1.

Where to apply
FC
FC 10

2. Requirements for issuance

a. Application
FC 11

b. proof of capacity
FC 12
FC 13
FC 14
FC 21

cf.
NCC 84

cf.
DOJ Opinion 50 S. 1991 (April 30, 1991)
DOJ Opinion 146 S. 1991 (Oct. 17, 1991)

Corpus v Sto FACTS:

Tomas, G.R. No. ● Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
186571, August 11, naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
2010 Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.
● Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
JOSOL surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man.
● He then filed a divorce back in Canada wherein the Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert's petition for divorce on December 8, 2005 and took effect a month later, January 8, 2006.
● Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love, and wanted to
marry her.
● Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
● Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC with his ex-wife’s consent. However, his petition got denied on
October 30, 2008.
● As such, he filed a direct petition for certiorari to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree; --N

RULING: ·
● The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse. As such, the court ruled to remand the
case in order to allow Daisylyn to claim her right. However, this does not mean that an alien spouse does
not have a legal standing in the case as he still has legal interest.
In line with Article 21 of the Family Code, the mere fact that a divorce paper is required to be submitted to a
judicial court is an example on how a foreign contracting party must prove his legal capacity to marry.

c. parental advice, FC 15
d. marriage counseling, FC 16
e. publication, FC 17
 f. investigation of impediments, FC 18
g. payment of fees, FC 19
h. family planning certificate, P.D. 965

3. Place where valid, FC 20

4. Period of validity, FC 20

De Castro v De Facts:
Castro, G.R. No. ● A petition for review of decision that Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner. That
160172, Feb. 13, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was valid.
2008 ● They had applied for a marriage license in the civil registrar of Pasig city on September 1994. When they
went back, the license had already expired.
● Due to the expiration of the marriage license they had executed an affidavit dated on March 13 1995 where
it states that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least 5 years.
● On the same date, they had gotten married and their civil rites were administered by Judge Jose Bernabe .
● On November 13 1995, respondent gave birth to Reinna Tricia A. De Castro.
● Respondent had been the one supporting the child thus filed a complaint for support against the petitioner.
● Petitioner had denied the marriage stating that their marriage is void ab initio (void from the beginning) and
that the affidavit was fake. That he was only prevailed by the respondent to sign the marriage contract so as
for her to avoid embarrassment and administrative prosecution.
o Petitioner also stated that they had not lived together as husband and wife
● RTC ruled that their marriage had not been valid but stated that the petitioner was the natural father of the
child thus obliged to give support.
● Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child
when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
● CA denied the appeal and stated that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting unless a judicial declaration of
nullity is made. CA had also took note of the affidavit wherein the petitioner voluntarily admitted that he is
the legitimate father of the child.
● Appellate court had a similar ruling.
● Petitioner contends that the RTC had properly annulled their marriage due to the absence of a marriage
license. That the affidavit that was executed contained a false narration of facts and should not be used as a
substitute for the absence of a marriage license.

ISSUE:
1. W/N their marriage was valid

Held:
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is
clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more
than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during
cross-examination. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Ruling:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626
dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.”

5. Duties of the Civil Registrar FC 24-25

FC Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all
interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed in connection with applications for marriage
licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax.
FC Art. 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a registry book strictly in
the order in which the same are received. He shall record in said book the names of the applicants, the date on which the marriage
license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary.
Republic v CA, FACTS:
G.R. No. 103047, ● The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina Castro in the RTC of
September 2, Quezon City seeking the nullity of her marriage to Edwin Cardenas on the grounds that no marriage license
1994 was issued to them prior to their marriage.
● Cardenas failed to file his answer and so the trial proceeded in his absence.
● On June 24, 1970 Castro and Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by the City Court Judge
of Pasay City.
● Since the marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents, they did not live together immediately and it was only
when Castro became pregnant that they decided to live together; however, it only lasted for 4 months.
● Castro consulted a lawyer in regards with the possibility of annulment and found out that there was no
marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to their marriage.
● Castro offered in evidence the certification stating that her marriage license does not appear from the
records of the Civil Registrar of Pasig. She further testified that she did not go to the registrar on or before
their marriage date to apply for license nor did she sign any application. She only signed on the marriage
contract during the wedding date.
● The RTC denied the petition stating that “inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is
not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued.”
● Castro appealed to respondent appellate court and it reversed the decision of the trial court. It declared the
marriage null and void due to absence of marriage license.
● Republic of the Philippines petitioned for review on certiorari against respondents CA and Castro.

ISSUE:
W/N the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent (Castro) are sufficient to establish
that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of their marriage.

HELD:
YES. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The
certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Pursuant to the same Rule, a certificate of “due search and inability to find” sufficiently proved that his office did
not issue marriage license to the contracting parties. Moreover, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified
during the trial cannot be held against her since her husband failed to file an answer despite the receipt thereof. The
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Alcantara vs Facts:
Alcantara, GR No. · Petitioner had filed for an annulment of marriage against Rosita A. Alcantara
167746, Aug. 28, · According to the petitioner, they had gotten married in Manila City hall by Rev. Aquilino Navarro
2007 without securing a valid marriage license
· They had created a fake marriage licenses procured from Carmona, a place that they’re neither
resident in nor the place they applied for a license.
· Contrary to the words stated by the petitioner, respondent states that the marriage license in
Carmona was valid and that the reason why the petitioner had said such statement was because he
had a mistress and was evading prosecution for concubinage.
· The RTC had denied the petition and had ordered the petitioner to pay 20000 PHP to the
respondent every 5th day of the month
· CA had dismissed the petitioners appeal and his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the marriage was valid

Held:
 The marriage was deemed as valid even with the irregularities wherein the valid issued marriage license
procured in Carmona was not a place of their residence. That this evidence does not sufficiently merit the
annulment of their marriage. In addition, petitioner was amenable and a willing participant of the said
marriage thus cleansing whatever irregularity attended the civil wedding.

Ruling :
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of
Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.”
Abbas vs Abbas, FACTS:
G.R. No. 183896, ●Petition for review on Certiorari under rule 45 from CA decision.
January 30, 2013 ●Petitioner SYED AZHAR ABBAS (Pakistani) filed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, GLORIA
GOO-ABBAS in RTC alleging that, the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of
Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.
●Syed (Pakistani) met Gloria in Taiwan in 1991, married on Aug 2 1992 at Taipei Mosque in Taiwan, arrived at PH on
Dec 1992.
●Jan 9, 1993 around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in law's residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St.,
Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to
undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony.
●During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a
marriage until Gloria told him later.
●Around 2001 to 2002, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura.
●To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo.
●In July 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license
however the Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect
that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967
was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
●To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as the
solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license
issued to Abbas.

RTC HELD: Valid marriage license was not issued.

CA HELD: Valid marriage license was issued.

ISSUE: whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple - NO, RTC is correct!

HELD:
● Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove
that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was
issued.
● The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was
issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was
issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
● (Republic v. CA) such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The
above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data.
● SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official
 record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
● (Republic v. CA) the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking,
relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged
marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
● Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been
regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.” No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her
duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a
diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted
to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
● It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to
explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither
party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the
validity and existence of said license.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008
and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED
RAQUEL G. KHO, Doctrine: Duties of the Civil Registrar
petitioner Article 24-25 of the Family code states that
Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to
vs. administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed in
connection with applications for marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax.
REPUBLIC OF THE Art. 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a registry
PHILIPPINES and book strictly in the order in which the same are received. He shall record in said book the names of the applicants,
VERONICA B. KHO the date on which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary.
respondents The Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel
G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."
GR No. 187462,
June 1, 2016 Facts:
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
MANLONGAT filed by herein petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
● May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office
of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were
required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around
midnight of June 1, 1972 to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony.
● Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took
place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972.
● Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license & had not
seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection w/ the procurement of marriage license.
● Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforementioned clerk of the treasurer’s office was
told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, no marriage license therefore could
have have been validly issued. Making the marriage null and void for want of the most essential requisites.
● Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has
neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their
marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

Issue: W/N the failure to file of marriage license by the civil registrar nullifies the marriage between Petitioner and
Respondent?
 Held:
Yes. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. Indeed, all the evidence cited by the
CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure
the absence of a valid marriage license.

Article 80 (3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated,
petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives are less
than pure that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as
it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license,
given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential
requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated
March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case
No. 464 is REINSTATED.

6. Marriages exempt from license requirement

FC 27-34, cf. NCC 76, P.D. 1083

Ninal vs Bayadog FACTS:

GR no. 133778 ● On September 26, 1974, Pepito Niñal got married to Teodulfa Bellones. They had children who were
March 14 2000 Petitioners in this case.
● On April 24, 1985, Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death.
AGUSTIN ● On December 11, 1986, 1 year and 8 months after Teodulfa’s death, Pepito married Respondent Norma
Badayog without any marriage license
● In lieu of their marriage Pepito and Respondent executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license.
● On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
● After Pepito’s death, Petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
● The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights.
● Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
● RTC dismissed the petition on the finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to
resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio; and
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was
dissolved due to their father's death

● The lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which
 enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.
● This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
● The Court ruled, "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in
the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal
effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.
● However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage of Pepito Nial to Norma Bayadog is null and void.

HELD:

YES.

RATIO:

The Court held that the Old Civil Code is applicable in this case. The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. There are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of
a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous
and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners’ father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other."

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and
wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union.

In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.

It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence
of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent.
It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband
and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Republic vs Dayot Facts:

March 28, 2008
• Felisa (petitioner) and Jose (respondent) were married on 24 November 1986 without the benefit of a marriage
ABARY license.
• Instead of a marriage license, the two executed a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age
of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
• In 1990, Jose married Rufina Pascual.
• Jose, roughly seven years after his first marriage, filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court, contending that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage
ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa
had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through
 fraud*.
• The RTC dismissed Jose’s Complaint, ruling that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid.
• Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed, citing Art. 87 of the NCC which
requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after
the discovery of the fraud (he had discovered the alleged fraud just months after their marriage).
• Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11
August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit.
• Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration, his central opposition being that the requisites for the proper application
of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at
bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
• The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
• Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution
dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
• The Republic of the Philippines and Felisa filed petitions for review with the Supreme Court assailing the CA’s
decision.

Issues:

1. W/N Jose and Felisa’s marriage is valid despite the lack of a marriage license – NO.
2. W/N Jose’s action for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Felisa has prescribed – NO.

Held:

1. The law allows some marriages without a marriage license. However, in as in the present case, the falsity
of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-
year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
a. Felisa and Jose were married under the NCC, not the Family Code.
b. In the NCC, only marriages of exceptional character are allowed to be validly celebrated without a marriage
license. One of these types of marriages is a marriage wherein the two parties execute a sworn affidavit claiming
that they have been cohabiting as husband and wife, with no legal defect, for at least five years.
c. However, in the case of Jose and Felisa, despite them executing a sworn affidavit purporting that they have
been cohabiting as husband and wife for at least five years, evidence shows that they actually have not. The
evidence showed that the two were married mere months after they first met.
d. Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the
formal requisite of a marriage license, and under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule,
should be strictly but reasonably construed.
i. In this case, since the sworn affidavit was false, the lack of a marriage license led to Jose and Felisa’s
marriage being declared void ab initio by the Court. Had the sworn affidavit been true, their marriage would have
been valid.
2. No, the action for the declaration of nullity of a VOID AB INITIO marriage cannot prescribe.
a. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn
a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Court Ruling:
• The Court dismissed the two petitions and declared Felisa and Jose’s marriage VOID AB INITIO.

Synthesis from the book of Dean Sol:

“The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of cohabitation, which would have qualified
a marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
 essential matter in the sworn affidavit were a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.
Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.”
(b) Authority of the solemnizing officer

1. Who are authorized

FC 7 Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with
the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at
least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise
only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10

FC 8 The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the
office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the
point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing
officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect.

FC 9 A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title.

FC 10 Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the
Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to
the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official.

FC 31 A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane
pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.

FC 32 A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo
mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians.

NCC 56

NCC 74

NCC 76

R.A. 7160 (1991 Local Government Code), Secs. 444(b)(1)(xviii), 445 (b)(1)(xviii)

Beso vs. Daguman, Facts:

323 SCRA 566 ● Judge Daguman solemnized the marriage of Zenaida Beso with Nardito A. Yman out from his jurisdiction as
(2000) a judge.
● After the marriage was solemnized, the man just abandoned his wife without any light or reason.
Luna ● Because of this, the woman had to go to the registrar to secure their marriage contract but to her
surprised, no marriage contract that has been registered in the office of the registrar
● The registrar gave advice to Zenaida Beso to write the judge who solemnized their marriage but likewise to
her surprised, judge Daguman who solemnized their marriage told her that her husband got sall the copies
of their marriage certificate and none was even left to him or was retained to the judge.
● This is the reason why Zenaida learned that the judge solemnized their marriage out of his jurisdiction and
was negligent in not retaining a copy and likewise in not registering their marriage to the civil registrar as
prescribed by law.

Issue:
 Whether or not the effect of good faith is acceptable in the case at bar as a solemnizing officer.

Held:
No, good faith is not a defense because to abide with the law is what matters most and good faith is not acceptable
if it violates the law how noble is your intention. A judge is, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the
authority or jurisdiction of his court. A judge solemnized a marriage out from his jurisdiction shows an irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in art.3 which while it may not affect the validity of marriage of marriage but may
subject the officiating officer to administrative authority.

The judge was fined at the amount of 5,000 pesos and any repetition with the same offense will be dealt severely
2. How authorized

FC7 (2) cf. NCC 92-96

Villar vs Paraiso 96 FACTS:
Phil 659 ● Pedro Vilar and Gaudencio Paraiso were among the candidates registered for the office of mayor of Rizal,
Nueva Ecija. After the canvass was made, Paraiso was proclaimed as the mayor duly elected with a plurality
KO of 41 votes over Vilar.
● Vilar instituted a quo warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office and
his proclamation as mayor-elect be null and void.
o He alleged that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office because he was a minister of the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines and as such disqualified to be a candidate under Sec. 2175 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
o He also prayed to be declared duly elected mayor in lieu of Paraiso.
● Paraiso denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ and
that even if he was ineligible, Vilar could not be elected to take his place.
● After the trial, the court found Paraiso to be ineligible for the office of mayor, for being an ecclesiastic, and
it declared his proclamation as null void. However, it refrained from declaring Vilar as mayor-elect for lack
of sufficient legal grounds to do so.

ISSUE:
● W/N Paraiso is still an ecclesiastic and therefore ineligible to hold office –YES

HELD:
Vilar presented evidence showing that Paraiso was ordained as minister of Evangelical Church and was given license
to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries. He has been acting as minister of Rizal, Nueva Ecija
continuously and without interruption, renewing his license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by the regulations
of the Bureau of Public Libraries. After transferring to the United Church of Christ, Paraiso applied for and was issued
a new license to solemnize marriages as a minister of the new church. This license was never cancelled as neither
the head of the United Church nor Paraiso has requested for its cancellation.

The court have not found any reason to deviate from the finding of the trial court that Paraiso never ceased as
minister of the order to which he belonged. If Paraiso really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the
religious organization, he should have resigned in gorm and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with
the Bureau of Public Libraries.

The purpose of resignation is two fold:

● Inform the public of the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, and
● Keep the public informed of any change in the minister’s religious status.

This information is necessary for the protection of the public especially so with regard to the authority to solemnize
marriages, the registration of which is made by the law mandatory.

This is so that the public would be informed on who is authorized to solemnize marriages and who are not.

Note: Quo warranto - legal procedure used to challenge an individual’s right to or authority over the position he or
she holds
OCA v. TORMIS, FACTS:
A.C. 9920 · This disbarment complaint is an offshoot from a previous decision in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
August 30, 2016 Necessario, et al.
In the earlier case, Respondent Former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, together with other judges and employees of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cebu City was dismissed for making a business out of the solemnization of marriages
Tormis (respondent) was dismissed from the service for the second time, and this Court directed the Office of the
Bar confidant to initiate her disbarment proceedings
On July 3, 2007, Atty. Rully Garcia led the judicial audit team to investigate Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the Municipal
Trial Court for alleged misdeeds in the solemnization of marriages. This was done through 2 undercover agents who
posed as a couple wanting to get married in the said Court.
· The investigation confirmed that the respondent judges in the earlier case connived with court personnel, who
acted as “fixers” in solemnizing marriages. The said judges continued solemnizing marriages despite irregularities in
the requirements provided

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE RULING

· In a Resolution dated July 10, 2007, the Court treated the judicial audit team's memorandum as an
administrative complaint against the respondent judges, including Tormis. During the proceedings of
the case, the said judges were suspended and were directed to file their comments on the said case
against them.
· On August 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño of the Office of the Court
Administrator submitted a Memorandum dated August 29, 2007 and Supplemental Report. The report
stated that out of the 642 marriage certificates examined by the judicial audit team, 280 marriages
were solemnized under Art. 34 of the Family Code. The logbooks indicate a higher number of
solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts’ custody. There were even
marriages solemnized at 9 AM with marriage licenses obtained on the same day.
· The said report also included admissions from various court personnel narrating their participation and
substantiating charges against Tormis. Aside from court personnel, affidavits of private individuals were
also attached to the records. One of them was Baguio-Manera who averred that while Art. 34 did not
apply to them, their marriages certificate was marked with the annotation, “No marriage license was
necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Art. 34 of E.O. No. 209.”
· On November 27, 2007, this Court En Banc issued the Resolution requiring all the judges involved,
including Tormis, to comment on the Supplemental Report. The Resolution also directed the Process
Servicing Unit to furnish all the judges with a copy of the Report. Further, all the court personnel
involved were asked to show cause why they should not be disciplined for their misconduct.
· In her comment, Tormis denied all charges against her and claimed that the action of the OCA
was an “entrapment.” She stated that there was nothing wrong with solemnizing marriage on
the same date the marriage license was issued. She also claimed that Baguio-Manera’s
affidavit was hearsay. She also blamed the filling clerks for the irregularities in the number of
solemnized marriages in her sala.
· On November 12, 2007, Tormis, together with Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, filed a Memorandum of Law
with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of the Case. This Court lifted the
suspension of the judges but forbade them from solemnizing marriages.
· On December 7, 2007, both judges moved for early resolution with a waiver of formal and/or further
investigation and to dismiss. This Court noted their Motion and affirmed the relief they sought, thus
allowing the payment of the judges' unpaid salaries and benefits from July 9, 2007.
· On June 15, 2010 the Court ruled that:
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis , Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty
and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would have been
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement
benefits, except leave credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -
controlled corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from
service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC)
· On June 18, 2013, this Court approved the docketing of the case and directed respondent Former
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis to comment on the disbarment charge against her.

OFFICE OF THE BAR CONFIDANT RULING:

· On November 29, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant sent respondent a letter informing her that the
charges in her administrative cases as a judge were the grounds for her disbarment. It cited A.M. No.
 02-9-02-SC, which provides that administrative cases against judges shall also be considered as
disciplinary charges against them as members of the bar.
· Respondent filed her one-page Comment 81 on January 10, 2014, asking this Court to grant her peace
of mind. 82 She states that she is adopting her Motion for Reconsideration 83 in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817
as her Comment on the disbarment case against her. In her comment, she argued that the dismissal of
the judges was based merely on an alleged “entrapment.” She was merely indicted based on the
statements of Plaza and Dela Cerna, who had been intimidated by Atty. Rullyn Garcia.
· In its Report and Recommendation 98 dated August 24, 2015, the Office of the Bar Confidant noted the
Atty. Rully Garcia, Plaza, and Dela Cerna as their witnesses and requested for the presence in the
proceedings. However, none of the witnesses participated in the proceedings. Hence, the parties were
required to just submit their respective memoranda for evaluation.
· Records show that all the administrative sanctions against former Judge Tormis were all for simple
gross inefficiency or neglect of duties and gross ignorance of the law in the discharge of her duties and
responsibilities as the presiding judge of the MTCC, Br. 4, Cebu City
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises , it is
respectfully recommended that the disbarment case against former JUDGE
ROSABELLA M. TORMIS be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUES:
· W/N the alleged irregularities committed by the respondent in the solemnization of marriages, where she was
found guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law, constitute gross misconduct
warranting her disbarment
· W/N Plaza’s and Dela Cerna’s affidavits are indispensable in finding that the respondent’s acts constitute gross
misconduct and merit the penalty of disbarment
W/N the respondent’s long line of administrative sanctions should affect her standing as a member of the bar

HELD:
WHEREFORE, respondent former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis is DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
YES. Any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his or her professional dealings or in a private capacity is basis for
suspension or disbarment. Possession of good character is a fundamental requirement not only for admission to the
bar but also for continuance of exercising the privilege to practice law. Respondent’s undue haste in repeatedly
solemnizing marriages despite incomplete and irregular requirements shows indifference to her role as an officer of
the court.
· NO. Although this Court recognizes the indispensability of the appearance of Plaza and Dela Cerna in the
proceedings, the disbarment case cannot be solely based on this. An affidavit is commonly recognized as hearsay
evidence. Since it is often prepared not by the affiant but by another person who makes use of his or her own
language in writing the statements, it is generally rejected unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify.
· YES. While respondent blatantly violated particular Canons of Judicial Ethics with her participation in the alleged
marriage scam, she similarly breached Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent's act
of heedlessly solemnizing marriages in utter disregard of the law and jurisprudence clearly constitutes gross
misconduct. The repetitiveness of her act shows her clear intent to violate the law. She disregarded the lawyer's
oath, which mandates lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. In view of this, either the penalty of
suspension or disbarment is warranted.

3. Effect of absence of authority

FC 4 The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

FC 35 The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or
both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;

RPC 352 Performance of illegal marriage ceremony. — Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law
cf.
cf. Tenchavez vs Facts:
Escano, 15 SCRA ● On 24 February 1948, 27 years old Vicenta Escano exchanged marriage wedding vows with Pastor
355 at page 360 Tenchavez (32), without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the
house of one Juan Alburo in the said city.
ABARY ● Vicenta’s (Escano) parents soon found out about the secret marriage and were disgusted because of the
great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke.
● The Escano spouses sought advice from a priest, Father Reynes who suggested a recelebration to validate
what he believed to be an invalid marriage. due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop to celebrate
the marriage.
● The recelebration however, did not take place because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed
a letter disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel (a mutual friend of
Pastor and Vicenta’s) and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage.
● Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila.
● On 24 June 1950, Vicenta applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that her
purpose was to study. The application was approved, and she left for the US.
● On 22 August 1950, she filed for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of
the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950,
the said tribunal issued a decree of divorce, "final and absolute"
● On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran and had children with him. She
acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
● On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint against Vicenta F. Escaño and her parents whom he charged
with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections,
and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment
of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
● Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell
Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
● The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife
and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and
Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the
extent of P45,000.00.

Issue:
1. (RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC) W/N Tenchavez and Escano were validly married despite the solemnizing officer
allegedly lacking of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by
Canon law - YES, they were validly married.

Held:
1. The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law.
a. The actual authority of the solemnizing officer is only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to
give the marriage civil effects.
b. Act 3613, Sec. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
c. The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed
until the contrary is positively proved. It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the
solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the
archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and
subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.

Ronulo vs People FACTS:

GR No. 182438 ● Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
July 2, 2014 ● The presented evidence showed that Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each
other on March, 29, 2003
ALMADRO ● However, on the day of the wedding, the officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning
that the couple failed to secure a marriage license
● As a recourse, the couple, along with their guests went to the Aglipayan Church where they requested the
petitioner, Fr. Ronulo to perform a ceremony
● The petitioner agreed to perform the ceremony despite being informed by the couple that they had no
marriage license
● He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of the invited guests
● An information for violation of Art. 352 of the RPC was filed against the petitioner before the MTC of Ilocos
Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony
● The prosecution’s witnesses, who were also the sponsors of the veil and the cord, testified that they saw
the bride walk down the aisle, the couple exchange wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document
● Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that
they take each other as husband and wife
● After a few days she went to the municipal local civil registrar where she was given a certificate that no
marriage license was issued to the couple
● The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple
was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law
● MTC found petitioner GUILTY of the violation of Art. 352 of the RPC and imposed on him a fine of 200
pesos
● RTC AFFIRMED the findings of the MTC
● CA AFFIRMED RTC’s ruling

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of performing an illegal marriage and thereby violating Art. 352 of the
RPC?

HELD: YES. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing
officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. While Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a “marriage ceremony” and what constitutes its “illegal”
performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. Article 6 of the Family Code provides
that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary,
however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife

Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was testified
to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution
has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each
other as husband and wife.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal
requirements of marriage set by law were lacking (marriage license). The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal.

Note: The marriage is void because of the absence of the marriage license

4. Duties of a solemnizing officer

5. Effect of Irregularity
FC 4
(c) Marriage Ceremony

1. Form of Ceremony

FC3 (3);
FC 6
cf.
FC 33
FC 8

Martinez vs Tan 12 Doctrine:

Phil 731 Marriage and Divorce; Marriage by justice of the Peace: man and woman appeared before a justice of the peace
and there signed a statement setting forth that they had agreed to marry each other and asked the justice to
G.R. No. 4904 solemnize the marriage. Another document was then signed by them, by the justice and by two witnesses, stating
Feb 5, 1909 that the man and woman appeared before the justice and ratified all that was contained in the preceding
instrument and insisted upon the marriage. Then the justice announces that the man and woman as married.
KANG
Facts:
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married

● Plaintiff (Rosalia Martinez; wife) and defendant (Angel Tan; husband) were married on September 25,
1907; solemnized by the Justice of the Peace (who eventually died after the solemnizing the marriage of
the couple)
● Plaintiff claimed that the marriage is void since she was not present during the solemnification and was
forced to sign the contract without reading it in her house; hence this petition.
o presented witness: Rosario Bayot - mother of the plaintiff; testified that plaintiff never left the
house except her company; but also she admitted that she left her unaccompanied at at 5 o’clock
o Pacita Ballori (witness of the marriage ceremony), stated that the plaintiff and her mother went to
Veles - chinese owner, 2 daughters went to the office of Justice of the peace. Later, they hid in the
witness’ house.
● Decision of the Lower Court was in favor of the defendant with the following evidence supported:
o Evidence at the trial: Expediente de matrimonio civil (2 witnesses of husband and wife
respectively: Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori) - it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant
were legally married by the justice of the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.
1. Documents were firmly signed by the plaintiff
2. Defendant’s claim on the appearance of both parties before the Justice of the Peace (with
witnesses)
3. Testimonies of the witnesses, and of the bailiff (Jose Santiago) on the complete presence
of the parties, witnesses, and the Justice of the peace during the marriage ceremony
● Plaintiff’s written proof of evidence - letters sent to the defendant; counter-claimed its
statement (she admitted the fact that she wrote letters to the defendant which includes
her acceptance of their legal[civil] marriage)
● Zacarias Esmero - one of the witness of the defendant, has testified that the parties mutually
agreed their marriage when they were solemnized by the justice of the peace.
Issue:
● W/N the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant is considered valid.

Held: YES.
Dispositive portion: “The judgement of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with
costs of this instance against appellant.”

● “... there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in a way prejudiced…”
● In fact both signing parties were fully capable in reading and understanding spanish, henceforth the claim
of the plaintiff on “misunderstanding of the contract” cannot be justified as a supporting claim.
● General Order No. 68, Section 6: “no particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the
parties must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as
husband and wife.”
o uHeld, That, under the circumstances in this case, there was a s ucient compliance with section 6 of
 General Orders, No. 68, to constitute a valid marriage.

A marriage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of peace, signed by both parties which certificate
gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of
peace, declaring that they took each other as husband and wife.

Notes:
● Expediente de matrimonio civil - It is written in Spanish and consists, rst, of a petition directed to the justice
of the peace, (in this case, dated 25th of September, 1907) signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in
which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of
the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage.
● Bailiff - a person to whom some authority, care, guardianship, or jurisdiction is delivered, committed, or
intrusted. (Black’s)

Compare to: Facts:

Morigo vs People, ● Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran
GR no. 145226 City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
Feb 06, 2004 ● After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
● In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
SOBREVEGA replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
● In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.
● In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both
agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
● On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
● On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
● On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay
Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
● On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seeked among others, the
declaration of nullity of accused's marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually
took place.
● On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

Issue: WON was the marriage between Lucio and Lucia valid? No.

Held:
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears
no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless
he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. Under the circumstances
of the present case, Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the
issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying
herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.

Notes:
Elements of bigamy (Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis):

1. the offender has been legally married;

 1. the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

1. he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

1. the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

2. Place for ceremony

FC 8
FC 2
FC 9
FC 32
FC 33

3. Issuance of marriage certificate

FC 6
FC 22
FC 23

Madridejo vs. De ● This is a case alleging that a marriage is null and void to illegitimize a child (succession rights)
Leon, 55 Phil 1 ● Eulogio De Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had one child, Domingo De Leon. Eulogio De Leon died
in 1915.
● During the widowhood of Flaviana, she lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the
municipality of Sinoloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro
Madridejo.
● On June 17, 1917, Melecio, as a son of Flaviana, was baptized with no mention of the father.
● July 8, 1920, Flaviana, being at death’s door, was married to Pedro Madridejo by the parish priest of
Siniloan. She died the following day, leaving Domingo, Eulogio, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio
Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo.
● Domingo De Leon died May 28, 1928.
● Petitioner filed a petition questioning the validity of marriage between Flaviana Perez and Pedro
Mardridejo, and the legitimacy of Melecio as the child of the two.

ISSUE
● Whether or not the marriage of Flaviana Perez to Pedro Medridejo is valid YES
● Whether or not the marriage subsequently legitimized Melecio Madridejo NO

HELD
● With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who
married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential
requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
● In order that a subsequent marriage may be effective as a legitimation, the natural children born out of
wedlock must have been acknowledged by the parents either before or after its celebration. Pedro did not
sign the birth certificate and no statement of acknowledgement from him for Melecio to be a legitimate
child.

People of the Philippines vs Elias Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 FACTS: Appeal from decision of Circuit Criminal Court 14th Judicial
District, Cebu-Bohol
October 31, 1984 ● Elias Borromeo, 40 yo, married, farmer, resident of
Relova, J. Putingbato, Babag, Cebu City, was found guilty of the
crime of parricide.
OCULTO ● July 3, 1981: 4-yo grandchild reported to her grandmother
 Matilde Taborada (Susana’s mother) that Elias was killing
Susana. Matilde told the child to report to her son
Geronimo. Geronimo went to Susana’s hut & saw her
lifeless body (her intestine having spilled out of her
abdomen), beside her 1-month old child crying. Elias was
lying Susana’s body still holding a bloody kitchen bolo.
● Elias contends that trial court erred. He alleges that (1)
that Borromeo & deceased Susana were not legally &
validly married in a church wedding ceremony, the
officiating priest testifying so,and there was no marriage
contract executed on the occasion or later on; hence, Elias
could only be liable for homicide; (2) that there are the
mitigating circumstances of provocation or obfuscation &
voluntary surrender; and (3) that it was wrong to convict
him of parricide.
● Elias said he was married to Susana in a chapel near the
RCPI station in Babag by a priest named Father Binghay of
Guadalupe. The marriage produced one child. He could
not remember when they married and how old the child
was.
ISSUE: Whether or not Elias was legally married to Susana - YES
Whether Elias was guilty of parricide or homicide -
parricide
HELD:
1. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission
of the accused of the existence of such marriage.
● Person living together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The presumption in favor of
matrimony is one of the strongest known in law.
The law presumes morality, and not immorality;
marriage, and not concubinage; legitimacy, and
nott bastardy. There is the presumption that
persons living together as husband and wife are
married to each other. Perido v Perido: The basis
of human society throughout the civilized world is
that of marriage.
● Pugeda v Trias: The mere fact that no record of
the marriage exists in the registry of marriage
does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in
the celebration thereof, all requisites for its
validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of
the marriage certificate to the registry is not ofe
of said requisites.
Petition is AFFIRMED, with modification of indemnity to P30k.
E. Law Governing Validity of Marriages Abroad

1. General rule in contracts

(a) As to form
NCC 17(1) and (2)

(b) As to Substantive requirements

NCC 15
NCC 17 (3)

2. Special Rule in Marriage

 (a) lex loci celebrationis

FC 26
FC 21
FC 10

Yao Kee v Sy Gonzales

167 SCRA 786
Facts:
• Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the
Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.
• Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition which alleged, among others that (a)
they are the children of the deceased with Asucion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; and, (c) they do not recognize Sy
Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him.
• The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife
of Sy Kiat in China; and, (b) they are the legitimate wife children of the deceased.
• THE CA’s RULING: The CA ruled that a) herein petitioner’s marriage is not proven to be valid under the laws of the People’s
Republic of China (and so not here in the PH as well), and that her children are therefore acknowledged natural children; and, b) herein
respondent’s children are also acknowledged natural children in that they are born of respondent Gonzales and the deceased, both having
lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for many years.
• In the case at bar, the petitioner herein assails the said decision of the CA, and brought forward the following testimonial and
documentary evidence: a) the practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children; b) respondent’s own
statements when she testified that the deceased was indeed married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; c) deceased Sy Kiat’s
Master Card of Registered Alien shows that his marital status was “married”, that his wife is “Yao Kee” and that their marriage was on
1931, in China; d) a certification issued by the Embassy of China showing the same details..

ISSUES:
1. W/N the marriage by custom of deceased Sy Kiat to petitioner Yao Yee is valid. - NO
2. W/N petitioner’s and respondent’s are legitimate children of Sy Kiat. - NO, they are only acknowledged natural children.
HELD:
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 26 of the Family Code which states that: Art. 26 . All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The validity of
the marriage cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
As petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of
legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [Art. 269, Civil Code.]
Both parties were, however, able to prove that the children were acknowledged by the deceased. For the petitioners by a) again, the
Master Card of Registered Alien; b) a signed affidavit by the deceased for presentation to the Local Civil Registrar to support one of the
petitioner’s application for marriage, stating that she is his daughter. For the respondents by an acknowledged compromise agreement
where he not only acknowledged them as his natural children, but also made provisions for their support and future inheritance.
The SC affirmed the CA’s ruling
Ruling:
“WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.”

Republic v Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005 Facts:

● Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at
SOBREVEGA the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an,
Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981.
● Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their
son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
● Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree sometime in 2000 and then married a
 certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.
● He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido
filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of
the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under

Article 26 of the Family Code. Yes.

Held: The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26,

paragraph 2 of the Family Code be interpreted as allowing a
Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under
Philippine law.

The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties

who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on,one of them became naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed,
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the US. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s
naturalization, he was still barred from remarrying (one who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence).

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is

GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

Minoru Fujiki DOCTRINE: Law Governing Validity of Marriages Abroad; Special

petitioner, rule in marriage; Lex Loci Celebrationis – law of the place where
vs. the contract is made
Maria Paz Galeli Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of
Q.C, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, FACTS:
respondents · Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013 Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife
Manlongat to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
· In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the First marriage being dissolved, Marinay
 and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She
left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay
met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship.
· In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14
January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay
and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35 (4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines; 5 and
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National
Statistics Office (NSO).
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his
or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy.
3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize
the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:
1. NO. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can
prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25,
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court.
 2. YES.
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition.
Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize

the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground
of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status
as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the
entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the
civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.

Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a

spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of
a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2 (a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife" 75 — it refers to
the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the
law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
under Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

3. NO. In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,

Negros Occidental, held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a

marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No.
8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous

marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, "the term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy]
shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
 archipelago."

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January
2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to
REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with
this Decision.

(b) Exceptions

FC 26 in relation to

FC 35(1)& 35 (4-6)
FC 36
FC 37
FC38

cf.
NCC 71
DOJ Opinion No 11 S. 1990 (Jan 17, 1990)

F. Common-law marriages/ ‘live-in’ relationships

FC 147, cf. RPC 350

FC 148 (“adulterous”)
Rule 131 Sec. 3 (aa) – (cc), 1989 Rules on Evidence cf. NCC 220
FC 26 par. 1
NCC Book II, Title III (484-501)

Testate Estate of the Late Baldomero L. Lesaca, Consuelo F. Lesaca, Doctrine:

and Juana F. Lesaca, MARRIAGE; PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY PERSONS LIVING
executrices-appellants, MARITALLY BUT NOT LEGALLY MARRIED. — Although there is no
v. technical marital partnership between persons living maritally
Juana Felix VDA. De Lesaca, Claimant-Appellee. without being lawfully married, nevertheless there is between
them an informal civil partnership which would entitle the parties
G.R. No. L-3605. April 21, 1952 to an equal interest in property acquired by their joint efforts.
Where there is no showing that the property was earned by the
Manlongat joint efforts of the two the property must be deemed to have been
the property of the party who acquired it.

FACTS:
● Baldomero J. Lesaca died in the City of Manila on
November 8, 1946. He was survived by his second wife
(Juana Felix), two minor children by the latter, two children
by his first marriage, and three acknowledged natural
children by a third woman. In his will he named Juana F.
Lesaca and Consuelo F. Lesaca, his children by his first
marriage, co-executrices
● The deceased and his widow, Juana Felix, had lived
together maritally since 1924 but were not married until
December 18, 1945; that is, less than a year before his
death; that in 1930 Ramon Garcia conveyed to the
 deceased three parcels of land for P2,500 under a pacto de
retro sale; and that on September 25, 1947 the co-
executrices, with the approval of the court, reconveyed the
said parcels of land to Ramon Garcia for the same sum of
P2,500. Claiming that this sum was conjugal property the
widow petitioned the court to order the co-executrices to
give her one-half thereof. The co-executrices opposed the
petition, claiming that the money paid to Ramon Garcia for
the land in question came from the products of the
property left by their mother. But after hearing, the court
granted the petition in an order dated March 11, 1949,
holding that the sum in dispute was conjugal property,
"considering that the reconveyance was effected after the
marriage."

ISSUE:
Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of land
sold a retrovendendo before such marriage to one of the consorts,
constitutes conjugal property or not

HELD:
NO. According to the briefs Garcia sold the land for P2,500 to
Lesaca before the latter’s marriage to Juana Felix and repurchased it
for that same amount after said marriage. If the money paid by
Lesaca was his own exclusively, surely the mere fact that it was
returned or repaid after marriage cannot convert it into conjugal
property. It is true that under Art. 1401 of the Civil Code of 1889
property obtained by the industry, wages or work of the spouses or
of either of them belongs to the conjugal partnership. But in the
case of Marata v. Dionio (G. R. No. 24449, unreported) wherein this
Court held that though there is no technical marital partnership
between persons living maritally without being lawfully married,
nevertheless there is between them an informal civil partnership
which would entitle the parties to an equal interest in property
acquired by their joint efforts, in the present case there is no
showing that the sum paid to Garcia was earned by the joint efforts
of the deceased and his widow. In the absence of such proof the
sum must be deemed to have been the property of the deceased to
whom the land for which it was given in payment was sold by
Garcia. It follows that the order below adjudging one-half of the
sum in question to the widow is erroneous.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Wherefore, it is the decision of this Court that (2) The other order
of March 11, 1949, declaring the sum of P2,500 received by the co-
executrices from Ramon Garcia as repurchase price of the three
parcels of land resold to the latter is conjugal property and that the
widow is entitled to one-half thereof is reversed and the said sum is
declared to be a part of the estate of the deceased;

125. Yaptinchay v. Torres, Josefina Yaptinchay, Virginia Yaptinchay et FACTS:

al, 28 SCRA 489 ● Petitioner there alleged that the deceased Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and
publicly as husband and wife for nineteen (19) years; that
the deceased who died without a will left an estate
consisting of personal and real properties situated in the
Philippines, Hongkong and other places with an estimated
value of about P500,000; that to petitioner's knowledge
 and information, the deceased left three daughters who
carted away from the residences aforesaid personal
properties belonging to the deceased together with others
exclusively owned by petitioner.
● Upon the foregoing allegations, the court issued on July
17, 1965 an order appointing herein petitioner Teresita C.
Yaptinchay special administratrix of the estate of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay upon a P25,000-bond.
● An opposition was registered by Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the
alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and
other children (Virginia, Mary, Asuncion), of the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the ground that said Teresita C.
Yaptinchay, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right
to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the
latter's estate, much less to procure appointment as
administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly
cohabited with the deceased for a number of years said
petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for
want of integrity.
● The probate court set aside its order appointing petitioner
Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix. Respondent
Virginia Y. Yaptinchay (daughter of the deceased) had been
appointed special administratrix.
● Petitioner filed in Court of First Instance of Rizal an action
for replevin and for liquidation of the partnership
supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation
with Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and for damages. Respondent
Guillermo E. Torres issued an order temporarily restraining
defendants therein from disposing any of the properties
listed in the complaint and from interfering with plaintiff's
rights to, and possession over, amongst others, "the house
now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal."
● Defendants filed for Writ of Injunction in CFI, thus it being
granted by Judge Torres. Virginia, as the special
administratix, should be given the custody of the house.
Motion for reconsideration by petitioner denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Teresita Yaptinchay has co-

ownership of the North Forbes house?

HELD:
NO.
● It is quite true that, in support of the allegation that the
house in North Forbes Park was her exclusive property,
petitioner presented proof in the form of loans that she
had contracted during the period when said house was
under construction. On the contrary, there is much to the
documentary proof presented by petitioner which would
tend to indicate that the loans she obtained from the
Republic Bank were for purposes other than the
construction of the North Forbes Park home. She obtained
various loans from the Republic Bank "for her own
exclusive account" and that the proceeds thereof "were
also used by affiant both for her business and for the
construction, completion and furnishing of the said house
at North Forbes Park" This is in contrast of her affidavit
stating that “through our joint efforts and capital, among
which properties are those situated" in "North Forbes

126. Eugenio v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
Park.
● It is in the context just recited that the unsupported
assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's
exclusive property may not be permitted to override the
prima facie presumption that house, having been
constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or of the
conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the
existence of his marriage with respondent Josefina Y.
Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be under the
control of the special administratrix.
● Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based
on the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code be
decisive. Said Article 144 says that: "When man and a
woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning,
the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
● One such condition is that there must be a clear showing
that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really
contributed to the acquisition of the property involved.
Until such right to co-ownership is duly established,
petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot
be considered the "present right" or title that would make
available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of
injunction.
FACTS:
● Petitions for certiorari and prohibition to review the
decision of the RTC of CDO City.
● Unaware of the death of Vitaliana Vargas on Aug. 28, 1988,
her full brothers & sisters, herein private respondents filed
a petition for habeas corpus on September 1988 before
the RTC of Misamis Oriental.
● The petition alleged that Vitaliana was forcibly taken by
the petitioner in his residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental
and deprived of her liberty without any legal authority.
● Vitaliana was 25 years old, single and living with petitioner
Eugenio.
● RTC issued writ of habeas corpus dated Sept. 28 but it was
returned unsatisfied.
● Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana who
died on Aug. 1988 because he said that a corpse cannot be
the subject of a habeas corpus proceeding.
● According to petitioner he had already obtained a burial
permit from the undersecretary of the DOH authorizing a
burial at the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary
Inc. (PBCM) where he is the Supreme Pres. & Founder.
● Petitioner alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to
toxemia of pregnancy in his Residence on Aug. 28 1988.
● As Vitaliana’s common-law husband petitioner claimed
legal custody of her body.
● The court directed the delivery of Vitaliana’s body to a
funeral parlor in CDO City & its autopsy.
● Petitioner filed an urgent motion to dismiss and further
arguing that habeas corpus is not applicable to a dead
person.
ISSUE:

127. Estrada v Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
W/N Eugenio has the authority over Vitaliana’s body?
HELD:
No. Article 305 of the Civil Code states that the duty and right to
make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accordance with the order established for support, under Article
294, that in case of descendants of the same degree or brothers
and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. Moreover, Sec. 1103 of
the Revised Administrative Code states that if the deceased was
an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any next of kin,
the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased. Vitaliana had no children nor did she have a husband. A
common-law husband has no rights to the burial or custody over
the deceased person’s body. Therefore, The Vargas’ have the rights
to custody and burial.
Facts:
>Complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada
requested Judge Jose F . Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253,
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, for an investigation of
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for
living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child within
this live-in arrangement.
>Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to
remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act
>Respondent Escritor testifiied that when she entered the judiciary
in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998.
>She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr more
than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living
with another woman.
>She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son.
>And, as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent
asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation.
>In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28,
1991, a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness."
>As laid down by the tenets of their faith, the members required
that at the time of the declaration, the couple could not secure the
civil authorities’ approval of the marital relationship because of
legal impediments.
>Only couples who had been baptized and in good standing could
execute the declaration, which required the approval of the elders
of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital status of
the declarants and their respective spouses’ commission of adultery
were investigated before the declarations were executed.
>Escritor and Quilapio made their declarations in the usual and
approved form prescribed by Jehovah’s Witnesses, approved by the
elders of the congregation where the declarations were executed,
and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.
>Moreover, the congregation believed that once all legal
impediments for the couple were lifted, the validity of the
declarations ceased, and the couple were obliged to legalize their
union. In this case, although Escritor was widowed in 1998 -- a fact
that, on her part, lifted the legal impediment to marry -- her mate
was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations
remained valid.
>Therefore, insofar as the congregation was concerned, there was
nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between the
couple, and they remained members in good standing in the
congregation.
>Moreover, by invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral
standards of her congregation, in asserting that her conjugal
arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct
for which she should be held administratively liable, the Court had
to determine the contours of religious freedom under Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides, viz: Sec. 5. No law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
>The Court held that in resolving claims involving religious freedom
(1) benevolent neutrality or accommodation, whether mandatory
or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the
religion clauses in our Constitution; and (2) in deciding respondent's
plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause (from the law
with which she is administratively charged), it is the compelling
state interest test, the strictest test, which must be applied.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the

administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct.

HELD: No.
The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the
judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality
and decency. “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how
this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s
plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the
compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be
discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the
Office of the Solicitor General”. Thus, the only issue left to be
resolved was the factual basis of the Complaint, specifically the
sincerity and centrality of the religious belief and practice claimed
by respondent. The resolution of this issue would allow the
government to present evidence on the State’s compelling interest
to override her religious belief and practice. The Court reiterated
the fact that, upon its finality, the Decision had to settle the
question of what approach should be taken in construing the
religion clauses; that is, the proper test applicable in determining
claims of exemption based on freedom of religion.

With respect to the intent and framework underlying those clauses

in our Constitution, applicable was the benevolent neutrality or
accommodation test, whether mandatory or permissive. In deciding
respondent’s plea for exemption based on the “Free Exercise
Clause,” however, the compelling-state-interest test was applicable.
The Court nevertheless revisited the highlights of the earlier
Decision; in particular the Old World antecedents and the
development of the religion clauses in the context of American
jurisprudence.
 Dispositive Portion: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to
the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is
ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the
opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present
evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override
respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the
means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should
be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court
Administrator's receipt of this Decision.

Explanation of Doctrine: The Court remanded the case to the OCA

to demonstrate how interest of preserving the integrity of the
judiciary “is so compelling that it should override the pleas of
religious freedom nor is it shown that the means employed by the
government in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent’s religious rights” It balanced the State’s interest in the
nature of marriage and the parties’ religious freedom when it dealt
with the exercise of religion.

G. Void Marriages

General rule

FC 4

1. Kinds of void marriages

(a) Absence of formal requisites

FC 35

cf.
FC 234
RA 6809

128. Alcantara v Alcantara, GR NO. 167746, Aug. 18, 2007 FACTS:

· The case at hand is a Petition for Review on Certiorari led by
PANISALES petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals denying petitioner's appeal and affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court dismissing his petition for annulment of
marriage.
· A petition for annulment of marriage was led by petitioner
against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on December 8,
1982 he and respondent got married without obtaining a marriage
license.
· They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding
before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of
the CDCC BR Chapel and got married on the same day.
· They went through another marriage ceremony at the San
Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on March 26, 1983
without again obtaining a marriage license.
· The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,
appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was
a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply
for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place.
· Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued
declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to
cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.
· Respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and
maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by
a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite. Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of
marriage be denied for lack of merit.
RTC RULING:
· The RTC DISMISSED the petition for LACK OF MERIT.

CA RULING:
· The CA AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE RTC and DISMISSED
the petition.
· The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the
parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not
presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover,
the parties' marriage contract being a public document is a prima
facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.
· The CA likewise DISMISSED the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

1. W/N the CA committed a reversible error when it ruled

that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis
despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license
at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage
2. W/N the CA committed a reversible error when it gave
weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that
the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the
trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the
face of the marriage contract
3. W/N the CA committed a reversible error when it failed to
apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy
vs. Court of Appeals
4. W/N the CA committed a reversible error when it failed to
relax the observance of procedural rules to protect and promote
the substantial rights of the party litigants

HELD:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied
for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

1. NO. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality,

not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance
of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to
the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered
mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.
An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not
affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
2. NO. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere
a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract

129. So v Valera, GR 150677, June 5, 2009
JOSOL
reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the
marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It
therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the
existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
3. NO. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at
the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In
this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and
respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to
this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona,
Cavite. The certification is precise in that it specifically identified the
parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto
Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a
license was in fact issued to the parties.
4. NO. Petitioner is an educated person. He knowingly and
voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit
from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the
marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer
palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot
countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the
institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.
FACTS: After meeting at a party in 1973, petitioner and respondent
maintained a 19-year common-law relationship before marrying on
December 10, 1991 at the Caloocan City Hall. They had three
children: Jeffrey, Renelee, and Loni. On May 14, 1996, the petitioner
filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his
marriage with the respondent on the grounds that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to continue her marital obligations
(respondent would often kick him out of the house and make him
sleep in the car, go out gambling with their employees, and even
made petitioner sleep with his friend for 2 months), and that their
marriage was void because he was only made to sign a blank
document and no marriage was conducted in 1991. The RTC
nullified the marriage of petitioner and respondent in its decision of
November 8, 1999. However, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, the CA reversed this decision by holding that the RTC did
not conduct a deliberate discussion on the merits of the case, that
the respondent’s attitude did not pertain to psychological illness
and the petitioner failed to prove that it is incurable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the alleged lack of
the essential and formal requisites of marriage; NO.
HELD:
● The court finds this argument baseless and misplaced for
three basic reasons.
1. The argument stems from the mistaken premise that the
RTC definitively ruled that petitioner's marriage to
respondent was null and void due to the absence of the
essential and formal requisites of marriage. In truth, the
RTC did not discuss the absence of the formal and
essential requisites of marriage and failed to even mention
the existence of a certified true copy of the Marriage

130. De Castro v De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, Feb. 13, 2008
ZUÑO
Contract signed by the officiating minister and registered
in the Civil Registry of Caloocan City.
2. The same examination of the RTC decision shows that it
concerned itself wholly with the declaration of the nullity
of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. As
such, RTC nullified the marriage on grounds of
psychological incapacity and not the lack of essential and
formal requisites of marriage.
3. As a duly registered document, the certified true copy of
the Marriage Contract is prima facie evidence of the facts
it contains, namely, the marriage of the petitioner with the
respondent. The burden of proof lies on the petitioner and
it requires more than a preponderance of evidence against
its validity. If the biased and interested testimony of a
witness is deemed sufficient to overcome a public
instrument, drawn up with all the formalities prescribed
by the law, then there will have been established a very
dangerous doctrine that would throw the door wide open
to fraud.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Reinel De Castro and respondent Annabelle
Assidao-De Castro applied for a marriage license and
regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When they went back
to the Local Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the
plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an
affidavit stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years and got married on
the same day. After the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did
not live together as husband and wife.
● A few months later, respondent gave birth to a child
(Reinna), and has since been supporting the child on her
own. This prompted her to file a complaint for support
against petitioner, alleging that he has failed to render his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his
wife and Reinna as his child.
● Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent,
claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he
was merely forced by respondent to sign the marriage
contract to save herself from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state.
● The Trial Court ruled that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized
without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner
as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give
her support.
● The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, ruled that their
marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, and that,
consequently, the child in question was born during the
subsistence and validity of their marriage.
ISSUE:
WoN the petitioner and respondent’s marriage is valid. - NO

131. Republic v Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008
MASCARENAS
HELD:
● The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect
in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence
presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license.
● Likewise, the falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered
as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage.
The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement
for a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame, and
embarrassment, associated with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage
license. In the instant case, there was no “scandalous
cohabitation” to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation
at all. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement, and their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
● WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, as
stated in the above facts, has been reinstated.
Facts:
● 24 November 1986, Jose (Respondent) and Felisa were
married at the Pasay City Hall, was solemnized by Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza, they executed a sworn affidavit, also
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried,
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years. In lieu of a marriage license.
● 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the RTC, Biñan,
Laguna. Contended that his marriage with Felisa was a
sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between
the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit
stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for
at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage
was secured through fraud.
● Jose’s version: He was introduced to Felisa in 1986.
Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in
Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three
weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the
Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package
sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay
City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them.
They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that
the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused
to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his
refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who
had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he
discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He
alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the
 table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the
same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage
contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter
feigned ignorance.
● Felisa’s version: denied Jose’s allegations and defended the
validity of their marriage. She declared that they had
maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she
had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of
their age difference. Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31
August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for
bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of
the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating
Board. The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable
for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to
him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.

RTC Ratio:
● Jose could have already detected that something was
amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a
package for Felisa but it was]he who was made to sign the
pieces of paper for the release of the said package.
● by his own admission, Felisa told him that her brother
would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it
took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that
the pieces of paper that he signed was purportedly the
marriage contract.
● he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote
Felisa’s name in the duly notarized statement of assets and
liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988
● in his company I.D., wrote the name of Felisa as the person
to be contacted in case of emergency. This is just but a
lame excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the
name of his sister.
● Jose’s sister was put into the witness stand, under oath,
she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a
witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate and she
further testified that the signature appearing over the
name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his brother that
he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract. She
believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her
brother.
● Jose’s action had prescribed.Cited NCC 87 which requires
that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after
the discovery of the fraud.

RTC Ruling: WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of

the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so
holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable
consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].
CA Ratio:
● the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment of marriage under NCC 86 did not exist in the
marriage between the parties.
● the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of
fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by
law.
● the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa
had lived together as husband and wife for the period
required by NCC 76 did not affect the validity of the
marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled
by the statements contained therein.

CA Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration, His central opposition was

that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from
a marriage license under NCC 76 were not fully attendant in the
case at bar. Cited the legal condition that the man and the woman
must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage. Maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

CA Ratio:
● (Niñal v. Bayadog) where the contracting parties to a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the
basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of
majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for
at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
other

CA Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is

RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the
marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review praying that the Court of
Appeals’ Amended Decision be reversed and set aside for lack of
merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared
valid and subsisting.

Issue:
● W/N the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

Held:
● The exception of a marriage license under NCC 76 applies
only to those who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and desire to marry each other. It is
indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their
sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic
admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage.

132. Abbas vs Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013
AGUSTIN
● The marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated
without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither
did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in
NCC 76
● The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires
not just the defense of a true and genuine union
(presumption of marriage) but the exposure of an invalid
one as well. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of
a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of
the law.
● There is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity
of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper,
without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no
affidavit at all.
● Jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under NCC 76 means a
five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It
covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the five years - and
continuity that is unbroken.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot
void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal
liability, if any. No costs.
FACTS:
● In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the
house of Felicitas Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He said he
was asked to participate in a ceremony, which was meant
to welcome him to the Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani).
He said he did not know that the ceremony was actually
his marriage with Gloria Goo.
● Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas
allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.
● To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo.
● To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a
marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as the
solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The
marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license
issued to Abbas.
● Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar, which states that the marriage license, based on
its number, indicated in the marriage contract, was never
issued to Abbas but to someone else.
● The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of

133. Kho v Republic, GR No. 187462, June 1, 2016
RAMOS
Appeals reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no
diligence to search for the real source of the marriage
license issued to Abbas (for it could be that the marriage
license was issued in another municipality).
ISSUE:
W/N there was a valid marriage license obtained to fulfill one of the
formal requisites of marriage.
HELD:
No. There was no valid marriage license obtained.
RATIO:
Their marriage lacked one of the formal requisites which is the
issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil
registrar’s certification enjoyed probative value, as her duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor
of the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this
presumption hence it stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it
conclusive that there was in fact a valid marriage license issued to
him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to
Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio.” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from
the beginning.
FACTS:
● On May. 31, 1972, Petitioner’s parents instructed a clerk to
arrange and prepare the necessary papers that were
required for the intended marriage between Raquel
(petitioner) and Veronica (respondent).
● The petitioner and respondent exchanged their marital
vows at around 3:00 am of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude
the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony.
● Soon after, Raquel filed for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage.
● In his petition, he said that he has never gone to the office
of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for a marriage license.
He added that considering the shortness of period from
the time the clerk was told to obtain the papers in the
afternoon of may 31, 1972, mere hours before the actual
marriage was celebrated, no marriage license could have
been validly issued.
● Among the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner
is a certification issued by the Municipal CIvil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the
Office of the Local CIvil Registrar has neither record nor
copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner.
● The RTC declared the marriage null and void ab initio.
● The respondent claims that she and petitioner were able

(b) Bigamous and polygamous marriages,
134. Lilia Wiegel v. Honorable Alicia Sempio-Diy (presiding judge of
the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) & Karl
Heinz Wiegel, 143 SCRA 499 (1986)
August 19, 1986
Paras, J.
to secure a marriage license which they presented to the
solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed.
● The CA reversed the RTC ruling.
● The CA held that there is a presumption that a marriage
license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner
failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled
that the absence of any indication in the marriage
certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere
defect in the formal requisites of the law which does not
invalidate the parties' marriage.
● Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari.
● The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is
always in favor of the validity of marriage and that any
doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity.
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid. NO
HELD: The marriage was celebrated before the Family Code hence
the Civil Code governs the union. The court enumerated the
essential requisites of marriage under the CIvil Code.
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless
all essential requisites are complied with: (1)
Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.
The court ruled that the certification issued by the civil registrar of
Arteche, with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is
sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage
license. Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed
validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been
overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that
their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity.
Unfortunately, the respondent was not able to discharge the
burden. The respondent failed to present their alleged marriage
license or a copy thereof to the court. It is a settled rule that one
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation
is not evidence.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a
simple defect in their marriage considering all the facts stated.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30,
2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25,
2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.
FACTS:
● Karl Wiegel filed before the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court of Caloocan a declaration of nullity of his July 1978
marriage with petitioner Lilia Wiegel on the ground of
Lilia’s previous existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion. Lilia
admitted the existence of the 1st marriage but claims
 that it was null & void, alleging she & Eduardo were
OCULTO forced to enter the marital union. Lilia asked JDRC to
present the evidence saying (1) 1st marriage was vitiated
by force exercised upon her by Eduardo, and (2) Eduardo
was at the time of 1972 marriage was already married to
someone else. Judge Sempio-Dy ruled against it because
the existence of force exerted on the 1st marriage was
already agreed upon. Hence, petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lilia’s first marriage to Eduardo was null
and void - NOT VOID, MERELY VOIDABLE
What is the effect of Lilia-Eduardo marriage to Lilia-Karl
marriage - first makes second VOID
HELD:
● Lilia’s first marriage is not void but merely voidable.
○ No need to prove that the first marriage was
vitiated by force committed against Lilia &
Eduardo. Assuming this to be true, the marriage
will not be void but merely voidable, therefore
valid until annulled.
Article 85, Civil Code. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (5) that the
consent of either party was obtained by force or intimidation,
unless the violence or threat having disappeared, such party
afterwards freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his
wife, as the case may be;
○ Since no annulment has been made, it is clear
that when she married respondent Karl, she was
still validly married to her first husband Eduardo.
● Since Lilia’s first marriage has not yet been annulled,
consequently, her marriage to respondent Karl is void.
Article 80, Civil Code. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
(4) bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article
83, Number 2;
○ No need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband
Eduardo at the time they married each other. For
then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration of
such fact & for all legal intents & purposes Lilia
would still be regarded as a married woman at
the time she contracted marriage with Karl.
Accordingly, Lilia-Karl marriage would be regarded
void under the law.
Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.
FC 35(4) The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;

FC 39 The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by Executive Order
227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase "However, in case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling
under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall take effect" has been deleted by Republic Act
No. 8533 [Approved February 23, 1998]).

FC 40 The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.

FC 41 A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for 4 consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only 2 shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse.

FC 44 If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of
marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law

RPC 344 Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes of
adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in
any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the
above named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable
to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned

RPC 349 Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

135. Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6 FACTS:

● Dorothy Terre charges Jordan Terre, a member of the
KO Philippine Bar, with grossly immoral conduct for
contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than Dorothy while their marriage was still
subsisting.
● Jordan averred that he married Dorothy upon her
presentation that she was single and he had subsequently
learned that Dorothy was married to Merlito Bercenilla.
○ When he confronted her, she drove him out of
their conjugal residence.
○ Dorothy had mocked him that the child she was
then carrying, Jason Terre, was actually the son of
Bercenilla.
● Believing in good faith that his marriage to Dorothy was
null and void ab initio, he married Helina Malicdem.
● After investigation, the Office of the SolGen submitted a
report:
○ Dorothy was married to Bercenilla while Jordan,
single and aware of her marital status, started
courting her.
○ Upon moving to Manila and pursuing law, Jordan
continued courting her, telling Dorothy that her
marriage with Bercenilla was void ab initio since
she and Bercenilla are first cousins.
○ Convinced, Dorothy agreed to marry Jordan and
in their marriage license, he wrote her status as
single explaining that since her first marriage was
void ab initio, there was no need to go to court
and declare it as such.
ISSUE:
● W/N a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter
into a subsequent marriage –YES
HELD:
 As a lawyer, Jordan knew or should have known that his argument
ran counter to the prevailing case law of the court which holds that
for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.

Without a declaration of nullity, any subsequent marriage is

bigamous and criminal in nature.

***That the moral character of Jordan is deeply flawed is shown by

the circumstances. After he convinced Dorothy that her first
marriage was null and void ab initio, they married and as Jordan
was going through law school, he was supported by Dorothy and
even received assistance from Dorothy’s parents.

After finishing law school and gotten Dorothy pregnant, he

abandoned her without support and without waiting for the safe
delivery of his child.

Jordan is disbarred.

136. Domingo v. CA 226 SCRA 572 FACTS:

● April 25, 1969, Roberto Domingo married Emerlina dela

Paz on which marriage is valid and still existing
● November 29, 1976, he married Delia Soledad Domingo
● January 23 1979 up to the present, Soledad has been
working in Saudi Arabia
● 1983, Emerlina sued for bigamy, respondent found out
about the prior marriage
● Out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and
personal properties with a total amount of approximately
P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto
● 1989, respondent found out that they are cohabiting and
Roberto was spending and disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge or consent
● May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A.
Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property” against petitioner Roberto
Domingo

ISSUE:
● WON a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage
is necessary. YES
● WON a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage
should be filed only for purposes of remarriage. YES

HELD:
● A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.
 ● Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the
Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by
the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life."
As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a
marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of
both parties or of one that their union is so defective with
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage
as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and
nothing more
137. Cariño vs. Cariño FACTS:
351 SCRA 127 ● Petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263,
AMATORIO which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87.
● SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño contracted two marriages, the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cariño (Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings.
● Second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent
Susan Yee Cariño (Susan Yee), with whom he had no
children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
back in 1982.
● On November 23, 1992, SPO4 Santiago Cariño died.
● Both petitioner and respond filed for claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance.
● Susan Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, and Pag-Ibig. While
Susan Yee was able to collect P21,000 from GSIS and SSS.
● Respondent filed a case of collection of sum money against
petitioner praying that at least one-half the of the
petitioner’s collected money be returned to her.
● Petitioner failed to file answer despite summons and was
declared in default.
● Respondent admitted that her marriage to the deceased
took place during the subsistence of, and without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She claimed that
she had no knowledge and only found out during the
funeral of the deceased.
● To bolster her case, she further contended that the
marriage between the petitioner and the deceased is void
ab initio because it was solemnized without marriage
license. A certification from the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, confirmed that the petitioner and the deceased’s
marriage was solemnized without marriage license.
● RTC ruled in favor of respondent.
● CA affirmed RTC ruling.

ISSUE:
● W/N petitioner and deceased’s marriage is void ab initio.
● W/N respondent is entitled to death benefits.

HELD:
YES. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the

138. Bobis vs. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
KANG
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,
renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, there is no
question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not
fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that
since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void
ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be
awarded to respondent. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
NO. Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and
the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized
during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to
be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of
Article 148 is therefore in order. With respect to the death
benefits, under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the
property regime of bigamous marriages, the properties acquired by
the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to
the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Since the disputed P146,000 was
earned by the deceased as a police officer, it is not owned in
common by the respondent and the deceased. Hence, Susan Yee is
not entitled to claim the same. By intestate succession only legal
heirs are entitled to claim, and the respondent not being the legal
wife, she is not entitled to claim.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article
applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of
a marriage license. Under the foregoing article, wages and salaries
earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by
the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between
them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did
not contribute thereto. Even if the disputed “death benefits” were
earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article
147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the
petitioner to share one-half thereof. Thus, one-half of the subject
“death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
Doctrine:
Prejudicial Question - is one which arises in a case of the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all essential elements of a crime have
been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the
indictment or may not have rested its case.
Bigamy; FC Art. 40 - requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of
previous marriage before a party may remarry.
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority.
A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.

FACTS:
● Respondent (Isagani Bobis) contracted his first marriage
(October 21, 1985) with Maria Javier and without it being
nullified, annulled, or terminated he contracted his second
marriage with the petitioner (Imelda Marbella - Bobis) on
January 25, 1996. And allegedly entered into the third
marriage contract with Julia Sally Hernandez.
● Petitioner filed a criminal case of bigamy (RTC-QC) but it
was denied and suspended the criminal case for the fact
that 1st marriage of the respondent was void due to
incomplete requirement of a valid marriage (no marriage
license). Also, MR was denied.
● Hence, the petition for review on certiorari of a decision of
RTC - QC
● Petitioner argued that the respondent should have
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage before
entering to a new one. Prejudicial question justifying
suspension of bigamy case is no longer legal truism (Art.
40; FC) - which requires a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage before remarrying. - but there was
none.
○ the respondent’s first marriage was contracted
before the effectivity of the FC, hence his claim on
void marriage does not support. - which makes
his first marriage valid (both parties at legal age,
has lived for at least 5 years together as husband
and wife hence the marriage is presumed to be
valid)
● Hence, the criminal case must not be suspended,
dependent on its civil case.

ISSUE:
● W/N the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration
of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial
question to a criminal case for bigamy

HELD:
● No. the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration
of nullity of the previous marriage does not constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
● In the current jurisprudence, previous marriage regardless
of it being valid or void, needs a judicial declaration of such
fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the
second marriage will also be void. The reason is that,
without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar,
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded
as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner.
○ Any decision in the civil action for nullity would

139. Mercado vs.Tan,
G.R. No 137110, August 1, 2000
ALMADRO
not erase the fact that respondent entered into a
second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December
29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to
IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
Notes:
● 2 essential elements in prejudicial question are:
○ the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action(bigamy in this case); and
○ the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed. (yes in
this case)
- In this case the prejudicial question raised by the
respondent is in a view where he has already been found
guilty of the case since he filed for absolute nullity of his
first marriage after he was convicted to the criminal case
of bigamy by the petitioner. Hence, it is not a prejudicial
question.
FACTS:
● Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan
got married on June 27, 1991 in Bacolod
● A Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the
parties and as entered in said document, the status of
accused was ‘single’.
● There is no dispute either that at the time of the
celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was
actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock
with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized
on April 10, 1976 by a Judge in Cebu City per Marriage
Certificate issued in connection therewith
● The matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Baur on
October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart
Church, Cebu City.
● In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused
and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on
June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas,
Diocese of Bacolod City.
● Both marriages were consummated when out of the first
consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children,
while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
● On October 5, 1992, a complaint for bigamy was filed by
the respondent. A month after the bigamy case was
lodged, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva.
● On May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G.
Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and
 void.
● Accused is charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second
marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on
June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united
in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10,
1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been
legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted
by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are
present
● Petitioner contended that he obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio.
Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until
set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void
marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Thus,
he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of.
● CA AFFIRMED decision of RTC
·

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 2nd marriage is a bigamous marriage?

HELD: YES. What constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any
person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage ‘before’
the former marriage has been legally dissolved.

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the
elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner
married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that
marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage,
this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently
filed the Complaint for bigamy.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first

marriage he obtained was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had
already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively
encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused
could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void
and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in
the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Elements of the crime of Bigamy under the RPC:

1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.”
140. Ty vs CA, FACTS:
346 SCRA 327 ● March 1977 - Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva (Anna)
in a civil ceremony.
LUNA ● Aug. 1977 - They had a church wedding
● 1980 - the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) of
QC declared their marriage as null and void
● The civil marriage for lack of marriage license
● The church wedding due to the lack of consent of the
parties.
● In 1979, prior to the JDRC decision, Reyes married Ofelia
Ty.
● 1991 - Reyes filed for an action for declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Ofelia
● He averred that they lack a marriage license at the time of
the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration
yet as to the nullity of his previous marriage with Anna.
● Ofelia presented evidence proving the existence of a valid
marriage license including the specific license number
designated.
● The lower court however ruled that Ofelia’s marriage with
Reyes is null and void.
● The same was affirmed by the CA applying the provisions
of the Art 40 of the FC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the previous marriage

of Reyes can be invoked?

HELD: NO. Art. 40 of the FC provides that, “The absolute nullity of a

previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.” This means that before one can enter into a second
marriage he must first acquire a judicial declaration of the nullity of
the previous marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring the previous marriage as
void. For purposes other than remarriage, other evidences may be
presented and the declaration can be passed upon by the courts.

In the case at bar, the lower court and the CA cannot apply the
provision of the FC. Both marriages entered by Reyes were
solemnized prior to the FC. The old CC did not have any provision
that states that there must be such a declaration before remarriage
can be done hence Ofelia’s marriage with Reyes is valid. The
provisions of the FC cannot be applied retroactively especially
because they would impair the vested rights of Ofelia under the CC
which was operational during her marriage with Reyes.

We can accept that the doctrine cited by defendants that no judicial

decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It
does not say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even
without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null
and void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are
unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is valid or
not is for each married spouse to determine for himself for this
would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a
second marriage even before a competent court issues a judicial
decree of nullity of his first marriage.
141. Tenebro vs. CA, G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004 (read
concurring of Justice Vitug and dissent of Justice Carpio)
LUNA
FACTS:
● 1990 - Veronico Tenebro and Leticia Ancajas were married
● 1991 - Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986.
● Tenebro thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he
shared with Ancajas
● Tenebro cohabited with Villareyes
● 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage with a
certain Nilda Villegas
● Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner
● Tenebro countered that his marriage with Villareyes
cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such
● further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has
been declared void ab initio due to psychological
incapacity
● Consequently, he cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

HELD:
YES. The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first
marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during
the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or
incapacity.

Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid

marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is
not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain
reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

142. Morigo vs. Morigo, Doctrine:

422 SCRA 376 Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements; In Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis, the
February 06, 2004 elements of bigamy were laid down.
Declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio retroacts to the
KANG date of the celebration of the first marriage - there was no marriage
in the first place

FACTS:
● Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the CA - seeks to reverse the decision dated
Oct 21, 1999 of the CA which affirmed the decision of the
RTC - Bohol of the criminal case filed against Morigo y
Cacho that he was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy and sentenced to prison mayor.
● August 30, 1990, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete agreed to
marry and got married at Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. - (no solemnification)
● August 19, 1991, Lucia filed for divorce against the
 appellant and it was then granted by the court and took
effect on February 17, 1992.
● Lucio then got married again with Maria Lumbago at the
Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
(October 4, 1992)
● September 21, 1993, accused filed for nullity of marriage
in the RTC on the ground that there was no marriage that
took place from the beginning.
● October 19, 1993 appellant was charged with bigamy by
the city prosecutor of Tagbilaran city with the RTC-Bohol.
● The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment
on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of
his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case.
● Divorce filed by Lucia was in Canada where they have no
jurisdiction over the matrimonial status of the parties. As
such, divorce granted in the court is not entitled to
recognition anywhere.
● October 23, 1997, the trial court rendered decision that
the marriage of Lucia and Lucio was void ab initio since no
marriage ceremony actually took place In affirming the
assailed judgement of conviction, the appellate court
stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of
Lucio’s marriage to Lucia could not acquit Lucio.
○ Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first
marriage was void from the beginning is not a
valid defense in a bigamy case.
● The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly
declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to
speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date
of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the
eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

ISSUE:
● W/N the CA erred in failing to appreciate the petitioner’s
lack of criminal intent when he contracted the second
marriage
● W/N the petitioner should have filed declaration of
nullity of marriage before his second marriage, for him to
be not guilty of the charge - bigamy

HELD:
● Yes. the CA erred in failing to appreciate the petitioner’s
lack of criminal intent when he contracted to his second
marriage.
● The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished
under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence,
good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a
complete defense. - no intention to commit bigamy.
● No. The petitioner did not have to file for nullity of his
first marriage. Since his first marriage with Lucia was
considered void ab initio.
○ The marriage was not duly authorized by a
solemnizing officer and as such, the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed

 decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated
September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the
ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.

Notes:
● Elements of bigamy:
○ the offender has been legally married
○ the first marriage has not been legally dissolved,
or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
○ he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
○ the subsequent marriage would have been valid
had it not been for the existence of the first.
143. Cenon Teves v People of the Philippines & Danilo Bongalon, FACTS: Petition for review seeks reversal of Jan 21, 2009 CA
GR 188775, decision affirming RTC Br 20 Malolos finding Teves guilty of bigamy
August 24, 2011 under RPC Art 349
Perez, J. ● 1st marriage-Nov 26, 1992: Cenon-Thelma marriage was
solemnized at MeTC of Muntinlupa, Manila. After
OCULTO marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. In 2002, she learned
that Cenon married Edita Calderon. She went to NSO to
secure a copy of the Certificate of Marriage indicating
A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid Cenon married Edita on
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires a 2nd marriage-Dec 10, 2001 at the Divine Trust Consulting
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. Services, Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan. On Feb 13,
2006, Thelma’s uncle Danilo Bongalon file a complaint of
bigamy against Cenon.
Cenon was charged on June 8, 2006 & penalized under
RPC Art 349.
● May 4, 2006: During the pendency of the criminal case,
RTC Br 130 Caloocan City rendered a decision declaring the
marriage between Cenon & Thelma null & void on the
ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code. Said decision became final by
virtue of a Certification of Finality issued on June 27,
20006.
● Aug 15, 2007: Cenon was found guilty of bigamy. Cenon
appealed before the CA contending the trial court erred in
not ruling that his criminal action/liability had already
been extinguished. CA dismissed the appeal on Jan 21,
2009. Cenon filed a MR on Feb 11, 2009. CA denied this on
July 2, 2009. Hence, petition.
● Cenon contends that since his marriage to Thelma was
declared null & void, there is in effect no marriage at all,
thus, there is no bigamy to speak of. He differentiates a
previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage void
ab initio, and posits that the former requires a judicial
dissolution before one can validly contract a second but a
void marriage, for the same purpose, need not be judicially
determined. Cenon further cites the Court ruling in
Mercado v Tan as inapplicable to his case because the
prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the
declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. in Cenon’s
 case, his marriage to Thelma was legally dissolved on May
4, 2006 before the bigamy case was filed in court on June
8, 2006.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Cenon is guilty of bigamy - YES
2. Whether or not his criminal liability in the crime of
bigamy had already been extinguished by the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Thelma - Not extinguished

HELD: 1. Cenon is guilty of bigamy.

Article 349, Revised Penal Code. The penalty of prision mayor shall
be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. that the offender has been legally married;
2. that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.

● At the time of Cenon’s marriage to Edita, his marriage to

Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of
the decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with
Thelma was only on June 27, 2006 or five years after his
second marriage to Edita.
○ A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense.
○ Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.

Rationale behind the requirement of judicial declaration of the

nullity of marriage (JDNM)
○ The Family Law Revisions Committee & the Civil
Code Revision Committee which drafted the
Family Code took the position that parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again.
○ For the protection of the spouse who, believing
that his marriage is illegal and void, marries again.
With JDNM, the person who marries again cannot
be charged with bigamy.
○ If Cenon’s contention that JDNM extinguishes his
criminal liability of bigamy is allowed, a person
who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and

144. Nollora vs. People,
GR 191425, September 7, 2011
AMATORIO
hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein
before the first marriage was declared a nullity.
Even assuming a complaint has been instituted,
the offender can still escape liability provided that
a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes
the filing of Information in court.
■ To allow Cenon’s contention would be to
make the crime of bigamy dependent
upon the ability or inability of the Office
of the Public Prosecutor to immediately
act on complaints and eventually file
Informations in court.
2. There is no question that criminal culpability attaches to
the offender upon the commission of the offense, and
from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing
of the criminal complaint (or Info in proper cases) is
material only for determining prescription.
● Crime of bigamy is committed on Dec 10, 2001
when he contracted a second marriage with Edita.
The finality of JDNM of his previous marriage to
Thelma on June 27, 2006 cannot be made to
retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.
Petition DENIED. Assailed CA decision AFFIRMED.
FACTS:
Atillano Nollora legally married Jesusa Pinat. Subsequent to their
marriage, Nollora also married Rowena Geraldino. An information
was filed against Nollora and Geraldino by the City Prosecutor for
the crime of bigamy before the RTC. According to Pinat, Geraldino
knows of their marriage because when she was brought by Nollora
to his residence to be introduced to his family, Geraldino heard
what they talked about. It was identified that Nollora was a Muslim,
however, in his marriage contracts it was stated that he was a
Catholic Pentecostal on his first marriage with Pinat and Catholic on
his second marriage with Geraldino. Geraldino alleged that she was
only a victim in the incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that
she only knew of Pinat when the case was filed and that when she
asked Nollora if he was single prior to their marriage, Nollora
responded that he was single.
After RTC ruling, Nollora appealed. CA dismissed appeal and
affirmed RTC ruling. Nollora filed petition for review before the SC.
RTC Ruling:
● Nollora was convicted and Geraldino was acquitted. The
court stated that Nollora did not declare that he was a
Muslim convert on both marriages, indicating his criminal
intent. He cannot just marry anybody again with the
requirements the Shari’a law imposes. With Geraldino, it
was found that there is no sufficient evidence to convict
her.
CA Ruling
● Dismissed Nollora's appeal and affirmed the trial court's
decision.
ISSUE:
W/N Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy.

145. Montanez vs Cipriano, GR 181089, October 22, 2012
AGUSTIN
HELD:
YES. The SC affirmed the rulings of the appellate court and of the
trial court. Art. 349 of the RPC provides the penalty and elements of
bigamy. The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the
elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; (2)
Nollora and Pinat's marriage has not been legally dissolved prior
to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the
existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; and (4) Nollora and
Geraldino's marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.
Moreover, Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies
were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, or P.D. 1083. Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage between a
Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or
Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines]
shall apply."
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CAG. R. CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30 September
2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010 are
AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a term of
two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum
of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties
provided by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
● On April 8, 1976, the respondent married Socrates in Lezo,
Aklan.
● On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the
marriage, respondent married Silverio Cipriano in San
Perdo, Laguna.
● In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of
marriage with Socrates on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
● On July 18, 2003, the RTC declared the marriage of
respondent with Socrates null and void, which became
final.
● In May 2004, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage
filed a complaint for Bigamy against her step-mother.
● Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the information
alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been
declared void ab initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on
January 24, 1983.
● The Motion was denied on the basis of Mercado v. Tan
ruling (See notes below).
● The Motion for Reconsideration of respondent was
granted. The RTC resolved to quash the Information for
bigamy.
● RTC ruled that since the marriages were contracted before
 the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not
require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a
condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage.

ISSUE:

W/N the lower court erred in quashing the Information for Bigamy.

HELD:

YES.

RATIO:

● The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender

has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
● The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage. In this case, it
appears that when respondent contracted a second
marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with
Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same
had not yet been annulled or declared void by a
competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy
were alleged in the Information.
● In Tenebro v. CA, we declared that although the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note
that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among
these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the
State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape
the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment.
● Here, at the time respondent contracted the second
marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had
not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-
mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage
during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus,
respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy,
since the essential elements of the offense charged were
sufficiently alleged.
 ● As to the issue of retroactivity of Art. 40, the Court invoked
the ruling in Atienza v. Brillantes that: “Article 40, which is
a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively
because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that
said “Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.”

NOTES:

Mercado v. Tan Ruling:

“In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage

although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-
complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second
marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. That he
subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already
been consummated by then. xxx”

See: FACTS
146. Abbas vs Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013 ● The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner
Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
ABARY marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) due to the alleged
absence of a marriage license.
● In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed, it is stated
that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona,
Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to
the resolution of this case.
● At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he
met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they
were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in
Taiwan.
● He arrived in the Philippines on Dec. 1992.
● On Jan 9, 1993, at his mother-in law's residence, his
mother-in-law arrived with two men.
● He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo
some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the
Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony.
● During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document.
He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a
marriage until Gloria told him later.
● Around ten years later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against
Syed because he allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon
Buenaventura.
● Abbas then filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Gloria Goo with the RTC.
● In July 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license.
● However, the Municipal Civil Registrar issued a certification
on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted
was the number of another marriage license issued to a
certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
 ● Syed used this to support his claim that, since there was no
marriage license, his marriage to Gloria is void ab initio
due to the lack of a formal requisite.
● Meanwhile, to prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria
presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as well as
the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The
marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license
number issued to Abbas.
● The RTC ruled in Syed’s favor, but when Gloria appealed
the case to the Court of Appeals, the latter court held that
the marriage was valid because of the following reasons:
It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be accorded
probative value.
The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been
validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law. It gave weight to the fact that
Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract.
The CA also considered that the parties had comported
themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against
him for bigamy.
● Hence the present case wherein Syed posed the following
issues…
ISSUES:
● Whether the CA erred in ruling that there was a valid
marriage license despite the negative certification of the
local civil registrar – YES.
● Whether Syed’s marriage to Gloria is void ab initio because
of the lack of a valid marriage license – YES.
HELD:
● The Local Civil Registrar’s negative certification has
probative value and is proof that no marriage license was
issued to Syed and Gloria. Since there was no marriage
license, the marriage is void ab initio.
○ Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual
marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on
the marriage contract as well as the testimonies
of her witnesses to prove the existence of said
license.
○ To prove that no such license was issued, Syed
turned to the office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly
issued said license. It was there that he requested
certification that no such license was issued.
○ The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed
was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the
effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and
Syed was issued, and that the serial number of
the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A
certified machine copy of Marriage License No.
9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria
 and Syed do not appear in the document.
○ In Republic v. CA, the SC previously ruled that
such certification was allowed, as permitted by
Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The
abovementioned Rule authorized the custodian of
the documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his
office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars
are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they
are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants,
the date the marriage license was issued and such
other relevant data.
○ SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written
statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.
○ In Republic v. CA, the Court, in sustaining the
finding of the lower court that a marriage license
was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by
the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated
that the alleged marriage license could not be
located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical
declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
○ Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it
is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary.
We held, "The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.” No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her
duty of checking the records of their office, thus
the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does
exist of a diligent search having been conducted,
as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed
located and submitted to the court. The fact that
the names in said license do not correspond to
those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the
presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.
○ It is telling that Gloria failed to present their
marriage license or a copy thereof to the court.
She failed to explain why the marriage license was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no

147. Capili v People, GR 183805, July 3, 2013
ALMADRO
pains to apply for the license, so she is not the
best witness to testify to the validity and
existence of said license.
WITH REGARD TO THE TOPIC OF BIGAMY:
Supreme Court: As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his
marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than
pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the
same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove
that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of
evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took
steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
FACTS:
● On June 28, 2004, James was charged with the crime of
bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City. The information
alleged that during the subsistence of a lawful marriage
with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage
having been legally dissolved or annulled, James
contracted a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo.
● Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging
that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of
nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo
City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the
marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him
from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the
civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant
criminal case.
● Subsequently, the RTC of Antipolo City declared the second
marriage between petitioner and Shirley void on the
ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the
husband during the subsistence of the first marriage is
void from the beginning. James filed his Motion to Dismiss
praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy
filed against him.
● The RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss since the second marriage between James Walter
P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by
the RTC, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared
"the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the
said second marriage. As such, the RTC submits that there
is no more bigamy to speak of.
● CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the
second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for
bigamy?
HELD: NO. The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1)
the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential

148. Fujiki v Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Manlongat
requisites for validity.
The subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or
guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of
bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28,
2004. The second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC
of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for
the crime of bigamy.
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to
the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by
law. It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by
petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with
private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of
nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of
a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
FACTS:
· Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife
to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
· In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the First marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She
left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay
met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship.
· In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14
January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay
and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35 (4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines; 5 and
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
 between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National
Statistics Office (NSO).
ISSUE:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

HELD:
3. NO. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35 (4) of
the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of
the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court.

4. YES. Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition.
Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the

Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to
file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court.

Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a

spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of
a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the

People v Odtuhan, GR 191566, July 17, 2013
contrary, when Section 2 (a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife" 75 — it refers to
the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the
law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
under Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
3. NO. In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental, held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, "the term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall
not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
archipelago."
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January
2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to
REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with
this Decision.
Facts:
· Odtuhan married Jasmine Modina on July 2, 1980 and
had also married Eleanor A. Alagon on October 28, 1993.
· Respondent had filed for annulment with Modina on Feb.
23, 1999
· RTC had granted his petition and had made their
marriage void ab initio due to lacking of a marriage license
· Alagon had found out on June 2003, filed a complaint and
had died on November 2003. In 2005, respondent was indicted
in an information for bigamy
Issue:
1. W/N odtuhan comitted the crime of bigamy considering that his
marriage to modina was void ab initio for lack of marriage license
Held:
 No. Respondent’s claim that there are more reasons to quash the
information against him because he obtained the declaration of
nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy
against him is without merit. Criminal culpability attaches to the
offender upon the commission of the offense and from that
instant, there is already liability. Since he had married Alagon
before filing a petition for nullity of marriage, he had committed
the crime of bigamy.
Ruling:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated
March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.”

149. P150. Lasanas vs People, GR 159031, June 23, 2014 FACTS:

● Petitioner-accused Noel Lasanas and private respondent
ZUÑO Socorro Patingo were married without the benefit of a
marriage license on 1968, and neither have they executed
any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack thereof. In
1980, they reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious
ceremony but failed to produce either requirements, still.
By 1993, the accused contracted a second bigamous
marriage with Josefa Eslaban where their marriage
certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as
single.
● In 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of
marriage and damages against the respondent where he
alleged that the respondent had employed deceit,
misrepresentations and fraud in securing his consent to
their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches,
psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had
caused him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and
social humiliation warranting the award of damages.
● In 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy and
after due proceedings, the accused was formally indicted.
In the meantime, in the same year, the court dismissed the
accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage.
● Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA,
insisting that (1) the RTC thereby erred in finding that he
had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the
marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation. The accused
contended that because he had not been legally married
to Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not
established, and that he had been of the honest belief that
there was no need for a judicial declaration of the nullity
of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent
marriage; along those lines, he further argues that (2) he
should be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was
null and void, for being without a recorded judgment of
nullity of marriage - consequently, an essential element of
the crime of bigamy, i.e., that the subsequent marriage be
valid, was lacking; and that (3) his good faith and lack of
criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal
liability.

ISSUE:
WoN the accused is guilty of bigamy, despite the fact that his first

SSS v Azote, G.R. No. 209741, April 15, 2015
SOBREVEGA
marriage was celebrated without a marriage license or affidavit of
cohabitation. - YES
HELD:
● The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1)
that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or
she contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4)
that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
● The crime of bigamy was consummated from the moment
he contracted the second marriage, because at the time its
celebration, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid
and subsisting due to such marriage not being yet declared
null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction. Parties
to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, and so long as there is no said
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
● Considering that the accused’s subsequent marriage to
Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy
was established. Nonetheless, he submits that his
marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a
recorded judgment of nullity of marriage. Since a second
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. A plain reading of [Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that
the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.
● The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves
scant consideration especially because the records show
that he had filed a complaint for the annulment of his
marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the
criminal complaint against him but after he had already
contracted his second marriage with Josefa.
● WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court
of Appeals in convicting the accused of the crime of
bigamy.
FACTS:
● On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a
member of the SSS, were married in civil rites at the RTC,
Branch 9, Lagazpi City, Albay. Their union produced six
children born from 1985 to 1999.
● On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS
with Edna and their three older children as designated
beneficiaries.
● Thereafter or on September 7, 2001, Edgardo submitted
another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger
children as additional beneficiaries.
● On January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away.
● Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death benefits
 with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It
appeared, however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had
earlier submitted another Form E-4 on November 5, 1982
with a different set of beneficiaries. Consequently Edna’s
claim was denied. Her children were adjudged as
beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian
of her minor children.
● Edna still filed a petition with the SSC insisting that she was
the legitimate wife of Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS
averred that there was conflicting information in the forms
submitted by the deceased.
● The SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for lack of merit, citing
Section 24 (c) of the SS Law, it explained that although
Edgardo filed the Form E-4 designating Edna and their six
children as beneficiaries, he did not revoke the designation
of Rosemarie as his wife-beneficiaries, and Rosemarie was
still presumed to be his legal wife.

ISSUE: WON Edna is the deceased-member’s legitimate wife (and

entitling her to the SSS benefits). No.

HELD:
Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only
the legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the
beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a
concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with
another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract.
Edgardo even acknowledged his married status when he filled out
the 1982 Form designating Rosemarie as his spouse.

It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was

celebrated at the time when the Family Code was already in force.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly states:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of
a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse.

Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code,

Edna, without doubt, failed to establish that there was no
impediment or that the impediment was already removed at the
time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the
rule that "whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by
law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial
evidence.

It is of no moment that the first wife, Rosemarie, did not participate

 or oppose Edna's claim. Rosemarie's non-participation or her
subsequent death on November 11, 2004 did not cure or legitimize
the status of Edna.
152. Santiago vs. Phils, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015 FACTS:

AGUSTIN ● Four months after the solemnization of their marriage in

1997, Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an
Information for bigamy.
● The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had
been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, asked
petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old
widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997.
● Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could
not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy,
because she had been under the belief that Santos was
still single when they got married.
● She also averred that for there to be a conviction for
bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid
by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their
marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
● Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the
first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution. She
alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and
April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced
herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this
allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August
and September 1997, or after she had already married
Santos.
● The RTC ruled that the accused Leonila G. Santiago is
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy.
● The CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is guilty of bigamy?

HELD: YES.

RATIO:

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of
two persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of
one of them is valid and subsisting.

As explained in Nepomuceno:

In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be
the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the
second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the
previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included
in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s

knowledge of Santos’s marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently
found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality
of the following circumstances:
(1) When Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of
her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him;
(2) It was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know
 of his true civil status; and
(3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with
petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on
two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted

of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity. If the accused wants to raise the
nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense
during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the
criminal case. In this case, petitioner has consistently questioned
below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that
marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage
license are void ab initio. In this case, the marriage in dispute was
allegedly void for being celebrated without a license. The Court
held that the marriage is valid since they are exempted from the
requirement of a license under the law.

NOTES:

Montanez v. Cipriano was also cited in this case.

