The Constitution of the Philippines (Filipino: Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas) is the constitution or

supreme law of the Republic of the Philippines. ... Three other constitutions have effectively
governed the country in its history: the 1935 Commonwealth Constitution, the 1973 Constitution,
and the 1986 Freedom Constitution.

History of the Philippine Constitution

1. Malolos Constitution the fundamental law of the Philippine Republic from 1898 to 1901.

The Malolos Constitution was adopted by the Revolutionary Congress, held during October and November
1898 in thevillage of Barasoain near the city of Malolos. It took effect on Jan. 21, 1899. The constitution assign
ed to the legislative body,a unicameral national assembly, full control over the executive power (a president ele
cted by the national assembly) and thejudicial system. The constitution provided for universal and direct electio
ns, the separation of church and state, compulsoryand free education, and equal legal status for the languages
of all the Philippine nationalities. It precisely delimited the rightsof citizens. Of special importance was the articl
e on nationalization (without compensation) of the real estate of the religiouscorporations, the largest landowne
rs in the country. Because of the war against the Philippine Republic launched by the USAin February 1899 an
d the subsequent seizure of the Philippines by the USA, the constitution never became widely effective.Howev
er, it left a profound mark on the consciousness of the people, and, when the USA introduced a law in 1902 on
thegovernance of the Philippines, several provisions from the Malolos Constitution relating to civil rights had to
be adopted.
2. The Philippine Regime and an Organic Acts
The Philippine Organic Act was a basic law for the Insular Government that was enacted by the United
States Congress on July 1, 1902. It is also known as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Cooper Act, after its
author Henry A. Cooper. The approval of the act coincided with the official end of the Philippine - American
War.
The Philippine Organic Act provided for the creation of an elected Philippine Assembly after the following
conditions were met:

1. the cessation of the existing insurrection in the Philippine Islands;

2. completion and publication of a census; and
3. two years of continued peace and recognition of the authority of the United States of America after the
publication of the census.
After the convening of the Assembly, legislative power shall then be vested in a bicameral legislature
composed of the Philippine Commission as the upper house and the Philippine Assembly as the lower house.
Supervision of the islands was assigned to the War Department's Bureau of Insular Affairs.
Other key provisions included:

 a bill of rights for the Filipinos,

 the appointment of two Filipino nonvoting Resident Commissioners to represent the Philippines in the
United States Congress, and
 the disestablishment of the Roman Catholic Church.
 conservation of natural resources for the Filipinos
 exercise of executive power by the civil governor who would have several executive departments
 establishment of the Philippine Assembly to be elected by the Filipinos two years after the publication of a
census and only after peace had been restored completely in the country
This act was superseded by the Philippine Autonomy Act, or the Jones Law, enacted on August 29, 1916.
Background
The act was preceded by the Spooner Amendment to the Army Appropriations Act of 1901 (31 Stat. 895, 910,
enacted 2 March 1901) which had provided that:
... all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands ... shall until otherwise
provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the
President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and
protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion.

3. The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY :
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The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines served as the fundamental law of the land from 1935 to 1972. It
establishes the Commonwealth of the Philippines and provides that upon withdrawal of American sovereignty
in the country and the declaration of Philippine independence, said commonwealth shall be known as the
Republic of the Philippines. The Constitution enumerates the composition, powers and duties of the three
branches of government (the Executive, Legislative and Judicial) and creates the General Auditing Office and
lays down the framework in the establishment of the civil service in the country. The Constitution vests the
President with the veto power on legislative bills and emergency powers in times of war and other national
emergencies. Also, the Constitution adopts the Regalian Doctrine or the Principle of State ownership for all its
natural wealth and provides for the proper utilization of such wealth by its citizens.
Salient features of the 1935 Constitution include the following: a bicameral legislature composed of a senate
and House of Representatives. The President is to be elected to a four-year term together with the Vice-
President without re-election; rights of suffrage by male citizens of the Philippines who are twenty-one years of
age or over and are able to read and write; extension of the right of suffrage to women within two years after
the adoption of the constitution.

4. Japanese Occupation

5. 1973 Constitution

a. PLANAS VS. COMELEC

49 SCRA 105; January 22, 1973, G.R. L-35925 Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.

FACTS:

While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the president issued
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under martial law. On November 29, 1972 the Convention
approved its proposed constitution. The next day the president issued PD No. 73 submitting to the people for
ratification or rejection the proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification. On
December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a petition to enjoin respondents from implemented PD No. 73 because
the calling of the plebiscite among others are lodged exclusively in the Congress. On December 17, 1972, the
president issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of PD 1081 for the purpose of free and open
debate on the proposed constitution. On December 23, the president announced the postponement of the
plebiscite, as such; the Court refrained from deciding the cases. On January 12, the petitioners filed for an
“urgent motion” praying that the case be decided “as soon as possible”.

ISSUES:
1. Is validity of PD 73 justiciable?
2. Is PD 73 valid?
3. Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the proposed constitution?

HELD:
The Court may pass upon constitutionality of PD 73 not only because of a long list of cases decided by the
Court but also of subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which expressly provides for
the authority of the Court to review cases revolving such issue. The validity of the decree itself was declared
moot and academic by the Court. The convention is free to postulate any amendment as long as it is not
inconsistent to what is known as Jus Cogens.

****Justiciability Law and Legal Definition. Justiciability refers to limits upon legal issues over which a
court can exercise its judicial authority. ... For example, in order for a court to hear a case, the plaintiff must
have standing to bring the claim; the legal question must not be moot or unripe, etc...

***Jus cogens (from Latin: compelling law; English: peremptory norm) refers to certain fundamental,
overriding principles of international law, from which no derogation is ever permitted.

b. Javellana vs. Executive Secretary

G. R No. L-36142, March 31 1973, 50 SCRA 33

FACTS:

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases,
Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the
proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino
2
citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and
voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate
implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon
ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the
Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a
free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and
proclamation which have the same import and objective.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question,
and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified
validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by
the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.
HELD:

First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new
constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled
that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of
the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our
1935 Constitution) shall show.

Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications
and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.

Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places
COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support
of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17,
1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of
Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the
Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of
judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not
to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.

Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive
Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed
Constitution.

Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is
in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to
declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
d. Philippine Bar Association (PBA) vs. COMELEC
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986

FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national
3
elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the
Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after
the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual
vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special
election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter
states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is
held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after
his proclamation.”

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the
incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the
purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office,
so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the
elections
HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining
respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10
votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3, as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have
turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of
the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the
people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the
election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the
incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

e. Lawyers League for a Better Philippines And/or Oliver A. Lozano Vs. President Corazon C. Aquino,
Et Al.
G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the
basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the people have accepted the Aquino
government which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact
and law a de jure government. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.

*** A de jure government is the legal, legitimate government of a state and is so recognized by other states.
In contrast, a de facto government is in actual possession of authority and control of the state.

*** A de jure government is the legal, legitimate government of a state and is so recognized by other states.
In contrast, a de facto government is in actual possession of authority and control of the state.

6. FREEDOM CONSTITUTION

a. Lawyers League for Better Philippines supra

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b. G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986 IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ

Facts:
In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents, petitioner asked the court if the provision of the Section
5 Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to wit: “The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992,” refers to the then-incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-
President Salvador Laurel or the previously-elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo
M. Tolentino.
After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos and Tolentino were declared the winners, Aquino and
Laurel were installed into the position last February 25, 1986 after the infamous People Power Revolution. The
next regular election for the President and Vice-President was held last May 2, 1992.

Issue:
Whether the afore cited article applies to the then-incumbent President and Vice-President, or the previously
elected President and Vice-President.
Held:
The petition was hereby dismissed outright for:
1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief. Rules of Court states that it is
the RTC (Regional Trial Courts) who has the jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. Also, incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and
tenure.

2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had no personality to use, and his allegation was
manifestly gratuitous. The legitimacy of the Aquino government was not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge, and the people have made judgment.

c. .R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Petitioner vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAAN Respondents

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Luisito G. Baluyut for respondent Ramas.
Armando S. Banaag for respondent Dimaano.

