Spouses Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 97973, January 27, 1992 RATIO: A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed.
First Name Cannot Be Changed. RA 9048 provides the grounds for which
FACTS:  Petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a review on the decision made by
herein respondent Court of Appeals – sustaining the right of private respondent Pe to
repurchase a parcel of land sold to petitioners. It started when respondent Pe was granted
parcel of lands acquired through free patent, however, Pe then mortgaged the lot to DPB;
developed it into commercial complex. Failed to pay the mortgaged, DBP foreclosed the lot;
Pe leased it to DBP; the former failed to redeem such property within one year period; DBP
sold it to petitioners Benzonan. Then Pe filed a complaint to repurchase. The RTC and CA
affirmed and granted the claim to repurchase. Petitioners filed a complaint against CA,
alledging, among other issues, that the latter erred in its decision re. the five-year period in
foreclosure sale by not relying on the doctrine in Monge v. Angeles and instead relied on the
ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court which was applied retroactively.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision regarding the
foreclosure sale by not applying the doctrinal law ruled in  Monge v. Angeles  and instead
applied retroactively the ruling in the case Belisario v. IAC?
HELD: Yes. At the time of the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing jurisprudence was still
the Monge case, hence, it is the doctrine that should be applied in the case at bar. However,
the respondent court applied the rulings in Belisario case in 1988 thereby rendering a decision
in favor of the private respondent. But the Supreme Court sustained the claims of the
petitioners. The Court said that though they are bound by decisions pursuant to Article 8 of
the Civil Code, the Court also stressed that: “while our decisions form part of the law of the
land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which states that “laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided””.  Moreover, the Court emphasized
that  “when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively  xxx.”  Therefore, respondents cannot rely on the
Belisario ruling because it should be applied prospectively and not the contrary. CA erred in its
decision regarding this case. Wherefore, such decision was reversed and set aside.
Silverio v. Republic, G. R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007
FACTS: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for
the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila by reason of sex alteration or sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male
transsexual. He underwent sex reassignment surgery on January 27, 2001 in Bangkok,
Thailand. From then on, he lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,”
and his sex from “male” to “female.”
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, stating that the
petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. On August 18,
2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, CA rendered a decision in favor
of the Republic, ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. Petition was moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the change of the petitioner’s first name and sex in his birth certificate
are allowed?
HELD: Petition DENIED. Lack of Merit.
change of first name may be allowed:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment. Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is.
“Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless
and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.”
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. On the other hand, Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the
entry in the civil registry of certain acts, and judicial decrees. These acts, events and judicial
decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality
of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment
is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that “All other matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special laws.” But there is no such special law in the
Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. While petitioner may have succeeded
in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Neither May
Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual).
There are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor
Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among
others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted. It is true that Article 9 of the
Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to
engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it. It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when
a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no
authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law
where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.
***Re: Resolution Granting Automatic Permanent Total Disability Benefits to Heirs of***
Justices and Judges Who Die in Actual Service, A.M. No. 02-12-01-SC
-SEPARATE-
Ting v. Velez-Ting, G. R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009
FACTS: On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and
while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the
RTC of Cebu City for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the
time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Onate’s findings and
the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code has been realized
RULING:
No. By the very nature of case involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understood to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedent, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions,
while highly advisable, are not conditions in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence
in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other
given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions
furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings.
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and
expert opinion of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s
alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and according,
be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted.
Philippine Farming Corporation, LTD. v. Llanos, et al., G. R. No. L-21014 August 14,
1965
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. (Hawaii) executed on July 11, 1950, an indenture of sale
purporting to transfer ownership of a 4,706 square meter parcel of land, situated in Tinejeros,
Malabon, Rizal, covered by transfer Certificate of Title No. 1584, to Manuel Ramos, Dominador
Llanos and Juliana Andrada, for P30,000.00. As a result thereof the aforesaid buyers were
subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19243
covering said parcel of land.
Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. (Philippines), a distinct corporation from its
aforementioned namesake, filed in August 1950 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a suit
docketed as Civil Case No. 1209 to annul and declare null and void the indenture of sale afore-
stated as well as to cancel TCT No. 19248 in the buyers' name and reinstate TCT 1584,
allegedly in plaintiff's name. The parties defendants were: Alejandro Llanos, Aquilino Galiza,
Antonio Bacilio, Dionisio Quinto, Andres Baxa (who all signed the sale as Directors of Philippine
Farming Corporation, Ltd. [Hawaii]); Manuel Ramos, Dominador Llanos, Juliana B. Andrada
(the buyers); and the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
On September 29, 1950, however, Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. (Philippines) moved to
dismiss its complaint in said Civil Case No. 1209 stating as reason therefor the settlement of
the case. Defendants concurred to said motion and the court dismissed the complaint.
Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. (Philippines) later sought to withdraw its motion to
dismiss and to annul the order of dismissal, alleging deceit on the part of the defendants. Still
later, however, it moved that its motion for withdrawal be itself considered withdrawn, and
the court granted said last motion on November 20, 1950.
On May 8, 1951, Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. (Philippines) filed an action in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 1439, against the same defendants as in
Civil Case No. 1209, likewise to declare the same indenture of sale null and void and to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19248. The court dismissed this second suit on November 27,
1951 for being res judicata. A motion for reconsideration was denied on February 19, 1952.
Sometime in 1960 Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. (Philippines) filed the present suit, in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 6322; to declare the
same indenture of sale null and void, to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19248 in the
buyers' name, and to declare null and void a certain mortgage executed by the buyers on
November 1, 1950 as well as the subsequent foreclosure sale on said mortgage. Alejandro
Llanos, Manuel Ramos, Dominador Llanos, Juliana Andrada assisted by her husband Honofre
Andrada, the Register of Deeds of Rizal all of whom were defendants in the previous suits
were again impleaded as defendants. Furthermore, the following were also included as
defendants: Estate of Florentrao P. Buan, Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (as purchasers of
the right to redeem in the foreclosure sale) and Philippine Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. (as
mortgagee).
Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss raising the ground of  res judicata. On January
30, 1962, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff appealed
to this Court on the sole issue of whether its present complaint is barred by res judicata. The
requisites for res judicata are: (1) court of competent jurisdiction; (2) final judgment or order
on the merits; and (3) identities of parties, subject matter, and cause of action (San Diego vs.
Cardona, 70 Phil. 281, 288). The Court of First Instance of Rizal clearly had competent
jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 1209. The subject matter thereof was annulment of declaration
of nullity of sale. And the parties came within the court's jurisdiction by the filing of the
complaint and service of summons.
The dismissal in said Civil Case No. 1209 was by a final order since thereafter nothing was left
to be disposed of. The dismissal was with prejudice, hence, on the merits. It was with
prejudice because the dismissal was by order of the court upon the instance of both plaintiff
and defendants, on the allegation of a settlement (Exh. 14-B, Offer of Additional Documentary
Evidence, Rec. on App., 89-92). Not being, therefore, a dismissal by plaintiff's mere filing of a
notice (Sec. 1, Rule 30, Old Rules of Court), nor a dismissal by order of the court upon
plaintiff's instance alone (Sec. 2, Rule 30, Old Rules of Court), it falls under "dismissal on other
grounds" covered by Section 4 of Rule 30 of the Old Rules of Court, in which case the
dismissal, unless otherwise specified (and here it was not), is with prejudice.
As to the identities required, the parties here were defendants in Civil Case No. 1209, the
newly added defendants mortgagee and purchasers of right of redemption are only successors-
in-interest and purchasers by title subsequent to the filing of the first action. Such parties are
considered the same as their predecessors-in-interest for purposes of res judicata. Since the
predecessors-in-interest were parties to the first case, the principle of  res judicata  applies
even with their inclusion, since they are after all bound by the first judgment as the parties
thereto.*
As regards the subject matter, the identity is undisputed, namely, the parcel of land now
covered by TCT No. 19248 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and the annulment or declaration
of nullity of the sale thereof, with cancellation of its Transfer Certificate of Title.
