People v. Taneo, L-37673, 31 March 1933, 58 Phil.

255
Facts: A fiesta was being celebrated in the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. As such was
being celebrated in the mentioned place, visitors, who among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao,
were entertained in the house where Potenciano Tadeo lives with his wife and his parents. Early
afternoon of the same day, Taneo resigned to bed. While sleeping, however, he got up, grabbed a bolo
and left the room, and when he met upon his wife who tried to stop him, Taneo wounded his wife’s
abdomen. Thereafter, Taneo attacked Tanner and Malinao, and even tried to attack his father. Taneo
also wounded himself. Taneo’s wife died due to the wound, and the fetus she was carrying (at that time
was already 7 months) died, as well. Taneo was convicted by the trial court guilty of parricide and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs and pay the costs.

Issue: whether or not Potenciano Taneo is criminally absolved on the ground that he acted under the
influence of hallucination and was not in his right mind

Ruling: The court finds and holds that Potenciano Taneo is not criminally liable of the crime he was
convicted of. The evidence evinces that the accused had a quarrel over a glass of tuba with Enrique
Collantes and Valentin Abadilla the day before the commission of the offense. Such quarrel resulted to
Taneo being invited over to come down and fight, however was stopped by his wife and his mother. On
the day when Taneo slept early, it was noted that he had a severe stomachache (on top of being sad and
weak). The accused claims that while he was asleep, he dreamt of the aforementioned circumstances
attributing his actions with. He dreamt of Collantes stabbing him while Abadilla holding his feet. Thus,
when he left the room armed, he wounded those whom he thought was his enemies. As he heard his wife
exclaim that she was wounded, he stabbed himself too.

The court rules that there is a lack of motive for committing the criminal act on the part of the accused. It
was evinced in the testimony that the accused loved his wife so much. As for Tanner and Malinao, he
himself invited them over thus a show of no motive to cause harm to them. The court rules that Taneo is
not criminally liable for the offense, and that he be brought to a government insane asylum.

People v. Bonoan, L-45130, 17 February 1937, 64 Phil. 87

Facts: On Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom’s Dixie Kitche, Celestino Bonoan met the
deceased Carlos Guison. Celestino Bonoan exclaimed, in Tagalog, directing to Carlos Guison the words
“I will kill you” to which Francisco Beech who was in the barbershop, heard. Beech then turned around
and he saw the accused holding a knife in his right hand. Guison remarked, in Tagalog, “I will pay you”.
Bonoan, nevertheless retorted that he would kill Guison, and the former stabbed Guison three times on
the left side. Policeman Damaso Arnoco witnessed the crime, who then rushed to the scene and arrested
the accused. Guison was rushed to the Philippine General Hosptial where he died two days later. The
lower court convicted the accused of the crime of murder.

Issue: whether or not the defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime
charged

Ruling: The court finds and holds that Bonoan was demented at the time of the commission of the crime
charged. In alleging insanity, the burden of proof lies on the defendant. The undisputed evidence
presented by the defense evinces that the accused was confined for quite some time in the insane
department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from dementia. Dementia is regarded as a mental
disease to which a person does not have control of his actions, and has “homicidal attacks because of
delusions that is being interfered with sexually, or that his property being taken away”. Further, the
testimony of Dr. Francisco, to which was not contradicted by the prosecution, claims that 4 days before
the commission of the offense, the accused had an attack of insomnia, which was one of the symptoms
leading to dementia. Further, as what the alienist’s report suggests, within the first month of his treatment
following a perpetration of a crime, he was suffering from manic depressive psychosis. On the same vein,
the testimony of Arnoco assailing the accussed’s alleged insanity was debunked by court. Albeit Arnoco
claims that it was premeditated, such “planning” and “complaining” were precedents of a person suffering
from dementia. The court reverses the decision of the lower court, and that the accused be acquitted.
People v. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991, 199 SCRA 860
Facts: Dungo went to the place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department of Agrarian
Reform, Agpalit, Pampanga, at about 2:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon. Suddenly, after the brief conversation
between the two, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed for many a
time the deceased. Thereafter, he went downstairs and out of the office. Blatantly, he had bloodstains all
over his clothes. He was as well carrying along the weapon. The lower court convicted Dungo of the
crime of murder.
The wife of Dungo alleges that his husband was insane at the time of the commission of the crime. She
presented his testimony claiming that his husband wasn’t able to finish his 2 year contract in Saudi Arabia
because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical treatment. Thereafter, her husband’s
actuations changed- ranging from maltreatment of his children to having deep thoughts always. She
alleges that Dungo killed the deceased under the pretext that Dungo believed that it was the only cure for
his ailment, and not killing her would mean death to him.

Issue: whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime

Ruling: The court finds and holds that Rosalino Dungo was sane when he committed the crime. To qualify
for insanity, complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the offense, or complete absence or
deprivation of one’s freedom of will is a necessary requisite. In the case at bar, the defense expert
witnesses testified that Dungo was suffering from psychosis or insanity to which lucid intervals were not
present, however, may be treated under medication. The prosecution debunked the aforementioned
defense assailing the claim of insanity of the accused stressing that it seems unusual for a deranged
person to confront another who may have caused wrong to him, to which the court sides to. The court
rules that his insanity is of having lucid intervals. The requisite to qualify for “insanity” as a defense is
devoid in this situation, as insanity should exist where there is complete deprivation of intelligence. His
insanity is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The court affirms the lower court’s judgment.

People v. Rafanan, L-54135, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 65

Facts: Estelita Ronaya, a lass of 14 years of age, was employed as a house help in the house of
Policarpio Rafanan’s mother where in the same house does Rafanan and his family live. March 16, after
dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to help in the store which was 6 meters
away from their home- the store which was being attended by Rafanan. At 11:00 pm of that day, the
accused called the complainant to help him close the door of the store to which the complainant complied
with. Suddenly, not long after, the accused pulled the complainant inside the store and remarked “come,
let us have sexual intercourse” to which the complainant blatantly refused. However, the accused held a
bolo threatening her that should she resist, he will slit her throat. Thereafter, the accused successfully had
carnal knowledge with the complainant despite her resistance and struggle. After which, he threatened
the complainant to not report the incident, otherwise, he would kill her. Out of fear, Estelita obliged and
not reported the incident that had transpired; in fact she did her daily routine work that evening until the
morning of the next day. Evening of the day after the morbid incident (evening of March 17), Estelita left
for home. The family of Estelita learned about what happened between Estelita and Policarpio on the
evening of March 16, thereafter a fight ensued among them prompting Estelita to file a complaint,
accompanied by her mother Alejandra Ronaya, against the accused. The court of first instance of
Pangasinan convicted Policarpio Rafanan of the crime of rape.

Issue: whether or not the accused was insane, specifically suffering from schizophrenia, during the
commission of the offense

Ruling: The court finds and holds that Policarpio Rafanan was not insane or suffering from schizophrenia
at the time of the commission of the offense, thus cannot be justified under Article 12 paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. The defendant describes schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized
by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.
The appellant submitted that he was suffering from schizophrenia when he committed the crime. The
hospital to where he was confined prepared four clinical reports to which were all signed by the attending
physician in charge (Dr. Masikip) and chief of Forensic Psychiatry Service (Dr. Nerit), and where all these
reports evince the presence of a mental condition being alleged by the appellant. On the last report
submitted, the doctors claimed that the appellant was then well-behaved and responsive. However, the
court finds that the fact that Rafanan threatened the complainant should she report the incident and
reveal the matter is telling that the appellant was cognizant of such moral obliquity in his acts; hence, a
total negation of “complete deprivation of intelligence”. The court affirms the decision appealed.

People v. Madarang, G.R. No. 132319, 12 May 2000, 332 SCRA 99

Facts: Lilia Mirador and Fernando Madarang were legally married and had 7 children. Madarang worked
as a seaman for 16 years. First, he was employed in the US ship, and after which, he was employed in
Germany for 9 years. Thereafter, he went back to his home in Infanta, Pangasinan where his family was
residing, and decided to put up a hardware store. Such store did not last for long due to its eventual
demise, and worse led to a crumble of fortune due to cockfighting. Because of the financial inability of
Macarandang which fails him to support his family, his wife decided to go to his mother and stay for a
while. One day, the couple had a quarrel. The accused was jealous of another man and accused his wife
of infidelity. As the fight ensued and further heated, Madarang stabbed Lilia causing the death of the
latter. The mother of Lilia, Avelina, heard the children shouting, but when she asked of what happened,
no one replied. Her nephew barged in and sent the children out of the house one at a time. Thereon, she
saw the accused holding a bolo, and fearing for her life, she scampered away. The trial court convicted
the accused of the crime of parricide

Issue: whether or not the accused was insane or schizophrenic at the time of the commission of the
offense

Ruling: The court finds and holds that the accused, Fernando Madarang, was not insane or schizophrenic
at the time of the commission of the offense, thus is criminally liable. The defense cited the report of Dr.
Tibayan which declared that the accused was sent to the NCMH. The said hospital conducted three
medical and psychiatric evaluations of the accused and on the first and second reports, it was found that
the accused was suffering from insanity or psychosis, classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained
that Schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions,
hallucinations, preoccupation with one’s thoughts, poor self-care, insight and judgment, social and
occupational functions. On the third report, it said that his condition was improved. However, the court
stresses that the burden of proof of insanity lies on the appellant which the latter failed to. The court finds
that the appellant was confined in the NCMH after he killed his wife, but what is pertinent is the condition
immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident, to which the defendant failed to prove as
none of his witnesses declared a chunk of symptoms associated with schizophrenia. The court finds the
claim to be speculative, thus affirming the judgment appealed.

People v. Robios, G.R. No. 138453, 29 May 2002, 382 SCRA 581
Facts: Lorenzo Robios, 15 year old lad, witnessed the feud that ensued between his parents, appellant
Melecio Robios and the victim Lorenza Robios. Lorenzo heard his mother exclaim towards the appellant
“why did you come home, who don’t you just leave?” to which the appellant struck the victim with a bolo
on her right shoulder. Also, Lorenzo witnessed the attack of Melecio to his mother Lorenza which caused
the death of the latter. Upon having seen such morbid incident, he ran towards his grandmother’s house
to report the incident. On that same day, Benjamin Bueno, the brother of Lorenza, went to his mother’s
house to inform his relatives that the accused killed his uncle, Alejandro Robios, to which on that very
same moment while he was in his mother’s house, he learned about a more distressing news- that
appellant had killed his sister. Benjamin sought for help to Brgy. Captain Valdez, who then called the
police station. The policemen paced to the scene of the crime, and because the appellant refused to
surrender, the officers barged in and there saw the appellant lying on the floor beside the lifeless body of
his wife. While lying beside his wife, he was uttering the words “I will kill myself, I will kill myself”. The
police officers caught him despite the appellant’s resistance. The appellant admitted to the brgy captain
that he killed his wife, showing the bloodstained knife. The lower court convicted Melecio Robios of the
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion.

Issue: whether or not the appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the offense
Ruling: The court finds and holds that the Melecio Robios was not devoid of sanity at the time of the
commission of the offense (and the court modifies the penalty, as well). The court stresses that insanity
presupposes complete deprivation of reason or discernment and freedom of will, and that insanity must
be present at the time of the commission of the crime, which in this case is not proven. Further, the
presumption of law lies in favor of sanity, thus the burden of proof lies on the defense. The acts of
Melecio were a conscious and deliberate retaliation to his wife’s remarks as testified by his son, Lorenzo.
Further, when he admitted his guilt, it was a manifestation of remorse which validates a sound mind. The
evidence adduced assailing the appellant’s sanity is unmeritorious. The court affirms the decision
appealed with modification- reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

People v. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, 17 March 2004, 425 SCRA 654
Facts: Banbi Herrerna was studying his lessons inside his house while his brother and a certain Jason
Masbang were outside sitting beside each other, and Allan Dracles was lying on a bench. After a while,
Jason barged inside the house of Bambi shouting that “there’s a long-haired man”. Bambi went to see
what it was about, and wherefrom he witnessed appellant Anacito stabbing Allan on the chest while Allan
seemed to be trying to get up. Allan managed to get up and paced through the inside the house of Bambi.
Allan was successful in locking the door and because Anacito was unable to follow him inside, he then
left. When Anacito was gone, Bambi sought for help, and when he saw Anacito’s brothers, the latter
exclaimed “never mind because he (Anacito) is mentally imbalanced”. Bambi carried Allan and dragged
him to the lower portion of the neighborhood to where the people who were have a drinking session
rendered aid. However, Allan died 15 minutes later. On the same day, prosecution witnesses learned that
Anacito stabbed somebody. While Tomas was on his way home from Demetrio’s house, he saw
Demetrio, and likewise Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetro reached the national highway, he
was attacked and stabbed four times by Anacito. Tomas paced immediately to the house of Demetrio to
inform them of what happened. Demetrio was sent to the hospital but died after several minutes. The trial
court received the medical report of Dr. Verona who found that Anacito had a psychotic disorder
characterized by flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations. The doctor confirmed that Anacito was
psychotic before and during the commission of the crime and even during the trial. Nevertheless, the trial
court convicted of two counts of murder

Issue: whether or not Anacito was insane during the commission of the offense

Ruling: The court finds and holds that Anacito was lucid at the time of the commission of the offense. The
court affirms the claim of the Officer of the Solicitor General which avers that the appellant failed to
establish proof beyond reasonable ground of his alleged insanity. Further, Dr. Verona was certain of
Anacito not being “grossly” insane but uncertain as to Anacito’s unconsciousness of his acts. The court
avers that not every mental aberration of the mind constitutes insanity, thus there should be a qualifying
requisite which is “complete deprivation of the mind”. Also, the evidence evinces that Anacito was not
subjected to medicine treatment; in fact there was no proof that he needed medicine at that time. The
sister only bought medicine for Anacito when the latter was jailed for the 2001 court decision, thus
appearing that the symptoms reappeared when Anacito was already in jail. Thus, if he really is psychotic,
he would need treatment and couldn’t stand trial which is not evinced from the case in bar. Also, Anacito
failed to raise his alleged insanity when his case was heard in the lower court rendering the 2001
decision. The court affirms, with modifications to the damages, the judgment appealed.

PEOPLE v. FORMIGONES

Facts: In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo was living on his farm in Camarines Sur w/ his wife, Julia
Agricola & their 5 children. From there they transferred in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias
Formigones in the same municipality to find employment as harvesters of palay. After a month, Julia was
sitting at the head of the stairs of the house when Abelardo, w/o previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house & stabbed his wife Julia, in the back, the blade
penetrating the right lung & causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death. Abelardo then took his
dead wife & laid her on the floor of the living room & then lay down beside her. In this position, he was
found by the people who came in response to the shouts made by his eldest daughter, Irene
Formigones.. The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to his statement, he used to
have quarrels with his wife for reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother, Zacarias; that
he suspected the 2 were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his wife had become
indifferent to him. During the preliminary investigation, the accused pleaded guilty. At the case in the CFI,
he also pleaded guilty but didn’t testify. His counsel presented the testimony of 2 guards of the provincial
jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct was rather strange & that he behaved like
an insane person, at times he would remain silent, walk around stark naked, refuse to take a bath & wash
his clothes etc… The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an IMBECILE & therefore
exempt from criminal liability under RPC A12.

Issue: WON Abelardo is an imbecile at the time of the commission of the crime, thus exempted from
criminal liability

Held: No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr. Francisco Gomes, although he was feebleminded, he is
not an imbecile as he could still distinguish between right & wrong & even feel remorse. In order that a
person could be regarded as an imbecile w/in the meaning of RPC A12 so as to be exempt from criminal
liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment & freedom of will at the time of
committing the crime. (Note that definition is same as insanity)

As to the strange behavior of the accused during his confinement, assuming it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental
condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy &
take violent measures to the extent of killing his wife who he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the
belief that in doing so, he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. WON the
suspicions were justified, is of little or no importance. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
Furthermore, in his written statement, he readily admitted that he killed his wife, & at the trial he made no
effort to deny of repudiate said written statements, thus saving the government all the trouble & expense
of catching him & securing his conviction.

But 2 mitigating circumstances are present: passion or obfuscation (having killed his wife in a jealous
rage) & feeblemindedness.