SYNOPSIS
The AFP AntiGraft Board was created by the Presidential Commission on GoodGov
ernment (PCGG) to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel. Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth
of respondent Major General Josephus Ramas and his alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. The PCGG filed a
petition for forfeiture against Ramas, but the same was amended to implead Dimaano as co-defendant.
After so many postponements due to inability of petitioner to show further evidence, private respondents’
filed their motion to dismiss based on Republic vs. Migrino
. In the Migrino case, the Court held that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without showing that they are
"subordinates" of former President Marcos. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the amended complaint and
ordered there turn of the confiscated items to respondent Dimaano. It remanded the records of the case to the
Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants and also referred the case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of
respondent Dimaano. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence,
this petition for review seeking to set aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The primary issue for
resolution herein is whether PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a
forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379. The
other issues involved the propriety of the dismissal of the case before the presentation of evidence and the
legality of the search and seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed the questioned resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan. The Court ruled that the PCGG had no jurisdiction to investigate
Ramas as he was not a"subordinate" of President Marcos as contemplated under EO No. 1, which created
PCGG. Mere position held by a military does not make him a "subordinate" as this term was used

5
in EO No. 1, absent any showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. The
Court disagreed with the petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before
the completion of the presentation of petitioner's evidence. According to the Court, the petitioner had almost
two years to prepare its evidence; however, it still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing
numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has
only itself to blame for failure to complete presentation of its evidence. The Court also ruled that the raiding
team exceeded its authority when it seized the subject items. The search warrant did not particularly
describe the items seized. The seizure of these items was therefore, void, and unless these items are contraband
perse, which they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding team
seized them

implead. : To bring into a lawsuit; specifically: to bring (a third party who is or may be liable to the plaintiff or
defendant) into a suit — compare interplead, intervene, join.

7. 1978 CONSTITUTION

a. De Leon vs Esguerra G.R. No. 78059153 SCRA 602 August 31, 1987

Petitioner: Alfredo M. De Leon, et al. Respondents: Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra in his capacity as OIC
Governor in the province of Rizal, et al
FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain together with other petitioners as BarangayCouncilmen
of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Pronice of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Barangay
Election Act of 1982.Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra which
provided the designation of respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of the same barangay and the
other respondents as members of the barangay Council of the same barangay and municipality. Petitioners
maintain that Sec 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 provides that the terms of office shall be six (6) years
which shall continue until their successors shall have elected and qualified. Also, in accordance with the recent
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, it seems that respondent OIC Governor no longer had the authority to
replace them as well as designate successors. Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared null and
void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not designation of respondents to replace petitioners was valid.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. SC declared that the Memorandum issued by respondent OIC
Governor designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Councilmen of Barangay Dolores has no legal
force and effect. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date therefore,
the provisional constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Effectivity of the Constitution is also
immediately upon its ratification

*** The petitioner is the party who presents a petition to the court. On appeal, the petitioner is usually the
party who lost in the lower court. This can be either the plaintiff or defendant from the court below, as either of
the parties can present the case to a higher court for further proceedings.

Abrogate. Definitions. To formally annul or repeal a law through an act of the legislature, constitutional
authority, or custom. In contract and insurance law, it is to rescind or terminate a contract.

6
STATE

a. Definition of State

State is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory, and
possessed of an independent government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants
render habitual obedience.

Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23, G.R 1-1 3250

In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an international zone [foreign country]
in North Africa). At the time of her death, she was a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier. She
however left some personal properties (shares of stocks and other intangibles) in the Philippines. The
designated administrator of her estate here is Antonio Campos Rueda.
In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for deficiency tax
amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda refused to pay the assessed tax as he claimed that the estate
is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code which provides:
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent
at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a
transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not
residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a
resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every
character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in
that foreign country.
Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between Tangier and the Philippines.
However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of the estate as it averred that Tangier is not a
“state” as contemplated by Section 22 of the Tax Code and that the Philippines does not recognize
Tangier as a foreign country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tangier is a state.
HELD: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country.
A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized sovereign community
independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory,
acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. The stress is on its being a nation, its
people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its
sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence (Collector vs De Lara)
which provides that even a tiny principality that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in
the sense, did fall under the exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus,
recognition is not necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier provides such exemption to
personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor the exemption as provided for
by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of reciprocity.
b. Distinguish from Nation; from Government

State is a political and geopolitical entity or deals with legal concepts while Nation is only a racial or cultural
and/ or ethnic concept.

b. Elements of a State
1. A community of persons, more or less numerous (PEOPLE)
2. Permanently occupying a definite portion of territory (TERRITORY)
3. Independent of external control (SOVEREIGNTY)
7
 4. Possessing an organized government to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience
(GOVERNMENT)
1. Definition of “People”
a. A Community of persons;
b. Sufficient in Number;
c. Capable of maintaining the continued existence of the community; and
d. Held together by a common bond of law.
People
- the inhabitants of the state
Territory
- the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the state.
Government
-is the agency is instrumentality through which the will of the state is formulated, expressed and realized

2. Territory
a. NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other t e r r i t o r i e s o v e r w h i c h t h e P h i l i p p i n e s h a s s o v e r e i g n t y o r
j u r i s d i c t i o n , c o n s i s t i n g o f i t s t e r r e s t r i a l , f l u v i a l a n d a e r i a l domains, including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, t h e i n s u l a r s h e l v e s , a n d o t h e r s u b m a r i n e a r e a s . T h e w a t e r s
a r o u n d , b e t w e e n , a n d c o n n e c t i n g t h e i s l a n d s
o f t h e archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.

b. Archipelagic Doctrine
It is defined as all waters, around between and connecting different islands belonging to the
Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, are necessary appurtenances of
its land territory, forming an integral part of the national or inland waters, subject to
the exclusive sovereignty of the Philippines. It is found in the 2nd sentence of Article 1 of the
1987 Constitution .

c. Territorial waters or a territorial sea, as defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, is a belt of coastal waters extending at most 12 nautical miles (22.2 km; 13.8 mi) from
the baseline (usually the mean low-water mark) of a coastal state. The territorial sea is regarded as the
sovereign territory of the state, although foreign ships (civilian) are allowed innocent passage through it,
or transit passage for straits; this sovereignty also extends to the airspace over and seabed below. Adjustment
of these boundaries is called, in international law, maritime delimitation.
The term "territorial waters" is also sometimes used informally to refer to any area of water over which a state
has jurisdiction, including internal waters, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and potentially
the continental shelf.
d. Baseline
Normally, the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured is the low-water line along the coast as
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state. This is either the low-water mark
closest to the shore, or alternatively it may be an unlimited distance from permanently exposed land, provided
that some portion of elevations exposed at low tide but covered at high tide (like mud flats) is within
{{convert|12|nmi}} of permanently exposed land.

Straight Baselines can alternatively be defined connecting fringing islands along a coast, across the mouths
of rivers, or with certain restrictions across the mouths of bays. In this case, a bay is defined as "a well-marked
indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-locked waters
and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a
bay unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across
the mouth of that indentation". The baseline across the bay must also be no more than {{convert|24|nmi}} in
length.

e. The contiguous zone is a band of water extending from the outer edge of the territorial sea to up to 24
nautical miles (44.4 km; 27.6 mi) from the baseline, within which a state can exert limited control for the

8
purpose of preventing or punishing "infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial sea". This will typically be 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) wide, but
could be more (if a state has chosen to claim a territorial sea of less than 12 nautical miles), or less, if it would
otherwise overlap another state's contiguous zone. However, unlike the territorial sea, there is no standard rule
for resolving such conflicts and the states in question must negotiate their own compromise. The United
States invoked a contiguous zone out to 24 nmi on 29 September 1999.