Similarly, the cause of action is identical. As stated in Penalosa vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil. 303, the
test is: "Would the same evidence support and establish both the present and former causes of
action?" In the instant case, the same evidence, namely, plaintiff's ownership of the parcel of
land and that the sale thereof was fictitious would support and establish the present and
former cause of action. It is therefore identical.
All requisites for  res judicata  being attendant, We find no error in the order of dismissal
appealed from.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
ordered.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council, G. R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event
actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas.
This dilemma is rooted in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting
the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential election and up to the end of his term, except when temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
However, Section 4 (1), Art VIII of the Constitution also provides that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence. The question leads to who
should appoint the next Chief Justice and may the JBC resume the process of screening
candidates should the incumbent president not prohibited to do so. May a mandamus lie to
compel the submission of JBC’s nominees to the president?
This issue at hand truly is impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation.
A lot of petitions were received by the court from a mandamus to prohibitions. We limit our
discussion with GR 191002 for brevity.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not the case at bar is an actual controversy and whether or not the
petitioners have legal standing to file said petition.
HELD: The court held the case being premature because the Judicial and Bar Council has until
May 17, 2010 at the least within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill
the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno.
The petitioner here asserts his right as citizen filing the petition on behalf of the public who
are directly affected by the issue of the appointment. The question raised before the court is
in fact of transcendental importance. The court dispels all doubt to remove any obstacle or
obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely presented. Standing is a peculiar
concept to constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who
have been personally injured by the operation of law or any other government act but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
The court dismissed the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in GR 191002 and GR 191149
and the petition for mandamus in GR no. 191057 for being premature; dismissal of the
petitions for prohibition in GR 191032 and GR 191342 for lack of merit; and grants the in AM
No. 10-2-5-SC and accordingly directs the JBC to: resume proceedings for the nomination of
candidates, prepare short list of nominees for the said position, submit to the incumbent
President the short list of nominees, and to continue proceedings for the nomination of
candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of
nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.
Obra v. Spouses Badua, G. R. No. 149125, August 9, 2007
The present Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the annulment of the Orders of the San
Fernando City, La Union RTC, directing petitioner Obra to demolish the fence she constructed
on the southern portion of her property which blocked a portion of respondents’ right-of-way.
FACTS:
1.  The case arose from a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way filed by respondents against
Anacleto and Resurreccion Obra, Donato and Lucena Bucasas, and Paulino and Crisanta Badua
before the RTC. Defendant Anacleto Obra of that case is the husband of the petitioner now.
> In that case, the respondents alleged that their residential houses, erected on a lot
commonly owned by them were located west of the properties of the Obras, Bucasases, and
Baduas. Their only access to the national highway was a pathway traversing the northern
portion of petitioner’s property and the southern portion of the properties of the Bucasases
and Baduas. The pathway was more than one meter wide and sixteen meters long. They
claimed that this pathway had been established as early as 1955. In 1995, however, petitioner
Obra constructed a fence on the northern boundary of their property; thus, blocking
respondents’ access to the national highway. Respondents demanded the demolition of the
fence, but petitioner refused.
> In her Answer, petitioner averred that respondents had not established any easement of
right-of-way either by law or agreement. She claimed that respondents failed to satisfy the
requisites provided in Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code in order to establish an easement
of right-of-way on the northern portion of her property. Moreover, she alleged that
respondents had another access as ingress and egress to the public road other than the one
traversing her property.
> The spouses Badua and Bucasas, the other respondents, failed to file an answer;
consequently, they were declared in default.
> The RTC dismissed the complaint and held that the respondents “were not able to satisfy all
the requisites needed for their claim of an easement of right of way.”
> It observed that when petitioner fenced the northern portion of her property, respondents
were able to use another pathway as ingress and egress to the highway. It stated further that
“the new pathway is more than adequate” for respondents’ use. Thus, the applied easement
of right-of-way on the northern portion of petitioner’s property was not allowed. The said
Decision became final and executory.
2. It must be noted that the “new” pathway used by respondents, however, traversed the
southern portion of petitioner’s property.
3. Sometime in 2001, petitioner constructed a fence on this portion of her lot, which again
restricted the use of respondents’ “new” pathway.
4. Aggrieved and prejudiced by petitioner’s action, respondents filed a Motion to Enforce the
July 7, 2000 Decision of the RTC. They alleged that the Decision of the RTC dismissing the
case was based on the existence of a new pathway which they had been using since 1995.
Thus, they asserted that petitioner was prohibited from closing said passage.
> The RTC granted the said motion.
> Petitioner Obra filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was rejected in the trial court
Order.
 5. Clarifying its July 7, 2000 Decision, the trial court, in its March 20, 2001 Order, held that
the dismissal of the complaint depended on petitioner’s representation that she was allowing
respondents to use the southern portion of her property as an alternative pathway. Since the
southern portion was an “agreed pathway,” petitioner could not reduce its width; thus, the
trial court ordered petitioner to remove the fence blocking the passage.
 
Hence, we have this present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
ISSUE:
1.  WON the Court can motu proprio declare a compulsory right of way on a property not the
subject of a pending case.
2.  WON there was a voluntary easement over the southern portion of Obra’s property
HELD: the petition is GRANTED.The June 20, 2001 and March 20, 2001 Orders of the RTC are
hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
1.  NO; Essentially, petitioner questions the propriety of the trial courts issuance of an order
clarifying its final and executory decision and effectively establishing an easement on
petitioners property without proper adjudication.
An order of execution must conform to the terms of the dispositive portion of the decision.
(A court that issues an order of execution in contravention of its final judgment exceeds its
jurisdiction and renders its order invalid.)
The resolution of the court in a given issue embodied in the  fallo  or dispositive part of a
decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties.  Thus,
where there is a conflict between the  fallo  and the  ratio decidendi  or body of the decision,
the  fallo  controls.  This rule rests on the theory that the  fallo  is the final order while the
opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.  The rule applies when the
dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear, and unequivocal, and can wholly
be given effect without need of interpretation or construction.
The amended complaint filed by respondents revealed that their cause of action was the
recognition of their easement of right-of-way of more than one (1) meter wide and more than
sixteen (16) meters in length [which] traversed the  northern portion  of the property of
defendants spouses Obra.  As prayer, respondents asked for the demolition of the concrete
fence constructed by petitioner and her spouse, that closed the pathway on the northern
portion of Obras lot; the declaration of right-of-way over said area in favor of respondents;
and the payment of damages and attorneys fees. When the RTC dismissed the case in its July
7, 2000 Decision, it ruled that respondents had no cause of action against petitioner and her
husband because they failed to satisfy one of the four requisites for the entitlement of a right-
of-way, namely that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway. The trial court took note of the fact that the new
pathway which incidentally traversed the southern portion of petitioners lot is an adequate
outlet to a public highway. While its body mentioned the existence of an alternative pathway
located south of petitioners lot, such was made only to emphasize that respondents failed to
satisfy the requirements for an easement of right-of-way. As held by the trial court:
The insistence of the plaintiffs to open up the old pathway is therefore without basis
considering that there is another outlet adequate enough as an access route for them in their
passage to the public highway and the alleged inconvenience cannot be a ground for the
opening of said old pathway.
 
xxxxx
Apparently, no pronouncement was ever made regarding the nature and legality of this “new”
pathway; therefore, no easement was established by the Court on petitioner’s property.
Thus, their claim for a right-of-way on the southern portion had no basis.
The parties and even the trial court were confined to the averments of the complaint, and the
answer and the issues joined by the major pleadings. It could not be disputed by respondents
that there was no mention at all of any right-of-way on the southern portion of petitioner’s lot
in the complaint nor any claim or prayer for the declaration of respondents’ entitlement to a
right-of-way over the said area. Thus, there was no joinder of issue on this matter and,
therefore, the dismissal of the case cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed to
encompass any grant of right-of-way to respondents relating to the southern portion owned by
petitioner.
 
No Voluntary Easement of Right-of-Way
The trial court, seemingly aware that it did not determine the legality of an easement of
right-of-way over the pathway located south of petitioner’s property, nevertheless, concluded
that the said passage was an agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way which petitioner
should respect.
The trial court was in error.
It is a settled doctrine that a decision, after it becomes final, becomes immutable and
unalterable. Thus, the court loses jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter a final judgment
and is left only with the jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. Any amendment or alteration
which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.
To recapitulate, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5033 meant that no easement was ever
established on petitioner’s property. However, the trial court, by issuing its March 20, 2001
Order directing petitioner to remove the fence that limited respondents’ passage, effectively
created a right-of-way on petitioner’s property in favor of respondents allegedly on the basis
of a voluntary agreement between the parties. This directive was in contravention of its July
7, 2000 Decision; thus, it was null and void for having been issued outside of the court’s
jurisdiction.
Granting for the sake of argument that the issue of voluntary easement of right-of-way,
subject of the assailed March 20, 2001 Order, was proper, relevant, and material to the issue
of right-of-way as averred in the complaint in Civil Case No. 5033, still, the conclusion that
there was an agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way had no basis. The records of Civil
Case No. 5033 do not reveal any agreement executed by the parties on the claimed right-of-
way. Glaring is the fact that the terms of the arrangement were not agreed upon by the
parties, more particularly, the payment of the proper indemnity. The evidence is not ample
enough to support the conclusion that there was a verbal agreement on the right-of-way over
the southern portion.
More so, since a right-of-way is an interest in the land, any agreement creating it should be
drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to a real estate, and ordinarily must
be in writing. No written instrument on this agreement was adduced by respondents.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the assailed March 20, 2001 and June 20, 2001
Orders are null, void, and without any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 20, 2001 and March 20, 2001 Orders of the
San Fernando City, La Union RTC, Branch 29 in Civil Case No. 5033 are hereby ANNULLED AND
SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006
FACTS:
The employees of Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, filed a formal
complaint with the OMB requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then
Deputy Ombudsman, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the Sexual harassment;
Mulcting money from confidential employees; and Oppression against all employees in not
releasing the benefits of OMB-Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for
release.
The Ombudsman directed his Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to conduct a
verification and investigation on the matter. The FFIB found the evidence against Petitioner
strong on the charges of acts of extortion, sexual harassment and oppression.
The Committee of Peers initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one
solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the
Ombudsman after careful study, and following the established stand of the Office of the
Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable
through impeachment.
In the same Memorandum, the Ombudsman directed the Committee of Peers (COP) to
evaluate the merits of the case and if warranted by evidence, to conduct administrative and
criminal investigation(s) immediately thereafter. Upon evaluation, the Committee
recommended the docketing of the complaint as criminal and administrative cases.
Aggrieved, the private respondent filed a petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
praying that a resolution be issued: issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to enjoin and
restrain the respondents, from suspending the petitioner (herein private respondent Mojica);
thereafter, converting said TRO into a Writ of Preliminary Injunction; after hearing, a decision
be rendered declaring the act of the Ombudsman of authorizing or directing the docketing of
the complaints against the petitioner, which is equivalent to authorizing the filing of the
administrative and/or criminal cases against the petitioner, who is an impeachable official,
null and void ab initio.
The CA held that although the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the
commentaries of noted jurists, all indicate that a Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable
official, it was nevertheless constrained to hold otherwise on the basis of this Courts past
rulings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the CA erred in declaring private respondent, a deputy
ombudsman, in an impeachable official.
HELD: Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, states that: The President, the Vice-
President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
To determine whether or not the Ombudsman therein mentioned refers to a person or to an
office, reference was made by the appellate court to the Records of the Constitutional
Commission, as well as to the opinions of leading commentators in constitutional law. Thus: It
appears that the members of the Constitutional Commission have made reference only to the
Ombudsman as impeachable, excluding his deputies
Moreover, this Court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal
luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is
impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section
2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his
deputies, is impeachable.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS
1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XI, Section 2
- Obra v. Spouses Badua, G. R. No. 149125, August 9, 2007 -
Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G. R. No.
167330, September 18, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation whose primary purpose is to establish, maintain, conduct
and operate a prepaid group practice health care delivery system or a health maintenance
organization to take care of the sick and disabled persons enrolled in the health care plan and
to provide for the administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities of the organization.
On January 27, 2000, respondent CIR sent petitioner a formal demand letter and the
corresponding assessment notices demanding the payment of deficiency taxes, including
surcharges and interest, for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 in the total amount of
P224,702,641.18. The deficiency assessment was imposed on petitioner’s health care
agreement with the members of its health care program pursuant to Section 185 of the 1997
Tax Code. Petitioner protested the assessment in a letter dated February 23, 2000.
As respondent did not act on the protest, petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking the cancellation of the deficiency VAT and DST assessments. On April
5, 2002, the CTA rendered a decision, ordering the petitioner to PAY the deficiency VAT
amounting to P22,054,831.75 inclusive of 25% surcharge plus 20% interest from January 20,
1997 until fully paid for the 1996 VAT deficiency and P31,094,163.87 inclusive of 25% surcharge
plus 20% interest from January 20, 1998 until fully paid for the 1997 VAT deficiency.
Accordingly, VAT Ruling No. [231]-88 is declared void and without force and effect. The 1996
and 1997 deficiency DST assessment against petitioner is hereby CANCELLED AND SET ASIDE.
Respondent is ORDERED to DESIST from collecting the said DST deficiency tax. Respondent
appealed the CTA decision to the (CA) insofar as it cancelled the DST assessment. He claimed
that petitioner’s health care agreement was a contract of insurance subject to DST under
Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code.

On August 16, 2004, the CA rendered its decision which held that petitioner’s health care
agreement was in the nature of a non-life insurance contract subject to DST. Respondent is
ordered to pay the deficiency Documentary Stamp Tax. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but the CA denied it.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. engaged in insurance business.
(2) Whether or not the agreements between petitioner and its members possess all elements
necessary in the insurance contract.
HELD: NO. Health Maintenance Organizations are not engaged in the insurance business. The
SC said in June 12, 2008 decision that it is irrelevant that petitioner is an HMO and not an
insurer because its agreements are treated as insurance contracts and the DST is not a tax on
the business but an excise on the privilege, opportunity or facility used in the transaction of
the business. Petitioner, however, submits that it is of critical importance to characterize the
business it is engaged in, that is, to determine whether it is an HMO or an insurance company,
as this distinction is indispensable in turn to the issue of whether or not it is liable for DST on
its health care agreements. Petitioner is admittedly an HMO. Under RA 7878 an HMO is “an
entity that provides, offers or arranges for coverage of designated health services needed by
plan members for a fixed prepaid premium. The payments do not vary with the extent,
frequency or type of services provided. Section 2 (2) of PD 1460 enumerates what constitutes
“doing an insurance business” or “transacting an insurance business”which are making or
proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract; making or proposing to make, as surety,
any contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as merely incidental to any other legitimate
business or activity of the surety; doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance business,
specifically recognized as constituting the doing of an insurance business within the meaning
of this Code; doing or proposing to do any business in substance equivalent to any of the
foregoing in a manner designed to evade the provisions of this Code.
Overall, petitioner appears to provide insurance-type benefits to its members (with respect to
its curative medical services), but these are incidental to the principal activity of providing
them medical care. The “insurance-like” aspect of petitioner’s business is miniscule compared
to its noninsurance activities. Therefore, since it substantially provides health care services
rather than insurance services, it cannot be considered as being in the insurance business.
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G. R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot.
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and
implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the
law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of
cybersecurity.”
IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS
R.A. 10175
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.– There is hereby created, within
thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision
of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the
formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time
commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT); x x
x.
Art. 1, Sec. 6 philippine constitution
Sec 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of R.A. 10175, known as The
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 unconstitutional and void. This case holds a handful of
petitions seeking the removal of different sections deemed to be infringing on privacy rights
and more.
For this instance, the focus is the creation of the “Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center” which, in the same breath, promulgates powers and functions to the agents of the
said center. “Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it
gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a
national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.”

“Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches,

actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and organization and user’s assets. This definition serves as the parameters
within which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.”

ISSUE
W/N The CICC is constitutional for it to operate under delegated powers by Congress

HELD: YES. “In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the
Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under