CASE LAW ANALYSIS: Planned Parenthood of

Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791

(1992)

Submitted By:
Mohammad Faaiz Irfan
PRN : 16010324236

BBA.LLB, Division – C
Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad
Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune

TUTORIAL II
In the month of
September 2018
Interpretation of Statutes

Under the guidance of

Mr. Pankaj Umbarkar
INTRODUCTION
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), was a landmark United States
Supreme Court case during which the constitutionality of many Pennsylvania state
statutory provisions relating to abortion was challenged. The Court's plurality opinion
reaffirmed the central holding of Roe v. Wade stating that "matters, involving the
foremost intimate and private decisions an individual might create in an exceedingly
period, decisions central to non-public dignity and autonomy, are central to the
freedom protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."

The Court's plurality opinion upheld the constitutional right an Associate in Nursing
abortion whereas altering the quality for analyzing restrictions on it right, crafting the
"undue burden" on that for abortion restrictions. Planned Parenthood v. Casey differs
from Roe, however, as a result of under Roe the state couldn't regulate abortions in
the first trimester whereas under Planned Parenthood v. Casey the state will regulate
abortions within the first trimester, or any point before foetus viability and beyond as
long as that regulation doesn't pose an undue burden on an abortion. Applying this
new commonplace of review, the Court upheld four laws and nullified the need of
spousal notification.

A person retains the right to own an abortion, established by Roe v. Wade, however,
the state’s compelling interest in protective the lifetime of an unborn kid means it will
ban an abortion of a viable foetus below any circumstances except when the health of
the mother is in danger. Also, laws proscribing abortion ought to be evaluated under
an undue burden commonplace instead of a strict scrutiny analysis.

At issue are 5 provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982: Section
3205, which needs that a woman seeking an abortion offer her consent before the
procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain info at least twenty four
hours before the abortion is performed; Section 3206, which mandates the consent of
1 parent for a minor to get an abortion, however, provides a judicial bypass
procedure; Section 3209, that commands that, unless sure exceptions apply, a wife
seeking an abortion should sign a statement indicating that she has notified her
husband; Section 3203, that defines a "medical emergency" that may excuse
compliance with the preceding requirements; and Section 3207(b), 3214(a), and
3214(f), that impose certain reporting necessities on facilities providing abortion
services. Before any of the provisions took the result, the petitioners, 5 abortion
clinics and a doctor representing himself and a category of doctors who give abortion
services, brought this suit seeking a declarative judgment that each of the provisions
was unconstitutional on its face, similarly as injunctive relief.

The District Court command all the provisions unconstitutional, and permanently
enjoined their enforcement. The Court of Appeals affirmed partly and reversed in
part, striking down the husband notification provision but upholding the others.

FACTS

In 1988 and 1989, a Pennsylvania abortion statute was amended to provide that

(1) a woman seeking an abortion is required to give her informed consent prior to the
abortion procedure and to be provided, at least 24 hours before the abortion is
performed, with certain information concerning her decision whether to undergo an
abortion,

(2) a minor seeking an abortion is required to obtain the informed consent of one of
her parents or guardians, but has available a judicial bypass option if the minor does
not wish to or cannot obtain such consent,

(3) unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion is required
to sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her intended
abortion,

(4) compliance with the foregoing requirements is exempted in the event of a

"medical emergency," which term is defined in another statutory provision as a
pregnant woman's medical condition that on the basis of a physician's good-faith
clinical judgment, necessitates an immediate abortion to avert the woman's death or to
avert a serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily
function, and
(5) facilities providing abortion services are subject to certain reporting and record-
keeping requirements, which do not include the disclosure of the identities of women
who have undergone abortions, but which include a requirement of reporting of a
married woman's failure to provide notice to her husband of her intended abortion.

Before any of these provisions took effect, five abortion clinics and one physician
representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provided abortion services
brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of the allegation
that each provision was unconstitutional on its face.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, after
entering a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the provisions, held that all
the provisions were unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against the
state's enforcement of the provisions (744 F Supp 1323).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed
in part, upholding all the provisions except for the spousal-notice requirement (947
F2d 682).

ISSUES

1. Can a State require that a woman give informed consent and receive information
24-hours before getting an abortion?
2. Can a State require that a minor obtain parental consent before getting an
abortion?
3. Can a State require a married woman to notify her husband before getting an
abortion?
4. Can a State allow for abortions in “medical emergencies?”
5. Can a State impose reporting requirements on abortion facilities?

ANALYSIS
The plurality rejected the decision to overturn Roe v. Wade that the state had
advanced on appeal, though it reshaped a number of Roe's guidelines. It stressed the
importance of adhering to precedents unless a dramatic amendment within the space
of the previous decision had happened, and it reaffirmed the existence of a
constitutional right to abortion.
In this case, O'Connor didn't feel that society had developed a concurrence against
abortion just like the concurrence against separate-but-equal education that resulted in
Brown v. Board of Education overruling Plessy v. Ferguson. Blackmun and Stevens
agreed with this section of the opinion, giving it the mandatory 5 votes for Roe to
survive.

Replacing the trimester formula in Roe with a stress on viability, the plurality found
that a foetus might become viable before when Roe was decided, and it held that a
state might ban abortion once a foetus becomes viable unless the health of the mother
was in danger. Its alternative notable revision of Roe was its replacement of strict
scrutiny with an undue burden standard that was more lenient to the state.
O'Connor built on her judgement from the Court's 1983 decision in Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health in holding those restrictions on abortion before the
foetus was viable were constitutional unless they expose a considerable obstacle to
the woman seeking an abortion.

As a result, the plurality nullified the husband notice requirement for reasons just like
those stated by the Third Circuit. It upheld the opposite provisions of the law.
Concurrence/Dissent partly
• John Paul Stevens (Author)
Stevens in agreement with the portion of the majority opinion that upheld Roe,
however, would have overruled all of the challenged provisions of the law.
Concurrence/Dissent partly
• Harry Andrew Blackmun (Author)
Blackmun, for the most part, agreed with Stevens in applying a heightened standard
of review and finding that each one of the provisions was unconstitutional under that.
Concurrence/Dissent partly
• William Hubbs Rehnquist (Author)
• Byron Raymond White
• Antonin Scalia
• Clarence Thomas
Rehnquist would have upheld all of the provisions, as well as the husband notice
requirement, and conjointly overruled Roe. He recognized the inconsistencies within
the majority's expressed respect for precedent and its substantial reshaping of the Roe
framework.
Concurrence/Dissent partly
• Antonin Scalia (Author)
• William Hubbs Rehnquist
• Byron Raymond White
• Clarence Thomas
Scalia in agreement with Rehnquist that the Court ought to have used this chance to
override Roe entirely. He also would have upheld the constitutionality of all the
provisions.

This case was a descendant of the Roe v. Wade line of decisions, however, it replaced
the trimester framework with attention on viability in determining when the state's
interests might outweigh the interests of a pregnant lady. The addition of the undue
burden standard inclined the balance in the state's favour once making these
determinations, however. Since the Court was thus deeply divided, the door remained
receptive to future challenges to Roe.

The case was a seminal one in the history of abortion decisions in the united states. it
absolutely was the first case that provided a chance to overturn Roe since the 2 liberal
Justices, William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, were replaced with the Bush-
appointed Justices, David Souter and Clarence Thomas. each was viewed as
ostensible conservatives compared with their predecessors. This left the Court with
eight Republican-appointed justices—six of whom had been appointed by Presidents
President Reagan or Bush, both of whom were well known for their opposition to
Roe. Finally, the sole remaining Democratic appointee—Justice Byron White—had
been one of the 2 dissenters from the initial Roe decision.
At this time, only 2 of the Justices were obvious supporters of Roe v. Wade:
Blackmun, the author of Roe, and Stevens, who had joined opinions specifically
reaffirming Roe in the city of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.

