Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.

Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers
and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly
executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said
will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the
institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs
of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to
dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.

On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët

The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create
intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.

1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's
area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed,
are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the
proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of
any devise or legacy therein.1

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be
allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the
court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. 2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and
here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary,
this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects
the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or
nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations
that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a complete
nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of
property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister
Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this
seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution
of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...

Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain
of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus —

Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies
and betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...

A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point
Manresa comments:

La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun

nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le
asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.

Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a uno
cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.

Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que
el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.

It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to have on
hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6

The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wife's
remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to
nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136
N..J Eq. 132.7

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do
away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga
Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were
deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition
in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento
referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as
the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture
that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:

En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se
añade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de
heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es
completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10

The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —

La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o

todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el
testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en
favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto
legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero."
... 11

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal
institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such
institution of universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez
Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses
the rule of interpretation, viz:

... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no
consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando
parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho
sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal
base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los
herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese
distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en
 materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta
que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones
que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro
del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de
que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para
modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que
informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho
constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este
procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12

3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they
are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in
a will — void because of preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is
inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies
apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of
Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added
(in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a
la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That
institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition". 15From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This
argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they
are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in
the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima
constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman
emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is
presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause
specified in the will itself. 20

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names
altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer
from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto,
unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective
disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put
only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of
preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the
preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus:
"Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23

5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that
the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of
said legitimes. 24

This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second
marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but
merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the
Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or
partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all.
And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or
betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of
construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs
from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which
is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is
therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are separate and
distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in
themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined.
Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again an institution of
heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn
merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution
of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs
allowed. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents – Felix and Paz,
and 6 brothers and sisters.

Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole,
universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued
to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the
deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence,
the institution is void.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir.

Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the
conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs.

Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending
line – her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case
is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.

Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in
turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it
contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession
ensues.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD
MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, respondents.

N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in
an intestateproceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after
a probate in the Utah district court).

Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on
November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward
Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two
children by a first marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).

He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate
which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate
outside the Philippines.

In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their
legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this
country, the testator said: têñ.£îhqwâ£

I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my
daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them
in a separate will disposing of my Philippine property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in
Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino,
California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate
proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53,
Rollo). In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and the
codicil It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between the attorneys for
Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita
Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).

Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel,
Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate
proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by David E.
Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine
and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.

In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives
(administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in
the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa
Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate". It recognized that
the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).

It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate"
and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and
marital share. A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F,
pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).

Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty- three days after Grimm's death, or
January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B.
Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the
settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also
moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his
Philippine estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.

The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco
(partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the
behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the
aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.

The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold for P75,000
on March 21, 1979 the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita
allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc.,
was incorporated by Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90, testate case).

Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and
others 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation (p. 135, Record).

Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not
signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine
onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-
142, Record). No mention at all was made of the will in that order.

Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their
lawyer who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the motion moot
considering that it had already approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition (p. 149, Record).

Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no longer connected with Makiling
Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the
sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p.
78, testate case).

Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979.
It was stated therein that Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no objection
to the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court noted the certification as in conformity with
its order of July 27, 1979.

After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate
case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the
Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's
lawyer was notified of that motion.

Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed again its appearance in
collaboration with Del Callar as counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that
the firm had previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion to
dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm was
then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.

Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. — On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the
Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the
probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set
aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris
be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).

Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts
spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm
died testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980.
Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed,
or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the
annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).

Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-
42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in
an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the
judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition
unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who
appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Roberts v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-55509, April 27, 1984 (129 SCRA 33)

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-
42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in
an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the
judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA
JUGO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now
intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 1982, as amended by the resolution dated August 10, 1982, declaring as
null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end
of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro,
Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The
Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.

In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only
executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by
whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully
wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator
Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the
Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and
Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:

Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez,
and our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be
legally and properly entitled to inherit from me; that while I have been estranged from my above-
named wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I was legally married to her or that we have been
separated up to the present for reasons and justifications known fully well by them:

Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom
I declare and avow to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the things which she has done for
me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent,
did comport and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of
the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned
previous marriage;

On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of
letters testamentary.

On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia
that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the
time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary should not be issued to her.

On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his
Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to
probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.

The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court.

On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the
probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner
is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby set aside, the will in question declared valid except the
devise in favor of the appellant which is declared null and void. The properties so devised are
instead passed on in intestacy to the appellant in equal shares, without pronouncement as to cost.

On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error" praying
that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to "appellees" so
as to read: "The properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without
pronouncement as to costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court on August 10, 1982.
On August 23, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court in a
resolution dated December 28, 1982.

The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.

The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided
in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only purpose of the probate of a Will is to
establish conclusively as against everyone that a Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of
paragraph 1 of Article 739 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only
be made by the proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific purpose of obtaining a
declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision in the Will in favor of the person with whom the testator was
allegedly guilty of adultery or concubinage.

