Leaders, Leadership and Democracy - are they compatible?

John Schostak

invited talk:

“Leadership for Democracy”

BELMAS

British Educational Leadership, management and Administration Society

25th September, 2015

The Co-operative Head Office, Manchester, UK

I start from the view that there are no natural laws ruling society, that is to say, there are

no laws of physics nor chemistry nor indeed biology that compel any particular vision

concerning the ‘good society’, nor how to construct the best forms of social organisation

that can benefit each and every individual. As such then, I do not take for granted that

leaders or any form of leadership is necessary to the organisation of societies in general

and education in particular. In short, we make our laws and our visions of society - and

education needs to be organised in ways that support this. But as I also accept that

people will have different views and may never agree with each other concerning the best

forms of social organisation, then the ways in which political, community, and

organisational decision making - particularly in education - are undertaken are critical

when decisions are made and actions undertaken.

My concern in this talk is ‘democracy’ and how best to bring it about and whether

schools or some other form of educational organisation are a way to bring about

‘democracy’. In thinking about that, then what is, if any, the role of leadership, the notion

of a ‘leader’ and whether the promotion of leaders and leadership is a desirable thing or is
injurious to the notion of democracy, or indeed, a notion of education. I think we’ve been

reminded sufficient times during the last few years that democracy is not just a form of

political governance over citizens. People will give their lives for it. It is inextricably tied to

the twin concepts of freedom and equality - that is, the freedom to speak fearlessly with

an equal voice to all others. Democracy in its widest application is a form of critique, a

way of getting critical purchase on how we live as human beings and is itself a way of

living with others. In that sense, I can argue that democracy is an educational process.

So, in being asked to say something about leadership, I am immediately worried about

the privileged position that the leader occupies in relation to others as followers and as

‘learners’, for a leader is nothing without followers, and nothing without an assumed

greater knowledge or expertise; and significantly, it seems to me, a leader is nothing

without an opposition, real, implied or imagined. But I could be mistaken in thinking this.

So I want to start with a couple of naive questions.

To what extent is leadership needed for a democratic life? Or to put it another way, what

form of democratic organisation, if any, is compatible with leadership?

Then I want to end with a final couple: is democracy undermined by leadership? If it is,

what can be done about it?

To what extent is leadership needed for a democratic life?

First off, I’ll make clear the kind of democracy that I support. In contemporary academic

discourse it goes by the name of radical democracy. From my own reading of some of

contributors to this discourse it seems to me that the following provide some useful
pointers for evaluating whether or not a given practice, organisation or system of

organisations is democratic to its roots or is simply a veneer that covers over something

its architects and its beneficiaries would rather not show.

These are the 5 key criteria that I shall employ in exploring the question of ‘leadership’

1. the place of power over people is not occupied, or in other words, the place of power

is empty (Lefort 1988)

2. all social relations operate under the principle of égaliberté (equaliberty) (Balibar 1994)

3. all decisions are made according to the principle of being ‘faithful to the

disagreement’ (Rancière 1999) to this can be added the idea of speaking

fearlesslessly (Foucault on ‘parrhesia’ - see for example: Ross 2008)

4. all intelligences are equal, or to put it another way, there is a suspension of the claims

to special or expert knowledge of those occupying a position of the ‘teacher’ or

‘master’ (Rancière (1987) on Jacotot)

5. in order to maximise the potential of each individual there is an equality of powers

within and between individuals as living beings (Spinoza 2004)

One could, no doubt increase the number to appear on such a listing as this but I think

these are enough to begin a discussion. I shall provide a rationale for each of these as I

explore the notion of a) a leader and b) the desirability of promoting leadership in the

context of a demand for democracy. I say demand deliberately. A demand is an

expression of agency, action, power that requires a response by others. So, with this

demand in mind, let’s start with the place of power and how and by who, or what, this

becomes a place of contestation for occupation.

The place of power

There is a view expressed by some that without leaders there is chaos.  What this

effectively means is that, in the place of power where decisions are taken and compliance

ensured, there needs to be someone able to set in motion a machinery that guarantees

actions are undertaken in an orderly fashion. I shall argue that the idea that leaders are

necessary to all apsects of life forms the dominant organising framework through which

democracy is tamed. This organising framework I call a leadership dispositif. I prefer to

use the term dispositif rather than its usual english translation as apparatus because, the

French word means much more than the english word. Like apparatus it connotes the

machineries through which activities are organised. But it also refers to resources and

most usefully, following Agamben (2009) and its development in Schostak and Schostak

(2013) it refers to the arrangement of resources that can be called into action to resolve or

address a pressing problem or issue. These resources include arrangements of

discourses, laws, tools such as weapons as well as organisations of people as in

corporations or militaries whether to produce profits, the compliance of subjects or to

conquer other nations.

Take for example the early days of the Arab Spring when large numbers of people were

occupying Tahrir square, there was an often heard Western complaint that there were no

leaders with whom to talk, negotiate and agree action (Witte 2011). To the protesters,

many said that this was itself a strength. As Roberts and Schostak (2012) argued, what

was missing was not so much leadership but the concrete practices, organisations and

institutions of democracy. When Mubarak toppled what was left securely in place was

the military, police, judicial and financial machineries which had been built up over

decades of dictatorship. In short, the place of power remained occupied. Only the

symbol of power fell. In such a circumstance new leaders appear and contest each other
for the place of power but as the machineries do not change then not much changes for

the people. As Jones (2013) reported, three years on from the suicide of Mohamad

Bouazizi that became the trigger for the Tunisian protests in 2010

"Absolutely nothing has changed," says Mohamed Ali, a math teacher turned

political activist, as he sips hot coffee in a youth center named after the uprising.

"There was blood on the streets. We fought and we got nothing."

The issue, as it always is, is how can change be made to take place. For the people who

engaged in the Arab Spring demanding greater freedoms there was no countervailing

democratic dispositif that was adequately developed to take fill the empty place of power.

It is an issue, that in very different contexts and circumstances made Dewey skeptical

about the role of schools being able to generate the conditions for an informed

democratic citizenry. But before exploring this question further, I want to return to the

issue of the empty place of power because it is in understanding its significance for

democracy that is critical for generating the conditions for an informed and effective

public.

For the French political theorist Lefort (1988), the empty place of power emerges when

there is no immediate obvious candidate who can occupy it following the fall of a tyrant

and the regime that had supported the power of the tyrant. At this point in time, however

fleeting and ill defined it might be, there is the possibility of a) the emergence of a leader

who can bring order under his or her name as a new tyrant that people will follow

because, for example, there is the promise of a kinder regime than the previous one; or b)

rather than one leader, there is an elite group; or c) there is the emergence of meetings

between equals who mutually create the rules and procedures through which a
democracy of voices for decision making can be constituted - that is, they are capable of

creating the countervailing discourses, practices, tools, forms of organisation and social

machineries required for the emergence of a democracy without leaders. It is this latter

possibility that interests me. is it possible to fill the empty place of power with a

democratic dispositif that does not include leaders?

Reflecting upon the Arab Spring and other revolutionary moments Zizek (2013) agreed

that

Yes, there are moments of intense collective participation where local communities

debate and decide, when people live in a kind of permanent emergency state, taking

things into their own hands, with no Leader guiding them. But such states don’t last,

and “tiredness” is here not a simple psychological fact, it is a category of social

ontology.

Admitting that he also is into tired politics, he called upon the work of Walter Lippman, a

journalist who was, along side Edward Bernays, an early pioneer of the modern public

relations industry, to justify his desire for an efficient state apparatus that would never

trouble him for a political opinion or act apart from the ritual of voting for a new party

every few years. Lippmann (1927) wrote a book called the Phantom Public in which he

argued that people do not have the time to be involved in day to day politics and that

therefore experts should do the thinking, the deciding and the acting for them. Our job,

as the phantom public is to consent to the decisions of the experts, the leaders. They

have the machineries, the dispositifs available to massage our egos, make us frightened

of the new, the outsider, the scrounger and seduce us with pomp, displays of wealth and

beauty. In short, as Zizek (2013) says:

 We act as if we are free and freely deciding, silently not only accepting but even

demanding that an invisible injunction (inscribed into the very form of our free

speech) tells us what to do and think. “People know what they want” – no, they

don’t, and they don’t want to know it. They need a good elite, which is why a proper

politician does not only advocate people’s interests, it is through him that they

discover what they “really want.”

This, of course, is a seductive message for all leaders in whatever system, community or

organisation. It fits with the oft rehearsed justification that ‘hard decisions’ have to be

made for us ‘in our best interests’. Leaving aside for the moment, the twin issues of 1)

what counts as the ‘good elite’ and 2) who gets to decide on who can decide who the

good elite are, the key issue is about the inevitability of elites and leaders. For Zizek

(2013), who was praising the leadership qualities of Thatcher in the article from which the

above quotes are drawn, the inevitability of elites and leaders means that we need a

Thatcher of the Left if we want to have a political vision that includes social justice. I

hesitate to remark that Jeremy Corbyn, the new left wing leader of the opposition recently

elected to lead the labour party in the UK, is this Thatcher of the Left. But even if he

were, is this desirable for those of us who hope for a more democratic, socially just

society?

I alluded above to Dewey as a possible starting point in answer to the question of

democracy. I will come back to him later but for now simply point out that Lippmann and

Dewey were contemporaries and where Lippmann saw the public as a phantom, Dewey

saw the education of a public as vital to the constant renewal of democracy. Although

they knew of each others work and indeed admired each others work, they never had a
face to face debate. This is not important, of course, because Lippmann has, to date,

won hands down. Dewey’s hopes to ground democracy through education never really

materialised and he became increasingly disillusioned that schools - his chosen vehicle -

would be enough. But while there is still a future there is always the possibility of a

different outcome and thus I’ll continue on with my hopes for the time being and move to

the next cluster of principles which I see as necessarily operating together in the empty

place of power.

To recall, these principles are: égaliberté, being ‘faithful to the disagreement’, the equality

of intelligences, and the equality of powers. They are important because they help to

think about the kind of conditions that have to be created if leaders and leadership -

whether of the right or the left - are to be constrained to the benefit of all and not just for

the wealthy, the privileged and the experts who compose elites no matter how kind and

wise they might be. I shall call these principles, the conditions for creating a

countervailing democratic dispositif and turn now to the question of whether leaders and

leadership can be compatible with democratic organisation.

What form of democratic organisation, if any, is compatible with leadership?

Fundamental, it seems to me, to any organisation or system that claims to be democratic

is the capacity for all its members to speak fearlessly and equally. And I mean everyone -

that includes all children and all immigrants who want to settle in a given territory, ideally,

the whole population of the planet. But I guess, meantime, as a first step, we’ll have to

set our sights on a given state or federation of states such as the EU. For that condition

to be met people have to feel free and they have to feel that their voice can be heard

equally and be taken equally into account alongside all other voices. For this kind of

condition Balibar coined the word égaliberté, often translated as the neologism
equaliberty. His argument is that an individual’s freedom is reduced if another individual is

able to weald power, say through wealth or bullying, to prevent the acts of the other. This

of course is the contemporary situation where corporations and millionaires are able to

influence and dominate political parties and the top jobs in governments. Neoliberalism is

founded upon a principle of freedom where the strongest are free unencumbered by what

they call ‘big government’ or ‘socialism’ to compete to exercise their freedom of action

over those who are weaker. They have a horror of equality and socialism which, in

Hayek’s terms is equated to serfdom. However, for Balibar, there can be no freedom for

all without equality - they are co-extensive. Hence he joined them as one word:

égaliberté. By this criterion, there are few contemporary organisations and no states that

can claim to be democratic. If it is considered that this ideal is impossible to meet, and

perhaps it is, then what compromises are acceptable?

There are four key pragmatic rationales that I will mention for the adoption of a

compromise that are often employed to justify this.

The first is that private property and its accumulation underpins the freedom, the self

responsibility, and the security of the individual. It is considered natural to the extent that

people are assumed to be self interested and thus motivated through the opportunity to

gain private wealth that working hard provides.

The second is that people are naturally competitive. Thus driven by self interest they

compete to outdo each other. This it is typically argued drives creativity as well as

productivity.

The third is the one Lippmann gave, people are too busy with their lives to be able to be

involved in politics, they need experts to do the decision making for them.

The fourth, is that populations cannot be asked to vote on every thing. There are simply

too many people and it would take too long. In a fast paced world you need fast paced

decisions. So, best leave it to the elites, the leaders, the managers and their expertise.

To provide a degree of democracy, political elites can be subjected to voting. However,

people may of course vote for the ‘wrong’ leaders hence Lippmann’s strategy can be

employed to manufacture consent or as Bernays termed it, engineer of consent through

the use of public relations campaigns. Pragmatically then, leaders can best lead under a

veneer of democracy. Thus leaders and leadership fit well with a model of democracy

that has been hollowed out and where the public is no more than a ghost in the

machinery of political organisation. The reduction of the involvement of the public to

being a ‘phantom’ with populations thus being manipulated by leaders is the strategy

through which any emergent democracy can be tamed as Bouton (2007) called it in his

study of the American War of Independence. He described the emergence in

Pennsylvania of a people’s democracy where equality was directly linked to freedom.

However, as time went on the wealthy grew impatient with the lower classes who insisted

on contributing to decision making and counter strategies were employed by the leaders

greedy for self enrichment. Bouton describes the strategy of Robert Morris the richest

and most powerful man in america at the time as being

to channel money to the wealthy, either through direct payouts or by privatising the

most lucrative parts of the state and turning them over to new for-profit corporations

owned and run by the gentry. If Morris had proposed this today, it might be called

“neoliberalism” or supply-side/trickle-down economics.

In Morris’s view ‘the chief obstacle to this plan was democracy’ (Bouton 2007). Morris

was against the Pennsylvanian democratic revolution and was against the Declaration of

Independence. However, he joined the government and used his position as the friend of

presidents and at the head of departments to channel money into his own pockets and

those of his allies as well as contribute to the construction of laws in such a way as to

limit democracy and create, in effect, the phantom public as a substitute to what Jill and I

called the effective public in our last book (Schostak and Schostak 2013).

We are now at what may be called the Machiavellian moment where the equality of voices

of an effective public is in conflict with the manufacture of the consent of the phantom

public by the voices of the elite and their leadership dispositifs managing the key

organisations through which the lives of populations are manipulated. This conflict

requires Machiavellian strategies. Critical to understanding this Machiavellian moment

and the strategies to be employed is that if democracy is to exist at all it is necessarily

open to all possible discourses from all possible points of view where each view is held

freely, expressed fearlessly and is counted as equal to all others where decisions are to

be made - under the principle of égaliberté. That is to say, an effective public is one

where disagreements are both expressed and counted in the decision making process -

in Rancière’s terms, the decision that arises is one that is faithful to the disagreement. If it

is not faithful to the disagreement then some voice or collection of voices are

marginalised at best and at worst suppressed and oppressed. Being faithful to the

disagreement is a demand for creativity where each voice much contribute its demand to

be taken into account if one is not to be suppressed by another.

This creativity is required because no one knows everything and everyone’s experience,

circumstances and points of view are significant in mapping what is at stake for who

when one decision is made rather than another. In that sense, where all are to some

extent ignorant and acting under conditions of uncertainty, then the more intelligences at

work on what decision to make is desirable if the decision is to be to the benefit of all

rather than the elite few or even the majority. The few and the majority are a significant

bias. Hence calling upon the principle of égaliberté we come to Rancière’s principle of

the equality of intelligences that he drew from his study of Jacotot’s approach to

teaching. In this sense, intelligence is not equivalent to IQ nor the forms of technical

reason favoured by contemporary forms of Modernity. IQ and technical reason focus on

a very limited set of mental powers and functions to produce elites in a society devoted to

puzzle solving in the interests of the privileged few. Rancière’s argument is that we are all

ignorant in some matter, that we cannot know everything but that we all have insights and

experiences from our own individual points of view and we can draw upon our own

intelligence in debate with others to form understandings. If the will of a teacher

overpowers that of a learner then in Rancière’s terms this intelligence will be stultified.

The intelligence is emancipated only when there is a relation of equality rather than

dominance between the two. In a relation of equality, it is not about explaining to another,

nor about telling another but about i the attention given to the materialities of the world

that manifests the deployment of intelligence. In Rancierès terms:

There  is  no  intelligence  where  there  is  aggregation,  the  binding  of  one  mind  to  

another.  There  is  intelligence  where  each  person  acts,  tells  what  he  is  doing,  and  

gives  the  means  of  verifying  the  reality  of  his  action.    (1987:  33)  
Hence

This  is  the  way  that  the  ignorant  master  can  instruct  the  learned  one  as  well  as  

the  ignorant  one:  by  verifying  that  he  is  always  searching.  Whoever  looks  

always  Dinds.  He  doesn’t  necessarily  Dind  what  he  was  looking  for,  and  even  

less  what  he  was  supposed  to  Dind.  But  he  Dinds  something  new  to  relate  to  the  

thing  that  he  already  knows.  What  is  essential  is  the  continuous  vigilance,  the  

attention  that  never  subsides  without  irrationality  setting  in—something  that  

the  learned  one,  like  the  ignorant  one,  excels  at.  The  master  is  he  who  keeps  

the  researcher  on  his  own  route,  the  one  that  he  alone  is  following  and  keeps  

following.      (1987  33)  

This route is quite different from that of the dominant form of modernity which is always

about engineering the attention of the other to conform to a vision of ‘rationality’, that is,

technical rationality employed by the teachers, the managers, the leaders who have

aggregated their mind in conjunction with their will to those of the elites. The alternative

route that I draw upon is what Mack (2010) calls the ‘other modernity’, stemming from

Spinoza. Spinoza does not make a hierarchical separation between mind and body and

indeed argues for an equality of powers, that is, a democracy of powers not just an

equality of intelligences. The powers of the body include thinking, feeling, imagining as

well as all the powers of the individual body to sense, to reach out, to move, to speak and

in utilising all the powers of perception and expression to communicate and engage with

others in projects of mutual benefit.