An exclusive economic zone extends from the outer limit of the territorial sea to a maximum of 200 nautical
miles (370.4 km; 230.2 mi) from the territorial sea baseline, thus it includes the contiguous zone. A coastal
nation has control of all economic resources within its exclusive economic zone, including fishing, mining, oil
exploration, and any pollution of those resources. However, it cannot prohibit passage or loitering above, on, or
under the surface of the sea that is in compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in
accordance with the provisions of the UN Convention, within that portion of its exclusive economic zone
beyond its territorial sea. Before the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, coastal nations
arbitrarily extended their territorial waters in an effort to control activities which are now regulated by the
exclusive economic zone, such as offshore oil exploration or fishing rights (see Cod Wars). Indeed, the
exclusive economic zone is still popularly, though erroneously, called a coastal nation's territorial waters.

f. MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archipelagic
State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then
in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements
complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some base points and classify KIG and
Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and
security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates
conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out base points along coasts, serving
as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our
maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law
norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser
footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state
can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the base points mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the
Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

9
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of base points shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of
the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should follow
the natural configuration of the archipelago.

g. Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty

International law generally recognizes five modes of acquiring territorial sovereignty by a state, they are
1. Discovery is the oldest method of acquiring title to territory. However, discovery alone would not suffice to
establish legal title. It is necessary that the discovered area must be physically occupied. Related to title by
discovery is the hinterland doctrine or the principle of continuity. If a state has made a settlement, it has a right
to assume sovereignty over all adjacent vacant territory, which is necessary to the integrity and security of the
settlement.
2. Occupation: When a particular territory is not under the authority of any other state, a state can establish its
sovereignty over such territory by occupation. The territory may never have belonged to any state, or it may
have been abandoned by the previous sovereign. The PCIJ (permanent court of international justice) held that
the occupation to be effective must consist of the following two elements
(i) intention to occupy. Such intention must be formally expressed and it must be permanent.
(ii) occupation should be peaceful, continuous.
There mere act of discovery by one state is not enough to confer a title by occupation. There are two
requirements (i) the territory subject to claim must not be under the sovereignty of nay state ( terra nullius) (ii)
the state must have effectively occupied the territory.
3. Annexation: Annexation means to incorporate (territory) into the domain of a country. Annexation is a
unilateral act where territory is seized by one state. It can also imply a certain measure of coercion,
expansionism or unilateralism. e.g 1961 annexation of Goa. Annexation of Golan Heights by Israel in 1967.
4. Accretion: Where a new territory is added mainly through natural causes to territory already under the
sovereignty of a state, acquisition by accretion takes place. Accretion refers to the physical expansion of an
existing territory through geographical process.
5. Cession: When a state transfers its territory to another state, acquisition by cession takes place in favour of
such later state. The cession of territory maybe voluntary or maybe under compulsion as a result of war. The
act of cession maybe even in the nature of a gift, sale, exchange or lease. Cession is the transfer of territory
usually by treaty from one state to another. e.g France cession of Louisiana to U.S in 1803.
cession of Alaska. Purchases of Alaska by U.S (from Russia in 1867).
6. Prescription: It means continued occupation over a long period of time by one state of territory actually and
originally belonging to another state. Requirements of prescription (i) the possession must be peaceful (b) the
possession must be public (iii) the possession must be for a long period of time.
Prescription is the acquisition of territory which belonged to another state, where as occupation is
acquisition of terra nullius. However, international law does not prescribe any fixed period for prescription.
The acquisition of territory by force was historically recognized as a lawful method for acquiring sovereignty,
but has been illegal in international law since the U.N charter came into force.
7. Conquest is acquiring territory by the use of force. The practice before was after conquest, the
conqueror annexed the conquered territory to his state. Thus, conquest first takes place
followed by annexation. But with the establishment of the United Nations, conquest is no longer acceptable in
the international community.

Loss of State Territory

Now that we have discussed all modes of acquiring territory or rather acquiring sovereignty over territory we
can easily point out the corresponding methods of losing state territory. These are cession, dereliction,
operation of nature, subjugation, prescription and there is a sixth mode that is Revolt. Loss of territory by
subjugation, cession and prescription is pretty straightforward and requires no further explanation. It’s
simply the corresponding loss of a territory due to the gain of that territory by another state.

Revolt on the other hand has been accepted as a mode of losing territory to which there is no corresponding
mode of acquisition. There is no hard and fast rule regarding the time when a state which has broken off from

10
another can be established permanently as another state. A revolt however seems to be more of a political
issue than a legal mode of loss of territorial sovereignty.

Dereliction as a mode of losing territory corresponds to occupation. Dereliction frees a territory from
sovereignty of the present state possessor. When the owner state completely abandons a territory with the
intention of withdrawing from it permanently and relinquishing sovereignty over it dereliction is effected. Actual
abandonment alone cannot amount to dereliction as it is assumed that the owner will and can retake
possession. Hence, just like occupation there has to be an abandonment of territory (corpus) and an intention
(animus) to withdraw too.

We shall lastly discuss the loss of territory due to natural causes, as an operation of nature. Just like accretion
adds to state territory, disappearance of land due to natural factors is ipso facto a loss of state territory. Thus, if
an island submerged or a river changes its course so as to eat into part of the territory of the state there is loss
of territory. This topic is widely gaining importance nowadays in the global scenario because the rapid changes
in the environment have caused a substantive rise in sea level. This has lead to the threat submergence of
several island nations. These nations are facing severe issues and are looking for support from other countries
as their territory is under the threat of completely vanishing altogether. Vanuatu, Marshall Islands, Fiji etc are
some of the countries that have already lost major portions of their territory due to rising sea levels and have
started asking neighboring countries to provide their subjects with territory to live. These residents have now
formed a class of people called environmental refugees and their rights under international law are a subject of
wide discussion.

3. Definition of “Government”
1. That institution or aggregate of institutions
2. by which an independent society
3. makes and carries out those rules of action
4. which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state
5. or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority
of prescribing them.

a. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987"

INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS
Sec. 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Administrative Code of 1987."
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. - Unless the specific words of the text, or the context as a whole, or a
particular statute, shall require a different meaning:

(1) "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" refers to the corporate governmental entity through
which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivisions or other forms of local government.
(2) "National Government" refers to the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from
the different forms of local governments.

(3) "Local Government" refers to the political subdivisions established by or in accordance with the
Constitution.

(4) "Agency of the Government" refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporations, or a local
government or a distinct unit therein.

(5) "National agency" refers to a unit of the National Government.

(6) "Local agency" refers to a local government or a distinct unit therein.chanrobles virtual law library
(7) "Department" refers to an executive department created by law. For purposes of Book IV, this shall
include any instrumentality, as herein defined, having or assigned the rank of a department, regardless of its
name or designation.

11
 (8) "Bureau" refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department. For purposes of Book IV, this shall
include any principal subdivision or unit of any instrumentality given or assigned the rank of a bureau,
regardless of actual name or designation, as in the case of department-wide regional offices.

(9) "Office" refers, within the framework of governmental organization, to any major functional unit of a
department or bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to any position held or occupied by
individual persons, whose functions are defined by law or regulation.

(10) "Instrumentality" refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework vested within special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled
corporations.

(11) "Regulatory agency" refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or
adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interests of private persons, the principal powers of which
are exercised by a collective body, such as a commission, board or council.

(12) "Chartered institution" refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested
by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state
universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State.

(13) "Government-owned or controlled corporation" refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature,
and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as
in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock: Provided,
That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the
Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and
discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.

(14) "Officer" as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee", refers to a person whose duties, not being of a
clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the
government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a
particular function in the exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes any government employee,
agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.

(15) "Employee", when used with reference to a person in the public service, includes any person in the
service of the government or any of its agencies, divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities.

b. Classification of governments
A de jure government (government of law) is an organized government of a state which has the general
support of the people.
– One established by the authority of the legitimate Sovereign

A de facto government (government of fact) is a government which actually exercises power or control but
without legal title.
- one established in defiance of the legitimate sovereign
There are three kinds of de facto government:

1. the government that gets possession and control of, or usurps by force or by the voice of the
majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter;
2. that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state; and

12
 3. that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory
of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated as a government of paramount force.

Classification of de facto governments

De facto proper
1. That government that gets possession and control of
2. or usurps by force or by the voice of majority
3. the rightful legal government
4. and maintains itself against the will of the latter.
Government of paramount force
1. That which is established and maintained by military forces
2. who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy
3. in the course of war.
4. That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise
in insurrection against the parent state.

The Second Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of paramount force, having been
established by the Japanese belligerents. On the other hand, in a decision rendered by the Supreme
Court it declared that the government under Corazon Aquino was a de jure government as the people
have already accepted it and the community of nations have recognized its legitimacy.

Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh

de facto government
CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH G.R. No. L-5 75 Phil 113, 122 September 17, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner, vs.

EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during the time of
the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were initiated during the
Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting
such authority.

Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto
government.

Issues:

1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid and
remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” has invalidated
all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial acts and
proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.

13
Discussions:

 Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid.
The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be
considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The
right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the
incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or
political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated
and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the
world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The
municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military
occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all
the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.”
 General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944, but this
cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
 If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been
continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become re-established and
conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of
the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then
pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental entity,
upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired.
. . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their
original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing
of the whole fiber and content.”

Rulings:

1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de
facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also
legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, remained good and valid after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur.
2. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also
to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact
that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial
proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military
occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power
of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
1.3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as
soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice
into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is
enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War
states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and
to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened
practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a
theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for
all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such
14
 arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws
and institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that
the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent
occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character.

C. Constituents and ministrants functions of Government

FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT
There are two functions of government: constituent and ministrant.

Constituent functions are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in
nature. Examples are keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property; the
fixing of the legal relations between man and wife, and between parents and child; the regulation of
property and the determination of contract rights; the definition and punishment of crime, the
administration of justice, the determination of political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens,
dealings of the state with foreign powers, the preservation of the state from external danger and the
advancement of international interest.

Constituent functions – the usual function of the government

(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery.

(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.

(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its
liabilities for debt or for crime.

4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.

(5) The definition and punishment of crime.

(6) The administration of justice in civil causes.

(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.

(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or
encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.
Ministrant functions are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of
society and are merely optional. Examples are public works, public education, public charity, health
and safety regulations and regulations of trade and industry.
Or

Ministrant functions - other functions which are undertaken, not by way of governing, but by way of advancing
the general interests of society, - functions which are optional, being necessary only according to standards of
convenience or expediency, and not according to standards of existence

(1) The regulation of trade and industry. Under this head I would
include the coinage of money and the establishment of standard weights and
measures, laws against forestalling and engrossing, the licensing of trades,
etc., as well as the great matters of tariffs, navigation laws, and the like.

(2) The regulation of labor.

(3) The maintenance of thoroughfares, - including state management of

railways and that great group of undertakings which we embrace within the
comprehensive term 'Internal Improvements.'

(4) The maintenance of postal and telegraph systems.

15
(5) The manufacture and distribution of gas, the maintenance of water-
works, etc.

(6) Sanitation, including the regulation of trades for sanitary purposes.

(7) Education.

(8) Care of the poor and incapable.

(9) Care and cultivation of forests and like matters, such as the
stocking of rivers with fish.

a. PVTA v. CIR G.R. No. L-32052 65 SCRA 416 July 25, 1975

Petitioner: Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration

Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in excess of their 8
regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No.
444.
Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more than eight (8) hours
daily.
Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction.

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions
and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444 which was denied and dismissed by RTC and CA. Motion for
Reconsideration were also DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt from CA
No. 444.

HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its people and promote
their general welfare. This case explains and portrays the expanded role of government necessitated by the
increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.

The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions, which the Chief Justice
points out, is already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He says that "The growing
complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government
obsolete." The distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is now considered obsolete.

The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration be DENIED.

b. Fontanilla Vs Maliaman
FACTS: A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven officially by its regular driver,
Hugo Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, which resulted in the latter's death. The parents
of Francisco filed a suit for damages against Garcia and the NIA, as Garcia's employer. After trial, the court
awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages to Spouses Fontanilla. NIA appealed. The Solicitor General
contends that the NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the
government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver
Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.

ISSUE:
May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who
was not its special agent?

16
HELD:
Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not
a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be
held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. (Fontanilla vs.
Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045, February 27, 1991)

RATIO:
■ Section 1 of RA No. 3601 tells us that NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality
separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 2, subsection f of
PD 552 provides that NIA also has its own assets and liabilities and has corporate powers to be exercised by a
Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection b of PD 552 provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court.
■ Of equal importance is the case of National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) vs. NWSA
Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA 766, which propounds the thesis that "the NAWASA is not an agency performing
governmental functions; rather it performs proprietary functions . . . ." The functions of providing water supply
and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of government even though the service rendered
caters to the community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society.
Like the NAWASA, the National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government.
While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public
interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function"
corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all
national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly,
the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these
functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.

NOTES:
■ The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as
an ordinary employer. Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045, December 1, 1989)

c. ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, G.R.

No. 110526February 10, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA'S administrative order,
the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, writ of preliminary injunction, while the case was
pending in the regional trial court, the governing board of the PCA issued a resolution for the withdrawal of the
Philippine coconut authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues
the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their
volumes of production and administration of quality standards. The PCA issue "certificates of registration" to
those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the office of
the president of the Philippines for not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent
petitioner received no reply from the office of the president. The "certificates of registration" issued in the
meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate.

ISSUES:
AT issue in This case is the validity of a resolution, of The Philippine coconut authority in which it
declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license
or permit as a condition for engaging in such business.

HELD:
The petition is GRANTED PCA Resolution and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby
declared null and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of The Philippine coconut authority to
adopt or issue. The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then president Aquino for authority to adopt the
resolution in question. The president Aquino approved the establishment and operation of new DCN plants
subject To The guidelines To be drawn by The PCA in The first place, it could not have intended To amend The
several laws already mentioned, which setup the regulatory system, by a mere memoranda To The PCA. In The

17
second place, even if that had been her intention, her act would be without effect considering that, when she
issued the memorandum in question on February 11, 1988; she was no longer vested with legislative authority.

D. DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE

Meaning and Definition
‘Parens patriae’ is a Latin term meaning ‘parent of his or her country’.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘parens patriae’ as:

1. The State regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for
themselves.
2. A Doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, especially on behalf
of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit. The State ordinarily has no standing to sue on
behalf of its citizens, unless a separate, sovereign interest will be served by the suit.
It is stated that parens patriae is the inherent power and authority of a State to provide protection to the person and
property of persons non Sui juris, such as minor, insane, and incompetent persons. Today, this term is used to
designate the State referring to its sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability.

In Heller vs. DOE, Justice Kennedy observed:

“The State has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable
to care for themselves.”

Also, in the case of State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, it has been categorically held that the Court is also ‘State’
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Thus, Court can also act as Parens Patriae so as to
meet the ends of justice.

Relying on the above-mentioned reasoning, the Supreme Court has stated that “in the case of an incompetent
person who is unable to take a decision whether to withdraw life support or not, it is the Court alone, as parens
patriae, which ultimately must take this decision, though, no doubt, the views of the near relatives, next friend and
doctors must be given due weight” .

The doctrine of ‘Parens Patriae’ has been evolved in common law and is applied in situations where the State must
make decisions in order to protect the interests of those persons who are unable to take care of themselves[5].

The Two Tests

There are two tests in relation to this doctrine. These tests help the court to ascertain the course of action that it can
adopt depending upon the situation. It is important to remember that these tests are merely guiding principles so as
to help the court to reach a logical conclusion.

1. ‘Best Interests’ Test – The ‘Best interests’ test requires the Court to ascertain the course of action which would
serve the best interests of the person in question. It is important to note that the Court's decision should be guided
by the interests of the victim alone and not those of other stakeholders such as guardians or society in general.

