Geometry - 1

Geometry and Spatial Reasoning

Douglas H. Clements

State University of New York at Buffalo

Michael T. Battista

Kent State University

Reference:
Clements, D. H., & Battista, M. T. (1992). Geometry and spatial 
reasoning. In D. A. Grouws (Ed.), Handbook of research on 
mathematics teaching and learning (pp. 420­464). New York: 
Macmillan.

Time to prepare this material was partially provided by the National Science

Foundation under Grant No. MDR-8651668. Any opinions, findings, and

conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of

the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science

Foundation.
 Geometry - 1

Geometry and Spatial Reasoning

Spatial understandings are necessary for interpreting, understanding, and appreciating

our inherently geometric world. {National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, 1989
#601, p. 48}

Geometry is grasping space...that space in which the child lives, breathes and moves.
The space that the child must learn to know, explore, conquer, in order to live, breathe
and move better in it. (Freudenthal in ***leave asterisks here for “clean-up” after
endnote (there’ll be an extra parenthesis)*** {National Council of Teachers of
Mathematics, 1989 #601, p. 48}

Arising out of practical activity and man's need to describe his surroundings, geometric
forms were slowly conceptualized until they took on an abstract meaning of their own.
Thus from a practical theory of earth measure, there developed a growing set of
relations or theorems that culminated in Euclid's Elements, the collection, synthesis,
and elaboration of all this knowledge. {Fehr, 1973 #51, p. 370}

Equations are just the boring part of mathematics. I attempt to see things in terms of
geometry. Hawking {National Research Council, 1989 #620, p. 35}

School geometry is the study of those spatial objects, relationships, and

transformations that have been formalized (or mathematized) and the

axiomatic mathematical systems that have been constructed to represent

them. Spatial reasoning, on the other hand, consists of the set of cognitive

processes by which mental representations for spatial objects, relationships,

and transformations are constructed and manipulated. Clearly, geometry

and spatial reasoning are strongly interrelated, and most mathematics

educators seem to include spatial reasoning as part of the geometry

curriculum. Usiskin {, 1987 #33}, for instance, has described four

dimensions of geometry: (a) visualization, drawing, and construction of

figures; (b) study of the spatial aspects of the physical world; (c) use as a

vehicle for representing nonvisual mathematical concepts and relationships;

and (d) representation as a formal mathematical system. The first three of

these dimensions require the use of spatial reasoning.

 Geometry - 2

When the term “school geometry” is used, it is almost universally used

to refer to Euclidean geometry, even though there are numerous approaches

to the study of the topic (e.g., synthetic, analytic, transformational, and

vector). The traditional, secondary school version of geometry is axiomatic

in nature; elementary school geometry traditionally has emphasized

measurement and informal development to those basic concepts needed in

high school. According to Suydam {, 1985 #28} there is a great deal of

agreement that the goals of geometry instruction should be to

• develop logical thinking abilities;

• develop spatial intuitions about the real world;

• impart the knowledge needed to study more mathematics; and

• teach the reading and interpretation of mathematical arguments (p. 481).

The National Council of Teachers of Mathematics {, 1989 #601}

Curriculum Standards call for all students to

• identify, describe, compare, model, draw, and classify geometric figures in

two and three dimensions;

• develop spatial sense;

• explore the effects of transforming, combining, subdividing, and changing

geometric figures;

• understand, apply, and deduce properties of, and relationships between,

geometric figures, including congruence and similarity;

• develop an appreciation of geometry as a means of describing and

modelling the physical world;

• explore synthetic, transformational, and coordinate approaches to

geometry, with college-intending students also required to

• develop an understanding of an axiomatic system through investigating

and comparing various geometric systems;

 Geometry - 3

• explore a vector approach to certain aspects of geometry.

The chapter contains seven major sections. First, students’

performance in geometry is briefly summarized as a background to the

entire research corpus. Second, research on three major theoretical

perspectives on the development of geometric thinking—Piaget, the van

Hieles, and cognitive science—is reviewed. Third, the establishment of truth

in geometry is discussed, highlighting both theoretical and empirical work.

Fourth, the relationship between spatial thinking and mathematics, the

nature of spatial reasoning and imagery, and attempts to teach spatial

abilities are considered. The fifth section, representations of geometric

ideas, includes issues related to concepts, diagrams, manipulatives, and

computers. Sixth, group and cross-cultural differences are examined.

Finally, broad conclusions are drawn.

Students' Performance in Geometry

According to extensive evaluations of mathematics learning, elementary

and middle school students in the United States are failing to learn basic

geometric concepts and geometric problem solving, and are woefully

underprepared for the study of more sophisticated geometric concepts and

proof, especially when compared to students from other nations {Carpenter,

1980 #36; Fey, 1984 #35; Kouba, 1988 #34; Stevenson, 1986 #38; Stigler,

1990 #568}. For instance, fifth graders from Japan and Taiwan scored more

than twice as high as U. S. students on a test of geometry {Stigler, 1990

#568}. Japanese students in both first and fifth grades also scored much

higher (and Taiwanese students only slightly higher) than U. S. students on

tests of visualization and paper folding. Stigler et al. {1990 #568}

postulate that the latter results may be due to the heavy reliance in

Japanese classrooms on visual representations for concepts and

 Geometry - 4

expectations that students become competent at drawing. Data from the

Second International Mathematics Study (SIMS) showed that, in geometry,

U. S. 8th and 12th graders scored at the 25th international percentile or

below {McKnight, 1985 #708; McKnight, 1985 #707}.

Usiskin {, 1987 #33}, citing data from the 1982 U. S. National

Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), reported that fewer than 10% of

13-year olds could find the measure of the third angle for a triangle given

the measure of the other two angles, and only 20% could find the length of
the hypotenuse of a right triangle given its legs. (He concluded that a

greater number of students could do the more difficult computation because

it is taught to more students.) On the 1986 NAEP, Kouba et al. {, 1988 #34}

reported students’ performance at identifying common geometric figures,

such as parallel lines and the diameter of a circle, acceptable, but students’

performance with figures not frequently encountered in everyday life, such

as perpendicular lines and the radius of a circle, deficient. Performance

dealing with properties of figures, visualization, and applications was poor.

For example, only 60% of 7th grade students could identify the image of an

object reflected through a line; only about 10% of 7th graders could find the

area of a square given the length of one of its sides (56% found the area of

a rectangle, given the length of its sides); and less than 10% of 7th graders

could identify which set of numbers could be the lengths of the sides of a

triangle (even though 66% could do it if segments were given). Apparently,

students can handle some problems much better if the problem is presented

visually rather than verbally {Carpenter, 1980 #36; Driscoll, 1983 #3;

Kouba, 1988 #34}.

The situation is even worse at the high school level. First, only about

half of all high school students enroll in a geometry course. Of those

 Geometry - 5

enrolled, at the beginning of the school year, only 63% were able to

correctly identify triangles that were presented along with distractors

{Usiskin, 1987 #33}. According to the 1978 NAEP in mathematics, only

64% of the 17-year olds knew that a rectangle is a parallelogram, only 16%

could find the area of a region made up of two rectangles, and just 9% could

solve “How many cubic feet of concrete would be needed to pave an area 30

feet long and 20 feet wide with a layer four inches thick?” Of 17-year olds

that had a full year of high school geometry, only 57% could calculate the
volume of a rectangular solid, 54% could find the hypotenuse of right

triangle whose legs were multiples of 3 and 4, and 34% could find the area

of a right triangle. Only 52% of entering secondary students could state the

area of a square when its sides were given {Usiskin, 1982 #42}. On the

1986 assessment, eleventh grade students who had not taken high school

geometry scored at about the same level as 7th graders {Lindquist, 1989

#706}. There were few performance differences in visualization between

students who had taken geometry and those who had not, although there

were large differences on items requiring knowledge of geometric properties

and on applications. Less than 25% of 11th grade students correctly

identified which figures had lines of symmetry, whether they had taken

geometry or not (even though symmetry is studied throughout elementary

and middle school). Even more incriminating of the curriculum, only about

30% of high school geometry students enrolled in a course for which proof

was a goal were able to write proofs or exhibit any understanding of the

meaning of proof {Senk, 1985 #27; Suydam, 1985 #28}. It is no wonder

that doing proofs was the least liked mathematics topic by 17-year olds on

the 1982 NAEP and that less than 50% of the students rated the topic as

important.
 Geometry - 6

This depressing picture of students’ knowledge of geometry is

elaborated through a consideration of students’ misconceptions. Here are

some examples {Clements, 1989 #543; Fuys, 1988 #546; Hoffer, 1983

#544} :

• an angle must have one horizontal ray

• a right angle is an angle that points to the right

• to be a side of a figure a segment must be vertical

• a segment is not a diagonal if it is vertical or horizontal

• a square is not a square if its base is not horizontal

• the only way a figure can be a triangle is if it is equilateral

• the height of a triangle or parallelogram is a side adjacent to the base

• the angle sum of a quadrilateral is the same as its area

• the Pythagorean theorem can be used to calculate the area of a rectangle

• if a shape has four sides, then it is a square

• the area of a quadrilateral can be obtained by transforming it into a

rectangle with the same perimeter

Apparently, much learning of geometric concepts has been by rote.

Properties, class inclusions, relationships, and implications are frequently not

perceived {Mayberry, 1983 #15}.

A primary cause of this poor performance may be the curriculum, both

in what topics are treated and how they are treated. The major focus of

standard elementary and middle school curricula is on recognizing and

naming geometric shapes, writing the proper symbolism for simple

geometric concepts, developing skill with measurement and construction

tools such as a compass and protractor, and using formulas in geometric

measurement {Porter, 1989 #586; Thomas, 1982 #480}. These curricula

consist of a hodgepodge of unrelated concepts with no systematic

 Geometry - 7

progression to higher levels of thought, levels requisite for sophisticated

concept development and substantive geometric problem solving. In

addition, teachers often do not teach even the impoverished geometry

curriculum that is available to them. Porter, for instance, reported whole

districts in which fourth- and fifth-grade teachers spent “virtually no time

teaching geometry” {Porter, 1989 #586, p. 11}. Even when taught,

geometry was the topic most frequently identified as being taught merely

for “exposure”; that is, given only brief, cursory coverage. The SIMS data
for the 8th grade level indicate that teachers rated the “opportunity to

learn” geometry much lower than any other topic {McKnight, 1985 #708. At

the secondary level, the traditional emphasis has been on formal proof,

despite the fact the students are unprepared to deal with it. Indeed, as

Usiskin {, 1987 #33} summarizes

There is no geometry curriculum at the elementary school level. As a result, students

enter high school not knowing enough geometry to succeed. There is a geometry
curriculum at the secondary level, but only about half of the students encounter it,
and only about a third of these students understand it (p. 29).

The Development of Geometric Thinking

Piaget and Inhelder: The Child’s Conception of Space

Two Major Themes

Two major themes of Piaget and Inhelder’s {, 1967 #43} influential

theory on children’s conception of space will be discussed. First, that

representations of space are constructed through the progressive

organization of the child’s motor and internalized actions, resulting in

operational systems. Therefore, the representation of space is not a

perceptual “reading off” of the spatial environment, but is the built up from

prior active manipulation of that environment. Second, the progressive

organization of geometric ideas follows a definite order and this order is

 Geometry - 8

more logical than historical in that initially topological relations (e.g.,

connectedness, enclosure, and continuity) are constructed, and later,

projective (rectilinearity) and Euclidean (angularity, parallelism, and

distance) relations. This has been termed the topological primacy thesis.

It is important to reiterate that Piaget and Inhelder were discussing the

child’s ability to represent space. They maintain that “perceptual space” is

constructed early in the sensori-motor period. Nevertheless, perceptual

space previews the development of representational (or “conceptual”) space

in that its development also embodies the topological primacy thesis, and it

too is constructed, not existent from the outset of development.

Representational space, in addition, reflects properties of logical operational

thought.

Topological Primacy and Constructivism

Haptic evidence. Piaget and Inhelder’s first experiments provide

evidence supporting both the themes of constructivism and topological

primacy. Children were asked to explore hidden objects tactilely (haptic

perception) and to either draw these objects or match them with duplicates.

Preschool children were reported initially to discriminate objects on the basis

of “topological” features, such as being closed or otherwise topologically

equivalent. Only later could they discriminate rectilinear from curvilinear

forms and, finally, among rectilinear closed shapes, such as squares and

diamonds.

Piaget and Inhelder claim that the development of more sophisticated

spatial concepts involves increasingly systematic and coordinated action.

During the first stages of development, children are basically passive in their

explorations. For example, children may touch one part of a shape, and this

action results in a tactile perception. Touching another part involves another

 Geometry - 9

action and perception, and so forth. When children regulate such actions by

establishing relations among them, an accurate representation of the shape

can be built; for example; the systematic return to each movement’s

starting point allows the parts of the figure to be synthesized. It is when

each mental action becomes reversible that it can be distinct yet

coordinated with every other action into a coherent whole.

From this perspective, then, abstraction of shape is not a perceptual

abstraction of a physical property, but is the result of a coordination of

children’s actions. Children “can only ‘abstract’ the idea of such a relation

as equality on the basis of an action of equalization, the idea of a straight

line from the action of following by hand or eye without changing direction,

and the idea of an angle from two intersecting movements” (p. 43).

Drawing evidence. Because making a drawing is an act of

representation, not a perception, Piaget and Inhelder claim that inaccurate

drawings reflect the inadequacy of mental tools for spatial representation.

(Indeed, the inability of young children to draw a copy of even simple

shapes is taken as an indication that coordination of actions, rather than

passive perception, lies at the foundation of the conceptual development of

space.) Again, they also claim that children’s drawn copies of geometric

shapes represent topological features first. For example, at Stage 0 (before

the age of 3) no purpose or aim can be discerned. Children simply scribble.

At substage IA (up to about age 3;11), a circle is drawn as an irregular

closed curve, and squares and triangles are not distinguished from circles.

While children do not distinguish between straight-sided and curved figures,

there is a correct rendering of topological properties (e.g., closed paths with

small closed paths inside, on, or outside of them). An obvious objection to

such arguments is that inaccuracies in drawing might be attributable to

 Geometry - 10

motor difficulties. However, Piaget and Inhelder do not accept such

arguments, providing examples such as the child who could draw a pine tree

with branches at right angles but not a square.

At stage II (about age 4), there is a progressive differentiation of

Euclidean shapes. The criterion for this stage is the successful reproduction

of the square or rectangle. Euclidean relationships, such as angle and

inclination, develop only slowly. Only at stage III (about 6-7 years) are all

problems overcome. For example, Piaget and Inhelder state that at least
two years work is required to pass from copying the square to copying the

rhombus, demonstrating that construction of a “Euclidean shape” requires

more than a correct visual impression. Such a task involves a complex

interplay of actions. To Piaget and Inhelder, then, topological relationships

develop first because they represent the simplest organization of those

actions from which shape is abstracted (e.g., the dissociated elements of

primitive motor rhythms in scribbling). Other relationships develop over

long periods of time.

Projective Space

To Piaget and Inhelder, the difference between topological and

projective or Euclidean relations concerns the way in which different figures

or objects are related to another. The former are internal to a particular

figure; the latter involve relations between figure and subject (projective) or

between figures themselves (Euclidean). Projective relations begin

psychologically at the point when the figure is no longer viewed in isolation,

but begins to be considered in relation to a ‘point of view.’ For example, the

concept of the straight line results from the child’s act of ‘taking aim’ or

‘sighting.’ Children perceive a straight line since the earliest years, of

course, but they cannot place objects along a straight path not parallel to
 Geometry - 11

the edges of a table. Instead, they tend to follow the edges of the table or

curve the line toward such a path. This is not a perceptual problem. They

realize that the line is not straight, but cannot construct an adequate

representation to make it so. They possess only an intuitive spatial

representation, an internalized imitation of previous perceptions that can be

altered by distracting perceptual configurations (e.g., edges of table).

Internal representation is based on operations and can therefore limit the

influence of perceptual configurations. Thus, at about 7 years of age

straight paths are constructed by children spontaneously ‘aiming’ or sighting

along a trajectory, putting themselves in line with the two posts to be linked

by the straight line.

Such findings are confirmed by other experiments, such as the “three

mountains” task in which children had to construct a scene from the

perspective of a doll. For each new position of the doll, young children

methodically went about their task of re-creating the appropriate viewpoint,

but it always turned out to be from the same perspective…their own. Thus,

Piaget and Inhelder infer that children must construct systems of reference,

not from familiarity born of experience, but from operational linking and

coordination of all possible viewpoints, each of which they are conscious.

They conclude that such global coordination of viewpoints is the basic

prerequisite in constructing simple projective relations. For although such

relations are dependent upon a given viewpoint, nevertheless a single “point

of view” cannot exist in an isolated fashion, but necessarily entails the

construction of a complete system linking together all points of view.

Euclidean Space

Piaget and Inhelder next investigate the development of notions

presumed to be “intermediate” between the projective and Euclidean, for

 Geometry - 12

example, constructing similar figures. These experiments illustrate the

gradual procurement of angle and parallelism concepts during middle

childhood. Finally, in the development of Euclidean space, children come to

“see” objects as located in a two-dimensional frame of reference. That is,

Piaget and Inhelder challenge the claim that that there is an innate tendency

or ability to organize objects in a two- or three-dimensional reference frame.

Spatial awareness does not begin with such an organization; rather, the

frame itself is a culminating point of the development of Euclidean space.

To test this hypothesis in the case of horizontality, children were shown

jars half-filled with colored water and asked to predict the spatial orientation

of the water level when the jar was tilted. For verticality, a plumb line was

suspended inside an empty jar, which was similarly tilted, or children were

asked to draw trees on a hillside. Children initially were incapable of

representing planes; the water, for example, was represented by a scribble.

At the next state, the level of the water was always drawn perpendicular to

the sides of the jar, regardless of tilt. Satisfaction with such drawings was in

no way undermined even when an actual water-filled tilted jar was placed

next to the drawing. It is, then, quite striking “how poorly commonly

perceived events are recorded in the absence of a schema within which they

may be organized” (p. 388). Sometimes, sensing that the water moves

towards the mouth of the jar, children raised the level of the water, still

keeping the surface perpendicular to the sides. Only at the final stage—at

about 9 years of age—did children ostensibly draw upon the larger spatial

frame of reference (e.g., tabletop) for ascertaining the horizontal.

Ultimately, the frame of reference constituting Euclidean space is

analogical to a container, made up of a network of sites or positions.

Objects within this container may be mobile, but the positions are stationary.
 Geometry - 13

From the simultaneous organization of all possible positions in three

dimensions emerges the Euclidean coordinate system. This organization is

rooted in the preceding construction of the concept of straight line (as the

maintenance of a constant direction of travel), parallels, and angles,

followed by the coordination of their orientations and inclinations. This

leads to a gradual replacement of relations of order and distance between

objects by similar relations between the positions themselves. It is as if a

space were emptied of objects so as to organize the space itself. Thus,

intuition of space is not a “reading” or innate apprehension of the properties

of objects, but a system of relationships borne in actions performed on these

objects.

Criticisms of Piaget and Inhelder’s Work

As with much of the Genevan work, Piaget and Inhelder’s theory of

children’s concept of space has been widely influential and widely criticized.

One criticism has been that Piaget and Inhelder’s use of the terms such as

topological, separation, proximity, and Euclidean, as well as the application

of these and related concepts to the design of their studies, are not

mathematically accurate {Darke, 1982 #155; Kapadia, 1974 #287; Martin,

1976 #344}.

Related to this is the problem of classifying figures as topological or

Euclidean. Every figure possesses both these characteristics to an

equivalent degree (i.e., one cannot discuss a “Euclidean figure” per se), but

Piaget and Inhelder’s experiments depend on a mutually exclusive

classification of figures into these two categories. Furthermore, because

many of the figures they used were topologically equivalent (see Figure 1),

one cannot be certain whether young children’s choices were made on the

basis of topological characteristics {Martin, 1976 #344}. It is not clear why

 Geometry - 14

some anomalies such as these are dismissed as lack of drawing skill,

whereas others (e.g., inability to draw a square’s straight sides) are not.

Given such problems, replicative research is critical.

Figure 1. Shapes such as those on the left were considered “Euclidean”

by Piaget and Inhelder in their haptic perception experiments; those on the

right were considered to be “topological forms.”

Other Research on the Theory

Researchers replicating Piaget and Inhelder’s experiments closely have

generally confirmed their findings {Laurendeau, 1970 #608; Lovell, 1959

#324; Page, 1959 #561; Peel, 1959 #389}. However, even within these

studies ambiguities arise. For example, several researchers reported that

even at the earliest ages (2-3 years), children can distinguish between
 Geometry - 15

curvilinear and rectilinear shapes, contrary to the theory {Lovell, 1959

#324; Page, 1959 #561}.

Yet it is still possible that children show a bias toward topological versus

Euclidean characteristics. Here, too, basically corroborative results have

been mixed with those contrary to predictions. For example, “curvilinear”

shapes were identified at least as easily as purportedly “topological” ones

{Laurendeau, 1970 #608; Lovell, 1959 #324}.

Several studies have attempted to ameliorate the problem of ambiguity

by showing children a test shape and then, after its removal, asking children

to identify a shape “most like” it. Esty (1970; cited in *** {Darke, 1982

#155} found that 4-year-olds classified the topologically-equivalent shapes

to be most like the original. However, older groups of children chose them

as least like the original. Overall, the author claimed Piaget’s thesis was

supported with the important condition that distortions from the original

were not substantial; this, however, is a metrical concept (see also ***

{Cousins, 1971 #148; Jahoda, 1974 #274}. Martin {, 1976 #345} used a

set of shapes and three variants: A was topologically equivalent to the

model. B and C, though not strictly equivalent to the model in a Euclidean

sense, preserved as many Euclidean properties of the model as consistent

with the fact that they had been altered to eliminate a particular topological

property. Thus, B and C preserved properties such as straightness,

curvature, line segment length, and angle size that A failed to preserve. But

B failed to preserve connectedness and C varied closedness. Four-year-olds

tended to choose the copy that was topologically equivalent as the “worst”

copy of the model less often than older children. But, the “worst” scores

were at or above chance levels and thus did not lend support to Piaget and
 Geometry - 16

Inhelder’s theory. In addition, four-year-olds sacrificed topological properties

in their selections as freely as did eight-year-olds.

A difficulty in designing such experiments is in quantifying the degree of

equivalence of the shapes. Geeslin and Shar {, 1979 #215} modelled

figures via a finite set of points on a grid. Degree of distortion was defined

as the sum of displacements of these points. The authors postulate that

children compare two figures in terms of the amount of “distortion”

necessary to transform one figure into another, after an attempt at

superimposition using rigid motions and dilations. This model received

strong support. In agreement with other research, preschool to grade 4

children were cognizant of both topological and Euclidean properties and

how these properties distinguished variants. A small number of students at

each level favored either topological or Euclidean properties. Note that, as

the authors admit, these studies dealt with perception, while Piaget and

Inhelder specifically address representation. Further, the model is more

predictive than explanatory.

In sum, results of many of the Piagetian studies may be an artifact of

the particular shapes chosen and the abilities of young children to identify

and name these shapes {Fisher, 1965 #201}. If true, however, this does

not support a strong version of the topological primacy thesis. It may not be

topological properties as a class which enable young children to identify

certain shapes. Visually salient properties such as holes, curves, and

corners; simplicity; and familiarity—rather than topological versus Euclidean

properties—may underlie children’s discrimination.

Similar problems have been found in drawing experiments {Dodwell,

1963 #609; Lovell, 1959 #324}. Martin {, 1976 #345} reported that the

drawings of 4-year-olds did not reflect predominantly topological features.

 Geometry - 17

He suggested that it may not be attention to topological properties per se

that enables children to draw homeomorphic copies; rather, it may be their

increasing coordination of Euclidean or projective properties, given that the

coordination of such properties automatically preserves topological

properties. Thus, despite evidence that many young children produce a

“circle” when drawing a square, results do not confirm a strong topological

primacy position. Research is needed that more closely examines children’s

step-by-step actions and thoughts in the process of drawing shapes and that
uses other techniques to infer children’s internal representations. For

example, one research program has confirmed an hierarchical

developmental sequence of (a) reproduction of geometric figures requiring

only encoding (i.e., building a matching configuration of shapes, with the

original constantly in sight), (b) reproduction requiring memory (building a

matching configuration from recall), and (c) transformation involving

rotation and visual perspective-talking (building a matching configuration

either from recall after a rotation or from another’s perspective), with

preschool children able to perform at only the first two levels {Rosser, 1988

#569}.