The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament itself expressly admits
indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner
herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led
private respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix
Nuguid, et al. (17 SCRA 449) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al. (G.R. No. L- 39247, June 27,
1975). Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of the illicit relationship between him and the
petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise. We agree with the respondents.

The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass
upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution
of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus:

xxx xxx xxx

... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning
capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament,
irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v.
Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428)

The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the
extrinsic validity thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of
the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality
of any devise or legacy is premature.

xxx xxx xxx

True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is
one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of
the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and
distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369)

xxx xxx xxx

To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed
with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the
only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The
judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has
no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for
example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. ... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426)

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless
to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and
completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically,
would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions would be superfluous.

Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed
upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions.

Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:

The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will,
before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious
legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court
 assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA
449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho
v. Udan L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).

There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed that
the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental
capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in
resolving the question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and
Testament, it ruled:

This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex A of Petition.)

On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision in toto.

The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary provision in favor of
the petitioner as null and void.

We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra):

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained.
On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the
record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result,
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that
induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of
the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517,
522). After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate
action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic
validity of its provisions.

Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:

The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation;

(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration
thereof;

(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of
the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of
evidence in the same action.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:

The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.

In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or almost six years before the testator's death on July
16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been estranged
"for so many years." He also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children.
In Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo declared
that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own
husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of
matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will.
There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22
years until his death.

It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the
Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno now
contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator.

The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee.

Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the
true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence.

In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to
petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.

Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as man and
wife, as already married, was an important and specific issue brought by the parties before the trial
court, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals.

Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to
present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN
of August 1, 1982, pp. 56-57 and pp. 62-64).

Private respondents, naturally, presented evidence that would refute the testimony of petitioner on
the point.

Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at length on the meretricious
relationship of his brother and petitioner. (TSN of August 18,1975).

Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue right at the
inception of the case.

Confronted by the situation, the trial court had to make a ruling on the question.

When the court a quo held that the testator Martin Jugo and petitioner 'were deemed guilty of
adultery or concubinage', it was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended
to be.

xxx xxx xxx

3. If a review of the evidence must be made nonetheless, then private respondents respectfully
offer the following analysis:

FIRST: The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town in Tarlac
where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If there was nothing to hide from, why the
concealment' ? Of course, it maybe argued that the marriage of the deceased with private
respondent Rufina Gomez was likewise done in secrecy. But it should be remembered that Rufina
Gomez was already in the family way at that time and it would seem that the parents of Martin Jugo
were not in favor of the marriage so much so that an action in court was brought concerning the
marriage. (Testimony of Sebastian Jugo, TSN of August 18, 1975, pp. 29-30)

SECOND: Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were still both single.
That would be in 1922 as Martin Jugo married respondent Rufina Gomez on November 29, 1923
(Exh. 3). Petitioner married the testator only on December 5, 1952. There was a space of about 30
years in between. During those 30 years, could it be believed that she did not even wonder why
Martin Jugo did not marry her nor contact her anymore after November, 1923 - facts that should
impel her to ask her groom before she married him in secrecy, especially so when she was already
about 50 years old at the time of marriage.

THIRD: The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself conclusive
demonstration that she new that the man she had openly lived for 22 years as man and wife was a
married man with already two children.

FOURTH: Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina Gomez, is it possible
that she would not have asked Martin Jugo whether or not they were his illegitimate or legitimate
children and by whom? That is un-Filipino.

FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the deceased testator, is it
possible that she would not have known that the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and
Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents of
Martin Jugo (where he had lived for many years) and that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a
few meters away?

Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They are, to say the least,
inherently improbable, for they are against the experience in common life and the ordinary instincts
and promptings of human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man she was
going to marry whether or not he was already married to another, knowing that her groom had
children. It would be a story that would strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did not know
that Martin Jugo was already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his
marriage to respondent Rufina Gomez that led petitioner to break off with the deceased during their
younger years.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who
are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming
that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he
was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate
Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

No. L-62952, October 9, 1985

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament where he named and
appointed petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the will that
the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but since 1952,
he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact,
on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia, were married on Tarlac before the
Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children
his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for the
probate of the last will and testament of the deceased, but the legal wife of the testator Rufina and her children filed
an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the will was procured by undue and improper influence on the
part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the will, the testator was already very sick and that the
petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting integrity and thus letters
testamentary should not be issued to her. The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that as the
testator admitted in his will to cohabiting with the petitioner because on the face of the will, the invalidity of its intrinsic
provisions is evident. The appellate court declared the will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner
is null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the donation made by the testator in favor of herein petitioner was valid.

No. There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo lived together in an
ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death. It is also a fact that Martin Jugo and Sofia Nepomuceno contracted a
marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno
contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator. The records do not
sustain that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the testator, since the last will and
testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the
devisee. Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are
living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may
receive. The very wordings of the will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a
person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23135 December 26, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA. MARIANO SUMILANG, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE PABELLA, LICERIA PABELLA and ANDREA
RAVALO, oppositors-appellants.

Gatchalian and Sison and J. A. Bardelosa, Jr. for petitioner-appellee.