Judgment: In conclusion, appellant is found guilty of parricide & the lower court’s judgment is hereby
affirmed w/ the modification that appellant will be credited with half of any preventive imprisonment he has
undergone (because of the 2 mitigating circumstances)

# 52SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:

On March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, accused SOLOMON
VERDADERO armed with a Rambo knife, with intent to kill, assault and stab ROMEO B. PLATA, thereby
inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death. Before the
incident, Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station. Together with
Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to report that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation
pump. Afterwards they had a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made their
way home on a tricycle and stopped at the drug store as Maynard intended to buy a baby supplies and the
victim also followed him, on his way the accused stabbed Romeo on the left side of the victim’s back twice
and his shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero attempted to attack him as well, he
defended himself using a small stool, which he used to hit Verdadero at the chest. Ronnie meanwhile got
into the Police station to seek assistance, Verdadero was arrested and Romeo was rushed into Cagayan
Valley Medical Center, however he is dead on arrival.
Prior to the incident, Solomon Verdadero was notably going in and outof CVMCs Psychiatric Department, in
the year 1999, 2000, 2003, and March of 2009, Doctors contended that he suffers a chronic mental disease
calledSchizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy
and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. A showing that an accused is suffering
from a mental disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate him from the consequences of his act.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.

On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for the crime of homicide.

The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, as the prosecution failed to establish the
presence of treachery and evident premeditation to qualify the killing to murder. The trial court, however,
opined that Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an exempting circumstance. The trial court posited that
Verdadero was unsuccessful in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the time he stabbed Romeo
or that he was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime.

Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.

In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The appellate court agreed
that the defense was able to establish that Verdadero had a history of schizophrenic attacks, but was unable
to prove that he was not lucid at the time of the commission of the offense. The decretal portion of the
decision states:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

In view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED on May 30, 2013, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao City, Branch 3 Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its
resolution, dated December 15, 2014.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

RULING:

Supreme Court contends Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of insanity. He
claims that Maynard even admitted that he was not in the proper state of mind when they were at the police
station before the stabbing took place. Further, it appeared that Verdadero was having hallucinations after
the stabbing incident as testified to by Dr. Andres-Juliana. Verdadero notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded that
he had a relapse at the time of the stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.

JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.

FACTS:
On October 29, 1984, the Petitioner who was then 11 years old was playing with best friend Teodoro
Almine Jr. and three other children in their backyard. The children were target-shooting bottle caps placed
15 to 20 meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour.

– In the course of game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate
death.

– The examining fiscal after investigation exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the
unfortunate appeared to be an accident.

– Victim’s parents appealed to Ministry of Justice, who ordered fiscal to file a case against petitioner for
Homicide through reckless imprudence.
– On October 25, 1985, the petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds:

a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense

b) Information contains averments which if true would constitute a legal excuse or justification

c) That the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person of defendant

– His primary argument was that the term discernment connotes intent under the exempting circumstance
found under Article 12, Section 3 of the RPC. If this was true, then no minor between the age of 9 to 15
may be convicted of quasi offense under Article 265 which is criminal negligence.

– On April 4, 1986, the said motion was denied with respect to the first and third grounds relied upon
decision on and part was deferred until evidence shall have been presented during trial.

– A petition for certiorari was filed.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND

2. WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY LUPON.

HELD:

Yes.
Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent means: a determination to do certain things; an
aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent. Discernment
means: the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong.

The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of
human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because … the infant 3 (has) no
intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability.

In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely,
intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However,
intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but below
fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-
offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his
negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-
offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off
with the phrase “Any person. . .” without any distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos
distinguere debemos.

Minors 9yrs to 15yrs are presumed to be without criminal capacity; but this presumption may be rebutted
if it could be proven that they were capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is,
that (they) acted w/ discernment.

Because of this, Guevarra was not exempted.

Yes.
The petitioner’s contention that he was entitled to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance due to
his minority because of P.D. 1508. He argued that this can be applied to his case because the penalty
imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an original arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional medium as prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC.

The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for
the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed.

The same principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:

(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P 200.00; … (emphasis
supplied)

Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:

The law says ‘punishable,’ not ‘punished.’ One should therefore consider the penalty provided for by law
or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the
attendant circumstances affecting criminal liability. 5

The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing
Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be
considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered.

The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated
in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438,
P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to
the lower court for trial on the merits. No cost.

People v. Doqueña, G.R. No. 46539, 27 September 1939, 68 Phil. 580

Facts: Juan Ragojos, and one Epifanio Rarng were playing volleyball in the yard of their intermediate
school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. Suddenly thereafter, Juan Ragojos intervened, and
catching the ball tossed it to Ragojos. Ragojos chased Doquena. Ragojos slapped Doquena in the nape
and even gave him fist blows on the mouth. Thereafter, Ragojos went back to playing with Rarang. The
accused, having been offended by the actions of Ragojos, searched for a stone to throw at the deceased;
however failed to find for one. Having not found one, he went to his cousin Romualdo Cocal to ask the
latter to lend his knife. Rarang told the cousin to lend his knife fearing that the accused may attack the
deceased; however, Doquena got a hold of the knife which was inside the pocket of his cousin. The
accused approached Ragojos challenging him in a duel to which the deceased refused because he
(ragojos) was bigger than the accused. Ragojos then continued playing, however was stabbed by the
accused in the chest. The accused-appellant who was a minor (exactly 13 yrs 9 mos and 5 days old) was
prosecuted for homicide in the court of first instance of pangasinan.

Issue: whether or not the minor acted with discernment

Ruling: The court finds and holds that the minor acted without discernment. The court rules that the
attorney for the defense mistakes discernment referred to in Article 12 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, for
premeditation. In contrary to the latter, the court holds that the discernment (under 15 yrs but over 9 yrs)
which constitutes an exception to the exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code refers to mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and that the latter
may be deduced from the facts of the circumstances. It must be noted that on observing the
circumstances, it must construed that these circumstances are being observed from the very appearance,
attitude, the behavior of the said minor before, during and after the trial.
Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, 20 August 2008
Facts: Petitioner’s family and AAA’s family were good friends since both families were neighbors.
Disturbingly, at three instances on different occasions, petitioner Ortega raped AAA. The first occasion
happened when AAA, who was then 6 years old, was left in the house of Luzviminda Ortega because
MMM, the mother of AAA, had to stay in a hospital to attend to her sick son. Petitioner woke AAA up and
brought her to the sala where the petitioner raped her. On the second occasion, which was the 2 nd night
of AAA’s stay in Luzviminda’s house, petitioner brought AAA to the comfort room where he raped her
again. Petitioner told her not to report the incident otherwise, he will spank her. On the third and last
occasion, when the petitioner went to the house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a
battery-powered television, petitioner brought AAA to the kitchen and succeeded in raping her again, but
this time, BBB, the brother of AAA saw what happened and told their mother about the incident. MMM
confronted Luzviminda to which the latter told the family of AAA to send her to the doctor to check her up.
The doctor’s findings shed truth on the claim of alleged rape. Amicably, the incident was settled, however,
when petitioner went home coming from a place where he was tasked to stay for a while, the father of
AAA got infuriated and so filed 3 counts of rape to the NBI. Petitioner was convicted.

Issue: whether or not petitioner qualified under the exempting circumstance invoking age
Ruling: The court finds and holds that petitioner Joemar Ortega is exempt from criminal liability invoking
his minority at the time of the commission of the offense. The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006. This law creates a more
comprehensive system to manage those children who are in conflicts with the law wuth child-appropriate
procedure and comprehensive programs gearing towards development. The petitioner was only 13 years
old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. His age was duly testified by his certificate of live
birth, by his mother and by his testimony as well. His age was never belied by the prosecution. In the
case at bar, since he was a minor when he committed the crime, he is thus exempted from criminal
liability, but not for civil liability.

People of the Philippines vs Allen Udtojan Mantalaba

Facts:

Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report that
Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling shabu. After a buy-bust operation, two informations was filed
against Mantalaba which was later on consolidated. Mantalaba pleaded not guilty.

RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized of reclusion perpetua to death
and fine of 500k for selling shabu and (2) for illegally possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in
application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8 yrs as maximum of prision mayor and fine of
300k. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the present appeal.

