G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos,1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the
historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the
provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing
legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51%
shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by
the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or
the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise
and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial
support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel.2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent
GSIS state —
I.
CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the
conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995
(reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder
will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares
and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the
other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must
negotiate and execute with the
GSIS/MHC the Management
Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other type of
contract specified by the Highest
Bidder in its strategic plan for the
Manila Hotel. . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must
execute the Stock Purchase and
Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE
WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC
PARTNER —
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary
contracts with GSIS/MHC not
later than October 23, 1995
(reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the
GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee
on Privatization)/OGCC (Office of
the Government Corporate
Counsel) are obtained.3
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered
by Renong Berhad.4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995
petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-
three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid
of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . .5 which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51%
of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition
and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En
Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then
set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando
and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage
and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos
who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its
power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino
people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the
national patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the
shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the
hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being
a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock
of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the
national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the
national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched
the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate
that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block
of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate,
there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which
business may be done."9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel
does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial
sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second
paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to
respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in
the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the
hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under
the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the
Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the
Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable
since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be
considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the
disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the
Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the
beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the
bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the
privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only
takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching
bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded
the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the
privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of
discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its
discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse
its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act
required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for
the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes
certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a
law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null
and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies
and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact
laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish
an outline of government providing for the different departments of
the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself
and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus
a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that
the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been
generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become
in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon
the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and
the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more
like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing
view is, as it has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from
discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —
MR. RODRIGO. Madam
President, I am asking this
 question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the
wording of "PREFERENCE" is
given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS,"
can it be understood as a
preference to qualified
Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who
are not qualified. So, why do we
not make it clear? To qualified
Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the
question of Commissioner
Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?".
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say
definitely "TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam
President, I think that is
understood. We use the word
"QUALIFIED" because
the existing laws or prospective
laws will always lay down
conditions under which business
may be done. For example,
qualifications on the setting up of
other financial structures, et
cetera (emphasis supplied by
respondents)
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter
of style.
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a
way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply
for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted
by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective
in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability
is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution,
further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily
mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10,
second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third
paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs
are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation
to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the
same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference
to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain
constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and
policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional
provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital
role of the youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social
justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance 26 refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice and
human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan,
29
Inc. v. Morato cites provisions on the promotion of general
welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in
nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development. 33A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows
that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions
manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations
must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission 34 explains —
The patrimony of the Nation that should be
conserved and developed refers not only to out rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage
of out race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop
 not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who corporation wholly owned by
resources but also the mental ability or faculty of acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management Filipino citizens?
our people. of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. MR. MONSOD. At least 60
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino percent, Madam President.
pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel MR. DAVIDE. Is that the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38 intention?
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in
in Our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which fact, we would be limiting it if we
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the say that the preference should
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when 1986 Constitutional Commission only be 100-percent Filipino.
it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino,
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that
venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine Davide is recognized. meaning clear because
history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" may refer
of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine MR. DAVIDE. I would like to only to individuals and not to
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine introduce an amendment to the juridical personalities or entities.
Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are Nolledo amendment. And the
accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36 amendment would consist in MR. MONSOD. We agree,
substituting the words Madam President. 39
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the
Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. 37During World War II the following: "CITIZENS OF THE
xxx xxx xxx
hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS
military headquarters. When the American forces returned to OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote,
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING
may I request that the
with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY
amendment be read again.
in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political SUCH CITIZENS.
activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970
the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment
xxx xxx xxx
international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent will read: "IN THE GRANT OF
and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d' RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
MR. MONSOD. Madam
etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
President, apparently the
of the Philippine Republic. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
proponent is agreeable, but we
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
have to raise a question. Suppose
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness it is a corporation that is 80-
FILIPINOS." And the word
to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its percent Filipino, do we not give it
"Filipinos" here, as intended by
existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity preference?
the proponents, will include not
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
only individual Filipinos but also
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo Filipino-controlled entities or
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC amendment would refer to an entities fully-controlled by
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it individual Filipino. What about a Filipinos. 40
 The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained
thus —
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I
would like to request
Commissioner Nolledo to please
restate his amendment so that I
can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT
OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS."
MR FOZ. In connection with that
amendment, if a foreign
enterprise is qualified and a
Filipino enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more
qualified in some aspects than
the Filipino enterprise, will the
Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is
"yes."
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision
Commissioner Nolledo continues —
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of
"MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE SHALL GlVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This
embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That
means that Filipinos should be given preference in
the grant of concessions, privileges and rights
covering the national patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional
Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified
by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the
"Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is
better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This
provision was never found in previous
Constitutions . . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that
preference shall be given to those citizens who can
make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient,
since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counter productive and inimical to the common
good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified
Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the
former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so
considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of
the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in
accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is
that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven
management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant
equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall
management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the
Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution
by arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and
requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to
violate a clear constitutional provision — by the government itself —
is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to
renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For,
even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need
implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be
the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the
government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further
enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse
of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —
The executive department has a constitutional duty
to implement laws, including the Constitution, even
before Congress acts — provided that there are
discoverable legal standards for executive action.
When the executive acts, it must be guided by its
own understanding of the constitutional command
and of applicable laws. The responsibility for
reading and understanding the Constitution and
the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If
it were, the executive would have to ask Congress,
or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every
time the executive is confronted by a constitutional
command. That is not how constitutional
government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is
at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC
could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting
through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed
out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered "state action" covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public
function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with
the private actor as to make the government responsible for his
action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the
action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of
its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third
categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the
transaction. although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the
people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed
to the State is correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher
bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly
provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning
bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts,
and secured the requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that
the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the
dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the
bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be
nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle
in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with
the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution
lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any
reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason
enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign
bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the
highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a
public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while
this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding
rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded.
To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
These are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore
desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies
or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations
under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well
aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were
invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if
no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the
highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while
petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding
because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet
matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the
right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its
earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign
firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's
matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional
safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist
on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino
group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays
down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left
with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of
MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with
petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse
of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is
embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must
it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution
will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of
upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to
defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this
Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of
foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes
more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference
for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the
Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not
been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is
not its function to substitute its judgment for that
of the legislature or the executive about the
wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in
nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared
criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to
 economic progress and development . . . in
connection with a temporary injunction issued by
the Court's First Division against the sale of the
Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner,
certain statements were published in a major daily
to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates
that the Philippine legal system can be a major
obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while
it is no business of the Court to intervene in
contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as
the judge of whether they are viable or attainable,
it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not
violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not
adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter
how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed
criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its
business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the
character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material
values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be
pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the
Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values.
Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper
governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct
in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when
the Constitution is involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being
a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the
Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates.
In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the
goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation
of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept.
Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy.
It cannot override the demands of nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property SO ORDERED.
in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has
hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima,
Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of Jr., JJ., concur
states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their
desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official
visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of
twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has
become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history
of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the
shaping of a country. 51
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined
efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand
Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands
cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner
viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of
foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be
equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos
Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino?
How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural
heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how
much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony
is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning
Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court,
heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of
being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect
and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to
execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds
as may be necessary for purpose.
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA,
JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M.
RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of
the Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as
OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G.
MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO
V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L.
TOLENTINO, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to
enjoin respondents from replacing them from their respective
positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.
As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on
the Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to respondents' Comment.
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo
M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners
Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la
Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise
known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by
respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC
Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a
Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating
respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V.
Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the
Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the
Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent portions of which
read:
xxx xxx xxx
That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such
on March 20, 1986;
That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the
performance of my duties thereof, I among others, have signed as I
did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of
all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of
Taytay, Rizal;
That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was
signed by me personally on February 8,1987;
That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all
concerned the following day, February 9. 1987.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.
Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.
Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of
February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that
pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall
commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors
shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It
is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority
to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the
Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which
provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under
the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation
or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
appointment is made within a period of one year from February
25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the
terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and
that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted
provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired;
and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of
office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have
been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision
of the Provisional Constitution.
Examining the said provision, there should be no question that
petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may
continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the
occurrence of any of the events mentioned. 1
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has
been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of
elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether
or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was
validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25,
1987.
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we
hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date
of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated,
in keeping with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year
deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over
purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. SO ORDERED.

By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed
to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent
OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by
petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure

specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares
it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of
the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the
autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which
the barangays form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to
"general supervision" over local governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8,
Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ...

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by

law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent

between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and
the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered
as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, reading:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations

letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not
inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC

Governor on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal
EN BANC
G.R. No. 45859 September 28, 1938
GOLD CREEK MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and
QUIRICO ABADILLA, Director of the Bureau of Mines, respondents.
Claro M. Recto and DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Tuason and Ramon Diokno for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This petition seeks to compel the respondents, as Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce and as Director of the Bureau of Mines,
respectively, to approve petitioner's application for patent for a
certain mining claim and prepare the necessary papers in relation
thereto, and to forward and submit said papers for the signature of
the President of the Philippines.
The petition alleges that petitioner owns the Nob Fraction mineral
claim, situated in the barrio of Gomok, municipality of Itogon, sub-
province of Benguet, Mountain Province, and located on public lands
by C. L. O'Dowd in accordance with the provisions of the Act of
congress of July 1, 1902, as amended by the Act of Congress of
February 6, 1905, and of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission,
relative to the location of mining claims; that said claim was located
on January 1, 1929, and the original declaration of location registered
in the office of the mining recorder of Benguet, Mountain Province,
on January 7, 1929; that from March 16 to 17, 1934, an amended
location on the premises was made, for which an amended
declaration of location was registered in the office of the mining
recorder on April 3, 1934; that petitioner by itself and its
predecessors in interest, has been in continuous and exclusive
possession of said claim from the date of location thereof: that prior
to August 9, 1933, petitioner filed in the office of the Director of Lands
an application for an order of patent survey of said claim, which
survey was duly authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce and performed by a mineral land surveyor in the former
divisions of mines, Bureau of Science, from August 9, 1933, to April
30, 1934, at the expense of petitioner; that the return of the surveyor,
the plat and field notes of the claim and certificate that more than
P1,600 worth of labor and improvements had been expended on said
claim, were approved by the Director of the Bureau of Science; that
prior to November 15, 1935, petitioner filed with the mining recorder
an application for patent, together with a certificate showing that
more than P1,600, worth of labor and/or improvements had been
expended by the petitioner upon said claim, and with the plat and
field notes above mentioned; having previously posted a copy of such
plat, together with notice of said application for patent in a
conspicuous place upon said claim; and filed a copy of such plat and
of such notice in the office of said mining recorder, as well as an
affidavit of two persons that such notice had been duly posted; that
prior to November 15, 1935, the notice of petitioner's application for
patent was forwarded by the mining recorder to the division of
mines, so that the latter could order the publication of said notice
was made once a week for a period of sixty days in the "Philippines
Herald," "El Debate," and the Official Gazette, commencing February
13, 1936; that the sum of P113.59 was tendered to respondents, as
payment for the purchase price of said claim, the area of which is
4.5434 hectares; and that petitioner has requested the respondents,
as Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and as director of the
Bureau of Mines, respectively, to approve its application for patent,
and to prepare the necessary papers relative to the issuance thereof
and to submit such papers for the signatures of the President of the
Philippines, but the respondents have failed and refused, and still fail
and refuse, to do so.
Petitioner claims that it is entitled, as a matter of right, to the patent
applied for, having complied with all the requisites of the law for the
issuance of such patent.
Respondents, in their answer, admit some allegations of the petition
and deny others, and, by way of special defense, allege that
"petitioner was not and is not entitled as a matter of right to a patent
to the 'Nob Fraction' claim because the Constitution provides that
'natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land, shall
not be alienated'; and that the respondents are, not only under no
obligation to approve petitioner's application for a patent to said
claim and to prepare the necessary papers in relation thereto, but,
also, in duty bound to proven the issuance of said patent and the
preparation of the aforesaid papers, because they have sworn to
support and defend the Constitution."
This is one of several cases now pending in this court which call for an
interpretation, a determination of the meaning and scope, of section
1 of Article XII of the Constitution, with reference to mining claims.
The cases have been instituted as test cases, with a view to
determining the status, under the Constitution and the Mining Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 137), of the holders of unpatented mining
claims which were located under the provisions of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, as amended.
In view of the importance of the matter, we deem it conducive to the
public interest to meet squarely the fundamental question
presented, disregarding for that purpose certain discrepancies found
in the pleadings filed in this case. This is in accord with the view
expressed by the Solicitor-General in his memorandum where he says
that "the statements of facts in both briefs of the petitioners may be
accepted for the purpose of the legal issues raised. We deny some of
the allegations in the petitions and allege new ones in our answers,
but these discrepancies are not of such a nature or importance as
should necessitate introduction of evidence before the cases are
submitted for decision. From our view of the cases, these may be
submitted on the facts averred in the complaints, leaving out the
difference between the allegations in the pleadings to be adjusted or
ironed out by the parties later, which, we are confident, can be
accomplished without much difficulty."
Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution reads as follows:
SECTION 1. All agriculture, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land, shall
not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be
the measure and the limit of the grant.
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give
effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that
which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of
public agriculture land. It seems likewise clear that the term "natural
resources," as used therein, includes mineral lands of the public
domain, but not mineral lands which at the time the provision took
effect no longer formed part of the public domain. The reason for this
conclusion is found in the terms of the provisions itself. It first
declares that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, etc., and other natural resources of the Philippines, belong
to the State. It then provides that "their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution." Next comes the prohibition against the alienation of
natural resources. This prohibition is directed against the alienation
of such natural resources as were declared to be the property of the
State. And as only "agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain" were declared property of the State, it is fair to
conclude that mineral lands which at the time the constitutional
provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain, do
not come within the prohibition.
This brings us to the inquiry of whether the mining claim involved in
the present proceeding formed part of the public domain on
November 15, 1935, when the provisions of Article XII of the
Constitution became effective in accordance with section 6 of Article
XV thereof. In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a
constitutional provisions must be presumed to have been framed and
adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and
with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the
people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and
existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and
upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption."
(Barry vs. Truax, 13 N. D., 131; 99 N. W., 769; 65 L. R. A., 762.)
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according
to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this
court in McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil., 749), a valid
location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public
domain. Said the court in that case: "The moment the locator
discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and
perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the
United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the
possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands
had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that
could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands
cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations;
and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands
afterward included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation
does not effect the validity of the former location. By such location
and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain
even as against the Government . (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S.,
337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc., 546.)"
The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent
therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed
by law. "Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area
becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the
locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co., 171
U. S., 650, 655; 43 Law. ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining
claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of
the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the
exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the
minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the
extralateral rights of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right
before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator
acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location made in
compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government
until patent issues." (18 R. C. L., 1152.) In Noyes vs. Mantle (127 U. S.,
348, 351; 32 Law. ed., 168, 170), the court said:
There is no pretense in this case that the original locators did not
comply with all the requirements of the law in making the location of
the Pay Streak Lode Mining claim, or that the claim was ever
abandoned or forfeited. They were the discoverers of the claim. They
marked its boundaries by stakes, so that they could be readily traced.
They posted the required notice, which was duly recorded in
compliance with the regulations of the district. They had thus done
all that was necessary under the law for the acquisition of an
exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the ground. The
claim was thenceforth their property. They needed only a patent of
the United States to render their title perfect, and that they could
obtain at any time upon proof of what they had done in locating the
claim, and of subsequent expenditures to specified amount in
developing it. Until the patent issued the government held the title in
trust for the locators or their vendees. The ground itself was not
afterwards open to sale.
In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States,
it was said:
The rule established by innumerable decisions of this court, and of
state and lower Federal courts, that when the location of a mining
claim is perfected under the law, it has the effect of a grant by the
United States of the right of present and exclusive possession. The
claim is property in the fullest sense of that term; and may be sold,
transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without infringing any right or
title of the United States. The right of the owner is taxable by the
state; and is "real property," subject to the lien of a judgment
recovered against the owner in a state or territorial court.
(Belk vs. Neagher, 104 U. S., 279, 283; 26 L. ed., 737, 737; 1 Mor. Rep.,
510; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U. S., 505, 510, 511; 38 L. ed., 532-534;
14. Sup. Ct. Rep., 651; 18 Mor. Min. Rep., 85; Elder vs. Wood, 208 U.
S., 226, [317] 232; 52 L. ed., 464, 466; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 263;
Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U. S., 389; 53 L. ed., 564; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
349.) The owner is not required to purchased the claim or secure
patent from the United states; but so long as he complies with the
provisions of the mining laws, his possessory right, for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.
(Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U. S., 306; 74 Law. ed.,
445.)
The Solicitor-General admits in his memorandum that the decision in
the McDaniel case in determinative of the fundamental question
involved in the instant case. But he maintains "that this decision is
based on a misapprehension of the authorities on which the court
relied," and that it "is not well founded and should be abandoned."
We do not deem it necessary to belabor this point. Whether well
founded or not, the decision in that case was the law when section 1
Article XII of the Constitution became effective; and even if we were
disposed to overrule that decision now, our action could not affect
rights already fixed under it.
Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no
longer formed part of the public domain when the provisions of
Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come
within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and
the petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon compliance
with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
It remains to consider whether mandamus is the proper remedy in
this case. In Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that "mandamus will lie to
compel the secretary of the Interior to dispose of an application for a
patent for a mining claim on its merits, where his refusal to do so is
based on his misinterpretation of a statute." In the course of its
decision the court said: "While the decision of this court exhibit a
reluctance to direct a writ of mandamus against an executive officer,
they recognize the duty to do so by settled principles of law in some
cases. (Lane vs. Hoglund, 244 U. S., 174, 181; 61 L. ed., 1066, 1069; 37
Sup. Ct. Rep., 552; and case cited.) In Roberts vs. United States (176
U. S., 221, 231; 44 L. ed., 443, 447; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 376), referred to
and quoted in the Hoglund case, this court said:
and the court could on that account be powerless to give relief. Such
a limitation of the powers of the court, we think, would be most
unfortunate, as it would relieve from judicial supervision all executive
officers in the performance of their duties whenever they should
plead that the duty required of them arose upon the construction of
a statute, no matter how plain its language, nor how plainly they
violated their duty in refusing to perform the act required."
In the instant case, we are not justified, upon the state of the
pleadings, to grant the relief sought by the petitioner. Considering,
however, that the refusal of the respondents to act on the application
for a patent on its merits as due to their misinterpretation of certain
constitutional and statutory provisions, following the precedent
established by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, a writ of mandamus
should issue directing the respondents to dispose of the application
for patent on its merits, unaffected by the prohibition against the
alienation of natural resources contained in section 1 of Article XII of
the constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.

"Every statute to some extent requires constructions by the public

officer whose duties may be defined therein. Such officer must read
the law, and he must therefore, in a certain sense, construe it, in
order to form a judgment from its languages what duty he is directed
by the statute to perform. But that does not necessarily and in all
cases make the duty of the officer anything other than a purely
ministerial one. If the law direct him to perform an act in regard to
which no discretion is committed to him, and which, upon the facts
existing, he is bound to perform, then that act is ministerial, although
depending upon a statute which requires, in some degree a
construction of its language by the officer. Unless this be so, the value
of this writ is very greatly impaired. Every executive officer whose
duty is plainly devolved upon him by a statute might refuse to
perform it, and hen his refusal is brought before the court he might
successfully plead that the performance of the duty involved the
construction of a statute by him, and therefore it as not ministerial,
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR.
AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA
RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD
CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
B.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO
LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO
LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO
NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA,
ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA,
JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN,
SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA,
DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON,
LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS,
RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO
MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO
ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO
BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL
DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO,
GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO
LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM
MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA
SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT
M. REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI,
BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK
COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO
MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA
NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY
ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA
PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C.
LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN
MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR.,
RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN,
MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P.
GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER
CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE
RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO
BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION
LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA,
ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U.
SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA,
MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER
JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON.
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA,
ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR.
MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND
MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON.
REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.
PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA
D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P.
NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.
CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR
THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND
GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO
SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST
SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS,
JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER,
MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR
A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY,
DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG
LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY
ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED
MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED
BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
[MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA
L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND
BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter
how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be,
over the determination by the independent branches of government
of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional
powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and
bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often
frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among
these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such
today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal
luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the
present controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the
filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within
the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the
resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political
crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon
by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is
sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that
this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the
feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither
necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection
of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the
Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this
Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine
of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute
autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental
power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which
has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the
official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect
without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican
government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power
is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the
delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is
in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus
populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall RULE II RULE
andVexpenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. PROCEEDINGS
On June 2, AGAINST THE SAME
2003, former OFFICIAL
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. – impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is Impeachment shall be initiated only by a verified Section 16. –Hilario
Chief Justice Impeachment
G. DavideProceedings
Jr. and seven Deemed
Associate Justices5 of this
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the Initiated.
Court for – In cases where
"culpable a Member
violation of the of the House betrayal of the
Constitution,
shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a files a verified
public complaint
trust and other highof impeachment
crimes."6 The or a citizenwas endorsed by
complaint
shall forthwith proceed. resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof or by files a verified complaint
Representatives that is Ronaldo
Rolex T. Suplico, endorsedB. by a
Zamora and Didagen
a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed Member of the House
Piang Dilangalen, 7
and was through a resolution
referred to the House of Committee on
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the endorsement
Justice on August against
5, 2003an8 in impeachable
accordance with officer,
Section 3(2) of Article
official more than once within a period of one year. House. impeachment proceedings
XI of the Constitution which against
reads: such official are
deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice
finds that3(2)
Section the Averified
verifiedcomplaint
complaintand/or resolution may be filed by
for impeachment
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
against such official, as the case may
any Member of the House of Representatives be, is sufficient
or by any citizen upon
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be
inasubstance, or on the date the
resolution of endorsement by any Member House votes to which shall be
thereof,
on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on
overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall
that the verified
referred to the complaint
proper and/or resolution,
Committee withinas three
the session days
not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
case may be, is not sufficient in substance.
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
Insession
cases where
days afrom
verified
suchcomplaint
referral, or a resolution
together with ofthe corresponding
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
impeachment is filed
resolution. The or endorsed,
resolution shall as
bethe case mayfor
calendared be,consideration by
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
bythe
at House
least one-third
within ten(1/3) of days
session the from
Members of thereof.
receipt the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless
House, impeachment proceedings are deemed
be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according
initiated
The Houseat the time ofonthe
Committee filingruled
Justice of such verified13, 2003 that the
on October
to law.
complaint or resolution of impeachment with
first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," the 9 but voted to
Secretary General.
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
underscoring supplied)
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution,
Proceedings.
Four months– and
Within a period
three weeks of onethe
since (1)filing
yearonfrom
June 2, 2003 of the
the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT the date impeachment proceedings are deemed
first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
initiated
Committeeas onprovided in Section
Justice voted 16 it,
to dismiss hereof, no impeachment
the second
(House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment impeachment 11 proceedings, as such, can be initiated
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by
previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress.
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official against the same Gilberto
Representatives official. C.(Italics
Teodoro,in the original;
Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and
The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House
more than once within the period of one (1) year. emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that
"[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging
that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental
importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress," 14 posits that his right
to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary
changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on
November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that
(1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9
thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to
comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution,
to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the
records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules
which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the
issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the
Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for
Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public
funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this
Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this
nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for
Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as
taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition
for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting
to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents
De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina
and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of
the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring
that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray
in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second
impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that
they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless
spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to
protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the
Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it
is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution
endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances
emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court
enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance
of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint,
and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its
prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or
to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose
members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T.
Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both
allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount
public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles
of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen
and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as
a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility
to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8,
9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be
permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment
Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation
Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they
claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v.
Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of
Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents
House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this
Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment
complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in
interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan
Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of
national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest
in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials
in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays
for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the
Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint
due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer,
alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella
and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment
complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they
acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail
the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and
Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an
abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are
trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House
of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from
trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without
alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment
complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial
Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that
the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in
the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction"
that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging
that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment
complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and
void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3)
respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of
Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution
of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of
Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents
Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in
the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited
from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and
160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this
Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for
the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules
as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and
160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief.
In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged
that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the
administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct
violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second
impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it
was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for
lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of
Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or
before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse
themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban
inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its
Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the
petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the
Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions
not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for
oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d)
appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition,
this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the
status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their
behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the
petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of
Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-
respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a
Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear,
much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is
an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated
duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex
Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the
issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole
power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment
court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where
the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld
pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this
Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated
petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than
4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate
President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar
as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no
basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the
petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its
constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court
commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment,
which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions
pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave
to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,
and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this
Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily
put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and
praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question
is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court
to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in
Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in
G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-
Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator
Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition
in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici
curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator
Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this
Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-
vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues
arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and
opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for,
this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the
threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial
review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2)
whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive
issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in
seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the
power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial
branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987
Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
(Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded
upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the
present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial
power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department
is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power
of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels,for then the
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government
mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional
grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for
a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication
from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is
to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved
in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power
of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to
"determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is
not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such
power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803
leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial
review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what
shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first
mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those
only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that
rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments,
are bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express
grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was
exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm
acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former
Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and
legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom
or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is
indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of
powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the
people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government. x x
x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of
its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To him,
"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that
balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave
abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of
government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block
letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the
following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent,
former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the government, which then had no
legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is,
the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and
other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed
because the government set up the defense of political question. And
the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that
this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial
law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or
so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions,
this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which
employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should
ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts
to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of
the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent
of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole
as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where,
speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it
declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it
should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of
the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court,
through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not
have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with
all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this
Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another,
if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear,
resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from
what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it
than in the framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional
refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial
review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor
Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has
excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et.
al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a
judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at
any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of
judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's
"sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the
application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the
Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment
proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely
heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in
the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate
to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes;
it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which
impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it
would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US
Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in
cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American
jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the
Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as
provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power
of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions
incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer
controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive
merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in
the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional
disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence
some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated
by different constitutional settings and needs." 53 Indeed, although
the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the
colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine
Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the
power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme
Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and
the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though
vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to
initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the
exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5),
Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment
of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to
conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this
Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the
people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the
above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to
the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-
defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially
discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise
of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited
by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment
power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These
cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to
compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not
concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the
power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago
v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition
raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court
declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being
violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v.
Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review.
In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it
held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is
vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power
of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the
National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of
whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power
of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument
by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions,
contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief
Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus
curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza
similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners
have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving
paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and
that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that
they have not abused the discretion given to them. 72 Amicus
curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the
same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-
entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is
unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the
case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners
standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-
interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil
procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In
view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the
Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify
what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-
interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest
has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that
standing because of its constitutional and public policy
underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue.
Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that
only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions
require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy
concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is
whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'" 76 (Citations
omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by
the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives,
none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal
rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the
vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress;
citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of
the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when specific requirements have been met have been
given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be
able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid,
but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies
the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient
that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant
standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment
and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any
official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 83
While an association has legal personality to represent its
members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers
and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with
standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and
the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it
has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all
citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully
protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal
properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a
class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under
the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears
that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the
divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court,
G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers,
however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole
ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U.
Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme
Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character
of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of
a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition
by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct
and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying
these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised
herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on
the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues
raised are of paramount importance to the public. 91 Such liberality
does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should
have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at
the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being
one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos'
case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus
have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of
right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R.
No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same
issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as
earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and
Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No.
160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that
"they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of
the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of
transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of
the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based
on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby
granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for
the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view
that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting
to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will
undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator
Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being
a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are
directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues
relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted
and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must
be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to
meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set
forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent
in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to
allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of
public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper
purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does
not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando,
held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was
done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the
filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice
in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The
questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before
suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant
petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President
Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this
Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on
questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all
remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of
Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going
attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment
complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House
Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise
constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of
Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to
the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles
are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of
their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the
House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither
would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit
of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution 97 and,
therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from
either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is
shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of
Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with
definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning
impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively
vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is
bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly
without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of
taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some
cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question
doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. 100 In
other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it
found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. 101 Even in the landmark 1988 case
of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of
whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this
Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance
thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political
question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question
doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the
Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became
a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial
review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I
suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among
the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds
the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with
which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of
reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of
God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception.
x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the
provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the government, which then had no
legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is,
the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees,
and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law
failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we
have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary
feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved.