Research on children’s construction of a frame of reference for

Euclidean space—a coordinate system—similarly has revealed alterations

and elaborations of Piaget and Inhelder’s theory. For example, young

children are more competent, and adolescents and adults less competent,

than the theory might suggest. Regarding the latter, not all high school

seniors or college students perform successfully on tasks designed by Piaget

to assess an underlying Euclidean conceptual system {Liben, 1978 #319;

Mackay, 1972 #331; Thomas, 1975 #482}. On the other hand, it appears

that young children's grasp of Euclidean spatial relationships is more

 Geometry - 18

adequate than the theory posits. Very young children can orient a horizontal

or vertical line in space {Rosser, 1984 #422}. Similarly, 4- to 6-year-old

children can extrapolate lines from positions on both axes and determine

where they intersect {Somerville, 1985 #467}. Piagetian theory seems

correct in postulating that the coordination of relations develops after such

early abilities. Young children fail on double-axis orientation tasks even

when misleading perceptual cues are eliminated {Rosser, 1984 #422}.

Similarly, the greatest difficulty is in coordinating two extrapolations, which

has its developmental origins at the 3- to 4-year-old level, with the ability to

extrapolate those lines developing as much as a year earlier {Somerville,

1987 #675}.

These results suggests an initial inability to utilize a conceptual

coordinate system as an organizing spatial framework. Nevertheless, it is

instructionally significant that, by the time they enter school, children can

use coordinates when these are provided for them, even if, in facing

traditional tasks, they are not yet able or predisposed to spontaneously

construct coordinates for themselves.

However, performance on coordinate tasks is influenced by a variety of

factors at all ages. Performance on horizonality and verticality tasks may

reflect bias toward the perpendicular in copying angles, possibly because

this reference is learned early {Ibbotson, 1976 #262}. Representations of

figures also are distorted either locally by angle bisection, or by increasing

symmetry of the figure as a whole {Bremner, 1982 #107}. Finally,

performance on these Piagetian spatial tasks correlates with disembedding

as well as with general spatial abilities {Liben, 1978 #319}. Such results

indicate a general tendency to produce symmetry or simplicity in

 Geometry - 19

constructions which confound the traditional Piagetian interpretation

{Bremner, 1982 #107; Mackay, 1972 #331}.

Such multiple determination of performance also characterizes the

literature on perspective-taking abilities; that is, Piaget and Inhelder’s

projective space. For example, perspective-taking tasks are easier if the

children move around the objects or are provided a model of the room,

suggesting that the locations of the objects are coded individually with

respect to an external framework of landmarks. Thus, coding the location of

small objects may develop from association (coincidence) with a single

external landmark, to proximity to a single landmark, to distance from

several landmarks. By the age of 5, and possibly as early as 3, children

encode the location of small objects with respect to a framework of

landmarks. Such encoding continues into adulthood {Newcombe, in press

#565}. This implies that the development of projective space may involve

not just the coordination of viewpoints but also the establishment of an

external framework. For both perspective-taking and coordinate system

abilities, the key may be the construction and selection of increasingly

coordinated reference systems as frameworks for spatial organization.

Conclusion

Overall, while the topological primacy theory is not totally disproven,

neither is it supported. It may be that children do not construct first

topological, and then later projective and Euclidean, ideas. Rather, it may

be that ideas of all types develop over time, becoming increasingly

integrated and synthesized. These ideas are originally intuitions grounded

in action—building, drawing, and perceiving. Thus, research is needed to

identify the specific, original, intuitions and ideas that develop and the order

in which they develop. For example, children might learn to coordinate

 Geometry - 20

certain actions that produce curvilinear shapes before corresponding those

that produce rectilinear shapes {Martin, 1976 #344}, although theoretical

explanations of such a sequence are lacking. Observed lack of synchrony

between perceptual and conceptual abilities supports Piaget’s constructivist

position {Rosser, 1984 #422}, but specific cognitive constructions generally

have not been identified.

Such research should also explore the deformations that children do

accept in their representation of figures; for example, some children equate

an “almost closed” figure with a closed variant. Previously unexplored

factors such as language, schooling, and the immediate social culture also

demand attention {Darke, 1982 #155}. Piagetian interpretations of

students’ performance on tasks too often emphasize logical failures at the

expense of uncovering the development of ideas not yet differentiated and

integrated; thus, new approaches are warranted. In any case, it appears

that certain Euclidean notions are present at an early age {Rosser, 1984

#422; Rosser, 1988 #569} and, contrary to Piaget and Inhelder and

interpreters {Peel, 1959 #389}, even young preschool children may be able

to work with certain “Euclidean” ideas.

Similarly, results regarding Piaget and Inhelder’s constructs of projective

and Euclidean space reveal that young children have basic competencies in

establishing spatial frameworks that might be effectively built upon in the

classroom. However, we should probably expect, in students of all ages, a

general Gestalt tendency toward symmetry and simplicity, for example, in

matching and reproduction tasks. Research is needed to identify instruction

that facilitates the construction and selection of increasingly sophisticated

reference systems for organizing spatial information.

 Geometry - 21

Researchers have tended not to discuss Piaget and Inhelder’s second

major theme—that children’s representation of space is not a perceptual

“reading off” of their spatial environment, but is constructed from prior

active manipulation of that environment. This is surprising, in that most of

Piaget and Inhelder’s results do support this hypothesis, at least implicitly

(results from one study, {Wheatley, 1990 #32}, do provide direct support,

as discussed in a succeeding section). More articulated research from a

constructivist position is needed. In this regard, we turn briefly to other

work which is consistent with this critical idea.

Fischbein {, 1987 #548} argues that people’s intuition of space is not

innate and is not reducible to a conglomerate of sensorial images. Space

representations constitute a complex system of conceptions—although not

necessarily formulated explicitly—which exceed the data at hand and the

domain of perception in general. Subjective space is an interpretation of

reality and not a reproduction of reality. It is shaped by and exceeds

experience. Consistent with Piaget’s constructivism, Fischbein’s theory

further elaborates the nature of the intuition of space. To begin, intuition is

not merely a reflection of objectively given space properties, but rather a

“highly complex system of expectations, and programs of action, related to

the movements of our body and its parts, which constitutes the intuition of

space” ( p. 87). Thus, intuitions consist of sensori-motor and intellectual

skills organized into a system of beliefs and expectations that constitute an

implicit theory of space. Most important, intuitions thus constructed are

enactively meaningful; that is, they are subjectively self-evident because

they express the direct behavioral meaningfulness of an idea.

For example, the notion of straight line seems self-evident. A

sophisticated adult is convinced that one may go on extending the line

 Geometry - 22

indefinitely, or that by following the straight line one uses the shortest path

to reach a given point. These appear unequivocal “facts,” properties of the

“object” called a straight line. However, the straight line is an abstraction, a

concept, not a perceptual object. It is a convention based on axioms which

could be changed. It is through extrapolation from a behavioral meaning

that one tends to believe in the absoluteness of the conception. People

know that they can draw a straight line, recognize a straight line, and run

along one to reach a goal in minimum distance. They thus imbue the notion
with the qualities of unequivocal evidence and credibility because it is

behaviorally meaningful.

However, building intuition based on experience cuts both ways. The

limitations of human experience account not only for the adaptive and

organizing functions of intuitions, but also for distorted or erroneous

representations of reality. Thus, space intuitions, like other intuitions, do not

develop inevitably into increasing correspondence with “pure” logic or

mathematics, as a reading of Piaget may suggest. Intuitive representations

of space are non-homogeneous and anisotropic (exhibiting properties with

different values when measured along axes in different directions). For

example, people tend to attribute absolutely privileged directions to space,

such as “up” and “down.” They view space as centered (e.g., at one’s

home), and as having increasing density as one approaches the centration

zones, with the effect that distances are increasingly amplified upon

approach. Thus, our intuitive representation of space is a mixture of

(possibly) contradictory properties, all related to our terrestrial life and our

behavioral adaptive constraints {Fischbein, 1987 #548}.

The van Hieles: Levels of Geometric Thinking and Phases of Instruction

Levels of Geometric Thought

 Geometry - 23

According to the theory of Pierre and Dina van Hiele, students progress

through levels of thought in geometry {van Hiele, 1959 #360; van Hiele,

1986 #39; van Hiele-Geldof, 1984 #547}. Thinking develops from a

Gestalt-like visual level through increasingly sophisticated levels of

description, analysis, abstraction, and proof. The theory has the following

defining characteristics:

• Learning is a discontinuous process. That is, there are “jumps” in the

learning curve which reveal the presence of discrete, qualitatively

different levels of thinking.

• The levels are sequential and hierarchical. For students to function

adequately at one of the advanced levels in the van Hiele hierarchy, they

must have mastered large portions of the lower levels {Hoffer, 1981

#44}. Progress from one level to the next is more dependent upon

instruction than on age or biological maturation. Teachers can “reduce”

subject matter to a lower level, leading to rote memorization, but students

cannot bypass levels and achieve understanding (memorization is not an

important feature of any level). The latter requires working through

certain “phases” of instruction.

• Concepts implicitly understood at one level become explicitly understood

at the next level. “At each level there appears in an extrinsic way that

which was intrinsic at the preceding level. At the base level, figures were

in fact also determined by their properties, but someone thinking that this

level is not aware of these properties” {van Hiele, 1984 #97, p. 246}

• Each level has its own language. “Each level has its own linguistic

symbols and its own system of relations connecting these symbols. A

relation which is ‘correct’ at one level can reveal itself to be incorrect at

another. Think, for example, of a relation between a square and a

 Geometry - 24

rectangle. Two people who reason at different levels cannot understand

each other. Neither can manage to follow the thought processes of the

other” {van Hiele, 1984 #97, p. 246}. Language structure is a critical

factor in the movement through the levels.

Both the number and numbering of the levels have been variable. We

shall initially describe the van Hieles’ original five levels and later discuss a

sixth. Our rationale is twofold. First, although van Hiele's recent works have

described three rather than the original five levels, both empirical evidence
(reviewed in succeeding sections) and the need for precision in

psychologically-oriented models of learning argue for maintaining finer

delineations. Second, the empirical evidence also suggests a level that is

more basic than van Hiele's “visual” level. 1

Level 1 Visual

Students identify and operate on shapes and other geometric

configurations according to their appearance. They recognize figures such

as squares and triangles as visual gestalts, and thus they are able to

mentally represent these figures as visual images. In identifying figures,

they often use visual prototypes, saying that a given figure is a rectangle,

for instance, because "it looks like a door." They do not, however, attend to

geometric properties or to traits that are characteristic of the class of figures

represented. That is, although figures are determined by their properties,

students at this level are not conscious of the properties. At this level,

students' reasoning is dominated by perception. For example, they might

distinguish one figure from another without being able to name a single

property of either figure, or they might judge that two figures are congruent

because they look the same; "There is no why, one just sees it" {van Hiele,

1986 #39, p. 83}. During the transition from the visual to the descriptive
 Geometry - 25

level, classes of visual objects begin to be associated with their

characteristic properties.

At this level, the objects about which students reason are classes of

figures recognized visually as “the same shape.” For instance, by the

statement "This figure is a rhombus," the student means "This figure has the

shape I have learned to call 'rhombus'" {van Hiele, 1986 #39, p. 109}. The

end product of this reasoning is the creation of conceptualizations of figures

that are based on the explicit recognition of their properties (i.e., after this
conceptual construction, the student is at level 2).

Level 2 Descriptive/analytic

Students recognize and can characterize shapes by their properties. For

instance, a student might think of a rhombus as a figure that has four equal

sides; so the term "rhombus" refers to a collection of “properties that he has

learned to call 'rhombus'" {van Hiele, 1986 #39, p. 109}. Students see

figures as wholes, but now as collections of properties rather than as visual

gestalts; the image begins to fall into the background. Properties are

established experimentally by observing, measuring, drawing, and model-

making. Students discover that some combinations of properties signal a

class of figures and some do not; thus the seeds of geometric implication

are planted. Students at this level do not, however, see relationships

between classes of figures (e.g., a student might content that figure is not a

rectangle because it is a square).

At this level, the objects about which students reason are classes of

figures, thought about in terms of the sets of properties that the students

associate with those figures. The product of this reasoning is the

establishment of relationships between, and the ordering of, properties and

classes of figures.
 Geometry - 26

Level 3 Abstract/relational

Students can form abstract definitions, distinguish between necessary

and sufficient sets of conditions for a concept, and understand and

sometimes even provide logical arguments in the geometric domain. They

can classify figures hierarchically (by ordering their properties) and give

informal arguments to justify their classifications (e.g., a square is identified

as a rhombus because it can be thought of as a "rhombus with some extra

properties"). They can discover properties of classes of figures by informal

deduction. For example, they might deduce that in any quadrilateral the

sum of the angles must be 360° because any quadrilateral can be

decomposed into two triangles each of whose angles sum to 180°.

As students discover properties of various shapes, they feel a need to

organize the properties. One property can signal other properties, so

definitions can be seen not merely as descriptions but as a way of logically

organizing properties. It becomes clear why, for example, a square is a

rectangle. This logical organization of ideas is the first manifestation of true

deduction. The students still, however, do not grasp that logical deduction

is the method for establishing geometric truths.

At this level, the objects about which students reason are properties of

classes of figures. Thus, for instance, the "properties are ordered, and the

person will know that the figure is a rhombus if it satisfies the definition of

quadrangle with four equal sides" {van Hiele, 1986 #39}, p. 109). The

product of this reasoning is the reorganization of ideas achieved by

interrelating properties of figures and classes of figures.

Level 4 Formal deduction

Students establish theorems within an axiomatic system. They

recognize the difference among undefined terms, definitions, axioms, and

 Geometry - 27

theorems. They are capable of constructing original proofs. That is, they

can produce a sequence of statements that logically justifies a conclusion as

a consequence of the "givens."

At this level, students can reason formally by logically interpreting

geometric statements such as axioms, definitions, and theorems. The

objects of their reasoning are relationships between properties of classes of

figures. The product of their reasoning is the establishment of second–order

relationships (i.e., relationships between relationships) expressed in terms of

logical chains within a geometric system.

Level 5 Rigor/metamathematical

Students reason formally about mathematical systems. They can study

geometry in the absence of reference models. They can reason by formally

manipulating geometric statements such as axioms, definitions, and

theorems. The objects of this reasoning are relationships between formal

constructs. The product of their reasoning is the establishment, elaboration,

and comparison of axiomatic systems of geometry.

Research on the Levels

As with the work of Piaget and Inhelder, van Hiele’s theory has been

influential and extensively studied. Research results will be discussed under

the rubric of several critical questions.

Do the van Hiele levels accurately describe students’ geometric thinking?

Generally, empirical research from the U.S. and abroad has confirmed

that the van Hiele levels are useful in describing students’ geometric

concept development, from elementary school to college {Burger, 1986

#41; Fuys, 1988 #546; Han, 1986 #234; Hoffer, 1983 #544; Wirszup, 1976

#45}. For example, Usiskin {, 1982 #42} found that about 75% of

secondary students fit the van Hiele model (it should be noted that the
 Geometry - 28

percentage classifiable at a level varies with the instrument and scoring

scheme). Burger and Shaughnessy {,1986 #41} administered clinical

interviews to students from kindergarten to college. They reported that

students’ behaviors were generally consistent with the van Hieles’ original

general description of the levels. One task will be described as a example.

Students were to identify and describe all the squares, rectangles,

parallelograms, and rhombuses in a set of quadrilaterals similar to those in

Figure 2. Students who included imprecise visual qualities and irrelevant

attributes (e.g., orientation) in describing the shapes while omitting relevant

attributes were assigned to level 1. References to visual prototypes (“a

rectangle looks like a door”) were frequent among students assigned to this

level. Students who contrasted shapes and identified them by means of

their properties were assigned level 2. One girl, for example, said that

rectangles have “two sides equal and parallel to each other. Two longer

sides are equal and parallel to each other, and they connect at 90 degrees”

(p. 39). Squares were not included. Students who gave minimal

characterization of shapes by using other types were assigned level 3 (e.g.,

a square is a parallelogram that has all the properties of a rhombus and a

rectangle). One student frequently made conjectures and attempted to

verify these conjectures by means of formal proof, indicating level 4

thinking.

Fig. 2 Quadrilaterals to be identified.

 Geometry - 29

2
4 5
3

6 9
7
8
10

13

12

11
14

15

The existence of unique linguistic structures at each level has been

supported in that, for example, “rectangle” means different things to

students at different level (e.g., a visual gestalt vs. a “bearer of properties”)

{Burger, 1986 #41; Fuys, 1988 #546; Mayberry, 1983 #15}. In sum, the

levels appear to exist and describe students’ geometric development. They

have been validated through both interviews and written assessments.

Are the levels discrete? Is there a discontinuity between levels?

Russian research seems to indicate a positive answer {Hoffer, 1983

#544; Wirszup, 1976 #45}. On the whole, however, results are mixed.

First, several researchers have reported that students in transition are

difficult to classify reliably {Fuys, 1988 #546; Usiskin, 1982 #42}. This is

especially true for levels 2 and 3 {Burger, 1986 #41}. Difficulties in

deciding between levels were considered by these researchers as evidence

questioning the discrete nature of the levels.

Fuys et al. {, 1988 #546} developed and documented a working model

of the van Hiele levels and characterized the geometric thinking of sixth and

ninth graders. The researchers used 6-8 45 minute instructional-assessment

 Geometry - 30

interviews, which allowed them to chart students’ ability to make progress

within and between levels as a result of instruction. They determined both

an entry level and potential level; that is, the level demonstrated after

instruction. Whereas some of the students appeared to be on a plateau,

there were also those who moved flexibly to different levels during the

teaching episodes (thus, an entry level assessment alone might have

underestimated their abilities; cf. *** {Vygotsky, 1934/1986 #676}. Further,

there was instability and oscillation between the levels in several cases.
Similar results were observed in a teaching experiment on polyhedra

{Lunkenbein, 1983 #329}. Continuity rather than jumps in learning was

frequently observed.

Do students reason at the same van Hiele levels across topics?

This question is also relevant to the issue of the discreteness of the

levels, and evidence on this question is similarly mixed. A test of consensus

revealed that preservice elementary teachers were on different levels for

different concepts {Mayberry, 1983 #15}. So were middle school {Mason,

1989 #614} and secondary students {Denis, 1987 #163}. Similarly, Burger

and Shaughnessy {, 1986 #41} reported that students exhibited different

preferred levels on different tasks. Some even oscillated from one level to

another on the same task under probing. The researchers thus

characterized the levels as dynamic rather than static and of a more

continuous nature than their discrete descriptions would lead one to believe.

Gutiérrez and Jaime {, 1988 #594} compared the level of reasoning of

preservice teachers on three geometric topics: plane geometry, spatial

geometry (polyhedra), and measurement. The levels reached across topics

were not independent, but the data did not support the theorized global

nature of the levels. The researchers hypothesized that as students

 Geometry - 31

develop, the degree of the globality of the levels is not constant, but

increases with level. That is, as children develop, they grasp increasingly

large “localities” of mathematical content and thus understand larger areas

of mathematics.

Fuys et al. {, 1988 #546} agreed that when first studying a new

concept, students frequently lapsed to level 1 thinking. They maintained,

however, that students were quickly able to move to the higher level of

thinking they had reached on prior concepts. The researchers therefore

claim that these results support the contention that a student’s potential

level of thinking remains stable across concepts. The question is still open,

but there has been the suggestion that assessment instruments must be

topic specific {Senk, 1989 #444}.

Do the levels form a hierarchy?

Research more consistently indicates that the levels are hierarchical,

although here too there are exceptions {Mason, 1989 #614}. For example,

Mayberry {, 1983 #15} employed Gutman’s scalogram analysis to show

that her tasks representing the levels formed a hierarchy for preservice

teachers. These results were replicated by Denis {, 1987 #163} for Puerto

Rican secondary students. Gutiérrez and Jaime {, 1988 #594} reported

similar analysis and results, but only for levels 1 to 4; level 5 was found to

be different in nature from the other levels. Most other researchers did not

test the hypothesis in a similarly analytic manner; nevertheless, they

interpret their results as supporting this hypothesis {Burger, 1986 #41;

Fuys, 1988 #546; Usiskin, 1982 #42}.

Thus, the levels do appear to be hierarchical, although there remains a

need to submit this hypothesis to rigorous tests. As the van Hieles posited,

however, this does not imply a maturational foundation. First, assignments

 Geometry - 32

to levels does not seem to be strictly related to age or to grade {Burger,

1986 #41; Mayberry, 1983 #15}. Second, development through the

hierarchy appears to proceed under the influence of a teaching/learning

process {Wirszup, 1976 #45}.

What is the most basic level; that is, does a level 0 exist?

As previously mentioned, there is evidence for the existence of a level 0

more basic than the van Hiele’s “visual” level. For example, 9-34% of

secondary students have failed to demonstrate thinking characteristic of

even the visual level; 26% of the students who began the year at level 0

remained at level 0 at the end of the year {Usiskin, 1982 #42}. Such

stability argues for the existence of level 0 {Senk, 1989 #444}. Likewise,

13% of the response patterns of preservice teachers do not meet the

criterion for level 1 {Mayberry, 1983 #15}. Finally, students who enter a

geometry course at level 1 perform significantly better at writing proofs than

those who enter at level 0 {Senk, 1989 #444}.

This issue is not resolved, however. Fuys et al. {, 1988 #546} specified

that to be “on a level” students had to consistently exhibit behaviors

indicative of that level. They also state, however, that level 1 is different

from the other levels, in that students may not be able to exhibit the

corresponding behaviors (i.e., they may not be able to name shapes).

According to the researchers, these students should not be described as “not

yet at level 1.” Nonetheless, they do demark such behaviors as “weak level

1.” In a later work, Fuys {, 1988 #14} hypothesizes that students with

“weak level 1” thinking are using one of Reif’s {, 1987 #64} case-based

rather than more sophisticated rule-based models as a foundation for their

concepts. Whether this actually argues for a separate level or for sub-levels

is as yet on open question.

 Geometry - 33

However, the bulk of the evidence from van Hiele-based research, along

with research from the Piagetian perspective, indicates the existence of

thinking more primitive than, and probably prerequisite to, van Hiele level 1.

Therefore, we postulate the following additional level:

Level 0 Pre–recognition

At the pre-recognition level, children perceive geometric shapes, but

perhaps because of a deficiency in perceptual activity, may attend to only a

subset of a shape's visual characteristics. They are unable to identify many

common shapes. They may distinguish between figures that are curvilinear

and those that are rectilinear but not among figures in the same class. That

is, they may differentiate between a square and a circle, but not between a

square and a triangle. According to Piaget, "it is one thing to perceive a

circle or a square and quite another to reconstruct a visual image of it to the

point where it can be picked out from a group of models, or drawn after a

purely tactile exploration" {Piaget, 1967 #43, p. 37}. Thus, students at this

level may be unable to identify common shapes because they lack the

ability to form requisite visual images. These images presuppose mental

representations constructed from the child's own actions. That is, "The

image is at first no more than an internal imitation of previously performed

actions, then later, of actions capable of being performed" {Piaget, 1967

#43, p. 449}.

At this level, the "objects" about which students reason are specific

visual or tactile stimuli (i.e., figures or objects); the product of this reasoning

is a group of figures recognized visually as "the same shape."

Should other characteristics of the levels be considered?

Levels are complex structures involving the development of both

concepts and reasoning processes {Burger, 1986 #41}. In addition,

 Geometry - 34

researchers have emphasized the importance of several interrelated

notions: intent, belief systems, and metacognition. Fuys et al. {, 1988

#14} posit that at each level students must become aware of what is

expected, intentionally thinking in a certain way. For example, students on

higher levels used such language as “explain,” “provide it,” “clinch it,” and

“be technical” in justifying their reasoning. Students on lower levels

believed that they should respond to a task on paper exactly as it appeared

(e.g., changing its orientation is not allowed). More of these students

labeled an oblique obtuse triangle a “triangle” when a manipulative triangle

was used {Fuys, 1988 #546}.

Actually, metacognitive knowledge always has been an implicit part of

the van Hiele model, in its emphasis on intent and insight, or understanding.

According to Hoffer {, 1983 #544}, students show such understanding when

they perform competently and intentionally a method that resolves an

unfamiliar problem. They understand what they are doing, why they are

doing, and when to do it. If certain beliefs, intentions, and the related

metacognitive and even epistemic knowledge characterize each level, they

need to be further articulated and incorporated into the model.

What levels of thinking are evinced given “traditional” instructional

paradigms?

Once the basic characteristics of the model have been generally

validated, the question arises: What levels of geometric thinking are

achieved by students in their present educational environment? Studies of

students by Pyshkalo and Stolyar indicated a significant number of Russian

students were perceiving shapes only as wholes. Students stayed at level 1

for a considerable time; by the end of grade 5, only 10-15% reached level 2

(note that Russian students enter grade 1 at 7 years of age, compared to

 Geometry - 35

age 6 in the U.S.). This delay was even greater with respect to solids, for

which there was no noticeable leap until the 7th grade {Pyshkalo, 1968

#617; Wirszup, 1976 #45}.

