we face the further question: Are we reporting, {eelings or neurons when we use “pain”? "To see tha this areal isue, consider the implications ‘of the identity of functional role. If tis the case that the [Antipodeans have the entire range of culture that we do, if they are as intentional in theit discourse and as secon: scious aesthetic in their choice of objects and persons 25 we if their yearning for moral excellence and immortality {ax great, they are likely to think our philosophers interest in whether they have minds isa bit parochial. Why, they ‘wonder, does it make such a difference? Why, they may ask ‘do we think that we have these odd thing called "fee and "minds"? Now that they have taught us microneurol ‘ogy, cannot we see that talk of mental sates was merely & placeholder for talk of neurons? Or, if we really do have tome funny extra states besides the neurological ones, are a1hey seally all that important? Is the possession of such states really the basis for a distinetion between ontological ‘ategories? ‘These last sets of question illustrate how lightly the ‘Amtipodeans take the controversy which, among Terran, philosophers, i the hard-fought issue between materialists nd epiphennomenalist. Further, the success of Antipodean, ‘neurology, not only in the explanation and control of be: havior but in supplying the vocabulary forthe Antipodean seltimage, shows that none of the other Terran theories About the relation between mind and body” ean even get a lookin. For parallelism and epiphenomenalism can only be diferentiated on some non-Humean view of causation— some view according to which there is 2 causal meckanis to be discovered which will show which way causal Lines run, ‘But nobody, not even the most diehard Cartesian, imagines that when 2 moleculedy-molecule account ofthe neurons is before us (as ex hypothen, iti before the Antipodeans) there vw tll be a place to look for further causal mechanisms, (What would “looking” amount to?) So even if we abandon ‘Hume, we ae sill in no position to be parallels, except on some a priori ground according to which we "just know” that the mental is a selécontained causal realm. As for Interactioniam, the Antipodeans would not dream of denying that beliefs and desires, for example, interact ‘causally with irradiations of the retina, movements of the ‘arm, and S000. But they view talk of such an interaction not ts yoking different ontological realms but as a handy (be- ‘cause brief) reference to function rather than to structure, (Ut is philosophically unproblematic 2s a transaction individual, No set of just who did what to whom can be given for a remark bout such a wansaction, any more than for remarks about lief-—but who would have thought they could?) Interaction would only be of interest ifa neural discharge were swerved. 82 from its course by 2 raw fel oF drained of some ofits power by a raw fel or something of the vot. But the Antipedean neurologists have no need of such hypotheses. If there is no way of explaining to the Antipodeans our problems and theories about mind and body--no way of making them see that ths isthe paradigm case of an onto. logical divide—we ought to be prepared to face up to the posibiity that the “materialist” Antipodeans (as opposed to the more charitable “epiphenomenalst” ones) ae right: ‘we have just been reporting neurons when we thought we ‘were reporting raw feels. It was just a happenstance of our cultural development that we got stuck so long with place holders. It is a8 if, while perfecting many sublunary dsc. pline, we had never developed astronomy and had re- ‘mained pre-Ptolemaie in our notions of what was above the moon. We would doubiless have many complicated things to say about holes in the black dome, movements of the dome as a whole, and the like—but once we were elued in Wwe could redescribe what we had been reporting easily enough. "At this point, however, there is a familiar objection to be dealt with Its expressed in such remarks asthe following: in the case of stabbing pains it it not possible to hold thatthe micro-picture isthe real picture, that perceptual appearances are only a coarse duplication, for inthis ese ‘we are dealing with the perceptual appearances them- Selves, which cannot very well be a coarse duplicate of themselves* It inall very well o lain that hurtfuness i how activity, of the C-ibers in the cortex appears, that the sell of ‘onion is how the shape of onion molecules appears to a Ihuman with a normal nasa system. ... This deals with the pain, smell or color apprehended and, relegating it to the eategory of appearance, renders it