It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the
people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are
familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the
Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with
a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs.
the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was
announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated
September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was
that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent
newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced
on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In
fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main
writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the
object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22
had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the
fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the
proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971
Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of
them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the
unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by
representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the
delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution
was presented to the President around December 1, 1972,
whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which
suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree
which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain
matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a
free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite
was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous
by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum,
however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized
with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its
approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the
plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a
referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the
questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced
until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed
supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then
designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays
came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released
with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary
to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum
should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a
motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of
the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard
before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the
Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new
Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority
of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution.
Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I
proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I
then informed the Court and the parties the presidential
proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified
by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that the
court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to
January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution.
Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of
Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in
their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in
the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum
proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a
majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no
referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a
big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another
group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political
question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only
major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up.
There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the
issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power?
What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to
settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed
by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case,
a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her
duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her
duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we
cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her
husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so
personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly
derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides
that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the
Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of
government are generally considered divided into three branches:
the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of
that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or
not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or
so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of
the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief
Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power,
thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but
judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in
other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to
identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there
is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary
cases but where there is a question as to whether the government
had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question.
Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided
by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the
political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of
discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended
to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what
is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial
power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we
might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising
from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly
political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a
power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1,
Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2)
those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political
in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the
UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken
jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the
effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame
Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which
the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to
the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice
Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court
must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987
Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with
the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this
Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable
political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however.
Identification of these two species of political questions may be
problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case
of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct
concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one
strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American
concept of judicial review is radically different from our current
concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our
courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should
pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from
a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question
of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice
into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.
Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such
an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six
grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes
and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the
boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-
justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever
possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this
Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it
is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which
the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case
arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of
Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due
process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over
a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied.
Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict
of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional
question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party,
and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the
decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality
unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking
the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively
raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this
controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether
one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed
upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that
"the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that,
among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid
since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative
inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry
petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of
the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims,
it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the
constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative
inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second
impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue
would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of
legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is
required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is
further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised
other grounds in support of their petition which would not be
adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of
legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court
in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21,
Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure"
and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right
to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's
self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second
impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella,
the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI
of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of
Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment,
the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-
mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have
verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement."
Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of
Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement
of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto
Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the
Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment
complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and
for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least
one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not
having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second
impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred
to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of
the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who
opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply,
there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and
verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed
and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice
Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the
resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such
resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one
Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and
Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to
the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations
militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present
controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised
this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment
complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for
deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for
naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but
the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as
unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier
by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined
in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments
and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly
prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably
linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant
controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the
ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole
power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court
reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of
review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that
"[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume
jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof
are subject to impeachment."125But this argument is very much like
saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with
penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives
are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an
option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because
this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced
as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty
vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take
cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus
curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn
duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our
system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the
challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. 128 On
the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the
controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as
always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the
judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass
upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they
expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be
unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be
equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest
had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent
Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition
of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of
SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested
parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced
the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose
disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter.
This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but
to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which
it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal
be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the
power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public
interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than
the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—
elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon.
Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992
elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the
Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or
mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels
that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that
in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot
legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and
that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly
a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court
itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And
if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the
jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court,
the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the
deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very
heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to
abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the
original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court
when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan
cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review,
enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in
the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit,
a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an
inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the
Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of
two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will
decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution
are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on
an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than
the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or
property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only
in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . .
In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit
brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment
declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge
of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by
the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at
the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided
(citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required
by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the
operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this
Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for
judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments
might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and
the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the
scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious
political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable
official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that
failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would
result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public
confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly
stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a
constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from
upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot
abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may
start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses
to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive
act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed
upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not
only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number
of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other,
itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at
least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split
and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the
petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing
constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that
the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a
lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to
believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a
precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and
anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the
land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well
guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of
justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within
which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office,
then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by
the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or
even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia,
argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present
Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to
file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of
Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly
mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the
Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by
a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House
of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have
been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act
on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the
term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in
order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an
Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as
"to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner
Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings,
which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during
the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5,
2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of
taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that
indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5)
of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action
on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as
dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely
puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes
with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who
elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on
November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The
end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the
formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the
initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment
is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is
looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the
procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would
need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the
Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of
which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne
out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last
impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang
Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution
covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with
initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial
and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking
that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment
on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that
the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is
actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the
body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor.
If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was
the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on
that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging
these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have
been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of
the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on
the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal,
but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to
indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of
the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect
the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of
the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States
regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of
this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we
delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the
letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so
that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of
all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or
to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as
the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and
every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing
of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House.
I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not
vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States
Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was
clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of
Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the
filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner
Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase
"to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of
the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood
once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings
starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of
the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing
of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of
the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same
view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article
XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing
must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified
that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis
supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment
proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb
is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case."
The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding."
Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases"
must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An
impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by
the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by
a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate.
It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all
cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must
be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium,
means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun.
It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the
Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the
filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the
House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the
complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee
rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded
to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of
the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either
affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a
contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at
least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this
point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this
point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached.
That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case"
before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not
initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial
because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning
of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further
step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the
initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its
ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing
that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was
met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of
the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the
filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not
found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No
impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second
verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded
on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which
means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the
people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and
that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and
not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not
as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body
can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says
"The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said
provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula
singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action
of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a
finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the
House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient
in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the
House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since
the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from
filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court
could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the
interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v.
Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions
(referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our
deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded
utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he
states that this Court likened the former members of the
Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their
emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the
real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present
petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who
participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice
Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken
part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court
has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members
of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of
the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3
(8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the
power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its
argument is premised on the assumption that Congress
has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption,
however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the
very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides
for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles
of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same
shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is
the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making
power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter
or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the
province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it
was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its
members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando,
speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States
v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question
becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United
States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking
for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house
to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further
that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all
matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature.
In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in
his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as
he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason
for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize
the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over
he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation
of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as
a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the
US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the
judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance
of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one
of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the
hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and
recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names
of the members voting, and be counted and announced in
determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker
or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do
the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule
present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the
question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method
of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are
open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate,
or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a
different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time.
The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised
by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the
validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found
to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be
attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction
to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation
of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII
of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x
x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is
new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or
any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous
power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law
where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the
eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-
vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government. 155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court
is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to
deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this
Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of
government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or
wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this
Court against the other branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected
by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the
courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our
experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and
more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts
of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution,
there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but
what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration
to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls
us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the
rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last
bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this
new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this
exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed
the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on
inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the
lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant
petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private
rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v.
US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply
provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No
limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court
concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to
impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since
our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions
articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003
and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice
on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is
always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual
and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair
for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean
the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For
many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating,
mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have
fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they
respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues
involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or
against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets
armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the
matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired
military, to the academe and denominations of faith – offered
suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations
of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived
resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of
Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked,
told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with
respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public
official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the
doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was
made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction,"
"non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the
Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment
proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as
the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate
what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in
full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally
vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose
resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a
provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an
issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can
properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with
the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government.
Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under
the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for
it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with
the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial
supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and
resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had
none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court
to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their
own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of
having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of
constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief
Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to
protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue
is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be
farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other
courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to
resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved
in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the
course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer
therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be
made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and
the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in
these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who
is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental
issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act
as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are
rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part
in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution
now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely
incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case,
which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in
any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law
as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to
secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is
no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous
in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme
Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through
its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind
in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law
and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is
the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than
anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights
irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt
been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief
Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other
than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared
would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed
immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our
bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through
this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can
resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon
each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI
of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity
as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
PADILLA, J.:
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional
boundaries. In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are
taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent
Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent
Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from
effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason
of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the
constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for
stability in the public service, the Court resolved to give due course
to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural
questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test
respondent Mison's right to the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring
this suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the
Commission on Appointments to intervene and file a petition in
intervention. Comment was required of respondents on said petition.
The comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The
parties were also heard in oral argument on 8 December 1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it
involves a conflict between two (2) great departments of
government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also
occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively
clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose
Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give
effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that
which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
themselves.
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions,
not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative
department may want them construed, but in accordance with what
they say and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom
the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law; 3
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are
initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone
of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or
without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and
statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But
we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional
construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with
more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the framers of the
1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the
appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth
groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief
Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional
provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the
light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference
to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a
constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the
subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express
their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D.,
131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935
Constitution, it is provided that —
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the army from the
rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain
or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may
by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
(4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ...
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that-
Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and
offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the
rank of Brigadier General or Commodore, and all other officers of The
government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime
Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee, Courts,
Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint
inferior officers in their respective offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments Appointments over presidential appointments more limited than that
required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution. Thus-
Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history that the
power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under Mr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized
the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many times,
into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices. The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few
authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the amendments that
successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment I would like to propose to the Committee this morning.
in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and
the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the
state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people
Commission on Appointments be limited to the department heads,
adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent
ambassadors, generals and so on but not to the levels of bureau heads
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first
and colonels.
group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such
confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e.,
officers of lower rank.
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two
(2) major changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this
were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from
conclusion. The original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by
the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on
the Committee on the Executive of the 1986 Constitutional
Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under
Commission, read as follows:
the second sentence 9 of the section from the same requirement. The
records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a
the following:
Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page 7,
may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President
Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words "and bureaus," and
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis
on line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase 'colonel or naval
supplied].
captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last amendment
which is co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is to put a period (.)
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision
after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same page, start a new
in the 1935 Constitution. When the frames discussed on the floor of
sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera.
the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling
was manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on
MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by one. The first
proposed amendment is to delete the words "and bureaus" on line
26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners, what
would be the justification of the proponent for such a deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite low in the
executive department, and to require further confirmation of
presidential appointment of heads of bureaus would subject them to
political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by
deletion also includes regional directors as distinguished from merely
staff directors, because the regional directors have quite a plenitude
of powers within the regions as distinguished from staff directors
who only stay in the office.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the supervisiopn
of the staff bureau directors.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner Foz? The
Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus on
Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not the
President?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their
appointment shall no longer be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the same answer
of Commissioner de Castro?
MR. FOZ: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction of the
Committee?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels that this
matter should be submitted to the body for a vote.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by one. We will
first vote on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus on line 26, such
that appointments of bureau directors no longer need confirmation
by the Commission on Appointment.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and
with the consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the phrase 'and
bureaus' on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendments is approved.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment on
page 7, line 28. 1 propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on line
29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT
ANY.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee accepts the
proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other
officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an amendment to his
amendment, so that after "captain" we insert the following words:
AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM
IN THIS CONSTITUTION?
FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.
MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for in the
Constitution whose appointments are vested in the President, as a
matter of fact like those of the different constitutional commissions.
FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in Section 16 is
not an exclusive list of those appointments which constitutionally
require confirmation of the Commission on Appointments,
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation of the words
I proposed.
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his proposed
amendment?
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND OTHER OFFICERS
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION.
FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION"?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the
Committee.
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that excludes those
officers which the Constitution does not require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, like the members of the judiciary and
the Ombudsman.
MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the modification
made by Commissioner Bernas.
THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed amendment of
Commissioners Foz and Davide.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed amendment
of Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted by the Committee?
(Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment, as amended, is
approved 10 (Emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third
groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the
second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII reading-
He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint . . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the
President shall "in like manner" appoint the officers mentioned in
said second sentence. In other words, the President shall appoint the
officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he
appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by
nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence
is not necessarily supportive of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as
the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean "in addition;
as well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981
edition) which meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word
"also" in said second sentence means that the President, in
addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first
sentence, can appoint (without such consent (confirmation) the
officers mentioned in the second sentence-
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings
of the word "also" as used in the context of said second sentence, the
Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first
sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the
President. And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences
proximate to each other underscores a difference in message
conveyed and perceptions established, in line with Judge Learned
Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien
juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly justify such
differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require no
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such
officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose
appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII.
Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor
requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even
if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the
purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the
1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose
appointments require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16,
Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President
without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what
they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or
presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such
power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it
is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated
that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint,
the intervenor Commission on Appointments underscores the third
sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [Emphasis
supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of
lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the
absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by
the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows
that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President,
subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence
of Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-
ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in
the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government.
No reason however is submitted for the use of the word "alone" in
said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered
opinion, after a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone" after the
word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more
than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled
that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision appears at the
end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof —
...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments. [Emphasis supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately
after the provision which makes practically all presidential
appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, thus-
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the
rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain
or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint; ...
In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general
rule, presidential appointments to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an
exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by
law vest the appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers
lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear
and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential
appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned
in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was
no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word
"alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by
law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President
alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the
power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the
President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article
VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated
merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may
by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the
heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word
"alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section
10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in
the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this
redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments,
except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII,
are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident
that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out,
while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those
officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately
excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that
need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601
of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have
one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the
Commissioner (hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and
Assistant Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual
compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing
laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by
the proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972
by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as follows:
Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of
Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known
respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as
Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall each
receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates
prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy
Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were
approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which
the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No.
1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII,
with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an
appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment,
however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted
within her constitutional authority and power in appointing
respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,
without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as
they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40004 January 31, 1975
BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., TRINIDAD HERRERA, BISHOP FRANCISCO
CLAVER, S.J., BISHOP ANTONIO NEPOMUCENO, BISHOP JESUS
VALERA, BISHOP FELIX ZAFRA, BISHOP TEOTIMO PACIS, EUGENIO
LOPEZ, JR., SERGIO OSMEÑA, III, ANTONIO ARANETA, ANTONIO
MIRANDA, RAUL GONZALES, JOKER ARROYO, and EMILIO DE
PERALTA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Renato E. Tañada and Wigberto E. Tañada for
petitioners
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor
General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V.
Mendoza & Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for
respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:p
I
This petition for prohibition, which was filed on January 21, 1975,
seeks the nullification of Presidential Decrees Nos. 1366, 1366-A,
calling a referendum for February 27, 1975, Presidential Decrees Nos.
629 and 630 appropriating funds therefor, and Presidential Decrees
Nos. 637 and 637-A specifying the referendum questions, as well as
other presidential decrees, orders and instructions relative to the said
referendum.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed their comment
on January 28, 1975. After the oral argument of over 7 hours on
January 30, 1975, the Court resolved to consider the comment as
answer and the case submitted for decision.
The first ground upon which the petition is predicated states that
President Ferdinand E. Marcos does not hold any legal office nor
possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or
the 1973 Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the
questioned proclamations, decrees and orders. This challenges the
title of the incumbent President to the office of the Presidency and
therefore is in the nature of a quo warranto proceedings, the
appropriate action by which the title of a public officer can be
questioned before the courts. Only the Solicitor General or the
person who asserts title to the same office can legally file such a quo
warranto petition. The petitioners do not claim such right to the
office and not one of them is the incumbent Solicitor General. Hence,
they have no personality to file the suit (Castro vs. Del Rosario, Jan.
30, 1967, 19 SCRA 197; City of Manila & Antonio Villegas vs. Abelardo
Subido, et. al., May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 231-232, 235-236; Nacionalista
Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101; and Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85
Phil. 127). It is established jurisprudence that the legality of the
appointment or election of a public officer cannot be questioned
collaterally through a petition for prohibition which assails the
validity of his official acts.
The foregoing governing legal principles on public officers are re-
stated in order to avert any misapprehension that they have been
eroded by Our resolution in the instant petition.
Because of the far-reaching implications of the herein petition, the
Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised.
II
This Court already ruled in the Ratification Cases "that there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in
force and effect." As Chief Justice Makalintal stressed in the Habeas
Corpus cases, the issue as to its effectivity "has been laid to rest by
Our decision in Javellana versus Executive Secretary (L-36142, March
31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 141), and of course by the existing political
realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in our relation
with countries" (Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile and 8 companion cases, L-
35546, L-35538-40, L-35538-40, L-35547, L-35556, L-35571 and
L-35573, Sept. 17, 1971, 59 SCRA 183, 241).
III
In the aforesaid Habeas Corpus cases, We affirmed the validity of
Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 issued on September 22, 1972 by
President Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance
of said proclamation pursuant to the 1935 Constitution that the
factual bases had not disappeared but had even been exacerbated;
that the question is to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation
has been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973
Constitution, which provides that "all proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent
President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid,
legal, binding and effective even after the lifting of Martial Law or the
ratification of this Constitution ..."; and that "any inquiry by this Court
in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual
bases for the proclamation of Martial Law, has become moot and
purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-
28, 1973. The question propounded to the voters was: "Under the
(1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can continue in
office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to continue
beyond 1973 and finish the reforms be initiated under Martial Law?"
The overwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots, including
citizens beyond 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the proposal.
The question was thereby removed from the area of presidential
power under the Constitution and transferred to the seat of
sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the exercise of that
power by the President in the beginning — whether or not purely
political and therefore non-justiciable — this Court is precluded from
applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the sovereign." (Aquino, Jr.
vs. Enrile, supra, 59 SCRA 183,
240-242).
Under the 1935 Constitution, President Ferdinand E. Marcos was duly
reelected by the vote of the sovereign people in the Presidential
elections of 1969 by an overwhelming vote of over 5,000,000 electors
as against 3,000,000 votes for his rival, garnering a majority of from
about 896,498 to 1,436,118 (Osmeña vs. Marcos, Presidential
Election Contest No. 3, Jan. 8, 1973). While his term of office under
the 1935 Constitution should have terminated on December 30,
1973, by the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign
people expressly authorized him to continue in office even beyond
1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on
January 17, 1973 by the sovereign people) in order to finish the
reforms he initiated under Martial Law; and as aforestated, as this
was the decision of the people, in whom "sovereignty resides ... and
all government authority emanates ...," it is therefore beyond the
scope of judicial inquiry (Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile, et. al., supra, p. 242).
The logical consequence therefore is that President Marcos is a de
jure President of the Republic of the Philippines.
IV
The next issue is whether he is the incumbent President of the
Philippines within the purview of Section 3 of Article XVII on the
transitory provisions of the new or 1973 Constitution. As heretofore
stated, by virtue of his reelection in 1969, the term of President
Marcos tinder the 1935 Constitution was to terminate on December
30, 1973. The new Constitution was approved by the Constitutional
Convention on November 30, 1972, still during his incumbency. Being
the only incumbent President of the Philippines at the time of the
approval of the new Constitution by the Constitutional Convention,
the Constitutional Convention had nobody in mind except President
Ferdinand E. Marcos who shall initially convene
the interim Assembly. It was the incumbent President Marcos alone
who issued Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 on September 22,
1972 and issued orders and decrees as well as instructions and
performed other acts as President prior to the approval on November
30, 1972 of the new Constitution by the Constitutional Convention
and prior to its ratification on January 17, 1973 by the people.
Consequently, since President Marcos was the only incumbent
President at the time, because his term under the 1935 Constitution
has yet to expire on December 30, 1973, the Constitutional
Convention, in approving the new Constitution, had in mind only him
when in Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the new Constitution it provided
"that all the proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts
promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part
of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and
effective even after lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or other acts of
the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified
or repealed by the regular National Assembly."
The term incumbent President of the Philippines employed in Section
9 of the same Article XVII likewise could only refer to President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. .
This conclusion is further buttressed by Section 10 of the same Article
XVII which provides that "the incumbent members of the
Judiciary may continue in office until they reach the age of 70 years
unless sooner replaced in accordance with the preceding section
hereof." There can be no dispute that the phrase "incumbent
members of the Judiciary" can only refer to those members of the
Judiciary who were already Justices and Judges of the various courts
of the country at the time the Constitutional Convention approved
the new Constitution on November 30, 1972 and when it was ratified.
Because President Ferdinand E. Marcos is the incumbent President
referred to in Article XVII of the transitory provisions of the 1973
Constitution, he can "continue to exercise the powers and
prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five Constitution
and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under
this Constitution until he calls upon the interim National Assembly to
elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall
then exercise their legislative powers vested by this Constitution (Sec.
3[l], Art. XVII, 1973 Constitution).
Under the 1935 Constitution, the President is empowered to
proclaim martial law. Under the 1973 Constitution, it is the Prime
Minister who is vested with such authority (Sec. 12, Art. IX, 1973
Constitution).
WE affirm the proposition that as Commander-in-Chief and enforcer
or administrator of martial law, the incumbent President of the
Philippines can promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during
the period of Martial Law essential to the security and preservation
of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of
the people and to the institution of reforms to prevent the
resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat
thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession,
inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations
including highly developed countries (Rossiter, Constitutional
Dictatorship, 1948 Ed., pp. 7, 303; see also Chief Justice Stone's
Concurring Opinion in Duncan vs. Kahanamoku, 327 US 304).
To dissipate all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority
by the President during the period of Martial Law, Section 3(2) of
Article XVII of the New Constitution expressly affirms that all the
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts he
promulgated, issued or did prior to the approval by the Constitutional
Convention on November 30, 1972 and prior to the ratification by the
people on January 17, 1973 of the new Constitution, are "part of the
law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective
even after the lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or other acts of the
incumbent President, or unless expressly and specifically modified or
repealed by the regular National Assembly."
The entire paragraph of Section 3(2) is not a grant of authority to
legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor
of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.
Dr. Jose M. Aruego, noted authority in Constitutional Law as well as
delegate to the 1935 and 1971 Constitutional Conventions, shares
this view, when he states thus:
108. ... — These Presidential Proclamations, order, decrees,
instructions, etc. had been issued by the incumbent President in the
exercise of what he consider to be his powers under martial law, in
the same manner that the lawmaking body had enacted several
thousand statutes in the exercise of what it consider to be its power
under the Organic Laws. Both these classes of rules of law — by the
President and by the lawmaking body — were, under general
principles of constitutional law, presumed to be constitutional until
declared unconstitutional by the agency charged with the power and
function to pass upon constitutional law question — the Judiciary, at
the apex of which is the Supreme Court. Hence, the inclusion of both
group of rules — President rules and legislative rules — in the new
Constitution for the people to approve or disapprove in the
scheduled plebiscite. (Aruego, The New Constitution, 1973 Ed., p.
230).
Delegate Arturo Pacificador, a Floor Leader of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, in explaining Section 3(2) of Article XVII, underscores this
recognition of the legislative power of the incumbent President as
Commander-in-Chief during martial Law, thus:
The second paragraph sets forth the understanding of the
Convention of the nature, extent and scope of the powers of the
incumbent President of the Philippines, under martial law. It
expressly recognizes that the commander-in-chief, under martial law,
can exercise all necessary powers to meet the perils of invasion,
insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof. This provision
complements Section 7, Article XVII of the Constitution that "all
existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the National
Assembly."
The second paragraph is an express recognition on the part of the
framers of the new Constitution of the wisdom of the proclamations,
orders, decrees and instructions by the incumbent President in the
light of the prevailing conditions obtaining in the country. (Montejo,
New Constitution, 1973 Ed., p. 314, emphasis supplied).
The power under the second clause of Section 3(2) is not limited
merely to modifying, revoking or superseding all his proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions or other acts promulgated, issued or
done prior to the ratification of the 1973 Constitution. But even if the
scope of his legislative authority thereunder is to be limited to the
subject matter of his previous proclamations, orders, decrees or
instructions or acts, the challenged Proclamations Nos. 1366 and
1366-A, as well as Presidential Decrees Nos. 629, 630, 637 and 637-A
are analogous to the referenda of January, 1973 and July 27-28, 1973.
The actions of the incumbent President are not without historical
precedents. It should be recalled that the American Federal
Constitution, unlike the 1935 or 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
does not confer expressly on the American President the power to
proclaim Martial Law or to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. And
yet President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, and President
Roosevelt during the Second World War, without express
constitutional or statutory authority, created agencies and offices
and appropriated public funds therefor in connection with the
prosecution of the war. Nobody raised a finger to oppose the same.
In the case of President Roosevelt, the theater of war was not in the
United States. It was thousands of miles away, in the continents of
Europe and Africa and in the Far East. In the Philippines, military
engagements between the government forces and the rebels and
secessionists are going on, emphasizing the immediacy of the peril to
the safety of the Republic itself. There is therefore greater reason to
affirm this law-making authority in favor of the incumbent President
during the period of Martial Law.
Petitioners further argue that the President should call
the interim National Assembly as required of him by Section 3(1) of
Article XVII, which National Assembly alone can exercise legislative
powers during the period of transition.
It should be stressed that there is a distinction between the existence
of the interim Assembly and its organization as well as its functioning.
The interim Assembly already existed from the time the new
Constitution was ratified; because Section 1 of Article XVII states that
"there shall be an interim National Assembly which shall exist
immediately upon the ratification of this Constitution and shall
continue until the members of the regular National Assembly shall
have been elected and shall have assumed office ..." However, it
cannot function until it is convened and thereafter duly organized
with the election of its interim speaker and other officials. This
distinction was clearly delineated in the case of Mejia, et. al. vs.
Balolong, et. al. where We held that from the phrase "the City of
Dagupan, which is hereby created, ...," Dagupan City came into
existence as a legal entity upon the approval of its Charter; but the
date of the organization of the city government was to be fixed by the
President of the Philippines, and necessarily was subsequent to the
approval of its organic law (81 Phil. 486, 490-492).
Petitioners likewise urge that the President should have convened
the interim Assembly before the expiration of his term on December
30, 1973. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the
prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. This was
revealed by no less than Delegate Jose M. Aruego himself, who
stated:
109. Convening the interim National Assembly. — The Constitutional
Convention could have fixed the date when the interim National
Assembly should convene itself as it did with respect to the regular
National Assembly. There would not have been any need for any
Presidential call as there is none, with respect to the regular National
Assembly.
But considering that the country had been already placed under
martial law rule the success of which was conditioned upon the unity
not only of planning but also in the execution of plans, many
delegates felt that the incumbent President should be given the
discretion to decide when the interim National Assembly should be
convened because he would need its counsel and help in the
administration of the affairs of the country.
And in the event that it should convene, why did the interim National
Assembly not fix its tenure, and state expressly when the election of
the members of the regular National Assembly should be called?
Many of the delegates felt that they could not be sure even of the
proximate date when the general conditions of peace and order
would make possible orderly elections, ... (The New Philippine
Constitution by Aruego, 1973 Ed., p. 230).
This was also disclosed by Delegate Arturo F. Pacificador, who
affirmed:
Under the first paragraph of this section, the incumbent President is
mandated to initially convene the interim National Assembly.
Note that the word used is "shall" to indicate the mandatory nature
of the desire of the Constitutional Convention that
the interim National Assembly shall be convened by the incumbent
President. The Constitutional Convention, however, did not fix any
definite time at which the incumbent President shall initially convene
the interim National Assembly. This decision was deliberate to allow
the incumbent President enough latitude of discretion to decide
whether in the light of the emergency situation now prevailing,
conditions have already normalized to permit the convening of
the interim National Assembly. (Montejo, The New Constitution,
1973 Ed., p. 314).
It is thus patent that the President is given the discretion as to when
he shall convene the interim National Assembly after determining
whether the conditions warrant the same.
His decision to defer the initial convocation of the interim National
Assembly was supported by the sovereign people at the referendum
in January, 1973 when the people voted to postpone the convening
of the interim National Assembly until after at least seven (7) years
from the approval of the new Constitution. And the reason why the
same question was eliminated from the questions to be submitted at
the referendum on February 27, 1975, is that even some members of
the Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who
are already ipso factomembers of the interim National Assembly, are
against such inclusion; because the issue was already decided in the
January, 1973 referendum by the sovereign people indicating thereby
their disenchantment with any Assembly as the former Congress
failed to institutionalize the reforms they demanded and had wasted
public funds through the endless debates without relieving the
suffering of the general mass of citizenry.
Petitioners likewise impugn the scheduled referendum on the ground
that there can be no true expression of the people's will due to the
climate of fear generated by Martial Law and that the period of free
discussion and debate is limited to two weeks from February 7 to 21,
without right of rebuttal from February 22 until the day of the
referendum.
The first objection is not tenable because during the senatorial
elections in 1951 and 1971, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
was suspended, during which period of suspension there was fear of
arrest and detention. Yet the election was so free that a majority of
the senatorial candidates of the opposition party were elected and
there was no reprisal against or harrassment of any voter thereafter.