Of the 16 sixth graders they studied, Fuys {, 1988 #546} found that

19% were uniformly at level 1, focusing on shapes as a whole without

analyzing shapes in terms of their properties, even after instruction. They

could identify familiar shapes singly, but not in complex configurations and

sometimes not in different orientations. They had great difficulty with the
concept of angle. They gained but a little level 1 knowledge, visual thinking

about shapes and parallelism, from work with manipulatives. The authors

described these students as “geometry deprived.” Another 31% made

progress within level 1 and were progressing toward level 2. The final 50%

began with level 2 thinking and progressed toward level 3. Nevertheless,

they had to review some level 1 knowledge and firm up those at level 2.

Some made deductive arguments, but most equated “proof” with

generalization by examples (inductive reasoning).

The ninth graders similarly fell into three groups. As with the lowest

group of sixth graders, for about 12% little school experience with geometry

coupled with language and memory difficulties resulted in level 1

performance. They seldom realized that they could figure things out in

mathematics by thinking about them. Progress within level 1 was limited.

The 44% in the middle group functioned at level 2, with lapses to level 1.

They knew familiar shapes in terms of their properties, but had no

knowledge of parallelograms and trapezoids. Another 44% performed

consistently on level 2, with progress to level 3, and worked more rapidly

and confidently. They were not only thoughtful and inventive about the

problems they were doing but were also reflective about their own thinking.
 Geometry - 36

Secondary students do not fair much better. That is, many students

who have studied geometry formally are nonetheless on levels 0 to 2, not

level 3 or 4; almost 40% end the year of high school geometry below level 2

{Burger, 1986 #41; Suydam, 1985 #28; Usiskin, 1982 #42}. In fact,

because many students have not developed level 3 thought processes, they

may not benefit from additional work in formal geometry because their

knowledge and that presented in the textbook will be organized differently.

What levels of thinking do traditional textbooks reflect?

Given the sorry state of students’ level of geometric thinking, it is

natural to ask what levels are promoted by textbooks. Fuys et al. {, 1988

#546} analyzed several current geometry curricula as evidenced by

American text series (grades K-8) in light of the van Hiele model. Four

components of geometry lessons were analyzed: the aim, expository

material, exercises, and related test and review questions. Not surprisingly,

textbook series were found to be deficient in this aspect. Most work

involved naming shapes and relations like parallelism. Students were only

infrequently asked to reason with the figures.

Most questions were answerable at level 1. There was little level 2 or

above thinking required in the lessons or tests, starting only slightly in

grades 7-8. Average students would not need to think above level 1 for

almost all of their geometry experiences through grade 8. There were some

jumps across levels; for example, exposition might occur at a higher level

than the exercises. Topics were repeated across grades at the same level;

the researchers termed this a “circular” rather than a “spiral” curriculum.

Worse, perhaps, properties and relationships among polygons were

sometimes not taught clearly and sometimes taught incorrectly.

 Geometry - 37

Similar analyses of older Russian textbooks (those written before

several major reforms) revealed the absence of any systematic choice of

geometric material, large gaps in its study, and a markedly late and one-

sided acquaintance with many of the most important geometric concepts

{Wirszup, 1976 #45}. Only about 1% of all problems dealt with geometry.

This left grade 6 students, from the very first lessons, doing work

corresponding to the first three levels of geometric development

simultaneously.
Phases of Instruction

The van Hiele model includes more than levels of geometric thinking.

According to the van Hieles, progress from one level to the next depends

little on biological maturation or development; instead, it proceeds under

the influence of a teaching/learning process. The teacher plays a special

role in facilitating this progress, especially in providing guidance about

expectations {Fuys, 1988 #546}. Given that van Hiele level and

achievement account for 40% to 60% of the variance in proof writing, much

of a student’s achievement in this area is within the direct control of the

teacher and the curriculum {Senk, 1989 #444}.

The van Hiele theory does not support an “absorption theory” model of

learning and teaching, however. The van Hieles claim that higher levels are

achieved not via direct teacher telling, but through a suitable choice of

exercises. In addition, “children themselves will determine when the

moment to go to the higher level has come” (P. van Hiele, Personal

communication, Sept. 27, 1988). Nevertheless, without the teacher, no

progress would be made. For each phase, the goal for students’ learning be

described, followed by a description of the teacher’s role in providing

instruction that enables this learning.

 Geometry - 38

Phase 1: Information

The students get acquainted with the content domain. The teacher

places at the child’s disposal and discusses materials clarifying this content.

Through this discussion, the teacher learns how students interpret the

language and provides information to bring students to purposeful action

and perception.

Phase 2: Guided Orientation

In this phase, students become aware of and get acquainted with the
objects from which geometric ideas are abstracted. The goal of instruction

during this phase is for students to be actively engaged in exploring objects

(e.g., folding, measuring) so as to encounter the principle connections of the

network of relations that is to be formed. The teachers' role is to direct

students' activity by guiding them in appropriate explorations—carefully

structured and sequenced tasks (often one-step that elicit specific

responses) in which students manipulate objects so as to encounter specific

concepts and procedures of geometry. Teachers should choose materials

and tasks in which the targeted concepts and procedures are salient.

Phase 3: Explicitation

Students become conscious of the relations; they begin to elaborate

their intuitive knowledge. Thus, in this phase, children become explicitly

aware of their geometric conceptualizations, describe these

conceptualizations in their own language, and learn some of the traditional

mathematical language for the subject matter. The teacher's role is to bring

the objects of study (geometric objects and ideas, relationships, patterns,

etc.) to an explicit level of awareness by leading students’ discussion of

them in their own language. Once students have demonstrated their

 Geometry - 39

awareness of an object of study and have discussed it in their own words,

the teacher introduces the relevant mathematical terminology.

Phase 4: Free Orientation

Children solve problems whose solution requires the synthesis and

utilization of those concepts and relations previously elaborated. They learn

to orient themselves within the “network of relations” and to apply the

relationships to the solving of problems. The teacher's role is to select

appropriate materials and geometric problems (with multiple solution

paths), to give instructions to permit various performances and to

encourage students to reflect and elaborate on these problems and their

solutions, and to introduce terms, concepts, and relevant problem–solving

processes as needed.39

Phase 5: Integration

Students build a summary of all they have learned about the objects of

study, integrating their knowledge into a coherent network that can be

easily described and applied. The language and conceptualizations of

mathematics are used to describe this network. The teacher's role is to

encourage students to reflect on and consolidate their geometric

knowledge, with an increasing emphasis on the use of mathematical

structures as a framework for consolidation. Finally, the consolidated ideas

are summarized by embedding them in the structural organization of formal

mathematics.39 At the completion of phase 5, a new level of thought is

attained for the topic studied.

Critical Issues

Issues regarding levels of thinking

There are problems with the research on the veracity of the theorized

levels. For example, Fuys et al. {, 1988 #546} interpret their results as
 Geometry - 40

supporting this validity. However, they also claim support for van Hiele’s

recent characterization of the model in terms of three levels: visual

(previously level 1, according to these researchers), analytic (previously 2),

and theoretical (previously 3-5). They state that van Hiele agrees with this

interpretation, but caution that the three-level model may not be sufficiently

refined to characterize thinking, especially considering their findings that

students progressed toward level 3 but with no sign of axiomatic thinking.

There are two additional problems with the three-level model, however.
First, it also seems that van Hiele describes the new visual level as

combining aspects of the previous levels 1 and 2; therefore, the mapping

from one model to the other is not unambiguous. Furthermore, if levels can

be changed and combined, their hypothesized discrete, hierarchical

psychological nature must be questioned. In a related vein, we have seen

reports of stronger and weaker performance at certain levels, and overlaps

between levels; the question is, how wide a band can be permitted before

the notion of hierarchical dependency disintegrates?

It is not even clear when a student is “at” a level. What does it mean

for students to think of shapes in terms of their properties? Do students

achieve level 2 when they evince cognizance of the characteristics of

shapes, or must they identify specific properties? When do students think

primarily in terms of properties? Do they have to identify properties of

specific shapes or classes of shapes?

Further, should students’ thinking be characterized as “at” a single

level? For example, Gutiérrez, Jaime, and Fortuny {, in press #595} attempt

to take into account students capacity to use each one of the four van Hiele

levels, rather than assign a single level. They use a vector with four

components to represent the degree of acquisition of van Hiele levels 1

 Geometry - 41

through 4 (e.g., one student might have a grade component for level 1 of

96.67%; level 2, 82.50%; level 3, 50.00%; and level 4, 3.75%). They found

many students who are apparently developing two consecutive levels of

reasoning simultaneously, and hypothesized this results from mathematics

instruction that leads students to begin the acquisition of level n + 1 before

level n had been completely acquired {Gutiérrez, in press #595}. Such

alternate conceptualizations of levels of thinking need to be explored; once

again, they may bring into question the very nature of the levels. That is,
the levels seems to have face validity, but if the number of levels is

malleable and if performance is spread across levels and determined by

what is taught, then are the levels more logical than psychological?

Another problem with the levels is the observed lack of “discontinuities

in learning.” Some have defended the theory in the face of this evidence,

claiming that the observations may reflect continuity not in learning but

rather in teaching {Fuys, 1988 #546; Hoffer, 1983 #544}. This is an open

question, but a problem with the defense is that it makes it virtually

impossible to disprove the theory, a criticism frequently waged against

Piaget’s theories. If there is a great deal of “transition,” then (also like

Piaget) this brings into question a strict stage interpretation.

Questions also arise concerning observations of reasoning at different

levels across topics. Some, attempting to make minimal elaborations to the

theory, have hypothesized that these students can “quickly move to the

higher level of thinking” regarding the lower-level topic. It is not clear

exactly what this means. Would others move reliably more slowly, and is

this speed not attributable to other factors such as learning potential not

directly tied to levels of thinking?

 Geometry - 42

Thus, it is critical that research be conducted on valid assessment of

van Hiele levels. Paper and pencil testing should be further refined and

evaluated (see a recent discussion of this issue in the May 1990 Journal for

Research in Mathematics Education, Vol. 21(3)). Different interview

techniques, possibly less dependent on specific educational experiences,

should be developed. For example, we have created a triad polygon sorting

task designed to determine the level of geometric thinking for polygons.

Students are presented with three polygons and are asked, “Which two are
most alike? Why?” For example, one student, presented with the following
shapes, A B C , chose B and C, saying that they “looked the same,

except that B is bent in.” She was attending to the visual aspects of the

shapes; a level 1 response. After working with our Logo-based geometry

curriculum {Battista, in press #627}, the student chose A and B, saying that

they both had four sides. Thus, she tended to let the overall visual aspect of

the figures fade into the background, attending instead to the shapes’

properties; a level 2 response. Finally, research is needed on the relative

useful of static and dynamic approaches to assessment. Dynamic

approaches, which can assess “potential” level of thinking and the amount

of instruction students need to achieve that level, may be more illuminating

than the more typical static or “snapshot” approach {Vygotsky, 1986 #29}.

The way in which students, especially young students, learn geometric

concepts has also been questioned. First, research demonstrates that young

children can discriminate some of the characteristics of shapes, and often

think of two-dimensional figures in terms of paths and motions used to

construct them {Battista, 1987 #539; Clements, in press #63; Clements,

1989 #543; Kay, 1987 #289}. This is inconsistent with the levels as

presently conceived. Secondly, while young children are currently taught

 Geometry - 43

with a “template” (visual prototype) approach to recognizing geometric

patterns, Kay {, 1987 #289} maintains that this is appropriate only if there

is basically only one such template for each class (e.g., squares)—but that

this does not apply to hierarchical-based classes. In contrast, Kay provided

first graders with instruction that began with the more general case,

quadrilaterals, proceeded to rectangles, and then to squares. It addressed

the relevant characteristics of each class and the hierarchical relationships

among classes and used terms embodying these relationships:

quadrilateral, rectangle-quadrilateral, and square-rectangle. At the end of

instruction, most students identified characteristics of quadrilaterals,

rectangles, and squares, and about half identified hierarchical relationships

among these classes, though none had done so previously. Thus, Kay

maintains that the van Hiele theory does not capture the full complexity of

how young children come to understand geometric concepts. Some

concepts always will be initially understood through inductive processes, if

the definition of the concept involves a complex deductive argument yet can

be represented by a small number of visual template (e.g., “circle”). If the

definition of the concept involves a relatively simple deductive argument

and the concept cannot be represented easily by a template, then initial

understanding will be deductive (e.g., “quadrilateral”). This dichotomy is

similar to Vygotsky’s {, 1934/1986 #676} formulation of spontaneous vs.

scientific concepts While both the depth of these first graders’

understanding (especially of hierarchical relations) and the generalizations

made on the basis of the empirical results must be questioned, such

alternate hypotheses deserve further investigation. Future investigations

should ensure that students are not simply mirroring repetitious verbal

training; “Direct teaching of concepts is impossible and fruitless. A teacher

 Geometry - 44

who tries to do this usually accomplishes nothing but empty verbalism, a

parrotlike repetition of words by the child, simulating a knowledge of the

corresponding concepts but actually covering up a vacuum” {Vygotsky,

1934/1986 #676, p. 150}.

In a similar vein, De Villiers {, 1987 #53} concluded that, in

contradiction to van Hiele's theory, hierarchical class inclusion and

deductive thinking develop independently, and that hierarchical thinking

depends more on teaching strategy than on van Hiele level. He then

describes a successful teaching strategy in which eighth and ninth grade

students were taught first about quadrilaterals, and how special

quadrilaterals could be obtained by specifying properties. This approach

was contrasted with the traditional approach in which students associate

names of figures with visual prototypes. As he explains of his results: "We

believe that the observation that children think of shapes as a whole {sic}

without explicit reference to their components, is the direct result of our

actually teaching children from the start to think of shapes as a whole {sic}

and in terms of visual prototypes, and with no reference to their

components" (p. 19). However, the author makes this claim based on

experiments with students intellectually capable of attending to properties.

Our research, for instance, indicated that after being taught about the

properties of squares and rectangles, if asked why they say that squares are

special kinds of rectangles, many first graders say simply “because the

teacher told us” {Battista, 1990 #690}. However, the criticism of the van

Hiele levels raised by De Villiers, that the levels are very dependent on the

curriculum, is certainly worthy of further research. He concluded that

further research on the level at which both hierarchical classification and

deduction occur is needed.

 Geometry - 45

Such questions lead to the conclusion that while van Hiele research has

added to our knowledge considerably, the corpus has not yet been

structured so as to simultaneously test alternate hypotheses (for example,

finding students whose behavior seems to support a characteristic of the

levels does not provide a strong test of competing hypotheses for the given

behavior). In addition, the van Hiele theory describes students' behaviors;

we also need to account for them. Research needs to address such

questions as:
• How—specifically—is students' knowledge represented and structured at

each level? Are new operations and concepts always constructed out of

those that came before, as in Piaget’s theory?

• Do levels represent discrete stages of major knowledge reorganization?

That is, can the levels can properly be described as stages? For

instance, do they satisfy the following criteria as described by Steffe and

Cobb {, 1988 #610}:

1. constancy—some property, state, or activity remains constant

throughout each stage;

2. incorporation—the earlier stage must become incorporated in

the next;

3. order invariance—the stages must emerge developmentally in a

constant order; and

4. integration—the structural properties that define a given stage

must form an integrated whole.

• Can we operationalize the levels? Most studies have used different

testing instruments, some of which are content oriented, some process

oriented. In addition, Fuys {, 1988 #14} has suggested that the mode

of presentation—verbal, pictorial, concrete—might influence students'

 Geometry - 46

performance on such tasks. Because the levels clearly depend on

instruction, we must be especially careful to consider the relationship

between instruction and levels in all future research.

• Exactly what ideas do students construct and what mental operations

must be attained in learning geometry? How does this development

occur in the early years?

• Does a transition from one level to the next depend on the acquisition of

certain types of knowledge, a restructuring of knowledge, or both? Does

this vary by topic, especially topics outside of plane geometry?

• How can level of thinking be related to and yet distinguished from

achievement {Senk, 1989 #444}?

• What curriculum factors help facilitate transitions from one level to the

next? This brings us to the next set of critical issues.

Issues regarding implications for teaching

Theory and research from the van Hiele perspective has strong

implications for instruction. Most of these implications have not been

adequately addressed in the research literature.

Educational goals for levels of thinking ***Ultimately, correct heading

types!

Opportunities for the construction of geometric ideas should be offered

early. Students do not reach the descriptive level of geometry in part

because they are not offered geometric problems in their early years {van

Hiele, 1987 #499}. The “prolonged period of geometric inactivity”

{Wirszup, 1976 #45, p. 85} of the early grades leads to “geometricly

deprived” children {Fuys, 1988 #546}.

van Hiele suggested that the initial focus of the study of geometry must

have as its goal the attainment of the second level of thought; "Geometric
 Geometry - 47

figures must become the bearer of their properties" {Wirszup, 1976 #45, p.

88}. He said that the subsequent focus of this study should be the

attainment of the third level of thought. Students should understand the

relations that connect properties of figures and begin to logically order the

properties of shapes. Most researchers agree that achieving level 2 and 3

thinking is an important goal of pre-secondary geometry instruction. When

van Hiele believed these levels should be attained remains in doubt,

however. In certain writings, he indicates that students in grades 1 to 5

should concern themselves with deepening thinking at the visual level 1 and

that higher levels should not be valued more highly than lower levels

(“There are no arguments to push towards a descriptive level: the visual

level is so extensive that the subjects there will last for years,” P. van Hiele,

Personal communication, Sept. 27, 1988). However, in other writings, both

van Hiele and other researchers emphasize the goal of level 2 thinking

earlier; for instance, by the end of the primary grades {Wirszup, 1976 #45}.

Such a goal may be attainable. The familiarity of an experimental class of

second graders with the geometry of solids enabled them to reach level 2,

surpassing 7th grades in the traditional curriculum {Wirszup, 1976 #45}.

The Russian researchers also claim that the period of accumulating facts

inductively should not be extended too long; they urge that simple

deductions be encouraged in elementary school. It is important to continue

study of these issues, because research consistently indicates that, if levels

are skipped, learning is rote {Wirszup, 1976 #45}.

Language

Imprecise language plagues students’ work in geometry and is a critical

factor in progressing through the levels {Burger, 1986 #41; Fuys, 1988

#546; Mayberry, 1983 #15}. Instruction should carefully draw distinctions

 Geometry - 48

between common usage and mathematical usage {Battista, 1990 #690;

Clements, in press #63; Fuys, 1988 #546}. Teachers need to constantly

remember that children’s concepts that underlie language may be vastly

different than the teachers think {Burger, 1986 #41; Clements, 1989

#543}. Thus, when mathematical language is used too early and when the

teacher does not use everyday speech as a point of reference, mathematical

language is learned without concomitant mathematical understanding {van

Hiele-Geldof, 1984 #547}.

Manipulatives and “real world” objects

Language, of course, rests on a foundation of real-world experiences,

and beginning with such experiences is strongly indicated by research. “The

deductive system of Euclid from which a few things have been omitted

cannot produce an elementary geometry. In order to be elementary, one

will have to start from the world as perceived and as already partially

globally known by the children. The objective should be to analyze these

phenomena and to establish a logical relationship. Only through an

approach modified in that way can a geometry evolve that may be called

elementary according to psychological principles” {van Hiele-Geldof, 1984

#547, p. 16}. Students should manipulate concrete geometric shapes and

materials so that they can "work out geometric shapes on their own" (p. 88).

Further research has concurred that students respond favorably to initial

introduction of concepts in real world settings and that manipulatives are

important and helpful, especially at the levels 0 and 1. The visual approach

seemed not only to maintain student interest but also to assist students in

creating definitions and conjectures and in gaining insight into relationships

{Fuys, 1988 #546}. Considering this and the deficiencies noted in

textbooks, it is imperative that teachers not rely solely on the text.

 Geometry - 49

Phases of Instruction

The phases of instruction are inextricably connected with the levels of

thinking, and potentially more important for education; therefore, it is

surprising and unfortunate that little research other than the van Hieles’ has

examined the phases directly. One study indicated 20 days of phase-based

instruction significantly raised high school students’ van Hiele level of

thought, more so from level 1 to level 2 than for any other levels, but did not

result in greater achievement in standard content or proof writing

{Bobango, 1988 #674}. Additional studies are sorely needed, especially

given unresolved questions and concerns regarding the phases; for

example:

• How are the phases of instruction related to the levels of thinking?

Hypothetically, students must be lead by the teacher through all five

phases to reach each new level; however, certain phases (e.g., 2 and 3)

appear to require of students types of thinking that are bound to a given

level (e.g., level 2). Van Hiele {, 1959 #360} criticized Piaget {, 1967

#43} for attaching his “stages of development” to one (preoperational)

period, but van Hieles’ phases may make the opposite mistake, in being

too flexible and iteratable across levels.

• Should the teacher attempt to proceed linearly through the phases, or

approach them as recursive within each level?

• Should the teacher introduce many concepts and guide students through

the levels on each of them in parallel, or work through the levels (say to

level 2 or 3) with a single concept and then use this as scaffolding to

develop higher levels of thinking for other concepts?

 Geometry - 50

• Is there a need for differentiation between pedagogical approaches for

different types of learning outcomes (e.g., concepts, skills, problem-

solving abilities)?

• What is the role of automatization and practice?

• The final phases would seem to enhancing transfer; must transfer also be

aided through the provision of systematic spaced reviews which include a

variety of problems?

Cognitive Science: Precise Models of Geometric Knowledge and Processes

A third major theoretical perspective that has been applied to

understanding students learning of geometry is that of cognitive science.

This field attempts to integrate research and theoretical work from

psychology, philosophy, linguistics, and artificial intelligence.

Anderson’s Model of Cognition

One cognitive science model, Anderson’s {, 1983 #549} ACT*,

postulates two types of knowledge, declarative and procedural. Declarative

knowledge is “knowing that”; for example, postulates and theorems would

be stored in schemas along with knowledge about their function, form, and

preconditions. Procedural knowledge, “knowing how,” is stored in the form

of production systems, or sets of condition-action pairs. If the condition, or

cognitive contingency that specifies the circumstances under which the

production can apply, matches some existing patterns of declarative

knowledge, the action is performed (usually, add new elements to working

memory; i.e., the store of information the system can currently access).

According to the ACT* model, all knowledge initially comes in

declarative form and must be interpreted by general procedures (e.g., one

uses general recipe-following procedures to cook a new dish using the

declarative knowledge read in a cookbook). Thus, procedural learning

 Geometry - 51

occurs only in executing a skill; one learns by doing. When declarative

information is in the form of direct instructions, such as a recipe, step-by-

step interpretation is straightforward. However, information is usually not

that direct. In the case of high school geometry, students may use

declarative information to provide data required by general problem-solving

operators (e.g., general search, sequential decomposition of problems,

means-ends analysis, inferential reasoning) or making analogies between

worked examples and new problems. Importantly, geometry textbooks

assume such operators (and virtually never directly specify procedures to be

applied), but this assumption is sometimes mistaken. For example, several

students studied by Anderson all had misunderstandings about how one

determines whether a statement is implied by a rule. In general, the

behaviors of these students on beginning proof problems was captured

accurately by this model.

In performing the task, proceduralization gradually replaces the original

interpretive application with productions that perform the behavior directly.

For example, instead of verbally rehearsing the side-angle-side rule in

geometry and figuring out how it applies, students build a production that

directly recognizes the application. In “English,” such a production might be:

IF the goal is to prove ∆XYZ @ ∆UVW

and XY @ UV

and YZ @ VW

THEN set a subgoal to prove – XYZ @ – UVW so SAS can be used

Proceduralization is complemented by a composition process that

combines sequences of productions. Together, proceduralization and

composition are called knowledge compilation, the creation of task-specific

productions through practice. One form of support for the knowledge

 Geometry - 52

compilation theory lies in protocols. One, for example, illustrates the

protracted, tediously incremental process initially followed by a student in

recognizing the application of the SAS postulate to a problem, compared to

the following recognition on a new task five problems latter: “Right off the

top of my head I am going to take a guess at what I am supposed to do…the

side-angle-side postulate is what they are getting to” {Anderson, 1983

#549, p. 234}. Three differences are noted: the application of the postulate

is faster, the statement of the postulate is no longer verbally rehearsed (i.e.,

evoking a declarative representation into working memory, replete with

failures leading to inaccuracies), and the original piecemeal application of

the postulate is replaced by a single step of recognition. In sum, according

to this theory, learning in the theory involves: (a) acquisition of declarative

knowledge, (b) application of declarative knowledge to new situations by

means of search and analogy, (c) compilation of domain-specific

productions, and finally, (d) the strengthening of declarative and procedural

knowledge {Anderson, n.d. #590}.