2. ‘Substituted Judgment’ Test – The application of the ‘Substituted Judgment ‘test requires the court to step
into the shoes of a person who is considered to be mentally incapable and attempt to make the decision which the
said person would have made, if he/she was competent to do so. This is a more complex inquiry but this test can
only be applied to make decisions on behalf of persons who are conclusively shown to be mentally incompetent.

a. Cabanas v. Pilapil 58 SCRA 94 G.R L-2584358

FACTS:

Florentino Pilapil, the insured, had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, Melchora Cabanas. The
complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant Francisco Pilapil, the brother of the deceased is the one
designated by the latter to act as his daughter’s trustee during her minority. Thus, upon Florentino’s death, the
proceeds were paid to his brother hence the complaint of the mother whom the child lives with. Petitioner
contends that she should be entitled to act as the trustee of the insurance policy of her child.

ISSUE:
Does the State have the authority to interfere with the terms of the insurance policy by virtue of parens patriae?

18
HELD:
The appealed decision adheres to the concept that the judiciary, as an agent of the State, acts as parens patriae.
As such, the judiciary cannot remain insensible to the validity of the petitioner’s plea. “The State shall strengthen
the family as a basic social institution”. The Constitution, moreover, dictates that it is the family as a unit that
has to be strengthened. As such, the decision of the lower courts, entitling the mother as the trustee, is
affirmed.

b. People v. Casipit May 31, 1994, G.R. No. 88229

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FOUND GUILTY OF RAPE and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the offended party
P30,000.00 for moral damages, 1 the accused GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM appeals to us insisting on his
innocence.

The victim, Myra Reynaldo, was then 14 years old and a sixth grader, while appellant was 22. They were
neighbors in Victoria, Alaminos, Pangasinan.

On 19 September 1986, before going to Manila for a medical checkup, the father of Myra entrusted her to the
parents of Guillermo. On the same day, Guillermo invited Myra to go to the town proper of Alaminos to buy
rice and bananas. When they reached the poblacion, he told her that they should buy in Dagupan instead
because the prices were cheaper. She agreed. Upon arriving in the poblacion, Guillermo invited Myra to watch a
Movie. They watched the movie until six o'clock in the evening, after which, they took a ride for Alaminos
arriving there at eight o'clock. They took their dinner in Alaminos before proceeding home to Barangay Victoria.
On their way home it rained hard that they had to take shelter in a hut in the open field of Barangay Talbang.
Inside the hut, Myra sat on the floor while Guillermo laid down. After a few minutes, he told her to lie down
with him and rest. Then he went near her. He removed her panties, poked a knife at her neck and warned her
not to shout. She resisted appellant, kicked him twice, but was helpless to subdue him as he tied her hands
behind her nape. Moreover, he opened her legs, went on top of her, and the inevitable had to come. He
mounted an assault on her chastity until he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She could not stop
him as he was big and strong. After the sexual encounter, she felt pain and could not
sleep.

After waking up the following morning, they proceeded home. On their way, he told her to proceed ahead.
When she reached home, she was observed to be walking abnormally (bull-legged) by Rogelio Casipit, her
cousin-in-law. When her aunt, Nenita Rabadon, learned about it, she called for her and asked her what
happened. She then narrated everything to her. Her aunt took her to the house of their barangay captain, Bruno
Carambas, and reported the incident to him. The barangay official then called for Guillermo but he denied
having raped Myra.

While inside the house of the barangay captain, the victim was examined by her sister-in-law Susan Cabigas and
Elsa Carambas, wife of the barangay captain, who both found the victim's private part reddish and her panties
stained with blood.

The following afternoon, Myra, accompanied by an uncle, went to the police station of Alaminos to report the
rape and then to the Western Pangasinan General Hospital where she was examined by Dr. Fideliz Ochave. The
medical findings of Dr. Ochave showed no external sign of physical injuries but noted the presence of first
degree fresh healing laceration at the perineum and of the hymen at six o'clock position. The laboratory result
was negative for spermatozoa. On 26 September 1986, Myra gave her statement to the police and later filed a
criminal complaint against Guillermo.

The version of Guillermo, on the other hand, is that long before the incident, he and Myra were sweethearts.
On 19 September 1986, they agreed to watch the movie "Cabarlo" so they went to Dagupan City. They entered
the moviehouse at noon and left at six o'clock in the evening. While watching the show, he placed his arm on
the shoulder of Myra and she did not object. He kissed her several times; she kissed him as many times. They
talked about their love for each other. After the movie, they went home. However, when they reached
19
Alaminos, it rained hard so they sought shelter in a hut. They removed their wet clothes. He embraced her and
she liked it. Then he lowered her panties and she did not resist. He laid her down on the floor and she
consented. He joined her on the floor. He placed himself on top of her and sexual intercourse followed as a
matter of course. They stayed inside the hut the whole night. They went home together the following morning.
After the love tryst, he went to look for a job in San Juan, Metro Manila. He was arrested in July 1987. He
contended that the victim was probably induced by her aunt Nenita Rabadon to file the case.

After the trial, the court a quo sustained the prosecution and found appellant guilty of raping Myra by means of
force and intimidation.

Appellant now assails the trial court for giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses while
disregarding his and worse, for finding him guilty instead. He maintains that the victim's story contained many
flaws: firstly, even as she had testified that she struggled with him and kicked him twice, the doctor who
examined her found no external physical injuries on her body; secondly, the fact that the victim agreed to have
a movie date with him shows that she liked him and was attracted to him; and, thirdly, the victim did not leave
the hut but slept with him until morning, which is an unnatural behavior of one who had been raped.

We cannot sustain the accused; hence, we affirm his conviction. We cannot argue against the trial court for
giving full faith and credit to the testimony of Myra that appellant poked a knife at her neck and sexually
abused her despite her resistance as he was stronger and bigger than she who was only 14 years old. Considering
the physical condition of the victim and the place where the crime was perpetrated, which was in an isolated
hut in an open field, it was not difficult for the accused to subdue the victim and coerce her into submission.

These factual findings of the trial court appear to be borne by the records, and we cannot have any justification
to hold otherwise. When the question of credence arises between the conflicting versions of the prosecution and
the defense on the commission of rape, the answer of the trial court is generally viewed as correct, hence
entitled to the highest respect, because it is more competent to so conclude having closely observed the
witnesses when they testified, their deportment, and the peculiar manner in which they gave their testimonies
and other evidence in court.

The argument that the absence of external injuries on the body of the victim belies her claim that she struggled
with appellant to prevent him from raping her is devoid of merit. The absence of external signs or physical
injuries does not negate the commission of rape. Proof of injuries is not necessary because this is not an essential
element of the crime. This does not mean however that no force or intimidation was used on the victim to
consummate the act. The force or intimidation required in rape is relative. It is viewed in the light of the victim's
perception and not by any hard and fast rule. It need not be overpowering or irresistible but necessary only to
achieve its purpose. Aside from applying force, the appellant used intimidation by threatening the victim with a
knife.

The fact that Myra went with appellant to a movie is no indication that she already agreed to have sex with
him. Her actuation is understandable as she is a close relative of appellant, according to his grandfather. 9 Hence,
it is not improbable that the victim placed her trust on appellant by letting him accompany her to the movie. It
should be emphasized that she was then only fourteen years old, an innocent barrio lass. Records are bereft of
evidence that she was a woman of ill-repute or of a flirtatious nature to incite or provoke appellant to have sex
with her.

The principal defense of appellant that he and Myra were sweethearts cannot be given weight. For, if that was
true, she would not have immediately disclosed to her family and to the authorities the sexual assault done to
her. 10 After all, nobody else but the two of them knew what happened between them in the loneliness of an
isolated hut in an open field. The fact that Myra lost no time in immediately reporting the violation of her
honor and submitting herself to medical examination bolsters her credibility and reflects the truthfulness and
spontaneity of her account of the incident. If she had voluntarily consented to the sexual act with appellant, her
most natural reaction would have been to conceal it or keep silent as this would bring disgrace to her honor and
reputation as well as to her family. Her unwavering and firm denunciation of appellant negates consent.