The same thing was true in the referendum of July 27-28, 1973, which
was done also through secret ballot. There was no Army, PC, or police
truck, bus or other mode of transportation utilized to transport the
voters to the various precincts of the country. There was no PC, Army
or police personnel assigned to each election precinct or voting
booth. And such assignment would be impossible; because the
combined membership of the police, PC, and Army was then as now
very much less than the number of precincts, let alone the number of
voting booths. And no one would be left to fight the rebels or to
maintain peace and order. And as heretofore stated, the voting was
done in secrecy. Only one voter at a time entered the voting booth.
The voting was orderly. There was no buying of votes or buying the
right not to vote. And as opined by the Solicitor General, every
qualified voter who fails to register or go to the polling place on
referendum day is subject to prosecution; but failure to fill up the
ballot is not penalized.
In the Habeas Corpus cases, We declared that the result of the
referendum on July 27-28, 1973 was a decision by the sovereign
people which cannot be reviewed by this Court. Then again, it is too
late now for petitioners to challenge the validity of said referendum.
Moreover, as stressed by the Solicitor General, the previous
referenda of January and July, 1973, were a lot more free than the
elections under the Old Society previous to the proclamation of DECREES NOS. 629,630, 637 AND 637-A ARE HEREBY DECLARED
Martial Law, where the will of the voter was subverted through "guns, VALID, AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITHOUT COSTS.
goons and gold", as well as through fraud. All modes of transportation
were utilized by the candidates and their leaders to transport the
voters to the precinct. The voters were likewise wined and dined and
so prostituted that they refused to vote until the required monetary
persuasion was proffered, if they were not being subjected to various
forms of intimidation. In some areas, the ballots were filled up and
the election returns were accomplished before election day. Even
animals and dead persons voted. The decisions in the electoral
contests filed after every election under the Old Society attest to this
very unflattering fact in our history.
The second objection that the two-week period for free debate is too
short, is addressed to the wisdom of the President who may still
amend the proclamation to extend the period of free discussion.
At any rate, such a brief period of discussion has its counterpart in
previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Under the Old
Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to
the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937
(Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as
ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski Act of the US
Federal Congress to the 1935 Constitution was published in only
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to
the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act No. 492). For the 1940
constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the
reelection of the President and Vice-President, and the creation of
the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com. Act No.
517).And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional
amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of
the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73).
The period of 14 days for free discussion can compare favorably with
the period required for publication of the proposed amendments
under the Old Society.
WHEREFORE, PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS IS HEREBY
DECLARED DE JURE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, PRESIDENTIAL
PROCLAMATIONS NOS. 1366 AND 1366-A AND PRESIDENTIAL
EN BANC issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits
provisions of the assailed Executive Order are: public respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with the other
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991 public officials enumerated in the list attached to the petitions as
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his Annex "C" in G.R. No.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant 838153 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 838964 from holding any other
vs. secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department office or employment during their tenure. In addition to seeking a
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent. may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284,
positions in the government and government corporations and petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines further seeks in G.R.
receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this No. 83815 the issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition
G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991
limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to and mandamus, as well as a temporary restraining order directing
boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman. public respondents therein to cease and desist from holding, in
ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T.
addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple positions other
REYES, petitioners,
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving
vs.
secretary or other appointive official of the Executive Department any salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of privileges and
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS
holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and compelling
DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING,
(sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate public respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and all
as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports; FULGENCIO
official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more amounts or benefits that they may have received from such positions.
FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources;
VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, as than two positions other than his primary position.
Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges
Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in that notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and self-executing"
Employment; LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of Local Government;
government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey
FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National Defense; TEODORO F.
(1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either Ordoñez, construing Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7,
BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as Secretary of
be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary. par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series
Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of
of 1987,5 declaring that Cabinet members, their deputies
Science and Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade
(undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public
and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows
office, including membership in the boards of government
ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in
as Secretary of Transportation and Communication; GUILLERMO secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition
the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio member
CARAGUE, as Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein
of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article
Head of the National Economic Development imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions
Authority, respondents. Constitution,2 which provides as follows:
of their respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the
President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days before
Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated Executive Order
David for petitioners in 83896. and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided
No. 284.6
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815. in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
"lumped together" Section 13, Article VII and the general provision in
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB. This "strained linkage"
FERNAN, C.J.:p agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
between the two provisions, each addressed to a distinct and
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
separate group of public officers –– one, the President and her official
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated family, and the other, public servants in general –– allegedly
August 9, 19881 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a "abolished the clearly separate, higher, exclusive, and mandatory
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
constitutional rank assigned to the prohibition against multiple jobs
for the President, the Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of
government expected to lead by example."7 Article IX-B, Section 7,
par. (2)8 provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ
Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as further elucidated and clarified by
DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 19879 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series
of 1988,10 being the first official construction and interpretation by
the Secretary of Justice of Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section
7, Article I-XB of the Constitution, involving the same subject of
appointments or designations of an appointive executive official to
positions other than his primary position, is "reasonably valid and
constitutionally firm," and that Executive Order No. 284,
promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is
consequently constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion No.
129, series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988 construed
the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not applying to ex-
officio positions or to positions which, although not so designated
as ex-officio are allowed by the primary functions of the public
official, but only to the holding of multiple positions which are not
related to or necessarily included in the position of the public official
concerned (disparate positions).
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being
challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the
Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),
Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8
(1), Article VIII.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in
Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil Service Commission applies
to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said
exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article
VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.
There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President, Vice-
President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants from holding dual or multiple positions in the Government
admits of certain exceptions. The disagreement between petitioners
and public respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the
exception. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article
VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution, as
in the case of the Vice-President being allowed to become a Member
of the Cabinet under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or
the Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public
respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII
makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members,
their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad
exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7,
par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus:
"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporation or their subsidiaries."
We rule in the negative.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The
object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought
to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect
that purpose.11
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of
various government agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, became prevalent
during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law
authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created agencies,
instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled
corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of
presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or
assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board
with the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances
and other perquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities have
remained up to the present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who
took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In
fact, the holding of multiple offices in government was strongly
denounced on the floor of the Batasang Pambansa. 12 This
condemnation came in reaction to the published report of the
Commission on Audit, entitled "1983 Summary Annual Audit Report
on: Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations, Self-Governing
Boards and Commissions" which carried as its Figure No. 4 a "Roaster
of Membership in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."
Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of propriety
and morality in government service were the data contained therein
that Roberto V. Ongpin was a member of the governing boards of
twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies, instrumentalities and
corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A.
Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S.
Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen each (14); Cesar C.
Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B. Ancheta and Jose A. Roño of
twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo
Tordesillas of eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Peña
of ten (10) each.13
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious
causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite
inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of
the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it
was after the people successfully unseated former President Marcos,
should draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions under
consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils
that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and
employment. In fact, as keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz
during the deliberations in these cases, one of the strongest selling
points of the 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its
ratification was the assurance given by its proponents that the
scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions in
the government and collecting unconscionably excessive
compensation therefrom would be discontinued.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7,
Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding
of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both
elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional
Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13,
Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding
any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of
the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of
the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President
and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment
in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13,
Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the
disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding
other offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VI, "(N)o
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government . . .". Under Section
5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed forces in the active
service shall, at any time, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian
position in the Government,including government-owned or
controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even Section 7
(2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government."
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to
hold other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office
or employment in the government and government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the
wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he President,
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure." In the
latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified
by the phrase "in the Government." The prohibition imposed on the
President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers
both public and private office or employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence
provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-
embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official
family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of
the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are
proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and
his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class
stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with
the President and his official family was also succinctly articulated by
Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong
noted during the floor deliberations and debate that there was no
symmetry between the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in
the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the Executive
Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be
stricter with the President and the members of the Cabinet because
they exercise more powers and, therefore, more cheeks and
restraints on them are called for because there is more possibility of
abuse in their case."14
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during
their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions
of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to
lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to
the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the
1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents
would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the
manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect
to holding other offices or employment in the government during
their tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article
VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B
would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the
Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive
Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand,
and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below
Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other
office or position in the government during their tenure.
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would
render certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This observation
applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section 13 of
Article VII is allowed to hold other office or employment when so
authorized by the Constitution, but who as an elective public official
under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is absolutely ineligible "for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure." Surely, to say that the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13, Article
VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB would render
meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing
the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet,15 and to act
as President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the
President shall not nave been chosen or fails to qualify.16 Such absurd
consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions
under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB
providing the general rule and the other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as
constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner must Section
7, par. (2) of Article I-XB be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to
be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.17 Sections
bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution 18 and
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.19
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.20
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is
to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect
to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during
their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with
equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is
prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive
and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language
used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation.21 The phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a
literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited
in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed
as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or
acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars.
(2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-
officiomember of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8
(1), Article VIII.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must
not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation
in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required22 by the
primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these
posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of
the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said officials.23 To characterize
these posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences, among
which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National
Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115
(December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive
Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and
Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would
then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members.
The respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also
be prohibited.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board of
Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC) or the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), both of
which are attached to his department for policy coordination and
guidance. Neither can his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries
chair these agencies.
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary
Board.24 Neither can their respective undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be assisted by
lower ranking employees in providing policy direction in the areas of
money, banking and credit.25
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such
absurd consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a continuously
operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as
demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or
absurd consequences, if possible, should be avoided.26
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be
interpreted as covering positions held without additional
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office.
The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers
to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the
official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any
other appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office."27 An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by
virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or
appointment.28 To illustrate, by express provision of law, the
Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-
officioChairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, 29 and
the Light Rail Transit Authority.30
The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-
officio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board,31 thus: "An examination of section 2 of the
questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman and
members of the Board to qualify they need only be designated by the
respective department heads. With the exception of the
representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to
be designated they must already be holding positions in the offices
mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a
previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the
act, be designated a representative from that office. The same is true
with respect to the representatives from the other offices. No new
appointments are necessary. This is as it should be, because the
representatives so designated merely perform duties in the Board in
addition to those already performed under their original
appointments."32
The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order
of importance and thus means chief or principal function. The term is
not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. 33 The
additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be
required by the official's primary functions. Examples of designations
to positions by virtue of one's primary functions are the Secretaries
of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary Board,
and the Secretary of Transportation and Communications acting as
Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority34 and the Civil
Aeronautics Board.
If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental,
remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to
the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions
would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the
Constitution. An example would be the Press Undersecretary sitting
as a member of the Board of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation. The same rule applies to such positions which confer on
the cabinet official management functions and/or monetary
compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships or
directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-
President, Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants which are
not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or
appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill
in their respective executive offices is a practice long-recognized in
many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of
efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among the
different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its
multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting
national interest and general welfare and delivering basic services to
the people. It is consistent with the power vested on the President
and his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices and to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed.35 Without these additional duties and
functions being assigned to the President and his official family to sit
in the governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or
instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by their primary functions, they would be supervision,
thereby deprived of the means for control and resulting in an
unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or
functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or
functions must be required by the primary functions of the official
concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation
therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part
of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no
right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It
should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he
is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary
function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and
banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to
collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per
them or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the
proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to Section 7, par.
(2), Article IX-B, originally found as Section 3 of the General
Provisions, the exception "unless required by the functions of his
position,"36 express reference to certain high-ranking appointive
public officials like members of the Cabinet were made.37 Responding
to a query of Commissioner Blas Ople, Commissioner Monsod
pointed out that there are instances when although not required by
current law, membership of certain high-ranking executive officials
in other offices and corporations is necessary by reason of said
officials' primary functions. The example given by Commissioner
Monsod was the Minister of Trade and Industry.38
While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople may
be used as authority for saying that additional functions and duties
flowing from the primary functions of the official may be imposed
upon him without offending the constitutional prohibition under
consideration, it cannot, however, be taken as authority for saying
that this exception is by virtue of Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB.
This colloquy between the two Commissioners took place in the
plenary session of September 27, 1986. Under consideration then
was Section 3 of Committee Resolution No. 531 which was the
proposed article on General Provisions.39 At that time, the article on
the Civil Service Commission had been approved on third reading on
July 22, 1986,40 while the article on the Executive Department,
containing the more specific prohibition in Section 13, had also been
earlier approved on third reading on August 26, 1986.41 It was only
after the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and "styling"
by the Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the General
Provisions became Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and reworded
"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position. . . ."
What was clearly being discussed then were general principles which
would serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence of specific
constitutional provisions on the matter. What was primarily at issue
and approved on that occasion was the adoption of the qualified and
delimited phrase "primary functions" as the basis of an exception to
the general rule covering all appointive public officials. Had the
Constitutional Commission intended to dilute the specific prohibition
in said Section 13 of Article VII, it could have re-worded said Section
13 to conform to the wider exceptions provided in then Section 3 of
the proposed general Provisions, later placed as Section 7, par. (2) of
Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission.
That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the
President and his official family is by reason of the legal principles
governing additional functions and duties of public officials rather
than by virtue of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B At any rate, we have
made it clear that only the additional functions and duties "required,"
as opposed to "allowed," by the primary functions may be considered
as not constituting "any other office."
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail 42 as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear.1âwphi1Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value
as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from
what appears upon its face."43 The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it
than in the framers's understanding thereof.44
It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the
1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself
and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of
Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the
debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitution's manifest intent and the
people' understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in
relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences
that will result from a strict application of the prohibition mandated
under Section 13, Article VII on the operations of the Government,
considering that Cabinet members would be stripped of their offices
held in an ex-officio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or
by virtue of legislation. As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-
officio posts held by the executive official concerned without
additional compensation as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of "any
other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition. With respect to other offices or employment held by
virtue of legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
suffice it to say that the feared impractical consequences are more
apparent than real. Being head of an executive department is no
mean job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention,
specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are
to be derived from a department head's ability and expertise, he
should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without
the distraction of other governmental offices or employment. He
should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy
among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in
haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived
from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise,
particularly at this stage of our national and economic development,
far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained from a
department head spreading himself too thin and taking in more than
what he can handle.
Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the
court hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local
Government45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel V.
Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the
Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately relinquish their other
offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. With respect to the other named respondents, the
petitions have become moot and academic as they are no longer
occupying the positions complained of.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be
considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered.46 It has been held that "in cases where
there is no de jure,officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has
had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining
thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may
in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other
compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly,
supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public
should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed
from all liability to pay any one for such services. 47 Any per diem,
allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by
virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may
therefore be retained by them.
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions
are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and
void and is accordingly set aside.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-543 August 31, 1946
JOSE O. VERA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL., respondents.
Jose W. Diokno and Antonio Barredo for petitioners.
Vicente J. Francisco and Solicitor General Tañada for respondents.
J. Antonio Araneta of the Lawyers' Guild as amicus curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
Pursuant to a constitutional provision (section 4, Article X), the
Commission on elections submitted, last May, to the President and
the Congress of the Philippines, its report on the national elections
held the preceding month, and, among other things, stated that, by
reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the
Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting
in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the
popular will.
When the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, it proceeded with the
selection of its officers. Thereafter, in the course of the session, a
resolution was approved referring to the report and ordering that,
pending the termination of the protest lodged against their election,
the herein petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E.
Romero — who had been included among the sixteen candidates for
senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the
Commission on Elections — shall not be sworn, nor seated, as
members of the chamber.
Pertinent parts of the resolution — called Pendatun — are these:
WHEREAS the Commission on Elections, charged under the
Constitution with the duty of insuring free, orderly, and honest
elections in the Philippines, reported to the President of the
Philippines on May 23, 1946, that
". . . Reports also reached this Commission to the effect that in the
Provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija, the secrecy
of the ballot was actually violated; the armed bands saw to it that
their candidates were voted for; and that the great majority of the
voters, thus coerced or intimadated, suffered from a paralysis of
judgement in the matter of exercising the right of suffrage;
considering all those acts of terrorism, violence and intimidation in
connection with elections which are more or less general in the
Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, this
Commission believes that the election in the provinces aforesaid did
not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. It should
be stated, however, that the Commission is without jurisdiction, to
determine whether or not the votes cast in the said provinces which,
according to these reports have been cast under the influence of
threats or violence, are valid or invalid. . . ."
WHEREAS, the minority report of the Hon. Vicente de Vera, member
of the Commission on Elections, says among other things, that "we
know that as a result of this chaotic condition, many residents of the
four provinces have voluntarily banished themselves from their home
towns in order not to be subjected to the prevailing oppression and
to avoid being victimized or losing their lives"; and that after the
election dead bodies had been found with notes attached to their
necks, reading, "Bomoto kami kay Roxas" (we voted for Roxas);
WHEREAS the same Judge De Vera says in his minority report that in
the four Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, the
worst terrorism reigned during and after the election, and that if the
elections held in the aforesaid provinces were annulled as demanded
by the circumstances mentioned in the report of the Commission,
Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, would not and could
not have been declared elected;
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS the terrorism resorted to by the lawless elements in the
four provinces mentioned above in order to insure the election of the
candidates of the Conservative wing of the Nationalist Party is of
public knowledge and that such terrorism continues to this day; that
before the elections Jose O. Vera himself declared as campaign
Manager of the Osmeña faction that he was sorry if Presidential
Candidate Manuel A. Roxas could not campaign in the Huk provinces
because his life would be endangered; and that because of the
constant murders of his candidates and leaders, Presidential
Candidate Roxas found it necessary to appeal to American High
Commissioner Paul V. McNutt for protection, which appeal American
High Commissioner personallyreferred to President Sergio Osme_¤_a
for appropriate action, and the Presidentin turn ordered the
Secretary of the existence and reign of such terrorism;
WHEREAS the Philippines, a Republic State, embracing the principles
ofdemocracy, must condem all acts that seek to defeat the popular
will;
WHEREAS it is essential, in order to maintain alive the respect
fordemocratic institutions among our people, that no man or group
of men be permitted to profit from the results of an election held
under coercion, in violation of law, and contrary to the principle of
freedom of choice which should underlie all elections under the
Constitution;
WHEREAS protests against the election of Jose O. Vega, Ramon
Diokno, and Jose Romero, have been filed with the electoral Tribunal
of the Senate of the Philippines on the basis of the findings of the
Commission on Elections above quoted;
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in
session assembled, as it hereby resolves, to defer the administration
of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose
Romero, pending the hearing and decision on the protests lodged
against their elections, wherein the terrorism averred in the report of
the Commission on Elections and in the report of the Provost Marshal
constitutes the ground of said protests and will therefore be the
subject of investigation and determination.
Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their colleagues
responsible for the resolution. They pray for an order annulling it, and
compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats, and to
exercise their senatorial prerogatives.
In their pleadings, respondents traverse the jurisdiction of this court,
and assert the validity of the Pendatun Resolution.
The issues, few and clear-cut, were thoroughly discussed at the
extended oral argument and in comprehensive memoranda
submitted by both sides.
A.—NO JURISDICTION
Way back in 1924, Senator Jose Alejandrino assaulted a fellow-
member in the Philippine Senate. That body, after investigation,
adopted a resolution, suspending him from office for one year. He
applied here for mandamus and injunction to nullify the suspension
and to require his colleagues to reinstate him. This court believed the
suspension was legally wrong, because, as senator appointed by the
Governor-General, he could not be disciplined by the Philippine
Senate; but it denied the prayer for relief, mainly upon the theory of
the separation of the three powers, Executive, Legislative and
Judicial. (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 81.) Said the decision:
. . . Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members,
or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative
in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative
functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts
cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of
power. So it has been held that where a member has been expelled
by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of
whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to
compel his reinstatement. (Code of civil Procedure, section 222, 515;
18 R.C. L., 186, 187; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 190;
French vs. Senate [1905], 146 Cal; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass.,
468; Ex parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs. Bolte [1889], 151
Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House of Delegates [1904], 5 Porto Rico, 235;
Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17 Colo., 156;
State ex rel. Crammer vs. Thorson [1896], 33 L. R. A., ex rel. Bruce vs.
Dunne [1913], 258 Ill., 441; People ex rel. La Chicote vs. Best [1907],
187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612.) (Supra, pp. 88,
89.)
. . . Under our form of government the judicial department has no
power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance
of the power committed exclusively to that department by the
constitution. (Supra, p. 93)
No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold that
it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature
or a branch thereof to take any particular action. If a court should
ever be so rash as to thus trench on the domain of either of the other
departments, it will be the end of popular government as we know it
in democracies. (Supra, p. 94.)
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an
appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year,
conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for
the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for
cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court
does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate
take any particular action. . . . (Supra, p. 97.)
The same hands-off policy had been previously followed in
Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental
Negros (16 Phil., 366) and Abueva vs. Wood (45 Phil., 612)
At this point we could pretend to erudition by tracing the origin,
development and various applications of theory of separation of
powers, transcribing herein whole paragraphs from adjudicated
cases to swell the pages of judicial output. Yet the temptation must
be resisted, and the parties spared a stiff dose of juris prudential lore
about a principle, which, after all, is the first fundamental imparted
to every student of Constitutional Law.
Not that a passable excuse would be lacking for such a dissertation.
The advent of the Republic, and the consequent finality of our views
on constitutional issues, may call for a definition of concepts and
attitudes. But surely, there will be time enough, as cases come up for
adjudication.
Returning to the instant litigation, it presents no more than the
questions, whether the Alejandro doctrine still obtains, and whether
the admitted facts disclose any features justifying departure
therefrom.
When the Commonwealth Constitution was approved in 1935, the
existence of three coordinate, co-equal and co-important branches
of the government was ratified and confirmed. That Organic Act
contained some innovations which established additional exceptions
to the well-known separation of powers; for instance, the creation of
the Electoral Tribunal wherein Justices of the Supreme Court
participate in the decision of congressional election protests, the
grant of rule-making power to the Supreme Court, etc.; but in the
main, the independence of one power from the other was
maintained. And the Convention — composed mostly of lawyers (143
out of a total of 202 members), fully acquainted with the Abueva,
Alejandrino and Severino precedents — did not choose to modify
their constitutional doctrine, even as it altered some fundamental
tenets theretofore well established.1
However, it is alleged that, in 1936, Angara vs. Electoral Commission
(63 Phil., 139), modified the aforesaid ruling. We do not agree. There
is no pronouncement in the latter decision, making specific reference
to the Alejandrino incident regarding our power — or lack of it — to
interfere with the functions of the Senate. And three years later, in
1939, the same Justice Laurel, who had penned it, cited
Alejandrino vs. Quezon as a binding authority of the separation of
powers. (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil., 62.) It must be stressed that, in the
Angara controversy, no legislative body or person was a litigant
before the court, and whatever obiter dicta, or general expressions,
may therein found can not change the ultimate circumstance that no
directive was issued against a branch of the Legislature or any
member thereof.2 This Court, in that case, did not require the
National Assembly or any assemblyman to do any particular act. It
only found it "has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission." (Supra,
63 Phil., 161.)
That this court in the Angara litigation made declarations, nullifying a
resolution of the National Assembly, is not decisive. In proper cases
this court may annul any Legislative enactment that fails to observe
the constitutional limitations. That is a power conceded to the
judiciary since Chief Justice Marshall penned Marbury vs. Madison in
1803. Its foundation is explained by Justice Sutherland in the
Minimum Wage Case (261 U. S., 544).Said the Court:
. . . The Constitution, by its own terms, is the supreme law of the land,
emanating from the people, the repository of ultimate sovereignty
under our form of government. A congressional statute, on the other
hand, is the act of an agency of this sovereign authority, and if it
conflicts with the Constitution, must fall; for that which is not
supreme must yield to that which is. To hold it invalid (if it be invalid)
is a plain exercise of the judicial power, — that power vested in courts
to enable them to administer justice according to law. From the
authority to ascertain and determine the law in a given case there
necessa ruly results, in case of conflict, the duty to declare and
enforce the rule of the supreme law and reject that of an inferior act
of legislation which, transcending the Constitution, is no effect, and
binding on no one. This is not the exercise of a substantive power to
review and nullify acts of Congress, for such no substantive power
exists. It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and
dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the
determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the
law.
And the power is now expressly recognized by our Organic Act.
(See sections 2 and 10. Article VIII.)
But we must emphasize, the power is to be exercised in proper cases,
with the appropriate parties.
It must be conceded that the acts of the Chief executive performed
within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will
neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is
non-interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily
follow that we are precluded from making an inquiry into the validity
or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly challenged in
an appropriate legal proceeding. . . . In the present case, the President
is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor
restrained to actin a particular way. . . . This court, therefore, has
jurisdiction over the instant proceedings and will accordingly proceed
to determine the merits of the present controversy." (Planas vs. Gil.,
67 Phil., 62, 73, 74, 76.) (Emphasis ours.) (See also Lopez vs. De los
Reyes, 55 Phil., 170.)
More about the Angara precedent: The defendant there was only the
Electoral Commission which was "not a separate department of the
Government" (Vol. 63,p. 160), and exercised powers "judicial in
nature." (Supra, p. 184) Hence, against our authority, there was no
objection based on the independence and separation of the three co-
equal departments of Government. Besides, this court said no more
than that, there being a conflict of jurisdiction between two
constitutional bodies, it could not decline to take cognizance of the
controversy to determine the "character, scope and extent" of their
respective constitutional spheres of action. Here, there is actually no
antagonism between the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate and the
Senate itself, for it is not suggested has adopted a rule contradicting
the Pendatun Resolution. Consequently, there is no occasion for our
intervention. Such conflict of jurisdiction, plus the participation of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal are essential ingredients to make the facts
of this case fit the mold of the Angara doctrine.
Now, under the principles enunciated in the Alejandrino case, may
this petition be entertained? The answer must naturally be in the
negative. Granting that the postponement of the administration of
the oath amounts to suspension of the petitioners from their office,
and conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the power
of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the Philippine
Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 88),this petition should
be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not
order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof.
To do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset
the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our
institutional setup.
Adherence to established principle should generally be our guiding
criterion, if we are to escape the criticism voiced once by Bryce in
American Commonwealth thus:
The Supreme Court has changed its color i. e., its temper and
tendencies, from time to time according to the political proclivities of
the men who composed it. . . . Their action flowed naturally from the
habits of thought they had formed before their accession to the
bench and from the sympathy they could not feel for the doctrine on
whose behalf they had contended. (The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, May, 1936, p. 50.)
Needless to add, any order we may issue in this case should,
according to the rules, be enforceable by contempt proceedings. If
the respondents should disobey our order, can we punish them for
contempt? If we do, are we not thereby destroying the
independence, and the equal importance to which legislative bodies
are entitled under the Constitution?
Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there
is are medy, and that the judiciary should stand ready to afford relief.
There are undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature may not correct,
for instance, those involving political questions. Numerous decisions
are quoted and summarized under this heading in 16 Corpus Juris
Secundum, section 145.
Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary
is the repository of remedies for all political and social ills. We should
not forget that the Constitution had judiciously allocated the powers
of government to three distinct and separate compartments; and
that judicial interpretation has tended to the preservation of the
dependence of the three, and a zealous regard of the prerogatives of
each, knowing full well that one is not the guardian of the others and
that, for official wrong-doing, each may be brought to account, either
by impeachment, trial or by the ballot box.
The extreme case has been described wherein a legislative chamber,
without any reason whatsoever, decrees by resolution the
incarceration, for years, of a citizen. And the rhetorical question is
confidently formulated. Will this man be denied relief by the courts?
Of course not: He may successfully apply for habeas corpus, alleging
the nullity of the resolution and claiming for release. But then, the
defendant shall be the officer or person, holding him in custody, and
the question therein will be the validity or invalidity of resolution.
That was done in Lopez vs. De los Reyes, supra. (See also Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168; 26 Law. ed., 377, p. 391.) Courts will
interfere, because the question is not a political one, the "liberty of
citizen" being involved (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra) and the act
will clearly beyond the bounds of the legislative power, amounting to
usurpation of the privileges of the courts, the usurpation being clear,
palpable and oppressive and the infringement of the Constitution
truly real. (See 16 C.J.S., p. 44.)
Nevertheless, suppose for the moment that we have jurisdiction:
B.—PROHIBITION DOES NOT LIE
Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. Under the law, prohibition
refers only to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, exercising functions judicial or ministerial. (Rule 67, section
2, Rules of Court.) As the respondents do not exercise such kind of
functions, theirs being legislative, it is clear the dispute falls beyond
the scope of such special remedy.
C.—SENATE HAS NOT EXCEEDED POWERS
Again let us suppose the question lies within the limits of prohibition
and of our jurisdiction.
Before the organization of the Commonwealth and the promulgation
of the Constitution, each House of the Philippine Legislature
exercised the power to defer oath-taking of any member against
whom a protest had been lodged, whenever in its discretion such
suspension was necessary, before the final decision of the contest.
The cases of Senator Fuentebella and Representative Rafols are
known instances of such suspension. The discussions in the
constitutional Convention showed that instead of transferring to the
Electoral Commission all the powers of the House or Senate as "the
sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly," it was given only jurisdiction over "all
contests" relating to the election, etc. (Aruego, The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, p. 271.) The proceedings in the
Constitutional Convention on this subject are illuminating:
It became gradually apparent in the course of the debates that the
Convention was evenly divided on the proposition of creating the
Electoral Commission with the membership and powers set forth in
the draft. It was growing evident, too, that the opposition to the
Electoral Commission was due to rather inclusive power of that body
to judge not only of cases contesting the election of the members of
the National Assembly, but also of their elections, returns, and
qualifications.
Many of the delegates wanted to be definitely informed of the scope
of the powers of the Electoral Commission as defined in the draft
before determining their final decision; for if the draft meant to
confer upon the Electoral Commission the inclusive power to pass
upon the elections, returns, and qualifications — contested or not —
of the members of the National Assembly, they were more inclined
to vote against the Electoral Commission. In an attempt to seek this
clarification, the following interpretations took place:
xxx xxx xxx
Delegate Labrador.—Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that
unless this power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own
motion does not have the right to contest the election and
qualification of its members?
Delegate Roxas.—I have no doubt that the gentleman is right. If this
right is retained, as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe
that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they
cannot remove him from that reason.
xxx xxx xxx
In the course of the heated debates, with the growing restlessness on
the part of the Convention, President Recto suspended the session in
order to find out if it was possible to arrive at a compromise plan to
meet the objection.
When the session was resumed, a compromise plan was submitted in
the form of an amendment presented by Delegates Francisco,
Ventura, Lim, Vinzons, Rafols, Mumar, and others, limiting the power
of the Electoral Commission to the judging of all cases
contesting elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly. Explaining the difference between the
amendment thus proposed and the provision of the draft, Delegate
Roxas, upon the request of President Recto, said:
The difference, Mr. President, consists only in obviating the objection
pointed out by various delegates to the effect that the first clause of
the draft which states "The election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly" seems to give to the Electoral
commission the power to determine also the election of the
members who have not been protested. And in order to obviate that
difficulty, we believe that the amendment is right in that sense . . .
that is, if we amend the draft so that it should read as follows: "All
cases contesting the election, etc.", so that the judges of the Electoral
Commission will limit themselves only to cases in which there has
been a protest against the returns.
The limitation to the powers of the Electoral Commission proposed in
the compromise amendment did much to win in favor of the Electoral
Commission many of its opponents; so that when the amendment
presented by Delegate Labrador and others to retain in the
Constitution the power of the lawmaking body to be the sole judge
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was put to
a nominal vote, it was defeated by 98 negative votes against 56
affirmative votes.
With the defeat of the Labrador amendment, the provision of the
draft creating the Electoral Commission, as modified by the
compromise amendment, was consequently approved.
"All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly shall be judged by an electoral
commission, composed of three members elected by the party having
the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected
by the members of the party having the second largest number of
votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the
Chief, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices."
In the special committee on style, the provision was amended so that
the Chairman of the Commission should be the senior Justice in the
Commission, and so that the Commission was to be the sole judge of
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. As it was then amended, the provision read:
"There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices
of the Supreme court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be
nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three
by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly."
The report of the special committee on style on the power of the
Commission was opposed on the floor of the Convention by Delegate
Confesor, who insisted that the Electoral Commission should limit
itself to judging only of all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. The
draft was amended accordingly by the Convention.
As it was finally adopted by the Convention, the provision read:
There shall be an Electoral Commission . . . The Electoral Commission
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly. (Aruego,
The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 267, 269, 270,
271 and 272.).
Delegate Roxas rightly opined that "if this draft is retained" the
Assembly would have no power over election and qualifications of its
members; because all the powers are by the draft vested in the
Commission.
The Convention, however, bent on circumscribing the latter's
authority to "contests" relating to the election, etc. altered the draft.
The Convention did not intend to give it all the functions of the
Assembly on the subject of election and qualifications of its members.
The distinction is not without a difference. "As used in constitutional
provisions", election contest "relates only to statutory contests in
which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also to
have himself inducted into the office."(Laurel on Elections, Second
Edition, p. 250; 20 C.J., 58.)
One concrete example will serve to illustrate the remaining power in
either House of Congress: A man is elected by a congressional district
who had previously served ten years in Bilibid Prison for estafa. As he
had no opponent, no protest is filed. And the Electoral Tribunal has
no jurisdiction, because there is no election contest. (20 C.J.,
58, supra.) When informed of the fact, may not the House, motu
propio postpone his induction? May not the House suspend,
investigate and thereafter exclude him?3 It must be observed that
when a member of the House raises a question as to the qualifications
of another, an "election contest" does not thereby ensue, because
the former does not seek to be substituted for the latter.
So that, if not all the powers regarding the election, returns, and
qualifications of members was withdrawn by the Constitution from
the Congress; and if, as admitted by petitioners themselves at the oral
argument, the power to defer the oath-taking, until the contests is
adjudged, does not belong to the corresponding Electoral Tribunal,
then it must be held that the House or Senate still retains such
authority, for it has not been transferred to, nor assumed by, the
Electoral Tribunal. And this result flows, whether we believe that such
power (to delay induction) stemmed from the (former) privilege of
either House to be judge of the election, returns, and qualifications
of the members thereof, or whether we hold it to be inherent to
every legislative body as a measure of self-preservation.
It is customary that when a number of persons come together to form
a legislative body, ". . . the first organization must be temporary, and
if the law does not designate the person who shall preside over such
temporary organization, the persons assembled and claiming to be
members may select one of their number for that purpose. The next
step is to ascertain in some convenient way the names of the person
who are, by reason of holding the proper credentials, prima
facie entitled to seats, and therefore entitled to take part in
permanent organization of the body. In the absence of any statutory
or other regulation upon this subject, a committee on credentials is
usually appointed, to whom all credentials to be entitled to seats. . . .
(Laurel on Elections, Second Edition, pp. 356, 357, quoting McCrary
on Elections.)
Therefore, independently of constitutional or statutory grant, the
Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the power to inquire into
the credentials of any member and the latter's right to participate in
its deliberations. As we have seen, the assignment by the constitution
of the Electoral Tribunal does not actually negative that power —
provided the Senate does not cross the boundary line, deciding an
election contest against the member. Which the respondents at bar
never attempted to do. Precisely, their resolution recognized, and did
not impair, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to decide the
contest. To test whether the resolution trenched on the territory of
the last named agency let ask the question: May the Electoral
Tribunal of the Senate order that Body to defer the admission of any
member whose election has been contested? Obviously not. Then it
must be conceded that the passage of the disputed resolution meant
no invasion of the former's realm.
At this juncture the error will be shown of the contention that the
Senate has not this privilege "as a residuary power". Such contention
is premised on the proposition that the Houses of the Philippine
Congress possess only such powers as are expressly or impliedly
granted by the Constitution. And an American decision is quoted on
the powers of the United States Congress. The mistake is due to the
failure to differentiate between the nature of legislative power under
the Constitution of the United States, and legislative power under the
State Constitutions and the Constitution of the Commonwealth (now
the Republic). It must be observed that the Constitution of the United
States contains only a grant or delegation of legislative powers to the
Federal Government, whereas, the other Constitutions, like the
Constitution of the Commonwealth (now the Republic), are
limits upon the plenary powers of legislation of the Government. The
legislative power of the United States Congress is confined to the
subject on which it is permitted to act by the Federal constitution.
(Dorr vs. United States, 195 U. S., 140; Martin vs. Hunter, 1 Wheat.,
326; McCullock vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 405; United States vs.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 551.) The legislative power of the Philippine
Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations, as are found in
the Republic's Constitution. So that any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by the
Philippine Congress, unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere.
Another line of approach. The Senate, as a branch of the legislative
department, had the constitutional power to adopt rules for its
proceedings(section 10 [3], Article VI of the Constitution), and by
legislative practice it is conceded the power to promulgate such
orders as may be necessary to maintain its prestige and to preserve
its dignity.4 We are advised by the respondents that, after weighing
the propriety or impropriety of the step, the Senate, in the exercise
of its authority and discretion and of its inherent power of self-
preservation, resolved to defer the administration of oath and the
sitting of the petitioners pending determination of the contest. It is
not clear that the measure had no reasonable connection with the
ends in view, and neither does it palpably transcend the powers of
the public deliverative body. On the contrary, there are reasons to
believe it was prompted by the dictates of ordinary caution, or of
public policy. For, if, as reported by the corresponding constitutional
agency, concededly well-posted on the matter by reason of its official
duties, the elections held in the Provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan,
Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija were so tainted with acts of violence and
intimidation, that the result was not the legitimate expression of the
voters' choice, the Senate made no grievous mistake in foreseeing the
probability that, upon proof of such widespread lawlessness, the
Electoral Tribunal would annull the returns in that region
(see Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil., 521; Laurel, Elections [2d ed.], p.
488 et seq.), and declare herein petitioners not entitled to seats in the
Senate. Consequently, to avoid the undesirable result flowing from
the participation of disqualified members in its deliberations, it was
prudent for it to defer the sitting of the respondents. True, they may
have no direct connection with the acts of intimidation; yet the votes
may be annulled just the same, and if that happens, petitioners would
not among the sixteen senators elected. Nor was it far-fetched for the
Senate to consider that "in order to maintain alive the respect for
democratic institutions among our people, no man or group of men
(should) be permitted to profit from the results of an election held
under coercion, in violation of law and contrary to the principle of
freedom of choice which should underlie all elections under the
Constitution." (Exhibit A of petitioners' complaint.)
a. Justices in the Electoral Tribunals
During our deliberations, it was remarked that several justices
subscribing the majority opinion, belong to the electoral tribunals
wherein protests connected with the Central Luzon polls await
investigation. Mulling over this, we experience no qualmish feelings
about the coincidence. Their designation to the electoral tribunals
deducted not a whit from their functions as members of this Supreme
Court, and did not disqualify them in this litigation. Nor will their
deliverances here at on a given question operate to prevent them
from voting in the electoral forum on identical questions; because the
Constitution, establishing no incompatibility between the two roles,
naturally did not contemplate, nor want, justices opining one way
here, and thereafter holding otherwise, pari materia, in the electoral
tribunals, or vice-versa.
Anyhow, these should be no diversity of thought in a democratic
country, at least, on the legal effects of the alleged rampant
lawlessness, root and basis of the Pendatun Resolution.
However, it must be observed and emphasized, herein is no definite
pronouncement that terrorism and violence actually prevailed in the
district to such extent that the result was not the expression of the
free will of the electorate. Such issue was not tendered in these
proceedings. It hinges upon proof to be produced by protestants and
protestees at the hearing of the respective contests.
b. Doubt and presumption.
After all is said or written, the most that may be conceded to the
industry of petitioners' counsel is that the Senate power, or lack of
power, to approve the resolution is not entirely clear. We should,
therefore, indulge the presumption that official duty has been
performed regularly, (Rule 123, section 69, Rule of Court), and in the
right manner:
It is a general principle to presume that public officers act correctly
until the contrary is shown. United States vs. Weed, 5 Wall., 62.
It will be presumed, unless the contrary be shown, that a public
officer acted in accordance with the law and his instructions. Moral y
Gonzales vs. Ross (Gonzales vs. Ross), 120 U.S., 605; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
705.
Officers charged with the performance of a public duty are presumed
to perform it correctly. Quinlan vs. Greene Country, 205 U.S., 410; 27
Sup. Ct. Rep., 505. (United State Supreme Court Reports Digest, Vol.
5, p. 3188.)
It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional
powers. (See cases cited at p. 257, 16 C.J.S., note 1.)
And should there be further doubt, by all the maxims of prudence,
left alone comity, we should heed the off-limits sign at the
Congressional Hall, and check the impulse to rush in to set matters
aright — firm in the belief that if a political fraud has been
accomplished, as petitioners aver, the sovereign people, ultimately
the offended party, will render the fitting verdict — at the polling
precints.
c. Membership in the Constitutional Convention
The theory has been proposed — modesty aside — that the
dissenting members of this Court who were delegates to the
Constitutional Convention and were "co-authors of the Constitution"
"are in a better position to interpret" that same Constitution in this
particular litigation.
There is no doubt that their properly recorded utterances during the
debates and proceedings of the Convention deserve weight, like
those of any other delegate therein. Note, however, that the
proceedings of the Convention "are less conclusive of the power
construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of the
proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent
of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to
arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives. (Willoughby on the
Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 54, 55.)
Their writings (of the delegates) commenting or explaining that
instrument, published shortly thereafter, may, like those of Hamilton,
Madison and Jayin The Federalist — here in the Philippines, the book
of Delegate Aruego, supra, and of others — have persuasive force.
(Op. cit., p. 55.)
But their personal opinion on the matter at issue expressed during
our deliberations stand on a different footing: If based on a "fact"
known to them, but not duly established or judicially cognizable, it is
immaterial, and their brethren are not expected to take their word
for it, to the prejudice of the party adversely affected, who had no
chance of rebuttal. If on a matter of legal hermeneutics, their
conclusions may not, simply on account of membership in the
Convention, be a shade better, in the eyes of the law. There is the
word "deference" to be sure. But deference is a compliment
spontaneously to be paid — never a tribute to be demanded.
And if we should (without intending any disparagement) compare the
Constitution's enactment to a drama on the stage or in actual life, we
would realize that intelligent spectators or readres often know as
much, if not more, about the real meanings, effects or tendency is of
the event, or incidents thereof, as some of the actors themselves,
who sometimes become so absorbed in fulfilling their emotional roles
that they fail to watch the other scenes or to meditate on the larger
aspects of the whole performance, or what is worse, become so
infatuated with their lines as to construe the entire story according
to their prejudices or frustrations. Perspective and disinterestedness
help certainly a lot in examining actions and occurrences.
Come to think of it, under the theory thus proposed, Marshall and
Holmes (names venerated by those who have devoted a sizable
portion of their professionals lives to analyzing or solving
constitutional problems and developments) were not so
authoritative after all in expounding the United States Constitution
— because they were not members of the Federal Convention that
framed it!
D.—ALLEGED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS
Quoting section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725, counsel for
petitioners assert that it was respondents' duty legally inescapable,
to permit petitioners to assume office and take part in the current
regular session. The section reads partly:
The candidates for Member of the House of Representatives and
those for Senators who have been proclaimed elected by the
respective Board of Canvassers and the Commission on Elections shall
assume office and shall hold regular session for the year nineteen
hundred and forty-six on May twenty-five, nineteen hundred and
forty-six. (Section 12, Commonwealth Act. No. 725.)
We have carefully considered the argument. We opine that, as
contended by the Solicitor-General, this provision is addressed to the
individual member of Congress, imposing on him the obligation to
come to Manila, and join his colleagues in regular session. However,
it does not imply that if, for any reason, he is disqualified, the House
is powerless to postpone his admission. Suppose that after elections
a member is finally convicted of treason. May not the House refuse
him outright admission, pending an investigation (by it or the
Electoral Tribunal as the case may be) as to his privilege to sit there?
Granting the right to admission as the counterpart of the duty to
assume office by virtue of said section 12; we must nevertheless allow
that such rights would not be peremptory whenever it contacts other
rights of equal or superior force. To illustrate: if the law provided that
all children, seven years or more "shall go to school", it can not
reasonably be inferred that school authorities are bound to accept
every seven-year boy, even if he refuses to pay fees, or to present the
certificates required by school regulations.
Furthermore, it would not be erroneous to maintain that any right
spelled out of section 12 must logically be limited to those candidates
whose proclamation is clear, unconditional and unclouded, and that
such standard is not met by the petitioners, because in the very
document attesting to their election one member of the Commission
on Elections demurred to the non-exclusion of the votes in Central
Luzon, calling attention to the reported reign of terror and violence
in that region, and virtually objecting to the certification of herein
petitioners. To be sure, it was the beclouded condition of petitioner's
credential (certificate of canvass) that partly prompted the Senate to
enact the precautionary measure herein complained of. And finding
no phrase or sentence in the Constitution expressly or impliedly
outlawing the step taken by that legislative body, we should be, and
we are, reluctant to intervene.
Indeed, had the Senate been officially informed that the inclusion of
petitioners' name in the Commission's certificate had been made at
the point of a gangster's automatic, none will deny the appositeness
of the postponement of their induction, pending an inquiry by the
corresponding authorities. Yet the difference between such situation
and the instant litigation is one of degree, broad and wide perhaps,
but not altering the dominant legal principle.
In answer to the suggestions as to abuse of the power it should be
stated that the mere possibility of abuse is no conclusive argument
against the existence of the power, of the power, for the simple
reason that every official authority is susceptible of misuse. And
everybody knows that when any people will discover the methods to
curb it.
Perhaps it is necessary to explain that this decision goes no further Commenting on this Congressional privilege, Willoughby relates
than to recognize the existence of Congressional power. It is settled apparently as controlling, the following incident:
that the point whether such power has been wisely or correctly
exercised, is usually beyond the ken of judicial determination. In 1910, several Members of Congress having been served with a writ
of mandamus in a civil action brought against them as members of
E.—PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES the Joint Committee on Printing and growing out a refusal of a bid of
the Valley Paper Company, for the furnishing of paper, the Senate
One final consideration. resolved that the Justice issuing the writ had "unlawfully invaded the
constitutional privileges and prerogatives of the Senate of the United
States and of three Senators; and was without jurisdiction to grant
The Constitution provides (Article VI, section 15) that "for any speech
the rule, and Senators are directed to make no appearance in
or debate" in congress, Senators and congressmen "shall not be
response thereto." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United
questioned in any other place." The Supreme Court of the United
States has interpreted this privilege to include the giving of a vote or States, Vol. I, Second Edition, p. 616.)
the presentation of a resolution.
Respondents are, by this proceeding, called to account for their votes
in approving the Pendatum Resolution. Having sworn to uphold the
. . . It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit
Constitution, we must enforce the constitutional directive. We must
it towards spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its
not question, nor permit respondents to be questioned here in
application to written reports presented in that body by its
connection with their votes. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra.)
committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be
reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, . . . (Kilbourn vs.
Case dismissed. No costs.
thompson, 103 U.S., 204; 26 Law. ed., 377, p. 391.)
In the above case, Kilbourn, for refusing to answer questions put to Moran, C J., Paras, Pablo, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
him by the House of Representatives of the United States Congress,
concerning the business of a real estate partnership, was imprisoned
for contempt by resolution of the house. He sued to recover damages
from the sergeant at arms and the congressional members of the
committee, who had caused him to be brought before the house, Separate Opinions
where he was adjudged to be in contempt. The Supreme Court of the
United States found that the resolution of the House was void for HILADO, J., concurring:
want of jurisdiction in that body, but the action was dismissed as to
the members of the committee upon the strength of the herein
I concur.
above-mentioned congressional immunity. The court cited with
approval the following excerpts from an earlier decision of the
Petitioners, alleging that they have been elected Senators in the last
Supreme Court of Massachusetts:
national elections, have filed this proceeding against respondents
who, according to the complaint, have been likewise elected Senators
These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protecting
in the same elections. In paragraph III of the complaint it is alleged
the members against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to
that respondent Hon. Jose A. Avelino is joined in this proceeding as
support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to
member and President of the Senate. Two kinds of remedies are
execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions, civil
sought by petitioners, one ancillary and the other principal. The
or criminal. I, therefore, think that the article ought not to be
ancillary they would have consist in a preliminary injunction
construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it may be
addressed to "respondents, their officials, employees, agents and
answered. . . (103 U.S., 203.) (Emphasis ours.)
other persons acting under them, ordering them", until the order is
remanded by the court, "to desist and to abstain from carrying out"
the so-called Pendatun Resolution complained of. (Exhibit A attached
to complaint.) The principal remedy, if the suit is to prosper, would
be as follows: a judicial declaration that the said resolution is entirely
null and void, a definite order of this court prohibiting respondents,
and each of them, from preventing petitioners from "continuing in
their seats in the Senate of the Philippines and freely exercising their
office as Senators, and likewise prohibiting them from adopting any
other ulterior procedure to execute the said resolution."
1. Has this court power to issue the writ of preliminary injunction
sought by petitioners under the facts alleged in their complaint?
The power of this court to issue auxiliary writs and process is defined
in, and conferred by, section 19 of Act No. 136, as follows:
Sec. 19. Power to issue all necessary auxiliary writs.—The Supreme
Court shall have power to issue writs of certiorari and all other
auxiliary writs and process necessary to the complete exercise of its
original or appellate jurisdiction.
Under this provision, such auxiliary writ or process as the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioners in the instant case, is
only issuable by this court is engaged in the exercise of its original (or
appellate) jurisdiction in a main case, and secondly, when such writ
or process is necessary to a complete exercise of that jurisdiction. This
principle is ingrained in and underlies the pertinent provisions of the
present Rules of Court (Rule 60). Indeed, it is elementary that an
independent action cannot be maintained merely to procure a
preliminary injunction as its sole objective. (Panay Municipal
Cadastre vs. Garduño and Soncuya, 55 Phil., 574.)
Besides, there are other grounds for holding that this court lacks
jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by
petitioners. It is clear that the rights sought to be exercised or
protected by petitioner through this proceeding are political rights
and the questions raised are political questions, and it is well settled
that the equitable remedy of injunction is not available for such a
purpose. The principle has also been incorporated in the rule that a
court of chancery will not entertain a suit calling for a judgement
upon a political question, and of course this court has been resorted
to in the instant case as a court of equity in so far as injunctive relief
is being sought. In the case of Flethcer vs. Tuttle (151 Ill., 41; 25 L.R.A.,
143,146), the definitions of a political right by Anderson defines a
political right as a "right exercisable in the administration of
government" (Anderson Law Dictionary, 905). And Bouvier says:
"Political rights consist in the power to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or management of the government."
(2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 597.)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The prayer of the bill is that, upon the hearing of the cause, both
acts be declared unconstitutional and void, and held to be of no
effect; and that a writ of injunction issue to Walter C. Tuttle, county
clerk of Vermilion county, restraining him from issuing, or causing to
be posted, notices of election calling an election for the house of
representatives for the eighteenth senatorial district; and that such
injunction be made perpetual; and that the court grant to the
petitioner and to the people all such other and further relief as the
case demands.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing statement of these two bills, it seems to be
perfectly plain that the entire scope and object of both is the
assertion and protection of political, as contradistinguished from
civil, personal or property rights. In both the complainant is a legal
voter, and a candidate for a particular elective office; and by his bill
he is seeking the protection and enforcement of his right to cast his
own ballot in a legal and effective manner, and also his right to be
such candidate, to have the election called and held under the
provisions of a valid law, and to have his name printed upon the
ballots to be used at such election, so that he may be voted for in a
legal manner. The rights thus asserted are all purely political; nor, so
far as this question is concerned, is the matter aided in the least by
the attempt made by the complainant in each bill to litigate on behalf
of other voters or of the people of the state generally. The claims thus
attempted to be set up are all of the same nature, and are none the
less political.
As defined by Anderson, a civil right is "a right accorded to every
member of a district community, or nation," while a political right is
a "right exercible in the administration of government." Anderson,
Law Dictionary, 995. Says bouvier: "Political rights consist in the
power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
management of the government. These political rights are fixed by
the constitution. Every citizen has the right of voting for public
officers, and of being elected. These are the political rights which the
humblest citizen possesses. Civil rights are those which have no
relation to the establishment, support, or management of the
government. They consist in the power of acquiring and enjoying
property, or exercising the paternal or marital powers, and the like. It
will be observed that every one, unless deprived of them by sentence
of civil death, is in the enjoyment of the civil rights, which is not the
case with political rights; for an alien, for example, has no political,
although in full enjoyment of the civil rights." (2 Bouvier Law Dict.,
597.)
. . . A preliminary injunction having been awarded, it was disregarded
by the city officers, who proceeded, notwithstanding, to canvass the
vote and declare the result. Various of the city officers and their
advisers were attached and fined for contempt, it was held that the
matter presented by the bill was a matter over which a court of
chancery had no jurisdiction, and that the injunction was void, so that
it violation was not an act which subjected the violators to
proceedings for contempt.
. . . In Georgia vs. Stanton (73 U. S., 6 Wall., 50; 18 Law. ed., 721), a
bill was filed by the state of Georgia against the secretary of war and
other officers representing the executive authority of the United
States, to restrain them in the execution of the acts of congress
known as the "Reconstruction Acts," on the ground that the
enforcement of those acts would annul and totally abolish the
existing state government of the state, and establish another and
different one in its place, and would, in effect, ovewrthrow and
destroy the corporate existence of the state, by depriving it of all
means and instrumentalities whereby its existence might and
otherwise would be maintained; and it was held that the bill called
for a judgement upon a political question, and that it would not
therefore be entertained by a court of chancery; and it was further
held that the character of the bill was not changed by the fact that, in
setting forth the political rights sought to be protected, it averred that
the state had real and personal property, such, for example, as public
buildings, etc., of the enjoyment of which, by the destruction of its
corporate existence, the state would be deprived, such averment not
being the substantial ground of the relief sought. (Flethcer vs. Tuttle,
151 Ill., 41; 25 L.R.A., 143, 145-147; (emphasis supplied.)
Section 381. 3. Political Questions.—a. in General.—It is well-settled
doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the
judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions
has been conferred on the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provisions. It is not easy, however, to define the phrase
"political question," nor to determine what matters fall within its
scope of the judicial power. More properly, however, it means those
questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. Among the questions that have
been held to be political, and therefore beyond the province of the
judiciary to decide, are: Questions relating to the existence or legality
of the government under which the court is acting; what persons or
organizations constitute the lawful government of a state of the
Union, or of a foreign country; . . . the canvass of an election. (12 C.J.,
878, 879; emphasis supplied.)
SECTION 20. 4. Only Civil Rights Protected.—The subject matter of
equitable jurisdiction being civil property and the maintenance of civil
rights, injunction will issue only in cases where complainant's civil
rights have been invaded. Injunctions do not issue to prevent acts
merely because they are immoral, illegal, or criminal. Courts of equity
have no jurisdiction over matters or questions of a political nature
unless civil property rights are involved and will not interfere to
enforce or protect purely political rights, . . . (32 C. J., 41; emphasis
supplied.)
But petitioners seem to proceed upon the theory that there is a main
case here to which the preliminary injunction would be merely
auxiliary — one of prohibition, presumably under Rule 67, sections 2,
4, and 7. Rule 67, section 2, omitting impertinent parts, says:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.—When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions
judicial or ministerial . . .
To begin with, respondents herein cannot in any rational sense be
said to constitute a "tribunal, corporation, board, or person . . .
exercising functions judicial or ministerial." To be sure, the functions
of the Senate and of its members in the premises are not judicial. It is
no less certain, in my opinion, that they are not ministerial. Indeed,
they are not only legislative but discretionary in the highest sense, as
more at length demonstrated hereafter.
It is insisted, however, that the provisions of section 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 725 imposed upon respondents the
ministerial duty of letting petitioners assume office and participate in
the regular session for the year 1946 on May 25, 1946. But, as in my
opinion correctly contended by the Solicitor General at the argument,
this provision is addressed to the members of both Houses of
Congress who are to assume office and hold regular session. Altho to
this, some who opine differently from us, may counter with the
question: What is the use of imposing upon said members the
ministerial duty to assume office and hold the session if either House
or other members thereof could prevent them from doing so? In the
first place, I would not say that, considering together, as we should,
the report of the Commission on Elections to the President of the
Senate of May 23, 1946 (Exhibit B), and the certificate of canvass of
the same date (Exhibit C), said Commission "proclaimed elected"
those candidates whose election may be adversely affected by the
Commission's own express reservation as to the validity or invalidity
of the votes cast in the Provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, and
Nueva Ecija, in the same sense that they proclaimed elected those
not so affected — it would seem that the proclamation made in
Exhibit C was based merely upon a numerical canvass or count of the
votes cast, the Commission considering itself without authority to
discount the votes cast in said four provinces, leaving that question
to the Electoral Tribunal for the Senate; and it would seem further,
that within the meaning and intent of section 12 of Commonwealth
Act No. 725 the phrase "candidates . . . proclaimed elected,"
rationally construed, is exclusive of those of whose valid election the
Commission is the first, in effect, to express very grave doubts. As to
these, considering the Commission's report and certificate of canvass
together, the Commission, in final effect, far from proclaiming them
elected, confesses that it does not really know whether they have
been or not. In the second place, Ido not admit that any such
ministerial duty is imposed upon the members of Congress in the
sense that its fulfillment may be compelled by mandamus issuing
from the judiciary. In the third place, if we were to concede that the
intention of the law is as petitioners contend it to be, that is, that it
imposes upon both Houses of Congress and upon the members
thereof who legitimately act for them, the ministerial duty of letting
even those members, as to whom there exist grounds for suspension,
assume office and participate in the Houses' deliberations, I am of the
considered opinion that the provisions would be null and void for the
simple reason that it would be destructive of, and repugnant to, the
inherent power of both Houses to suspend members for reasons of
self-preservation or decorum. I say null and void, because the
principle underlying said inherent power is ingrained in the very
genius of a republican and democratic government, such as ours,
which has been patterned after that of the United States, and
therefore lies at the very foundation of our constitutional system. It
was admitted at the argument that when both legislative chambers
were the sole judges of the election, returns and qualifications of its
members, each chamber possessed such inherent power of
suspension, particularly as against members whose election was the
subject of contest. When the Commonwealth Constitution
transferred to the Electoral Tribunal for each chamber the jurisdiction
as sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members, without any provision as to said power
of suspension, the clear inference is that the same was left intact, to
remain where it was inherent. And certainly the framers should not
be presumed to have silently intended to abrogate and take away a
power so vital and so essential.
Coming now more fundamentally to the alleged main case presented
by the complaint. As stated at the outset, the principle remedy
pursued by petitioners, if this suit is to prosper, and therefore the
main case which they seem to allege as justifying the ancillary remedy
of preliminary injunction, would be concerned with a judicial
declaration by this court that the so-called Pendatun Resolution is
entirely null and void, with a definite order of this court prohibiting
respondents, and each of them, from preventing petitioners "from
continuing in their seats in the Senate of the Philippines and freely
exercising their functions as Senators, and likewise prohibiting them
form adopting any other ulterior procedure to execute the said
resolution."
This immediately brings to the fore the vital and serious question of
whether this court has jurisdiction to grant the remedy thus prayed
for by giving final judgment making the said judicial declaration of
nullity and granting the writ prohibition definitely prohibiting the
respondent President of the Senate and respondent senators from
executing the above specified acts. Such fundamental principle as the
separation of powers, as well as the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal for the Senate of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of its members, are involved.
Our Constitution and laws will be scanned and searched in vain for
the slightest hint of an intention to confer upon the courts, including
the Supreme Court, the power to issue coercive process addressed
to, or calculated to control the action of, either of the other two
coordinate departments of the government — the legislative whose
power is vested in the Congress, consisting of the Senate and the
House of Representatives (Constitution, Article VII, section 1),
concerning matters within the sphere of their respective functions.
Besides, if we had jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary
injunction, it must be upon the ground that prima facie the facts
alleged in the complaint are sufficient to justify the writ. In that case,
we must have the power to make said injunction final if upon a trial
on the merits we find those facts proven. (Rule 60, section 10.)But
since such a permanent or perpetual writ would have to be premised
upon the determination that petitioners have been legally and validly
elected, which question is beyond our power to decide, it is clear that
we lack jurisdiction to issue even the preliminary process. And be it
not contended that our preliminary writ is simply to serve while the
contest has not been decided by the Electoral Tribunal, because
under Act No. 136, section 19, and Rule 60, sections 2 and 3, this court
can issue such a process in aid only of its own jurisdiction of another
tribunal — and it is unthinkable that the Supreme Court should be
made to serve as a sort of auxiliary court to the Electoral tribunal.
2. Has this court jurisdiction of the subject matter of the alleged main
case and, consequently, to grant the alleged principal remedy?
The judicial declaration of nullity sought by petitioners, severed from
the writ of prohibition prayed for by them, would become, if at all,
nothing more nor less than a declaratory relief. Thus divorced from a
remedy of prohibition, it will be a mere abstract pronouncement of
an opinion of this court regarding the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of the Pendatun Resolution, giving rise to no
substantial relief or positive remedy of any kind. It will order nothing
and will prohibit nothing to be done by one party or the other. But
not even as such declaratory relief can said judicial declaration be
considered under Rule 66, nor its antecedents, Act No. 3736
Commonwealth Act No. 55, since the Pendatun Resolution is neither
a "deed, will, contract or other written instrument . or a statue or
ordinance," within the plain and natural meaning of said rule and said
acts, aside from the reason that pursuant to the same acts the action
for a declaratory judgment should be brought in a Court of First
Instance, without any express provision conferring original
jurisdiction upon this court in such cases, which provision is necessary
before this court can possess such original jurisdiction (Act No. 136,
section 17), and the final consideration that alike under said Act No.
3736 and Rule 66, section 6, the court has a discretion to refuse to
exercise the power to construe instruments, among other cases,
where the construction is not necessary and proper at the time under
all circumstances. In the case of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil.,
83,95), this court, referring to a case of mandamus, said:
. . . On the one hand, no consideration of policy or convenience
should induce this court to exercise a power that does not belong to
it. On the other hand, no consideration of policy or convenience
should induce this court to surrender a power which it is its duty to
exercise. But certainly mandamus should never issue from this court
where it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It should not be
awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should not be
awarded where mischievous consequences are likely to follow.
Judgment should not be pronounced which might possibly lead
to unseemly conflicts or which might be disregarded with impunity.
This court offer no means by a decision for any possible collision
between it as the highest court in the Philippines and the Philippine
Senate as a branch of coordinate department, or between the court
and the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive Legislature. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is true that the Alejandrino case was one of mandamus. But under
the principle of separation of powers, the rule is equally applicable to
cases of injunction--in fact, to all cases where it is desired to have the
judiciary directly control the action of either the executive or
legislative department, or either branch of the latter, concerning
matters within their respective province. Moreover, not much
scrutiny is required to see that what is here pursued is, in practical
effect, an order of this tribunal commanding the Senate or
respondents, who represent it, to allow the petitioners to remain
seated in the Senate and freely exercise their alleged functions and
rights as Senators: for no other is the effect of an
order prohibiting the Senate or said respondents from
preventing petitioner's from remaining thus seated and exercising
said functions and rights. Looking thru the form to the substance, the
petition is really one of mandamus.
As the writ of prohibition, the complaint asks this court, after trial on
the merits, to enjoin respondents and each of them from preventing
petitioners from continuing seated in the Senate and freely exercising
the functions of Senators, and likewise, from adopting any other
ulterior proceeding in execution of the resolution in question. The
writ thus sought would, if granted, be definite and final in its effects.
(Rule 67, sections 2, 8, and 9.) Such a writ of prohibition would
necessarily be perpetual or permanent in character and operation, in
the same way that a final injunction under Rule 60, section 10, would
permanently enjoin the act complained of and perpetually restrain
the defendant from the commission or continuance of such act. It
would enjoin respondents from preventing petitioners from acting as
members of the Senate in exactly the same way and with exactly the
same rights and privileges as the other members whose election is
unchallenged and uncontested, not only temporarily but for the
entire term of the office. But for this court to so order, it would
necessarily have to base its judgment and decree upon the premise
that petitioners have been duly and validly elected as members of the
Senate. This would inevitably involve a determination of precisely the
question, presently contested before the Electoral Tribunal for the
Senate, as sole judge under the Constitution, of whether or not said
petitioners have been duly and validly elected as Senators. This
clearly would be an unconstitutional invasion of the sphere allotted
by the fundamental law to said Electoral Tribunal as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the Senate. All of which means that this court cannot
constitutionally possess jurisdiction over the alleged main case of
prohibition. This is another way of saying that petitioners are not
entitled to the principal remedy thus sought by them from this Court.
Sec. 17 (2). Prima Facie Case.—While it is not a ground for refusing a
preliminary injunction that is not absolutely certain that complainant
has the right to relief, yet to authorize a temporary injunction,
complain must make out at least a prima facie showing the right to
the final relief. (32 C. J.,38 ; emphasis supplied.)
Reason for rule.—The injunction pendente lite can be justified only
upon theory that it is necessary incident to the granting of
such final relief as complainants appear to be entitled to. The right to
such final relief must appear; if not, the allowance of an injunction is
erroneous. Amelia Milling Co. vs. Tennessee Coal, etc., R. Co. (123
Fed., 811, and other cases cited.) (32 C. J., 39 under note 76 beginning
on p. 38; emphasis supplied.)
Finally, we come to the great principle of separation of powers. In the
case of Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra, this court said (pp. 88, 89):
There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to students
of public law. It is here only necessary to recall that under our system
of government, each of the three departments is distinct and not
directly subject to the control of another department. The power to
control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the
power to usurp. . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members,
or its officers, to compel the perfromance of duties purely legislative
in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative
functions And over which they have exclusive control. The courts
cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of
power. So it has been held that where a member has been expelled
by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of
whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to
compel his reinstatement.
If mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of purely
legislative duties by the legislature, its members, or its officers, how
can, under the same principle, injunction or prohibition lie to enjoin
or prohibit action of the Legislature, its members, or its officers, in
regard to matters pertaining to their legislative functions and over
which they have exclusive control? And if the courts are powerless to
compel reinstatement of an expelled member of the legislative body,
it seems inconceivable that under the same system of government
the courts should possess jurisdiction to prohibit the expulsion in the
first instance. And if the courts cannot interfere to prevent such
expulsion, a fortiori they should lack authority to intervene to
prevent a mere suspension, which is a less drastic measure against
the member. If the expulsion of a member of the Senate is purely a
legislative question, as clearly decided in the Alejandrino case, the
supension of a member of the same body must equally be of the same
nature.
In the same case this court, in remarking that some of the cases cited
therein related to the chief executive rather than to the legislature,
said that the rules which govern the relations of the courts to the
chief executive likewise govern the relations of the courts to the
legislature.
In Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord (4 Wall., 475), a bill was filed
praying the United States Supreme Court to enjoin Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States, and E. O. C. Ord, General Commanding
in the District of Mississipi and Arkansas from executing certain acts
of Congress. The court, per chief Chief Justice Chase, said that the
single point for consideration was: Can the President be restrained by
injunction from carrying into effect an Act of Congress alleged to the
be unconstitutional? It continued:
The Congress is the Legislative Department of the government; the
President is the Executive Department. Neither can be restrained in
its action by the Judicial Department; though the acts of both, when
performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance.
The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon
consideration of its possible consequences.
Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the
President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that the court is
without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the
President complies with the order of the court and refuses to execute
the acts of the Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur
between the Executive and Legislative Departments of the
Government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the
President for such refusal? And in that case could this court interfere
in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its
mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United States
from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle
be offered to the public wonder of an attempt by this court to arrest
proceedings in that court?
These questions answer themselves.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . we are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to
enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and that
such bill ought to be received by us.
It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that, if the relief
sought cannot be had against Andrew Johnson, as President, as
President, it may be granted against Andrew Johnson as a citizen of
Tennessee. But it is plain that relief as against the execution of an act
of Congress by Andrew Johnson, if relief against its execution by the
President. . .
In the case of Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan (29 Mich., 320),
Justice Cooley, speaking for the Supreme Court of Michigan, had the
following to say:
. . . Our government is one whose powers have been carefully
apportioned between three distinct departments, which emanate
alike from the people, have their powers alike limited and defined by
the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their respective
spheres of action equally independent.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that neither of the departments can operate in all respects
independently of the others, and that what are called the checks and
balances of government constitute each a restraint upon the rest. . .
. But in each of these cases the action of the department which
controls, modifies, or in any manner influences that of another, is had
strictly within its own sphere, and for that reason gives no occassion
for conflict, controversy or jealousy. The Legislative in prescribing
rules for the courts, is acting within its proper province in making
laws, while the courts, in declining to enforce an unconstitutional law,
are in like manner acting within their proper province, because they
are only applying that which is law to the controversies in which they
are called upon to give judgment. It is mainly by means of these
checks and balances that the officers of the several departments are
kept within their jurisdiction, and if they are disregarded in any case,
and power is usurped or abused, the remedy is by impeachment, and
not by another department of the government attempting to correct
the wrong by asserting a superior authority over that which by the
constitution is its equal.
It has long been a maxim in this country that the Legislature cannot
dictate to the courts what their judgments shall be, or set aside or
alter such judgments after they have been rendered. If it could,
constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the Legislature could
in like manner override executive action also, the government would
become only a despotism under popular forms. On the other hand it
would be readily conceded that no court can compel the Legislature to
make or to refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its
command, or to take any action whatsoever, though the duty to take
it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws. In these cases
the exemption of the one department from the control of the other
is not only implied in the framework of government, but is
indispensably necessary if any useful apportionment of power is to
exist.
xxx xxx xxx
It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the relators that any
other course than that which leaves the head of the executive
department to act independently in the discharge of his duties might
possibly lead to unseemly conflicts, if not something worse, should
the courts undertake to enforce their mandates and the executive
refuse to obey. . . . And while we should concede, if jurisdiction was
plainly vested in us, the inability to enforce our judgment would be
no sufficient reason for failing to pronounce it, especially against an
officer who would be presumed ready and anxious in all cases to
render obedience to the law, yet in a case where jurisdiction is
involved in doubt it is not consistent with the dignity of the court to
pronounce judgments which may be disregarded with impunity, nor
with that of the executive to place him in position where, in a matter
within his own province, he must act contrary to his judgment, or
stand convicted of a disregard of the laws.
In the same case of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra), we find the
following quotation from French vs. Senate of the State of California
(146 Cal., 604):
Even if we should give these allegations their fullest force in favor of
the pleader, they do not make a case justifying the interposition of
the court. Under our form of government the judicial department has
no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance
of the power committed exclusively to that department by the
constitution. . . .
From the case of Masachusetts vs. Mellon (262 U.S., 447; 67 Law. ed.,
1078, 1084), we quote the following passage:
. . . If an alleged attempt by congressional action to annul and abolish
an existing state government, "with all its constitutional powers and
privileges," presents no justifiable issue, as was ruled in Geogia vs.
Stanton, supra, no reason can be suggested why it should be
otherwise where the attempt goes farther, as it is here alleged, than
to propose to share with the state the field of state power.
In our case the Senate action through the Pendatun Resolution and
the acts alleged to have been performed thereunder, are still less
transcendental in comparison to those involved in Georgia vs.
Stanton (supra), and Massachusetts vs. Mellon (supra), as should be
obvious to every one.
In the case of Barry vs. United States ex rel. Cunningham (279 U.S.,
597; 73 Law ed., 867, 872), the Federal Supreme Court was concerned
with a case where the United States Senate, pending the adjudication
of the validity or nullity of the election of William S. Vare as Senator,
refused acceptance of his credentials consisting of the returns, upon
the face of which he had been elected, and a certificate form the
Governor of the State to that effect, and refused to administer the
oath of office to him, and to accord the full right to participate in the
business of the Senate. It was held that all this "was a matter within
the discretion of the Senate." This is strikingly similar to the instant
case where the Senate of the Philippines, which I maintain retained it
inherent power of suspension after the transfer to the Electoral
Tribunal for the Senate for its exclusive jurisdiction to judge contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members,
deemed it to be necessary or convenient to suspend the
administration of oath to petitioners, their seating in the Senate and
their participation in its deliberations, pending final decision by said
Electoral Tribunal of the contest concerning their election, which
matters were in my opinion within the discretion of said Senate.
In the case of Masachusetts vs. Mellon (supra), the Supreme Court of
the United States concluded its decision in these words:
. . . Looking through forms of words to the substance of their
complaint, it is merely that officials of the executive department of
the government are executing and will execute an act of Congress
asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent. To
do so would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a
position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-
equal department — an authority which plainly we do not possess.
Strikingly similar, our case is one wherein the substance of the
complaint is merely that respondents President and Members of the
Philippine Senate have executed and will execute a resolution of the
body asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to
prevent, to paraphrase the Federal Supreme Court. I could not do
better than make mine the conclusion of that High Tribunal that
rather than a judicial controversy which we are asked to decide, it is
a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-
equal department which we are asked to assume — an authority
which plainly we do not possess.
In the adjudicated cases, it has often been said that in actual and
appropriate controversies submitted to the courts the judiciary has
the constitutional power to declare unconstitutional any legislative
or executive act which violates the Constitution; thus, in the case of
Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139, 182), the fourth
conclusion established by this court was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and
duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(Emphasis supplied.)
But I am of the considered opinion that, aside from such writs, as that
of habeas corpus, as may be guaranteed in the Constitution, all others
of a purely statutory origin and coersive in their operation are not
issuable by the judiciary against either of the other coordinate and
co-equal departments. In the latter cases, I think the function of the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, does not go
beyond the declaration of constitutionality or unconstitutionality of
the legislative or executive act assailed. But some would ask how such
a judgment could be enforced as against the other two departments
or either of them. I believe that in a democratic system of
government, built as it is upon the principle of separation of powers,
with the consequent freedom of each department from direct control
by the others, the effectiveness of the adjudications of the courts, in
cases properly coming under their jurisdiction, has perforce to
depend upon the conscience of those at the head of, or representing,
the other two departments, and their loyalty to the Constitution. I for
one am persuaded that when the officers in whom at the time are
vested the executive and legislative power should see that the
highest court of the land, at the head of the judicial power, as, in a
case properly brought before it and within its legitimate jurisdiction,
decided that an act of the executive or legislative department is
unconstitutional, their conscience and loyalty to the Constitution can
safely be relied upon to make them, with good grace, respect such
final adjudication. As was said in Angara vs. Electoral Commission
(supra), our Constitution is, of course, lacking perfection and
perfectibility; but it has been deemed by the framers of this and
similar antecedent organic laws preferable to leave the three
coordinate departments without power of coercion, one against the
other, with the exceptions which may have been therein established,
to open the door to mutual invasion of jurisdiction, with the
consequent usurpation of powers of the invaded department. And it
is here where appeal will have to be made to the conscience of the
department concerned. If the executive or legislative department, in
such cases, should abuse its powers against good conscience, or in a
manner disloyal to the Constitution, ignoring the judgment of the
courts, the aggrieved party will have to seek his remedy through the
ordinary processes of democracy.
During our consideration of this case reference has been made to the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Barry vs. United
States ex rel. Cunningham (279 U.S. 597; 73 Law. ed. 867). But an
examination of the facts of that case will readily reveal that the
question of whether or not Cunningham should have been released
on habeas corpus arose from his arrest by order of the United States
Senate in the course of certain proceedings before that body, sitting
as a tribunal to judge of the election, returns and qualifications of
William S. Vare for Senator. It was held that:
In exercising the power to judge the elections, returns and
qualifications of its members, the Senate acts as a judicial tribunal,
and the authority to require the attendance of witnesses is a
necessary incident of the power to adjudge, in no wise inferior under
like circumstances to that exercised by a court of justice. (P. 873.)
In the last sentence of the same paragraph the court speaks of the
power of the Senate "to compel a witness to appear to give testimony
necessary to enable that body efficiently to exercise a legislative
function; "and the court proceeds: "but the principle is equally, if not
a fortiori applicable where the Senate is exercising
a judicial function." (Emphasis supplied.)It will thus appear that the
powers of the Senate there involved were not legislative but judicial
in character which fact differentiates the case from those here cited,
wherein purely legislative powers or functions of the Legislature or
any branch thereof were in question. There is no wonder, therefore,
that the Federal Supreme Court, in the Barry case, by what really
amounts to an obiter, made the remark at the conclusion of its
opinion that "if judicial interference can be successfully invoked it can
only be upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use
of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law," the
power referred to being thejudicial power to which the court refers
in the paragraph which I have quoted above. In such a case, the
Senate being permitted by the Constitution to exercise, for a special
purpose, a portion of the powers which primarily belong to the
judiciary, it is but proper that any abuse of such limited and special
power, constituting a denial of the due process of law, should have
its redress in the judicial department, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter; not so in cases where any branch of the legislative
department is exercising powers or functions purely legislative in
nature and, therefore, within its alloted province under the
Constitution, as in the case at the bar. The Federal Supreme Court
speaks of "judicial interference" without specifying its kind or nature.
Much less does it say that such interference will necessarily be
coercive in character. But even if it had in mind the writ of habeas
corpus there applied for, this being a high prerogative writ (29 C. J.,
6, 7) the privilege of which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in our
Constitution (Article III, section 1, paragraph [14]), it is in a class apart
from the coercive writs or process spoken of elsewhere in this opinion
— it is not merely a statutory remedy, such as injunction, prohibition,
etc., but a constitutional remedy which by its very nature should be
binding, in proper cases, upon any department or agency of the
Government to which it may be lawfully addressed.
TUASON, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result. On the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46
Phil., 83), "the writ prayed for cannot issue for the whole simple
reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of
coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action."
With regret I have to dissent from the majority opinion upholding the
constitutionality of the Pendatum Resolution.
That the National Assembly, now Congress, retains the power it
possessed prior to the approval of the Constitution over the
uncontested election, returns and qualifications of its members,
cannot successfully be disputed. This power remains intact,
unaffected by section 11, Article VI of the Constitution, which limits
the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress that are the subject of protest.
But within this limited sphere of its jurisdiction, the authority of the
Electoral Tribunal is supreme, absolute, exclusive. In the language of
section 11, Article VI of the Constitution (supra), "the Electoral
Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of their respective members."
In Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), it was held, in the
light of the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, that the
purpose of the creation of the Electoral Commission "was to transfer
in its totality all the power previously exercised by the legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal," which, though constituted by
majority members of the legislature, "is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature." It was said that "the grant of power
to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature"; that "the express lodging of
that power by the National Assembly," and that "this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution." In other parts of the decision, this court characterized
as exclusive the jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission over protests
against the election of members of the National Assembly and
"determination thereof."
No stronger language than this can be found to emphasize the
completeness of the inhibition of the National Assembly from
interference in any matter pertaining to an election protest filed with
the Electoral Commission.
The resolution in question destroys the exclusive character of the
Electoral Tribunal's power. It encroaches upon the Electoral
Tribunal's prerogative as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress.
In seeking the suspension of the petitioners on the strenght of the
reported election irregularities in Central Luzon, irregularities which
constitute the sole basis of the main protest, to that extent the
resolution passed judgment on the truth or probabilities of the
charges, although the judgment may not have been intended as final.
At the very least, the resolution touches directly on a matter which
involves a senatorial election contest. From whatever stand pointone
may look at the Pendatun Resolution, it is hard to escape the
conclusion that it oversteps the bounds of the Senate's authority and
trespasses on a territory entirely reserved for the Electoral Tribunal.
Viewed from another angle, the legality of petitioners' suspension is
open to attack. This suspension was resorted to as an auxiliary and
interlocutory step subordinated to the final outcome of the election
protest filed against them. Only a few will disagree with the
proposition that the power of the Senate or the House of
Representatives to suspend its members as a subsidiary measure for
causes connected with their election, returns and qualifications, is, if
such power exists, an implied power derived from the power to
remove or exclude, or what is the same thing in this connection, the
power to invalidate an election. It follows that where the political
power has been taken away, as in the case of protested elections, the
accessory power to suspend vanishes. The fact that the power to
suspend may not have been transferred, as is contended, to the
Electoral Commission does not argue in favor of the contention that
it still resides in the Congress.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
I.—TO MEET OR NOT TO MEET THE CHALLENGE
The challenge has been flung. Shall we evade it by an unmanly and
shameful retreat?
By this case the highest tribunal of the land in undergoing a crucial
test. Shall it do honor to its constitutional role as the last bastion of
the "regime of justice" proclaimed by the Constitution in its
preamble, as one of the fundamental goals of the government
established?
The Constitution itself is on the balance. Fundamental principles of
good government, basic human rights, prime rules for the existence
of an orderly society have been trampled upon. The victims come to
the Supreme Court where the last line of democracy lies. Shall we
allow that line to give under the onslaught? Shall we betray the faith
of our people?
Shall we refuse to do our part, our duty, our mission, to maintain in
our country a government of laws, only because we have to face a
powerful group of senators?
Three senators of the Philippines, duly proclaimed as elected by
1,736,407 combined votes cast by qualified Filipino electors,
immediately after assuming their respective positions, were deprived
of their seats in the Senate through the unscrupulous, irresponsible,
and subversive action of a tyrannical and ruthless majority who would
not stop even to a downright trampling of the fundamental law. The
victims come to us clamoring for relief and justice. Shall we meet the
clamor with deaf ears? Shall we remain aloof with callous indifference
to a flagrant violation of the Constitution? Shall we leave the victims
at the mercy of a despotic oligarchy and allow the latter to supplant
democracy? Shall we leave them instead to pin their hopes on
popular justice, if they be patient enough not to seek justice by their
hands or by the people who exalted them by suffrage to be their
spokesmen in the Senate and in Congress?
Within the remaining span of our life, never shall we be more
conscious of the great privilege of performing our duties as the
ultimate guardians of the fundamental source of vitality of our nation
as an organic whole, whether normality prevails or the people boil in
the cauldron of ex surging partisan passions. The very essence of
constitutional government is under our trust and the momentous
question is whether we shall betray that trust and keep unblemished
our judicial escutcheon. The blinding grandeur of the unprecedented
opportunity challenging us cannot fail to move our whole being, from
ender on to the inner recesses of heart and brains, in the effort to be
equal to the high duty.
II.—CONFLICT OF PHILOSOPHIES
Under the admitted lack of perfection and perfectability of our
Constitution, it being the work of men, still we can not subscribe to
the nihilistic theory that there are flagrant violations of its provisions,
committed in utter oppression of a minority, to whom our
government is incapable of giving redress, and when a judicial
controversy arising from them is submitted for our decision we must
allow ourselves to be petrified in buddhistic nirvana and declare
ourselves impotent, like the bystander who can not lift a finger to
save people crying for help inside a burning house or a little child
inclosed in a cage full of hungry tigers.
Here, three senators of the Philippines are wantonly deprived of their
seats in the Senate as constitutional representatives of the people.
Here, chosen, spokesmen of many hundreds of thousands of qualified
voters, are silenced and muzzled, and their constitutional rights
trampled upon. The transgression of the fundamental law is evident.
But it is alleged that the Supreme Court is powerless to protect the
victims, to revindicate their constitutional rights and those of the
qualified voters who elevated them to office, and to restore law. It is
alleged that within our system of government there is absolutely no
remedy for such an oppression. The theory is an unmistakable upshot
of a philosophy of frustration, defeatism, and despair. We can not
subscribe to such an effete philosophy, afflicted with moral asthenia,
unable to see but an horizon of failure. We refuse to adopt the
despairing and fatalistic attitude of decrepit and impotent senility.
Philosophical eunuchry is incompatible with enemy. Gelded
intellectual virility or a dynamic moral effeminacy has no place within
the system of Philippine constitutional democracy.
The framing of our Constitution is based on a philosophy of faith and
hope, the philosophy of healthy, vigorous and courageous youth, full
of the zest of life, brimming with sturdy and exalted ideas, drunk with
the wine of inspired ambition and filled with enthusiasm for all good
and beautiful things, always dreaming of a nobler and more glorious
future. Within that strenuous philosophy there is no place for the
theory of impotency of our system of government in redressing
constitutional transgressions and of the incapability of the courts of
justice in giving protection and redress to the victims.
III.—QUALITIES REQUIRED IN JUDICIAL FUNCTION
We cannot accept the invitation to bury our heads in ostrich-like
fashion in the sands of indifference and inaction because, in having
to exercise the constitutional function of administering justice, we
will be constrained to face and take action against powerful, defiant
or arrogant parties. It is precisely in cases like this where we should
never show the least hesitancy in the performance of our official
duties and in the exercise of the loftiest function of humanity: the
administration of justice.
The judicial function calls for those qualities which, for lack of better
words, are described as manliness, moral courage, intellectual
decision, firmness of character, and steadfastness of convictions. We
accepted our position in this court fully cognizant of the grave
responsibilities it entails and aware that it will exact from us all the
best that nature has bestowed on us. We must not give less. We must
not betray popular trust. We should not disappoint the people.
IV.—FACTS IN THE CASE
The Commission on Elections, pursuant to the provisions of section
11 of Commonwealth Act No. 725, made the canvass of the votes cast
for senators in the election held on April 23, 1946, and on May 23,
1946, proclaimed petitioners as elected. (See accompanying
Appendix A.)
Of the 16 senators proclaimed elected, 9 belong to the Liberal Party,
respondents Jose A. Avelino, Vicente Francisco, Vicente Sotto,
Melecio Arranz, Ramon Torres, Mariano J. Cuenco, Olegario Clarin,
Enrique Magalona, and Salipada Pendatun; and 7 to the Nacionalista
Party, the 3 petitioners and Tomas Confesor, Carlos P. Garcia, Tomas
Cabili, and Alejo Mabanag.
Of the senators elected in 1941, 8 remain in office, 4 belonging to the
Liberal Party, Domingo Imperial, Proceso Sebastian, Sa Ramain
Alonto, and Emiliano Tria Tirona; and 4 to the Nacionalista Party,
Eulogio Rodriguez, Nicolas Buendia, Pedro Hernaez, and Vicente
Rama.
The Senate therefore, is actually composed of 13 Liberals, with a
precarious majority of 2, and a minority of 11 Nacionalistas.
On May 25, 1946, in accordance with the Commonwealth Act No.
725, the Senate convened to inaugurate the regular legislative
session for this year.