Thus, an important key to success in proof-oriented geometry problem

solving is the development of data-driven rules (i.e., low-level, unconscious

processing). These rules respond to configurations of information and result

in further development of the problem. For example, experts quickly

perceive relations such as triangle congruence, even without recognizing at

that time how this will figure in the proof. How might such achievement be

facilitated? In a succeeding section, the efforts of Anderson and his

colleagues in building an AI (artificial intelligence) tutor based on this theory

will help constitute their answer to this important question.

Greeno’s Model of Geometry Problem Solving

 Geometry - 53

Greeno’s {, 1980 #228} model of geometry problem solving is similar.

Based on think-aloud protocols obtained from six ninth-grade students, a

computer simulation was designed that solves the same problems as these

students were able to solve, in the same general ways that they solved

them. The simulation is a production system with in three types of

productions, considered to reflect three domains of geometry required for

students to solve the problems they are given.

First, propositions are used in making inferences (familiar statements

about geometric relations such as “Corresponding angles formed by parallel

lines and a transversal are congruent”), these inferences constituting the

main steps in geometry problem solving. Second, perceptual concepts are

used to recognize patterns that are mentioned in the antecedents of many

propositions (e.g., the corresponding angles). Third, strategic principles are

used in setting goals and planning (e.g., when solution requires showing that

two angles are congruent, one approach is to use relations such as

corresponding angles; another is to prove that triangles containing the

angles are congruent).

Of these, the first two are included explicitly in instructional materials.

However, strategic knowledge is not. References to that knowledge in the

materials is indirect at best, and most teachers do not explicitly identify

principles of strategy in their teaching. Students must acquire this

knowledge through induction from sequences of steps observed in example

solutions. Thus, the induced strategic principles are in the form of tacit

procedural knowledge, involving processes the student can perform but not

describe or analyze. These strategic principles are quite specific to the

domain of problems. Should they be taught directly? Greeno suggests that

they should because it is unlikely that unguided discovery is more effective

 Geometry - 54

than a more explicit form of instruction. If direct teaching is interpreted as

the teacher imposition of prescribed steps on students, it contrasts with van

Hiele’s characterization of students finding “their own way in the network of

relations”; if it is interpreted as teacher facilitation of students’ construction

and development of explicit awareness of strategies, the two positions are

not disparate.

PDP (Parallel Distributed Processing) Networks

Other cognitive science research suggests models with even more low-
level detail. For example, a PDP (parallel distributed processing) network

model might explain the holistic template representations of the lower levels

in the van Hiele hierarchy. Such a network possesses processing units that

represent conceptual objects such as features, words, or concepts, and

connections with activation weights between these units. It is the pattern

of interconnections among the units that constitutes the processing

system's knowledge structure in the domain; that is, what it knows and how

it responds {McClelland, 1986 #567}.54

How might such PDP networks more precisely represent students’

knowledge structures at different van Hiele levels? During the pre-

recognition level, neural network units that recognize certain commonly-

occurring visual features are formed; thus, these features become

recognizable. Shapes are “recognized” when certain patterns of links among

features become established and enable the child to respond to any of a

class of visual stimuli.

When a sufficient number of visual features become recognizable and

their detectors interconnected in patterns that correspond to common

shapes, the child progresses to the visual level. At this level, networks of

detector units serve as “shape recognizers” with patterns of activation

 Geometry - 55

representing initial schema for figures. Figures that match visual prototypes

“closely enough” cause certain patterns to be activated and thus the figures

to be recognized. Properties of figures are not recognized explicitly; the

visual features that embody these properties simply activate the prototype

recognizers. These representations are not usually reflected upon by the

child. However, when some reflection is necessitated (usually by external

requests, such as copying a figure), a pattern might be activated, but this

pattern may be inadequate. For example, students often encode the basic
configuration of a polygon rather than the number of sides, describing a

nonconvex quadrilateral as a “triangle with a notch” or a “triangle with a

side bent in” {Clements, 1989 #543}. With appropriate instruction,

property recognition units begin to form. That is, visual features become

sentient in isolation and are linked to a verbal label; the student becomes

capable of reflecting on the visual features and thus recognizing the shapes'

properties. This eventually leads to level 2, descriptive/analytic, thought.

This is all conjectural; however, it is meant to illustrate a possible cognitive

science interpretation of the current van Hiele theory. There is a frustrating

lack of progress in further explicating such notions as “network of relations”

and “find his way about in the field of symbols”; these ideas are interesting

and provocative, but they have not progressed to any greater degree of

theoretical specificity from their inception. (For a possible path for

elaboration, see {Minsky, 1986 #553, p. 131}).

Research has also substantiated the PDP-postulated existence of

multiple schemas. That is, students may possess several different visual

subschemas for figures (e.g., a vertically and a horizontally-oriented

rectangle) without accepting the “average” case (e.g., oblique). Neumann

{, 1977 #552} studied geometric patterns consisting of large rectangles

 Geometry - 56

each with two rectangles within it. The patterns varied on three dimensions:

size of outer rectangle, size of lower rectangle, and number of stripes in

upper rectangle. Subjects studied a preponderance of stimuli with extreme

values and few intermediate values of these three variables. They were

presented with test patterns and asked to rate their confidence that they

had already studied that pattern. Subjects did not average what they had

studied; instead, they rated the extremes much higher than the mean value

patterns, showing that they could extract out of multiple foci of centrality in
a stimulus set. While not addressing this question directly, studies on the

van Hiele theory are consistent with this finding {Burger, 1986 #41; Fuys,

1988 #546}.

As a final example, such a perspective helps explain people’s

recognition of a two–dimension representation of a three–dimensional cube.

First, why do we see a line as an edge; a region as an area of a three–

dimensional object? “Our vision–systems seem virtually compelled to group

the outputs of our sensors into entities” like these {Minsky, 1986 #553, p.

254}. What enables us to see those features as grouped together to form

larger objects? “Our vision–systems again are virtually compelled to

represent each of those features, be it a corner, edge, or area, as belonging

to one and only one larger object at a time…. Our vision–systems are born

equipped, at each of several different levels, with some sort of ‘locking–in’

machinery that at every moment permits each ‘part,’ at each level, to be

assigned to one and only one ‘whole’ at the next level” {Minsky, 1986 #553,

p. 254}. How do we recognize these objects as cubes? Our “memory–frame

machinery also uses ‘locking–in’ machinery that permits each object to be

attached only to one frame {i.e., schema} at a time. The end result is that

in every region of the picture, the frames must compete with each other to
 Geometry - 57

account for each feature” {Minsky, 1986 #553, p. 254}. A PDP model might

postulate units representing competing hypothesis concerning each vertex

of a Necker cube (e.g., the lower left vertex may either be a in the “front” or

“back” of the cube). The network consists of two interconnected

subnetworks, one corresponding to each of the two global interpretations of

the cube. They are mutually exclusive, and thus the spread of activation

through the network forces one or the other pattern—but not both—to be

activated at any given moment {McClelland, 1986 #567}.

The Three Theoretical Perspectives

The cognitive science models bring a precision to models of geometric

thinking not always present in the theories of Piaget (e.g., how do

assimilation and accommodation operate?) and van Hiele (e.g., exactly how

is a “network of relations” structured; of what does it consist?). For

example, Anderson’s and Greeno’s models identify knowledge structures

and processes in detail; the PDP models bring explicitness to certain specific

aspects of students’ representations at lower levels. However, limitations of

the cognitive science models also must be noted. With the small number of

subjects usually involved, generalizability is a concern. These models tend

not to explain the unsuccessful student, processes such as conjecturing and

problem finding, and the mechanisms of knowledge restructuring. Also, it is

not clear that the genesis of all procedural knowledge lies in the compilation

of previously-learned declarative knowledge. In fact, it would seem that

many students in the current curriculum acquire mathematical ideas only

procedurally (without connecting procedural to conceptual knowledge).

That is, students often perform sequences of mathematical processes

without being able to describe what they are doing or why, perhaps as

visually moderated sequences as described by Davis {, 1984 #581}. Most

 Geometry - 58

of these models do not address students’ development of qualitatively

different levels of thinking and representation, belief systems, motivation,

and meaningful interpretation of subject matter, and they de-emphasize the

roles of sensori-motor activity, intuition, and culture in mathematical

thinking {Cobb, 1989 #551; Fischbein, 1987 #548}. In fact, similarities

between computer simulations and student performance may be a reflection

of the paucity of situations in which learning and teaching are meaningful.

Nevertheless, the theories provide insights and useful metaphors, as well as

specific explications missing from most other perspectives.

The theories of Piaget and the van Hieles share certain important

characteristics. Both, for example, emphasize the role of the student in

actively constructing their own knowledge, as well as the non-verbal

development of knowledge that is organized into complex systems. For

example, van Hiele emphasizes that successful students do not learn facts,

names, or rules, but networks of relationships that link geometric concepts

and processes. These networks are eventually organized into schemata

{van Hiele, 1959 #360}. Thus, students must abstract mathematics from

their own systematic pattern of activities. Teachers cannot successfully

provide direct help to students who have not yet attained a certain level,

only indirect assistance. “If you want to know how far children have made

progress, do not wait for their imitation of your argumentation, but listen to

them for what they have found out themselves” (P. van Hiele, Personal

communication, Sept. 27, 1988). Thus, both theoreticians strongly disagree

with the belief that good teachers merely explain clearly to children to teach

them. Some mechanisms of development are also similar. Piaget stresses

the role of disequilibrium and resolution of conflicts. van Hiele implores

teachers to recognize students’ difficulties, but not avoid “crises of

 Geometry - 59

thinking,” because these facilitate the transition to the higher level. In

addition, both tend to avoid two positions: (a) the goal of education is to

unabatedly accelerate development (“we’ve identified levels; now how fast

can we get children through them”) and (b) the complete devaluation of

thinking at a lower level once a higher level is achieved. Espousal of these

positions can be heard in discussions of some who apply their theories to

practice, however, and the wisdom of either stance in unknown.

There are also important differences. As previously discussed, van Hiele

emphasizes that the course of development is strongly influenced by the

teaching/learning process. More significantly, van Hiele {, 1959 #360}

criticizes Piaget’s belief in logic as a basis of thinking, claiming that logic can

only develop on the foundation of earlier levels of thinking, levels that

Piaget supposedly “missed” because he already discovered stages of a

different nature. By Piaget’s “stages” van Hiele meant the stages of

transition; for example, from preoperational to concrete operational thought.

In these three stages, the child (a) does not understand a certain idea, (b) is

in transition, and (c) understands. van Hiele states that the “stages and

periods described by Piaget are not essentially connected with a particular

age, but are characteristic for very many learning processes irrespective of

the age at which they take place” {, 1959 #360, p. 14}. While intriguing, it

should be noted that these three “stages” constitute but a small part

Piaget’s developmental theory.

There are also problems with van Hiele’s claim that it “escaped Piaget

that the object of thought is quite different at the different levels, so that

there can be no question of reasoning at the first level being based on a

mastery of logical relations which belong to the third level and therefore

cannot yet be known” (p. 14). First, van Hiele makes a similar mistake that
 Geometry - 60

he attributes to Piaget—defining logic in his own image, or from his

constrained perspective. Second and more important, Piaget did

hypothesize that objects of thought differed at different developmental

stages. Both theorists believe that a critical instructional dilemma is

teaching about objects that are not yet objects of reflection for students.

Little research has been conducted on the issues of similarities,

differences, and potential syntheses of Piaget’s and van Hiele’s theories.

They appear connected. Denis {, 1987 #163} indicated that for high school
students, the van Hiele levels appear to be hierarchical across concrete and

formal operational Piagetian stages. She reported that only 36% of students

who had taken high school geometry had reached formal operational stage,

and that most of them attained only level 3 in the van Hiele hierarchy. She

also found a significant difference in van Hiele level between students at the

concrete and formal operational stages (although the nature of this

relationship is equivocal).

Recall that the argument presented for the existence of a level 0 is

based on a partial synthesis of the theories of Piaget and van Hiele. Greater

synthesis might be possible. For example, it may be that van Hiele’s level 2

represents a reconstruction on the abstract/conscious/verbal plane of those

geometric conceptualizations that Piaget and Inhelder {, 1967 #43}

hypothesized were first constructed on the perceptual plane and then

reconstructed on the representational/imaginal plane. Thus, level 2 may

depend in many ways on what Piaget termed the construction of

“articulated mental imagery.” There is a potential and a need for more

detailed work in this area. For example, investigations need to consider

how visual thinking is manifest when higher levels are achieved. As our

discussions below will indicate, it is doubtful that it is untransformed and

 Geometry - 61

merely “pushed into the background” by more sophisticated ways of

thinking. The same psychological process, visual thinking, probably has a

number of psychological layers, from more primitive to more sophisticated

(the latter being interconnected with other ways of thinking), which play

different roles in thinking depending on which layer is activated. Study of

the development must go beyond investigating only the growth of

increasingly sophisticated levels of geometric thinking to investigating the

continual development of processes such as visual thinking that appear

initially well developed {Vygotsky, 1934/1986 #676}.

In general, research that builds on the strengths of all three theoretical

perspectives might have potential. For example, Piaget’s schemes, van

Hiele’s network of relations, and cognitive science’s more explicit

declarative networks certainly possess commonalities in their view of

knowledge structure, and it is possible that a synthesis of these would yield

a richer and more veridical model. Ideally, such a model would have the

explication of the cognitive science perspective and the developmental

aspects of the Piagetian and van Hiele perspectives.

Establishing Truth in Geometry

How do mathematicians establish “truth?” They use proof—logical,

deductive reasoning based on axioms. How do they “find” truth? Most

frequently by methods that are intuitive or empirical in nature {Eves, 1972

#2}. In fact, the process by which new mathematics is established is belied

by the deductive format in which it is recorded {Lakatos, 1976 #16}. In

creating mathematics, problems are posed, conjectures made,

counterexamples offered, conjectures revised—a theorem results when this

refinement of ideas is judged to have answered a significant question. Bell

{, 1976 #49} distinguishes three functions for proof in mathematics:

 Geometry - 62

verification—concerned with establishing the truth of a proposition;

illumination—concerned with conveying insight into why a proposition is

true; and systematisation—organization of propositions into a deductive

system.

In geometry, as in other areas of mathematics, empirical and deductive

methods should interact and reinforce each other. For instance, oftentimes,

when one is stymied in taking a deductive approach, empirical

investigations can generate possibilities that can be explored. However, for

most students in geometry, deduction and empirical methods are separate

domains with different ways to establish correctness {Schoenfeld, 1986

#46}. In fact, the use of formal deduction among students who are taking

or have taken secondary school geometry is nearly absent {Burger, 1986

#41; Usiskin, 1982 #42}. According to Schoenfeld, most students who have

had a year of high school geometry are “naive empiricists whose approach

to straightedge and compass constructions is an empirical guess-and-test

loop” {Schoenfeld, 1986 #46, p. 243}. Students make a conjecture, then

test it by examining their construction. If the construction looks sufficiently

accurate, the student is satisfied that the conjecture has been verified. “In

various problem sessions students have rejected correct solutions because

they did not look sufficiently accurate and have accepted incorrect solutions

because they looked good” (p. 243). In one series of interviews, college

students were asked to solve a construction problem after having solved a

proof problem that provided a solution to the construction problem. “Nearly

a third of the students began the second problem by making conjectures

that flatly violated the results they had just proved!” {Schoenfeld, 1988

#435, p. 150}. Evidently, the students’ proof activity either had not really

established knowledge for the students (as it should have) or the knowledge
 Geometry - 63

that was established was compartmentalized in such a way that it was not

accessible in the domain of constructions. According to Schoenfeld,

instructional strategies used in the high school classrooms might be the

cause for this compartmentalization. Although theorems and deduction

were used to introduce and validate constructions, the emphasis was on

constructions as procedures—that is, on skill acquisition.

It should be noted that Schoenfeld's investigation of “empirical

methods” was restricted to students’ use of constructions, which are usually

taught as procedures that have value in and of themselves. Other empirical

approaches might produce somewhat different results. For instance,

constructions on a computer might be better for students because (a) they

require more precise specification than those done with paper and pencil,

and (b) because the computer performs the constructions, the teacher can

treat the topic less as a set of procedures to be learned and thus focus more

on concept development. Even with computer constructions, however, we

might need to worry about the pitfalls of promoting an empiricist approach.

For instance, in commenting on the computer software Geometric Supposer,

Schoenfeld {, 1986 #46} wondered if the ability of the program to repeat

constructions automatically would lead students to be overly empirical.

Judah Schwartz (the software’s author) replied to him by recounting an

instance where the opposite seemed to have happened. One student tried

to convince another student that something was true by appealing to a

large collection of confirming examples. Another student countered that the

class had seen lots of constructions that worked for many examples but

later had turned out to be incorrect. Thus, and maybe because deduction

arises from empirical approaches, the latter student had, through

experience with empiricism, discovered its limitations. This was certainly an

 Geometry - 64

important step toward appreciating a need for the deductive approach to

establishing truth in geometry. Apparently this is not an isolated case: As

we will discuss below, research indicates that the Geometric Supposer’s

empirical measurement approach does not negatively affect students’ ability

to learn proof.

Other studies have confirmed the existence of student confusion

concerning methods of justifying mathematical statements. In a study by

Martin and Harel {, 1989 #47}, preservice elementary teachers were asked
to judge the mathematical correctness of inductive and deductive

verifications of statements. For each statement, more than half the

students accepted an inductive argument and more than 60% accepted a

deductive argument as a valid mathematical proof. Fifty-two percent

accepted an incorrect deductive argument as valid for an unfamiliar

statement. Fischbein and Kedem {, 1982 #715} found that high school

students, after finding or learning a correct proof for a statement,

maintained that surprises are still possible and that further checks are

desirable. In a study of students of age 12 to 15, Galbraith {, 1981 #31}

found that over a third of the students did not understand that

counterexamples must satisfy the conditions of a conjecture but violate the

conclusion; 18% felt that one counterexample was not sufficient to disprove

a statement.

According to Martin and Harel, in everyday life, people consider “proof”

essentially to be “what convinces me.” Bell {, 1976 #49} suggested that

“conviction arrives most frequently as the result of the mental scanning of a

range of items which bear on the point in question, this resulting eventually

in an integration of the ideas into a judgment” (p. 24). According to Bell,

proof grows out of internal testing and the resultant acceptance or rejection
 Geometry - 65

of a generalization. Later, one subjects the generalization to criticism by

others, first by telling, then through written statements which present not

only the generalization but evidence for its validity in the form of a proof.

Thus, students will not appreciate the purpose of formal proof until they

recognize the public status of knowledge and the resultant need for public

verification.

Of crucial importance here is the idea of “internal testing.” For a

mathematician, internal tests eventually take the form of proof—one

attempts to perform the socially accepted criticism of one’s argument

oneself. But do students perform this testing, and, if so, how? When

quizzed about their justifications for ideas, students may refer to general

propositions, specific instantiations of general propositions, diagrams, and

isolated results that are unconnected to justifications {Talyzina, 1971

#713}. Of course, the latter two justifications are problematic; the first of

these, because students often make unwarranted assumptions based on

diagrams, and the second, because students are ignoring the need for one’s

reasoning to be laid out in detail so that it can be evaluated. Talyzina also

found that younger students much more often than older students recalled a

general proposition rather than a specific, relevant instantiation of that

general proposition. It was claimed that the latter behavior “is characteristic

of the higher stages of mastering the ability to solve geometry problems”

(p. 98). That is, a characteristic of more accomplished thinking in geometry

is a curtailment of step-by-step deductive thought.

Students’ Proof Performance.

About one month before the end of the school year, Senk {, 1985 #27}

tested the proof-writing ability of 1,520 students in geometry classes that

had studied the topic. A proof was considered correct if all the steps
 Geometry - 66

followed logically, even if there were minor errors in notation, vocabulary, or

names of theorems. Seventy percent of students were correct on a simple

six-step proof in which they were to supply either the reason or the

statement. Fifty-one percent of students were correct on a simple proof

requiring an auxiliary line and in which the students had to write both

statements and reasons themselves. Thirty-two percent of the students

could prove that the diagonals of a rectangle are congruent, but a mere 6%

proved a somewhat more difficult theorem that did not follow directly from
the triangle-congruence postulates/theorems. Just 3% of the students

received perfect scores on the test. On only three of the twelve problems

which required a full proof were at least half of the students successful.

Senk concluded that only about 30% of students in full-year geometry

courses that teach proof reach a 75% mastery level in proof writing.

Brumfiel {, 1973 #50} queried 52 high school students who had taken

an accelerated geometry course the previous year and were headed for an

advanced placement calculus course about geometry. When asked to list as

many postulates as they could remember, 50% of the students listed

nothing at all and 31% listed only statements that were not postulates.

Forty percent of the students could not list a single theorem, with many

mixing theorems with axioms, definitions and false statements. When asked

to choose one interesting theorem and to prove it, 81% students did not

attempt a proof and only one of the 10 students who did was correct.

Apparently, even bright students get very little meaningful mathematics out

of the traditional, proof-oriented high school geometry course.

The Development of Proof Skills.

Given students' poor performance on proof writing, it is imperative to

investigate the development of this important skill. What are its

 Geometry - 67

components? What are the prerequisites for proof writing? When do

children first attempt to justify their conclusions? How do they go about it?

Several components for understanding and constructing proofs have

been suggested by Galbraith {, 1981 #31}. They are: a) understanding

that (and being able to perform) an exhaustive check of the set of

possibilities required to verify a statement; b) detecting and utilizing a

relevant pattern or principle in the data; c) utilizing a chain of inferences

(not needing to establish intermediate steps with concrete referents); d)

recognizing the domain of validity of a generalization; e) correctly

interpreting statements and definitions; and f) understanding the formal

structure of proof. van Hiele, Piaget, and other theorists have offered

several different perspectives on the development of proof skills. Piaget

{Piaget, 1928 #711; Piaget, 1960 #712; Piaget, 1987 #52} for example,

described levels for the notions of justification and proof. We will give a

broad overview of these levels (the numbers used for the levels are a

synthesis so they do not necessarily correspond to those of Piaget).

Level 1 (up to age 7-8): In decisions about the truth of ideas, there is a

lack of integration of observations and local conclusions. Each piece of data

collected or example examined is treated as a separate event that is not

integrated with other events. Exploration proceeds randomly, without a

plan. Local conclusions may be contradictory. The lack of direction in

thinking is due to the fact that “there is nothing here which tends to make

thought conscious of itself and consequently to systematize or ‘direct’ its

successive judgments” {Piaget, 1928 #711, p. 15}. Being egocentric, the

child does not attempt to see the point of view of another nor to think about

making his or her viewpoint understood by others.

 Geometry - 68

At the end of this level, there is some degree of integration and more

purposeful exploration. Thought is more directed. Students begin to

understand that several clues or examples must be integrated to draw

conclusions. Although patterns are established empirically, this is done

without attempting to understand why the patterns occur. For instance,

when students were putting together angles of a triangle, they were shown

what happened for one triangle and asked to predict what would happen for

others. The students counted the angles and predicted that shapes with
three angles would produce semicircles and shapes with four, circles.

However, they ignored the size of angles; they did not attempt to determine

why the pattern occurred.

The child at this level is capable of the most elementary form of

deduction. It “consists either of foreseeing what will happen when such and

such conditions are given, or in reconstructing what has happened when

such and such results are given” {Piaget, 1928 #711, p. 66}.

Level 2 (ages 7-8 through 11-12): As students begin this level, they not

only make predictions based on empirical results, they begin trying to justify

their predictions. Induction and deduction often conflict. In the angles task,

they attempted to analyze the angles for each new example. But, because

they were unable to see the sizes of the three angles as interdependent,

they were often misled by the appearance of the angles, and often seem

less advanced than the students at level 1. Children’s incorrect predictions

seemed to lead them to analyze interrelationships between the angles, but

they were unable to establish a general relationship. There is also an

anticipatory character and purposefulness to searches for information. For

example, students might use information to establish classes of possibilities

and nonpossibilities in a search task.

 Geometry - 69

During the latter part of this level, inductive generalizations take place

more quickly and often immediately. Each instance is compared with

previous instances. On the angles task, children are able to establish a

relationship between the three angles of a triangle. Also, there is no longer

a contradiction between the analysis of the angles in individual triangles and

the inductive generalization about their sum. “On the contrary, the

induction itself which leads the subject to believe that the angles of any

triangle will yield a semi-circle provides an anticipatory schema which guides

the composition of the angles of new triangles” (p. 204). The discovery

becomes universal “‘They always do {form a semi-circle}’” (p. 204).

Students at this level, however, do not establish logical necessity. Even

after empirically eliminating all possible answers but one, one student said

“I prefer opening other ones {clues}, you never know” (p. 114).