In this context, unequal relations between powers and between individuals damages the

democratic development and organisation of mutual projects because the imposition of

the will of a leader over that of others means that mutuality dissolves into the course of

action favoured by the leader. Hence, there are potentials for development that are

suppressed, marginalised or ignored. The benefits for all are reduced to the benefits for

some.

I now come to the question raised at the beginning: What form of democratic

organisation, if any, is compatible with leadership? To this I answer “none!” apart from

what may be called a lazy democracy which respects none of the key principles of a

democracy substituting the dominance of one will over another whether through coercion

or the manufacture of consent.

That leads then to the final pair of questions. The first asks: is democracy undermined

by leadership? To that, my answer is: yes if by democracy we mean the community of

equals as articulated through the principles already outlined of égaliberté, being ‘faithful

to the disagreement’, the equality of intelligences, and the equality of powers.

The concluding question: what to do about it

So, I am now drawn to my final question that given that democracy is undermined by

leadership, and given that leaders abound in all the key organisations of everyday life,

what can be done about it?

In short, if a democratic form of social organisation is wanted, then strategies have to be

put into place to stop it from being subverted by elites whether or not they see

themselves as benign experts, managers, leaders or have some rather darker motives.
This is the strategy that McCormick (2006, 2011) calls Machiavellian democracy. Here,

perhaps, there is a role for a leader who is able to adopt the position of what is

sometimes called, the vanishing mediator. That is to say, the leader as vanishing

mediator is one who seeks to abolish his or her own role. Such a leader occupies a

position in the place of power only to replace the role of leader with other forms of

organisation that do not reinforce hierarchical decision making but creates the conditions

for the values, the practices, the discourses, the forms of organisation to emerge that

are democratic. However, leaders may well succumb to the rewards, privileges and

powers associated with the elites. Hence, Machiavelli, according to McCormick sought

to develop mechanisms and procedures by which to constrain the insolence of the elites,

who in his time were the princes, but nowadays are the super rich and their senior

directors and management teams whether these are in the private or the public sector.

Machiavelli had his strategies. McCormick (2006) in the context of ancient and

contemporary state practice discuss the use of

• lotteries

• frequent rotation in office

• election

• tribunals

• preventing the rich from voting and engaging in office in exchange for them keeping
their wealth and paying no tax - that is, buy them out of the political process

Each of these suggestions are about preventing leaders from retaining and reinforcing

their grip on decision making at the expense of others. For immediate practice in most
forms of hierarchical organisation these specific mechanisms are unlikely to be

employable. More useful would be to imagine what kinds of mechanisms are already

available that can be employed to constrain the grip of leaders on decision making

processes regardless of the views of others.

In the educational context, there are of course legacies from democratically and co-

operatively formed organisation as for example described by Fielding and Moss (2011)

and the contributors to Woodin’s (2014) book on co-operative forms of education.

However, much as we may look to the legacies of Robert Owen, Dewey’s Laboratory

School or Neill’s Summerhill or indeed Reggio Emilia these have by no means become

mainstream. However, each of these in their different ways have taken seriously the

ability of people to organise for mutual benefit. It is that seriousness I think that is the

most subversive of leadership power and the insolence of elites. If a leader adopting the

role of the vanishing mediator seeks to incorporate democratic practice, then the means

by which decision making on the ground gets to be improved and made effective must be

enhanced at every opportunity. As a vanishing mediator, perhaps the leader becomes the

ignorant leader in conjunction with Rancière’s ignorant master, that is, one whose only

decision is to facilitate the attention to detail of all participants that a mutually agreed

project requires. Once the democratic culture, practice and organisation is in place in the

empty place of power, the leader simply vanishes as a role. Perhaps at this point we may

return to Dewey’s conception of the laboratory school and see in it the possibility of all

organisations being constructed upon the principle of a democratic test for the

exploration of forms of social action for mutual benefit. And perhaps, if we take it on

board as a mutual project and work for it, we might have a little more optimism than

Dewey’s fading hopes in his later years.

Finally this hope relates to one last pair of questions echoing Zizek’s complaint about

politics being tiring: do we want a lazy democracy run by those who claim expertise,

wisdom and the psychological make up to take hard decisions on our behalf?: or do we

want a courageous democracy comprised of fully functioning, effective organisations

where we make our own decisions fearlessly about how to run our lives? In short, must

we wait for a leader to come along? If so, how long?

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