Mantalaba: the lower court gravely erred in convicting him and that there was no evidence of actual sale
between him and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust operation. He also claims that the chain of custody
of the seized shabu was not established.

Issue: Whether Mantalaba is guilty of drug trafficking and possession.

Ruling:

The petition is without merit.

The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. From
the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been
satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug,
as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to
the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an
accused arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during the buy-bust operation but was of legal age during the
promulgation of the decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect after the promulgation of the
RTC's decision against Mantalaba. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with PD 603
(Child and Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law that were applicable at the
time of the promulgation of the judgment. However, as ruled in People vs Sarcia, suspension of sentence
can still be applied but NOT when the offender upon the promulgation of judgment is 21 yrs old. or older.
Mantalaba is now 21 yrs old, therefore his suspension of sentence is already moot and academic.

But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated Mantalaba's minority as privileged mitigating
circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be
one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is
prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal,
there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.

People v. Jacinto
G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011

FACTS: In the evening of January 28, 2003 at about 6 o’clock in the evening, FFF, the father of the victim
AAA, sent his 8 year old daughter CCC to buy cigarettes at the store of Rudy Hatague. AAA
followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not worried as he thought AAA was
watching television at her aunt Rita Lingcay’s house. Julito Apike went to the same store at
around 6:20 PM to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum and saw appellant place AAA on his lap. Julio,
Hermie and AAA left the store at the same time, Julito proceeded to Rita’s house while Hermie
and AAA to the “lower area.” AAA was brought by Hermie to the ricefield near the house of
spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho, there AAA was made to lie down on the ground, her
panties removed and was boxed by the accused in the chest. Half-naked, accused mounted AAA
and made a push and pull movement causing AAA to cry. Appellant then went to the house of the
Perochos while the victim went home crying. Medico-legal exam revealed hymenal laceration at 5
and 9 o’clock.

RTC finds accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
a fine of PHP 75,000 as rape indemnity and PHP 50,000 as moral damages.

CA on appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision with the following modifications: (1) accused
should suffer an indeterminate penalty from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum and fined PHP 75,000 as
civil indemnity, PHP 75,000 as moral damages, and PHP 25,000 as exemplary damages.
.

ISSUE: Is the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape?
RULING: Yes, the Court considered three well-entrenched principles: (1) accusation of rape can be made
with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove,
(2) testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution, (3) evidence for
prosecution must stand on its own merit and not depend on the weakness of the defense.

The Court finds that the testimony of the victim was credible, natural and convincing as proven by
victim’s positive identification of the accused, description of what was done to her and how the
accused spread her legs, inserted his penis and made push and pull movements. This was
corroborated by medico-legal findings of hymenal lacerations. Court finds that the prosecution
sufficiently established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but imposes a penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and affirms the damages awarded by the CA of PHP 75,000 as civil
indemnity, PHP 75,000 as moral damages and increasing exemplary damages to PHP 30,000.
Furthermore, in accordance with Section 38 of RA 9344, automatic suspension of sentence is
applied and in accordance with Section 51 of RA 9344, accused is confined to an agricultural
camp or other training facility established, maintained, and controlled by BUCOR in coordination
with the DSWD.

People of the Philippines vs. Madali

Facts:

On April 13, 1999, said accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each
other, did then and there by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, strike with a coconut frond and "llave inglesa" and strangle with a dog chain,
one AAA, inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in different parts of his body which caused his untimely
death. The suspects, Raymund and Rodel were minors 14years old and 16 years old respectively. The
lower court found them guilty of homicide. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA and during the
pendency of the appeal, RA 9344 took effect.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners should be exempted from criminal liability.

HELD:

Yes. At the time of the commission of the crime, petitioners were minors. By provisions of RA 9344, they
are exempted from liability but not from criminal liability. Their exemption however differs. In the case of
Raymund, the case is dismissed as to him since he was below 15 years old. He is to be released and
custody is given to the parents by virtue of RA 9344 Secs. 6 and 20 setting the minimum age of criminal
responsibility and who will have custody respectively. In the case of Rodel, who was 16 years old at that
time, It is necessary to determine whether he acted with discernment or not. Sec 6 provides that children
above 15 but below 18 will be exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with discernment.He,
however, should be subjected to an intervention program. Sec 38 provides for the automatic suspension
of sentence.

US v. Tañedo, L-5418, 12 February 1910, 15 Phil. 196

Facts: The accused, together with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan
Arellano went to the dam of the land the accused owns (since the latter is a landowner). The accused
brought with him a shotgun under the pretext that he is going to hunt from some wild chickens. While his
laborers were at work, he set himself off to a short distance away from the laborers to see an alteration he
had made in his land. Soon thereafter, the defendant was off to the woods where he met the uncle of the
deceased. The defendant asked the uncle where is a good place to hunt therein to which the deceased, a
lad of 20 years of age and a tenant of the land a relative of Tanedo owns, and who was working under a
manga tree, responded through pointing out in a general way a portion of the forest. It was disputed
whether or not the boy tagged along with the accused. And while hunting, the accused saw a wild chicken
and shot it; however, after the chicken was shot, the accused heard a human cry. The accused picked up
the chicken, scampered away to where his laborers were, and informed Bernardino Tagampa of the
unfortunate incident since the deceased was Tagampa’s relative. Further, one shot was only heard that
moment when admittedly, a chicken was killed. It was testified by the wife of the accused that the dead
chicken was personally delivered to her by the witness Yumul. At the same moment, the defendant and
Tagampa were out in the forest to conceal the dead body by covering it up with cogon and burying it in an
old well. Tagampa admits that his participation was neither drawn from threats nor being compelled to do
so. It is as well undisputed that the deceased and accused had no unpleasant relations, thus the motive
for the commission of the crime is ruled out

Issue: whether or not the accused caused an injury by mere accident without fault or intention causing it

Ruling: The court reverses the decision of the lower court, and acquits the defendant. In the case at bar,
there is a lack of evidence of negligence on the part of the accused, neither is there evidence of lack of
intention to cause death. The accused was solely pounding on his denial that such actions bore from
negligence. The court finds and holds that in such a case where there is a lack of evidence, the burden of
proof shifts to the state to assail the denials posed by the accused. Thus, the state must show that the act
was intentional. The accused, thus is discharged from custody.

People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, 29 June 2007, 526 SCRA 215
Facts: On the evening of the day the incident happened, the accused came home drunk and was also in
a livid mood. Guillermo, the father of the victim, tried to pacify him and told him to rest after the accused
kicked the door and table and threw the electric fan away. The advice given by Guillermo was not heeded
upon by the accused, who instead took his sling and arrow kept in the ceiling of the house. Casted down,
Guillermo transferred to the adjacent house of her daughter Yolanda. Thereon, Guillermo heard the victim
wail, and afterwards shouting at the accused. Guillermo told Yolanda to check on what was happening to
which Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda chanced upon the defendant who was carrying his injured
wife. Yolanda brought consorcia to the hospital but was unsuccessful in reviving her life.

Issue: whether or not the accused-appellant caused injury by mere accident without fault or intention of
causing it, thus his guilt is not proven beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling: The court finds and holds that the accused-appellant caused injury not by mere accident. The
court finds reasonable grounds on the circumstantial pieces of evidence presented. The circumstantial
pieces of evidence presented are a) they had a quarrel immediately prior to the incident, b) the nature of
the wound sustained by Consorcia, c) the irate accused during the commission of the offense, and d)
Consorcia was heard crying prior to the incident. The court stresses that conviction on the basis of
circumstantial evidence can be yielded from provided that there is more than one circumstance, and
piecing all these circumstances would create a picture proving beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused. In fact, adjoining all the circumstantial pieces of evidence- from the fight, to the nature of the
wound sustained, and the actuations of the accused after the incident were all telling of his intention to
kill. The defense of accident cannot be proven here, for the essential requisites of accident which are a)
there should be an unlawful act, b) acted with due care, and c) causing injury, d) without fault or
negligence of causing it are absent. The court affirms the decision appealed from.

POMOY v. PEOPLE
ROWENO POMOY, petitioner
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

Facts:
--1990- Policemen arrested Tomas Balboa, a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and
Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo, for he was allegedly connected with a robbery. He was brought to the
Headquarters of thePhilippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni in Iloilowhere he was detained.
RowenoPomoy, a member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company, directed the latter to come out, for
tactical interrogation at the investigation room. Petitioner had a gun hanging from his bolster. After that, 2
gunshots were heard. Petitioner was seen holding his .45 caliber pistol facing Balboa who was lying in a pool
of blood. Balboa died.

--Version of the Defense: (presented 2 witnesses + accused Pomoy)

Self-defense: Balboa allegedly tried to grab the handle of Pomoy’s gun. Balboa was not able to take actual hold
of the gun because of his efforts in preventing him. He and Balboa grappled in taking control of his gun.
Balboa was accidentally shot.

--RTC of Iloilo CityfoundPomoy guilty of the crime of homicide.

--CA modified the RTC decision (removed aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position) stating that
1) the victim was not successful in his attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in control of the
weapon when the shots were fired; 2) the gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and
immediately before it went off; it was petitioner who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired the
fatal shots; and 3) the location of the wounds found on the body of the deceased did not support the assertion
of petitioner that there had been a grappling for the gun. Thus,there is no unlawful aggression on the part of
the deceased to justify self-defense.

Issue
WON the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an accident in his fulfillment of duty- YES. It was in the
lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon
when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster.

Dispositive:
Petition is granted and the assailed decision REVERSED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.

Ratio:
Article 12.Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are exempt from criminal
liability:4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intent of causing it.

Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due to the fault
or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen or controlled. Thus, in
determining whether an “accident” attended the incident, courts must take into account the dual standards of
lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This determination inevitably brings to the fore the
main question in the present case: was petitioner in control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the
shots were fired? YES. that petitioner did not have control of the gun during the scuffle. The deceased
persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart those attempts.

Elements of Accident:
1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due care;
2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and
3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury

All these elements were present in this case.

--At the time of the incident, Pomoy was a member -- specifically, one of the investigators of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in the lawful
performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the
victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation. It was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law
enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to
remove it from his holster.He was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone,
especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to
kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
--Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his
service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept his
service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within the
premises of his working area
--The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in the course
of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the
release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the death of the victim
were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner.

Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa, he
claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

People v. Retubado, G.R. No. 124058, 10 December 2003

Facts: Edwin Retubado was the mentally ill younger brother of the appellant Jesus Retubado. Someone
played a joke on Edwin. Someone placed a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave such to
Edwin. Edwin went home and placed the cigarette pack on top of the dining table where he was having
dinner with his father. Suddenly, the pack exploded. The incident was brought to the attention of the
barangay which closed the matter stating that Emmanuel Jr was not the culprit. Shortly after the incident,
Emmanuel Sr, the father of the “culprit” drove his pedicab and stopped at the junction of Rizal and
Gallardo Streets. The appellant approached the deceased to inquire as to why his son did such a thing to
his brother. Emmanuel Sr. ignored the appellant but the latter ran after Emmanuel. Emmanuel Sr just
ignored the appellant until he reached home. NOrberta Caon, the wife, waited for the arrival of Emmanuel
Sr while their son was fast asleep already. The appellant continued following the deceased. Emmanuel Sr
demanded why he was following him to which the appellant retorted that he only wanted to talk to his son.
Emmanuel Sr said that his son was asleep. At this moment, the appellant withdrew a gun and shot
Emmanuel Sr at the forehead to which the latter died. The appellant assailed the version of the
prosecution alleging that Emmanuel emerged from the room of his son holding a gun, and fearing for his
life, he grappled with Emmanuel causing the appellant to fire at the forehead of the deceased. The lower
court convicted Jesus Retubado of the crime of murder

Issue: whether or not the death of the Emmanuel Sr. Caon was caused by mere accident without the fault
or intention while the accused was performing a lawful act with due care

Ruling: The court finds and holds that the death of Emmanuel Sr was not due to an accident. The court
stresses that invoking an exempting circumstance, the burden of proof shifts to the party that claims as
such. The following pieces of evidence that aver the claim that the death was due to an accident: 1)
Norberta heard her husband and the appellant arguing with each other in the porch of their house, and
she was shocked to see appellant pulled out a handgun 2) there is no evidence that the appellant
informed the police that he killed Emmanuel Sr out of necessity 3) the appellant had the motive to kill the
deceased as evidenced in the appellant’s continuance of following the deceased. The court affirms the
judgment appealed from

US v. Caballeros, G.R. No. 1352, 29 March 1905, 4 Phil. 350

Facts: The defendants were sentenced by the court of first instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years
of presidio mayor for being accessories on the crime of assassination or murder on American school-
teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger because albeit they didn’t
take part in the commission of the crime as principals, but they took part in the burial to conceal the
incident which accounts for being accomplices.

Issue: whether or not defendants, as being accomplices, acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of an equal or greater injury

Ruling: The court finds and holds that the defendants acted under having been compelled to do so by the
principals of the crime. Roberto Baculi, the witness, claims that he was working at a banana plantation at
the time he heard gunshot to which therefrom he ran out of fear. The leaders of the band saw him, and
the latter called him striking him the butts of the gun forcing him to bury the corpses. The court finds that
Baculi acted under the impulse of an irresistible force which makes him criminally absolved from the
charges. The same goes with the other defendants, Covarrubias and Caballeros, because their
confessions appear not to be voluntarily and freely given. The court orders the reversal of the judgment
appealed from.

People v. Loreno, L-54414, 9 July 1984, 130 SCRA 311

Facts: On the evening of the day the incident happened, Brgy. Captain Monge was at his house located
at Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. Elias Monge was married to a Beata Monge and had 2
daughters- Monica Monge (single) and Cristina Monge (married), and 2 sons- Mario, 11 and Nilo 13, and
their farm househelp Francisco Fable. They were going to attend a dance to be held in the barrio but
couldn’t leave yet as they were waiting for Beata to finish changing the diapers of their infant child. On
that same evening, Fable, while he was at the balcony of the house, saw two men approaching. One of
the men exclaimed that there was a letter addressed to Elias coming from the chief. Fable called the
attention of Elias regarding the letter addressed to him. Elias went out of the house to receive the letter,
however, as it was too dark, he invited the men to go inside his house. However, it was only the man
wearing a dark sweater who went in while the other posted himself near the balcony as a lookout.
Thereafter, Elias called upon his daughter, Monica to get his glasses as he couldn’t read through the
piece of paper handed to him. On reading the letter, Monica and Elias Monge read the words “kami mga
npa”, and to Monica’s fear, she rushed to her mother and informed her of what she read. Cristina tried to
arm herself with a bolo but was seized upon by the man in dark sweater who announced that no one
should dare to make a scandal. The man ordered everyone to lie down on the floor, and so everyone
obliged out of fear. Outside the balcony, the other man (wearing red clothes) instructed Fable to fetch him
some water. Fable obliged and while he was on his way going inside the house, he noticed that the man
wearing red clothes was following him. Fable saw and recognized the man in red clothes to be Estaquio
Loreno. Thereafter, the man in the dark sweater instructed Loreno tie all the victims on the floor to which
the latter abided. Fable recognized that the man wearing a dark sweater was Jimmy Marantal. Further, at
two separate instances (one after the other), the accused Marantal raped the two daughters of Elias
Monge, each being carried and dragged to the room. In spite of the struggle and resistance from the
daughters, the accused nevertheless was successful in raping them. Loreno, also brought Beata Monge
to the masters room and the teachers room forcing her to open the aparador and the trunk with her keys
which he brought to the sala. Not so long after, a third man entered the sala. The third man ordered
Loreno to cover the victim with a floor mat to which failure to find one, covered the victims with a lawanit
instead. The third man went to the kitchen and returned with some rice on hand. The fourth man came in
and asked Elias for a cigarette to which the latter stood and told the fourth man that the cigarette was in
his pocket. The fourth man boxed Elias causing the latter to fall on the ground. Loreno ordered Elias to
accompany him to the house nearby their neighbor to which Elias refused but because Loreno threatened
him through pointing a gun at Elias, he nonetheless obeyed; however, on reaching the balcony and
through Elias’ resistance, Loreno then desisted from his plan to proceed to the house of the nearby
neighbor. The accused, then, after having gone down the stairs left the house together with the things
they robbed, while on the same occasion touched the thighs of Cristina who was then wearing shorts.
Thereafter, Monge heard Sixto Agapito call out for them asking if they were going to the dance hall to
which Elias replied that he wasn’t feeling well. Elias Monge successfully untied himself and the others.
The daughters told Elias that they were raped by the accused. The family later discovered that they were
robbed of their personal properties. The incident was reported to the PC Detachment Station in Sipocot to
which Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro investigated the robbery-rape incident. The victims positively identified
the assailants. The court of first instance of camarines sur convicted the accused-appellants of the crime
of robbery with double rape.

Issue: whether or not Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal acted under the compulsion of an irresistible
force and/under the impulse of uncontrollable fear or equal or greater injury.

Ruling: The court finds and holds that Loreno and Mrantal did not act under the compulsion of an
irresistible force. The court highlights that the force must be irresistible to reduce the person into a mere
instrument who acts not only without his will but also against his will, and that there should be force, fear,
intimidation and impending danger. The court finds that the facts established do not equate to the
appellants having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. The facts established particularly the assailants’ actuations
towards the victims- having consummated their lust to the daughters of Elias, having threatened the
victims through occasionally pointing a gun at them, and tying all them up demonstrate the presence of
voluntary participation and conspiracy among the appellants. There is a show of community of interest
and a concerted criminal design to perform all the acts. The court affirms the decision appealed wit
modifications sentencing the accused Marantal to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, 14 April 1999, 305 SCRA 740
Facts: Del Roasrio, a tricycle driver, was hired by a certain Boy Santos. Boy Santos directed him to
proceed to the market place to fetch Juan Marquez and Dodong Bisaya, in stark contrast to their original
agreement which was just to drive Boy Santos to Blas Edward Coliseum. Del Rosario acquiesced. On the
market place specifically in front of the Merced Drugstore, Marquez and Bisaya boarded the said tricycle.
Del Rosario was summoned to proceed to the corner of Burgos and General Luna St.. On that place, the
assailants attacked the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Del
Rosario tried to leave and seek help however Boy Santos, who was inside the vehicle, prevented him
from doing so by pointing a gun at him. Marquez ruthlessly shot the victim dead. The assailants boarded
the tricycle where Marquez hunched behind Del Rosario ordering the latter to speed up and drive towards
Dicarma. Upon reaching the destination, the three men took off and threatened Del Rosario to not report
the incident to the police authorities, otherwise he and his family would be harmed. Del Rosario went
home and did not report the incident. The shoot-out and the handing over the bag to a man inside the
tricyclce was corroborated by the testimony of the eyewitness Alonzo. The court a quo was charged of
the crime of robbery with homicide.

Issue: whether or not the accused Del Rosario acted under the presence of threat and irresistible force

Ruling: The court finds and holds that Del Rosario acted under the presence of threat and irresistible
force. The court finds Del Rosario to be unarmed and unable to protect himself at the time he was
threatened and prevented from leaving the scene of the crime. A person who acts under the impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because of the complete
deprivation of freedom. In the case at bar, when Boy Santos pointed a gun at Del Rosario, the danger
was imminent. The court assails the trial court’s decision that there was conspiracy. In the case at bar,
there was no evidence evincing that an agreement concerning the commission of the crime took place.
The appellant shows no inkling of the malicious design. Thus, the decision of the lower court is reversed
and the accused is acquitted.

People v. Bandian, G.R. No. 45186, 30 September 1936, 63 Phil. 530 (see also: dissent of J.
Villareal)
Facts: Valentin Aguilar, the neighbor of the appellant, saw the appellant go to a thicket. Valentin thought
that it was probably because of responding to the call of nature since in their place, that is what it is for.
However, a few minutes later, Aguilar saw his neighbor appellant emerge from the thicket with blood all
over her doddering down blatantly a show of her inability to support herself. He ran to render aid,
therefrom he was informed by her that she was very weak and dizzy, and so he helped her go up to her
house and place her in her own bed. When Aguilar inquired regarding what happened, she merely
responded that she was very dizzy. Valentin called upon Adriano Comcom whom the former instructed to
fetch some leaves to cease the appellant’s further bleeding. Comcom obliged and on the thicket where
Comcon went, he saw a body of a newborn baby. Comcom rushed to Aguilar to inform him of what he
saw to which the latter responded to bring the baby to the house. The appellant answered in affirmative
when she was asked if it was hers. Thereafter, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno was notified of such. He paced to
the house and found her lying on the bed. Nepomuceno narrated his own version of the facts alleging that
the appellant tried to kill the baby as the baby was not with the man she was martially living with, but
instead from a man she had amorous relations with before prior to Luis Kirol. The lower court convicts the
appellant of the crime of infanticide
Issue: whether or not the appellant failed to perform an act required by law because she was prevented
by some lawful or insuperable cause.

Ruling: The court finds and holds that the appellant failed to perform an act required by law due to
insuperable cause. There is actually no evidence showing that the child died. The wounds sustained by
the baby were due to animal bites. The court clarifies that Infanticide of abandonment must be a result of
a voluntary and conscious act or omission. The evidence show in contrary to the alleged willful act or
conscious act of the appellant in abandoning her child, thus, the court finds her having no intention to kill
or abandon it, for the second lover barely had an idea of her amorous relations with another man. In
addition, from the time the appellant was pregnant, she continuously had fever. This illness went into its
extreme undoubtedly leading to long illness as well as hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth.
Coupling the aforementioned with her inexperience, and being uneducated with childbirth, and furthered
by her dizziness and physical weakness, the court finds it meritorious that she acted with insuperable
cause. Also, the going of the appellant in the thicket to respond to the call of nature was a lawful act. The
birth which came along to the response to the call of nature was by mere accident. The court reverses
the decision of the lower court, thus acquitting the appellant.
Villareal: Justice Villareal concurs with the decision but dissents on the ground to which the decision was
formulated. Justice Villareal contends that there is no crime that was committed by the appellant. Under
the consideration that she was a “primipara” when she gave birth, she was unconscious of sudden
deliveries, so much so being mistaken as just a call of nature- which is the case at bar. Upon her
defecation, she didn’t know that she already conceived a child. She just knew about her delivery when
she was shown the kid. The appellant cannot be held negligent as she completely had no knowledge of
her delivery. The exempting circumstance cannot hold for her because if the accused been aware of her
delivery and deliberately abandoned her child, then she would be criminally liable and the death of the
child is not accidental, thus no exempting circumstance. It is not the insuperable cause that prevented her
from doing what the law requires but rather her ignorance of her delivery.

PEOPLE VS DEQUINA

Facts: Accused Nelida Dequina was charged for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the
pertinent facts of the case are as follows: P03 Masange along with two other companions were given a tip
that a huge amount of marijuana will be delivered in the corner of Juan Luna and Rexabano Street in
Tondo Manila. Being given the description of the purported carriers, P03 Masange et al. proceeded to the
area and, a male and two females were seen getting off the taxi and carrying individual black bags. The
officers went to the individuals and the three began to panic. One of them is accused Nelida Dequina who
dropped the bag she was carrying, causing the zipper to open and revealed what seemed to be bricks of
marijuana. The bags of her two other companion contained the same. Dequina raised as a defense that
she only did what she did because she was under the gun, that her daughter was in the hands of the
mastermind threatening her that something bad is to happen to her daughter if she would not complete
what she is asked to do.

The RTC convicted her party of the crime and was affirmed by the CA. Dequina and party assail their
conviction, asserting that their arrests were illegal. They were not doing anything illegal that would have
justified their warrantless arrest, much less a warrantless search of their persons and belongings. A
search made without a warrant cannot be justified as an incident of arrest unless the arrest itself was
lawful. The People counters that accused-appellants’ arrests were lawful as they were then actually
committing a crime. Since accused-appellants were lawfully arrested, the resulting warrantless search of
their persons and belongings was also valid. In addition, accused-appellants did not refute that they were
indeed transporting prohibited drugs when they were arrested and, instead, alleged as defenses that
Dequina acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear, and Jundoc and Jingabo were merely
accommodating a trusted childhood friend.

Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest of Dequina is valid.

Held: Yes. The party of Dequina was in inflagrante delicto at the time of the arrest.

Ratio: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful arrest without a warrant may be
made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances: 1. When the person to be
arrested is in inflagrante delicto. 2. When the arresting officer is in hot pursuit. 3. When the person to be
arrested is an escapee.

“Transport” as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean “to carry or convey from one
place to another.” The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants
were caught in flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3
Masanggue need not even open Dequina’s traveling bag to determine its content because when the latter
noticed the police officers’ presence, she walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her
traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime
was then actually being committed by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally
justified, and the following warrantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their
lawful arrest.

Pp. vs. Salvatierra

Facts:

While Charlie Fernandez was walking towards Quiapo, appellant and the 2 accused lunged a
pointed instrument at Charlie, hitting the latter at the left breast. This resulted to his death.

On Nov. 15, 1990 the police received a complaint that appellant was creating a commotion. He
was thereafter taken in custody.

Appellant put up the defense of alibi alleging that he was having merienda with his wife and
children when the incident occurred. He also alleged that he had an altercation with a woman on that day
who caused his arrest for the crime of malicious mischief, wherein he was detained after. Then, when
police arrived, they brought him to the Homicide Section where he was investigated for the stabbing of
Fernandez.

Appellant claimed that the arrest was made almost 3 months after the commission of the crime
and no warrant had been obtained during the 3-month intervening period between the commission of the
crime and his apprehension, thus making the arrest illegal.

Issue: W/N the arrest is violative of his constitutional rights?

Held:

No. Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never
raised it before entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, 22 January 1999, 301 SCRA 668
Facts: The Civilian informants went to the PNP headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to
prepare for the buy-bust operation, together with the Nacrom agents, to capture a certain “Jun” at E.
Jacinto Street, Mandaluyong City. The NARCOM agents designated PO3 Manlangit as the poser-buyer
and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the members as perimeter security. The PNP Narcom
Chief of the North Metorpolitan District gave the team 2 000 pesos to cover for the expenses of the
operation. PO3 Manlangit set aside 1 600 for the buy bust operation since the mark up price for a kilo of
marijuana is 1 600. Thereafter, the team headed to the place where there target is. Soon, a few moments
later, a certain Jun appeared and the civil informants introduced him to PO3 Manlangit as the buyer who
was interested. PO3 Manlangit gave the money as payment to Jun who thereafter gave the illegal drug
(marijuana) wrapped in plastic. Jun was then arrested but the marked bills weren’t with him, but instead
were in possession of a “Nenneth”. The police officers went to the house of Nenneth to where they
searched for the bills. PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the table which contained 10 bricks of
alleged dried marijuana leaves. The defense assailed the prosecution’s story alleging that they were
accused of being pushers in the community while the police officers were searching for a “totoy”. As there
were lots of Totoys in the community, and that the accused-appellant denied knowing of any Totoy, they
were suddenly arrested by the police officers. The lower court convicted the accused appellants Florencio
Doria and Violeta Gaddao of the crime in violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue: whether or not the police officers acted under instigation as an exempting circumstance, thus the
validity of the buy bust operation and warrantless arrest

Ruling: The court clarifies the difference between entrapment and instigation. In Entrapment, there are
ways and means that the peace officer resorts to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker
in the execution of the criminal plan. In instigation, it induces the “would-be” criminal to perform the
commission of the offense and so himself becomes a co principal. Entrapment is a broad pang which
covers illegal seizures, searches, illegal detentions and among other, thus there should always be a
presumption of duty. It is then crucial to identify with critical scrutiny the initial contact which in this case
doesn’t show that it was the police officer was the one who contacted the accused. In the case at bar, it
was the informant who contacted the accused regarding the meet-up. Thus, it is substantial that
Manlangit handed over the money as payment for the illegal drug and not induced the criminal to
consummate the commission of the offense. On the other note, Gaddao was arrested primarily on the
ground of alleged identification made by the co-accused which is not a justification for the police officers
to arrest her. The warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal. The court affirms the judgment appealed from
with modifications which declare Gaddao to be acquitted from the charge against her.

Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales v. People, G.R. No. 181409, 11 February 2010
Facts: Mediatrix Carungcong was duly appointed as the admisnitratrix for the intestate testate of her
deceased mother Manolita Gonzales. Mediatrix Carungcong filed an estafa case against her brother in
law, William Sato. William Sato is married to Mediatrix’s sister, Zenaida Carungcong who died prior to
their mother. Mediatrix was tasked to preserve the properties left, and reciver such funds or properties
belonging to the estate which are in possession of the other parties. As Mediatrix conferred with her
nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, and she learned that William Sato through fraudulent
misrepresentations came to secure the signature and thumbmark of Manolita, whereby as such, Wendy
Sato was made to sell and dispose four pieces of land in Tagaytay City. William Sato failed to deliver the
proceeds to Manolita. William Sato refuses to deliver the proceeds of the estate thus prejudicing the
deceased, and of the heirs of the deceased. The City Prosecutor of QC filed an estafa complaint against
William Sato to which the prosecution sought for a much higher amount for the damages. William Sato
assailed in his motion to dismiss that the death of his wife severs the link between him and the deceased
thus no affinity of any kind is obtained herefrom. The petition for motion for reconsideration was denied,
hence this petition

Issue: whether or not there is an effect of absolutory cause on the criminal liability for the complaint of
estafa through falsification of public documents

Ruling: The court grants the petition of the prosecution. The court holds that the scope of Article 332 for
absolutory causes under the exempting circumstances involve simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It is, thus, well construed that all other crimes are not affected by the absolutory
cause. The waiver of absolutory cause is not applied in this circumstance if in violation of the property, it
involves a breach of public interest, which is the case at bar. In the case at bar, the criminal liability
involves a single criminal liability, as the falsification of public documents is a component crime for the
consummation of estafa. The consummation of the crime of estafa was spurred through the falsification of
document when Sato presented to Manolita a ready-made SPA.

People v. Lua Chu, G.R. No. 34917, 7 September 1931, 56 Phil. 44

Facts: Juan Samson, chief of the customs secret service of Cebu had returned from a vacation in Europe.
He called upon the collector of customs for the port of cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office, and the latter
asked the chief how much his trip had cost him. Samson retorted saying that he had spent 2 500.
Natividad then gave Samson a piece of paper money saying that a shipment will arrive tomorrow and that
he will be able to recoup all his travelling expenses. Uy Se Tieng informed Samson of the opium
shipment. The opium shipment came loaded in Kolambugan ship. Samson ordered for the unloading of
all the cargoes. Natividad instructed Samson to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over 6K. Tieng went to the
house of Samson and was told to pay 6K before he can take the opium out of the customshouse.
preparations for the capture ensued. Tieng went to the house of Samson. Samson demanded for the
money but was told that it was in possession of Lua chu. Lua chu with Tieng went to the house of
Samson, thereafter. Lua Chu didn’t have the money but promised to deliver the money as soon as the
opium is in Tieng’s warehouse. The chinemen were then arrested.

Issue: whether or not Juan Samson induced the defendants to import the opium

Ruling: The court finds and holds that Juan Samson did not induce the defendants to import the opium.
Samson had smoothed the way for the introduction of the drug but the accused had already planned its
importation already. The officer did not help them carry out the design of importation. Samson pretended
to have an agreement with the collector of customs to better ensure the seizure of the defendants- not to
gain but to arrest the importers.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOHN GUIAGUI y KOTENG, defendant-appellant.

This is an appeal interposed by the accused John Guiagui y Koteng from the judgment * rendered in
Criminal Case No. Q-42795 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, finding him guilty of violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P30,000.00, with costs.

The record of the case shows that on 4 November 1985, the PC Narcotics Command (NARCOM, for
short), based in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was told by one of its confidential informants that he
(informer) was to meet that afternoon at the Uniwide Sales Center in Cubao, Quezon City, one Johnny, a
notorious drug pusher from Baguio City who was in Manila looking for a buyer of marijuana. M/Sgt.
Arsenio Carlos of the NARCOM unit was instructed by his superiors to take appropriate action on the
matter and to conduct an "intelligence build-up." M/Sgt. Carlos agreed to pose as a buyer of marijuana
and went with the informer to the designated place to meet Johnny. They proceeded to the restaurant at
the second floor of the store and occupied a table. Soon thereafter, Sgt. Carlos was introduced to Johnny
as a buyer of marijuana. Sgt. Carlos talked with Johnny in Ilocano. He told Johnny that he needed three
(3) kilos of marijuana. After he and Johnny had agreed on the price, P1,500.00 per kilo, Johnny promised
to come back with the marijuana the following Saturday, 9 November 1985, Johnny told Sgt. Carlos to
wait for him at the back exit of the store. 1

On 9 November 1985, M/Sgt. Carlos and a back-up team headed by P/Lt. Casimiro Llanes went to the
Uniwide Sales Center at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening. M/Sgt Carlos went directly to his meeting
place with Johnny, while the back-up team took up strategic positions nearby. Not long thereafter, M/Sgt.
Carlos saw Johnny coming towards him. Johnny was carrying a travelling bag. He approached Johnny
and asked him if the latter had brought his order (of marijuana) and Johnny pointed at the travelling bag.
M/Sgt. Carlos opened the bag and examined its contents. Finding the contents to be marijuana, he gave
the pre-arranged signal to the back-up team by scratching his head. Soon thereafter, P/Lt. Llanes and his
men arrived and placed Johnny under arrest. A receipt for the bag and its contents 2 was then prepared
and duly signed by M/Sgt. Carlos and the appellant John Guiagui. 3

The articles were sent to the PC Crime Laboratory and after examination, P/Lt. Nelly Carriage attested
that the contents of the bag were marijuana fruiting tops. 4

The accused, John Guiagui, however, while admitting that he was arrested by NARCOM agents on 9
November 1985, denied that the bag and its contents belonged to him. He also denied that he was
arrested in the manner testified to by witnesses for the prosecution. According to him, he and an
acquaintance, named Vic, were drinking in the restaurant at the second floor of the Uniwide Sales Center
in Cubao, Quezon City at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 9 November 1985, when M/Sgt Carlos and
P/Lt. Llanes suddenly arrived and placed handcuffs on their hands. They were then brought out of the
store and loaded in a car. Vic, however, was separated from him and probably released, while adhesive
tape (plaster) was placed over his eyes. After about thirty (30) minutes, the car stopped and more plaster
was placed over his eyes. His shirt and pants were then removed and he was maltreated when he could
not tell them the persons who deal in marijuana. Water was poured over him and he was repeatedly
electrocuted.

After two (2) hours of intensive grilling, he was asked if he could pay them P5,000.00 and when he told
them that he had no money, he was maltreated again. After a while, he was brought to Camp Crame
where his blindfold was removed. The following morning, he was brought to a room where he was made
to sign a receipt. He was also told to point to a thing on the table and a picture was taken of him. 5

Renan Liselo a security guard at the Uniwide Sales Center at Cubao, Quezon City, testified for the
accused. He declared that he was posted at the Fast Food section of the store at about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of 9 November 1985 when he saw two (2) persons, one of whom is the appellant herein, being
handcuffed. He was only three (3) meters away from them and he was about to approach them when he
noticed that the men who placed the handcuffs had guns. He further stated that he noticed earlier that the
appellant and his companion were not carrying anything except a jacket. He also stated that it was the
policy of the store not to allow any person or customer to bring bags or packages inside the store. 6

Counsel for the appellant, in this appeal, contends that the accused was induced into committing the
crime by NARCOM M/Sgt Arsenio Carlos and urges the reversal of the judgment. In support thereof, he
quotes a portion of the testimony of M/Sgt. Arsenio Carlos of the NARCOM, to wit:

A . . . he is an Ilocano so we talked in Ilocano because I am also Ilocano, telling him that I needed
three kilos of marijuana.

Q After you intimated this alias Johnny your intention of buying three kilos of marijuana, what did
he tell you?

A He told me that he will be back at the Saturday of that week and he will deliver to me the three
kilos of marijuana. I will just wait for him at the back exit of the Uniwide Sales. (tsn of February 3,
1986, p. 5)

There is no merit in the appeal. We find that entrapment, and not instigation, prevailed in this case.

In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law
breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation, the instigator
practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and himself
becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction while in instigation,
the defendant would have to be acquitted.7
There was entrapment in this case, because it would appear that the accused was already engaged in
the illicit trade of marijuana and all that the NARCOM agents did was to catch him in the act. He was not
induced to sell marijuana to the NARCOM agents. M/Sgt. Arsenio Carlos categorically denied that he
prodded the accused to sell him marijuana. His testimony reads, as follows:

Q And after you were introduced, you asked the accused and prodded him to let some marijuana
and give it to you, correct?

A No, sir.

Q What did you do then after meeting the accused?

A He asked the confidential informant if I am also a buyer and the confidential informant told him
yes and then and there, I ordered 3 kilos. 8

The testimony of M/Sgt Carlos, relied upon by the appellant, that he "needed three (3) kilos of marijuana"
cannot also be considered as proof that he had induced the appellant to commit the offense. As we see it,
the statement was but a quantification of the amount of marijuana that Sgt. Carlos desired to buy from the
accused.

Neither could the appellant's testimony about Vic be considered as proof that the NARCOM agents had
induced him to commit the offense since there is no proof that the said Vic was a NARCOM agent.
Besides, the appellant testified that the said Vic merely told him to look for somebody from whom he
could buy marijuana. His testimony reads, as follows:

Q You said there were about two meetings in October. What did this Vic talk about in the second
meeting in October, if you can recall?

A He convinced me to look for somebody from whom he could buy marijuana.

Q And what did you say to him?

A I thought of not answering his request but he bragged of his wealth and showed to me his bank
account so I decided to tell him that I know of people if I could look for them. 9

If there was any inducement in this case, the inducement did not come from the NARCOM agents, but
from the appellant's own greed and cupidity. He wanted to live the life-style of the rich who have plenty of
ready cash and fat bank accounts.

The trial court correctly found the accused, John Guiagui y Koteng guilty of the crime with which he is
charged.1âwphi1 The witnesses for the prosecution who actively took part in the "buy-bust" operation,
M/Sgt Arsenio Carlos and P/Lt. Casimiro Llanes, are police officers who are presumed to have performed
their duties in the regular manner, and there is nothing in the record which would suggest any reason that
would motivate them to testify falsely against the said accused. Besides, as the trial court found, their
testimonies were straightforward, credible and bore all the earmarks of truth. However, for accuracy, the
designation of the penalty imposed upon the accused should be changed from reclusion perpetua, as
ordered by the trial court, to life imprisonment, the latter being the penalty specifically provided for by
law.10

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the accused appellant is sentenced to life imprisonment, the
judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs .

SO ORDERED.
People v. Genosa, 341 SCRA 493, 419 SCRA 537

Facts: Appellant and Ben Genosa were married and blessed with 2 children. One day, Arturo Basabas
and Ben Genosa went to a cockfight after having received their salaries. They had 2 bottles of beer
before going home. When Ben arrived home, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel to look for
him. Arturo was across the house of Ben until 9 pm waiting for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo
heard the appellant (but didn’t see her arrive) say I wont hesitate to kill you to which Ben replied why kill
me when I am innocent. That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Therafter, Joseph Valida, who was
waiting for a bus, he saw appellant with her 2 children walk out of the house locking the gate and each
one carrying a bag. A few days later, the neighbours told Steban Matiga (the owner of the rented house of
Genosas) of a foul smell coming from the Genosas house. Steban went in the house finding out a
decomposing body of Ben Genosa. The police officers who went to the scene found the body wrapped in
bedhseet and a metal pipe was found just 2 meters away from the body. Appellant insisted that it was
firing at him that ended his life and not the metal pipe. According to her, it was Ben who attacked her first
and that she just defended herself. Marivic Genosa was convicted of the crime of parricide

Issue: whether or not Marivic acted in complete deprivation of intelligence averring the claim that she is a
battered wife

Ruling: The court affirms the judgment of the lower court with modifications- presence of mitigating
circumstances. Marivic claims that she is a battered woman. The court, however clarifies that Marivic
Genosa was not able to tender sufficient evidence to prove that she acted under the circumstance that
she is completely deprived of her will and intelligence as a consequence of a battered wife syndrome. In
this instance, it is evinced that Marivic would only run to her mother’s house after a heated argument
between them, thus lacking of the 3rd stage in the battered wife syndrome- the “loving” stage. This casts
doubt on Marivic’s claim of her suffering from battered wife syndrome.