In Montanez v. Cipriano, this Court enumerated the elements of

bigamy as follows:

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been
legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x
x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d)
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all
the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
(c) Subsequent marriage, upon reappearance of absent spouse

FC 41
in relation to
FC 42
FC 43
FC 44
NCC 390
NCC 391

153. Jones v. Hortiguela, December, 1914, Marciana Escaño married Arthur W.

64 Phil 179 Jones in the suburban catholic church of San Nicolas, Province of
Cebu.
On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport to go
abroad and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him.
In October, 1919, proceedings were instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte, at the instance of
Marciana Escaño, to have her husband judicially declared an
absentee.
In October 25, 1919, the court issued an order declaring
Arthur W. Jones an absentee from the Philippine Islands pursuant
to the provisions of article 186 of the Civil Code, with the proviso
that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect
until six months after its publication in the offcial newspapers.
Pursuant thereto, said order was published in the Official
Gazette during the months of December, 1919, and January,
February, March, April, May and June, 1920. On April 23, 1921, the
court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration
of absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official
Gazette and in "El Ideal."
On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño
were married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte,
and they signed the certificate of marriage.
Marciana Escaño had died intestate, her widower Felix
Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her entire
estate, and in an order issued on May 9, 1932.
Angelita Jones, her daughter by her first marriage, and
Felix Hortiguela, her widower by her second marriage, were
declared her only heirs
Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence
must be understood to have been made not in the order of
October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from the
latter date to May 26, 1927, the date of the celebration of the
marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed; and in accordance
with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No. 68, the
marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño is
null and void.
She prayed: ( a ) for the reopening of the proceedings;
( b ) that her husband be appointed special administrator without
bond; ( c ) that her mother's alleged marriage to Felix Hortiguela
be declared null and void; ( d ) that the partition of the properties
made by administrator Hortiguela be declared null and void and
that the petitioner be declared the only universal heir of her
deceased mother; and ( e ) that in case there was a valid marriage
Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escaño, Hortiguela be declared not
entitled to the widower's usufruct; the errors in the
administrator's account be corrected; the latter be granted a
remuneration of only P4 a day, and a new partition of the
properties be made.
In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the
absence of Marciana Escaño former husband should be counted
from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news
concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to
May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is,
therefore, valid and lawful.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felix Hortiguela's marriage to Marciana

Escaño was null and void?
HELD: No. The absence of Marciana Escaño's former husband
should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the
last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said
date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Hence, the
marriage is valid and that the validity of the marriage makes him a
legitimate heir.

Dispositive Portion:
For all the foregoing considerations this court reverses the
appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so far as it set aside the
order of January 10, 1933, relative to the administrator's fees and
the order of June 26, 1933, approving the final account and the

154. Republic vs. Nolasco,
220 SCRA 20, March 17, 1993
JOSOL
project of partition, and in so far as said order of March 14, 1935,
required the presentation of a new project of partition; denies the
appointment of Angelita Jones' husband as administrator; arms
the order of May 9, 1932, relative to declaration of heirs; and
holds it unwarranted to make a nding as to whether or not the
properties of this intestate estate are paraphernal properties of
the deceased Marciana Escaño, reserving to the parties the right
to discuss which are paraphernal and which are conjugal
properties. So ordered.
FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco (respondent) was a seaman and that he
had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in
England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance
meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent
Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to
respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November
1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982,
respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in
Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of
San Jose.
After the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment
contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose,
Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas,
respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that
Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed
him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he
then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return
home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
After allegedly looking for his wife by means of personally looking
for her in London every time his vessel ports there, respondent
gave up testifying that even all the letters he had sent to his missing
spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the
address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all
returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among
friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica. As such,
respondent filed a petition for the presumption of death of his
estranged wife with the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10.
The RTC granted his petition, but was opposed by the Republic of
the Philippines through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who
had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General by appealing to
the CA. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the trial court's
decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a
basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died. As
such, petitioner has filed a petition to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s marriage with Janet Parker is
terminated under Article 41 of the Family Code; NO.
HELD:
● As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4)
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
 disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
● Petitioner alleges that the respondent has failed to
establish a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead
because of the ineffective method of his search (personally
searching for his wife blindly in major cities like London
and Liverpool). With this, the Court believes that
respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his
missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-
founded belief" that she is dead.

155. Bienvenido vs. CA, FACTS:

237 SCRA 676, October 24, 1994 ● Aurelio Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila.
● Without his marriage with Consejo being dissolved,
KO Aurelio married Luisita Camacho in Tokyo.
○ There were instances when, because of their
quarrels, one of them left the dwelling place for
long periods of time.
● Afterwards, Aurelio met Nenita Bienvenido who had been
estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera.
○ Aurelio courted her and started living with her
until his death, along with Nenita’s children.
● Aurelio executed a deed of sale over a house and lot in
favor of Nenita.
● When Aurelio died, Luisita came back from USA and
claimed ownership over the house and lot in which Nenita
had been living in.
○ Luisita filed a case in the RTC seeking annulment
of the sale of the property to Nenita alleging that
the deed was a forgery and was executed in fraud
of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
● TC: upheld the sale of the property
● CA: In the absence of proof to the contrary, Consejo must
be presumed to have been absent for 7 years without
Aurelio having news of her being alive when Aurelio
contracted a second marriage. The property in dispute,
thus, belongs to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and
Luisita.

ISSUE:
● W/N the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita is void –
YES

HELD:
Bienvenido had shown that when Aurelio married Luisita, the
marriage with Consejo was still subsisting and therefore, his second
marriage was bigamous. Luisita is then burdened to prove that at
the time of her marriage with Aurelio, Consejo had been absent for
at least 7 years and that Aurelio had no news that she was alive.

ART. 83 (2) of the Civil Code states that any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of

156. Republic v Cantor,
G.R. No. 184621, Dec. 10, 2013
MASCARENAS
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance unless the first spouse had
been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee
being alive or if absent for less than 7 years is generally believed to
be dead, or presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391.
It presents 3 cases when the subsequent marriage will not be
considered void:
● The absent spouse has not been heard from for 7
consecutive years and the present spouse has no news
that he/she is alive, although absent for less than 7 years,
● The absent spouse is generally considered to be dead and
believed to be by the spouse present, and
● He/she is presumed to be dead after 4 years from the
occurrence of any of the events enumerated in Art. 391 of
the Civil Code.
It has been held that the first exception refers to the subsequent
marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the
deserting spouse after the 7 years has lapsed.
This exception cannot be invoked in this case to sustain Aurelio’s
marriage to Luisita because apparently, it was Aurelio who had left
his first wife. At the time of Aurelio’s marriage to Luisita, he and
Luisita had already been living together as husband and wife for 5
years and begat a child before their marriage.
Aurelio and Luisita’s marriage, thus, was void for being bigamous
and consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property in
question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and
Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place.
***In short: the spouse who left cannot declare the abandoned
spouse as presumptively dead
Facts:
● September 20, 1997, respondent (Maria Fe Cantor;Wife)
and Jerry (Husband) were married and lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan
Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato.
● January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought
about by:
1. the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax"
whenever she and Jerry would have intimate
moments
2. Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the
respondent’s father.
● After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and
this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him.
● May 21, 2002, > 4 years from the time of Jerry’s
disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a
petition for her husband’s declaration of presumptive
death. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that
Jerry was already dead (inquired with Jerry’s family,
neighbors, friends, patients directory whenever going to a
hospital)
RTC Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that
respondent Jerry F. Cantor is presumptively dead pursuant to Article
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice to the
effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.

CA Ruling(via petition for certiorari by Republic of the Phil via Office

of Sol Gen):
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED and the assailed Order dated December 15, 2006
declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.

Petition for review on certiorari via rule 45 brought the case to the
SC

Issue:
W/N the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already
dead.

Ruling:
● Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be
obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse
had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. (See FC 41 for the 4 essential requisites for
the declaration of presumptive death)
● The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show
that all the requisites under FC 41 are present. He who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.
● A well-founded belief is required, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent
spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort
(not a mere passive one).
● Strict standard approach. This is to ensure that a petition
for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
the Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently
circumvent the laws. The requisite judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse (and
consequently, the application of a stringent standard for its
issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It is
intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of
bigamy under RPC 349 which might come into play if
he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court's
declaration.
● Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent
spouse presumptively dead, the present spouse's good
faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively
established.

Held:
● the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on
her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, fell short of
the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required
by jurisprudence.

157. Republic v Hon. Estrada, G.R. No. 214792, March 18, 2015
RAMOS
● the respondent did not actively look for her missing
husband, She did not purposely undertake a diligent
search for her husband as her hospital visits were not
planned nor primarily directed to look for him.
● she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she
seek the aid of the authorities to look for him.
● she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their
neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to
locate Jerry, and they were not even named.
● there was no other corroborative evidence to support the
respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent search
(respondent only did passive search). Neither was there
supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded
belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from
her friends and in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order
dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor
presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
FACTS:
● Teresita married Diego on Nov. 25, 1973 in
Impasug-ong, Bukidnon.
● 3 years later, Diego left their residence and never
came back. He failed to communicate with her
ever since and never made contact with any of
their children or immediate relatives.
● On October 14, 2008 (32 years after DIego’s
disappearance), Teresita J. Olemberio filed a
petition for declaration of Absence and
Presumption of Death of her husband Diego
before the RTC of Malaybalay.
● Teresita filed the petition to declare her husband
presumptively dead so that she could contract
another marriage without any impediment.
● RTC Malaybalay granted her petition.
● OSG filed a petition for certiorari contesting the
grant of petition.
● CA denied the petition and affirmed the decision
of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in the ff:
1. Their appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the
death of Diego. NO
2. The insufficiency of efforts of teresita in locating Diego’s
whereabouts which let to form a belief that the latter is
already dead. NO
Held:
#1
● Article 41 of the Family Code provides that a marriage
contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage is usually null and void except when the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead.

158. Republic v Villanueva,
G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015
● In the case at bar, Diego’s absence for more than 30 years
far exceeded the law-required four years of absence, and is
more than enough to declare him presumptively dead for
all legal intents and purposes.
● The fact that Diego would be 75 years old by now was
reason enough to support the presumption that he could
be dead.
● The court added that due to the prevalence of NPAs in
Malaybalay, It can be gleaned from the totality of evidence
that Diego had already died.
#2
● To Teresita Olemberio, the acts of going to SSS to inquire
on Diego's remittances and of going to the house of the
parents of Diego to inquire as to his whereabouts,
constitute diligent efforts sufficient to support her belief
that Diego is dead. It is the petitioner in a petition for
declaration of presumptive of death, and not the trial
court, who must possess a well-grounded belief of the
death of his or absent spouse. To the satisfaction of the
trial court, Teresita Olemberio was able to prove such
belief.
WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 12 December 2013 and 9
October 2014 are hereby AFFIRMED.
FACTS:
· The case at hand is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of
the RTC , granting the petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-
Villanueva (Edna) and declaring her husband, Romeo L. Villanueva
(Romeo), as presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family
Code.
· Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in
Iligan City.
· In 1992, Edna worked as domestic helper in Singapore while
her husband worked as a mechanic in Valencia City, Bukidnon.
· In 1993, Edna heard the news from her children that Romeo
had left their conjugal home without reason or information as to his
whereabouts. Because of this, Edna took a leave from work and
returned to the country to look for Romeo. She inquired from her
friends and family but found no leads as to his whereabouts or
existence.
· On August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petition to
declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family
Code. During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness.
RTC RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Romeo L. Villanueva to be presumptively dead for all
legal intents and purposes in accordance with Article 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to his
reappearance.
· The RTC GRANTED the petition and DECLARED Romeo
Villanueva to be PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD.
 On August 13, 2010, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in finding that Edna had a well-
founded belief that Romeo, her absent spouse, was dead. It argued
that the conclusions reached by the RTC were in direct opposition
to established jurisprudence.

CA RULING:
· The CA DISMISSED the petition, holding that the RTC acted
within its jurisdiction in issuing the assailed decision having been
expressly clothed with the power to determine the case. It also
cited Article 247 of the Family Code which provided for the final
and immediate executory character of the decision of the RTC.
· The CA also DENIED the OSG’s Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC despite
the fact that the conclusion reached by the RTC is contrary to
prevailing jurisprudence
2. W/N the CA erred in ruling that the grounds raised by the
petitioner to assail the RTC decision are mere errors of judgment

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the October 18,
2013 Decision and the January 8, 2014 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition of
respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband
declared presumptively dead is DENIED.

1. YES. Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a

judicial declaration of presumptive death may be granted, the
present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-founded belief
that the absentee is dead. In this case, Edna failed. Her claim of
making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it
merely consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative
evidence on record. She also failed to present any person from
whom she inquired about the whereabouts of her husband. She did
not even present her children from whom she learned the
disappearance of her husband.
2. YES. Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the
previously cited cases, particularly Cantor, Edna's efforts failed to
satisfy the required well-founded belief of her absent husband's
death. Following the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence
and is not equivalent to proof, the Court cannot give credence to
her claims that she indeed exerted diligent efforts to locate her
husband. Worse, the CA affirmed the RTC decision when it
dismissed the petition for certioriari filed by the OSG. The CA
should have realized the glaring and patent disregard by the RTC of
the rulings in similar situations where petitions for declaration of
presumptive death have been denied by this Court. By declaring
Romeo presumptively dead, the CA clearly ignored this Court's
categorical pronouncements.

159. Republic vs. Sareñogon, FACTS:

G.R. No. 199194, Feb. 10, 2016 ● Respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition
 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamiz City-Branch
15 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
Netchie S. Sareñogon (Netchie).
● Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis
Occidental in 1991. They later became sweethearts and on
August 10, 1996, they got married in civil rites at the
Manila City Hall. However, they lived together as husband
and wife for a month only because he left to work as a
seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic
helper.
● For three months, he did not receive any communication
from Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her
whereabouts.
● While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents,
but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis
Occidental.
● He returned home after his contract expired. He then
inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about her
whereabouts, but they also did not know where she was.
Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie
was already dead.
● He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract
another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code.
● The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose’s
alleged efforts in locating Netchie did not engender or
generate a well-founded belief that the latter is probably
dead.
● It maintains that even as Jose avowedly averred that he
exerted efforts to locate Netchie, Jose inexplicably failed to
enlist the assistance of the relevant government agencies
like the PNP, NBI, POEA, DFA, etc.
● It likewise points out that Jose did not present any
disinterested person to corroborate his allegations that the
latter was indeed missing and could not be found.
● It also contends that Jose did not advert to circumstances,
events, occasions, or situations that would prove that he
did in fact make a comprehensive search for Netchie.
● The Republic makes the plea that courts should ever be
vigilant and wary about the propensity of some erring
spouses in resorting to Article 41 of the Family Code for
the purpose of terminating their marriage.

ISSUE: WoN Netchie should be declared “presumptively dead”. NO

HELD:
The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family
Code is complied with only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-
goodness efforts had indeed been made to ascertain whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained,

it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the
Family Code, there are four essential requisites for the declaration
of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
 consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the
Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It

depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be
able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).

Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a

declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC’s
finding that Jose’s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41
of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief"
standard. If anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the
missing Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent
diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare
claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to
Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand
specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the
course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie.
Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent
government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he
undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging search for
Netchie, say for at least two years and naming the particular places,
provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or
went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or
talked to in the course of his search.
160. Republic v Tampus, FACTS:
GR 214243, March 16, 2016 ● Respondent Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was married to Dante
L. Del Mundo (Dante) on November 29, 1975 in Cordova,
Cebu. The marriage ceremony was solemnized by
Municipal Judge Julian B. Pogoy of Cordova, Cebu. Three
days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left
respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned.
The couple had no children.
● Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried
everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile.7
Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition 8
to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of
remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33)
years without any kind of communication from him, she
firmly believes that he is already dead.
● Due to the absence of any oppositor, Nilda was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte. She testified on the
allegations in her petition, affirming that she exerted
 efforts to find Dante by inquiring from his parents,
relatives, and neighbors, who, unfortunately, were also not
aware of his whereabouts. She averred that she intends to
remarry and move on with her life.
RTC:
RTC granted Nilda's petition and declared Dante as presumptively
dead for all legal purposes, without prejudice to the effect of his
reappearance. It found that Dante left the conjugal dwelling
sometime in 1975 and from then on, Nilda never heard from him
again despite diligent efforts to locate him. In this light, she
believes that he had passed away especially since his last
assignment was a combat mission. Moreover, the RTC found that
the absence of thirty-three (33) years was sufficient to give rise to
the presumption of death.

CA affirmed RTC, petition filed by Sol Gen on behalf of the Republic

CA opined that if Dante were still alive after many years, it would
have been easy for him to communicate with Nilda, taking into
consideration the fact that Dante was only 25 years old when he
left and, therefore, would have been still physically able to get in
touch with his wife

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision
declaring Dante as presumptively dead.
HELD:
YES.
● Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be
obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse
had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead.
● However, it necessitates exertion of active effort, not a
passive one. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for
such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news
that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to
communicate, or general presumption of absence under
the Civil Code would not suffice.
● Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried
to locate him by making inquiries with his parents,
relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but
unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him.
Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no
further efforts to find her husband. She could have called
or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request
information about her husband, but failed to do so. She
did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP
itself in finding him. She could have inquired from the AFP
on the status of the said mission, or from the members of
the AFP who were assigned thereto.
● Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors
as witnesses who could have corroborated her
asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These
resource persons were not even named. other than
Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence
had been offered to support her allegation that she
exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What
appears from the facts as established in this case was that
 Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without actively
and diligently searching for her husband, which the Court
cannot accept as constituting a "well-founded belief that
her husband is dead.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision

dated June 17, 2013 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2014
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04588 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition of respondent Nilda
B. Tampus to have her husband, Dante L. Del Mundo, declared
presumptively dead is DENIED.

161. Matias vs. Republic, GR 230751, April 25, 2018 FACTS:

● This is an appeal assailing the decision and resolution of
KANG the CA
● April 10, 2012 - petitioner (Estrellita Tadeo - Matias) filed
before the RTC - Tarlac; a petition for declaration of
presumptive death of her husband (Wilfredo Matias) -
member of Philippine Constabulary;
○ Wilfredo has not shown up for 3 decades (from
1979)
○ it became necessary for her to request to claim
the benefits of her absent husband
● RTC declared that the petitioner is eligible to claim her
husband’s presumptive death financial benefits under FC
Art 41.
● Republic (respondent) questioned the decision of the RTC
(petitioned for certiorari) which the CA granted and the
decision of the RTC was annulled and set aside.
○ RTC erred in declaring the presumptive death of
Wilfredo on the basis of Art. 41 of the FC.
Wherein the said article does not apply
to the instant petition.
○ but rather, Art. 390 or 391 of the civil code shall
be applied to the presumptive death of Wilfredo.
■ Art. 390 and 391 merely express rules of
evidence that allow a court or a tribunal
to presume that a person is dead —
which presumption may be invoked in
any action or proceeding, but itself
cannot be the subject of an independent
action or proceeding.
● Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained
steadfast. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
● W/N the decision of RTC on declaring the presumptive
death of Wilfredo based on Art. 41 of FC is right

HELD:
● No. The decision of RTC on declaring the presumptive
death of Wilfredo based on Art. 41 of the FC does not
apply to the instant petition.
● the petitioner did not file a petition for declaration of
presumptive death of her husband for remarriage, but to
claim the financial benefits of her husband’s death as a
Constabulary. Hence, the application of FC is inapplicable
to the instant petition.
 ○ The CA was correct. The petition for the
declaration of presumptive death filed by the
petitioner is not an authorized suit and should
have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC's
decision must, therefore, be set aside.
○ "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for
the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended."
○ The petition for the declaration of presumptive
death filed by petitioner was based on the Civil
Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated

November 28, 2016 and Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467 are AFFIRMED. The
Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a
person is presumptively dead is not a requirement before the
Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines can grant and pay the benefits under Presidential
Decree No. 1638.
Let a copy of this decision be served to the Philippine Veterans'
Affairs Office and the Armed Forces of the Philippines for their
consideration.

Notes:
● Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall
be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for
the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence
of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five
years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order
that his succession may be opened.

● Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all

purposes, including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea
voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the loss
of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part
in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under
other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years.

Procedure

162. SSS vs Jarque, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006
AMATORIO
FACTS:
● On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P.
Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.
● More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon
filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Sorsogon a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead.
● CFI granted the petition.
● Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared
presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
 contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in
Casiguran, Sorsogon.
● On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the
Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree
pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died. Respondent
was the beneficiary.
● Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim
for death benefits which was also granted by SSS.
● On April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be
the brother and guardian of "Aliz P. Diaz," (Alice) filed
before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from
Bailon's death.
● Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS
Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the cancellation of
payment of death pension benefits to respondent on the
grounds that Alice (the presumed legal wife) was still alive.
● SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her monthly
pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered
by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was
void as it was contracted while the latter's marriage with
Alice was still subsisting and that the CFI order declaring
Alice presumptively dead did not become final, her
"presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of
the order.
● Respondent filed petition for review before CA. CA
reversed and set aside the decision of SSC.
● SSS filed petition for review on certiorari, hence this case.

ISSUE:
W/N subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent
Teresita Jarque may terminate by mere reappearance of the absent
spouse of Bailon.

HELD:
NO. That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect
to SSS coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no doubt. In so
exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less
reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at
bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was
obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and
Alice's marriage on the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and
respondent's marriage on the other. The applicable law to
determine the validity of the two marriage is the Civil Code, under
Art. 83 (2) “…or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in
any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent
court.” In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been
absent for 15 consecutive years when Bailon sought the
declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration
was not even a requirement then for purposes of remarriage.
Moreover, under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case
instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the
spouses in the subsequent marriage. Under the Family Code, no
judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary.
Thus Article 42 thereof provides the subsequent marriage shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of

163. Republic vs. Granada
GR No. 187512, June 13, 2012
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. If the
absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such
absentee mere reappearance will not terminate such marriage.
Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues in spite of the spouse‘s physical reappearance. In the
case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify Bailon & Jarque’s
marriage, Teresita is proclaimed to be rightfully the dependent
spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
FACTS:
· This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the
Resolutions by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.
· In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda)
met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an
electronics company in Parañaque where both were then working.
The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on March 3,
1991.
· Due to the closing of Sumida Electric Philippines in 1994,
Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that
from that time, she had not received any communication from her
husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. This was supported
by her brother who had communicated with Cyrus’ relatives, to no
avail.
· After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda led a Petition to have
Cyrus declared presumptively dead.
RTC RULING: The RTC GRANTED the petition and declared Cyrus as
presumptively dead.
· On 10 March 2005, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
led a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued
that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and
thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already
dead.
RTC RULING: The RTC DENIED the motion.
· Petitioner led a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the
CA, presumably under Rule 41, Section 2 (a) of the Rules of Court.
· Yolanda led a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA
had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family
Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is
immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
CA RULING: The CA GRANTED Yolanda's Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on
the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to
 ordinary appeal
2. W/N the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC's grant of
the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41
of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent
presented

HELD:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.

1. NO. In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing

party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground
that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the
Republic's Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment
on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of
respondent's spouse was immediately final and executory and,
hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. YES. Petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not
initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her
brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter's relatives, these relatives
were not presented to corroborate Diosdado's testimony. In short,
respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her
husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought
information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from
other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could
have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse,
she failed to explain these omissions.

NOTES:
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse.

(d) Bad faith of both spouses, under FC 44. Other effects of bad faith: 43, 40, 45, 81, 86

(e) Psychological incapacity under FC 36

FC 36 A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

FC 39 The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
FC 68 The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support

FC 69 The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.

FC 70 The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations
shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of
insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties.

FC 71 The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be
paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.

R.A. 8533 - February 23, 1998

AN ACT AMENDING TITLE I, CHAPTER 3, ARTICLE 39 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, NULLIFYING THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR ACTION OR DEFENSES GROUNDED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Title I, Chapter 3, Article 39 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"TITLE I – MARRIAGE
"CHAPTER 3 – VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
"Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."
Section 2. Effectivity clause. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: February 23, 1998

164. Santos v. CA 240 SCRA 20 FACTS:

● This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing

the dismissals by the RTC and CA of the petitioner’s
complaint for “Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of
the Family Code” for lack of merit.
● On 20 September 1986, Leouel (petitioner/husband) and
Julia (private respondent/wife) were married.
● On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a boy they named
Leouel Jr.
● Their honeymoon stage didn’t last very long after that.
● On 18 May 1988, Julia left for the United States to work as
a nurse despite her husband’s pleas.
● After around seven months, Julia called and promised to
return home when her contract expires in July 1989. But
she never did.
● When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where
he underwent a training program under the auspices of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 10 April up to 25
August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of
no avail.
● Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 30, a complaint for “Voiding of Marriage Under
Article 36 of the Family Code” (docketed, Civil Case No.
9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
 ● On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through
counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner
who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent. A
possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree
of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
● On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had
repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court,
Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she
would neither appear nor submit evidence.
● On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed
the complaint for lack of merit.
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: W/N their marriage should be declared null and void on

the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of Julia - NO.

HELD:

1. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by a)

gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability.
a. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties, required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
2. The use of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity” under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances.
a. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriages. Thus correlated, “psychological
incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support.
3. The intendment of the law has been to confine the
 meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensibility or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
a. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration
of nullity of the void marriage to be “legitimate.”
4. Other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.
a. The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant
to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude
the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
5. Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters (the
case of Molina, perhaps?) are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree,
extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
6. The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure
at all, can come close to the standards required to decree
a nullity of marriage.
a. How come? Well, the husband’s complaint only
brought up the wife’s absence/abandonment
from their home and failure to communicate. His
complaint never proved that she was
psychologically incapacitated in accordance with
the guidelines prescribed by the Court above. I
guess his case failed because his was the first that
reached the SC. Poor guy.
 Disposition: Petition is DENIED.
165. Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA FACTS:
G.R. No. 119190 ● Plaintiff (wife) married the defendant (Chi Ming Tsoi) at the
Jan. 16, 1997 Manila Catherdral as evidenced by their marriage contract
● After the celebration of their marriage, the couple
proceeded to the house of defendant’s mother where they
slept together on the same bed and in the same room
● According to the plaintiff, she expected that as newlyweds,
they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse but defendant just turned his back on the
plaintiff and went to sleep. This happened for another 4
nights
● In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place
where they can enjoy their first week as husband and wife,
they decided to go to Baguio but, the defendant invited his
mother, his nephew her mother, and an uncle.
● In the 4 days that they stayed there, not once did they
have sexual intercourse because defendant just avoided
her
● They slept together in the same room and on the same
bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989 but there
was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
Plaintiff even claims that she did not even see her
husband’s private part nor did he see hers
● Because of this, they submitted themselves for a physical
examination and the plaintiff said that her tests were all
normal, while the defendant was given medications and
was asked by the doctor to come back for another visit
● Plaintiff also observed defendant using an eyebrow pencil
and the cleansing cream of his mother
● She further avers that defendant only married her to
acquire or maintain his residency status and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man
● The defendant claimed that if their marriage shall be
annulled by reason of psychological incapacity the fault lies
with his wife because (1) he loves her very much, (2) he
has no defect on his part and he is psychologically and
physically able (3) their relationship is still very young and
whatever differences they have can be reconciled
● The defendant admitted that there was no sexual contact
between them since their marriage on May 22, 1988 until
their separation on March 15, 1989 but it because of the
wife (plaintiff)
● The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination
where the doctor asked the defendant to masturbate to
find out whether or not he has an erection and he found
out that from the original size of (2) inches his penis
lengthened by (1) inch. The defendant only had a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in full length. With
this the doctor said that he is capable of having sexual
intercourse with a woman.
● RTC declared the marriage void
● CA affirmed the decision of the RTC

ISSUE: Whether or not Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual

intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity?

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a

166. Republic v Molina, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
JOSOL
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although
physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity rather than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted
refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
“to procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at
bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, the
sanction therefore is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the
cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have
cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is
a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
The RTC decision which declared the marriage void and affirmed by
the CA was also affirmed by the SC.
FACTS:
● Roridel Molina and Reynaldo Molina were married on April
14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila and that a
son, Andre O. Molina was born.
● After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a
father since he preferred to spend more time with his
peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance,
and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
● Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his
job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family.
● In October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged
● In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila
and went to live with her parents in Baguio City.
● A few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child,
and had since then abandoned them.
● Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations
and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served,
 and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them
from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from
the start.
● On August 16, 1990, Roridel filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage against Reynaldo; to which the latter
argues that it is not due to psychological incapacity.
● On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring the marriage void.
● The Solicitor General (petitioner) filed an appeal to the CA
but was denied and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
● The Solicitor General, however, argues that the CA’s
judgment is erroneous, hence the current petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Molinas’ marriage is void due to

psychological incapacity; NO.

HELD:
● In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking
thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,
Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
● In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
difficulty experienced by many trial courts in interpreting
and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici
curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of the
Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up
with written memoranda. From their submissions and the
Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time

167. Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76, December 08, 1999
RAMOS
of the celebration" of the marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state.
FACTS:
● Lucita (Petitioner) and Mario (Respondent) met in 1977 at
the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarinas, Cavite.
● Petitioner was the teacher of Respondent for two
consecutive semesters.
● The eventually became sweethearts in 1979 and got
married 2 years later.
● The respondent continued studying for 2 more years while
the petitioner supported the family thru her salary as a
faculty member of the PCU.
● Respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family.
● After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he
availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his
employer and spent the entire amount on himself.
● For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent
was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for
another.
● During this time, Respondent’s negative traits became
obvious. Respondent often smokes and drinks with his
peers, betted on fighting cocks, and had extramarital
affairs with other women.
● On one occasion, respondent had beaten up the petitioner
when he was confronted about his relationship with a
japayuki.
● Also, Respondent having engaged in extreme promiscuous
conduct, contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner.
● On 1992, respondent left for the Middle East leaving
behind the petitioner and their children.
● Petitioner filed before the RTC a petition seeking the
annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the
ground psychological incapacity, alleging that from the
time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the
suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to
support the family and contribute the management of the
household.
● RTC dismissed the petition for annulment.
● Petitioner appealed to the CA
● CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: WON respondent is psychologically incapacitated to

168. Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000
comply with his essential marital obligations? NO.
HELD: In the case at bar, other than her self-serving declarations,
petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were
married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological
defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As
the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to
show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital
obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent
was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of
a psychological nature, and not merely physical. In fact, petitioner-
appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husbands
youth and very good looks, who was admittedly several years
younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be the
college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant
even described her respondent-husband not as a problem student
but a normal one.
Private respondent’s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
grounds for finding that he is suffering from psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. These acts
are only among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for
the grant of legal separation and not as grounds for a declaration of
nullity of marriages or annulment thereof.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to
establish the precise cause of private respondents psychological
incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of
the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation
of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos
were married twice and had five children.
● After the downfall of President Marcos, the respondent
left the military service in 1987.
● Consequently, due to the respondent’s failure to engage in
 any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and the
respondent would hit and beat the petitioner.
● As a result, in 1992 they were already living separately.
● Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage under Art.
36 of the Family Code.
● The RTC found the respondent to be psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
● However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented.

ISSUE:
● WON a psychological evaluation is a sine qua non
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity -
NO
● WON the totality of the totality of evidence presented,
including the testimonies of petitioner, the common
children, petitioner's sister and the social worker, was
enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated - NO

HELD:
● (1) The court held that the personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is not a
requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented
does not show such incapacity. While it is true that the
testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological
incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should
not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals,
simply because respondent had not taken those tests
himself, the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other
sources of information in order to determine the
psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to
submit himself to such tests. The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(Molina Doctrine)
● (2) The court held that is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family
and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. the behavior of respondent can be attributed to
the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of more than six years. It was during
this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to
give material and moral support, and even left the family
home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced
only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing
that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is
gainfully employed as a taxi driver. The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of

169. Republic vs. Dagdag, 351 SCRA 425
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.'
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto. (Molina Doctrine)
Notes: Molina Doctrine (Republic v CA and Molina)
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity;
2. The root cause (something that happened in the past that
defines who a the person is today) of the psychological
incapacity must
a. medically or clinically identified,
b. alleged in the complaint,
c. sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. clearly explained in the decision.
The incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof;
3. The incapacity (need not to be manifested but at least
attached) must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage;
4. Such incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable;
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage;
6. Non-complied marital obligation(s) must be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of
the decision.
7. Contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive but not controlling effect.
8. Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state
FACTS:
● On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old,
married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the
Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.
The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija, on October 20, 1988.
● Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their in-
laws. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving
his family without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then
disappear again. During the times when he was with his
family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and
would return home drunk. He would force his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would
inflict physical injuries on her. |||
 ● On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the
last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look
for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support
herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that
Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, 6 and that he
escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.
RTC
● On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36||...
● Avelino could not be located, summons was served by
publication in the Olongapo News. Subsequently, a hearing
was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts. Erlinda
testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag,
as her only witness.|||Virginia testified that she is married
to the brother of Avelino. She testified that Erlinda and
Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed
for long at the couple's house.
● Without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's
manifestation, the trial court ruled that the husband
suffers from a psychological incapacity as he is emotionally
immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a
fugitive from justice.

Solgen filed an appeal to CA after RTC denied her Motion for

Reconsideration
● CA affirmed RTC:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because
he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person
but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an
alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed
with the right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Defendant's constant
non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously (sic)
destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the
plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated,
1992 Ed.,p. 46)."

Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Solgen on behalf of

Republic to SC

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from
psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice

HELD: NO.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the Court laid down
the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
 decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that

Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary
requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2
which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven
by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to
the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the
allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not
sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested
was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise
not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.|||

170. RP vs. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, FACTS:

· Lolita and Toshio Hamano started a common
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the PH for month.
However, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for
half of 1987. On Nov 16 1987 Lolita gave birth to their
child.
· On Jan 4 1988 Lolita and Toshio were married by
Judge Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor,
Cavite. Unknown to Lolita that Toshio is psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
manifest only after the marriage.
· A month after the marriage, Toshio went back to
Japan and then gave financial support to Lolita that
stopped after two months. She wrote letters to him but did
not get any responds until she learned the Toshio went
back to the PH to visit but never bothered to see her and
the child.

ISSUE:
W/N Toshio Hamano is psychologically incapacitated to null
and void their marriage?

HELD:

171. Antonio vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, Mar. 10, 2005
NO. According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of
his family and his insensitivity to them did not
automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His
behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and
incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent,
reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial
of the instant petition.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage.
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines provides that:
FC 36 A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even in such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED.
The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Facts:
● Antonio and Reyes got married at Manila City Hall and
subsequently in church on December 8, 1990.
● A child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months
later.
● Antonio could no longer take her constant lying,
insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated from
her in August 1991.
● He attempted reconciliation but since her behavior
did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.
● Only after their marriage that he learned about her
child with another man. He then filed a petition in 1993 to
have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
● RTC RULING: Null and Void.
● CA RULING: Reversed RTC decision.
● CA held that the totality of evidence presented was
insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the 1997 Molina case
had not been satisfied.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Antonio has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code
 Held:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant
lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological
and corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, which
amounts to psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC
dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family
Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.”

172. Republic vs. Tanyag-San Jose, 517 SCRA 123, February FACTS:

● This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the

decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
● Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose (Laila) and Manolito
San Jose (Manolito) were married on June 12, 1988. Laila
was 19 years and 4 months old, while Manolito was 20
years and 10 months old.
● The couple begot two children: Joana Marie who was born
on January 3, 1989, and Norman who was born on March
14, 1997.
● For nine years, the couple stayed with Manolito’s parents.
Manolito was jobless and was hooked to gambling and
drugs. As for Laila, she sold fish at the wet market of
Taguig.
● On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and transferred to
her parents’ house.
● On March 9, 1999, Laila filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, under Article 367 of the Family Code
on the ground of psychological incapacity, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig where it was docketed
as JDRC Case No. 4862.
● Testifying for Laila, Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist at
the National Center for Mental Health, declared that from
the psychological test and clinical interview she conducted
on Laila, she found Manolito, whom she did not personally
examine, to be psychologically incapacitated to perform
the duties of a husband.
● Branch 70 of the RTC of Pasig, by Decision of July 17, 2001,
citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Leouel Santos v. CA, et al, denied Laila’s petition on the
ground that psychological incapacity was not proved in
accordance with the guidelines set by the SC in the
abovementioned cases.
● Laila’s motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s
decision was, by Order of November 13, 2001,13 denied.
Laila thus appealed to the Court of Appeals which
docketed it as CAG.R. CV No. 73286, faulting the trial court
in holding that she failed to comply with the guidelines
 enumerated in Molina.
● By Decision dated February 15, 2005, the appellate court,
finding Manolito psychologically incapacitated after
considering “the totality of the evidence,” reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared the marriage
between him and Laila void ab initio, saying that…
○ “While We may not have strictly adhered to the
ruling in the Molina case in arriving at Our
present conclusion—We have reason to deviate
from the same. In view of the peculiar
circumstances attendant in this case, We were
constrained to take exception from the Molina
case. Note that the “(c)ommittee did not give any
example of psychological incapacity for the fear
that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would
like the judge to apply the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decision of Church tribunals
which although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision
was taken from Canon Law.”
● Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision which
was denied, by Resolution dated June 2, 2005,17 hence, its
present Petition for Review.

ISSUES:

1. W/N it was proven that Manolito’s alleged defects are

constitutive of psychological incapacity as contemplated
under article 36 of the Family Code, and that the same has
juridical antecedence, is grave, and incurable - NO.
2. W/N the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in not
adhering to the ruling of the Molina case and the doctrine
of stare decisis - YES.
3. W/N the person sought to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to
arrive at such declaration - NO.

HELD:

1. The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for

the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage.
a. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of
marriage, has been succinctly
expounded in the recent case of Ma. Armida
 Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris (Ferraris), 495 SCRA
396 (2006), thus: The term “psychological
incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.
b. As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders,
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality. However, the root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained.
2. While the guidelines set in the Molina case is not set in
stone, the facts and circumstances attendant to this case
do not warrant a deviation from it.
a. Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity is thus
premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as
well as his inability to support his family and his
refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Manolito’s state or condition or
attitude has not been shown, however, to be a
malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating
or debilitating psychological condition.
b. In Molina, where the therein respondent
preferred to spend more time with his friends
than with his family, this Court found the same to
be more of a “difficulty” if not outright “refusal”
or “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations.
3. There is no requirement that the person sought to be
declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.
a. If it can be proven by independent means that
one is psychologically incapacitated, there is no
reason why the same should not be credited. In
the present case however, the only proof which
bears on the claim that Manolito is
psychologically incapacitated is the testimony of

173. Almelor v RTC Las Piñas
GR 179620, Aug. 26, 2008
KO
Laila and only that.
b. The doctor’s conclusion that Manolito is
psychologically incapacitated bears no weight
because it is merely hearsay as it was based only
on descriptions given by Laila.
c. Parenthetically, Dr. Tayag’s Psychological Report
does not even show that the alleged anti-social
personality disorder of Manolito was already
present at the inception of the marriage or that it
is incurable. Neither does it explain the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor
identify its root cause. It merely states that
“[s]uch disorder is considered to be grave and is
deeply [immersed] within the system [and]
continues to influence the individual until the
later stage of life.”
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February
15, 2005 Decision and June 2, 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73286 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
FACTS:
● Manuel Almelor and Leonida Trinidad were married and
had 3 children.
○ Both are medical practitioners, an
anesthesiologist and a pediatrician respectively.
● After 11 years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition to annul
their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations.
○ When they first met, Manuel was very thoughtful
and got along well with others. After getting
married, she got to know that in private, Manuel
was a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably
meticulous, and easily angered.
○ Manuel has a deep attachment to his mother and
is dependent on her for making decisions.
○ Manuel also concealed that he was homosexual.
■ Upon finding out, Leonida took her
children and left their conjugal abode
and since then, Manuel stopped giving
support to their children.
● Dr. Del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, testified to
have conducted interviews and tests on Leonida and had a
one-time interview with Manuel.
○ Concluded that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated, that it existed even before the
marriage and that it appeared to be incurable.
(Abusive, mama’s boy, and gay)
● Manuel admitted that they had some petty arguments but
their marital relationship was generally harmonious.
○ The true cause of Leonida’s hostility against him
was their professional rivalry (he and her family
have competing hospitals in the same vicinity).
○ Denied maltreating their children and at most,
only imposed the necessary discipline.
○ It was only natural to return the love and
 affection of his mother especially know that she is
in her twilight years.
○ Leonida is very jealous and possessive in nature,
driving Manuel to avoid the company of female
friends.
● RTC: granted the annulment on the ground of
homosexuality under Article 45 of the Family Code.
● CA: affirmed the annulment.

ISSUE:
● W/N the marriage of Manuel and Leonida may be
annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity –NO

HELD:
The trial court declared that Leonida’s petition for nullity had no
basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon cannot
legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code. It even
cited Republic v Molina that allegations of conflicting personalities,
irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings,
unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment and
difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital
obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.

If so, the trial court should have outrightly dismissed the petition
for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. However, instead of
dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage on the
ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud.

What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel’s

homosexual tendencies by citing acts generally predominant among
homosexuals. She wanted to prove that this perceived
homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential
marital obligations. These were not sufficient proof to substantiate
the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed
this to Leonida at the time of their marriage.

Even assuming that Manuel is a homosexual, it cannot be a ground

to annul the marriage as it is only a ground for legal separation. It is
the concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage.

174. Te vs Te, GR No. 161793, Feb. 13, 2009 FACTS:

AGUSTIN ● Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first met respondent

Rowena Ong Guitierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by
the Filipino-Chinese association in their college.
● Initially, petitioner was attracted to respondent’s close
friend; but as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young
man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January
1996. The petitioner was a sophomore student while
respondent was a freshman.
● In March 1996, it was Rowena who asked Edward that they
elope but he refused bickering that he was young and
jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They
left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; Edward
provided for their travel money of P80,000 while Rowena
purchased the boat ticket.
● In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena
proceeded to her uncle’s house while Edward to his
 parents’ home. However, Rowena kept on calling Edward,
threatening him that she would commit suicide. Edward
then decided to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.
● In April 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court
where they got married without a marriage license.
Petitioner was 25 years old while respondent is 20 years
old.
● Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house
unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her
uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house,
and stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted
them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and
demanded that they shall have a separate abode.
● In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live
separate lives so then they decided to parted ways.
● Four years after, petitioner filed a petition before RTC of
Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage with
Rowena on the ground of latter’s psychological incapacity.
● In July 2001, RTC rendered its decision declaring the
marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that
both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.

ISSUE:

W/N marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological

incapacity.

HELD:

YES.

RATIO:

The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both

parties to be psychologically incapacitated.

There is no requirement that the person to be declared

psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-

depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder,

cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support,
for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from
others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions
(such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He
is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a

175. Azcueta vs RP, G.R. No. 180668, May 26, 2009
LUNA
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear
direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential
marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of
others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without
remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in
this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and
of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
Notes:
The following are the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically
ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides: The trial court must
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.
Facts:
● In 2002, Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage, celebrated
 in 1993, to Rodolfo Azcueta (Rodolfo) before the RTC.
● Marietta alleges that Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.
● Marietta complained that regardless of her
encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job
and always depended on his mother for financial
assistance and for his decisions.
● In terms of a conjugal home, it was Rodolfo’s mother who
found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid the
monthly rental.
● Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave
Marietta money which actually came from Rodolfo’s
mother.
● When Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child
and told her his parents could support their needs.
● Their sexual intercourse was only once a month which
Marietta never enjoyed.
● When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta that sex
was sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused.
● Rodolfo also told Marietta that he was not ready for a
child.
● When Marietta asked Rodolfo if they could move to
another place, he did not agree and she was forced to
leave and see if he would follow her.
● Rodolfo did not follow her.
● Rodolfo’s first cousin, Florida de Ramos, who at one time
lived with Rodolfo’s family, corroborated Marietta’s
testimony that Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and
relied on the allowance given by his mother who also paid
the rentals for the room the couple lived in.
● The psychiatrist who examined Marietta testified that she
found the latter to be mature, independent, focused,
responsible, had a direction and ambition in life, and was
not psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties
and responsibilities of marriage.
● Based on information gathered from Marietta, the same
psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent
Personality Disorder characterized by loss of self-
confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his
own decisions and dependency on other people.
● The psychiatrist explained that the root cause of the
disorder was a cross-identification with Rodolfo’s mother
who was the dominant figure in the family considering
that Rodolfo’s father, a seaman, was always out of the
house.
● She added that the problem began during the early stages
of Rodolfo’s life but manifested only after his marriage.
She stated that the problem was severe, because he would
not be able take on the responsibilities of a spouse, and
incurable, because it began in early development and had
been deeply ingrained in his personality. She, thus,
concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital duties and responsibilities.
● Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service
of summons on him.
● The City Prosecutor found no collusion between the
parties. Based on the evidence presented by Marietta, the
 Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage void ab
initio.
● The Solicitor General appealed the RTC’s decision, arguing
that the psychiatric report was based solely on the
information given by Marietta, and there was no showing
that the alleged psychological disorder was present at the
start of the marriage or that it was grave, permanent and
incurable.
● CA Reversed.
● Marietta, thus, brought the case to the Supreme Court on
a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated

thereby making their marriage void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

Held: Yes. Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his

marital duties because of his Dependent Personality Disorder. His
marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio.

Rationale: Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her

husband’s psychological incapacity. As held in Marcos vs. Marcos
[397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. What matters
is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity.

The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged in

the petition, medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by
testimony of an expert witness with more than 40 years experience
in the field of psychology and psychological incapacity, and clearly
explained in the trial court’s decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No.
161793, 13 February 2009), “(b)y the very nature of Article 36,
courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive
evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.”

TIME OF EXISTENCE (Must be before marriage) - Rodolfo’s

psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly existed
at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage.
Witnesses were united in testifying that from the start of the
marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother
and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. These
manifestations of Rodolfo’s Dependent Personality Disorder must
have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early
development and a by-product of his upbringing and family life.

SEVERITY (Severe enough to disallow him to do ESSENTIAL marital

obligations)- Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been shown to
be grave so as to render him unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance
from his mother might have been due to embarrassment for failing
to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive for not
wanting a child was a “responsible” realization since he was
unemployed, were dismissed by the SC for being speculative and

176. Halili v Halili, GR 165424, June 9, 2009 (Motion for Recon)
SOBREVEGA
unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court likewise disagreed
with the Court of Appeals’ finding that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and
overdependence on his mother could be attributed to immaturity,
noting that at the time of his marriage, Rodolfo was almost 29 years
old. Also, the expert testimony identified a grave clinical or
medical cause for Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent
Personality Disorder.
One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who
cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most
basic matters that spouses face every day; and one who cannot
contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his
spouse, is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital
obligations within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent
Personality Disorder is automatically deemed psychologically
incapacitated to perform his/her marital obligations. The court
must evaluate the facts, as guided by expert opinion, and carefully
examine the type of disorder and the gravity thereof before
declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
INCURABILITY - Finally, it has been established that Rodolfo’s
condition is incurable, having been deeply ingrained in his system
since his early years.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili and respondent Chona
M. Santos-Halili were only 21 and 19 years of age,
respectively, when they got married on July 4, 1995 at the
City Hall of Manila. After the wedding, they continued to
live with their respective parents and never lived together
but maintained the relationship nonetheless. A year after,
the couple started bickering constantly. Petitioner stopped
seeing respondent and went on dates with other women.
● Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 158 a petition for the declaration of nullity of
the marriage on the ground that he was psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations to
respondent. He claimed that he thought that the wedding
performed at the City Hall of Manila was a “joke” and that
the marriage certificate he signed was “fake.” He also
pointed out that he and respondent never lived together
as husband and wife and never consummated the
marriage. (Husband-petitioner wanted the marriage to be
null and void due to his own psychological incapacity)
● The RTC granted the petition and declared petitioner
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The RTC found petitioner to be suffering from
a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and
self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his
expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan.
● On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision
and held that, taken in totality, the evidence for petitioner
failed to establish his psychological incapacity. The case
was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under
Rule 45. The Court affirmed the CA’s decision and
resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
 ● Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration
reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent
ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his
psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he
presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness,
was more than enough to sustain the findings and
conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is
psychologically incapable of complying with the essential
obligations of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is

sufficient to prove that petitioner suffered from psychological
incapacity (which effectively prevented him from complying with
his essential marital obligations).

HELD:
Yes. In this case, the testimony of petitioner’s expert witness
revealed that petitioner was suffering from dependent personality
disorder. In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that
petitioner’s dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact
that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and
depended on them for decisions.

Petitioner’s mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal
help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning
that his marriage to respondent was for real. Dr. Dayan further
observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent
personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating
manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive
attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him. This
could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be
dominated, first, by his father who treated his family like robots
and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his father.
When petitioner could no longer take respondent’s domineering
ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than confront her and
tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage.

It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a

psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a
deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized
that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have
long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.
Particularly, personality disorders are “long-standing, inflexible ways
of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as
dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of
functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create
problems for those who display them and for others.”

From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed

suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him
unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
declared null and void.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
 From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed
suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him
unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.

The April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court and the January 26, 2004
decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158
dated April 17, 1998 is hereby REINSTATED.

177. Digna Najera v Eduardo Najera, FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari of February 24, 2004 CA decision
G.R. No. 164817, affirming the RTC Lingayen Br. 68 decision finding Digna & Eduardo Najera
July 3, 2009 entitled to legal separation
● Jan 31, 1988: Digna & Eduardo, then both residents of
Peralta, J. Bugallon, Pangasinan, were married in Bugallon. They are
childless. E is presently living in USA.
OCULTO ● Jan 27, 1997: Digna filed w/RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage w/alternative prayer for legal separation
w/application for designation as administrator pendente lite of
the conjugal partnership of gains. D claims that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, E was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of the marriage. Such incapacity were shown by
the ff:
(1) At the time of marriage, D was employed as a clerk. E
was jobless, exerted no effort to find a job,
& was dependent on E for support. It was only w/ the
help of D’s elder brother that E was able
to find a job as a seaman in 1988 through the
Intercrew Shipping Agency.
(2) Even when employed, E did not give D sufficient
financial support. E had to rely on herself & her
parents to live.
(3) He was away from home from 9-10 mos each year on
his job.
E was employed in July 30, 1988 & gave D a monthly
allotment of P1,600.
Upon return in May ‘89, E quarrelled w/D & falsely
accused her of having an affair. He took to
smoking marijuana & tried to force D into it. When D
refused, E insulted her & uttered
unprintable words against her. He was always drunk
when he came home.
(4) Upon return in Apr ‘94, same. Quarrel-jealous-drunk-
marijuana.
July 3, 1994: E, while quarreling w/ D, w/out
provocation, inflicted physical violence & tried to
kill D w/ a bolo. D tried to stop his attack w/ her left
arm & sustained physical injuries. The
incident was reported at the Bugallon Police Station.
(5) E left the family home, w/all their personal
belongings. He lived w/his mother at Banga,
Bugallon, & abandoned D.
● D learned that E jumped ship while it was anchored in LA,
 California. D prays that upon filing of the petition, an order be
issued appointing her as the sole administrator of their
conjugal properties, & that a judgment be rendered (1)
declaring their marriage void ab initio in accordance w/ Art
36 FC, (2) in the alternative, decreeing their legal separation
pursuant to Title II FC, & (3) declaring the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership & forfeiture in E’s favor D’s share in the
said properties.
● Psychologist Cristina Gates testimony (only D’s interview since
E was abroad): conclusion says E’s violent behavior towards
his wife is his recurrent thought towards his mother who
cheated & separated from his father. E is afflicted w/
Borderline Personality Disorder. E’s chances of curability are
nil. Its curability depended on whether the established
organic damage was minimal -- malfunction of the brain
brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which
probably afflicted E w/BPD & uncontrollable impulses.
● Mar 7, 1997: RTC granted the motion. Apr 7, ‘97: E denied
material allegations & averred that D was incurably immature,
of dubious integrity, w/ very low morality, & guilty of infidelity.
He claimed that the house & lot were acquired through his
sole effort & money. D filed a counterclaim asking for
damages.
● Mar 31, 2000: RTC decreed only their legal separation, but not
annulment of their marriage

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the totality of D’s evidence was able to
prove E’s psychological incapacity warranting the annulment of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code - - - NO
(2) Whether or not foregoing evidence warrants
annulment of marriage - - - NO, legal separation
HELD:
1. No. The Court is not persuaded in the evidence Digna
presented establishing that the root cause of Eduardo’s
psychological incapacity is his dysfunctional family
background.
a. Republic v CA Guidelines in the interpretation &
application of Art 36 FC
i. Burden of proof to show nullity of
marriage belongs to plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the
existence & continuation of the marriage
& against its dissolution & nullity.
ii. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be:
a. medically or clinically identified,
b. alleged in the complaint,
c. sufficiently proven by experts,
and
d. clearly explained in the
decision.
- Art 36 requires that the incapacity must
be psychological, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical.
- Evidence must show that one/both the
parties was mentally /psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could
 not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof.
- Root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness & its incapacitating
nature fully explained.
- Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists & clinical
psychologists.
iii. The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, already existing when they
exchanged I dos. Manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
iv. Such incapacity must also be
medically/clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to the marriage, like employment
in a job. Ex: A pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing children but may
not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear, & raise his own children
as an essential obligation.
v. Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligation. Mild
characterological peculiarities, & mood
changes, emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must
be shown as incapacity, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
vi. Essential marital obligations embraced
by Arts 68-71 FC: husband & wife,
Arts. 220, 221, 225 FC: parents & their
children
vii. Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling/decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts since the
purpose of including such provision in
our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of the
people.
b. Santos v CA Three basic requirements:
“psychological incapacity must be characterized
by
(a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.
Foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
a party’s psychological condition. In this case, psychologist Gates’

178. Camacho-Reyes v Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18,
MASCARENAS
conclusion was based on facts relayed to her be Digna & not based
on her personal knowledge & evaluation of Eduardo. Thus, her
finding is unscientific & unreliable. The trial court correctly found
that Digna failed to prove that Eduardo’s alleged personality
disorder was incurable.
2. No. The Court agrees with CA that the evidence DIgna
presented in regard to the physical violence / grossly
abusive conduct of Eduardo toward D & E’s abandonment
of E without justifiable cause for more than one year are
grounds for legal separation only & not for annulment
under Art 36 FC.
Article 55, Family Code. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any
of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in
such corruption or inducement
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more
than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause
for more than one year.
Petition DENIED. February 23, 2004 CA decision & its August 5,
2004 Resolution AFFIRMED.
Facts:
• Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes (Petitioner) met Ramon Reyes
(Respondent) at UP Diliman when they were both 19 y/o and
began dating. At that time, respondent held a job in the family
buiness (Aristocrat Restaurant). Petitioner’s good impression of
the respondent was not diminished by the latter’s habits
(cutting classes, marijuana). Only petitioner finished her studies
(AB Sociology). By 1974, respondent dropped out of school, and
just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
• December 5, 1976, They got married wherein petitioner was
already 5 months pregnant and employed at the Population
Center Foundation, they lived with the respondent’s family in
Mandaluyong City, and all of their living expenses were
shouldered by respondent’s parents, their respective salaries
were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent
gave petitioner a monthly allowance of ₱1,500.00 from his
salary.
• March 22, 1977, they had their first child and their financial
difficulties started. 1 year after marriage, the monthly
allowance of ₱1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Respondent
had resigned due to slow advancement within the family
business, and plans to venture into trading seafood in the
province, which took respondent away from his family for days
without any communication.
• Petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws.
While petitioner struggled as the single-income earner of the
household, respondent’s business floundered. Respondent
 attempted a fishpond business but was unsuccessful.
Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Respondent
had indifferent attitude towards his family, he did not exert any
effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in
Mindoro.
• After 2 years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence
and moved in with petitioner’s mother, which made the parties
more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of
supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as
well.
• 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage,
gave birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was in
Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the
petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in
Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with
nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
• 1989, respondent’s fishpond business stopped operations, he
refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent
engaged in scrap paper and carton trading but did not succeed.
The relationship of the parties deteriorated.
• 1996, respondent was having an extra-marital affair. Petitioner
realized that respondent was not only unable to provide
financially for their family, but also in his duty to be faithful to
her and their family.
• Petitioner had cyst removal, respondent remained
unconcerned and unattentive (read the newspaper, played
dumb when petitioner requested to accompany her into the
OR). After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had
enough of respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her mother
to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
• Petitioner approached respondent’s siblings and asked them to
intervene, even respondent’s siblings waved the white flag on
respondent. Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his
spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group,
invited and sponsored the parties to join the group, but these
did not improve the parties’ relationship as respondent
remained uncooperative.
• 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Dayan for a
psychological assessment to "determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning.” Respondent resisted and did not
continue with the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to
undergo psychotherapy.
• Petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told
respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced
to give space to petitioner. The relationship still did not
improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his
children.
• 2001, petitioner filed (RTC) a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations under FC 36.

RTC RULING: Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity

of both parties, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage
between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and
respondent RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the
Archbishop’s Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is
declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as
amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.

respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, adamant on the

validity of his marriage to petitioner.

CA RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is

GRANTED. The Decision of the RTC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Issue:
W/N the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the
ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity, as provided in FC
36.

Ratio & Ruling:

• the marriage between the parties from its inception has a
congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which
pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function
emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in
relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love,
fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and
support, (FC 68). There was already a fixed niche in the
psychological constellation of respondent which created the
death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any
slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder
of the respondent.
• the Court considered the assessment/diagnosis of the expert
witnesses as credible or a product of an honest evaluation on
the psychological status of the respondent. This psychological
incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three
(3) expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his
marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural
constellation. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly
suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality
Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an
Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas
diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type,
associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and
narcissistic features.
• FC 72 provides remedy to any party aggrieved by their marital
reality. The case of the parties is already a settled matter due to
their psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their
marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral
parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all in their
marriage for it never existed at all.
• (Santos v. CA) factors characterizing psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2)
juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
• Even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents
alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to
the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
• respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a

179. Kalaw v Fernandez, GR 166357, September 19, 2011
ZUÑO
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2)
extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a
job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7)
criminal charges of estafa.
• (Republic v. CA & Molina) Each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. Dr. Villegas’ finding that [petitioner] is
supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area
does not amount to psychological incapacity under FC 36. Such alleged condition of
[petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In fact, in the Psychological
Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing
evaluation as she was found to be a "good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has
tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are
praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas’ psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was
able to remain in their marriage for more than 20 years "trying to reach out and lending a
hand for better understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no
less than [petitioner’s] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is
psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of FC 36.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL
and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No
costs.
FACTS:
● Trial Court Ruling - Parties are both suffering from
psychological incapacity. Void ab initio.
● CA Ruling - Reversed the trial court’s ruling for lack of legal
and factual basis.
● Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma.
Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973, maintained a
relationship, and eventually married on November 4,
1976. Their marriage bore them four children.
● Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an
extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who
also gave birth to four children. Malyn left the conjugal
home, and her own four children, to Tyrone.
● Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn and went to
the US with her and their four children from that affair. He
left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a
rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a
driver.
● On July 6, 1994, Tyrone came back from the US and filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that
Malyn was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the
celebration of their marriage.
● The petitioner presented the testimonies of two supposed
expert witnesses, a psychologist and a canon law expert
priest. They alleged that the respondent’s excessive
mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, and going
out with friends, were to the utter neglect of her duties as
mother and wife. The petitioner also alleged that he and
the respondent’s brother caught Malyn with another man
in a hotel.
● Included in their reports were the interviews on the side of
the petitioner, and a psychological profile of the
respondent, as prepared by the expert witnesses. They
explained how the respondent’s troubled family past, her
responsibilities as a bread winner, among others, are
 contributing factors to her psychological incapacity, in the
form of Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), evident
even prior to their marriage.
● The respondent, on the other hand, claims that she left to
escape her physically abusive husband who preferred to
keep Malyn a housewife, and was upset that the latter was
working. She also denied the accusation of adultery. She
stated that the person in question checked her in the hotel
because she was so drunk from partying with friends, and
that they were fully clothed, as opposed to the petitioner’s
narrative. She admits to playing mahjong, but maintained
that it was only two to three times a week and always with
the permission of her husband and without abandoning
her children at home.
● As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was
Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as
manifested by his drug dependence, habitual drinking,
womanizing, and physical violence, and presented her own
psychologist as her expert witness.
● The trial court ordered a social worker to conduct a case
study on the parties as well as the children. Based on the
interviews of the family members themselves, Malyn was
shown to be more available to the children and to exercise
better supervision and care. The social worker
commended the fact that even after Malyn left the
conjugal home, she made efforts to visit her children and
to personally attend to their needs and to devote time
with them.

ISSUE:
WoN the respondent suffers from psychological incapacity. - NO

HELD:
● Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological
incapacity is on the petitioner. The petitioner must prove
that the incapacitated party suffers a serious psychological
disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of
the marital state. The psychological problem must be
grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must
be incurable.
● However, the conclusions of the expert witnesses
presented by the petitioner were heavily premised on the
alleged acts and behavior of respondent which had not
been sufficiently proven. In fact, the respondent presented
contrary evidence refuting the allegations of the petitioner.
● The children corroborated the respondent’s story. Not
once did the children state that they were neglected by
their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took
care of them, was around when they were sick, and
cooked the food they like. This is also supported by the
findings of the court’s social worker. It appears that
respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her
children despite her estrangement from their father. There
was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment
and neglect of familial duties. Indeed, the totality of the
 evidence points to the opposite conclusion.
● Anent the infidelity, assuming arguendo that petitioner
was able to prove it, that one instance of sexual infidelity
cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for
attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a
ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity.
● Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent
actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive
of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was
indeed psychologically incapacitated.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The

Court of Appeals’ Decision in reversing the trial court’s decision is
AFFIRMED

180. Kalaw v Fernandez, GR 166357, January 14, 2015 PRELUDE: On 19 September 2011, the court DISMISSED the
declaration of nullity of marriage finding no merit in the petition
YNIGUEZ and that CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial
court’s decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

FACTS:
● This case is a motion for reconsideration imploring the
Court to take thorough second look into what constitutes
psychological incapacity, to consider the trial court’s
finding conferring to the three expert witnesses and the
consequently to find that the respondent, if not both
parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform
their respective essential marital obligation.
● In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
● Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery,
and neglect of their children.
● Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged
habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as
mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in
the form of NPD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of

psychological incapacity.

HELD: YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration

held that Elena Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated
as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regards to
this case.

The Court held that the guidelines set in the case (citing Molina)
have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every
instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of
nullity to the fate of certain rejection.

But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters
to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable
“some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its
own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all
fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court.

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity

as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are
concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at
an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the
in-depth diagnosis by experts.

The Court held that totality of evidence must be considered. We

have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate
for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution
only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to
a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage
has no legal existence.

There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically

incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because
what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.” Verily, the totality of
the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the
acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition
could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the
record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as
an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation. Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity
should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any
probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish
causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would
not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as
evidence. Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to
psychological and emotional temperaments

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved
credence because it was in the better position to view and
examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the
appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity
were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due
importance and respect.

It is improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a

merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to
dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the
 nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts
sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity
of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family
Code. The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to
expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the
parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by
the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite
having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of
the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of

parental duties. The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong
playing should not have delimited our determination of the
presence or absence of psychological incapacity. The fact that the
respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions
did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also
manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling.
Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on
every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and
serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. The
respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral
and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a
parent to safeguard and protect her children.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for

Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976
as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of
the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

181. Vinas v Vinas, G. R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015 Doctrine:

Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage;
GLENN VIÑAS, petitioner, vs. MARY GRACE PAREL- The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent
VIÑAS, respondent. by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition
for the declaration of nullity of marriage.
KANG Psychological Incapacity;
The Supreme Court (SC) understands the inherent difficulty
attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest
to the antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but such
difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what
the law requires.

FACTS:
● this case is a PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
● RTC rendered that the marriage between the petitioner
(Glenn Viñas) and the defendant (Mary Grace Parel-Viñas)
null and void but the CA SET ASIDE the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
● April 26, 1999 - the petitioner and the defendant were
married in civil rites.
○ lived together until 2006; but the defendant left
without notice to Dubai
 ● February 18, 2009 - petitioned for nullity of marriage;
○ petitioner consulted clinical assistance of
heteroesexual marriage
○ Dr. Tayag - diagnosed the defendant with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder simply with the
traits given from the petitioner’s cousin who is
also an acquaintance of the defendant; Rodelito
Mayo (December 29, 2008)
○ the defendant was not present neither during the
trial (nor in the clinic).
● RTC declared the marriage of the petitioner and the
defendant null and void on account of psychological
incapacity.
● OSG appealed before the CA that the marriage must be
subsisting since there is no competent evidence exist to
prove that the defendant is suffering from psychological
incapacity.
● CA REVERSED the decision of the RTC declaring that the
marriage is valid and subsisting.
○ no evidence was shown to prove the
psychological condition*
○ The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage and
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
○ disability of the the parties to assume the
essential obligation of marriage as set forth in Art.
68 to 71 and 220 to 225 of th FC.
○ the petitioner and the witnesses were not able to
testify the root cause of psychological incapacity*
of the defendant
○ Dr. Tayag’s medical issuance was insufficient to
prove that the defendant is indeed suffering of
the psychological illness.
○ Art 36 of FC - Psychological incapacity “before the
the celebration of marriage” was not applicable
to the defendant to nullify the marriage
● petitioner filed for MR but it was denied, Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:
● W/N that the marriage of the petitioner and defendant
be nullified with the evidence shown from the petitioner
as ruled by the RTC with Article 36 of the FC

HELD:
● No. the marriage can not be nullified as ruled by the RTC
with Article 36 of the Family Code.
● the petition is denied since it lacked merit.
● mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will, on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted on some deliberating
psychological condition or illness.
● While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s marital
woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides
inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary

182. Mallilin v Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, 18 Feb. 2015
AMATORIO
Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 29, 2013 and Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Notes:
*Psychological conditions:
a. gravity
b. juridical antecedence
c. incurability
*Root cause of psychological incapacity:
a. medically or clinically identified
b. alleged in the complaint
c. sufficiently proven by experts
d. clearly explained in the decision
FACTS:
● Robert (petitioner) and Luz (respondent) were married on
September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.
● On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC. It was
then denied, on March 7, 1996.
● Petitioner, appealed to the CA and so the decision was
reversed "due to lack of participation of the State as
required under Article 48 of the Family Code." It was
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
● In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering from
psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness
to enter into such marital life and to comply with its
essential obligations and responsibilities. Such that during
their marriage, Luz exhibited clear manifestation of
immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent
rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy
and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
● Luz filed her Answer with counterclaim. She averred that it
was Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in
their marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not
appear during the trial.
● When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already
living in California, USA, and had married an American. He
also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz
continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain
Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had
been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother
as shown by the following circumstances:
○ (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room
because Luz did not know how to keep order;
○ (2) it was her mother who prepared their meal
while her sister was the one who washed their
clothes because she did not want her polished
nails destroyed;
○ (3) it was also her sister who took care of their
children while she spent her time sleeping and
looking at the mirror;
○ (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated
 different men;
○ (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her
loitering with male students;
○ (6) when he was not home, she would receive
male visitors;
○ (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house
when he was away; and
○ (6) she would contract loans without his
knowledge.
● In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna
Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist
II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.
● On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the
trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment
with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal)
● On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed
down a decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio
on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part
of both parties as contemplated by the second paragraph
of Canon 1095. This decision was affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
● Prior to that, on September 20, 2002, the RTC had
rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
● The State, through OSG, interposed an appeal. The CA, in
its November 20, 2009 Decision, granted the petition and
reversed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
W/N the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:
No. "Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a
mental — not merely physical — incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live
together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and
support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage. Other than his
self-serving testimony, no other evidence was adduced to show
the alleged incapacity of Luz. Second, the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity of Luz was not medically or clinically
identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based on the
records, Robert failed to prove that her disposition of not cleaning
the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and
 propensity for dating and receiving different male visitors, was
grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the parameters of
jurisprudence on psychological incapacity. The alleged failure of Luz
to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise
to the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the
nullification of the parties' marriage. Fourth, the decision of the
Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological
incapacity of Luz. Although decisions of the NAMT should be
respected by other courts, it is not controlling and is a subject to
law on evidence. Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must
be pointed out that the basis of the declaration of nullity of
marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon 1095
which mentions causes of a psychological nature similar to Article
36 of the Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095
which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations
to be mutually given and accepted. Hence, even if, as contended
by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by
petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of
marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological
incapacity of respondent. Robert's reliance on the NAMT decision
is misplaced. To repeat, the decision of the NAMT was based on
the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who
suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given
and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Article 36
of the Family Code. A cause of psychological nature similar to
Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the
Code of Canon Law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009,
and its Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby AFFIRMED,
without prejudice.

183. Republic vs. Romero, February 24, 2016 FACTS:

· The case at hand are consolidated petitions 1 for review on
PANISALES certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the
marriage of Reghis M. Romero II (Reghis) and Olivia Lagman
Romero (Olivia) null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
· In 1971, Reghis met Olivia in Baguio City when he helped her
and her family who were stranded along Kennon Road. Reghis
eventually developed a closeness with her family, with Olivia’s
parents serving as matchmakers for the two who eventually
became lovers.
· Less than a year into their relationship, Reghis tried to break-
up with Olivia because he felt that her demanding attitude would
prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals, especially
since he was still a student. However, she refused to end their
relationship and insisted on staying with Reghis at the latter's
dormitory overnight. Reghis declined and, instead, made
arrangements with his friends so that Olivia could sleep in a female
dormitory.
· Believing that they had eloped, Olivia’s parents planned for
them to get married. Reghis initially objected to the planned
marriage as he was unemployed and still unprepared. Eventually, he
consented since Olivia’s parents reassured him of their moral and
financial support.
· On May 11, 1972, Reghis and Olivia married at the Mary the
Queen Parish in San Juan City and were blessed with two (2)
children, namely, Michael and Nathaniel, born in 1973 and 1975,
respectively.
· The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage,
often having violent fights and jealous fits. Reghis could not forgive
Olivia for dragging him into marriage and resented her
condescending attitude towards him. As a result, he spent little
time with his family, causing Olivia to complain that Reghis failed to
be a real husband to her.
· In 1986, the couple parted ways.
· On June 16, 1998, Reghis led a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage, citing his psychological incapacity to comply
with his essential marital obligations. In support of his petition,
Reghis testified that he married Olivia not out of love but out of the
desire to please the latter's parents. 14 He also added that Olivia is
in a relationship with a certain Eddie Garcia but he (Reghis) has no
ill feelings towards Mr. Garcia, as he and Olivia have been separated
for a long time.
· For her part, Olivia maintained that she and Reghis were
capacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations before, at
the time, and after the celebration of their marriage. She also
averred that the petition is barred by res judicata inasmuch as
Reghis had previously led petitions for the declaration of the nullity
of their marriage on the ground the she is allegedly psychologically
incapacitated, but said petitions were dismissed.
· The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the petition.

RTC RULING:
· In a Decision 23 dated November 5, 2008, the RTC GRANTED
the petition and declared the marriage between Reghis and Olivia
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO on the ground of psychological
incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Basilio,
holding that Reghis suffered from a disorder that rendered him
unable to perform the obligations of love, respect and fidelity
towards Olivia.
· The Republic and Olivia moved for reconsideration, which
was, however, denied by the RTC.

CA RULING:
· The CA AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC, holding that
the OCPD from which Reghis suffered made him yearn for
professional advancement and rendered him obligated to support
his parents and siblings, at the expense of his marital and filial
duties.
· The Republic's and Olivia's respective motions for
reconsideration were DENIED by the CA.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's declaration of

nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity

184. Castillo vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 189607, Apr. 18, 2016
Note: Psych inca as defense was mentioned just twice in the case
so idk why maybe this is for a diff topic
HELD:
· YES. After a thorough review of the records of this case, the
Court finds that the foregoing requirements do not concur. As aptly
pointed out by the petitioners, Reghis' testimony shows that he was
able to comply with his marital obligations which, therefore,
negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological
incapacity on his part. That he married Olivia not out of love, but
out of reverence for the latter's parents, does not mean that
Reghis is psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36
of the Family Code. Dr. Basilio simply concluded that Reghis'
disorder is incurable but failed to explain how she came to such
conclusion. He did not discuss the concept of OCPD, its
classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how
and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order
to create a necessary inference that Reghis' condition had no
definite treatment or is incurable. The Court is not unaware of the
rule that factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA,
are binding on this Court. However, this principle does not apply
when such findings go beyond the issues of the case; run contrary
to the admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain relevant
facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts. Thus,
absent sufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity within
the context of Article 36 of the Family Code, the Court is
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated
March 21, 2013 and the Resolution dated September 12, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94337 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage led under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, as amended, is DISMISSED.
FACTS:
● On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo
(Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6
January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner
Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
● On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his
marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting
marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its
Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of
psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for
this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this
Petition for Review on Certiorari Rule 45.
● RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it
was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family
Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to
Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6
January 1979 (even though they had no marriage
license), makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus
rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed
Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial
decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a
 prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long
as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is
valid and existing.
● In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's
marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August
1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the
law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated,
and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that
the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
● Petition for review on certiorari - SC

ISSUE:
W/N the marriage is valid

HELD:
NO
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be
determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea
contracted both marriages was the Civil Code.

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable

marriage in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is
nonexistent — i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning —
while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled
by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified,
while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3)
being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked,
while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in
a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the
offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable
marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before the decree of annulment are considered
legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to
establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable
marriage there must be a judicial decree.

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante,
that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the
necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v.
Court of Appeals, the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity
does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the
effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the
parties were born while the Civil Code was in force.

As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is

applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes that the
subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the
invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the
absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the
second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a
requirement under theCivil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent
Decision of the RTC of Paranñ aque City declaring the nullity of
Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that
her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

185. Castillo v Republic, G.R. No. 214064. Feb. 6, 2017
PETITION DENIED
FACTS:
● Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually,
became sweethearts.
● During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe
sustained his affair with his former girlfriend.
● The couple’s relationship turned tumultuous after the
revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they
reconciled.
● They got married in Bani, Pangasinan on April 22, 1984 and
were blessed with two (2) children
● On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint 4 for declaration
of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90.
● Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was
harmonious, however, after thirteen (13) years of
marriage, Felipe resumed philandering.
● Their relatives and friends saw him with different women.
One time, she has just arrived from a trip and returned
home to surprise her family but instead caught him in a
compromising act with another woman.
● Tired of her husband’s infidelity, she left the conjugal
dwelling and stopped any communication with him.
● Felipe’s irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another
woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting
their children for a period of not less than ten (10) years
without any reason, constitute a severe psychological
disorder.
● In support of her case, Mirasol presented a clinical
psychologist who, in her Psychological Evaluation Report,
concluded that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill the essential marital obligations saying that:
● (Antecedence) The personality disorder speaks of
antecedence as it has an early onset with an
enduring pattern and behavior that deviates
markedly from the expectations of the individual’s
culture.His poor parental and family molding
(particularly lack of parental parenting) caused
him to have a defective superego and he proved
to be selfish, immature and a negligent person
and followed a pattern of gross irresponsibility
and gross disregard of the feelings of his
partner/wife disregarding the marriage contract
and the commitment he agreed on during the
wedding. In other words, the root cause of
respondent’s flawed personality pattern can be in
childhood milieu
● (Gravity) He just cannot perform his duties and
obligations as a husband, as he entered into
marriage for his own selfsatisfaction and
gratification, manipulate and denigrate the
petitioner for his own pleasures and satisfaction
● (Incurability) People suffering from this
personality disorder are unmotivated to
treatment and impervious to recovery. There are
no medications and laboratory examinations to
be taken for maladaptive behavior such as the
NPD (Narcissistic Personality Disorder). Otherwise

186. Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario, GR 222541, Feb 15, 2017
JOSOL
stated, his personality disorder is chronic and
pervasive affecting many aspects of his life,
● RTC declared the marriage null and void
● CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC ruling
that Mirasol failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
that Felipe was suffering from psychological incapacity
ISSUE: Whether or not Felipe is psychologically incapacitated?
HELD: NO. Time and again, it was held that “psychological
incapacity” has been intended by law to be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c)
incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence,
are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.
Based on the records, this Court finds that there exists insufficient
factual or legal basis to conclude that Felipe’s sexual infidelity and
irresponsibility can be equated with psychological incapacity as
contemplated by law. We reiterate that there was no other
evidence adduced. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not
present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe’s
infidelity notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their
relatives saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is
considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.
FACTS:
● Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then
seventeen (17) years old, sometime in December
1983 at a party in Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya. Very soon, they became romantically
involved.
● Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work
as a domestic helper. During this period, Rachel
allegedly provided for Jose's tuition fees for his
college education
● Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on
December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in
San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a
son, named Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On
February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a
church ceremony held in the Philippine Independent
Church, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.
● In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as
domestic helper/caregiver and has been working
there ever since, only returning to the Philippines
every year for a vacation. Through her efforts, she
was able to acquire a house and lot in Rufino Homes
 Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija.
● In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 11-891, alleging that Jose
was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his
essential marital obligations.
● In support of her petition, Rachel claimed that: during
their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid
discharging his duties as husband and father.
According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and
violent; he punched her in the shoulder a few days
before their church wedding, causing it to swell, when
she refused to pay for the transportation expenses of
his parents; he hit his own father with a pipe, causing
the latter to fall unconscious, which forced them to
leave Jose's parents' house where they were then
staying; and he even locked her out of their house in
the middle of the night sometime in December 2007
when she fetched her relatives from the bus terminal,
which he refused to perform. Rachel added that Jose
would represent himself as single, would flirt openly,
and had an extra-marital affair which she discovered
when Jose mistakenly sent a text message to her
sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly), stating: "love, kung
ayaw mo na akong magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na
lang dito." Another text message read: "Dumating
lang ang asawa mo, ayaw mo na akong magtext at
tumawag sa'yo ." On one occasion, she, together with
Wesley and Beverly, caught Jose and the other
woman with their child inside their conjugal dwelling.
Finally, she claimed that Jose would refuse any
chance of sexual intimacy between them as they
slowly drifted apart. Rachel, however, admitted that
their married life ran smoothly during its early years,
and it was only later in their marriage that Jose
started frequenting bars and engaging in drinking
sessions.
● The RTC ruled that their marriage is void relying on
the testimony of Dr. Nedy Tayag, a psychologist, who
diagnosed Jose to have Antisocial Personality
Disorder.
● The CA, on appeal from Jose, reversed this decision
stating that it is not enough grounds for psychological
incapacity. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Del Rosarios’ marriage is void;

NO.

HELD:
● In Santos v. CA , the Court declared that
psychological incapacity under Article of the Family
Code must be characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it
must be grave and serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e.,
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
 the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability,
i.e., it must be incurable, or otherwise the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.
● The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 in Republic
v. Molina.
● Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note,
however, that an expert opinion is not absolutely
necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition
under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of
the evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established.
● In Toring v. Toring, the Court emphasized that
"irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity, as [these] may only be due
to a person's difficulty, refusal, or neglect to undertake
the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some
psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family
Code addresses."
● It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does
not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be
characterized as grave, deeply rooted in his
childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential
parameters for establishing psychological incapacity.

187. De la Fuente v De la Fuente, G.R. No. 188400, March 8, FACTS:

RAMOS • Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La
Fuente Jr. first met when they were students at UST. Soon
thereafter, they became sweethearts.
• While they were still sweethearts, Petitioner already
noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to jealousy.
She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in
life and felt insecure of his siblings, who excelled in their studies
and careers.
• On June 21, 1984 Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married
in Mandaluyong City and had two children: Maria Katharyn and
Maria Kimberly.
• Rodolfo’s attitude worsened as they went on with their
marital life. He was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria and
would even skip work at his family’s printing press to stalk her.
• Rodolfo also treated Maria as a sex slave and would have
sex 4 or 5 times a day. He would fetch Maria at work just to have
sex with her during lunch breaks.
• Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because
Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. In the
heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa’s head.
Maria Teresa left with their 2 daughters the conjugal home. Maria
Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that, and she supported
their children by herself.
• On June 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Quezon City.
• Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist
was presented as an expert witness. He testified that he
conducted an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to gather
information on her family background and her marital life with
Rodolfo, and subjected her to a battery of psychological tests. Dr.
Lopez also interviewed Rodolfo's best friend.
• Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality
disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like
reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and
suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives
of [Maria Teresa]; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his
resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe
immaturity.
• Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the
severe forms of personality disorder, even more severe than the
other personality disorders like borderline and narcissistic
personality disorders. Dr. Lopez explained that Rodolfo's
personality disorder was most probably caused by a pathogenic
parental model. Rodolfo's family background showed that his
father was a psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo might have
developed psychic contamination called double insanity, a
symptom similar to his father's. Dr. Lopez further claimed that
Rodolfo's disorder was serious and incurable because of his severe
paranoia.
• Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo’s
marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo’s incapacity to perform his
marital obligations.
• On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its
decision granting the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
• While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine
Rodolfo, the trial court gave credence to his findings as they were
based on information gathered from credible informants. The trial
court held that the marriage between Maria Teresa and Rodolfo
should be declared null and void because "Rodolfo's psychological
incapacity was grave, serious and incurable."
• The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before
the Court of Appeals. It argued that the trial court erred a) in
deciding the case without the required certification from the
Office of the Solicitor General, and b) in giving credence to Dr.
Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held
that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did not
follow the standards set forth in the Molina case.
• CA granted the OSG’s appeal and ruled that the testimony
of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for being hearsay, thus should not
have been given weight. The Court of Appeals also disagreed with
Dr. Lopez’s finding that Rodolfo’s behaviour descended from
psychological illness contemplated under Art. 36 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. YES.

HELD: Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the SC found

that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the
nullity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent. Petitioner was
able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered
from psychological incapacity.

The CA is mistaken when it chided the lower court for giving

undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no
chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of
 respondent’s mental and psychological condition.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes
states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not
automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the
examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since “marriage, by its very
definition, necessarily involves only 2 persons. The totality of the
behaviour of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is
generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.

Marcos v. Marcos
Emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician to examine a
person and declare him/her to be psychologically incapacitated.
What matters is that the totality of evidence presented
established the party’s psychological condition.

Article 68 of the family code obligates the husband and wife “to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.” In this case, petitioner and
respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by
petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply
with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even
apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of their marriage.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by
intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and
friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are
proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what
marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for
this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to
respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage
and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there
was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent
truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations.
This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that
respondent's mental illness is incurable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
marriage of Maria Teresa Tani-De La Fuente and Rodolfo De La
Fuente is declared NULL and VOID. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV. No. 76243 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-37829 is
REINSTATED.

188. Bakunawa v Bakunawa, G.R. No. 217993, August 9, FACTS:

● Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the
Philippines where they were students and became
sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she and
Manuel got married on July 26, 1975
● Because Manuel and Nora were both college
undergraduates at that time, they lived with Manuel's
parents. Nora was able to graduate, Manuel had to stop
his studies to help his father in the family's construction
business.
● Manuel was assigned to provincial projects and came
home only during weekends. This setup continued even as
Nora gave birth to their eldest child, Moncho Manuel
 ● However, when Manuel came home from his provincial
assignments, he chose to spend time with his friends and
girlfriends, which Nora resented and became a source of
their quarrels, which was made worse because Manuel
was dependent on his father and on Nora for their family’s
needs.
● In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's
parents, where Manuel observed Nora’s passiveness and
laziness, which irritated him further thus escalating their
verbal quarrels to physical violence.
● On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child.
However, nothing changed in their relationship. Manuel
would often engage in drinking sprees with his friends
● In 1979, he had an extramarital affair and seldom came
home. He eventually left Nora and their children in 1980 to
cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered themselves
separated.
● In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for
her and their children. After Manuel spent a few nights
with them in the new house, Nora became pregnant again
and thereafter gave birth to their third child.
● On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, 9 on the ground that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
● Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr.
Villegas), who testified that Manuel has Intermittent
Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability and
aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the cause.
Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nora with Passive Aggressive
Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative
attitude and passive resistance in her relationship with
Manuel, based on her interview with Manuel and the
parties' eldest son, Moncho, because Nora did not
participate in the psychological assessment.
● RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage null
and void ab initio
● Nora appealed to the CA where the ruling of the RTC was
reversed and set aside.
ISSUE:
WON the totality of evidence presented by Manuel is sufficient to
prove the psychological incapacity of both parties to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. - NO

HELD:
● The totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising
of his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the
latter's psychological evaluation report, is insufficient to
prove that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential obligations of marriage
● In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang ,the Court held that
"[i]f the incapacity can be proven by independent means,
no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
admitted to support a conclusion of psychological
incapacity, independently of a psychologist's examination
and report." In this case, the only person interviewed by
Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses'
 psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be
considered as a reliable witness to establish the
psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to
Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could not have been
there at the time his parents were married. The incapacity
(need not to be manifested but at least attached) must be
proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage (Molina Doctrine)
● The court also notes that Manuel did not undergo any
psychological tests, despite having the opportunity to do
so. While it is true that there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated should
be examined by a physician, this rule is only applicable
when the totality of evidence is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity. In this case, the personality
disorder of Manuel could have been established by
psychometric and neurological tests which are objective
compared to that of Moncho’s testimony

189. Republic v Tionglico, GR 218630, Jan. 11, 2018 FACTS:

● Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a
group of mutual friends. After a brief courtship, they
entered into a relationship. When she got pregnant, the
two panicked as both their parents were very strict and
conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news well as
he was worried how it would affect his image and how
his parents would take the situation. Nevertheless, they
got married on July 22, 2000.
● They moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until
the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico
(Lanz), on December 30, 2000. Lawrence was distant
and did not help in rearing their child, saying he knew
nothing about children and how to run a family.
Lawrence spent almost every night out for late dinners,
parties and drinking sprees. Katrina noticed that
Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother and
suffered from a very high degree of immaturity.
Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with
him and they lost all intimacy between them as he
insisted to have a maid sleep in their bedroom every
night to see to the needs of Lanz.
● Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all
of Katrina's decisions — from the manner by which she
took care of Lanz, to the way she treated the household
help. Most fights ended up in full blown arguments,
often in front of Lanz.
● In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked
Katrina to leave his parents' home and never to come
back. They have been separated in fact since then.

Expert opinion
● Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano
(Dr. Arellano), who confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's
psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the
narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, that is characterized
by a heightened sense of self-importance and grandiose
feelings that he is unique in some way.
● Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is
permanent, incurable, and deeply integrated within his
 psyche; and that it was present but repressed at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the onset
was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and
irresponsible behaviors interfered in his capacity to
provide mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual help, and
support to his wife.

RTC granted the petition:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C.
Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab initio. As a necessary consequence of
this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of
her husband having lost the right over the same and so as to avoid
the misconception that she is still the legal wife of respondent.
Custody over the couple's minor child is awarded to petitioner,
with reasonable visitation rights accorded to respondent,
preferably Saturday and Sunday, or as the parties may agree
among themselves.

CA affirmed RTC, OSG filed on behalf of the Republic a petition

for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling the declaration of

the nullity of marriage

HELD: YES

Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity"

has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Katrina also failed
to prove the psychological incapacity of Lawrence in accordance
with the Molina case. The court further ruled:
● First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is
psychologically incapacitated were based solely on
Katrina's statements. It bears to stress that Lawrence,
despite notice, did not participate in the proceedings
below, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite
being invited to do so.
● Second, the testimony of Katrina (fights, etc) is not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations that characterize some
marriages.
● Third, we reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist,
Katrina did not present other witnesses to substantiate
her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity.
Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and
had no serious evidentiary value.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby

GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8,
2012 Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Imus
Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and
declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and
Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
docketed as Civil Case No. 4903-11 is hereby DISMISSED.|||
190. Singson v Singson, GR 210766, Jan. 8, 2018
FACTS:
● It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, Maria
Concepcion (petitioner) and Benjamin L. Singson
(respondent) were married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso
L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal;
that said marriage produced four children, all of whom
are now of legal age; that when they started living
together, petitioner noticed that respondent was
"dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the expense
of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and
spiritually, and a compulsive gambler; that respondent
was immature, and was not able to perform his
paternal duties; that respondent was also
irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of
infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior made
him completely unable to render any help, support, or
assistance to her; and that because she could expect
no help or assistance at all from respondent she was
compelled to work doubly hard to support her family
as the sole breadwinner.
● Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this
Petition, respondent was confined at Metro Psych
Facility, a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and
that respondent's attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita
Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the
following diagnosis on respondent: Based on history,
mental status examination and observation, he is
diagnosed to be suffering from Pathological
Gambling.
● While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted in
behavioral changes as a young boy, it would be
difficult to say that the psychotic episodes he
manifested in 2003 and 2006 are etiologically related
to the general medical condition that occurred in his
childhood.
● Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to
significant impairment in social, occupational and
interpersonal relationship. In respondent’s case, this
has persisted for several years, and can be traced
back [to] his adolescence since he started gambling
while in high school. He is therefore diagnosed to be
suffering from Personality Disorder.
● All these, put together, hindered respondent from
performing his marital obligations.
● Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came
from a "distraught" family and had a "dysfunctional"
childhood; that respondent had all the love, care, and
protection of his parents as the youngest child for
some time; but that these parental love, care and
protection were, however, transferred to his youngest
brother who was born when respondent was almost
five years old; and that these factors caused
respondent emotional devastation from which he
never recovered.
● Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent
even as a high school student, was already betting on
jai alai. She also claimed that she tried to adjust to
respondent's personality disorders, but that she did
not attain her goal.
● Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent
did not enter into any antenuptial agreement to
 govern their property relations as husband and wife
and that they had no conjugal assets or debts.
● Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent
claimed that "psychological incapacity" must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability, which are not present in the instant case
because petitioner's allegations are not supported by
facts.
● Respondent further averred that it was not true that
he failed to render any help, support or assistance to
petitioner and their family; that the family home where
petitioner and their children are living was in fact his
own capital property; that his shortcomings as
mentioned by petitioner do not pertain to the most
grave or serious cases of personality disorders that
would satisfy the standards required to obtain a
decree of nullity of marriage; that petitioner's
complaint is nothing more than accomplaint of a
woman with a unsatisfactory marriage who wants to
get out of it; that contrary to petitioner's claim that he
is a good-for-nothing fellow, he has a college degree
in business administration, and is a bank employee,
and, that it was money problem, and not his alleged
personality disorder, that is the wall that divided him
and petitioner.
● Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay
the basis for the conclusions of the psychiatrist to the
effect that he is suffering from pathological gambling
and personality disorder; that petitioner's allegation
that he came from a distraught family and that he
suffered emotional devastation is vague, and bereft of
particular details, and even slanderous; and that
assuming that he had not acted the way petitioner
expected him to conduct himself, his actions and
behavior are not psychological illnesses or personality
disorders, but simply physical illnesses of the body,
akin to hypertension and allied sicknesses, and that
these physical illnesses are not at all incurable
psychiatric disorders that were present at the time of
his marriage with petitioner.
● Respondent furthermore claimed that he and
petitioner had conjugal assets and debts; that the land
where their family home is built came from his
earnings, hence the family home is their conjugal
property; that he and petitioner also have a house and
lot in Tagaytay City, as well as bank accounts that are
in petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner also
have investments in shares of stocks, cars, household
appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these are
conjugal assets because they came from petitioner's
salaries and his (respondent's) own inheritance
money.
● Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of
the present Petition, petitioner had caused him to be
admitted into the Metro Psych Facility for treatment;
that on account of his confinement and treatment in
this psychiatric facility, he has incurred medical
expenses and professional medical fees; and that
since it is petitioner who manages all their finances
and conjugal assets it stands to reason that he should
be awarded "spousal support."
ISSUE: W/N Benjamin Singson is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
making their marriage void ab initio?

HELD:
NO. In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held
that petitioner failed to prove that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations because she failed to establish that such
incapacity was grave and serious, and that it existed at the
time of the marriage, and that it is incurable. We agree.

this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion

that "personality disorders are generally incurable" as this is
not a matter that courts are mandated to take judicial notice
under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation

where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing at the time the
marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the
obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly
entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013
Decision and January 6, 2014 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are AFFIRMED.