There is the capability of implication for these children “when reasoning

rests upon beliefs and not upon assumptions, in other words, when it is

founded on actual observation. But such deduction is still realistic, which

means that the child cannot reason from premises without believing in

them. Or even if he reasons implicitly from assumptions which he makes on

his own, he cannot do so from those which are proposed to him” (pp. 251-

52). Thus, although thought is logical, it is empirical in nature.

Level 3 (ages 11-12 and beyond): The child is capable of formal,

deductive reasoning based on any assumptions. The soundness of the

assumptions does not affect the validity of the argument. Logical necessity

is established by the method employed. Students integrate information that

has been revealed by various actions and decide what information must be

obtained from further actions. At level 2, “the deficiency that remains is the

failure to recognize exhaustivity, which prevents subjects from considering

 Geometry - 70

their proofs as sufficient even when they are. Only at level {3} does

progress in integration lead to the conviction that the conditions established

as being necessary, when taken together, are also sufficient” (p. 116).

For the angle task, students progressed from simply believing that the

angles will always make a semi-circle to a belief, based on logical reasoning,

that this must necessarily be so. For example, they might state that the

three angles make a semi-circle because “the angles (at the base of an

elongated isosceles triangle) aren’t quite right angles, and the point makes
up the difference” (p. 205). However, the logical reasoning that is used by

the students is not based on formal mathematics. So the students may

have believed that the three angles must necessarily form a semi-circle, but

they usually could not provide a formal reason.

In summary, at level 1, the child’s thinking is nonreflective and

unsystematic, and therefore, not logical. At level 2, thought is logical, but

restricted to being empirical. Only at level 3, is the child capable of logical

deduction and of consciously operating within a mathematical system.

What causes progress through the levels? From where does the need for

verification arise? “Surely it must be the shock of our thought coming into

contact with that of others, which produces doubt and the desire to

prove....Proof is the outcome of argument” {Piaget, 1928 #711, p. 204}.

Due to contact with others, the child becomes ever more conscious of his or

her own thought, becoming “conscious of the definitions of the concepts he

is using” and acquiring “a partial aptitude for introspecting his own mental

experiments” (p. 243). The child becomes increasingly able to take the

perspective of others. Finally, with the onset of formal thought, mental

experiments, in which reality is constructed by reproducing in thought

sequences of events as they have happened or are imagined to happen, are

 Geometry - 71

replaced by logical experiments, in which the actual mechanism for

construction is reflected upon. At this time, arguments can, in a real sense,

be internalized; “Logical experiment is therefore an experiment carried out

on oneself for the detection of contradiction” (p. 237).

van Hiele’s View

According to van Hiele, the reasoning of students at the visual and

descriptive/analytic levels is quite different when they identify a figure. For

the student at the visual level, the judgment is “based on an observation”

{van Hiele, 1986 #39, p. 110}, “There is no why, one just sees it” (p. 83).

For the student at the descriptive/analytic level, the judgment results “from

a network of relations” (p. 110). The thinking of students at the

descriptive/analytic level may involve observation; it may be that they see

an image whenever they consider a given figure. But the image is not the

basis for judgment, the network of relations is. Even if a figure was

imperfectly drawn (or distorted on a computer screen), such students'

thinking would not be swayed if they were assured that it was the intention

of the drawer to make the sides all equal. van Hiele continues that it is this

network of relations that distinguishes between the two levels. At the

beginning, one does not possess the network.

Once a class of shapes is thought of as a collection of properties (at

level 2), the relationship between a figure and other figures is determined,

and can be reflected upon. An elementary form of associational implication

can take place. However, “What it means to say that some property

'follows' from another cannot be explained” (p. 111). At level 3, in contrast,

the contents of statements A and B are not important. “The only things of

importance for the further train of thought are the links existing between A

and B. With these links the new network of relations is constructed.... When
 Geometry - 72

this second network of relations is present in so perfect a form that its

structure can, as it were, be read from it, when the pupil is able to speak to

others about this structure, then the building blocks are present for the

network of the third level” (p. 112). A technical language develops that

makes it possible to communicate with others about the essential ideas in

the network of relations (i. e., to reason). “Without the network of relations,

reasoning is impossible” (p. 110). But with the power of communication that

results from the technical language comes an obligation to “stick to the

network of relations.” That is, with formal reasoning comes constraints. But

therein lies the difficulty for many students. They do not know what the

constraints are nor do they understand why they apply.

According to van Hiele, the intuitive foundation of proof “begins with a

pupil's statement that belief in the truth of some assertion is connected with

belief in the truth of other assertions. The notion of this connection is

intuitive: The laws of such a connection can only be learned by analysis” {,

1986 #39, p. 124}. Logic is created by analyzing and abstracting these

laws, that is, by operating on the network of links between statements. de

Villiers {, 1987 #53} concurs that deductive reasoning first occurs at level 3,

when the network of logical relations between properties of concepts is

established. He continues that because students at levels 1 or 2 do not

doubt the validity of their empirical observations, proof is meaningless to

them—they see it as justifying the obvious.

Van Dormolen {, 1977 #30} describes three levels of proof performance

and relates them to the van Hiele levels. In the first, justifications are made

for single cases; conclusions are restricted to the specific example for which

the justification is given (e.g., a particular rectangle). In the second,

justifications and conclusions may be for specific cases, but refer to

 Geometry - 73

collections of similar objects (e.g., the class of rectangles); several examples

will be considered to illustrate a pattern, with students capable of

generating further examples. In the third, students justify statements by

forming arguments that conform to accepted norms; that is, they are

capable of giving formal proofs. Van Dormolen relates his first level to van

Hiele’s visual level of thinking; his second to van Hiele’s descriptive/analytic;

and his third to van Hiele’s level of formal deduction in which students

attend to the properties of arguments. It should be observed that although

students in van Dormolen’s second level have made progress, their method

is fraught with potential for error. For instance, as students reason about a

class of shapes by examining specific cases, they often attend to properties

of the particular instances—and thus make mistakes about the class in

general.

van Hiele Levels and the Ability to Construct Proofs.

As can be seen from the above descriptions, a proof-oriented geometry

course requires thinking at least at level 3 in the van Hiele hierarchy.

However, over 70% of students begin high school geometry at levels 0 or 1,

and only those students who enter at level 2 (or higher) have a good chance

of becoming competent with proof by the end of the course {Shaughnessy,

1985 #623}. It follows, therefore, that instruction help students attain

higher levels of geometric thought before they begin a proof-oriented study

of geometry.

Senk {, 1989 #444} investigated the relationship between van Hiele

levels, writing geometry proofs, and achievement in nonproof geometry.

Students enrolled in full-year geometry classes were tested in the fall for

van Hiele level and entering level geometry knowledge, and in the spring for

van Hiele level, knowledge of geometry, and proof-writing ability. It was

 Geometry - 74

found that achievement in writing geometry proofs was positively correlated

with van Hiele level (.5 in the fall, .6 in the spring) and to achievement on

nonproof content (.7 in the spring). Senk argued that students who start

geometry at level 0 have little chance of learning to write proofs, students at

level 1 have less than a 1 in 3 chance, and students at level 2 have a 50-50

chance. Level 2 is the critical entry level. She noted that at the end of the

school year, students at levels 3 and above significantly outperformed (on

proof) students at levels 2 and below, but students at levels 4 and 5 did not
score significantly better than students at level 3. (Possibly because of the

low n's for the upper two levels.) Indeed, 4%, 13%, and 22% of students at

levels 0, 1, and 2, but 57%, 85%, and 100% at levels 3, 4, and 5,

respectively, were classified as having mastered proof writing. These data

seem to support that van Hiele level 4 is the level at which students master

proof, with level 3 being a transitional level. One might conjecture that

students at level 3 probably are not able to do substantial proofs that they

have not seen before (or actually understand what the proofs entail or

accomplish). However, van Hiele’s hierarchical theory that only students at

Levels 4 or 5 should be expected to consistently write formal proofs was not

strictly supported by the research.

Spring achievement on nonproof content accounted for 57% of the

variance in proof scores, but van Hiele test scores accounting for only an

additional 3%. Although Han {, 1986 #234} also found that van Hiele level

predicted performance on a proof-writing test, the relatively small

contribution of van Hiele level to prediction above that of standard

achievement test scores must be explained {Senk, 1989 #444}. It may be

due to the difficulty of separating level of thinking from content. (The

correlation between the van Hiele test and content was .6.)
 Geometry - 75

A Conflict

There seems to be a great difference in emphasis between van Hiele

and Piaget on how geometric reasoning and proof, develop. For van Hiele,

the emphasis seems to be on content; one progresses to higher levels of

thought in geometry when the network of relations becomes sufficiently

built up. The ability to reason logically in geometry is dependent on the

amount and organization of content-specific knowledge. According to

Piaget, however, certain logical operations develop in students independent

of the content to which they are applied. These operations can be applied in

a variety of contexts, and it is through these operations that new

mathematical knowledge is established. For instance, if a student knows

that a rectangle is a figure that has opposite sides equal and four right

angles, and a square is a figure that has all sides equal and four right

angles, then the student may deduce and internalize the fact that all

squares are rectangles. The conclusion is thus newly created knowledge

that has, by virtue of deduction, been integrated into the student's current

cognitive structure.

In support of the Piagetian perspective, Driscoll {, 1983 #3}, has

emphasized the role of cognitive development in the acquisition of the

ability to construct proofs, claiming that students need to be formal

operational thinkers to completely understand and construct proofs. As

evidence, he noted that on logic items from the 1978 NAEP (on which even

the 17-year-olds did poorly), there was a much greater jump in performance

between the 7 and 13-year-olds, than between the 13 and 17-year-olds.

Furthermore, Gardner {, 1983 #17} suggests that only during the formal

operational period can individuals deal with the idea of abstract spaces or

with formal rules governing space. That is, formal geometry can be
 Geometry - 76

constructed only by individuals who can integrate logico-mathematical and

spatial intelligence into a scientific system. McDonald {, 1989 #48}

provides support for the notion that the nature of thought that a student is

capable of affects the student's construction of knowledge in geometry.

Twenty secondary students classified as formal operational and twenty as

concrete operational made judgements about the similarity of 13 geometric

concepts from the area of similarity and congruence. Multidimensional

scaling techniques indicated that prototypical cognitive maps could be

drawn for both the formal and concrete operational students. Furthermore,

formal operational students' structure of the content was significantly more

like that of subject matter experts than that of the concrete operational

students. Finally, in contrast to van Hiele’s theory, Mason {, 1989 #614}

reported that the reasoning ability of fourth to eighth graders was far

beyond what may have been anticipated, given their low van Hiele level of

geometric thinking. These students evinced logical thinking indicative of

level 2, but without knowledge of specific definitions or geometric content

corresponding to that level.

We conclude, then, that this is not a “chicken or egg?” type of problem.

There exists a dynamic interplay between level of reasoning and

organization of knowledge. An important research issue is the elaboration of

this interplay—how does the organization of knowledge depend on the stage

of operational thinking, how does the stage of thinking depend on

knowledge organization?

Proof and Instruction.

There have been numerous attempts to improve students’ proof skills

by teaching formal proof in novel ways, almost all of which have been

unsuccessful {Harbeck, 1981 #235; Ireland, 1974 #269; Martin, 1971 #346;
 Geometry - 77

Summa, 1982 #474; Van Akin, 1972 #496}. An alternate approach claims

that for students to develop an ability with proof, they must understand its

nature. For example, Driscoll {, 1983 #3} reported a study by Greeno and

Magone in which college students who had had high school geometry but

were not very good at it were given a two hour training program on proof-

checking. The instructional program not only taught students specific steps

to follow in checking a proof, it provided students the opportunity to analyze

the nature of proofs. The researchers found that the experimental students
were not only more effective than control students at checking proofs but

did better at constructing proofs as well. They hypothesized that students

needed to understand the nature of proof and how it differed from everyday

argumentation.

Fuys claimed that some 6th and 9th graders in their teaching

experiment made progress toward level 3 thinking “by following and

summarizing deductive explanations, and giving deductive arguments”

{Fuys, 1988 #14, p. 9}. There was indication that some students inability to

do proofs was attributable to students believing that justification is

something that others do for them—“this is true because it is a theorem or

procedure I learned in class.”

Bell {, 1976 #49} suggested that success in proof could be promoted

through cooperative investigations by students in which conjectures were

made and conflicts were resolved by students presenting arguments and

evidence. Fawcett {, 1938 #621} conducted a two-year experiment in

geometry with the results supporting this contention. Students were

challenged to develop their own axioms, definitions, and theorems, and to

examine, debate, and justify their conjectures. At the end of the two years,

the experimental students scored higher than traditional students in

 Geometry - 78

geometry and both experimental students and their parents claimed that

the students' deductive thinking had improved. Fawcett also observed

student behaviors that indicated an understanding of proof such as: asking

for significant words and phrased in statements to be carefully defined,

requiring evidence to support conclusions, analyzing evidence, recognizing,

analyzing, and reevaluating stated and unstated assumptions, and

evaluating arguments.

In a similar vein, Human and Nel {, 1989 #629} reported success in a

geometry course, based on the van Hiele model, that attempted a “gentle

introduction” to deductive and axiomatic thinking. The intent was to make

proof as meaningful as possible by initially including proofs of non-obvious

statements and by having students formulate their own hypotheses to

prove. The materials begin to develop deductive skill by reviewing some

“familiar statements” about triangles, and then asking students to solve

problems by thinking , with the aid of these statements. For example:

“Given triangle PQR, PQ = PR, and the exterior angle at R being 100°, supply

as much additional information about the triangle as you can and explain

how you obtained this information.”

The results of Human and Nel, and especially Fawcett, are consistent

with an analysis of proof by Hanna {, 1989 #701}. She argues that,

because mathematical results are presented formally by mathematicians in

the form of theorems and proofs, this rigorous practice is mistakenly seen by

many as the core of mathematical practice. It is then assumed that

“learning mathematics must involve training in the ability to create this

form” (pp. 22-23). Instructional treatments that have been based on this

view have generally failed to accomplish their goals probably because the

students are attempting to follow formal rules that are unconnected to any
 Geometry - 79

activity that they find meaningful. On the other hand, studies that have

attempted to involve students in the crucial elements of mathematical

discovery and discourse—conjecturing, careful reasoning, and the building of

validating arguments that can be scrutinized by others—have shown more

positive effects.

In summary, we have seen that students are extremely unsuccessful

with formal proof in geometry. This is disappointing given the amount of

time in the curriculum devoted to this goal. However, our analysis of

students' proof making abilities reveals a far more devastating finding.

Students are deficient in their ability to establish truth in geometry, and

indeed, all of mathematics. They have not developed those beliefs and

schemas that motivate and allow them to establish mathematical truths.

Indeed, if we adopt a constructivist perspective on mathematics learning, as

students construct mathematical meaning, as they build a network of

knowledge in mathematics, the process by which they establish

mathematical truth for themselves becomes vitally important. For, in the

process of constructing and restructuring mathematical knowledge, students

must decide what they believe to be mathematical truths. Each newly

encountered idea is accepted as true or rejected as false based on current

knowledge and reasoning structures. Each of these decisions, in turn,

buttresses the current structures or causes them to be reorganized.

Obviously, more research attention must be devoted to how students

establish truth and how they come to understand and utilize proof in their

mathematical thinking. Work such as Piaget's, which documents the

development of knowledge verification skills, is important. But much of this

work was done in a context divorced from formal mathematics. Do the

same results obtain in situations where students are exploring mathematics

 Geometry - 80

in classroom situations? Can we elaborate on the levels of verification?

What types of tasks and environments encourage students to progress to

higher levels of verification? How is students’ knowledge organization

affected by their methods of establishing truth?

Spatial Reasoning

Gardner {, 1983 #17, p. 8} argues that spatial ability is one of the

several “relatively autonomous human intellectual competences” which he

calls “human intelligences.” Spatial thinking is essential to scientific

thought. It is used to represent and manipulate information in learning and

problem solving. The “metaphoric ability to discern similarities across

diverse domains derives in many instances from a manifestation of spatial

intelligence” {Gardner , 1983 #17, p. 176}. An example is when scientists

draw analogies between human society and micro-organisms or brain

function. According to Harris {, 1981 #11}, the U.S. Employment Service

estimates that most technical-scientific occupations such as draftsman,

airplane designer, architect, chemist, engineer, physicist, and

mathematician require persons having spatial ability at or above the 90th

percentile.

The Relationship Between Spatial Thinking and Mathematics

Hadamard argued that much of the thinking that is required in higher

mathematics is spatial in nature. Einstein commented that his elements of

thought were not words, but “certain signs and more or less clear images

which can be voluntarily reproduced or combined” {Gardner, 1983 #17, p.

190}. Numerous mathematicians and mathematics educators have

suggested that spatial ability and visual imagery play a vital role in

mathematical thinking {Lean, 1981 #4; Wheatley, 1990 #688}. Perhaps

 Geometry - 81

underlying this position is the recognition that different modes of thought

are used in mathematics.

Krutetskii {, 1976 #57}, for instance, refers to two different modes of

thought—verbal-logical and visual-pictorial. He argues that the balance

between these two modes of thought allows for different “mathematical

casts of mind” which determine how an individual operates on mathematical

ideas. He classified as analytic, those students who prefer verbal-logical

modes of thought in mathematical problem solving, even for problems that

would yield to a relatively simple visual approach; geometric, those who

prefer visual-pictorial schemes even on problems more easily solved with

analytic means; and harmonic, those who have no specific preference for

either verbal-logical or visual-pictorial thinking. The theory of hemispheric

specialization of the brain corroborates the existence of two modes of

thought {Springer, 1981 #58}. A great deal of physiological evidence

indicates that the two hemispheres of the brain are specialized for different

modes of thought processing. In general, the left hemisphere is specialized

for analytic/logical thinking in both verbal and numerical operations; it

excels in sequential tasks, logical reasoning, and analysis of the components

of a stimulus. Language is processed in the left hemisphere. The right

hemisphere, on the other hand, predominates for spatial tasks, artistic

endeavor, and body image. It seems specialized for holistic thinking.

“Although the left hemisphere seems to be as competent as the right in

identifying the Euclidean (and nameable) properties of objects (i.e., points,

lines, and planes), it is much less capable than the right in identifying the

less nameable topological properties such as transformations involving

changes in lengths, angles, and shapes” {Franco, 1977 #714, p. 108}.

 Geometry - 82

In fact, positive correlations have been found between spatial ability

and mathematics achievement at all grade levels {Guay, 1977 #232;

Fennema, 1977 #193; Fennema, 1978 #697}. It is not difficult to see why,

for there are numerous concepts in mathematics that have an obvious visual

dimension. Davis {, 1986 #62}, for example, describes what “cognitive

building blocks” are needed to determine the area of a rotated square on a

geoboard. In addition to mental images of squares and triangles, he cites

mental representations of the acts of rotating and translating triangles, of

putting them together to make other shapes, and even of cutting apart

squares to get triangles. Similarly, Soviet researchers have emphasized the

importance of spatial thinking in geometry, “Visualizations are used as a

basis for assimilating abstract (geometric) knowledge and individual

concepts” {Yakimanskaya, 1971 #10,p. 145}. For instance, understanding

the concept of rectangle and its properties requires that students analyze

the spatial relationship of the sides of a rectangle—that is, understand

“opposite” sides and distinguish them from “adjacent” sides. It was argued

that teachers should provide activities for developing students' spatial

imagination because assimilation would be “formalistic” if the teacher did

not develop students' spatial images, but provided verbal information about

the properties of figures instead.

Hershkowitz {, 1989 #704} outlined the role of visualization in the

development of a student’s conceptualization of a geometric idea and

related this development to the van Hiele levels. First, a prototypical

example is used as a reference to which possible exemplars are compared

visually (van Hiele level 1). Second, the prototypical visual example is used

to derive the critical attributes of the concept (transition from level 1 to level

2) which are then applied in judging other figures. Finally, the critical
 Geometry - 83

attributes or properties of the concept are used to judge whether figures are

instances of the concept (level 2). Battista and Clements {, 1990 #690}

found a similar developmental sequence among students doing geometry in

a Logo environment.

Moreover, visual thinking is utilized by many students in representing

and operating on concepts that do not inherently contain a spatial aspect

{Krutetskii, 1976 #57; Lean, 1981 #4}. Because of instruction, for instance,

students may think of fractions and operations on fractions in visual terms

{Clements, 1989 #695}. In fact, heavy reliance on visual representations of

mathematical ideas might be especially important at the elementary school

level {Stigler, 1990 #568} because young children rely more heavily on

imagery than do adults {Kosslyn, 1983 #612}.

Indeed, Johnson {, 1987 #18} argues that imagery is what enables us

to utilize our bodily experiences to structure all thought, not just

mathematics. There are two mechanisms by which this process occurs. The

first is the image schema, “a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual

interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our

experience” (p. xiv). For example, the vertical schema is the abstract

cognitive structure that emerges from our natural tendency to employ an

up-down orientation in structuring our experience. We encounter this

structure repeatedly as we perceive objects and maneuver about the world.

The second concept that is useful for understanding the role of bodily

experience in thinking is the metaphor. According to Johnson, a metaphor is

"a pervasive mode of understanding by which we project patterns from one

domain of experience in order to structure another domain of a different

kind" (p. xv). It is one of the primary cognitive mechanisms by which we

structure and make sense of experiences. Because physical experience is so

 Geometry - 84

fundamental to intellectual development, image schema become a primary

source for metaphors. "Through metaphor, we make use of patterns that

obtain in our physical experience to organize our more abstract

understanding" (p. xv). For example, the idea that “more is up,” as part of

the vertical schema, is used to help us understand the abstract notions of

more/less and change in quantity. Johnson argues that the use of image

schema as metaphors for understanding abstract notions is pervasive and

natural in human understanding. Even the idea of deduction derives from

the spatial concept of “following a path.”

Despite the claims for the importance of imagery and spatial thinking in

mathematics, the relationship between spatial thinking and learning

nongeometric concepts is not straightforward. For instance, Fennema and

Tartre {, 1985 #22} present somewhat conflicting results. Students high in

spatial ability and low in verbal ability tended to translate problems into

pictures more completely than low/high students, and there was some

indication that low/high students were less able to draw and to use pictorial

representations than high/low students. But when using a problem-solving

process that emphasized the use of spatial visualization, students who had

high spatial visualization skill solved no more problems than students who

had low visualization skill. Lean and Clements {, 1981 #4} concluded that

students who process mathematical information by verbal-logical means

outperform students who process this information visually. Similarly,

Hershkowitz {, 1989 #704} claimed that the use of imagery in

mathematical thinking can cause difficulties. For example, if a concept is

tied too closely to a single image, its critical attributes might not be

recognized, or use of the concept in problem-solving situations might be

limited because of over reliance on this image. On the other hand, Brown
 Geometry - 85

and Wheatley {, 1989 #694} reported that, although the fifth grade girls

with low spatial ability that they interviewed performed well in school

mathematics, their understanding of mathematics (multiplication and

division) was instrumental. The high spatial girls’ understanding was more

relational. One high spatial girl, although evincing an excellent grasp of

mathematical ideas and problem solving in the interviews, performed poorly

in school mathematics. Similarly, Tartre {, 1990 #555} suggested that 10th

grade students who scored high on spatial orientation were better able to
understand nongeometric problems and link them to previous work than

students who scored low in spatial orientation.

Thus, there is reason to believe that spatial ability is important in

students’ construction and use of mathematical concepts, even those that

are not geometric. But the role that such thinking plays in this construction

is elusive, and even in geometry, multifaceted. For example, in van Hiele

level 1, one relies on and is restricted to strictly visual processing. At van

Hiele level 2 and higher, one’s use of visual images is constrained by one’s

verbal/propositional knowledge. Images and transformations of images

incorporate this knowledge and so might behave differently at the different

levels. Finally, there is the use of imagery in thinking about nongeometric

concepts. One might be manipulating mental entities that do not have

either a visual or verbal format, but are nonetheless operated on by visual-

like transformations. Future research should attempt to elaborate these

different types of uses of imagery and take care in distinguishing between

the qualitatively different types of visual thinking.

The Nature of Spatial Abilities

Gardner {, 1983 #17, p. 173} states that “Central to spatial intelligence

are the capacities to perceive the visual world accurately, to perform

 Geometry - 86

transformations and modifications upon one's initial perceptions, and to be

able to re-create aspects of one's visual experience, even in the absence of

relevant physical stimuli.” Two major components or factors of spatial tasks

have been identified {Bishop, 1980 #1; Harris, 1981 #11; McGee, 1979

#348}. Spatial orientation is understanding and operating on the

relationships between the positions of objects in space with respect to one's

own position—for instance, finding one's way in a building. Spatial

visualization is comprehension and performance of imagined movements of

objects in two- and three-dimensional space. Others have debated the

characterization into these two factors {Clements, 1979 #141; Eliot, 1987

#54}, and indeed, there is debate about the nature of spatial ability and its

measurement. For instance, Bishop {, 1983 #692} has suggested two

spatial components that he believes are especially relevant for mathematics

learning. The first is the ability to interpret figural information and involves

understanding visual representations and vocabulary. The second is the

ability for visual processing. It involves manipulation and transformation of

visual representations and images, in addition to the translation of abstract

relationships into visual representations. Other authors {Guay, 1978 #622}

believe that the essence of true spatial ability is the formation and

transformation of visual images as organized wholes. They argue that many

so-called spatial tests can be done effectively with analytic processing and

are thus not good measures of spatial ability. Furthermore, there is evidence

that different groups of individuals use different processes on spatial tasks.