The case was argued by ACLU attorney Kathryn Kolbert for Planned Parenthood,
with Linda J. Wharton serving as Co-Lead Counsel. Pennsylvania attorney general
Ernie Preate argued the case for the State. Upon reaching the Supreme Court, u. s.
joined the case as advisor and solicitor general Ken Starr of the Bush administration
defended the Act partly by urging the Court to overturn Roe as having been
incorrectly decided.

The District Court's ruling

The plaintiffs were 5 abortion clinics, a class of physicians who provided abortion
services, and one doctor representing himself independently. They filed suit eastern
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to enjoin the state from
imposing the 5 provisions and have them declared facially unconstitutional.
The District Court, after a three-day bench trial, command that all the provisions were
unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against Pennsylvania's social
control of them.

Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed partially and reversed partly,
upholding all of the laws apart from the husband notification requirement. The Third
Circuit ended that the husband notification was unduly burdensome as a result of it
potentially exposed married ladies to spousal abuse, violence, and economic duress at
the hands of their husbands. Then-Circuit decides Samuel Alito sat on that three-judge
appellate panel and dissented from the court's dissolution of that requirement.

The Supreme Court's consideration

At the conference of the Justices 2 days after oral argument, Justice Souter defied
expectations, joining Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Blackmun, who had likewise
refused to do so 3 years earlier in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. This
resulted in a precarious 5 Justice majority consisting of chief justice William
Rehnquist, Byron White, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas
that favoured upholding all 5 oppose abortion restrictions. However, Justice Kennedy
modified his mind shortly thereafter and joined with fellow Reagan-Bush justices
Sandra Day to write and David Souter to put in writing a plurality opinion that will
reaffirm Roe.

RULES APPLIED
• Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982
• Fourteenth Amendment.
• Rule of Law
• Stare decisis
• The undue burden standard

CONCLUSION
In this Pennsylvania case, US. Supreme Court protected the central right to an
abortion, whereas also recognizing the state's interest in the woman's health and in
foetal life. The Court rejected the trimester framework established in Roe v. Wade,
stating that it was too rigid and sometimes contradicted the state's exercise of its
powers.

The Court adopted an "undue burden" standard, which exists if the state's purpose or
result is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a lady seeking an abortion before
viability. The Court defined viability as when there's a sensible possibility of
maintaining and nourishing life outside the female internal reproductive organ. using
the "undue burden" standard, the Court upheld the informed consent, parental
consent, recordkeeping, and medical emergency provisions of a Pennsylvania statute,
whereas invalidating the statute's spousal notification requirement.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey has huge historical

significance as a result of it was, in essence, about whether Roe v. Wade ought to be
overturned. Ultimately, the Court didn't overturn Roe. whereas the case established
the “undue burden” standard over Roe trimester framework, it clearly stands for the
fact that the essential holding of Roe — that a lady has the right to choose an abortion
before foetal viability — remains intact.

With these new rules established, the Court examined the Pennsylvania law and
measured its constitutionality. The Court dominated that one of the more
controversial provisions of the law, the mandatory 24-hour waiting amount, wasn't an
undue burden and was therefore constitutional. This provision's purpose, to promote
well-considered abortions, was legitimate and solely incidentally and slightly limited
access to abortions.

Next, the Court ruled that the spousal consent provision did constitute an undue
burden because husbands might potentially resort to abuse and obstruction upon
learning of their spouses' abortion plans. The Court upheld the remaining portion of
the law, including a parental consent provision for minors.

Casey v. Planned Parenthood, though less known than Roe v. Wade, is truly a more
necessary case. In Casey, a more modern Supreme Court not only affirmed Roe's
abortion right but broadened the authority of the state to regulate it. And yet the
decision remains as controversial as Roe, not simply politically or morally, but
legally. The "undue burden" test is a lot of ambiguous and difficult to apply. With
Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito joining the Supreme Court in its 2005 term, it
may revisit the constitutional status of the abortion right that Casey, in part,
preserved.