ontically neutral ‘Rihard Brand, “Dosbis about the Hetay Theory,” in Dimer sion of Mind, oh iany Hook. (Ne Yor, 161, 83‘But it leaves us with 2 set of seemings, acts of imperfect apprehension, in which the phenomenal properties are tgrisped. So we must ask the new question: Is it possible that things can seem fo be ina certain way to a merely material stem? Is there a way in which acts of imperfect apprehension can be seen 0 be ontically neural? "The materialist account of real men can find no place for the fact that our imperfect apprehension is by phenomenal property and not by, for example, beliefs just Spontaneously 2rsing. This objection common to Brandt and Campbell seems at fiat blush to be that one can only misdescibe things if one isnot a ‘merely material system""—for such systems cannot have things appear to them differently from what they are. But this will not do ati stands, for, as T suggested earlier, the distinction between reality and appearance sem merely the distinction between getting things right and geting things wrong—a distinction which we have no trouble ‘making for simple robots, servomechanisms, etc To make the objection plausible we must say that “appearance” in the present canter ea richer notion—one which has to be cexplicated by the notion of “phenomenal property.” We ‘must hold some principe lke: (®) Whenever we make an incorrigible report on a state ‘of ourselves, there mist be 2 property we are pre sented with which induces us'to make the report. ‘But this principle, of course, enshrines the Cartesian notion that “nothing is loser to the mind than itself," and in solves an entire epistemology and metaphysics, a specifcally dualistic one? Sot i not surprising, once we have encapsu- Keith Camp, Body and Mind (Sow York, sf), ps seen, Tosnge leer Sas worked out 28 account of the linguini te vor we diplay Sm reporting pais without wing such prem ice aes pine 0 be repr of damage peripheral ane, wheres fhe Anipdean ke them be epors of wae the coal nero lated this view in the notion of “phenomenal property.” that “the materialist acount... cam find no place forthe fact that our imperfect apprehension is by phenomenal propery.” Stl, we must ask whether there is some pre-philorphical Jntution which is preserved in (P) and which can be sep- arated from the Cartesian picture, What exactly i the difer fence between midescribing something ikea star and misde- scribing something like a pain? Why does the former seem ‘obviously posible and the later unimaginable? Perhaps the answer gots something like this. We expect the sar 10 100k the same even after we realize that it ie a faraway ball of flame rather than a nearby hole, but the pain ought to feel diferent once we realize that itis a stimulated C-iber, for the pain isa feeling. as the star is not a visual appearance. Lf we give this answer, however, we are will stuck with the notion of “feeling” and with the puazle about whether the “Antipodeans have any feelings. What, we must atk, i the diference between feeling a pain and simply reacting to 3 ‘timulated C-iber with the vocable “pain,” avoidance ‘behavior, and the like? And here we are inclined to say: 0 dliflerence a all from the ouside, but all the difference in the world from the inside. The dilfculty is that there will {Jaca siew, eva wihe wo Oink of he emmon see com ‘eto pain atthe concep of a ena pata woud wat 10 Sy cha er the coma os mena partly, but cal that is Seat hcp to pi pcg mats medi * Php! Review 99 (sr) 68 9u8 Pichers general 1 Postion (Printon, 7) a0 se D.M. Arman, Pvetion ‘he Pose! orld (Landon sod New Yok, ss) a8 4 Matera or the Mind (Lada and New Yor, 298) Tis sratey 1 cnntaly night, and enought sow tat the me. fer vce open, ut Tain uiow about Pichers aed ‘rmssong’s mcapiilompbical vance, whieh would make shi ie Ploophers mienaral of wine we Believe, ther tan scone unt of mhat we belive ut need not cnn to bee}. %(OUR GLASSY ESSENCE never be any way in which we can explain this diference to the Antipodeans. The materialist Antipodeans chink that we don't have any feelings, because they do not think there is mich a ching a “feeling” The epiphenomenalist Antipo- ‘deans think that there may be such things, but cannot imag ine why we make such fas about having them. The “Teran philoiophers who think that Antipodeans do have feelings but don’t know it have reached the terminal stage of philesophizing mentioned by Witigenstein: they just fee! like uttering an inarticulate sound. They cannot even say to the Antipedeans that "it's different for us on the inside” because the Antipodeans do not understand the notion of “inner space"; they