Some represent problems visually, others verbally. Some attend to the

whole stimulus at once, others to parts of it at a time. Some individuals use

processing aids such as marks on paper, object manipulation, and body

movement.
 Geometry - 87

Imagery

Several researchers have suggested that the most important

determinant of spatial visualization ability is maintenance and manipulation

of a high quality image of the stimulus, whereas others argue that

performance on most spatial tests is best understood not in terms of

imagery but rather in terms of reasoning and problem solving {Eliot, 1987

#54}. However, most factor analysts and developmentalists agree that

“persons with well-developed spatial skills should be capable of imagining

spatial arrangements of objects from different points of view and of

manipulating visual images” {Clements, 1979 #141, p. 15}. Thus the

concept of image plays a central role in our study of spatial ability.

Images are internally perceived, wholistic representations of objects or

scenes that are isomorphic to their referents. They are mentally changed by

continuous transformations that correspond to physical transformations.

Kosslyn {, 1983 #612} defines four classes of image processes: generating

an image, inspecting an image to answer questions about it, transforming

and operating on an image, and maintaining an image in the service of

some other mental operation.

According to Eliot {, 1987 #54}, there is consensus among spatial

researchers about the following four points:

1. The mental processes that underlie the experience of an image are

similar to those that underlie the perception of objects or pictures.

2. An image is a coherent, integrated representation of a scene or object

from a particular viewpoint and is open to a perceptual-like process of

scanning.

3. An image can be subject to apparently continuous mental

transformations, such as rotations, in which intermediate states

 Geometry - 88

correspond to intermediate views of an actual object undergoing the

corresponding physical transformation.

4. Images represent not only objects but interrelationships between their

component parts and other objects. That is, “the functional relations

among objects as imagined must to some degree mirror the functional

relations among those same objects as actually perceived” {Shepard,

1978 #24}, p. 131.

While there has been much debate about the physiological nature of
imagery, one noted researcher in mental imagery concludes that, “although

the brain processes that underlie a mental image need not themselves be

like any sort of a picture, they must necessarily contain the information that

could in principle permit the reconstruction of a picture with a high degree of

isomorphism to the external object imagined.... What is behind the common

tendency to think of a mental image as some sort of a picture may be the

fact that the brain process that underlies a purely mental image is very

much like the brain process that is produced by looking at a corresponding

picture” {Shepard, 1978 #24, p. 128}. Kosslyn’s research supports this

point of view. He and his colleagues found, for instance, that more time was

required to scan greater distances on a mental image and that larger

images required more time to scan than smaller ones. They concluded that

their experiments support the claim that “portions of images depict

corresponding portions of the represented object(s) and that the spatial

relations between portions of the imaged object(s) are preserved by the

spatial relations between the corresponding portions of the image” {Kosslyn,

1978 #23, p. 59}. Shepard's work also supports this view. He and his

colleagues found that the amount of time that it takes individuals to judge

whether two spatial forms (two-dimensional depictions of three-dimensional

 Geometry - 89

objects made of congruent cubes) is dependent on the number of degrees

that one form must be rotated to match the other.

Shepard {, 1978 #24, p. 128} also noted that the existence of

ambiguous pictures such as optical illusions indicates that “not all of what is

perceived or imagined is contained in the concrete picture that is externally

presented or reconstructed” (p. 129). A mental image, perceptual or

imagined, has a “deep as well as a surface structure.” But how are mental

images formed and how is imagery related to perception? Let us return to

Piaget:

Perception is the knowledge of objects resulting from direct contact with them. As
against this, representation or imagination involves the evocation of objects in their
absence or, when it runs parallel to perception, in their presence. It completes
perceptual knowledge by reference to objects not actually perceived.... Now in all
probability the image is an internalized imitation..., and is consequently derived from
motor activity, even though its final form is that of a figural pattern traced on the
sensory data {Piaget, 1967 #43, p. 17}.

As discussed previously, one of Piaget's experimental tasks was to have

children examine flat geometrical shapes without seeing them, and then

identify the shapes by drawing, naming, or pointing them out. Of this task

Piaget and Inhelder say, "Clearly, the reaction involves translating tactile-

kinesthetic impressions from an invisible object into a spatial image of a

visual kind" {Piaget, 1967 #43, p. 18}. To gain insight into how images are

constructed, let us examine Piaget and Inhelder’s description of stages of

performance on this task.

In Stage 1, (2-4 yrs), the child cannot construct a complete image of the

geometrical figure "and, according to whether he has felt a curved or

straight side or a point, he likens the shape touched to a visual shape

possessing the same characteristic, not bothering about the rest of the

object or attempting to put together the total structure.... It is obvious that

these errors are due to inadequate exploration of the objects.... to recognize

 Geometry - 90

geometrical shapes the child has to explore the whole contour" (p. 23).

Thus, if a child is unable to take in a whole shape with a single tactile

centration, he or she is compelled to move his or her hands on the object to

produce a series of centrations. "The perceptual recognition of the shape is

consequently a result of the co-ordination of these centrations " (p. 38).

"The lack of exploration on the part of children at this stage may therefore

be explained as the result of a general deficiency in perceptual activity

itself" (p. 24). Children of this stage could not draw a copy of even the
simplest shapes because perceptual activity, not perception, is the source of

imitation. That is, since these children failed to explore the edges of the

surfaces, they could not draw the surfaces.

In Stage 2, (4-7 yrs), perceptual activity becomes apparent.

... a general distinction is drawn between two major classes of shape, curvilinear or
without angles, and rectilinear or with angles.... It is not the straight line itself which
the child contrasts with round shapes, but rather the conjunction of straight lines
which go to form an angle (p. 30).

Furthermore, the child constructs his representation of angle not as two

intersecting lines, but rather as the “outcome of a pair of movements (of

eye and hand) which conjoin” (p. 31). In fact, “Euclidean shapes... are at

least as much abstracted from particular actions as they are from the object

to which the actions relate” (p. 31).

That is, the image the child extracts from an object is what can be

constructed from own actions performed on the object. Even drawings

express an object not so much as visually or tactilely perceived, but in terms

of the related perceptual activity. However, although perceptual activity is

capable of being carried to completion during Stage 2, the analysis remains

empirical, so for complex shapes it fails to achieve a synthesis and

coordination of perceptual data that is based on reasoning.

 Geometry - 91

During Stage 3, (7-8 yrs), exploration of shapes is still performed by

means of the same type of perceptual activity as in the earlier stages. But

this activity is now directed by an "operational method which consists of

grouping the elements perceived in terms of a general plan, and starting

from a fixed point of reference to which the child can always return." At this

level, the construction of the image of a shape assembles data into an

anticipatory schema that includes possible features such as straight or

curved lines, angles, parallels, order, and equal or unequal lengths. "In
other words, every perceived shape is assimilated to the schema of the

actions required to construct it" (p. 37).

Most of the discussion above relates to "haptic perception." The

difference between a haptic and visual centration is that a visual centration

can take in more elements at the same time. Thus simple shapes can be

visually apprehended in a single centration.

According to Piaget and Inhelder, "it is one thing to perceive a circle or a

square and quite another to reconstruct a visual image of it to the point

where it can be picked out from a group of models, or draw it after a purely

tactile exploration" (p. 37). But a visual image of a shape presupposes a

mental representation, and thus "the image is not a direct outcome of

perception" (p. 38). Furthermore, "the power to imagine the shapes visually

when they are perceived through the sense of touch alone, is an expression

of the sensori-motor schema involved in their perception" (p. 41). Piaget

concludes that in all three stages, "children are able to recognize, and

especially to represent, only those shapes which they can actually

reconstruct through their own actions" (p.43).

Thus, the mental representation of a figure—its image—is seen by

Piaget as an internal imitation of actions. The reconstruction of shapes as

 Geometry - 92

visual images (so that they can be drawn, for instance) "is not just a matter

of isolating various perceptual qualities, nor is it a question of extracting

shapes from the objects without more ado. The reconstruction of shapes

rests upon an active process of putting in relation, and it therefore implies

that the abstraction is based on the child's own actions and comes about

through their gradual co-ordination" (p. 78).

Although evidence from experimental psychologists has not been

gathered to support Piaget’s claim for the importance of action, it is at least

consistent with it. For instance, according to Kosslyn {, 1983 #612}, images

of objects are built out of separately stored parts (e.g., line segments or

common geometric shapes), along with information (which may be verbal or

nonverbal) specifying how the parts are to be arranged relative to one

another. Images of figures never before seen could be generated by

amalgamating parts that have been previously generated from experience.

Using this theory to support Piaget only requires us to equate Kosslyn’s

component parts of images to memory traces of a person’s actions (physical

or perceptual).

Also taking a constructivist approach to spatial thinking, Wheatley and

Cobb {, 1990 #32} claim that individuals give meaning and structure to

spatial patterns based on their experiences, conceptual structures,

intentions, and on-going social interaction. “We do not conceive of the

pattern {of shapes} as being 'out there' for the child to capture visually and

store as is in her head but believe that each child constructs through her

actions an image of the pattern which may later be re-presented and

transformed” (p. 3). These “actions” can be physical or perceptual,

conscious or unconscious. Furthermore, construction is not necessarily a

conscious process. For example, when a person gives meaning to a

 Geometry - 93

diagram, they may be unaware of the “meaning-making” process (G.

Wheatley, personal communication, August 11, 1989). In their study, first

and second grade students were given five tangram pieces (medium

triangle, two small triangles, square, and parallelogram) and asked to make

a pictured square. To help the students, a line diagram showing the

placement of the three triangles was shown to students for three seconds

initially and at any other times the students requested. They found the

students at different levels of performance on several aspects of the task.

Some interpreted the diagram as a set of triangular regions and others as a

set of lines forming a design. Only the most advanced students not only

interpreted the diagram as a set of triangular regions but also constructed

the relative placement of these triangles. Some students were able to

mentally rotate images of the tangram pieces and thus anticipate the their

positions; others determined the correct orientations by physical trial and

error.

In summary, we have seen that images are internal, wholistic

representations of objects that are isomorphic to their referents and can be

inspected and transformed. The construction of images is certainly affected

by existing cognitive structure, but it would be helpful to know more about

how this actually occur and whether it can be controlled. If we accept that

images are based on actions, by what mechanism are images derived from

these actions? Is the image of an object simply a replay of the sequence of

actions involved in perceiving it? But then how are images generated in the

absence of objects, that is, what psychological mechanisms support the re-

presentation of an image?

Improvement in Spatial Ability.

 Geometry - 94

Numerous studies have indicated that spatial ability can be improved

through training {Bishop, 1980 #1}. Ben-Chaim, Lappan, & Houang {, 1988

#5} reported that a 3-week instructional training program significantly

increased the spatial visualization ability for all students in grades 5-8, with

no sex differences in the gains. They suggested that 7th grade may be the

optimal time for spatial visualization training. Bishop {, 1980 #1} found

that students taught in primary schools where the use of manipulative

materials was prevalent performed better on tests of spatial ability than

students who were in schools lacking use of such materials. Battista et al. {,

1982 #618} found that students' spatial skills improved during the course of

an informal geometry course. However, there are reports that no

improvement in spatial ability results from a standard course in high school

geometry {Bishop, 1980 #1}. There is also evidence that performance on

spatial tasks increases with grade level {Ben-Chaim, 1988 #5; Johnson,

1987 #19}.

Given the obvious connection between spatial thinking and

transformational geometry, one might hypothesize that work with the latter

would improve skills in the former. As Fey stated, the "transformation

approach makes geometry an appealing, dynamic subject that will develop

spatial visualization ability and also the ability to reason" {Fey, 1984 #35, p.

44}. In agreement with this hypothesis, Del Grande {, 1986 #162} found

that a such a geometry unit improved spatial perception of grade 2

students. Williford {, 1972 #522} also investigated the effects of a unit on

rigid motions and congruence. He concluded that the second and third

graders studied did learn manual procedures for producing transformation

images but that they did not learn to mentally perform such

transformations. Kidder's {, 1976 #294} results extend Williford's in that

 Geometry - 95

they indicate that students' ability to mentally perform isometries (without

training) is limited at the middle and junior high level. He conjectured that

“the ability to perform transformations at the representational level derives

from formal-operational thought (in a Piagetian sense), and that the

thirteen-year-old subjects of the present study were not in the formal

operational stage” (p. 50). Ali Shah {, 1969 #446} found that performance

on these transformations increased greatly from age 7-8 to age 10-11, but

that only about 50% the latter age group mastered these topics. Moyer {,
1978 #367} investigated whether, for children of ages 4 to 8,

understanding of a 2-dimensional isometry is dependent on an explicit

awareness of the physical motion that is related to the transformation.

There were no significant effects for slides and flips (with the trend being a

negative effect for younger children) but a dramatic beneficial effect for

turns. He also found that a slide task was at least as easy as a flip, and

turns were most difficult. Finally, Usiskin {, 1972 #493} compared the

effects of a transformational approach to high school geometry to the

traditional approach. Both the experimental and control groups showed

significant increases on a spatial/perceptive test, although not differentially

so. Both groups showed a decline in attitudes towards mathematics, but

only the control group's was significant. It was also found that girls'

attitudes towards mathematics declined more than boys' for both the

transformational and traditional approaches.

Representations of Geometric Ideas

Concept Images

Vinner and Hershkowitz {, 1980 #558} claim that in thinking, people do

not use definitions of concepts, but rather concept images—a combination

of all the mental pictures and properties that have been associated with the
 Geometry - 96

concept. Their research validated not only the existence of these concept

images for a number of geometric concepts, but that such images could be

adversely affected by inappropriate instruction. For example, the fact that,

for many students, the concept image of an obtuse angle has a horizontal

ray might result from the limited set of examples they see in texts and a

“gravitational factor” (i.e., a figure is “stable” only if it has one horizontal

side, with the other side ascending). {The findings of other studies agree

that students limit concepts to studied exemplars and consider inessential

but common features as essential features of the concept, \Burger, 1986

#41; Fisher, 1978 #607; Fuys, 1988 #546; Kabanova-Meller, 1970 #6;

Zykova, 1969 #588}. Components of concept images were also identified;

for example, students’ concept image for a right triangle were most likely to

include a right triangle with a horizontal and a vertical side, less likely to

include a similar triangle rotated slightly, and least likely to include a right

isosceles triangle with a horizontal hypotenuse. Study of such concept

images may provide useful information about errors that students make.

For example, students who know a correct verbal description of a concept

but also have a specific visual image or prototype associated tightly with the

concept may have difficulty applying the verbal description correctly

{Clements, 1989 #543; Hershkowitz, in press #626; Vinner, 1980 #558}.

Fischbein {, 1987 #548} relates concept images to intuition. Subjects

attach a particular presentation to the concept which has a strong impact on

their cognitive decisions. Even when the definition is explicitly mentioned,

most subjects are not able to respond correctly. “The manner in which a

concept functions in a reasoning process is highly dependent on its

paradigmatic connections. The fact of knowing explicitly the definition does

not eliminate the constraints imposed by the tacitly intervening paradigm”

 Geometry - 97

(p. 146). This also helps explain students’ resistance to hierarchical

relationships among quadrilaterals. The images attached to each figure

function cognitively not as particular cases but as general models. Thus,

students have to learn the decisive role of explicitly defining concepts to

avoid errors in using the terms that signify them. They have to construct a

meaningful synthesis of this definition with a range of exemplars.

Employing such a synthesis of analytic and verbal processes to construct

robust concepts is possible, especially for students in grade 5 and beyond

{Hershkowitz, in press #626}.

This formulation is highly consistent with Reif’s {, 1987 #64} “ideal”

model for interpreting mathematical concepts reliably and efficiently. In

familiar situations, this model first applies nonformal, case-based knowledge

(cf. Fischbein’s paradigmatic models), then checks doubtful conclusions with

explicit formal knowledge. In unfamiliar situations, or whenever

inconsistencies or need to make general inferences arise, the ideal model

turns to formal knowledge directly. Nonformal knowledge is then still useful

in providing checkpoints for more abstract arguments. Reif found the

processes of effective experts fit this ideal model closely and recommends

activities that encourage its development in students; for example, teaching

them concept-interpretation procedures and letting them implement them in

various typical and error-prone cases, thus compiling repertoires of

knowledge about special cases and common errors.

This line of inquiry is relevant to both theory and practice; is it therefore

unfortunate that it has neither adequately acknowledged nor built upon

earlier work. For example, Vygotsky {, 1934/1986 #676} construct of “word

sense” as the sum of all the psychological events aroused in a person’s

consciousness by the word is in some ways a more elaborate formulation.

 Geometry - 98

Word sense is a dynamic, complex, fluid whole, which has several zones of

unequal stability (the word’s definition is only one of the zones of word

sense, albeit the most stable and precise zone). A word acquires its sense

from the context in which it appears; in different contexts, it changes its

sense. “The primordial word by no means could be reduced to a mere sign

of the concept. Such a word is rather a picture, image, mental sketch of the

concept. It is a work of art indeed. That is why such a word has a ‘complex’

character and may denote a number of objects belonging to one complex”

{Vygotsky, 1934/1986 #676, p. 133}.

Using Diagrams

The soviet researcher, Kabanova-Meller, states “Mastery of geometric

theorems is characteristically accomplished through the perception of

diagrams and is intimately connected with the development of spatial

images” {, 1970 #6, p. 7}. To be successful with proof problems in which a

diagram is used, students must establish semantic connections in the

diagram—the solution process must be “constructive.” That is, students

must form conclusions from the conditions (“expand” the condition) and find

new relationships in the diagram (“transform” the diagram). Sometimes

students derive the solution by expanding the condition step by step until it

includes the solution; other times students represent the solution through a

visual image and then determine the logical steps required to derive it. In

addition, when perceiving a diagram for a problem, a student must focus on

what is essential and dismiss what is inessential. Kabanova-Meller found

that some pupils could not do so, and she attributed this inability to the

original learning of the relevant theorems. When learning theorems,

students often incorporated information contained in a specific diagram as

part of a theorem (for instance, thinking that the exterior angle of a triangle
 Geometry - 99

must be obtuse because the diagram given with the theorem pictured an

obtuse exterior angle). This information later constrained the application of

the theorem. That is, the student did not recognize that the theorem was

relevant for another problem because the diagram contained an acute

exterior angle.

As students use a diagram to interpret a theorem, they must alter the

corresponding mental image “by distinguishing its essential aspects during

the abstraction process” (p. 46). The image becomes a guide for thinking
about and applying the theorem. In a successful teaching experiment which

used multiple drawings to illustrate theorems, students learned how the

placement, direction, and magnitude of geometric elements in a diagram

might vary within the conditions set forth in a theorem. It was concluded

that

The process of abstracting the essential aspects of a concept or theorem must be

inseparably linked with an awareness of how the features accompanying a diagram
may vary. The pupil, therefore, must learn to formulate verbally the principle by which
the features as well as the geometric elements and their relationships, may vary in
different diagrams without destroying the sense of the concept or theorem. Unless
the diagrams are used in this manner, varying the visual material will be ineffective.
(p. 48)

In a similar vein, Vladimirski concluded that the diagram accompanying

the discussion of a geometric statement is not always helpful in reasoning

{Vladimirskii, 1971 #9}. Students might mistake features of the diagram as

essential features of the geometric relationship being considered, thus

introducing irrelevant ideas into the concept. Alternately, a theorem might

be linked to only the example diagram given with its statement; the “visual

images corresponding to the relationship being studied become inert and

inflexible” (p. 81). Thus, students will be unable to effectively use the

theorem in problem solving. The author found that an instructional

treatment designed to have students analyze the “system of features of a

 Geometry - 100

concept” in the context of diagrams was successful in helping students

knowledge become unlinked from specific diagrams.

Although these authors discussed how diagrams affect students’

representation of concepts and theorems, it should be clear that similar

comments about misconceptions and instructional remedies could be made

about students’ representation of geometric problems. Indeed, there are

numerous accounts of persons arriving at incorrect solutions to problems

due to improper problem representations {Davis, 1984 #581}.

While we have been focusing on how diagrams can affect students’

representation of concepts, theorems, and problems, we should not overlook

misconceptions that can arise out of students’ interpretation of the

diagrams themselves. For example, Parzysz {, 1988 #385} reports that

students often attribute characteristics of a drawing to the geometric object

it represents, fail to understand that drawings do not necessarily represent

all known information about the object represented, and commonly attempt

to draw figures so that they preserve both viewing perspective and what the

student knows about the properties of the object being drawn (e.g., drawing

the base of a regular pyramid as a square instead of a parallelogram).

An interview with a bright fourth grade student at the end of the school

year suggests caution in making even the most straightforward assumptions

about how students interpret diagrams {Clements, in press #63}. The

student was asked to identify all the rectangles out of a set of quadrilaterals

consisting of rectangles, squares, rhombuses, parallelograms, and

trapezoids having various sizes and orientations. He also said that two

parallelograms were "sorta like" rectangles, "like you're looking at it a

different way. Like you'd look side-ways or something." When the

interviewer asked if one of these parallelograms was really a rectangle, KL

 Geometry - 101

said "Yeah, it makes it if you're looking at it, like if it's like a piece of paper

and you're looking below it ..." Interviewer: "What if it was a piece of paper

that was actually cut that way?" KL: "Then it wouldn't be a rectangle." For

KL, the figures drawn on paper represented pictures of geometric objects;

they were not considered as geometric objects themselves. In fact, it is true

that a parallelogram might very well be a picture of a rectangle drawn in

perspective. But the fact that KL was almost willing to name such a picture

a rectangle that is most instructive. Initially for children, pictures are meant
to be depictions of real objects. In mathematics, however, pictures are

meant to be symbols for concepts. KL seemed to be in transition between

these two interpretations and was thus vacillating between them. This

example is especially illustrative because it demonstrates the wide

discrepancy that can exist between a child's and a teacher's or textbook's

interpretation of a simple diagram.

Driscoll {, 1983 #3} relates other difficulties that students have with

drawings to the notion of concept images discussed above. For instance,

middle school students had a great deal of difficulty identifying right

triangles when they were drawn with a nonstandard orientation (legs

vertical and horizontal). If students’ concept images do not include relevant

and irrelevant attributes of the concept, they become too restricted for

proper identification and use of future examples.

Along with the previously-discussed PDP models, this research corpus on

geometric representations has strong instructional implications: There is a

dire need to provide variety in exemplars and later to help students

construct a meaningful verbal synthesis or definition from these exemplars

(including dealing with special cases and common errors). “By analyzing the

paradigm in the light of the concept, by learning to find correct examples

 Geometry - 102

and counter-examples corresponding to the concept, the student may reach

this stage of grasping a concept which is not void, related to exemplars

which are not misused” {Fischbein , 1987 #548, p. 152}.

Results of research has additional implications for the presentation of

examples and nonexamples. Psychological research often implies that

positive instances are more useful than mixed negative-and-positive

instances, whereas educational research suggests the usefulness of

negative instances {Gibson, 1985 #219}. Wilson’s results {, 1986 #523}

suggest a resolution. When every feature of every irrelevant dimension was

equally likely, positive instances were more helpful in learning. When

certain irrelevant features predominate, mixed positive and negative

instances were more helpful. Note that the former is unlikely in the

classroom context (especially considering typical prototypes in textbooks)

and thus a mixture will be superior in most instance, especially for more

difficult concepts {Charles, 1980 #137; Gibson, 1985 #219}. Further,

strategies for sequencing examples and nonexamples are not equally

effective. Rational sequences (nonexamples of a concept are matched with

divergent examples to focus attention of the critical attributes) are superior

to random sequences and can lead to a high level of achievement {Petty,

1987 #392}. Preservice teachers can be successfully trained to use such

strategies, including exemplification moves (presenting example or

nonexample) and characterization moves (statement about attribute,

relevant or not) {Charles, 1980 #137}.

The Role of Action

Mental action is deemed important to the learning of geometry by each

major theoretical perspective. Recall that Piaget and Inhelder claimed that

children’s representation of space is not a perceptual “reading off” of their

 Geometry - 103

spatial environment, but is the result of prior active manipulation of that

environment. The second teaching phase in the van Hiele scheme centers

around students’ manipulation of objects. Johnson provides another

perspective on this important issue by arguing for the importance of image

schema as metaphors.