Jose L. Desvarro Jr. for oppositors-appellants

MAKALINTAL, J.:

On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959. Said
document, written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949, institutes petitioner as sole heir of the testator.

The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) of oppositors — appellants herein — who questioned the due
execution of the document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to
be his last will and testament. Aside from merely opposing the petition for probate, the first set of oppositors —
Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa — also claimed that they, instead of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate
of the deceased. The other oppositors representing themselves simply as next of kin, appropriately prayed only for
the disallowance of the will.

At the hearings of the petition petitioner adduced his evidence, and then rested his case on February 16, 1961.
Reception of oppositors' evidence was set for July 14, 1961. However, on July 3, 1961 oppositors moved for the
dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground that "the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter
because the last will and testament of the decedent, if ever it was really executed by him, was revoked by implication
of law six years before his death." Oppositors alleged that after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner
Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario the parcels of land described therein, so that at the time of the testator's
death the titles to said lands were no longer in his name.

Petitioner filed his opposition to the motion for dismissal on July 17, 1961 supplemented it by another opposition on
August 14, 1961, and by a rejoinder on August 21, 1961. Finally, on October 22, 1962 petitioner moved to strike out
the oppositors' pleadings on two grounds, namely:

1. That oppositors have no legal standing in court and they are bereft of personality to oppose the probate of
the last will and testament of the testators; and

2. That oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the distribution of (the) estate of the aforesaid testator
and no existing valid right whatsoever.

On October 18, 1963 the court a quo issued the order now subject of this appeal, which read as follows:

Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the oppositors dated July 31, 1961, the same is hereby denied for
the allegations contained therein goes (sic) to the very intrinsic value of the will and other grounds stated on
said motion to dismiss are without merit.itc-alf With respect to the motion to strike out opposition and all
other pleadings of oppositors filed by the petitioner, it appears that oppositors have no relationship
whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore the oppositors are totally strangers to
the deceased whose will is under probate. This being so, the motion to strike out opposition and all other
pleadings pertinent thereto is hereby ordered stricken out of the record.

The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof.
The testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law
are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature. (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June
23, 1966).

To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings . . . for the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine
nothing more. (Alemany, et al. vs. CFI of Manila, 3 Phil. 424).

Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss petition for probate on the ground that the testator had impliedly
revoked his will by selling, prior to his death, the lands disposed of therein.

True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing the validity
of the testamentary provisions is another.itc-alf The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary
capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.

The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary
heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed. For
 one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become
superfluous: in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the
revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent
acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the
properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise
or legacy.itc-alf (Fernandez, et al. vs. Dimagiba, L-23638 and Reyes, et al. vs. Dimagiba, L-23662, October
12, 1967.)

In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quo's finding that they "have no relationship whatsoever
within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore . . . are totally (sic) strangers to the deceased whose will is
under probate." They do not attempt to show that they have some interest in the estate which must be protected. The
uncontradicted evidence, consisting of certified true copies of the parties' baptism and marriage certificates, support
the said court's finding in this respect.

It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he
must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or
as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an
interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who
has a claim against the estate like a creditor. (Teotico vs. Del Val, etc., G.R. No. L- 18753, March 26, 1965.)

The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court may be
prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the
courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no
interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil.
244.)

Sometime after this case was elevated to this Court appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the
order appealed from is interlocutory. We deferred action on the motion until after the brief of both parties had been
filed. The motion, although now practically academic in view of our resolution of the main issue involved, must be
denied, since the order of the lower court striking out appellants' opposition to the probate of the will on the ground
that they have no personality to intervene in the case, was final and therefore appealable order insofar as they were
concerned.

SUMILANG V. RAMAGOSA

FACTS

Mariano Sumilang filed a petition for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion
Ramagosa. Said document institutes Mariano as the sole heir of the testator. The petition was opposed by two
Saturnina Ramagosa, et. al, who questioned the due execution of the document, claiming that it was made under
duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament. Saturnino and Santiago
Ramagosa also claimed that they, instead of Mariano, were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. After
Mariano presented evidence and rested his case, oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground
that decedent revoked his will by implication of law six years before his death by selling the parcels of land to Mariano
Sumilang and his brother Mario so that at the time of the testator's death, the titles to said lands were no longer in his
name. On the other hand, Mariano moved to strike out oppositors pleadings on the ground that the oppositors have
no interest in the probate of the will as they have no relationship with the decedent within the fifth degree. The lower
court ruled in favor of Mariano stating that the allegations of the oppositors go to the very intrinsic value of the will and
since the oppositors have no standing to oppose the probate of the will as they are strangers, their pleadings are
ordered stricken out from the record.

ISSUE

Whether the probate court should pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will.

HELD

The petition being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity only. The
testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are
the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature (Nuguid vs. Nuguid).To establish conclusively
as against everyone and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that
the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings . . . for the probate of a will. The
judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. (Alemany, et al.vs. CFI of Manila) True
or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing the validity of
the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary
capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution. The revocation invoked by the oppositors is
not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of
the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, there vocation would not affect the will
itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy