VOID MARRIAGES; GROUNDS; FAMILY
CODE Whether a subsequent declaration of nullity of the first
Art 4 FC
Art 35 FC
Art 36 FC
Art 37 FC
Art 38 FC
Art 39 FC
Art 40 FC
Art 41 FC
Art 44 FC
Art 390 CC
Art 391 CC
ANTONE V BERONILLA (2010)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Myrna Antone alleged in her Affidavit-Complaint,filed in
March 2007, that she and Leo were married in 1978.
However, Leo contracted a second marriage
with CecileMaguillo in 1991. The prosecution filed the
Information in the Regional Trial Court(RTC) in a
criminal case of Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case
for arraignment, Leo moved to quash the Information
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense because his marriage with Myrna was
declared null and void as of April 2007 and became final
and executory on May 2007. Leo argues that since the
marriage had been declared null and void from the
beginning, there was actually no first marriageto speak
of. Thus, absent the first marriage, the facts alleged in
the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy.
The prosecution argued that the marriage of Myrna
and Leo on 1978 was not severed prior to his second
marriage on 1991, for which bigamy has already been
committed before the court declared the first
marriage null and void on 2007.
The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying
on Morigo v. People. Similarly, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
marriage only after contracting the subsequent
marriage is immaterial in the crime of bigamy.
HELD:
YES. Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the
previous ruling of People v. Mendoza(under the Civil
Code) declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a
void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is
no need fora judicial decree to establish that a void ab
initio marriage is invalid; and (b) a marriage declared
void ab initiohas retroactive legal effect such that there
would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all,
which renders the elements of bigamy complete.
In fact, this was exhaustively discussed in Mercado v.
Tan. It stated that, under the Family Code a
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by
then the crime had already been consummated.
Otherwise stated, a person who contracts a subsequent
marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of
a previous marriage is guilty of bigamy.
While, Morigo v. People was promulgated
after Mercado, the facts are different. InMercado,
the first marriage was actually solemnized, although
later declared void ab initio. While in Mendoza,
no marriage ceremony was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer, because what occurred
was a mere signing of a marriage contract through a
private act. Thus, there is no need to secure
a judicialdeclaration of nullity before Morigo can
contract a subsequent marriage. The ruling of Morigo is
not applicable to this case.
VOID MARRIAGES; GROUNDS;
INCESTUOUS MARRIAGES
Art 37 FC
Art 38 FC
MATTER OF BAUTISTA: IN VISA PETITION
PROCEEDINGS (SEPT 1987)
FACTS:
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legac
y/2012/08/17/2671.pdf
ISSUES:
HELD:
RULING:
VOID MARRIAGES; GROUNDS; ARTICLE 36
(W/ SEMPIO-DY ANNOTATIONS)
Art 36 FC
REPUBLIC V DAGDAG (2001)
DOCTRINE:
Article 36, Family Code. “A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization”
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the
Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite.
Petitioner, who is five years older than private
respondent, was then in her first year of teaching
zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college
freshman, was her student for two consecutive
semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979
when she was no longer private respondents teacher.
On January 1, 1981, they were married. Out of their
marriage, three (3) children were born, namely, Maie,
Lyra, and Marian.
However, on July 10, 1992, petitioner filed a
petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to
private respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time
of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit,
private respondent failed to perform his obligation to
support the family and contribute to the management
of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in
drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed
that private respondent, after they were married,
cohabited with another woman with whom he had an
illegitimate child, while having affairs with different
women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private
respondent endangered her health by infecting her with
a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that
private respondent was irresponsible, immature and
unprepared for the duties of a married life. Lastly, she
averred that the respondent abandoned her and their
children.
RTC denied Lucita’s petition ruling that the
grounds in her petition are for legal separation and not
for psychological incapacity under Article 36.
On appeal, CA affirmed RTC and further ruled that
the grounds of Lucita for Respondent’s psychological
incapacity did not, as required under Article 36, occur at
the time of her marriage with the respondent.
ISSUES:
WON Respondent’s (Mario) habitual alcoholism,
infidelity, STD transmitting to petitioner, abandonmen,
irresponsiblity and imaturity constitute psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the New family Code?
HELD:
No. As held in Santos v. Court of Appeals, “Psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.”
Furthermore, the other forms of psychoses, if
existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.
If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
 In the instant case, other than her self-serving
declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that
at the time they were married, private respondent was
suffering from a psychological defect which in fact
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
In other words, there was no evidence was presented to
show that private respondent was not cognizant of the
basic marital obligations.
The court upheld the case of Molina (Republic v
CA) holding that the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article
36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
In the present case, expert testimony should have
been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
rests upon petitioner.
SANTONS V BEDIA SANTOS (1995)
FACTS:
Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army,
met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a
municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. The couple lived with Julia’s parents at
the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in
1987 and was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally,
the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside
from the interference of Julia’s parents into their family
affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite
Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, she called her husband and promised to
return home upon the expiration of her contract in July
1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US
where he underwent a training program under AFP, he
desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch
with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared
void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He argued that
failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with
him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show
her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life.
ISSUES:
Whether their marriage can be considered void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
HOLDING:
No, the failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with her husband Leouel for more than
five years does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Pyschological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and dischargedby the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art.
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY” to the mot
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inablity to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem
HOLDING:
Petition DENIED.
REP V CA and MOLINA (1997)
DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the
nullity of marriage, may beestablished by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however
that therespondent should be examined by a physician
or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such
declaration.
FACTS:
Respondent Roridel Molina married Reynaldo Molina on
April 14, 1985. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a
husband and a father exhibited by his preference to
spend time with friends, squandering money,
dependence on his parents and dishonesty involving
finances. Inevitably, this resulted in quarrels and by
March 1987, Roridel quit her job and moved in with her
parents in Baguio. Reynaldo left her and their child a
few weeks thereafter.
On Aug. 16, 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of
psychological incapacity of the husband. The trial court
declared the marriage void, which the CA affirmed in
toto; hence, the petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
WON there is psychological incapacity.
HOLDING:
No. The case of Roridel and Reynaldo merely
constituted incompatibility among the estranged
spouses. The law intended to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity only to the most serious cases
of personality disorders that must have existed at the
time marriage is celebrated. Irreconcilable differences
or conflicting personalities are not incapacities that
would hinder the fulfillment of the essential marital
obligations of the parties. The characteristics of gravity,
judicial antecedence and incurability are not present in
the case.
Due to the improper interpretations and applications
arrived at by the lower courts on this particular issue,
the SC found it wise to construe the law and lay down
guidelines in interpretation and application of Art. 36.
Here, the SC sought the help of two amici curiae -
considered an external aid in statutory construction.
The guidelines set forth are thus: (1) the burden of
proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven
by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) such
illness must be grave enough to disable fulfillment of
essential marital obligations; (6) the essential marital
obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles
220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and
their children; (7) interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
are to be given great weight; and (8) the fiscal and the
Solicitor-General must appear as counsel for the State.
MARCOS V MARCOS (2000)
FACTS:
Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson
Marcos were married twice and hadfive children. After
the downfall of President Marcos, the respondent left
the military service in1987. Consequently, due to the
respondent’s failure to engage in any gainful
employment, theywould often quarrel and the
respondent would hit and beat the petitioner. As a
result, in 1992they were already living separately. Thus,
petitioner filed for annulment of marriage assailingArt.
36 of the Family Code. The court a quo found the
respondent to be psychologicallyincapacitated to
perform his marital obligations. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed thedecision of the RTC because
psychological incapacity had not been established by
the totality of the evidence presented.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Respondent Wilson Marcos’ failure to
find work to support his familyand his violent attitude
towards Petitioner Brenda Marcos and their children
constituted psychological incapacity.
HOLDING:
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the
nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality
of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however that the respondent be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non
for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects” were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior
of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had
lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period
of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and
moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his
alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot
declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to
observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and
Molina.

ANTONIO V REYES (2006)
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when
petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36
years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they
got married
Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991,
who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,[7] petitioner filed a petition to have
his marriage to respondent declared null and void.
He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the
time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up
to the present.[8]... petitioner claimed that respondent
persistently lied about herself, the people around her,
her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things, [9] to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth
to an illegitimate son,[10] and instead introduced the
boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin
David, attempted to rape and kill her
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her
obstetrician
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice
talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold)
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via
Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters
to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting
her as the "number one moneymaker" in the
commercial industry worth P2 million.[16]
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater
means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear
that she earned a higher income.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to
the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts.
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-
disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other
lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay
and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of
the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding
of... psychological incapacity on her part.
ISSUES:
WON the state of facts as presented by petitioner
sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code
HOLDING:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to... the marriage."... psychological incapacity "is
a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities... of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."
Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further
the initiatives... of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who,
for reasons independent of their will, are not
capacitated to understand or comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the
guidelines in Molina.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological
incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts,
and clearly explained in the trial court's decision.
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was
established to have clearly existed at the time of and
even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated
friends and made up letters from fictitious characters
well before she married petitioner
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological
incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately
discernible that the parties had shared only a little over
a year of cohabitation before the... exasperated
petitioner left his wife.
Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend
the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its
psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage, including parenting.
Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to... remain in the marriage hardly banishes
nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations.
the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope... with her marital obligations,
kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with
the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles
68 to 71 of the Family Code.
As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed
to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of
the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church.
Respondent's psychological incapacity was considered
so grave... that a restrictive clause[93] was appended to
the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from
contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's
consent.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the
requirement in Molina that such psychological
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged,
as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
maintained her excessive... jealousy. From this fact, he
draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is
incurable.
respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure
thereof a remarkable feat.
The requirement... that psychological incapacity must
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined
without expert opinion.
From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently
convinced that the incurability of respondent's
psychological incapacity... has been established by the
petitioner.
REPUBLIC V MELGAR (2006)
PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS:
1. March 27, 1965 – Marriage of petitioner to Eulogio
Melgar
2. Since birth of their first born, Eulogio manifested
habitual alcoholism, immaturity, unbearable
jealousy (over her male co-workers), constitutional
laziness (him not looking for a job and leaving the
petitioner to deal with all expenses), and
maltreatment of petitioner.
3. December 27, 1985 – Eulogio was forcibly thrown
out of the house by petitioner’s brothers. Was not
heard of since.
4. August 19, 1996 – Petitioner filed for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the grounds of Eulogio’s
psychological incapacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations.
5. Summons to the Court were sent to the latter, but
he did not respond.
6. RTC rendered the marriage null and void
7. Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an appeal
and said that the evidence of petitioner was
insufficient under Art 36 of the Family Code.
8. CA upheld RTC’s decision.
9. OSG petitioned to SC for certiorari of the decision of
CA.
ISSUES:
WoN the petitioner’s evidence was enough to rule her
marriage null and void under Art. 36 of FC.
HOLDING:
1. Petitioner failed to establish that at the time of her
marriage with Eulogio, the latter was already
suffering from a mental disorder; in fact, it was
stated that her marriage woes started only after the
birth of their firstborn.
2. Petitioner also failed to establish or insufficiently
proved that Eulogio had a personality disorder that
made him unable to discharge essential marital
obligations. The Court stressed that the incapacity
has to be from a psychological disease, and that,
although considered not to be sine qua non, the
petitioner failed to render expert testimonies to
support her claim of her husband’s mental
incapacity (it weakened her case.)
3. LEGAL SEPARATION more applicable
4. Petitioner failed to establish that at the time of her
marriage with Eulogio, the latter was already
suffering from a mental disorder; in fact, it was
stated that her marriage woes started only after the
birth of their firstborn.
5. Petitioner also failed to establish or insufficiently
proved that Eulogio had a personality disorder that
made him unable to discharge essential marital
obligations. The Court stressed that the incapacity
has to be from a psychological disease, and that,
although considered not to be sine qua non, the
petitioner failed to render expert testimonies to
support her claim of her husband’s mental
incapacity (it weakened her case.)
NOTES: interpretation of Art 36 based on Molina
Relevant law: Art 48 FC.
DIMAYUGA-LAURENA V CA (2008)
Make own digest later pretty short
TE V TE (2009)
PONENTE: Nachura, J.
FACTS:
1. For the resolution of the Court is a petition for
review assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision of the
Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the RTC
and Resolution denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision on
January 19, 2004
2. Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo met respondent
Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in college.
3. Edward courted Rowena January 1996, petitioner a
sophomore and respondent a freshman.
4. Key facts: In March 1996, or around three months
after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that
they elope, Edward refused at first but later agreed.
5. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he,
providing their travel money for 80,0000 and she,
purchasing the boat ticket.
6. April 1996, they decided to go back and live at
Rowena’s Uncle’s house and Edward back to his
parents’ home.
7. Key facts: As his family was abroad, and Rowena
kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she
would commit suicide,
8. Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s
place.
9. Key facts: On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle
brought the two to a court to get married. He was
then 25 years old, and she, 20.
10. The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place
where Edward was treated like a prisoner—he was
not allowed to go out unaccompanied.
11. Key facts: Edward was told by his father that he
would be disinherited, and insisted that he must go
home.
12. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of
Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His
family then hid him from Rowena and her family
13. Key facts: In June 1996, Edward’s parents wanted
them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and
demanded that they have a separate abode. In
June 1996, she said that it was better for them to
live separate lives and they then parted ways.
14. January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis
of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
15. As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on
July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to investigate whether
there was collusion between the parties.
16. On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an
investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the
parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.
17. Key facts: The clinical psychologist who examined
petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated.
18. Key facts: July 30, 2001, RTC rendered its Decision marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is
declaring the marriage of the parties null and void thus, declared null and void.
on the ground that both parties were 6. Petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the 7. Decision of RTC reinstated.
essential marital obligations.17 8. SO ORDERED.
19. The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed
its notice of appeal.
20. Key facts: On review, the appellate court, in the TING V VELEZ-TING (2009)
assailed August 5, 2003 Decision n CA-G.R. CV No.
71867, reversed and set aside the trial court’s TSOI V CA (1997)
ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the CHOA V CHOA (2002)
psychological incapacity of respondent.
21. The CA later denied petitioner’s motion for SUAZO V SUAZO (2010)
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19,
MARABLE V MARABLE (2011)
2004 Resolution.
22. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the MENDOZA V REPUBLIC (2012)
instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15,
2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective *STUDENT REPORT ON PERSONALITY DISORDER*
memoranda
VOID MARRIAGES; PERIOD TO FILE ACTION
ISSUES:
Art 39 FC.
WON based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the
marriage between the parties is null and void. RA 8533.

HOLDING: NINAL V BALDAYOG (2000)

1. key facts: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted ABLAZA V REPUBLIC OF THE PH (2010)
more or less six (6) months. They met in January
1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in
May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who VOID MARRIAGES; FINAL JUDGMENT
provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s PEOPLE V MENDOZA (1954)
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, TOLENTINO V PARAS (1983)
that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality WIEGEL V SEMPIO-DY (1986)
disorder.
2. Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, TERRE V TERRE (1992)
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically ATIENZA V BRILLANTES (1995)
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even APIAG V CANTERO (1997)
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
3. Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental VOID MARRIAGES; EFFECTS OF NULLITY
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage.” Art 43 FC.
4. Petitioner being afflicted with dependent
personality disorder that hinders him from Art 44 FC.
assuming marital obligations and respondent being Art 50 FC.
afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes
her unable to assume the same. Art 51 FC.
5. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and
Art 52 FC.
incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
Art 53 FC.
Art 54 FC.

VOID MARRIAGES; EFFECTS OF NULLITY;

PROPERTIES
DOMINGO V CA (1993)
NICDAO-CARINO V YEE CARINO (2001)
DINO V DINO (2011)

VOID MARRIAGES; EFFECTS OF NULLITY;

STATUS OF CHILDREN
Art 43 FC.
Art 54 FC.