Worth noting is the marked receptively of our courts to lend credence to the testimonies of victims who are of
tender years regarding their versions of what transpired since the State, as parens patriae, is under obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are not yet able to fully protect themselves.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding accused-appellant GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM guilty of rape
and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the indemnity in favor of
MYRA REYNALDO is increased to P50, 000.00.

20
Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

E. Act of State Doctrine

The act-of-state doctrine states that every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts will not sit in judgment of another government's acts done within its own territory.
The doctrine is not required by international law (neither customary international law nor treaty law), but it is a
principle recognized and adhered to by United States federal and state courts. In the United States, the rationales for
the doctrine include respect for other nations' sovereignty and protection of the U.S. Executive's prerogative in
foreign affairs, both of which may be frustrated by a decision issuing from U.S. courts.
The Act of State Doctrine enters consideration most often in cases where a foreign sovereign has expropriated the
property of a U.S. national located in that foreign territory (e.g. through nationalization). Rather than pursuing
recourse through the courts, United States nationals are to take their claims against foreign sovereign governments to
the Executive so that the government can either espouse the claims of all U.S. nationals as a group or seek recourse
through diplomatic channels. The United States employs the Act of State Doctrine more broadly and with more
frequency than other countries.
a. PCGG, et al. v. SB, et al. Aug. 14, 2007, G.R.124772

Definition of “Republican State”

It is one wherein all government authority emanates from the people and is exercised by representatives
chosen by the people.

Definition of Democratic State

This merely emphasizes that the Philippines has some aspects of direct democracy such as initiative and
referendum.

21
Classes
1.
Territorial
– a u t h o r i t y t o h a v e a l l p e r s o n s a n d t h i n g s w i t h i n i t s territorial limits be completely subject to its
control and protection.2.
Personal
– authority over its nationals, their persons, property, or acts, whether within or outside its territory.3.

4. DEFINITION OF SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty is one of the most essential and unique features of the state. It is the ultimate and supreme
law and policy making authority of the state. It is the soul of state. It is that element of the state, whit
distinguishes the state from all, other associations. The word 'Sovereignty' is derived from Latin word
"Superanaus" which means supreme. Sovereignty (of the state) means the supremacy of the will of the state
as expressed by its laws over all the individuals and associations within its boundaries and independence
against all foreign control and intervention. No people can form a state unless they sovereign. In other words
there can be no state without sovereignty.

There have been a number of definitions of the term Sovereignty.

1. Aristotle says it is the supreme power in the state. According to Jean Bodin it is the supreme power
over citizens and subjects unrestrained by law.
2. Hugo Grotus, the Father of the International law, says it is the supreme political power vested in him
whose acts are not subjects to any other, whose will cannot be over-ridden.
3. In short, we can say that sovereignty is the supreme, unlimited and absolute power of the state.

Other definition of “Sovereignty”

1. LEGAL sovereignty
a. The supreme power to make law.
b. It is lodged in the people.

2. POLITICAL sovereignty
a. The sum total of all the influences in a state,
b. Legal and non-legal,
c. Which determine the course of law.

According to the Principle of AUTO-LIMITATION:

Sovereignty is the property of the state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-
determination and self-restriction.

a. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty is permanent, exclusive, comprehensive, inalienable, absolute and unified.

1. Permanence - So long as the state itself exists, sovereignty continues without interruption.

2. Exclusive - There can be but one supreme power in the state. Within the state, there is no other
power that possesses equal or superior authority to it.

22
 3. Comprehensiveness - Sovereign power extends over all persons, associations, and things within
such territorial limits except those over which the state has voluntarily consented to waive the exercise
of its jurisdiction.

4. Inalienability - An attribute of the state by virtue of which it cedes away any of its essential elements
without self-destruction.

5. Absolutism - Sovereignty is a primary power. It does not derive its power from anything; there is no
other body that determines the nature and the extent of the power as a matter of legal right.

6. Unity - Sovereignty cannot be divided without producing several wills of the people, which is
inconsistent with the notion of sovereignty.

b. KINDS OF SOVEREIGNTY

1. Legal sovereignty - is the authority which has the power to issue final commands. This is the supreme
law making power.

2. Political sovereignty - is the power behind the legal sovereign, or the sum of the influences that
operate upon it. This is legally unknown, unorganized and incapable of expressing the will of the state
in the form of legal command. But it is this will that must ultimately prevail in the State. In a narrower
sense, the electorate constitutes the political sovereign, and in a broader sense, the whole mass of
population.

3. Internal sovereignty - refers to the power of the State to control its domestic affairs. It empowers the
State to make and alter its system of government, and to regulate its private affairs, as well as the
rights and relations of its citizens, without any dictation, interference, or control on the part of any
person or body or State outside the particular political community.

4. External sovereignty - is the power of the State to direct its relations with other States. With this, the
State is not subject to the control, dictation, or government of any other power. It implies the right and
power to receive recognition as an independent power from other powers, and to make treaties with
them on equal terms, make war or peace with them, send diplomatic agents to them, acquire territory
by conquest or occupation, and otherwise to manifest the freedom and autonomy. (Suarez, 2005) This
is also known as independence.

c. DUAL ASPECT OF SOVEREIGNTY

1. Internal sovereignty
- is the supremacy of a person or body of persons in a State over the individuals or association
of individuals within the area of its jurisdiction. It also means supreme authority within one's territory.
- is the right of a nation to be free of internal forces of disruption to its rights & freedoms to
exercise the internal governance of its society & territories.
- can be further subdivided to include the rights & freedoms of subsets of the sovereign nation
to exercise their constitutional or otherwise defined rights of governance within their regional
boundaries. These subsets typically comprise provinces, states, territorial regions & municipalities.

2. External sovereignty
- is the absolute independence of one State as a whole with reference to other States.
- it relates to the recognition on the part of all states that each possesses this power in equal
measure.
- Is the right of a nation to be free from external forces of interference that would challenge,
disrupt, or remove the rights & freedoms of that nation to exist & to govern its own territory & society.

d. POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY

Political sovereignty - refers to the highest level of absolute power through which independent states
are controlled by a designated political authority. Is sometimes called supreme will, and includes control of a
specific state granted through a constitution or other enabling law, and carried out through an established
23
government. Rests in that class of people under whose influence the mass of the people is or the people are. It
also rests in the electorate, in the public opinion and in all other influences in the state which mould and shape
the public opinion.

The political sovereign means the sum-total of influences in a State which lie behind the law. In modern
representative government we might define it roughly as the power of the people. In other words by political
sovereign in the representative democracies, we mean the whole mass of the people or the electorate or the
public opinion. But at the same time, it cannot be emphatically asserted that political sovereignty can definitely
be identified with the whole mass of the people, the electorate or the public opinion. Political sovereignty is a
vague and indeterminate term.

e. EFFECTS OF CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY

1. People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero,
discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil
companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the
newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against
the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code – provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied
in the case at bar?

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was
enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in
the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with
the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means
that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article
256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus,
the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the
previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is
considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was
acquitted.

2. Ruffy v. Chief Of Staff 75 Phil 875

FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941.
When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on February 27, 1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to the mountains
and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a
petition for prohibition praying that respondents be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of
the petitioners on the ground that petitioners were not subject to military law at the time of offense.
ISSUE:

1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?
HELD:

Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War (2d). The Bolo Area was
a contingent of the 6th military district which had been recognized by the United States army. The
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War on the ground that it violates Article VIII
Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution which provides that “National Assembly may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death
or life imprisonment”. The petitioners are in error for courts martial are agencies of executive character
and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits and is dismissed with costs.
Ruffy vs Chief of Staff
G.R. No. L-533 75 Phil 875 August 20, 1956
Petitioners: Ramon Ruffy, et al. Respondents: The Chief of Staff, et al.

FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated
camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his
24
band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio
relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested
upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his
fellow petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was
committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.

HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed
Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an
occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of
War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which make
them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the petition is
hereby DENIED.

c. Laurel v. Misa 77 Phil 856

FACTS:

Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds
that the sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then
suspended, and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of
the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE:

1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?

2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD:

The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government on sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier. There is no such
thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same
government and same sovereign people.

f. DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM

Distinction between Imperium and Dominium.

1. Imperium
Government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced in sovereignty.
2. Dominium
1. The capacity of the State to own and acquire property.
2. It refers to lands held by the government in a proprietary character: can provide for the exploitation and
use of lands and other natural resources.
Scope:
The following are owned by the State:
Lands of the public domain like:
Waters, Minerals, coals, petroleum, and other mineral oils; All sources of potential energy; Fisheries; Forests
or timber; Wildlife; Flora and fauna; and other natural resources.

Alienation of Natural Resources

1. General Rule: All natural resources CANNOT be alienated
2. Exception: Agricultural lands

Exploration, Development and Utilization of Natural Resources

1. Shall be under the full control and supervision of the State
2. Means
A. The state may DIRECTLY UNDERTAKE such activities

25
 B. The state may enter into CO-PRODUCTION, JOINT VENTURE OR PRODUCTION-SHARING
arrangements with
1. Filipino citizen or
2. Corporation or association at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such citizens

3. Limitations:
A. Period: It should not exceed 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years
B. Under terms and conditions as may be provided by law.

4. In case of water rights/water supply/fisheries/industrial uses other than the development of water power
The beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

Small-scale Utilization of Natural Resources

1. Congress may, by law, authorize small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens

2. Congress may also authorize cooperative fish farming with priority given to subsistence fishermen and fish
workers in the rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.

Large-Scale Exploration, Development and Utilization of Minerals/Petroleum/Other Mineral Oils

1. The President may enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations involving technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration etc. of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. These agreements
should be in accordance with the general terms and conditions provided by law.

2. They should be based on the real contributions to economic growth and general welfare of the country.

3. In the agreements, the State should promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.

4. The President should notify Congress of every contract under this provision within 30 days from its
execution.

5. Management and service contracts are not allowed under this rule.

Protection of Marine Wealth

1. The State shall protect its marine wealth in its archipelagic waters
Territorial sea & EEZ

2. The State shall reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

________________________________________________________________________________________

THE IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT, KNOWN ALSO AS THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY OR NON-SUABILITY OF THE STATE, IS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED IN ARTICLE XVI OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION

1. Section 3. State Immunity

Suability of State
1. The State cannot be sued without its consent.
2. When considered a suit against the State
a. The Republic is sued by name;
b. Suits against an un-incorporated government agency;
c. Suit is against a government official, but is such that ultimate liability shall devolve on the
government.

i. When a public officer acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority, he can be held personally
liable for damages.

ii. BUT: If he acted pursuant to his official duties, without malice, negligence, or bad faith, they are not
personally liable, and the suit is really one against the State.
3. This rule applies not only in favor of the Philippines but also in favor of foreign states.
4. The rule likewise prohibits a person from filing for inter pleader, with the State as one of the defendants
being compelled to interplead.

Consent to be sued
26
A. Express consent:
1. The law expressly grants the authority to sue the State or any of its agencies.
2. Examples:
a. A law creating a government body expressly providing that such body “may sue or be sued.”
b. Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, which creates liability against the State when it acts through a special
agent.

B. Implied consent:
1. The State enters into a private contract.
a. The contract must be entered into by the proper officer and within the scope of his authority.
b. UNLESS: The contract is merely incidental to the performance of a governmental function.
2. The State enters into an operation that is essentially a business operation.
a. UNLESS: The operation is incidental to the performance of a governmental function (e.g. arrastre
services)
b. Thus, when the State conducts business operations through a GOCC, the latter can generally be
sued, even if its charter contains no express “sue or be sued” clause.
3. Suit against an incorporated government agency.
a. This is because they generally conduct propriety business operations and have charters which grant
them a separate juridical personality.
4. The State files suit against a private party.
UNLESS: The suit is entered into only to resist a claim.

Garnishment of government funds:

1. GENERAL RULE: NO. Whether the money is deposited by way of general or special deposit, they remain
government funds and are not subject to garnishment.
2. EXCEPTION: A law or ordinance has been enacted appropriating a specific amount to pay a valid
government obligation, and then the money can be garnished.

Consent to be sued is not equivalent to consent to liability:

1. The Fact that the State consented to being sued does not mean that the State will ultimately be held liable.
2. Even if the case is decided against the State, an award cannot be satisfied by writs of execution or
garnishment against public funds. Reason: No money shall be paid out of the public treasury unless pursuant
to an appropriation made by law.

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability
of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, viz: Section 3. The State may not be
sued without its consent.

The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong.
Moreover, as the eminent Justice Holmes said in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank:

The territory [of Hawaii], of course, could waive its exemption (Smith v. Reeves, 178 US436, 44 L ed
1140, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919) and it took no objection to the proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done
so. xxx But in the case at bar it did object, and the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield.
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its
own permission, but the answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap.
26, 2. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but
on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends. “Car on peut bien recevoir loy d’autruy, mais il est impossible par
nature de se donner loy.” Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis,
chap. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b,
ed. 1539, fol. 61.

Practical considerations dictate the establishment of immunity from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and
the State is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service may be severely obstructed
and public safety endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to defend against. Several
justifications have been offered to support the adoption of the doctrine in the Philippines, but that offered
in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines is “the most acceptable explanation,”
according to Father Bernas, a recognized commentator on Constitutional Law, to wit:

[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience
that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of
its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of
judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known propensity on the part of our people to go to

27
court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence
of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.

An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity
from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages
against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the
need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one
performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its
function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose
function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.
Should the doctrine of sovereignty immunity or non-suability of the State be extended to the ATO?

In its challenged decision, the CA answered in the negative, holding:

On the first assignment of error, appellants seek to impress upon Us that the subject contract of sale partook of
a governmental character. Apropos, the lower court erred in applying the High Court’s ruling in National
Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro (91 Phil. 203 [1952]), arguing that in Teodoro, the matter involved the
collection of landing and parking fees which is a proprietary function, while the case at bar involves the
maintenance and operation of aircraft and air navigational facilities and services which are governmental
functions.
We are not persuaded.

Contrary to appellants’ conclusions, it was not merely the collection of landing and parking fees which was
declared as proprietary in nature by the High Court in Teodoro, but management and maintenance of airport
operations as a whole, as well. Thus, in the much later case of Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of
Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]), the Supreme Court, reiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro,
declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions
pertaining to a private entity. It went on to explain in this wise:

The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body
corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the
promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from
being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by
private concerns. [National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, supra, p. 207.]

True, the law prevailing in 1952 when the Teodoro case was promulgated was Exec. Order 365 (Reorganizing
the Civil Aeronautics Administration and Abolishing the National Airports Corporation). Republic Act No. 776
(Civil Aeronautics Act of the Philippines), subsequently enacted on June 20, 1952, did not alter the character of
the CAA’s objectives under Exec. Order 365. The pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case, particularly
Secs. 3 and 4 of Exec. Order 365, which led the Court to consider the CAA in the category of a private entity
were retained substantially in Republic Act 776, Sec. 32(24) and (25). Said Act provides:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. – Subject to the general control and supervision of the
Department Head, the Administrator shall have among others, the following powers and duties:

(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport and all
government-owned aerodromes except those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
including such powers and duties as: (a) to plan, design, construct, equip, expand, improve, repair or alter
aerodromes or such structures, improvement or air navigation facilities; (b) to enter into, make and execute
contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity; …
(25) To determine, fix, impose, collect and receive landing fees, parking space fees, royalties on sales or
deliveries, direct or indirect, to any aircraft for its use of aviation gasoline, oil and lubricants, spare parts,
accessories and supplies, tools, other royalties, fees or rentals for the use of any of the property under its
management and control.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the CAA is tasked with private or non-governmental functions which
operate to remove it from the purview of the rule on State immunity from suit. For the correct rule as set forth
in the Teodoro case states:

Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is
determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized. The rule is thus stated in
Corpus Juris:
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or non-
governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes,
but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a
28
governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter is true, although the
state may own stock or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations through a
corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits
against the corporation. (59 C.J., 313) [National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp. 206-207; Italics
supplied.]