The session, with all senators present, except Senators Sa Ramain
Alonto and Vicente Rama, began by the reading of the proclamation
made by the Commission on Elections, as copied in the accompanying
Appendix A. No objection having been raised against the
proclamation, there being no question as to its legality and regularity,
with all the 22 members present, including petitioners, recognized
and accepted as full-fledged senators of the Philippines, the Senate
proceeded to elect its President, a vacant position previously held by
President Manuel A. Roxas. The result was: 3 absent; 2 abstained; for
respondent Senator Jose A. Avelino, 10 votes, including his own; for
petitioner Senator Jose O. Vera, 8 votes; and for Senator Carlos P.
Garcia, 1 vote.
After respondent Senator Avelino assumed his office as President of
the Senate, it was moved that he receive the collective oath of office
of the newly elected senators, and, at that juncture, Senator Salipada
Pendatun proposed the adoption of a resolution herein attached as
Appendix B, as a historical exhibit of the scurviest dealing a minority
has ever endured, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines, in
session assembled, as it hereby resolves, to defer the administration
of oath and the sitting of JOSE O. VERA, RAMON DIOKNO, and JOSE
ROMERO, pending the hearing and decision on the protests lodged
against their elections, wherein the terrorism averred in the report of
the Commission on Elections and in the report of the Provost
Marshall constitute the ground of said protests and will therefore be
the subject of investigation and determination.
Debate began upon the adoption of the proposed resolution.
Afterwards it was unanimously agreed upon to postpone further
debate on the question for Monday, May 27, 1946.
The Senate proceeded thereafter to consider another matter during
which, in protest against the action taken by the majority on the said
matter, all the minority senators walked out from the session hall,
leaving therein only 12 majority senators, including the President of
the Senate. Taking advantage of the absence of all the minority
senators, the 12 majority senators remaining in the session hall
approved and adopted the Pendatun Resolution, notwithstanding
the fact that the Senate had already postponed the further
consideration of said resolution to May 27, 1946, and the 12 majority
senators, for lack of quorum, could not, under the Constitution,
proceed with the business of the same and, therefore, had not the
authority either to reconsider the resolution taken by the Senate,
postponing the continuation of the debate on the Pendatun
Resolution to May 27, 1946, or to consider and approve said
resolution.
At the time the petition has been filed, May 27, 1946, respondent
Senator Jose Avelino, President of the Senate, had already begun to
put into effect the Pendatun Resolution by ordering the Secretary of
the Senate to erase from the roll of the same the names of the three
petitioners.
Among the three petitioners who are complaining of being deprived
of their constitutional and legal right to continue sitting in the Senate
of the Philippines is the minority Floor Leader Jose O. Vera, who lost
the election for President of the Senate by the bare difference of two
votes. All the three petitioners, by the high positions they formerly
occupied in the Government of which we may take judicial notice, are
recognized as political leaders of national stature, whose presence
will do honor to any legislative chamber of any country in the world.
V.—PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Upon the facts above related and the allegations made in the petition
under oath, including the one to the effect that the respondents of
the majority party are determined to put into effect immediately the
Pendatun resolution, to deprive the petitioners of their right to sit in
the Senate, the "sinister purpose" of which was the approval, without
the intervention and participation of petitioners, of important
measures, including an alleged terroristic one for judicial
reorganization and the highly controversial Bell Bill, as soon as the
petition was submitted in the night of May 27, 1946, the undersigned
issued the preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition upon
petitioners' filing a cash bond in the amount of P1,000. (Copy of the
order is attached as Appendix D.)
On May 29, 1946, the Supreme Court in banc was specially called to
session with the specific purpose of considering the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction. As the court functioning is a special division
of six, and the Supreme Court in banc was then in vacation, the
session had to be called upon the initiative of the Chief Justice. In the
meantime, the service of the writ was suspended.
The Supreme Court in banc adopted then the following resolution:
The court in banc, having been informed that a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued in G.R. No. L-543, Jose O. Vera vs. Jose
Avelino by Justice Perfecto under sections 2 and 5 of Rule 60,
Resolved to set for hearing the petition for preliminary injunction on
Saturday, June 1st, 1946, at 10 o'clock a.m., for the purpose of
determining whether or not the issuance of said writ was justified.
Let notice be given to all the parties.
The Chief Justice and Associate Justices Paras, Hilado and Bengzon
voted to dissolve the preliminary injunction in the meantime.
Upon the adoption of the above resolution, the undersigned
instructed the Clerk to proceed with the service of the writ of
preliminary injunction, which was immediately served to
respondents.
On June 3, 1946, a majority adopted the following resolution,
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction:
Considering that the preliminary injunction was issued in the case of
Jose O. Vera, petitioners, vs. Jose A. Avelino, respondents, G.R. No. L-
543, to preserve the status quo and thus prevent the execution of the
acts alleged under oath in the last part of paragraph X of the petition,
without the intervention of the petitioners; and taking into
consideration that this court, after hearing both parties, at any rate
believes and trusts that the respondents will not carry out said acts
during the pendency of this proceeding, this court, without deciding
whether or not the said injunction was justified, hereby resolves to
dissolve it in the meantime, without prejudice to whatever action or
decision this court may take or render on the question involved in this
case including that of jurisdiction.
Justice Paras concurs in the result.
Justice Jaranilla absent.
Justice Perfecto dissents as follows:
The facts alleged in the petition show that petitioners' fundamental
rights have been trampled upon in open defiance of the law and the
Constitution; that respondents, in adopting the Pendatun Resolution
and trying to enforce it, usurped constitutional functions exclusively
entrusted by the people to the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate, as an
independent and separate department of the government; that the
people at large, who voted for and of whom petitioners are legal
representatives, are intended to be deprived of their voice and vote
on matters of transcendental importance to the welfare and future
of this nation, that are and to be under consideration of the Senate.
Respondents did not deny these facts. They reduced themselves to
impugn the inherent and undisputable jurisdiction of this Supreme
Court to pass upon the above mentioned flagrant violations of the
Constitution and to afford coercive relief to the victims thereof. We
cannot agree with an action which history may give a damaging
interpretation. We must have proper respect to the judgement of
posterity. We have a plain duty to uphold the Constitution. We must
not shirk that sacred duty. We are called upon to protect the
constitutional prerogatives of the representatives of the people. Our
loyalty to the people does not permit any alternative action to that of
extending the cloak of our authority so that the representatives of
the people may continue performing unhampered their fundamental
prerogatives and functions. We cannot agree with any suspension of
their exercise in utter violation of the fundamental law of land. The
sovereignty of the people itself is involved in this case. We cannot
suffer the idea that in one of the crucial moments in the performance
of our functions and in the compliance of our duty as is pointed out
by our conscience, we have faltered. The preliminary injunction must
not be dissolved.
Although the belief expressed in the majority resolution is, in effect,
a moral injunction, addressed solely to the sense of responsibility,
fairness, decency, and patriotism of respondents, without any
enforceable legal sanction, the majority being sure that respondents
will not betray the trust reposed on them, yet we felt it our duty to
dissent because in questions so important as those raised in this case
we do not agree with indirect and diplomatic procedures, with
wavering, innocious and hesitating action, with laodicean measures
and resolutions, with equivocal, furtive, and not forth putting
attitude. In judicial matters, the best policy is forthrightness, not
ambiguity. The way of Themis is always rectilinear. Her path is never
tortuous, labyrinthine, or misleading.
Without any attempt at prophecy, not long after the resolution
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction, events have shown the
moral, indirect, or admonitory injunctions by courts of justice are
mere sounds transcribed on scraps of paper, not worthier than the
sheets on which they are written. Hocking at the credulity,
ingenuousness, and compliance of the majority of this court, with the
exclusion of petitioners, respondents proceeded to carryout the acts
alleged in the last part of paragraph X of the petition, such as the
approval of the Bell bill, the revamping of the judiciary system of the
Philippines, including the unconstitutional reduction of the
membership of the Supreme Court from the eleven to seven, and the
measure which would wipe out the time-honored principle of
stability in the Philippine civil service system, by placing many
thousands of public officers and employees in iniquitous insecurity in
the positions in which they have invested the be stenergies in years
of public service.
For the nonce, it will be hard to gauge and appraise the full
consequences of the resolution of June 5, 1946, dissolving the writ of
preliminary injunction based on the majority's belief and trust that
events have shown to be completely hazy and groundless. It is only
our fervent hope that the consequences, whatever they may be, may
not dampen the enthusiasm of those who have reposed so much faith
in the success of our sovereign Republic as the pursuivant heralding
a new era to all subjected peoples.
On June 8, 1946, petitioners filed a motion praying that the above
majority's resolution of June 3, 1946, be reconsidered and that the
writ of preliminary injunction be restored. It remained deplorably
unacted upon for weeks until respondents were able to consummate
the acts above mentioned.
That action continues now to be pending before us for decision, the
same as respondents' motion to dismiss.
VI.—UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution reads as follows:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three
of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The constitution of the Electoral Tribunals is provided in section 13 of
Article VI of the Constitution, wherein it is required that they shall be
constituted "within thirty days after the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have been organized with the election of their
President and Speaker, respectively."
From the foregoing, it is evident that the power to judge "all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of senators and
representatives, is exclusively lodged in the respective Electoral
Tribunal, the exclusivity being emphasized by the use of the word
"sole" by the drafters of the Constitution.
By the Pedatun Resolution, respondents exercised, in effect, the
power to judge "the election, returns, and qualifications" of
petitioners as senators of the Philippines, duly proclaimed as elected
on April 23, 1946.
From the very words of respondents themselves there can be no
possible mistakes as to the fact that, in adopting the Pendatun
Resolution, they exercised the judicial power to judge a controversy
concerning the election of petitioners as senators of the Philippines.
From their motion to dismiss dated June 6, 1946, through Solicitor
General Lorenzo Tañada and Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, himself one of
the Senate, referring to the reasons behind the adoption of the
Pendatun Resolution, we read:
The Senate considers it against its dignity and inimical to its welfare
and integrity to allow petitioners to sit as members pending the final
determination of the question whether or not they were duly elected .
. . it was an expression of the legislative (?) policy, a desire on the part
of the Senate to recognize only members whom it believes were
legally elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents do not constitute the Senate Electoral Tribunal
which has the exclusive jurisdiction to exercise said power. The fact
that latter three among the respondent Senators were chosen to be
members of said Tribunal does not change the situation, nor cures
the constitution inroad. They, therefore, in adopting the Pendatun
Resolution, usurped a power, a jurisdiction, and an authority
exclusively belonging to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The usurpation
has been perpetrated in flagrant violation of the Constitution. The
Pendatun Resolution, being unconstitutional, is null and void per se.
Among the Justices who voted to declare it invalid, because it
wimbles the fundamental law, are two former members of the
constitutional convention and of its committee on style, who took
active part in the creation of the Electoral Commission, and a former
member of the Second National Assembly which, by constitutional
amendment, created the present Senate and the two Electoral
Tribunals. Justice Hontiveros, one of the present three Justices who
took part in the framing of the original Constitution, did not
participate in the voting.
We have to bring out these facts because it is only logical that the co-
authors of the Constitution and of its amendments must be in a
better position to interpret their own will, intention, and purposes as
they expressed them in their own words in the fundamental law.
VI.-A.—THE INTENT OF THE PEOPLE IN THE CONSTITUTION IS
IDENTICAL WITH THE INTENT OF THEIR DELEGATES
Even the majority themselves admit that, in construing the
Constitution of the United States, the writings in "The Federalist" of
the delegates of the constitutional convention, such as Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay, have persuasive force, the same as the book of
Delegate Aruego and of other members of our own constitutional
convention concerning the Constitution of the Philippines. It is only
logical that the authors themselves should be in the advantageous
situation of construing more exactly the product of their own minds.
But, as if repenting for making the admission, foreseeing the
damaging consequences thereof for the majority's position, they
tried to neutralize it or subtract its validity by seconding the sophistic
distinction made by Willoughby as to the conclusiveness of the
parliamentary proceedings as means by proper construction of the
Constitution, on one side, and of the statutes, on the other, since in
the legislative proceedings "it is the intent of the legislature we seek,
" while in the preceedings of the constitution convention "we are
endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the
discussions and the liberations of their representative." The
distinction is absolutely groundless. In either the constitutional
convention are in the legislature, it is the people who speak through
their delegates and representatives, and the intent of the people may
only be gathered from the utterances of said delegates and
representatives. The "intent of the legislature" in ordinary laws is the
"intent of the people," both and being undistinguishable for all
practical purposes. And the "intent of the people" in a constitutional
convention is identified with the "intent" of their delegates thereof.
It is absurd, in practical, and against the realities of all experience to
mention "intent of the people" as something different from and in
opposition to the intent of their own representatives. The delegates
and representatives are the mouthpiece of the people. In the system
of the representative democracy prevailing in the United States of
America and in the Philippines, the people never speak by
themselves, but by their chosen mouthpieces — the voters in the
matter of selection of government officers, and the officers in the
matter of expressing the people's will in government or state matters.
There is no essential difference between the parliamentary role of
the delegates to a constitutional convention and that of the members
of a legislature. The fact that the former are charged with the drafting
of the fundamental law and the latter with the enactment of ordinary
laws does not change their common character as representatives and
mouthpieces of the people. In either the Constitution or in the
ordinary statutes, it is the thought and the will of the people which
are expressed. What that thought and that will are can only be
gathered from the way they are expressed by the representatives.
The thought and the will of the people are interpreted and expressed
by the representatives and crystallized in the words uttered and
written by them. No one may pretend to know the meaning of the
expressions uttered of the provisions written better than the very
persons who poured on them their own thoughts and decisions. The
thought and the will of the people remain in the abstract, are
incapable of caption, are more ideological entities, and do not form
and cannot be pointed out or determined until and unless their
representatives in the constitutional convention are in the legislature
express them in concrete and specific words of their own. The
collective entity of the people is, by its very in being, inarticulate. It
becomes articulate only through its chosen representatives. Its will is
an aphlogistic amber that becomes aflame only in the parliamentary
actuations of its delegates.
And if we are not dreaming, we must accept the fact that what the
representatives of the people stereotype either in a constitution or in
ordinary laws are their own personal opinions and convictions, their
own individual and personal thoughts and wills, although in doing so
they act in their representative capacity. We, the members of the
Supreme Court, are also representatives of the people and are
performing our official functions in are presentative capacity, but the
opinions we express and write flow, not from any extrinsic or
indwelling reservoir of justice, reserved to us by the sovereign
people, but from the spiritual fountain of our own personal
consciousness.
We will not dare to dispute any one's claim to wield, in interpreting
the fundamental law, the same authority of such judicial giants as
Marshall and Holmes, but we consider it completely out of place to
conclude that, because in the present constitutional controversy we
maintain that the co-authors of our fundamental law are in better
position to construe the very document in which they have infused
the ideas which boiled in their minds, and gave a definite form to their
own convictions and decisions, said great justices shall not be so
authoritative in expounding the United States Constitution, because
they were not members of the federal convention that framed it,
eventhough, it should be recalled, Chief Justice Marshall was one of
the outstanding figures in the Virginia convention that ratified said
Constitution. The mention is out of place, because it has not been,
and can not be, shown that the constitutional opinions of Marshall
and Holmes, for which they were hailed as authorities, are in conflict
with what Madison, Hamilton, Jay, and other delegates to the federal
convention had said or written as to the intent expressed in said
fundamental law; while in the present controversy, there is an actual
conflict of interpretation between former delegates and those who
never have been, and it happens that the former members of the
constitutional convention taking part in the disposal of this case, are
unanimous in construing the document in the drafting of which they
took personal and active part.
Of course, in our atmosphere of freedom of opinion, outsiders may
perfectly claim and pretend to know what the delegates to our
constitutional convention intended to express in the Constitution
better than the delegates themselves, as it is possible for some
anthropologists to claim that they are in a position to recognize the
children of some parents better than the parents themselves. But
everybody must also agree that such feats of clairvoyance are not
within the range of normal experience and, therefore, must not
ordinarily be accepted at their face value.
VII.—UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE
The Pendatun Resolution has been adopted when there was no
quorum in the Senate. Those present were only 12, all respondent
senators.
When respondents adopted the resolution, they purportedly
adopted it as a resolution of the Senate.
Section 10 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but
a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent members in such manner and under such
penalties as such House may provide."
It is evident, therefore, that, to do business, the Senate, being
composed of 24 members, needs the presence of at least 13 senators.
"A smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent members," but not in exercising any other
power, such as the adoption of the Pendatun Resolution.
The procedure used by respondents in adopting the Pendatun
Resolution is, therefore, conclusively unconstitutional.
VIII.—CRIMINAL OFFENSES
Petitioners are among the senators who, having been proclaimed
elected by the Commission on Elections, are duty bound to assume
office from May 23, 1946, under the following mandatory provision
of section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725:
SEC. 12. The candidates for member of the House of Representatives
and those for Senator who have been proclaimed elected by the
respective Board of Canvassers and the Commission on Elections shall
assume office and shall hold regular session for the year nineteen
hundred and forty-six on May twenty-five, nineteen hundred and
forty-six. Within thirty-five days after the election has been held, both
Houses of Congress shall meet in session and shall publicly count the
votes cast for the offices of President and Vice-President, in
accordance with Article VII, section two of the Constitution. The
persons respectively having the largest number of votes for President
and Vice-President shall be declared elected; but in case two or more
candidates shall have an equal and largest number of votes for either
office, one of them shall be chosen President or Vice-President, as the
case may be, by a majority vote of the members of Congress in joint
session assembled.
If petitioners should fail to discharge the duties of their respective
offices, they will incur criminal responsibility and may be punished,
according to the Penal Code, with arresto mayor or a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both.
Art. 234. Refusal to discharge elective office.—The penalty of arresto
mayor or a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed
upon any person who, having been elected by popular election to a
public office, shall refuse without legal motive to be sworn in or to
discharge the duties of said office.
No one may prevent them from performing the duties of their office,
such as attending the meetings of the Senate or of any of its
committees or subcommittees, or from expressing their opinions or
casting their votes, without being criminally guilty of a violation of
parliamentary immunity, a criminal offense punished by the Penal
Code with prision mayor.
ART. 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity.—The penalty
of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall use
force, intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member of the
National Assembly (Congress)from attending the meetings of the
Assembly (Congress) or of any of its committees or subcommittees,
constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, from
expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty of prision
correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee
who shall, while the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special
session, arrest or search any member thereof, except this Code by a
penalty higher than prision mayor. (Words in parenthesis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondents have the
inexcusable duty of recognizing petitioners as legal members of the
Senate, otherwise they may be liable to criminal prosecution for an
offense defined and punished by the Penal Code with imprisonment
ranging from 6 years to 12 years.
IX.—PETITIONERS' CREDENTIALS CONCLUSIVE AS TO THEIR RIGHT TO
THEIR SEATS IN THE SENATE
It is a duty from which respondents can not legally escape. Otherwise
they will invite the sword of Damocles of criminal prosecution to be
hanging on their heads. As the Supreme Court of Kansas said in Re
Gunn. 19 L.R.A., 519:
But, again we have what is known as a "standard work" on
parliamentary or legislative practice. It is found in almost every public
library, is examined and referred to by every legislative assembly and
every congressional body, and its title is "Cushing's Law and Practice
of Legislative Assemblies." . . . In section 240 it is said: "the principle
of parliamentary law applicable to the question are perfectly simple
and plain, founded in the very nature of things, established by the
uniform practice and authority of parliament, confirmed by reason
and analogy. These principles are as follows: First, that every person
duly returned is a member, whether legally elected or not, until his
election is set aside; second, that no person who is not duly returned,
is a member, although legally elected, until his election is established;
third, that conflicting claimants, both in form legally returned (that
would be where two persons had certificates), are neither of them
entitled to be considered as members until the question between
them has been settled; fourth, that those members who are duly
returned, and they alone — the members whose rights are to
determined being excluded — constitute the judicial tribunal for the
decision of all questions of this nature." Upon this question of
certificates, we also cite the contest in the United States Senate from
Montana, which is the latest utterance of the highest legislative body
in this land. In the report of the majority of the committee it is said:
"The majority of the committee are of the opinion that, if this body
of persons had lawful and constitutional certificates of their election,
that title is a good title against all the world, governing their
associates in that body, governing the senate, governing everybody
who had a lawful duty to determine who are lawfully elected
representatives, until there can be an adjudication by the House itself
to the contrary; and that nobody can be heard to say, and that no
authority can be permitted to inquire into or determine, the actual
facts of the election as against the title." (51st Congress, 1st Session
[21 Cong. Record, pt. 3, pp. 2906-2810], p. 521.)
The court also quoted from the American and English Encyclopedia,
saying:
The American and English Encyclopedia summarizes the law of the
worth of a certificate of election as follows: "It is settled that when it
is made the duty of certain officers to canvass the votes, and issue a
certificate of election in favor of the successful candidate, a
certificate of such officers, regular upon its face, is sufficient to entitle
the person holding it to the possession of the office during an action
to contest the right." Volume 6, p. 373; 33 Law. ed., 948; State vs.
Buckland (23 Kan., 369).
The court might well have added that Ruling Case Law wholly
confirms its stand:
. . . The certificate entitles the recipient to exercise the office until the
regular constitutional authority shall determine who is legally elected
officer, and it is duty of the incumbent of an office at the expiration
of his term to surrender it to one who has received a certificate of
election and has qualified thereunder. If it is desired to contest the
election or qualification of such person, this may be done in the
manner prescribed by law for determining claims to an office.
Disbursing officers, charges with the payment of salaries, have a right
to rely on the apparent title, and treat the officer who is clothed with
it as the officer de jure, without inquiring whether another has the
better right. While a certificate of election may be superseded by a
decree in proceedings to contest the election, it cannot be subjected
to attack in a collateral proceeding in which the title may be in
question; and if the time should pass within which such proceeding
may be instituted the title may become absolute and indefeasible in
default of any contest. Hence it has been said that the holder of a
certificate of election who has duly qualified is prima facie entitled to
the office when his term begins, as against everyone except a de
facto officer in possession under color of authority. He is entitled to
retain possession and to perform the duties of the office without
interference until such certificate is set aside by some appropriate
proceeding." (22 R. C. L., 436, 437.)
This Supreme Court laid down the same doctrine by stating the
following:
. . . As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of
canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the
National Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said
body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted
December 6, 1935)
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons
and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither
necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The
return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-
elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a
member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of
England, vol. 12, pp. 331, 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695;U. S. C. A., Title 2,
secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested
elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the
protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted
election is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the
House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the
Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give
such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue
of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the
determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125,
sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of
the particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without
any actual alteration or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and
Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166). (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 180, 181.)
As a matter of fact, in the Gunn case, the Supreme Court of Kansas
had occasion to comment on the exclusion of ten duly proclaimed
members from the roll of the House, and unhesitatingly condemned
it in these words:
It seems that while 10 contestants are marked in the Dunsmore
Journal as present, but not voting, 10 names on the certified roll are
wholly omitted. Any rightful reason for such omission does not
appear. We cannot perceive any valid reason for such omission, even
if 10 certified members had their seats contested. Every person duly
returned too a house of representatives, and having a certificate, is a
member thereof, whether elected or not, whether eligible or not,
until his election is set aside. And this must be set aside by the House,
not by the individual members before organization, not by anyone
member, not by any contestant, not by any mob. Before organization,
a few members properly elected, meeting in causus or otherwise,
cannot pass upon the "elections, returns, and qualification of a
members of the House to be thereafter organized." If one member,
before organization can object to any other member duly returned
and having a certificate, then all members can be objected to, and
there could be no one left to organize any house. In McCraryon
Election (2d ed., s. 204) the practice is thus stated; "Where two or
more persons claim the same office, and where a judicial
investigation is required to settle the contest upon the merits, it is
often necessary to determine which of the claimants shall be
permitted to qualify and to exercise the functions of the office
pending such investigation. If the office were to remain vacant
pending the contest, it might frequently happen that the greater part
of the term would expire before it could be filled; and thus the
interests of the people might suffer for the want of a public officer.
Besides, if the mere institution of a contest were deemed sufficient
to prevent the swearing in of the person holding the usual
credentials, it is easy to see that every great and serious injustice
might be done. If this were the rule, it would only be necessary for an
evil-disposed person to contest the right of his successful rival, and to
protract the contest as long as possible, in order to deprive the latter
of his office for at least a part of the term; and this might be done by
a contest having little or no merit on his side for it would be
impossible to discover in advance of an investigation the absence of
merit. And, again, if the party holding the ordinary credentials to an
office could be kept out of the office by the mere institution of a
contest, the organization of a legislative body-such, for example, as
the House of Representatives of the United States-might be
altogether prevented by instituting contest against a majority of the
members; or what is more to be apprehended, the relative strength
of political parties against members of one or the other of such
parties. These considerations have made it necessary to adopt and to
adhere to the rule that the person holding the ordinary credential
shall be qualified and allowed to act pending a contest and until a
decision can be had on the merits.
Now, why should not this principle be followed? Why should not this
rule, which is universal throughout the states of this Union, and which
is accepted and adopted by Congress, be followed in the state of
Kansas? It has history to sustain it. It has reason to sustain it. And let
us here remark that in every state of this Union where, through
political excitement or personal contests, a different rule has been
adopted, disturbance, violence, and almost bloodshed have always
occurred. (Pp. 522-523.)
X.—ELECTORAL CONTESTS ON LEGISLATIVE POSITIONS
Much reliance has been placed by respondents on the Rafols case in
support of their authority to suspend the seatings of petitioners
through the Pendatun Resolution.
We agree that not enough emphasis may be placed on said case,
although not as an isolated one but as the initial link of a chain of
historical events handing with the leading and epoch-making,
although not enough of the publicized case of Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, decided on July 15, 1936, which reversed the
pusillanimous, vacillating, and self-contradictory majority position
taken in Alejandrino vs. Quezon, decided on September 11, 1924.
A little piece of history will be helping.
In 1925, Nicolas A. Rafols was reelected as representative from one
district of Cebu. The House of Representatives of the 7th Philippine
Legislature suspended his seating. The resolution for suspension was
passed after a bitter parliamentary debate between members of the
majority belonging to the Nacionalista Party and the members of the
minority belonging to the Democrata Party. The House was then
presided over by Speaker Manuel A. Roxas, now President of the
Philippines, and among those who with us opposed the resolution for
suspension were Representative Jose Avelino from Samar, now
President of the Senate, and the minority floor leader, Claro M. Recto,
who later became President of the House of Representatives. The
arbitrariness and injustice committed against Representative Rafols
were bitterly resented and rankled deep in the hearts of the minority
who felt they were despotically trampled upon by a bulldozing
majority.
The Pro-Anti political struggle in 1934 resulted in new alignments.
Former Democratas Avelino and Recto happened to align with the
Anti majority, the same as Justice Hontiveros, who also became a
Delegate to the constitutional convention; and former Nacionalistas
Manuel A. Roxas and Manuel C. Briones happened to align with the
Pro minority.
In 1934, the constitutional convention was presided over by Claro M.
Recto, as President, Ruperto Montinola, as First Vice President, and
Teodoro Sandico, as Second Vice President. All of them belonged to
the Democrata Party when in 1925 injustice was committed against
Representative Rafols. Recto and Sandico were aligned with the Anti
majority and Montinola with the Pro minority.
Although the Pro delegates of the convention were only about one-
fifth of all the members, some of them were elected to preside over
important committees--Rafael Palma, on principles; Jose P. Laurel, on
the bill of rights; Manuel C. Briones, on legislative power; and
ourselves on citizenship. By his leading and influential role in the
drafting of the Constitution, Manuel A. Roxas was pointed out as the
Hamilton of our convention.
With such men and with their background, the convention
introduced the innovation of creating the Electoral Commission of
the National Assembly, to which the power to judge upon the
election, returns, and qualifications of legislators, formerly exercised
by legislative bodies, was transferred. The innovation was introduced
precisely with the purpose of avoiding the repetition of such abuses
and injustices as those committed against Rafols, by lodging the
judicial power of deciding electoral contests for legislative positions
to where it should logically belong--to a judicial body, which is
expected to do justice and not to serve partisan political interests
without compunctions and scruples.
Although the initiative came from the minority, Pros, it was whole
heartedly supported by the majority Anti leaders. The members of
the constitutional convention, with the most prominent leaders
thereof, were fully aware of how changeable the political fortunes of
men are, and it was in the interest of everybody that the rights of the
minority be equally protected as those of the majority.
Through Justice Laurel, a former member of the constitutional
convention, this Supreme Court said:
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our
fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history
and political development of other countries of the world. When,
therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as
a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of
passing upon and determining the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral
Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the
framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Nothwithstanding the
vigorous opposition of some members of the convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body
by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the
approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral
Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of
the people." (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4,
1861.)