think “inside” means “inside the skull.” ‘There, they rightly remark, i int diferent. The Terran philosophers who think that the Antipodeans don't have feelings are in a better position only because they fel it beneath their dignity to argue with mindles beings about whether they have minds "We scem to be getting nowhere with pursuing the objec: tion offered by Brandt and Campbell. Let us try another tack, Inthe materialist view, every appearance of anything 4 going to be, in reality, a brainstate So, it would seem, the materialist ie going to have to say that the “coarse” duplicate of a brainstate (the way stimulated C-fibers fel) is going to be another brainstate. But, we may then sy, let that other brainstate be the referent of “pain” rather than the stimulated C-fibers. Every time the materials says “but tha’ just our description of a brainstat,” his opponent will reply, “Okay, let's talk about the brainstate which is {he act of imperfect apprehension’ ofthe fst brainstae."* [And so the materialat seems to be pres ever backward — with the mental cropping up again wherever error does. It is as if man’s Glassy Esvence, the Mirror of Nature, only became visible to itself when slightly douded. A neural +1 owe this way of puting the Brand. Campbel pola 1 Thomas 86 system can’t have clouds but a mind can, So minds, we conclude, cannot be neural stems Consider now how the Antipodeane would view “acts of imperfect apprehension.” They would see them not as clouely portions of the Mireor of Nature but asa result of Tearing a second rate language. The whole notion of incor- rigibly knowable entities, as oppored to being incorrigible about how entities seem to be-the notion of "seemings” as themselves a kind of entiy—sttikes them a8 a deplorable way of speaking. The whole Terran vocabulary of “acts of apprehension,” “cognitive sta,” “feelings,” etc. strikes them as an unfortunate turn fora language to have taken, ‘They se no way of getting us out of ic except by proposing that we raise some of our children to speak Antipodean and see whether they don't do as well as 4 control group. The “Anuipodean materials, in other words, see ouF notion of “mind and matter" as a reflection of an unfortunate lin- fguistic development. ‘The Antipodean epiphenomenalist ae batld by the question "What isthe neutal input to the ‘Terrestrial speech center which produces pain reports a8 ‘well a G-fber reports" Those Terrestrial philosophers who think that Anuipodeans do have feelings think that the Antipodean language is “inadequate to reality.” Thove Ter- restrial philosophers who think that the Antipodeans don't hhave feelings rest their ese on a theory of language develop- ment according to which the frst things named are the things “better Known to us"—raw feels that the absence ‘fa name for feeling entails the absence of feeling. ‘To sharpen the iste abit further, perhaps we may drop from consideration the Antipodean epiphenomenalist and the Terrestrial skeptics. The former's problem about the neurology of pain reports seems insoluble; if they are to continue charitably to asribe states to Earthmen which are ‘unknoven to Antipadeans they will have to swallow a whole dualistic system, irrefutable by farther empirical inquiry, in order to explain our linguistic behavior. As for the ‘Terran skeptics claim that the Antipodeans have no raw 87{cel this is based entirely on the a priori dictum that one cannot have a raw feel and lack 4 Word for it Neither in {ellectual portion—the extreme charity of the Antipodean cpiphenomenalist and the parochial distrust of the Ter restrial skeptic—is attractive. We are left with the Antipo- ‘dean materialist saying “They think they have feelings but they don't” on the one hand and Terrestrial philosophers saying "They have felings but don't know it” on the other hand: Is there a way out of this impasse, given that every empirical result Qorainswitching, te) seems to weigh ‘equally on both sides? Are there powerfol philosophical ‘methods which will cut through the problem and eit settle i oF offer some happy compromise? 