This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of Malong v. Philippine National Railways [G.R. No. L-
49930, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 63], where it was held that the Philippine National Railways, although
owned and operated by the government, was not immune from suit as it does not exercise sovereign but
purely proprietary and business functions. Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the
management of airport operations which primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the immunity
from suit accorded to government agencies performing strictly governmental functions.

In our view, the CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the
Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the
management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the
State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. We uphold the
CA’s afore quoted holding.
a. Basis

a. Republic v. Villamor G.R. L 30671, Nov. 28, 1973.

b. Department of Agriculture vs NLRC G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993

Doctrine of non-suability

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et

al., respondents.

Facts:
The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security
services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards
were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security
agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency
did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency.
Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of
execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the
Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More
importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the
State.

The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity
from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.

Issues:
Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.

Discussions:
Act No. 3083, afore cited, gives the consent of the State to be “sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied. However, the money claim should first be brought to the
Commission on Audit. Act 3083 stands as the general law waiving the State’s immunity from suit, subject to its
general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that ‘no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by
any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act
327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed.

29
Rulings:
No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at
times be sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the
Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.”
In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity
when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in
character. But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.

c.

Introduction to Philippine Constitution 1987

1. What is constitution? A constitution is a system for government, codified as a written document, which
contains fundamental laws and principles. It usually contains fundamental political principles, and
establishes the structure, procedures, powers and duties, of a government. The Constitution of the
Philippines is the supreme law of the Philippines. The Constitution currently in effect was enacted in
1987, during the administration of President Corazon C. Aquino, and is popularly known as the "1987
Constitution―. Philippine constitutional law experts recognize three other previous constitutions as
having effectively governed the country — the935 Commonwealth Constitution, the 1973 Constitution,
and the 1986 Freedom Constitution. Constitutions for the Philippines were also drafted and adopted
during the short-lived governments of Presidents Emilio Aguinaldo (1898) and José P. Laurel (1943).

2. Nature and purpose of Constitution1. It serves as the supreme or fundamental law2. It establishes basic
framework and underlying principles of government Constitutional Law Body of law derived from
countries written constitution. It lays down and guides the duties and powers of the government, and
the duties and rights of its citizens and residents.

3. Kind of Constitution
1. As to their origin and history
a. Conventional or enacted b. Cumulative or evolved
2. As to their form
a. written b. Unwritten
3. As to manner of amending them
a. Rigid or inelastic b. Flexible or elastic

4. Constitution distinguished from Statute

1. Constitution is a legislation direct from the people
2. Constitution merely states the general framework of the law
3. Constitution is intended not merely to meet existing conditions but to govern the future
4. Constitution is the supreme or fundamental law
Statute
1. Is a legislation from the people’s representatives.
2. It provides the details of the subject of which it treats
3. Is intended primarily to meet existing conditions only
4. Statute conforms to Constitution.

5. Parts of the 1987 Constitution. The Constitution is divided into 18 parts, excluding the Preamble, which
are called Articles. The Articles are as follows:
Article I - National Territory
Article II - Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Article III - Bill of Rights
Article IV – Citizenship
Article V – Suffrage
Article VI - Legislative Department
Article VII - Executive Department
Article VIII - Judicial Department
Article IX - Constitutional Commission
Article X - Local Government
Article XI - Accountability of Public Officers
Article XII - National Economy and Patrimony
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 Article XIII - Social Justice and Human Rights
Article XIV - Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Cultureand Sports
Article XV - The Family
Article XVI - General Provisions
Article XVII - Amendments or Revisions
Article XVIII - Transitory Provisions

5. Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble reads:

“We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the
common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom,
love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.”

6. Significant features of the 1987 Constitution. The Constitution establishes the Philippines as a" democratic
and republican State", where "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them". (Section 1, Article II) Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the powers of
the national government are exercised in main by three branches —the executive branch headed by the
President, the legislative branch composed of Congress and the judicial branch with the Supreme Court
occupying the highest tier of the judiciary. Section 1. Article 2. The Philippines is a democratic and
republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

7. Historical Constitution
• Malolos Constitution (1899)
• Commonwealth and Third Republic (1935)
• Japanese Sponsored Republic (1943)
• Martial Law Constitution (1973)
• Freedom Constitution (1986)

8. Malolos Constitution (1899) First republic

 Was the first republican constitution in Asia.
 It declared that sovereignty resides exclusively in the people.
 Stated basic civil rights.
 Separated the church and state.
 Called for the creation of an Assembly of Representatives to act as the legislative body.
 It also called for a Presidential form of government with the president elected for a term of four
years by a majority of the Assembly.
 It was titled "Constitución política", and was written in Spanish following the declaration of
independence from Spain, proclaimed on January 20, 1899, and was en acted and ratified by the
Malolos Congress, a Congress held in Malolos, Bulacan.

9. Commonwealth and Third Republic (1935) 1935 Constitution

 Was written in 1934, approved and adopted by the Commonwealth of the Philippines (1935–1946)
and later used by the Third Republic of the Philippines (1946–1972).
 It was written with an eye to meeting the approval of the United States Government as well, so as to
ensure that the U.S. would live up to its promise to grant the Philippines independence and not have
a premise to hold onto its possession on the grounds that it was too politically immature and hence
unready for full, real independence.

10. Japanese Sponsored Republic (1943) Second Philippine Republic.

 Composed of a preamble and twelve articles, creates a Republican state with a powerful executive
branch and subordinate legislative and judicial branches.
 The executive power is vested in the President, who is to be elected by the members of the National
Assembly from among themselves.
 The President is the head of government, and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.
 The powers of the President are: to veto any bill of the Assembly, to promulgate regulations when
the Assembly is not in session and in times of war or national emergency, to declare martial law, to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to appoint the members of the Council of
State and officials of the local government.
 A limited legislative power is exercised by the unicameral National Assembly whose members, like
the President, are not directly elected by the people.
 Rather, the Assembly is to be composed of representatives from each province elected in Kalibapi
conventions throughout the country with appointed governors and mayors as ex-officio members.
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  The judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court whose justices, together with judges of lower
courts, are to be appointed by the President.

11. Martial Law Constitution (1973) 1973 Constitution of the Philippines.

 Promulgated after Marcos declaration of martial law, was supposed to introduce a parliamentary-
style government.
 Legislative power was vested in a National Assembly whose members were elected for six-year
terms.
 The President was ideally supposed to be elected as the symbolic and purely ceremonial head of
state from the Members of the National Assembly for a six-year term and could be re-elected to an
unlimited number of terms.

12. Freedom Constitution (1987) 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

 Following the EDSA People Power Revolution that removed President Ferdinand E. Marcos from
office, the new President, Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 as a provisional
constitution.
 It adopted certain provisions from the 1973 constitution and granted the President broad powers to
re organize the government and remove officials from office, and mandated that the president
would appoint a commission to draft a new constitution

13. Basic Principles Underlying the New Constitution

1. Recognition of the Aid of Almighty God
2. Sovereignty of the People
3. Renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy
4. Supremacy of civilian authority over the military
5. Separation of Church and State
6. Recognition of the importance of the family as basic social institution and of the vital role of youth in
nation building
7. Guarantee of human rights
8. Government through suffrage
9. Separation of Power
10. Independence of Judiciary
11. Guarantee of local autonomy
12. High sense of public service morality and accountability
13. Nationalization of natural resources and certain private enterprises affected by public Interest
14. Non – suability of the state
15. Rule of the majority; and
16. Government of laws and not men.

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