From the deliberations of our constitutional convention it is evident
that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matter pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an indefendent and impartial
tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of
contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt
need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people, acting through their
delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the
Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in
which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented
to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and
further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership
three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral commission is a constitutional creation, invested with
the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the
limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of
that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as
effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1;
State vs. Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R. A., 1917B, 1). (Angara vs.
Electoral commission, 63 Phil., 139, 174-176.)
XI.—SEPARATION OF POWERS
There is much misunderstanding as to the real import meaning, and
scope of the much vaunted principle of separation of power due to
the confusion in many minds between two conceptions: one, naive
and vulgar; and the other, constitutional and strictly juridical. The
trouble lies in the fact that, for lack of more appropriate term, the
word separation has been used to convey a group of concepts and
ideas, when the word only expresses just one of partial aspect of one
of said concepts and ideas. Thus a misconception results by
confounding a part with the whole or the whole with the part.
The vulgar notion of separation of powers appears to be simple,
rudimentary, and clear-cut. As a consequence, the principle of
separation of powers creates in the mind of the ignorant or
uninitiated the images of the different departments of government
as individual units, each one existing independently, all alone by
itself, completely disconnected from the remaining all others. The
picture in their mental panorama offers, in effect, the appearance of
each department as a complete government by itself. Each
governmental department appears to be a veritable state in the
general set up of the Philippine state, like the autonomous kingdoms
and princedoms of them a harajahs of India. Such undiscerning and
rudimentary notion can not fit in the pattern framed by the Filipino
people through their representatives in the constitutional
convention. The true concept of the principle of separation of powers
may not be obtained but in conjunction with the political structure
set up by the Constitution and only in accordance with the specific
provisions thereof.
The drafters of the constitution were fully acquainted with the then
prevailing confusions and misconceptions as to the meaning of the
principle of separation of powers. One outstanding instance is shown
in the self-contradicting, courageless decision in Alejandrino vs.
Quezon (46 Phil., 83), where the majority deflected from the natural
and logical consequences of the premises unanimously agreed upon
by all the members of the court using as a subterfuge an erroneous,
disrupting, and subversive interpretation and application of the
principle of separation of powers, becoming since a fetish of a class
of unanalytical constitutional doctrinaires, distressingly unmindful of
its dangerous implications, eager to emulate, in proclaiming it as a
legal dogma, the plangent exertions of housetop bawlers preaching
the virtues of a new panacea.
Fully knowing the prevailing misconceptions regarding said principle,
although there was an implicit agreement that it is one of those
underlying principles of government ordered by the Constitution to
be established, the delegates to the constitutional convention
purposely avoided its inclusion in the Declaration of Principles
inserted as Article II of the fundamental law. They even went to the
extent of avoiding to mention it by the phrase it is designated.
XII.—CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTION—THE ONLY ONE ACCEPTABLE
The only acceptable conception of the principle of separation of
powers within our democracy in the constitutional one. We must
reject any idea of it as something existing by itself, independent of
the Constitution and, as some misguided jurist would have it, even
superior to the fundamental law of the land.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. . . . The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a
check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the
enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that
a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President
to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case
may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On
the other hand, the National Assembly operates as check on the
Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and
the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 156, 157.)
The framers of the Constitution had never intended to create or allow
the existence of governmental departments as autonomous states
within the republican state of the Philippines. The three departments
mentioned in the Constitution were created, not as complete
independent units, but as limbs and organs of the organic unit of the
department is independent and separate from the others in the sense
that it is an organ specifically entrusted with the performance of
specific functions, not only for the sake of efficiency resulting from
division of labor, but to avoid tyranny, despotism, and dictatorship
which, as experience and history have taught, result from the
concentration of government powers in one person or in an
oligarchical group.
XIII.—FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF UNITY
The idea of unity is fundamental in our Constitution.
The Filipino people ordained and promulgated the Constitution "in
order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the
general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy" (Preamble of the Constitution). "The Philippines is a
republic state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article 11, Constitution).
Under this principle we must view the whole government as a unit,
and all departments and other government organs, agencies and
instrumentalities as parts of that unit in the same was as the head,
the hands, and the heart are parts of a human body.
By examining the provisions of the Constitution, the vulgar notion of
the principle of separation of powers can be shown to be wrong, as
there is neither an office nor a department, created or allowed to be
created under the Constitution, that may be considered as effectively
separate from the others, as the misinformed people would have it.
As a matter of fact, there is no government power vested exclusively
in any authority, office, or government agency. Section 1 of Article VI
vests the legislative power in a Congress of the Philippines, but this
provision does not preclude the President of the Philippines and the
Supreme Court from partaking in the exercise of legislative power.
The President has the initiative in the making of appropriations which
may not be increased by Congress except those pertaining to
Congress itself and the judicial department, and the President may
veto any bill enacted by Congress (sections 19 and 20, Article VI, of
the Constitution). The Supreme Court may declare unconstitutional
and, therefore, nullify a law enacted by Congress and approved by
the President of the Philippines (sections 2 and 10, Article VIII, of the
Constitution). The Supreme Court exercises, besides, legislative
power in promulgating rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts (section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution)
The executive power is vested in a President of the Philippines
(section 1, Article VII, Constitution of the Philippines), but the Senate
and House of Representatives, through the Commission on
Appointments, take part in the exercise of the executive power of
appointment (section 12, Article VI, and section 10 [3], Article VII, of
the Constitution), and in the granting of amnesty and in making
treaties (section 10 [6] and 10 [7], Article VII, of theConstitution). The
Supreme Court exercises executive power regarding the transfer of
judges from their districts to another. (Section 7, Article VIII, of the
Constitution.) Tribunals' power to order the execution of their
decisions and mandates is of executive character.
The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
court as may be established by law (section 1, Article VIII, of the
Constitution).But there are many instances wherein the President of
the Philippines must administer justice, so it is required from him by
the Constitution to swear to "do justice to every man" (section 7,
Article VII, of the Constitution). And by impeachment proceedings,
the House of Representatives and the Senate exercise judicial
function (Article IX, of the Constitution). Their power to construe and
apply their own rules and their disciplinary power to punish their own
members for disorderly conduct are of judicial nature.
Furthermore, there are specific functions of government entrusted to
agencies other than the three great departments of government, the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The judicial function of
judging contests as to election, returns, and qualifications of senators
in entrusted to the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate; and that of
judging contests as to election, returns, and qualifications of
representatives, to the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives (section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution).The
executive function of auditing the government accounts is entrusted
to a constitutional officer, the Auditor General (Article XI, of the
Constitution), and the administrative function of supervising
elections is entrusted to the Commission on Elections (Article X, of
the Constitution).
To understand well the true meaning of the principle of separation of
powers, it is necessary to remember and pay special attention to the
fact that the idea of separation refers, not to departments, organs, or
other government agencies, but to powers exercised. The things
separated are not the subject of the powers, but the functions to be
performed. It means division of functions, but not of officials or
organs which will perform them. It is analogous to the economic
principle of division of labor practiced in a factory where multiple
manufacturing processes are performed to produce a finished article.
XIV.—APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
In the discussion of the question how the principle of separation of
powers must be applied, misunderstood ideas have been asserted as
springboard to jump to rash and unfounded conclusions. Among such
assertions is the one which would have three great departments of
government, not only co-equal in dignity, but, notwithstanding their
admitted coordination, as actual sovereigns — as if within the sphere
of the sovereigns can be admitted — each one with full powers to
destroy and trample upon the Constitution, with the victims
absolutely incapable and powerless to obtain redress against the
offense. Such an assertion would make of said departments as states
within a state. The fundamental error of the assertion lies in the
failure to consider the following principle of the Constitution:
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them. (Section 1, Article II.)
Each department of government is nothing but a mere agency by
which the people exercise its supreme sovereignty. Within the
framework of the Constitution, our government may be compared to
a human being: the legislative department is the brain that
formulates policies and rule through the laws it enacts; the executive
department is the hand that executes such policies and rules; the
judicial department is the conscience that declares what is wrong and
what is right, and determines what acts are in consonance with or
inimical to the constitutional unity as the very condition of life and
survival.
The brain that defines policies and the hand that executes them may
go astray and disregard, by their physical power, the infallible
pronouncements and admonitions of conscience; but nothing can
and should stop conscience in its great ethical mission as a condition
indespensable to existence itself. By the same token, nothing can and
should silence tribunals as the organs, in the government set up by
the Constitution, of the collective conscience of the people. In the
long trip of destiny, that collective conscience shall ever be the
guiding star, unerring even in the gloomiest confusions.
Applying to the case at bar the principle of separation of powers in its
true meaning, the logical result will be precisely the opposite of the
position taken by respondents who, unwittingly, are insistently
invoking it to challenge the power, authority, and jurisdiction of this
Supreme Court to entertain the petition and to grant petitioners
coercive relief.
From the facts of the case, it is evident that respondents encroached
upon, invaded, and usurped the ancillary powers to suspend
petitioners in relation to the power to judge electoral contests
concerning senators, a power which the Constitution specifically
assigns to the Senate Electoral Tribunal, exclusive of all other
departments, agencies or organs of government. That power of
suspension is accessory, adjective, complementary, and ancillary to
the substantial power to judge said electoral contests. The accessory
must follow the principal; the adjective, the substantive; the
complementary, the complemented.
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139).
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 177.)
That power of suspension may, in the interest of reason and justice,
be exercised by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in relation too an
electoral contest, among other possible cases that can be surmissed,
where two or more allegedly elected senators are in possession of
apparently valid credentials of having been proclaimed as duly
elected. In such a case, as the Constitution does not allow more than
twenty-four senators to sit in the Senate and there is, in the
meantime, no possibility of determining who among the contestants
have been duly elected — all the claimants being in possession of
incompatible, self-denying and self-destroying credentials — reason
counsels that all of them be suspended by the Electoral Tribunal
pending the presentation of the necessary evidence to allow one of
them to take his seat in the Senate until the contest is finally decided.
The usurpation perpetrated by respondents is a flagrant violation of
the principle of separation of powers, they having invaded a ground
belonging exclusively to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
XV.—THE SENATE WITHOUT POWER TO SUSPEND ITS MEMBERS
Respondents lack the power of suspension, not only as ancillary
remedy in senatorial election contests, but even in the exercise of the
Senate judicial power to punish its members for disorderly conduct.
The majority and the minority of the Supreme Court in the case of
Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83), agreed unanimously with
respect to said Senate Malcolm, speaking for the Court in said case,
stated:
As to whether the power to "suspend" is included in the power to
"punish," a power granted to the Houses of the Legislature by the
Constitution, or in the power to "remove" a power granted to the
Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that neither
is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld
from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General
alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature.
It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not in all
its long history suspended a member. And the reason is obvious.
Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged
dignity of the House without depriving the construency of
representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the
honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an
opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral
district of representation without the district being afforded any
means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains
filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is
equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. (P. 96.)
And Justice Johnson, who dissented on another ground, explained
the ruling in greater detail as follows:
The power to punish for misbehavior was intended purely as a
disciplinary measure. When a member of the Legislature is removed
either by the Governor-General or by the Legislature, a vacancy
exists, and the law gives the Governor-General the right to appoint,
and the people of the district the right to fill the vacancy by election,
so that the people may again, under either case, be represented. A
"suspension" of a member, however, does not create a vacancy, and
the people of the district are without a representative and the
Governor-General cannot appoint one and the people cannot elect
one during the period of suspension. They are without representation
during that period. They are, for the period of suspension, taxed
without representation. If a member, under the power to punish, can
be suspended for ten or more years, thus depriving the Governor-
General of his right under the law, and the people of the district, of a
representative, and without a remedy in the premises.
If the power "to punish for disorderly behavior" includes the power
to suspend or to deprive a member of all his rights, and if the
suspension is in effect a removal, then an appointed member many
be removed, under the power to punish, by a mere majority, while
the law requires a two-thirds majority to remove an elective member.
In other words, if under the power to "punish," any member of the
legislature, including an appointive member, may be in effect
removed, then an elective member may be removed by a majority
vote only, thus encroaching upon the power of the executive
department of the government, as well as violating the powers
conferred upon the Legislature, because the Legislature cannot
remove an elective member except by two-thirds majority.
It is strenuously argued by the respondents that the resolution
depriving the petitioner "of all his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments for the period of one year" is not a removal from his
office but a mere suspension. The resolution does not use the word
"suspend" but does not use the word "deprive." It provides that the
petitioner is "deprived" of all his prerogatives, etc., for a period of one
year. If that word means anything it means that all of the
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of the petitioner and the
citizens whom he represents have been taken from him and them.
His prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments constitute his right to
represent the people of his district, and his right to exercise all the
duties and to assume all the responsibilities pertaining to his office.
His emoluments constitute his right to receive his salary and the
benefits pertaining to his office as a senator. If a value can be placed
upon his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments, and if he has been
deprived of them, then it must follow that they have been removed
from him, or that he has been removed from them. At any rate, the
resolution has separated the petitioner and the people whom he
represents and deprived them of all of one year; and, for all intents
and purposes, he and the people whom he represents, have been
deprived of their prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and in
effect, has been removed from any participation in the legislative
affairs of the government.
A great many cases have been studied on the question of removal
and suspension, and we are confindent in the assertion that the
power to punish does not include the power to remove or suspend.
A suspension from an office or a deprivation of the rights of an officer
of all his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, is in effect a
deprivation or a removal from office for the time mentioned in the
order of suspension. It has been held that a suspension from office
for an indefinite time and lasting for a period of six months, lost its
temporary character, ceased to be a suspension, and in effect
became a removal from such office. It was held, in the case of the
State vs. Chamber of Commerce, that the suspension of a member
was a qualified expulsion, and that whether it was called a suspension
or expulsion or removal, it in effect disfrachised the person
suspended. In the case of Metsker vs. Nelly, it was held that a
suspension or a deprivation for either a definite period is in effect a
removal. In the case of Gregory vs. New York, it was held that the
power to remove an officer or punish him does not include the power
to suspend him temporarily from his office. A mere suspension would
not create a vacancy, and the anomalous and unfortunate condition
would exist of an office, — an officer, — but no vacancy, and of no
one whose right and duty it was to execute the office. (Pp. 100-102.)
XVI.—POWER OF JUDICIAL NATURE
The principle of separation of powers can not be invoked to deny the
Supreme Court jurisdiction in this case, because to decide the
question of validity or nullity of the Pendatun Resolution, of whether
petitioners are illegally deprived of their constitutional rights and
privileges as senators of the Philippines, of whether respondents
must or must not be enjoined by injunction or prohibition from
illegally and unconstitutionally trampling upon the constitutional and
legal rights of petitioners, is a function judicial in nature and, not
having been assigned by the Constitutional to other department of
government, is logically within the province of courts of justice,
including the Supreme Court.
The power, authority, and jurisdiction to decide any question as to
the allocation of powers by the Constitution are of judicial nature and
belong to court of justice. In denying that power to the Supreme
Court, respondents only add insult to injury by maintaining that there
is no remedy for any usurpation being committed in adopting the
Pendatun Resolution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves
off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict,
the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of power between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power
of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for then
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government
mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living
constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional
grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescense for
a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication
from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is
to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in
what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. Even this, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren
legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass
upon the questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government. (Angara vs. Election Commission, 63 Phil., 139, 157-
159.)
XVII.—SENATORIAL TERRORISM
There is much loose talk as to the inherent power of the Senate to
adopt the unsconstitutional Pendatun Resolution for the self-
preservation of the Senate, for its dignity and decorum. We are afraid
that, by the facts publicly known to everybody, such talks serve only
to reveal sheer hypocrisy. There is absolutely no showing that they
are guilty of any disorderly conduct or of any action by which they
may be subject to criminal prosecution, or that by their conduct they
have become unworthy to have a seat in Congress. On the other
hand, there are three senators who are under indictment for the
heinous crime of treason before the People's Court, not for acts
committed before their election, but for acts committed while they
were already holding office as such senators. Respondents have not
taken any action looking toward the suspension of said three
senators. Although we do not propose to criticize respondents for this
inaction, as the three senators undicted for treason must be
presumed innocent unless and until they are finally convicted by the
proper court, such inaction serves to emphasize the iniquitous
discrimination committed against petitioners, who have not even
been indicted before any court of justice for the slightest violation of
law.
The Pendatun Resolution invokes the report of the Commission on
Elections as to alleged electoral irregularities in four Central Luzon
provinces; but there is absolutely nothing in the resolution to show
that petitioners had anything to do with said irregularities, and
respondents themselves, in the canvass of votes for President and
Vice President, had counted as valid all the votes cast in said Central
Luzon provinces and had accepted as good ones the votes they
themselves obtained therein. In fact, one of them occupied the first
place in one of said provinces. This self-contradicting attitude has
absolutely no defense in the judgement of any decent person. To this
we must add that the Pendatun Resolution, in fact, misquotes the
report of the Commission on elections in the sense that it tries to
convey an impression contrary to said report by quoting parts thereof
based on unverified and uncorroborated hearsay evidence, and
ignoring its main conclusion in which it is stated that the alleged
irregularities did not affect the orderly election in said provinces.
There is much talk as to the alleged terrorism prevailing in the
provinces in question during election, but there is absolutely no
reliable evidence as to such terrorism that can be found either in the
report of the Commission on Elections or in the Pendatun Resolution.
Even in the case that such terrorism really happened, there is no
reason to make any pronouncement based on it without proper
investigation by proper authorities, and in the present case the
proper authority that must determine, if such terrorism did really
take place and affect the election on April 23, 1946, concerning
senators, is the Senate Electoral Tribunal. And until then there is no
reason why respondents must themselves resort to senatorial
terrorism in order to oppress, muzzle, and crush minority senators,
such as petitioners. Congressional terrorism is no better than lawless
terrorism. Because it is practised by despotice government officials
does not make it holy and sacrosanct.
XVIII.—NOBODY IS ABOVE THE LAW
There are assertions to the effect that we may exercise jurisdiction
against individual officers of the Senate, but not against the Senate
or against respondents. We do not agree with such an unmanly
attitude. We do not agree with the theory that the Supreme Court
must exercise its judicial power to give redress to the victims of a
usurpation only when its decision is addressed to minor officers of
government, but not when it is addressed to minor officers of
government, but not when it is addressed to powerful ones. We will
incur a grave dereliction of duty if we should refuse to grant the
redress that justice demands only and because we have to reverse an
illegal and unconstitutional act committed by a legislative chamber,
or a group of its members, specially if the group forms the majority,
or by Congress itself. To show that under the Constitution nobody is
above the law, we have only to refer to its provision which recognizes
in the Supreme Court the power to nullify the declare
unconstitutional an act enacted by Congress and approved by the
President of the Philippines. A law passed by Congress is enacted with
the direct participation of the two great departments of our
government, the legislative and the executive. Nevertheless, if the
law enacted is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has the power to
declare it so and deny effect to the same.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can
become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the
United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its
interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain principles,
supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles, as, in their opinion, shall most conduce
to their own happiness is the basis on which the whole American
fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very
great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The
principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And
as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom
act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns
to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop
here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those
departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The
powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be
passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between
a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if
act prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a
proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls
any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter
the Constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The
constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means, or it is On a level with ordinary legislative acts, and,
like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter
it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act
contrary to the constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then
written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people,
to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law
of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every such
government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the
constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and, is
consequently, to be considered, by this court, as one of the
fundamental principles of our society.
xxx xxx xxx
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must
of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either
decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the
constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the
law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution
is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and
not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Those, then, who controvert the principle that the constitution is to
be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the
necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the
constitution, and see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written
constitutions. It would declare that an act which, according to the
principles and theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in
practice, completely obligatory. It would declare that if the legislature
shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the
express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be given to the
legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath
which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is
prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at
pleasure. Manbury vs. Madison (1 Cr., 137; 2 Law. ed., pp. 60, 73, 74)
But we have found no better expression of the true principle on this
subject than the language of Justice Hoar, in the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts reported in 14 Gray, 226, in the case of Burnham vs.
Morrissey. That was a case in which the plaintiff was imprisoned
under an order of the House of Representatives of the Massachusetts
Legislature for refusing to answer certain questions as a witness and
to produce certain books and papers. The opinion, or statement
rather, was concurred in by all the court, including the venerable
Chief Justice Shaw;
"The House of Representatives (says the court) is not the final judge
of its own power and privileges in cases in which the rights and
liberties of the subject are concerned, but the legality of its action
may be examined and determined by this court. That House is not the
Legislature, but only a part of it, and is therefore subject in its action
to the law in common with all other bodies, officers and tribunals
within the Commonwealth. Especially is it competent and proper for
this court to consider whether its proceedings are in conformity with
the Constitution and laws, because living under a written
Constitution, no branch or department of the government is
supreme, and it is the province and duty of the judicial department
to determine in cases regularly brought before them, whether the
powers of any branch of the government, and even those of the
Legislature in the enactment of laws, have been exercised in
conformity to the Constitution; and if they have not, to treat their
acts as null and void. . . ."
In this statement of the law, and in the principles there laid down, we
fully concur. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 Law. ed., 377, 390.)
Professor Edward S. Corwin, in this book "The Twilight of the Supreme
Court," says:
The pivotal proposition was set up that between the making of law
and its construction was an intrinsic difference of the most vital
nature; and that since the latter function was demonstrably a daily
concern of courts, it followed necessarily that the legislature might
not perform it in a way to produce finally binding results.
Applied to the Constitution, this reasoning automatically produces
judicial review. As Marshall insists in Marbury vs. Madison, the
Constitution, a solemn act of the people themselves, was made to
be preserved, and no organ of government may alter its terms. But
interpretation, which belongs to the courts exclusively and is "their
peculiar and proper province," does not change the law,
it conserves it. By the same token, judicial interpretation of the
Constitution is vested with the authority of the Constitution itself. (P.
110.)
A passage in Cicero's De Legibus, the substance of which was later
recalled by Coke, describes the law as "the silent magistrate" and the
magistrate as "the law speaking." Despite the apparent implication of
these words, the Roman Law would seem to have regarded
interpretation as primarily an extension and condition of the process
of law making, as the maxim "curius est cendere est interpretari"
appears to bear witness. Reciprocally, the official attitude of the
common law has not always escaped skeptical comment. A yearbook
of the fourteenth century records a dispute among the judges over
whether they were enforcing reason or only their own will, and two
hundred years later we find an Elizabethan bishop asserting flatly:
"Whoever that an absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver to all intents and
purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them."
Suppose the good bishop had known of the Constitution of the United
States, a law first spoken in 1789 and subject 150 years later to the
"absolute authority" of the Supreme Court to interpret it! (Pp. 112-
113.)
What gives the coup de grace to the idea that — in the words of Chief
Justice Marshall — "courts are the mere instruments of the law and
can will nothing," is the simple fact that most so-called "doubtful
cases" could very evidently have been decided just the opposite way
to which they were decided without the least infraction of the rules
of logical discourse or the least attenuation of the principle of stare
decisis. (P. 114.)
In short, decision is choice; the very circumstance which produces
doubtful cases guarantees the Court what Justice Holmes has termed
"the sovereign prerogative of choice" in deciding them. This
circumstance may be described as a factual situation which forthwith
divides, as it were, the acknowleged body of established law as far as
it bears upon the said facts into two opposed — two antinomous —
camps. (P. 115.)
Should the Constitution be construed "strictly" or "liberally"? That
depends logically on whether it came from the people at large or from
state sovereignties. Then there is the antimony of "inclusive" versus
"exclusive" construction — in Marbury vs. Madison Chief Justice
Marshall invoked the latter principle, in McCulloch vs. Maryland he
invoked the former. Again there is the issue whether the Court's
mandate to interpret the Constitution embraces the power and duty
of adopting it to change circumstances. Marshall thought that it did,
while Taney repudiated any such mission for the Court; and in the
recent Minnesota Moratorium Case the Chief Justice takes as his
point of departure Marshall's doctrine, while Justice Sutherland,
dissenting, builds upon Taney's doctrine. Furthermore, there are
those diverse attitudes of a shifting majority of the Bench which,
though they may never have found clear-cut expression in
antithetical principles of constitutional construction, have given rise
none the less to conflicting courses of decision, the potential bases of
future opposed arguments which either counsel or the Court may
adopt without incurring professional reproach. In brief, alternative
principles of construction and alternative lines of precedent
constantly vest the Court with a freedom virtually legislative in scope
in choosing the values which it shall promote through its reading of
the Constitution. (P. 117.)
The concept of a "government of laws" simmers down, therefore,
under the Constitution to a power in the Supreme Court which is
without statable limits to set the metes and bounds of political
authority in both the nation and the states. But the dominating
characteristic of judicial review, wide-ranging though it be, is that it
is ordinarily or negative power only — a power of refusal. The Court
can forbid somebody else to act but cannot, usually, act itself; in the
words of Professor Powell, it "can unmake the laws of Congress, but
cannot fill the gap." (P.122.)
To summarize: From legal history emerge two conceptions of law —
that of a code of intrinsic justice, not of human creation but
discoverable by human reason, and that of a body of ordinances
assertive of human will and owing its binding force thereto. The idea
of a "government of laws and not of men" originally predicated the
sway of the former kind of law and a "legislative power" which was
merely a power to declare such law, and hence was indistinguishable
in principle from "judicial power." But as we saw in the previous
chapter, the very essence of the American conception of the
separation of power is its insistence upon the inherent distinction
between law-making and law-interpreting, and its assignment of the
latter to the judiciary, a notion which, when brought to bear upon the
constitution, yields judicial review. For all that, the idea that
legislative power embraces an element of law-declaring power has
never been entirely expelled from our inherited legal traditions,
while, conversely, modern analysis of the interpretative function
exercised by courts plainly discloses that it involves unavoidably an
exercise of choice substantially legislative in character; and especially
is this so as the Supreme Court's interpretations of the national
Constitution, on account of the wealth of alternative doctrines from
which the Court may at any time approach its task of interpretation.
In short, the meaning of "a government of laws" in our constitutional
law and theory is government subject to judicial disallowance. (Pp.
146, 147.)
XIX.—PARALLELISM WITH THE ANGARA CASE
No better precedent may be invoked to decide several important
questions raised in this case than the decision rendered by this very
Supreme Court in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, which may
be considered as an outstanding milestone in Philippine
jurisprudence.
The facts and legal issues in said case are in exact parallel with the
ones in the present controversy. Then, there was a conflict between
two independent departments or organs of government, the National
Assembly and the Electoral Tribunal. Now the conflict is between two
equally independent departments or organs of government, the
Senate and the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The differences between
the contending parties consist in: (a) that while the former National
Assembly constituted the whole legislative department, the present
Senate is but a part of the legislative department; (b) that the
National Assembly that adopted the resolution then in question and,
finally, declared by this Supreme Court as unconstitutional, null, and
void, acted as a body, with undisputable quorum and regularity; while
the Pendatun Resolution was adopted by but 12 senators or the
majority Liberal Party, when there was no quorum present in the
Senate. There is also an accidental difference in the fact that, in the
Angara case, the Electoral Commission was the respondent and the
National Assembly was not a party, although 6 members thereof
were also parties in the case, they constituting a majority of two-
thirds of the Electoral Commission membership; while the present
case, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is not a party, and the respondents
are the majority members of the Senate, which is but a branch of
Congress. In both cases the legislative department upon which the
legislative power was vested by the Constitution — the National
Assembly in 1936 or Congress in 1946 — is definitely not a party.
Another difference between the two cases is the fact that in the
Angara case, petitioner sought to nullify a resolution of the Electoral
commission because it was in conflict with one previously adopted by
the National Assembly. The Supreme Court, is denying the petition,
nullified instead the resolution of the National Assembly as adopted
without the powers vested in it by the Constituiton. In the present
case, petitioners pray for the annulment of the Pendatun Resolution
which the respondents or the Senate could not and cannot adopt
without transgressing the Constitution.
Many of the conclusions and pronouncements of the Supreme Court
in the Angara case may appear as if written expressly to decide
several of the very legal issues raised in the present case. This will
readily appear if we should read "Senate" and "Senate Electoral
Tribunal," respectively, in lieu of "National Assembly" and "Electoral
Commission," in the following summarized conclusion in said case:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows
fundamentally the theory of separation of powers into the legislative,
the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of
functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the
powers granted.
(c) That in case of conflict between the several departments and
among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally
to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and
duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional
creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any
other two departments of the government.
(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present
Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications
of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to
the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral
Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necessitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was
to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration,
which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to
retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the
manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only
section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine
Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No.
3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and
manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the
time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds,
to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is
not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and
enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission
of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests
against the election of any member of the National Assembly should
be filed. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra.)
Without the slightest ambiguity, in perspicuous and clear-cut
language, the Supreme Court stated the real conflict, grave and
transcendental, in said case as follows:
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a
conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the
other. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra.)