3. Isconns ‘One phitosophical method which will do no good a all is “analysis of meanings” Everybody understands everybody elw's meanings very well indeed. The problem is that one side thinks there ate too many meanings around and the other side too few. In this respect the closest analogy one can find is the confict between inspired theists and un- Inspted atheists. An inspired thei, let us sa, is one who “jute knows” that there are supernatural beings which play certain explanatory roles in accounting for natural phe rnomens. (They are not to be confused with natural theo- Togiane who offer the supernatural as the best explanation ‘of these phenomena) Inspired theists have inherited their picture ofthe universe as divided into two great ontological ‘ealms—the supernatural and the natural—along with their language. The way they tlk about things is inextricably tied up with—or atleast strikes them as inextricably tied ‘up with references to the divine. The notion ofthe super: natural does not strike them asa “theory” any more than the notion ofthe mental strikes us 8a “theory.” When they encounter atheists they view them as people who don't know whats going om, although they admit that atheists 88 miurry ano Raw Fests seem able to predict and control natural phenomena very nicely indeed ("Thank heaven,” they say, "that we are not as those natural theologians are, or we #00 might lose touch ‘wth the teal.”) The atheists view these theists as having too ‘many words in their language and too many meanings to bother about, Enthusiastic atheists explain to inspited theists that "all there really iin and the theists reply that one should realize that there are more things in heaven and extth...- And 40 it goes. The philosophers on both fides may analyze meanings until they are blue inthe face, ‘but all such analyses are either “directional” and “redue- tive” (eg, “noncognitive” analyses of religious discourse, ‘which ate the analogue of “expresive” theories of pain reports) or ele simply describe alternative “forms of life,” ‘culminating in nothing more helpful than the announce- rent: “This language game is played." ‘The theists’ game i fssential co their seltimage, just as the image of man's Glasy Essence is ctential to the Western intellectual’ but neither has a langer context available in which to evalue te this image. Wher, after all, would such a context come from ‘Well, perhape from philosophy. When experiment and “meaning analysis" fail, philosophers have traditionally turned to system building inventing a new context on the spot, 0 to speak. The usta strategy sto find a compromise ‘which will enable both those who favor Occam's Razor (eg. materialist, atheists) and those who dling to what they “just know" to be viewed indulgently as having achieved “alternate perspective” on some larger reality Which philosophy fas jost adumbrated. Thus some tender- Ininded philosophers have risen above the “warfare between science and theology” and seen Bonaventure and Bohr as posessing different, noncompetitive “forms of conscious- hess” The question “consciousness of what?” is answered by something like "the world” or “the thinginiself” or “the sensible manifold” or “simulations.” t does not mat- ter which of these is fered, since all are tems of art de 89signed to mame entities with no interesting features save placid neutrality. The analogue of this tactie among tough: Ininded philorophers of mind is neutal monism, in which the mental and the physical are een as two “aspects” of some underlying reality which need not be described fur ther. Sometimes we are told that this realty is inuited (Bergson) ori identical with the raw material of sensation (Russel, Ayer), but sometimes i is simply postulated asthe only means of avoiding epistemological skeptic (James, Dewey) In no case ate we told anything about it save that ‘owe just know what is like” or that reason (Le, the need to avoid philosophical dilemmas) requires it. Neutral mon: fats lke to suggest that philosophy has discovered, or should look for, an underlying substrate, in the same way in which the scientist has discovered molecules beneath ele- rents, atoms beneath molecules, and so on. But ia fact the “neutral stuf” which is neither mental nor physical is ‘not found to have powers or properties of its own, but simply postulated and then forgotten about (or, what ‘comes t0 the same thing, asigned the role of inefable ‘datum)? This tactic cannot help in coping with the ques tion which the tough minded Terrestrial philosophers raised Urging at poopbers need wo do more than hi, Coralie XKanpe tat meneted tat the sind tty Wnty they wal ake eon eal fe provi "here! fame ora tnlgy for {He commen iim) of ch » ype a © provide 8 nk forthe vo diverse phsomen hone ientey fe aparted” His mote for thie eve nel moni hs ele hat taking veo a ety theory reais Dat "the sbjetiecbjetie inion must De tandoged, ar mast the preg sats ffs penon intepetve {pura Such Gang, be mye would "asl alt the peo Siege Sint Rung # Ht a eng he mh ‘Rng that gine op peg mcr won ar ih Sd has shown, and as T ave teen aug bere, he mje

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