The Use of Manipulatives

Although there are exceptions {Anderson, 1957 #73}, the majority of

studies verify that use of manipulatives should facilitate the construction of

sound representations of geometric concepts. Exposure to a greater variety

of stimuli positively affects achievement in geometry {Greabell, #227}.

Such tactile-kinesthetic experiences as body movement and manipulating

geometric solids help children, especially young children, learn geometric

concepts {Gerhardt, 1973 #217; Prigge, 1978 #400}. Children also fare

better with solid cutouts than printed forms, the former encouraging the use

of more senses {Stevenson, 1958 #472}.

There is empirical support that even for older (e.g., middle school)

students, especially those at lower levels in the van Hiele hierarchy,

manipulatives are an essential aid in learning geometry {Fuys, 1988 #546}.

Use of manipulatives seemed to allow students to try out their ideas,

examine and reflect on them, and modify them. This physical approach

seemed to maintain student interest, to assist students in creating

definitions and new conjectures, and to aid them in gaining insight into new

relationships. Similarly, sixth grade students learn concepts of vector space

better with concrete materials {Lamon, 1971 #308}. Fourth graders

benefited more from an advanced organizer on motion geometry using

concrete models than one using applications, whereas seventh graders

benefitted equally; the younger students may have been less able to impose
 Geometry - 104

the relevant relationships {Lesh, 1976 #316}. Overall, the benefits of

manipulatives holds across grade level, ability level, and topic, given that

use of a manipulative “makes sense” for that topic {Driscoll, 1983 #677;

Sowell, 1989 #628}. However, U.S. textbooks only infrequently suggest the

use of manipulatives in geometry, and even when they do, the suggested

uses are not aimed at developing higher levels of thinking {Fuys, 1988

#546; Stigler, 1990 #568}. In contrast, the evidently more successful

Japanese instruction and instructional materials feature far greater use of

manipulatives {Stigler, 1990 #568}. Similarly, Mitchelmore {, 1980 #363}

found that British students were about 3 years ahead of U.S. children in both

spatial and three-dimensional drawing ability. He suggested that differences

are attributable to different teaching approaches, in that British teachers

tend to take a more informal approach to geometry and use more

manipulatives materials at the elementary level and more diagrams at

higher levels. Another, complementary possibility is that the curricula

reflect each country’s attitude towards the use of spatial models.

Unfortunately, nearly half of K-6 teachers report that their students use

manipulatives less than once a week, or not at all {Driscoll, 1983 #677}.

This may be important, because manipulative use for a school year or

longer results in significant differences of moderate to large size in favor of

the manipulative groups; use of shorter duration often does not produce

significant results {Sowell, 1989 #628}. Further, use of manipulatives is not

sufficient. Simply using manipulatives does not guarantee meaningful

learning {Raphael, 1989 #406}. Students must be guided to reflect on

their use of manipulatives and to relate manipulative models to pupil’s

informal concepts.
 Geometry - 105

If manipulative are accepted as important, what of pictures? Pictures

can be important; even children as young as 5 or 6 years (but not younger)

can use information in pictures to build a pyramid, for example {Murphy,

1981 #369}. Thus, pictures can give students an immediate, intuitive grasp

of certain geometric ideas. However, pictures need to be varied so that

students aren't led to form incorrect concepts (cf. the previous discussions of

concept images and diagrams). However, research indicates that it is rare

for pictures to be superior to manipulatives. In fact, in some cases, pictures

may not differ in effectiveness from instruction with symbols {Sowell, 1989

#628}. But the reason may not lie in the “nonconcrete” nature of the

pictures as much as it lies in their “nonmanipulability”—that is, that children

cannot act on them as flexibly and extensively. This suggests investigation

of manipulatable pictures such as graphic computer representations, the

subject to which we turn.

The Promise of Computers

Computers’ graphic capabilities may also facilitate the construction of

geometric representations. Not unlike for other topics, students instructed

in geometry with computers often score significantly higher than those

having just classroom instruction {Austin, 1984 #82; Morris, 1983 #606}.

Even with children as young as preschool, computer-based programs are as

effective in teaching about shapes as teacher-directed programs {von Stein,

1982 #602} and more effective at teaching spatial relational concepts than

television (Brawer, cited *** in {Lieberman, 1985 #603}. Computer games

have been found to be marginally effective at promoting learning of angle

estimation skills {Bright, 1985 #110} and significantly more effective than

traditional instruction in facilitating achievement in coordinate geometry

{Morris, 1983 #606}. However, optimism about the use of computers must
 Geometry - 106

be tempered by consideration of the findings of comparative media

research. Decades of pre-computer research comparing the effects of

different media on achievement show basically the same result: No

significant difference {Clements, 1984 #604}. A change of curriculum or

teaching strategy may explain the positive results of many comparative

studies of CAI {Clark, 1983 #605}. However, there are certain functions

computers can perform that cannot be duplicated in other situations.

Logo
Logo represents such an application. We have seen that children's

initial representations of space are based on action {Piaget, 1967 #43}.

One implication is that Logo activities designed to help children abstract the

notion of path may provide a very fertile environment for developing their

conceptualizations of simple two-dimensional shapes. Logo environments

are in fact action-based. These actions are both perceptual—watching the

turtle's movements, and physical—interpreting the turtle's movement as

physical motion that could be performed oneself. By first having children

form paths by walking, then using Logo, children can learn to think of the

turtle's actions as ones that they can perform; that is the turtle's actions

become "body syntonic" {Battista, 1988 #542; Papert, 1980 #611}.

Because the mathematical concept of path can be thought of as a record of

movement, the path concept may constitute a particularly good starting

point to the study of geometry. That is, having students visually scan the

side of a building, run their hands along the edge of a rectangular table, or

walk a straight path will give students experience with the concept of

straightness. But this concept can be brought to a more explicit level of

awareness with path activities in Logo; it is easy to have students use the

turtle to discover that a straight path is one that has no turning. Thus, such
 Geometry - 107

experiences can help students develop a description or formalization of the

concept of straightness.

These and other types of Logo activities might be used to encourage

students to progress to levels 2 (descriptive/analytic) and 3

(abstract/relational) in the van Hiele hierarchy. For instance, with the

concept of rectangle, students initially are able only to identify visually

presented examples, a level 1 (visual) activity in the van Hiele hierarchy. In

Logo, however, students can be asked to construct a sequence of

commands (a procedure) to draw a rectangle. This “...allows, or obliges, the

child to externalize intuitive expectations. When the intuition is translated

into a program it becomes more obtrusive and more accessible to reflection”

(Papert, 1980, p. 145). That is, in constructing a rectangle procedure, the

students must analyze the visual aspects of the rectangle and reflect on how

its component parts are put together, an activity that encourages level 2

thinking. Furthermore, if asked to design a rectangle procedure that takes

the length and width as inputs, students must construct a form of definition

for a rectangle, one that the computer understands. They thus begin to

build intuitive knowledge about the concept of defining a rectangle,

knowledge that can later be integrated and formalized into an abstract

definition—a level 3 activity. Asking students if a square or a parallelogram

can be drawn by their rectangle procedure (if given the proper inputs)

encourages students to start logically ordering figures, another level 3

activity.

Research suggests that these theoretical predictions are valid. Grade 7

students’ work in Logo relates closely to their level of geometric thinking

{Olson, 1987 #378}. In addition, appropriate use of Logo helps elementary

students begin to make the transition from the levels 0 and 1 to level 2 of
 Geometry - 108

geometric thought. For example, Logo experience has been shown to have

a significant positive effect on the plane figure concepts of elementary

school children {Clements, 1987 #540; Clements, 1989 #543; Hughes, 1986

#571}. This may be because, as recommended by van Hiele researchers,

Logo incorporates implicitly the types of properties which will be developed

by level 1 thinkers explicitly, something that textbooks often fail to do

{Battista, 1987 #539; Battista, 1988 #542; Fuys, 1988 #546}. Logo

experience encourages students to view and describe geometric objects in

terms of the actions or procedures used to construct them {Clements, 1989

#543}. When asked to describe geometric shapes, children with Logo

experience proffer not only more statements overall, but also more

statements that explicitly mention components and geometric properties of

shapes, an indication of level 2 thinking {Clements, in press #63; Clements,

1989 #543; Lehrer, 1986 #575}.

Similar results have emerged in the area of symmetry and motion

geometry. Working with a Logo unit on motion geometry, students’

movement to van Hiele levels was slow, but there was definite evidence of a

beginning awareness of the properties of transformations {Olson, 1987

#378}. Similarly, intermediate grade students in the U.S. were engaged in

symmetry and motion geometry activities using either Logo or paper and

pencil {Johnson-Gentile, 1990 #645}. Interviews conducted with a

subsample revealed that both treatment groups performed at a higher level

of geometric thinking than did the control group; Logo students performed

at a higher level than the noncomputer students on four of the six interview

tasks, noncomputer students performed at a higher level on one. Both Logo

and nonLogo groups outperformed the control group on immediate and

delayed posttests; in addition, though the two treatment groups did not
 Geometry - 109

significantly differ on the immediate posttest, the Logo group outperformed

the nonLogo group on the delayed posttest. Thus, there was support for the

notion that the Logo-based version enhanced conceptual reconstruction of

previously-learned ideas. Compared to students using paper and pencil,

students using Logo work with more precision and exactness {Gallou-

Dumiel, 1989 #636; Johnson-Gentile, 1990 #645}.

Thus, there is evidence in support of the hypothesis that Logo

experiences can help elementary to middle school students become

cognizant of their mathematical intuitions and facilitate the transition from

visual to descriptive/analytic geometric thinking in the domains of shapes,

symmetry, and motions {Clements, in press #63}.

Several research projects have investigated the effects of Logo

experience on students’ conceptualizations of angle, angle measure, and

rotation. In one study, responses of intermediate grade control students

were more likely to reflect little knowledge of angle or common language

usage, whereas the responses of the Logo students indicated more

generalized and mathematically-oriented conceptualizations (including

angle as rotation and as a union of two lines/segments/rays)109 {Clements,

1989 #543}. Other researchers studied how Logo might provide

experiences at the second and third van Hiele levels for ninth-grade

students {Olive, 1986 #579}. Logo students gained more than the control

students on interviews that operationalized the van Hiele levels for the

concept of angle. Several other researchers have similarly reported a

positive effect of Logo on students angle concepts {Kieran, 1986 #578;

Olive, 1986 #579}, although in some situations, benefits do not emerge

until more than a year of Logo experience {Kelly, 1986-87 #291}.

 Geometry - 110

This line of research also indicates that students hold many different

schemas regarding not only the angle concept, but also angle measure.

Third graders frequently relate the size of an angle to the length of the line

segments that formed its sides, the tilt of the top line segment, the area

enclosed by the triangular region defined by the drawn sides, the length

between the sides (from points sometimes, but not always, equidistant from

the vertex), the proximity of the two sides, or the turn at the vertex110

{Clements, in press #543}. Intermediate grade students often possess one

of two schemas. In the “45-90 schema,” slanted lines are associated with

45° turns; horizontal and vertical lines with 90° turns. In the “protractor

schema,” inputs to turns are based on usage of a protractor in “standard”

position (thus, to have a turtle at home position turn left 45°, students might

use an input of 135°, which corresponds to a protractor's reading when its

base is horizontal) {Kieran, 1986 #576}. Logo experiences may foster

some misconceptions of angle measure, including viewing it as the angle of

rotation along the path (e.g., the exterior angle in a polygon) or the degree

of rotation from the vertical 110{Clements, in press #543}. In addition,

such experiences do not replace previous misconceptualizations of angle

measure {Davis, 1984 #581}. For example, students’ misconceptions about

angle measure and difficulties coordinating the relationships between the

turtle's rotation and the constructed angle have persisted for years,

especially if not properly guided by their teachers {Hershkowitz, in press

#626; Hoyles, 1986 #574; Kieran, 1986 #576; Kieran, 1986 #577; Kieran,

1986 #578}. In general, however, Logo experience appears to facilitate

understanding of angle measure. Logo children's conceptualization of larger

angle are more likely to reflect mathematically correct, coherent, and

abstract ideas {Clements, in press #543; Findlayson, 1984 #580; Kieran,

 Geometry - 111

1986 #577; Noss, 1987 #582} and show a progression from van Hiele level

0 to level 2 in the span of the treatment {Clements, in press #63}. If Logo

experiences emphasize the difference between the angle of rotation and the

angle formed as the turtle traced a path, misconceptions regarding the

measure of rotation and the measure of the angle may be avoided

{Clements, in press #543; Kieran, 1986 #577}.

There is some evidence that Logo experiences affect measurement

competencies beyond the measure of rotation and angle. Observations

show that first graders invent their own standard units of measure to make

Logo drawings, such as a rectangle with a width of 44 and a length of 88 via

FD 44 FD 44 {Kull, 1986 #572}. Research indicates that Logo can help

young children learn about measurement and aid researchers in learning

more about what young children learn about measurement, because Logo

provides an arena in which young children may use units of varying size,

define and create their own units, maintain or predict unit size, and create

length rather than end point representations through either iterative or

numeric distance commands. Further, Logo permits the child to manipulate

units and to explore transformations of unit size and number of units without

the distracting dexterity demands associated with measuring instruments

and physical quantity {Campbell, 1987 #573}. Working with kindergartners

and first graders, Campbell found that:

1. Children have difficulty adjusting to changes in unit size, especially when

the unit size is halved. They may be using perceptual/spatial strategies

rather than numeric/mathematical strategies to solve these problems.

2. Children are, however, remarkably accurate when estimating halved

distances, even if the mid-point of the total distance has to be imagined.

 Geometry - 112

3. Children understand that a distance traversed with a smaller unit

requires a greater number of units than that same distance traversed

with a larger unit. However, they consistently underestimate the

strength of the inverse relationship between unit size and numeracy of

units.

4. Contrary to expectations, estimation of lines with oblique orientations is

not usually more difficult than lines with horizontal or vertical

orientations. There was no differences across grades; a rather modest

amount of Logo experience (2 hours) may have helped the kindergarten

children ignore the problem-irrelevant variables in the spatial field.

In almost all comparisons, Logo children were more accurate than

control children. The control children were more likely to: underestimate

distances, particularly the longest distances; have difficulty compensating

for the halved unit size; and underestimate the inverse relationship between

unit size and unit numeracy. The Logo experience may have contributed to

estimation accuracy. Nevertheless, even inexperienced children knew that

the smaller numbers were to be associated with the shorter lengths and that

progressively larger numbers would be assigned to progressively longer

lengths. This basic principle of measurement seems to be acquired early in

life and may not be dependent on specific measurement experiences. 112

Not all research has been positive. First, it should be noted that none of

the studies have reported students’ “mastery” of the concepts investigated,

but merely a facilitative effect. Second, some studies show no significant

differences between Logo and control groups {Johnson, 1986 #277}. Third,

some studies have shown limited transfer. For example, students from two

ninth-grade Logo classes did not differ significantly from control students on

subsequent high school geometry grades and tests {Olive, 1986 #579}.
 Geometry - 113

One problem is that students do not always think mathematically, even

when the Logo environment invites such thinking. For example, some

students rely excessively on visual cues and eschew analytical work such as

looking for exact mathematical and programming relations within the

geometry of the figure {Hillel, 1988 #583}. The visual approach is not

correlated with the ability to visualize but refers to reliance on the visual

“data” of a geometric figure in determining students’ Logo constructions

(e.g., “this last side looks like 60…try FORWARD 60”). In terms of van Hiele
levels, the visual approach to solving Logo problems involves reasoning that

lies between levels 1 and 2. Although important in beginning phases of

learning, its continued use inhibits children from arriving at mathematical

generalizations related to their Logo activity. There may be little reason for

students to abandon visual approaches unless they are presented with tasks

whose resolution requires an analytical approach. In addition, dialog

between teacher and students is essential for encouraging higher-level

reasoning. Care must be taken to help students establish and reflect upon

path-command correspondences; that is, connections between geometric

paths drawn by the turtle and the Logo commands that produce these paths

{Battista, 1987 #539; Clements, 1987 #540; Clements, in press #63}.

In sum, studies that have shown the most positive effects involve

carefully planned sequences of Logo activities and teacher mediation of

students’ work with those activities. It would appear that Logo's potential to

develop geometric ideas will be fulfilled to the extent that teachers and

instructional materials properly guide students' Logo experiences. This

should include encouraging students to reflect on and to forge links between

Logo-based procedural knowledge and more traditional conceptual

knowledge {Clements, in press #543; Lehrer, 1986 #575}.

 Geometry - 114

Graphic tools and construction programs (Geometric Supposer)

Logo provides a powerful and flexible environment for students’

representation and exploration of geometric ideas. Other computer drawing

and construction programs provide less flexibility but no less viable

environments for geometric learning. For example, use of a computer

“boxes” function, which allowed children to draw rectangles by stretching an

electronic “rubber band,” gave children a different perspective on

geometric figures {Forman, 1986 #202}. The area fill function, which fills
closed regions with color, prompted children to reflect on such topological

features as closure. The potential of such drawing tools lies in the possibility

that children will internalize (or develop mental structures that allow them to

make sense of) such functions, thus constructing new mental tools; research

has not adequately addressed this issue.114 Interaction with certain

computer environments may help students build less restricted concept

images. For example, producing random examples of isosceles and right

triangles varying in shape and orientation helped 2-6 year-old children

generalize their concepts of triangles to include a greater variety of

triangular shapes and orientations {Shelton, 1985 #393}.

Computer graphics tools may positively affect spatial skills, with special

benefits for girls. Although boys may outperform girls in computer games

dealing with spatial ability {Pepin, 1985 #390}, specially designed

computer graphics modules have been shown to increase the spatial skills of

high school girls to a level significantly beyond that of boys (although girls

started with a lower composite mathematics score, after this training they

had a significantly higher score than boys) {Luchins, 1983 #327}.

Present-day media use two-dimensional representations to present most

three-dimensional information. Research indicates that people find this

 Geometry - 115

difficult {Ben-Chaim, 1988 #5}. Computers allow the dynamic manipulation

of two-dimensional representations of three-dimensional figures. Osta (cited

in *** {Hershkowitz, in press #626} studied this potential using two

commercial programs, one in which operations could be performed on three-

dimensional objects represented on the screen and the other a “paint”

program in which operations could be performed only on two-dimensional

figurative designs. The programs have constraints that necessitate the use

of geometrical properties rather than just visual information. Osta created

problem situations in which students modified figures to move between two-

and three-dimensional representations. Solution strategies of students in

grades 8-9 were studied. At first, their work was local, dealing with small

parts of figures through only perceptual strategies. With experience,

students considered more global criteria and replaced inefficient perceptual

strategies with strategies based on geometrical properties.

The focus of construction programs, such as the Geometric Supposer

software series, is to facilitate students making and testing conjectures. The

Supposer programs allow students to choose a primitive shape, such as a

triangle or quadrilateral (depending on the specific program), and to

perform measurement operations and geometric constructions on it. The

programs record the sequence of constructions and can automatically

perform it again on other triangles or quadrilaterals. Thus, students can

explore the generality of the consequences of constructions. Reports

indicate that the Supposers can be used effectively. In one evaluation,

Supposer students performed as well as or better than their non-Supposer

counterparts on geometry exams {Yerushalmy, 1987 #616}. In addition,

students’ learning went beyond standard geometry content, for example, re-

inventing definitions, making conjectures, posing and solving significant

 Geometry - 116

problems, and devising original proofs. Making conjectures did not come

easily to students and there was much frustration at the beginning of the

year, but by the end nearly all students were making conjectures on large

scale projects and felt the need to justify their generalizations. On specially-

designed tests, Supposer students produced the same or higher level

generalizations than the comparison group. There is conflicting evidence,

however. For example, Bobango {, 1988 #674} found that while instruction

based on the van Hiele phases using the Supposer significantly raised
students’ van Hiele level of thought, more so from level 1 to level 2 than for

any other levels, it did not result in greater achievement in standard content

or proof writing.

We have already seen that students interpretation of diagrams is

complex. A promising finding is that students make gains in understanding

of diagrams and their limitations using the Supposer. After such experience,

they approached diagrams flexibly, treated a single diagram as a model for

a class of diagrams and were aware that this model contains characteristics

not representative of the class, and added auxiliary lines to diagrams

{Yerushalmy, 1988 #684; Yerushalmy, 1987 #616}.

We have also seen that students have difficulty understanding proof; for

instance, they often do not distinguish between two sources of knowledge

about geometrical statements, measurement evidence and deductive

proofs. They believe that measuring examples “proves” a statement true

for all members of an infinite set and/or that deductive proof pertains to one

example only. Many students who held both beliefs still preferred the

deductive proofs, not due to the influence of their teachers as much as the

explanatory characteristic of the proofs {Chazan, 1989 #685}. Supposer-

based activities designed to change these beliefs engendered a movement

 Geometry - 117

away from considering measurement evidence as proof {Chazan, 1989

#685; Wiske, 1988 #680}, although some students still thought that there

might be counterexamples to deductively proven results.

Considering posttest performance, percentages of students from

experimental and control groups who produced informal and formal proofs

were about the same in five comparisons conducted in one evaluation, and

greater for the Supposer group in the sixth {Yerushalmy, 1987 #616}. The

researchers noted, however, that teachers too-frequently promoted a linear

ordering of data collection and analysis, conjecture derivation, and proof,

which led to non-reflective data gathering and obscured the differences

between representations of specific instances during data collection phases

and representations during conjecture and proof phases. Students did not

then appreciate the different levels of generality these phases represented.

The researchers recommend starting Supposer activities as investigations of

a geometric relationship or concept {Yerushalmy, 1987 #616}.

Unlike textbook theorems, students believe Supposer-generated

theorems need to be proved before they could be accepted as true, leading

to ownership of the theorems. They seemed to engage in van Hiele’s phase

4 learning, orienting themselves within the network of geometric relations

{Lampert, 1988 #679}. In sum, it appears that, with proper support from

the teacher, students using the Supposer can come to understand the

importance of formal proof as a way of establishing mathematical truth,

although this seems to be related more to Bell’s illumination function of

proof more than the verification and systematisation functions {Yerushalmy,

1986 #531}. Chazan {, 1989 #685}, arguing from a philosophy of

mathematics perspective, suggests that differences between deductive

arguments and those based on measurement evidence are are not as

 Geometry - 118

distinct as often supposed. He offers suggestions for teaching the

differences, including developing proof as a social process and as an

exploratory and explanatory process rather than an endpoint.

To implement successfully the Supposer’s guided inquiry approach,

research suggests the need for teaching strategies that connect students’

inquiry with the curriculum and encourage inquiry as a way to learn

successfully what needs to be known. In general, teachers in regular

classrooms face multiple difficulties using the Supposer; however, such

struggles seem to have the potential to change teachers’ practice, and thus

change their beliefs about the meaning of knowing geometry and how

knowledge is acquired in classrooms. Overall, while use of the Supposer was

found to demand hard work from, and cause some frustration in, both

teachers and students, benefits were evident {Lampert, 1988 #679; Wiske,

1988 #680; Yerushalmy, 1987 #616}.

Intelligent tutoring: The Geometry Tutor

Another field in which computers may make a unique contribution is

that of intelligent tutors. Anderson, Boyle, and Feiser {, 1985 #550} claim

that it is feasible to build computer systems that are as effective as

intelligent human tutors. Their Geometry Tutor was based on a set of

pedagogical principles derived from the ACT* theory. First, productions in

this theory always include a goal in the condition; thus, the goal structure of

each problem is made explicit. Second, students are helped to cope with

working memory demands by placing on the computer screen much of the

information that the student might forget in the form of a proof graph.

Third, because knowledge compilation occurs only during problem solving,

formal instruction is made part of the problem-solving process. Students are

 Geometry - 119

given immediate feedback on their errors to make it easier for them to

integrate this instruction into new productions that they form.

The Geometry Tutor presents the statement to be proved at the top of

the screen and the given statements at the bottom. The student adds to a

developing “proof graph” by pointing to statements on the screen and by

typing information. Each logical inference involves a set of premises, a

reason, and a conclusion. Reasoning forward, the student points to the

premises, types the reason, points to relevant geometric points in the

diagram, and points to the conclusion (if already on the screen) or types it.

These are connected in the proof graph with arrows. The proof is completed

when there is a set of logical inferences connecting the given statements to

the statements to be proved. The resultant proof graph makes concrete

two abstract characteristics of proof problem solving: logical relations

among the premises and conclusions and the search process used to find a

correct proof. As the students works, the tutor infers which rule the student

applied by determining which one matches the students’ response. If

correct, the tutor is silent; otherwise, instruction is given. All instruction is

thus in the context of solving problems.

Three students of varying levels of ability learned geometry with the

Geometry Tutor. According to the researchers, all learned geometry

successfully and were solving problems more complex than those usually

assigned in classrooms. All had positive attitudes {Anderson, 1985 #550}.

Since this initial test, the Geometry Tutor has been used successfully in a

public high school with four classes from regular academic track to gifted

{Anderson, n.d. #590}. It was reported that students were enthusiastic.

For the first year, all groups showed statistically significant improvement

from pre- to posttest. A second year’s test utilized a control group and
 Geometry - 120

found similar gains with a significant difference of the Geometry Tutor

students over control group students, with improvements of about one

standard deviation. Students unanimously reported that they prefer the

proof-graph structure to traditional two-column proof formats. Further, such

use has led to important revisions in the underlying ACT* theory.

Results of other evaluations of the program are more complex. Kafai {,

1989 #545} used the Geometry Tutor to help students do congruence

proofs in three classes. Generally, the Geometry Tutor was a success. All
students had positive attitudes toward the program and recommended it for

other students. All completed the minimal problem set and most of them

did all of the additional problems (a teacher stated that this had never

happened before). However, when students used the proof path method for

noncomputer work, their performance decreased (most also used the

statement-reason method). When using the proof path method, students

tended to reverse the order of statements and reasons and confuse the

sequence of steps. This may indicate a serious problem with the program,

for confusing the sequence of steps in a proof is an indication that students

do not understand the nature of proof. As with many students in a standard

geometry course, these students may have been learning merely

superficially operate within a set of rules. Another observed problem

involved the rigidity of the tutor. It is not certain whether changes in the

program or length of students’ exposure to the program would ameliorate

these difficulties. In another study, experimental students spent 30% of

their time on the Geometry Tutor {Wertheimer, 1990 #615}. Here, there

was no reported difficulty shifting from proof-graph to two-column format.

Two experimental classes averaged 79% on a posttest, whereas the control

class averaged 69% (about a letter grade in difference). The

 Geometry - 121

teacher/researcher commented that an increase in his individualization of

instruction was the greatest impact of the program’s use. However, the

tutor still makes considerable demands on the teacher; in fact, one report

stated that 2-3 teachers were needed to keep the laboratory running

smoothly {Schofield, 1988 #613, note that software was not in its final

form}. These researchers proffered one additional warning—that black and

female students, were more likely to express hostility toward or displeasure

with the computer-tutor. Although the results are positive for the most part,
it is not clear that the evaluations were adequate to test students

understanding of proof in either environment. More research that

investigates students’ thinking in this environment is needed.

Implications of this research program are not limited to computer tutors.

Anderson claims that one of the reasons why traditional instruction is often

so inadequate is that the teacher has an inadequate conception of the flow

of control in the student. His model may illuminate these processes.

Similarly, the structures of both problems and processes by which a proof is

generated might be more explicitly represented and discussed.

Implications across computer environments

Several findings are intriguingly consistent across studies using different

computer environments. First, researchers and teachers consistently report

that in such contexts students cannot “hide” what they do not understand.

That is, difficulties and misconceptions that are easily masked by traditional

approaches emerge and must be dealt with, leading to some frustration on

the part of both teachers and students, but also to greater development of

mathematics abilities {Clements, 1989 #543; Schofield, 1988 #613;

Yerushalmy, 1987 #616}. Second, at least at the high school level, student

can become confused regarding the purpose of different components of a

 Geometry - 122

course; a single location for computer work, discussion, and lecture may

alleviate this confusion. A monitor or projector for group discussions is

noted as essential for all three environments. (These may seem to be lower-

level concerns, but another general finding is that the importance and

problems of arranging and managing hardware and software must not be

underestimated.) Third, evaluation of learning in such environments must

be re-considered, as traditional approaches did not assess the full spectrum

of what was learned; in some cases, these approaches made little sense
(e.g., when students worked on self-selected inquiries). On at least one

issue the various environments differed: With the Geometry Tutor, putting

more than one student at a computer was deemed particularly unsuccessful

{Wertheimer, 1990 #615}. In contrast, two students working cooperatively

at a computer seemed ideal in the more exploratory environments of the

Geometric Supposer and Logo; indeed, one of the strengths of such

environments is the spontaneous generation of cooperative learning and

teaching {Clements, 1989 #543; Lampert, 1988 #679; Yerushalmy, 1987

#616}.

In summary, appropriately-designed software can engender higher-level

interaction with geometric ideas. Certain computer environments allow the

manipulation of screen objects in ways that assist students in viewing them

as representatives of a class of geometric objects. This apparently develops

students’ ability to reflect on the properties of the class of objects and to

think in a more general and abstract manner. Thoughtful sequences of

computer activities and teacher mediation of students’ work with those

activities appear to be critical components of an efficacious educational

environment. Perhaps even more fundamental, inquiry environments such

as the Supposer and Logo-based environments appear to have the potential

 Geometry - 123

to serve as catalysts in promoting teachers’ and students’

reconceptualization of what it means to learn and understand geometry and

in promoting the growth of students’ autonomy in mathematical thinking.

Fundamental changes demand considerable effort on the part of teachers

and call for extensive support from teacher educators or advisors, peers,

and ultimately, the greater school system and culture.

Group and Cross-Cultural Differences

We have already reported several cross-cultural differences in geometry

achievement. There have also been studies of cross-cultural differences in

spatial reasoning. For instance, Mitchelmore {, 1976 #362} reported that

native Africans of all nationalities had lower perceptual development when

compared to Europeans with the same age and length of schooling as well

as when compared to illiterate Eskimos and North American Indians. He also

reported that the spatial thinking of students in Kingston, Jamaica was about

three years behind that of students in Columbus, Ohio, which, in turn, was

three years behind that of students in Bristol, England {Mitchelmore, 1980

#363}. He attributed these cross-cultural differences to various factors

such as physical environment, social/cultural environment, and the school

mathematics curriculum. Results from the fourth NAEP in the U.S. indicated

that blacks and Hispanics in grades 7 and 11 had more difficulty than whites

with graphically presented information, measurement, and geometry

{Johnson, 1989 #705}. Johnson and Meade {, 1987 #19} found that

whites' spatial scores were higher than blacks'. However, the factors that

contribute to these latter two differences have not been adequately

investigated. On the other hand, researchers have investigated differences

in performance between males and females extensively.

Gender Differences
 Geometry - 124

In Geometry

In an examination of the mathematics items from the 1978 National

Assessment of Educational Progress, Fennema and Carpenter {, 1981 #56}

found that males significantly outperformed females in the areas of

geometry and measurement. Females' performance was lower than males'

for geometry and measurement, for all cognitive levels (knowledge, skill,

understanding, application), and all ages (9, 13, 17 years), with the

difference increasing with age. In the 1985 assessment, males

outperformed females at all grade levels, but the differences were

significant only at grade 11 for geometry and grades 3 and 11 for

measurement {Meyer, 1989 #709}. Fennema and Carpenter observed

large differences between males' and females' performance both for

geometry items that were presented spatially and those that were presented

verbally. Also, consistent with the hypothesis that differences in spatial

ability somehow contribute to differences in mathematics achievement

{Fennema, 1981 #56}, there was some indication from the sample items

discussed in the 1985 data that the male advantage was greater on items

that were presented with an accompanying diagram {Meyer, 1989 #709}.

Smith and Walker {, 1988 #55} found significant gender differences on the

10th grade geometry New York Regents exams in favor of males. They

rated the difference as small, and equated it to one-half of a question.

Hanna {, 1989 #703, 1989 #702} reported gender differences for

eighth graders studied in the Second International Mathematics Study

(SIMS). Overall, boys scored higher than girls on 75% of the geometry

items; girls scored higher than boys on 25%. Boys’ mean score in geometry

was higher than girls’ for 18 of the 20 countries (significantly so for 10,

including the U.S.). The significant differences in mean percents ranged

 Geometry - 125

from 2 to 6%. Ethington {, 1990 #651}, analyzing a subset of this same

data, found that, overall, males did better than females on the geometry

items.

On the other hand, in their study of over 1,300 high school students,

Senk and Usiskin found equal geometry proof-writing skills among males

and females, both when all and when just high-achieving students were

examined {Senk, 1983 #26}. They also found that males significantly

outperformed females on the entering and end-of-year geometry tests, but

attributed the latter difference to the former. In contrast, they found no

gender differences in van Hiele level at the beginning of the year, with

males nevertheless surpassing females in this respect at the end of the year

{Usiskin, 1982 #42}. They conjectured that the occurrence of gender

differences in geometric problem solving and the lack of gender-differences

in proof writing could be explained by the difference in formal educational

experiences relating to these two types of tasks. Boys and girls do equally

well on mathematical tasks for which in-class and out-of-class experiences

are equivalent. Boys might have more spatial and problem-solving

experiences than girls, so do better at these tasks. An alternate explanation

is that girls do better at proof writing because it is a task that requires strict

adherence to a classroom mandated, formal set of rules—a “grammar” in a

sense. This explanation is consistent with conjectures by Badger suggesting

that girls tend to “keep to specific methods that have been approved by

their teachers” {, 1981 #25, p. 12} and by Linn and Hyde {, 1989 #652}

that “females may be more likely than males to use the techniques they

learned in school” (p. 22). Closely following prescribed procedures can

certainly be helpful in a situation where true understanding is lacking (as is

the case with most students and proof).

 Geometry - 126

In a comparison on various measures of geometry achievement,

students in a standard geometry curriculum were compared to students

studying the geometry curriculum created by the University of Chicago

School Mathematics Project. Flores {, 1990 #698} reported that the UCSMP

treatment either reduced or reversed the usual gender gap favoring males.

However, because the analyses were performed on scores adjusted for pre-

treatment performance on a geometry readiness test, we do not know how

males and females compared in achievement, only on their gains in

achievement during the school year. Despite this caveat, this finding

indicates that further investigation of gender differences in the UCSMP is

warranted. It is noteworthy that females seemed to do better in a

curriculum that places heavy emphasis on reading (an activity in which

females have traditionally excelled) and applications (in which females have

usually done more poorly).

In Spatial Skills

Fennema and Carpenter {, 1981 #56} hypothesized that one possible

factor that may underlie gender differences in geometry achievement is

spatial visualization. Mathematics achievement generally correlates with

spatial visualization in the range of .30 to .60, and males' spatial scores

have consistently been found to be higher than females' {Battista, 1990

#690; Ben-Chaim, 1988 #5; Fennema, 1985 #22; Tartre, 1990 #554}. In

her review of gender-related spatial differences, Harris states that gender

differences in favor of males appear in a broad spectrum of tasks and

situations and concludes that gender differences on spatial tasks are “real,

not illusory” {Harris, 1981 #11, p. 90}. Linn and Petersen stated

“Differences between males and females in spatial ability are widely

acknowledged, yet considerable dispute surrounds the magnitude, nature,

 Geometry - 127

and age of first occurrence of these differences” {Linn, 1985 #12, p. 1479}.

For instance, they reported that spatial perception and rotation tasks were

easier for males than females but that tasks characterized by an analytic

combination of visual and non-visual strategies were equally difficult for

males and females.

Johnson and Meade {, 1987 #19} administered a battery of spatial

tests to over 1,800 public school students in grades K-12. They found that

males' spatial ability exceeded females' by fourth grade, with evidence that
this superiority also existed at the earlier grades but was masked by

females' superiority in verbal skills. (In fact, males' spatial scores were

significantly higher than females in grades 1-4 when reading scores were

used as a covariate). Their data also suggests that the male/female

difference almost doubled starting at the tenth grade. They found that

there was a male spatial advantage for both blacks and whites.

While it has been argued that the commonly reported male superiority

in spatial ability is of little consequence, Johnson and Meade suggest that

the “effect sizes are substantial enough to create a sizable male majority if

spatial ability were actually to influence performance levels on important

variables or selection rates for certain occupations or training programs” {,

1987 #19, p. 738}. For instance, if the mean were used as a selection

cutoff, their data for grades 4-12 indicates that 62% of the boys but only

38% of the girls would be selected.

Differences in strategies. There are several reports that indicate that

the relationship between spatial ability and mathematics achievement

differs for males and females. Liben {, 1980 #20} found that scores on

Piagetian horizontality (water-level) and verticality tasks (plumb-line ) were

 Geometry - 128

significantly and highly related to spatial ability for boys but not for girls

(grades 4-12). Kyllonen, Lohman, and Snow {, 1984 #306} found that

females' verbal aptitude but males' spatial aptitude correlated with

performance on a paper folding task. And Tartre {, 1990 #554} found that,

although male and female high school students did not differ on

mathematics (geometric and nongeometric) achievement or spatial

orientation (SO) skill, low SO girls scored much lower in mathematics than

high SO girls, and high and low SO boys. These findings are consistent with
the hypothesis that there are differences in the processes that underlie

spatial and geometric thinking in males and females.

Indeed, there have been reports that males prefer nonverbal modes and

females verbal modes of thought {Clements, 1983 #619}. In fact, Tartre {,

1990 #554} reported that females, more than males, tended to keep a

written record of information during problem solving. Also, Clements {,

1983 #619} found that a much greater percentage of females than males

used an inefficient visual-whole strategy on the Differential Aptitude Space

Relations test, and that females used less effective concrete strategies and

males used more efficient abstract strategies on spatial tasks {, 1983

#619}. In fact, gender differences may “result from the propensity of

females to select and consistently use less efficient or less accurate

strategies for these tasks” {Linn, 1985 #12, p. 1492}. Battista {, 1989

#689} reported a tendency for female preservice elementary teachers

enrolled in geometry not to use the strategies that they used most

effectively.

Battista {, 1990 #21} found that males outperformed females in spatial

visualization and in high school geometry, but that there were no gender

differences in logical reasoning ability or use of geometric problem-solving

 Geometry - 129

strategies. When predicting geometry performance, spatial visualization

was the most important factor for females, whereas logical reasoning, and

as a secondary factor, the discrepancy between spatial visualization and

logical reasoning were most important for males. It was suggested that

there is a fundamental difference in the role that spatial visualization and

logical reasoning play in males' and females' learning of geometric ideas. It

was also found that the more spatial ability males, but not females,

possessed in relation to their logical reasoning ability, the more likely they
were to use a visualization strategy and the less likely to use a drawing

strategy. This finding seems to indicate a fundamental difference in the way

that the males and females represented geometric problems. Males with

relatively higher spatial ability seemed to forego the use of the drawing

strategy in preference for visualization—perhaps because their high

visualization skills made them feel that drawing is unnecessary. Females

with relatively higher spatial ability, on the other hand, were more likely to

use a diagram and less likely to use visualization. Similarly, Tartre {, 1990

#554} found that high SO females were more likely than low SO females to

use a drawing, but there were no differences for high and low SO males.

Another promising area of investigation is the interaction of teachers’

style along a visual/nonvisual continuum and students’ representational

preference or visualization ability. Battista {, 1990 #690} found that

spatial visualization was more highly correlated with geometry learning for

students in the classes of a teacher who emphasized and felt more confident

about the role of visualization in geometry than a teacher de-emphasized

and felt less confident about this role. Males scored slightly higher than

females in the former teacher’s classes, whereas males scored much higher

than females in the latter teacher’s classes. Presmeg {, 1986 #398} found
 Geometry - 130

that students who were visualizers seemed to do better in classes of

teachers who neither over- nor underemphasized visual presentations.

Bishop {, 1989 #693} suggested that the latter study called into question

the usefulness of simplistic ATI studies in this area. More thoughtful

research is needed that investigates the interaction between teachers’

instructional emphases and students’ preference for and ability with

visualization.

Thus, there is evidence suggesting that males and females, or at least

subgroups thereof, may differ in the processes they use solve mathematics,

and in particular, geometry problems. There seem to be differences, in

particular,along the spatial dimension. However, these differences have not

yet been adequately investigated. More research is needed in which

students are carefully observed and interviewed as they solve problems.

Brain organization and gender differences. It has been suggested by

researchers in the physiology of the brain that “sex differences in verbal and

spatial abilities may be related to differences in the way that those functions

are distributed between the cerebral hemispheres in males and females”

{Springer, 1981 #58, p. 121}. For instance, it has been conjectured that

“both language abilities and spatial abilities are represented more bilaterally

in females than in males” {Springer, 1981 #58, p. 123}. Further, this

hypothesis posits that greater lateralization of function (i.e., specialization to

one side of the brain) may be essential for high spatial performance but less

lateralization more important for verbal performance, so males should be

superior in spatial tasks and females in verbal tasks. Thus, gender

differences in geometry performance—performance which involves both the

spatial and logical modes of thought—might productively be examined in

terms of these two types of thought.

 Geometry - 131

For example, drawings by left-side, brain-injured patients tend to be

deficient in internal features and in organization of planning but adequate in

overall spatial configuration, with the reverse true for patients with injury on

the opposite side. These differences were mirrored by 5-13 year-old boys

and girls asked to draw a complex figure. “At the youngest age, girls drew

more internal details and more of the discrete parts, whereas boys

concentrated more on the external configuration. At 11 years, boys drew

their designs in 'long, sweeping, continuous lines,' whereas girls 'drew theirs
part by part'…. In other words, where stylistic differences appeared, the

boys' style tended to be characteristic of right-hemisphere processing, the

girls' of left-hemisphere processing” {Harris, 1981 #11, p. 103}.

It is important to keep in mind the complexity of the research on gender

differences. Such differences are observed in some areas of mathematics

but not others, on some spatial tests but not others, in some cultures but

not others {Hanna, 1989 #702}. For instance, while males have performed

better than females on various spatial tasks, the largest and most

consistently observed male advantage appears on items requiring the rapid

mental rotation of figures {Halpern, 1989 #700}, with the source of the

difference being identified as the rate of mental rotation not accuracy

{Alderton, 1989 #70}. It has also been found that training tends to reduce

these differences {Alderton, 1989 #70; Linn, 1989 #652}. Gender

differences have been attributed to both biological and cultural factors and

to a combination of the two {Geary, 1989 #699}. In a meta-analysis,

Baenninger and Newcombe {, in press #687} found a weak relationship

between participation in spatial activities and spatial ability, and that spatial

performance can be improved by training. Neither the participation/activity

relationship nor the increases in performance differed for males and

 Geometry - 132

females. Even when there are no gender differences on a task, it should not

be assumed that males and females are using the same strategies

{Newcombe, 1989 #710; Tartre, 1990 #554}. Finally, Linn and Hyde {,

1989 #652} and Feingold {, 1988 #696} have argued that cognitive gender

differences, including those in mathematics and spatial ability, are declining.

Halpern {, 1989 #700}, on the other hand, has argued that these trends are

artifacts of the testing instruments and changes in test populations.

Conclusions and Implications

Without doubt geometry is important. It offers us a way to interpret and

reflect on our physical environment. It can serve as a tool for the study of

other topics in mathematics and science. More important, however, is that

spatial thinking, which obviously undergirds geometry, has been suggested

by Hadamard and Einstein to be essential to creative thought in all high

level mathematics. Given their importance, therefore, it essential that

geometry and spatial reasoning receive greater attention in instruction and

in research.

As we have seen, and belying its obvious importance in the curriculum,

students’ performance in geometry is woefully lacking. Neither what

students learn in geometry nor the methods by which they learn it are

satisfactory. There has been too little instructional attention given in the

United States to spatial reasoning.

Evidence supports a constructivist position on how children learn spatial

and geometric ideas. It appears that there is a progressive construction of

geometric concepts from the perceptual to the conceptual plane, as well as

developmental sequences in which children build increasingly integrated

and synthesized geometric schemata. Research is needed to identify the

specific cognitive constructions that children make at all age levels,

 Geometry - 133

especially in the context of supportive environments (e.g., those including

manipulatives, computer tools, and engaging tasks). Previously unexplored

factors such as language, schooling, and the immediate social culture

deserve attention in any such research program. Research on geometric

representations from the cognitive science perspective should also be

integrated in this quest. Ideally, such research should inform us how to

build on the strength of children’s existing intuitions while ultimately aiding

them in transcending the shortcomings of these intuitions.

Similarly, research that elaborates and extends the van Hiele theory is

crucial. This perspective appears to hold much promise for the

improvement of both research and instruction, and further elaboration and

explication of such notions as “levels of geometric thinking” can help realize

this promise. In addition, many of the implications for instruction previously

described can and should be directly assessed in future studies. Especially

crucial is research on the phases of instruction, which has not received

adequate attention.

Perhaps the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the cognitive science

approach lies in its extreme degree of specification. It provides much-

needed details on cognitive processes (and thus forces explication on

notions too often left vague in other theories, such as “networks of

relations”). It may in particular provide explicitness to limited aspects of

students’ representations at lower van Hiele levels (e.g., visual

representations via PDP representations) and of concept formation.

However, in a quest for machine-codable formats, some theories eschew

such important constructs as belief systems, motivation, and meaningful

interpretation of subject matter and de-emphasize the role intuition and

 Geometry - 134

culture. Thus, a synthesis of cognitive science, Piagetian, van Hiele, and

other constructivist theories may yield particular riches.

Empowering students with methods by which they can establish for

themselves mathematical truth (and thus helping students develop

intellectual autonomy) is a critical goal of geometry instruction, and indeed

all of mathematics instruction. Currently, this goal is treated in a formal

sense only in geometry, and unfortunately, our instructional attempts at

achieving this goal are failing. While we may dismiss formal proof as an
instructional objective that only the best students need to master, and thus

not be overly concerned with our inability to teach it, we cannot so dismiss

the process of establishing mathematical truth. It is the essence of

mathematics. Without it, students cannot do mathematics, they can only

examine (noncritically) what others have done. Thus, much more attention

should be focused on research aimed at discovering how this important

process develops, its effect on students’ beliefs about and structuring of

geometry knowledge, and how, for students, it can culminate in giving

formal proofs.

Future investigations need to consider how visual thinking is manifest in

higher levels of geometric thinking. It has been postulated here that visual

thinking has a number of psychological layers, from more primitive to more

sophisticated, which plays different roles in thinking depending on which

layer is activated.

We know a substantive amount about students’ learning of geometric

concepts. We need teaching/learning research that leads students to

construct robust concepts through a meaningful synthesis of diagrams and

visual images on the one hand, and verbal definitions and analyses on the

other. Such research should address the interrelationships between verbal

 Geometry - 135

and visual processing. It might also study how to help students build on,

strengthen, and elaborate their existing intuitions about space and

ultimately develop second-order, geometric intuitions.

Computers can help establish fecund environments for the study of

students’ geometric thinking. Research indicates that appropriately-

designed software, such as Logo and the Geometric Supposer, can engender

high levels geometric thinking. We need to learn more about the design of

engaging tasks and teacher mediation, especially with an eye to using such
software as a catalyst for the development of classroom cultures in which

both teachers and students expand their beliefs about learning and

understanding geometry.

We have reported gender differences in both geometry and spatial

reasoning favoring males. If researchers focus not on if such differences

exist but rather on their exact nature, such differences provide one

perspective for investigating the mental processes of all students. That is,

by investigating how males and females reason differently when dealing

with spatial ideas and geometry, we may be able to better understand the

development of geometric and spatial thinking for all students. However,

because there is obviously much more variability in performance and

processing within genders than between them, we should eventually be able

to move beyond studying gender differences to the study of the different

cognitive profiles that underlie successful performance in geometry. More

importantly, however, gender differences represent a cause for concern.

Why do gender differences arise? Are there current instructional practices

that tend to exasperate the differences? What instructional practices can

help ameliorate them?

 Geometry - 136

Finally, geometry learning is an area rich with possibilities for future

research. Given students’ poor performance in this area, such research in

sorely needed. And given a constructivist view of learning, research that

describes the development of geometric concepts and thinking in various

instructional environments is certainly required. Indeed, we believe that

qualitatively different and improved environments for education in geometry

will not emerge without the presence of (a) the theoretically-cognizant

teacher and (b) the student armed with a full array of tools for geometric
investigations, including manipulatives and—perhaps most powerful—a

computer replete with appropriate software. But these agents cannot

evolve without research that investigates the use of innovative materials,

examines how students’ knowledge develops within different instructional

environments, and discovers how teachers can utilize both these

environments and this knowledge about students’ learning.

 Geometry - 137

References
 Geometry - 138

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO

DEPARTMENT OF LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION

MEMORANDUM

TO Maria, FAX 217-398-3923

FROMDouglas Clements DATE -

SUBJECT Corrections

Doug Grouws asked me to have you kindly make the following change
on p. 447, left hand column, 2/3 of the way down.

Replace the old sentence beginning: “Developmental sequences…”

with the following:

Components of concept images were also identified; for example,

students’ concept image for a right triangle were most likely to include a

right triangle with a horizontal and a vertical side, less likely to include a

similar triangle rotated slightly, and least likely to include a right isosceles

triangle with a horizontal hypotenuse.

Thank you.

Douglas H. Clements
1
There have been several different numbering systems used for the levels; we have adopted one

system and have transposed those of each researcher to this scheme for consistency’s sake)