The Supreme Court then, in the full consciousness of the far-reaching
importance of the pronouncement it had to make, with manly
courage stated:
From the very nature of the republican government established in
our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon
the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries. . . . Conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental
law between departmental powers and agencies of the government
are necessarily determined by the judiciary injusticiable and
appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European
types of constitutional government, the framers of our Constitution
adopted the American type where the written constitution is
interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. . . . The
nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between
two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take
cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And
if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a
void be thus created in our constitutional system which may in the
long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these
questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we
avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason
and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted
facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for
the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, supra.)
Where the Supreme Court wrote "Electoral Commission" in the last
preceding lines, we may also write as well "Senate," "House of
Representatives," "Congress," "Senate Electoral Tribunal," "House
Electoral Tribunal," or any other constitutional body.
The above pronouncements of the Supreme Court made in the
ringing words penned by Justice Jose P. Laurel who, with President
Roxas, Justice Briones, Justice Hontiveros, former Justices Romualdez
and Recto, and several others, was among the leaders and most
prominent figures in the constitutional convention, we believe will
sound through the ages as the expression of permanent truth and
undisputable wisdom. Since the words have been written, the
question as to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance
and decide controversies such as the present one and to grant
redress for or against parties like those included in this litigation, has
been unmistakably definitely and definitely settled in this jurisdiction.
XX.—THREE DIFFERENT EDITIONS OF A SENTENCE
Regret can not be repressed when, upon reading the majority
opinion, one notices that, in the very first paragraph heading it, truth
is unwittingly immolated by, as a counterpart of the Pendatun
Resolution and without the benefit of any ritual, attributing to the
Commission on Elections an assertion which in fact it did not make.
The Commission is represented to have fathered the statement that
in the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, voting
"did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will."
This assertion is the third revised edition of a 3-line sentence
appearing in the report of the Commission on Elections. For
clearness, we will reproduce the three editions, the original one and
the amended two:.
First edition.—In the report of the Commission on Elections, the
sentence reads as follows:
It is believed that the election in the provinces aforesaid did not
reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.
Second edition—The drafter of the Pendatun Resolution, who
appears to be ready to sacrifice truth if it is necessary to serve or
bolster his interests and purposes, in reproducing said statement,
without any compunction or scruple, changed the words "it is
believed" to the words "This Commission believes" as follows:
This commission believes that the election in the provinces aforesaid
did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.
Third edition.—In the majority opinion the idea of belief by third
persons, contained in the report of the Commission, and the idea of
belief by the Commission, attributed in the Pendatun Resolution are
eliminated and substituted by a positive statement by the
Commission on Elections of a categorical and conclusive nature as
follows:
The Commission on Elections . . . stated that . . . the voting in said
region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.
The discrepancy is emphasized by reading the following paragraph of
the report of the report of the Commission on Elections:
Except for alleged suppression of the popular will in the Provinces of
Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and certain municipalities of Nueva Ecija
wherein the voters were allegedly intimidated or coerced by the
Hukbalahaps and other lawless elements to such an extent that the
election in said provinces is considered a farce, not being the free
expression of the popular will, the elections throughout the country
were carried on peacefully, honestly and in an orderly manner, as a
result of which the respective representatives-elect for all the
provinces throughout the country have been duly proclaimed by the
various boards of provincial canvassers, and the Commission on
Elections on May 23, 1946, also proclaimed those elected senators in
accordance with section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 725. (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is evident: (1) that the alleged suppression of
the popular will in Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan, and certain
municipalities of Nueva Ecija is mentioned by the Commission only as
a hearsay information that the Commission itself, contrary to the idea
which the Pendatun Resolution or the majority opinion conveys, does
not accept; (2) that to emphasize the Commission's refusal to accept
the unverified information, it explicitly and conclusively manifested
that "the elections throughout the country were carried on
peacefully, honestly and in an orderly manner, as a result of which
the respective representatives-elect for all the provinces throughout
the country have been duly proclaimed elected by the various boards
of provincial canvassers, and the Commission on Elections on May 23,
1946, also proclaimed those elected senators in accordance with
section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 725."
An abiding respect for truth compels us to point out the above glaring
error of fact, which is just a fitting prelude and milieu to a long chain
of errors of law spread over the opinion of the majority, resulting in
conclusions that we are sure will fail to withstand the test of
posterity.
XX-A.—UNJUSTIFIED AND RECKLESS PRONOUNCEMENTS
The error of reading the report of the Commission on Elections
assertions contrary to the ones appearing therein, induces the
majority to make pronouncements which are necessarily groundless
and unjustified, because premised on assertions not borne out by the
truth.
Thus, in justifying the adoption of the Pendatun Resolution, the
majority assert that "there are reasons to believe it was prompted by
the dictates of ordinary caution, or of public policy" for "if, as
reported by the corresponding constitutional agency" (the
Commission on Elections), the elections held in the provinces of
Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija" were so tainted with
acts of violence and intimidation, that the result was not the
legitimate expression of the voters' choice, the Senate made no
grievous mistake in foreseeing the probability that, upon proof of
such widespread lawlessness, the Electoral Tribunal would annul the
returns in that region (see Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil., 521; Laurel,
Elections[2d Ed.], p. 448 et seq.), and declare herein petitioners not
entitled to seats in the Senate."
Taking as point or departure the false assumption, that of attributing
to the Commission on Elections a statement that, upon the very face
of its report, is contrary to what it made, the majority, not only
attribute to the respondent majority of the Senate preternatural
prophetic foresight, taking for granted what the Senate Electoral
Tribunal will do, but by making the pronouncement pretend to
assume an improper role, the one by which, in effect, they pretend
to direct and dictate to the Senate Electoral Tribunal what it should
do in the pending electoral protests against petitioners, thus
recklessly prejudicing the decision and disposal of a litigation pending
in an independent tribunal with exclusive and final constitution
jurisdiction over said litigation.
On second thought, it seems that the majority try, with an apologetic
attitude, to recede from the bold position of practically announcing
what the Senate Electoral Tribunal, three members of which are
Justices of the Supreme Court, will do, by beginning to state that
"there should be no diversity of thought in a democratic country, at
least, on the legal effects of the alleged rampant lawlessness, root
and basis of the Pendatun Resolution," and ending with the following
paragraph:
However, it must be observed and emphasized, herein is no definte
pronouncement that terrorism and violence actually prevailed in a
district to such extent that the result was not the expression of the
free will of theelectorate. Such issue was not tendered in these
proceedings. It hinges upon proof to be produced by protestants and
protestees at the hearing of the respective contests.
We can not but regret that the endeavor is futile, because it can not
subtract a scintilla from the boldness of the pronouncement
emphasized with the following reiteration: "True, they may have no
direct connection with the acts of intimidation; yet the votes may be
annulled just the same, and if that happens, petitioners would not be
among the sixteen senators elected."
Furthermore, the recession seems only to be apparent, used as a
breathing respite, preparatory to another onslaught, on less
unjustified, reckless, and out of reason.
Commenting on section 12 of Commonwealth Act no. 725, the
majority restrict the provision to those candidates whose
proclamation "is clear, unconditional, unclouded," adding — and
here comes the aggressive thrust, prejudging petitioners on the basis
of an unfounded surmise — "that such standard is not only met by
the petitioners, because is the very document attesting to their
election one member of the Commission on Elections demurred to
the non-exclusion of the votes in Central Luzon, calling attention to
the reported reign of terror and violence in that region, and virtually
objecting to the certification of herein petitioners. To be sure, it was
the be clouded condition of petitioners' credential (certificate of
canvass) that partly prompted the Senate to enact the precautionary
measure herein complained of."
The attack does not stop here. It goes even further when, adducing
as argument by analogy, an uncharitable example is used by
comparing the situation imagined without any evidentiary
foundation on fact by the dissenting minority of one in the
Commission on Elections with the case if "the inclusion of petitioners"
name in the Commission's certificate had been made at the point of
a gangster's automatic," although adding that " the difference
between such situation and the instant litigation is one of degree,
broad and wide perhaps, . . . .
XXI.—FUTILE EFFORT TO NEUTRALIZE THE SWEEPING EFFECT OF
DECISION IN ANGARA CASE
In a futile effort to neutralize the sweeping effect of the decision of
this court in the Angara case, the majority assume unfoundedly that
in said case "no legislative body or person was a litigant before the
court," and that "no directive was issued against a branch of the
Legislature or any member there of" the statements being premised
on the error of fact and law that two-thirds of the members of the
Electoral Commission were assemblymen.
The fact that this court, in the Angara case, made declarations
nullifying a resolution of the National Assembly is, according to the
majority, "not decisive," when a better precedent can hardly be cited
to show the practical exercise by the Supreme Court of its power to
declare null and void any legislative resolution violative of the
fundamental law. The majority recognize the power of this court to
annul any unconstitutional legislative enactment, citing as authorities
the epoch-making decision of Chief Justice Marshall in Marburry vs.
Madison, and the following pronouncement of Justice Sutherland in
the Minimum Wage Case (261 U. S., 544):
. . . The Constitution, by its own terms, is the supreme law of the land,
emanating from the people, the repository of ultimate sovereignty
under our form of government. A congressional statute, on the other
hand, is the act of an agency of this sovereign authority, and if it
conflicts with theConstitution, must fall; for that which is not
supreme must yield to that which is. To hold it invalid (if it be invalid)
is a plain exercise of the judicial power — that power vested in courts
to enable them to administer justice according to law. From the
authority to ascertain and determine the law in a given case there
necessarily results, in case of conflict, the duty to declare and enforce
the rule of the supreme law and reject that of an inferior act of
legislation which, transcending the Constitution, is of no effect, and
binding on no one. This is not the exercise of a substantive power to
review and nullify acts of Congress, for no such substantive power
exists. It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and
dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the
determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the
law.
If the above reasoning is accepted by the majority with respect to a
law enacted by two Houses of Congress and approved by the Chief
Executive, there is absolutely no logic in denying its applicability to
mere resolutions adopted by just a legislative branch, by the Senate
alone, or by a group of senators acting collectively when the Senate
is without quorum. The Supreme Court has the power to declare null
and void such resolutions when they are in conflict with the
Constitution, the same as the acts of the President as, according to
the decision rendered by this court in Planas vs. Gil (67 Phil., 62, 73,
74), cited with approval by the majority, the Supreme Court has the
power of "making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of
his(the Chief Executive's) acts when these are properly challenged in
an appropriate legal proceeding."
The majority, accepting the pronouncement in the Angara case that
this court could not decline to take cognizance of the controversy to
determine the "character, scope and extent" of the respective
constitutional spheres of action of the National Assembly and the
Electoral Commission, maintain that in the present case, there is
actually no antagonism between the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate
and the Senate itself, "for it is not suggested that the former has
adopted a rule contradicting the Pendatun Resolution." This assertion
is based on the wrong idea that in order that antagonism may exist
between two independent bodies, the attacks should be reciprocal
and bilateral, and it is not enough that one should rashly invade the
province of the other. The theory is parallel with the Japanese
insistence in calling what they term "China Incident" because China
was not able to invade in her turn the Japanese mainland of Honshu.
XXII.—FALLACIOUS ARGUMENT
It is argued by the majority that conceding that petitioners'
suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, the petition
should be denied, because for this court to order the reinstatement
of petitioners "would be to establish judicial predominance, and to
upset the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into
our constitutional setup." The argument is utterly fallacious. There
can be no more judicial predominance because the Supreme Court,
without shirking its responsibility, should order that petitioners be
reinstated in the full exercise of their constitutional rights, functions
and prerogatives, of which they were deprived, in flagrant violation
of the fundamental law, than there will be legislative predominance
because Congress should refuse to be cowed into prevarication in the
exercise of its legislative powers, or executive predominance because
the President would not allow denial of his executive functions. And
the pattern of checks and balances is not disrupted because the
Supreme Court should proceed to perform its judicial duty by
granting petitioners the legal redress to which they are entitled.
The indictment of volubility flung by Lord Bryce against the Supreme
Court of the United States, resulting from "the political proclivities of
the man who composed it," is quoted by the majority in order to
support the rule of conduct that "adherence to established principle
should generally be our guiding criterion." We
underline generally because we prefer it to the word invariably, as,
otherwise, we will expose ourselves to the English author's
indictment, and with more reason if we should reverse the doctrines
and principles enunciated in the Angara case in order not to displease
a controlling majority in the Senate.
XXIII.—NOT DEMIGODS OUTSIDE THE REACH OF LAW
Should respondents disobey any order we may issue in this case, the
majority ask, can we punish them for contempt? Of course. They are
not demigods, duces, fuehrers, or nippon emperor divinities, who are
outside the reach of law. They do not pretend that they are like the
king of France who said L'etat c'est moi.
But, why should we render respondents the disservice of entertaining
the false hypothesis that they may disobey any order we may legally
issue? Our people were not crazy enough to elect anarchists to our
Senate.
XXIV.—BUILT ON PRECARIOUS FOUNDATION
The majority insist, notwithstanding, in arguing that if we should
punish respondents for contempt because they should have
disobeyed an order of ours, we would be destroying the
independence and equal importance of legislative bodies, under the
Constitution. We would never imagine that the independence and
equal importance of legislative bodies, under the Constitution, should
be precariously built upon the unstable and shifting quagmire of
immoral immunity to punishment for contempt, an offense
punishable under all modern systems of criminal law.
Dogmatizing ex cathedra, the majority preached that we must
"disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the
repository of remedies for all political and social ills." Shooting in the
dark of fantastic hobglobins, insufflated with extraterrestrial life by
supercreative imagination, might be an amusing sport, but is
misleading in juridical controversy. No one has ever entertained the
false and laughable notion that the judiciary may afford remedies "for
all political and social ills." No one, unless he be a paranoiac
mogalomaniac, may pretend to be the happy possessor of any
political or social panacea. The argument is irrelevant because, in the
case, we are dealing with a constitutional wrong which, under the
fundamental law, can and must be redressed by the judiciary.
XXV.—FLAGRANT INCONSISTENCY
A citizen, deprived of liberty by a resolution to incarcerate him for
years, illegally and unconstitutionally adopted by a legislative
chamber, according to the majority, may not be denied relief by the
courts and "may successfully apply for habeas corpus, alleging the
nullity of the resolution and claiming for release," invoking as
authorities Lopez vs. De los Reyes (55 Phil., 170) Kilbourn vs.
Thompson (103 U. S., 168; 26 Law ed., 377). The reason is because
the resolution is beyond the bounds of the legislative power, is a
usurpation of functions belonging to courts, is an infringement of the
Constitution, which is precisely the case of the Pendatun Resolution.
But the majority would then have only as defendant the officer or
person holding the victimized citizen in custody, which officer or
person might be a senator or a group of senators.
The majority's inconsistency can not be hidden.
XXVI.—ELECTION CONTESTS—WRONG DEFINITION
The majority maintain that not all the powers of the House or Senate
as "the sole judge of the election, returns and qualifications of the
members" thereof were transferred to the Electoral Commission, but
only "all contests" relating to said election, returns and qualifications.
But the use of the words "all contests" in the Constitution does not
affect or limit the transfer of all powers as "the sole judge of the
election, returns and qualifications" of the legislative members,
because these all powers have always been, from the very beginning,
circumscribed by the word "contests." The very words "the sole
judge" imply necessarily contests, because if there is no contest,
there is nothing to be judged.
The majority adhere to the following quotation: "As used in the
constitutional provisions, `election contest' relates only to statutory
contests in which the contestants seek not only to oust the intruder,
but also to have himself inducted into office." (Laurel on Elections, 2d
ed., p. 250; 20 C. J.,58.)The assertion is wrong because there are
election contests in which the contestants do not seek to be inducted
into office, as when the contestants do not pretend to have won in
the election and, admitting that the protestee obtained the majority
votes, should, however, be ousted because he is unqualified.
The example of a man, disqualified for having served a long term of
imprisonment, elected to either House of Congress, is a good one not
in support of the majority's theory that the House may, upon its
authority, investigate and exclude the disqualified person, but to
show that the election may be contested before the corresponding
Electoral Tribunal in a proper contest, without the protestant seeking
to be himself seated.
XXVII.—UNCONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The majority's theory that an election contest does not ensue when
a member of the House raises a question as to the qualification of
another because the former does not seek to be substituted for the
latter, is based on the wrong definition of an election contest, the one
limiting it to cases wherein protestants seek also to have themselves
inducted into the contested office. Having for its basis a wrong
premise, the theory can not be correct. The election contests
mentioned in section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution include
contests "relating to qualifications" of the respective members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives. To maintain that either
House may investigate and thereafter exclude a disqualified member,
is to maintain a constitutional heresy. An insistent effort to justify and
approve an action that violates elemental standards of law and
justice, such as the Pendatun Resolution, may often lead one to
advancing unwittingly the most expected theories.
Invoking as authority the erroneous statement made by one of the
attorneys for petitioners during the oral argument to the effect that
the power to defer the oath taking until the contest is adjudicated
does not belong to the corresponding Electoral Tribunals, the
majority gleefully jumps to the conclusion that "then it must be held
that the House or Senate still retains such authority, whether we
believe that such power (to delay induction) stemmed from the
privilege of either House to be the judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members thereof, or whether we hold it to be
inherent to every legislative body as a measure of self-preservation.
Thus we see that the majority seem reluctant to accept the new
constitutional setup by the creation of the Electoral Commission,
later substituted by the Electoral Tribunals. They would rather stick
to the old order of things when the majority of the Senate and the
House of Representatives before the Commonwealth were the
absolute dictators of the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the respective legislative chambers, when they boldly
assert that either House has "the privilege to be the judge of the
election, returns and qualifications of the members thereof."
XXVIII—THE CHARACTER AND PHYSIOGNOMY OF THE CONSTITUTION
The discussions as to the character of the legislative power vested in
Congress gives way to a confusion of ideas due mainly to lack of
discrimination between preconceived constitutional ideas, ingrained
in the mind during university training, and the actual provisions of the
Constitution of the Philippines, which enjoy outstanding and
substantial advantages over older ones, because the delegates to our
constitutional convention embodied in it new precepts and principles
based on the lessons of one century and a half experience of
American and European countries in constitutional government and
four decades of Philippine constitutional history and last juridical and
idealogical discoveries.
Whether the Constitution of the United States is only a grant or
delegation of legislative powers to the federal government and the
American state constitutions are mere limitations of plenary powers
of legislation, having nothing to do with the true character and
physiognomy of our own Constitution which we must examine, not
on the mirror of other constitutions, but on the face of its own
concepts, precepts and provisions, and there we will see at once that
our Constitution is both a grant and a limitation of powers of
government decreed by our people, on whom sovereignty resides
and from whom all government authority emanates. (Section 1,
Article II of the Constitution.) The sovereign people is the repository
of all powers of government, in fact, also political and social powers.
From them emanate, not only all government authority, but the
plenary and unlimited power of society which is the foundation of
government. Social order is established and maintained by the will of
the people. The people is the absolute master of his own destiny. The
people is the holder of the universality and residuum of all human
powers. This being a natural conviction of humanity since time
immemorial although not always articulate and vocal, to justify the
absolutism of kings and emperors, it had been necessary to create
the fiction of the divine genesis of their authority, imposed on the
ignorance and religious credulity of superstitious masses, so much so
that in certain epochs of history the position of high priest and king
were merged in the same individual. And those who would attach to
a high officers of government, no matter in what department, any
kind of monarchial or oligarchical absolutism, unlimited because
placed above the law and not controllable by the provisions of the
Constitution or any agency existing under its authority, are only trying
to perpetuate the worn-out tradition of the divine origin of the
despotic rulers of the past.
To our mind, no power of government may be exercised by any
branch, agency or officer thereof unless expressly or implicitly
granted by the people through the Constitution. Subject to the
limitations provided therein and in accordance with express
provisions, the residuum of legislative, executive and judicial powers,
respectively, are vested in Congress, the President, and the Supreme
Court. It is wrong to maintain that any legislative power is vested
exclusively in the Senate. The legislative power is vested in Congress,
composed of the Senate and the House for Representatives, and not
in any of its branches alone.
XXIX.—RIZALIAN ADMONITION ON TOLERANCE
Although there is absolutely nothing in the report of the Commission
on Elections or in the Pendatun Resolution itself which imputes upon
petitioners any act of disorderly behavior, it not appearing that they
have anything todo with alleged irregularities and terrorism in the
four provinces of Central Luzon, yet had the Senate elected to deprive
petitioners of their seat in the Senate under the power to punish and
expel a member for disorderly behaviour provided in section 10 (3) of
Article VI of the Constitution, and the Senate adopted the Pendatun
Resolution in pursuance thereof, the majority of this court would still
dismiss the petition. It appearing that not two-thirds of all members
of the Senate concurred or could concur in the adoption of the
Pendatun Resolution and, therefore, under the constitutional
provision invoked, the deprivation of petitioners of their seat in the
Senate would appear as a flagrant transgression of the fundamental
law, the majority of this court would still shield respondents with the
palladium of judicial noli me tangere. Respondents must be very
extraordinary beings to enjoy such an immunity from even the most
shocking and tyranical violation of theConstitution.
The majority would counsel prudence and comity and admonish to
heed the off-limits sign at the Congressional hall, firm in the belief
that "if apolitical fraud has been accomplished, as petitioners aver,
the sovereign people, ultimately the offended party, will render the
fitting verdict — at the polling precint."
We are reluctant to wash our hands so easily. We can not remain
comfortably seated in the highest tribunal of the land nor reconcile
with our conscience by abstaining to give the relief we are duty bound
to give the victims of a political fraud which constitutes a wanton
trampling down of the rights and privileges guaranteed by the
Constitution. Let us not so easily forget the Rizalian admonition:
"Sufferance is not always a virtue; it is a crime when it encourages
tyrannies." Let us not disguise such kind of resignation under the
inoffensive name of judicial prudence. Burke said: "There is also a
false, reptile prudence, the result not of caution, but of fear." Fear, as
favor, should not have place in judicial vocabulary.
XXX.—CONSTITUTIONALISM
The present nuclear physics of a far cry from the more than twenty-
five centuries old theory enunciated by Democritus in the following
words: "By convention sweet is sweet, by convention bitter is bitter,
by convention hot is hot, by convention cold is cold, by convention
color is color. But in reality there are atoms and the void. That is, the
objects of sense are supposed to be real and it is customary to regard
them as such, but in truth they are not. Only the atoms and the void
are real."
The heated controversy between Ptolemy and Copernicus, the
discoveries of Galileo and Newton, are just small incidents in the
perennial struggle in which man is engaged to be, through science,
fully acquainted with the truth about our universe. It takes 1,600
years for one-half of a gram of radium to disintegrate, and it takes
one second for light to travel 186,300 miles; formerly matter and
energy were essentially different things, but now solid matter is but
concentrated energy, and energy has weight; it is not yet answered
whether light is wave of a shower of photons, but it is known that it
can be weighed. The theory of relativity, opened new vistas in the
panorama of science, but new riddles meet man in the great
adventure to the unknown. Albert Einstein said:
Yet new, still more difficult problems arise which have not been
definitely settled as yet. We shall mention only some of these
unsolved problems. Science is not and will never be a closed book.
Every important advance brings new questions. Every development
reveals, in the long run, new and deeper difficulties." (The Evolution
of Physics, p. 308.)
All theories which, in their day, served useful scientific purposes, had
to give way to others giving better explanations of physical
phenomena. The prevailing theories may not resist the onslaught of
new intellectual discoveries, but because they may eventually be
discarded themselves is no reason to dispense with them when, in
the meantime, they are only ones that can satisfy reason. Otherwise,
science will be crippled. Paralysis will keep her from new advances.
By the same token, in the history of law, man had to stick in each
epoch to the known as the best of legal institutions. In the millenia of
human life no more wonderful legal institution was devised by man
than constitutionalism, the evolution of which is one of the most
inspiring chapters of history. A mere religious concept, giving voice to
moral law, in Israel, a philosophical concept, merely normative, in
Greece, it was in republican Rome where it took a definite legal and
political force as the basis of jurisdiction as distinguished
from gobernaculum, the reason of the law as opposed to the power
of government. In England for the common law to prevail over the
prerogative of the crown it took several hundred years of bitter
struggle. But fate had it that in America is where the evolution of
constitutionalism had to reach its highest accomplishment. It became
the basis of the government of the United States from its very
inception. Now constitutionalism for the world is envisaged as the
only hope of humanity to attain the goal that will insure juridical
order for the world, so that men's inventions, including those
ominous on nuclear energy, may be placed under adequate social
control.
The hope of the Republic of the Philippines lies also on
constitutionalism. Not the one that would merely offer lip service to
the Constitution, but that would make of that document as one of the
living tissues of our body politic, absolutely indispensable to its own
existence.
XXXI.—THE MOST VITAL ISSUE
The validity of the Constitution of the most vital issue involved in this
case. If no one must be allowed to be above the law, with greater
reason no one should be allowed to ignore or to trample upon the
provisions and mandates sacred by all persons living under the pale
of the Republic of the Philippines, and not rocked of as an insignificant
pushpin to toy with.
Burning with the thirst of immortality, shepherd Erostratus burned
the temple of Ephesus to gain a berth in history. Let us not make of
the Constitution of the Philippines another temple of Ephesus. It is
much better to be buried in the dust of eternal oblivion than to
permanently live in the memory of future generations as guilty of
arson, as rivals of the barbaric hordes who destroyed the great works
of art of Greece and Rome, or the contemporary vandals who
destroyed without any compunction churches and schools, treasures
of noble human institutions, or other works wherein the loftiest
ideals and aspirations of man have blossomed with imperishable
grandeur and beauty. Letus spare the Constitution from the
deleterious effects of our prejudices and from the ravages of blind
passions. Let us keep it as an underlying beacon of hope, the
indestructible foundation of our national existence, the inexpugnable
citadel of the rights and liberties of our people, the eternal rock upon
which the Republic of the Philippines shall forever subsist with
dignity.
The pamphlet in which it is printed may wizen and shrivel, its paper
rived into shreds, the shreds pulverized into dust and ashes, and
these reduced into infinitesimal atoms which will finally scatter in the
wide universe, to form new substances. But the juridical sense of our
people, crystallized in that pamphlet and permeating that paper,
embodied in the great document, like the mythological phoenix of
Arabia, undergoing the five hundred years cycle of resurrection, shall
again and again rise in youthful freshness from the scattered ashes
and atoms, the undying symbol of the spirit of law, the flaming
banner of justice, the magnificent expression of the undaunted will-
4. Melencio Arranz
power to live.
5. Ramon Torres
The petition must be granted, and the preliminary injunction of May
29, 1946, must be reissued and made perpetual.
6. Tomas Confessor
7. Mariano Jesus Cuenco
BRIONES, M., disidente: 8. Carlos P. Garcia
Despues de las elecciones generales de 23 abril, 1946, en que fueron 9. Olegario Clarin
elegidos el Presidente y Vice Presidente de Filipinas y los miembros
del Congreso, el senado y la Camara de Representantes inauguraron 10. Alejo Mabanag
se periodo de sesiones reuniendose por primera vez el 25 mayo. Uno
de los primeros documentos que seleyeron en el Senado fue la 11. Enrique B. Magalona
roclama expedida por la Comision sobre Eleccionescuyo texto integro
se transcribe a continuacion: 12. Tomas Cabili
CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF 13. Jose O. Vera
RETURNS OF VOTES FOR THE OFFICE OF SENATOR AND
PROCLAMATION OF THE CANDIDATES ELECTED IN THE ELECTIONS
14. Ramon Diokno
HELD ON APRIL 23, 1946.
15. Jose O. Vera
We, the undersigned, constituting the Commission on Elections, do
hereby certify that, pursuant to the provisions of section 11 of
16. Salipada E. Romero
Commonwealth Act No. 725, we have made the canvass of the votes
cast in the Philippines for the office of Senator in accordance with the
statements submitted by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of the In view of the above result, we hereby proclaim that the above-
different provinces and the City Board of Canvassers of Manila, and named sixteen(16) registered candidates are the duly elected
that the result thereof shows the following sixteen (16) registered Senators in the election held on April 23, 1946.
candidates to have received the highest number of votes:
We further certify that Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Sotto, Jose
Name of candidates Avelino, Melecio Arranz, Ramon Torres, Tomas, Confesor, VotesMariano
Jesus Cuenco and Carlos P. Garcia received the first eight (8) highest
received
number of votes, and that Olegario Clarin, Alejo Mabanag, Enrique B.
Magalona, Tomas Cabili, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, Jose E. Romero
1. Vicente J. Francisco 735,671
and Salipada Pendatun received the next eight (8) highest number of
votes.
2. Vicente Sotto 717,225
3. Jose Avelino 708,420
 We further certify that the attached statement of votes shows the
number of votes polled by each candidate for the Office of Senator in
the Philippines by provinces.
In witness whereof, we have signed these presents in the City of
Manila, this 23rd day of May, 1946.
(Sgd.) JOSE LOPEZ VITO
Chairman
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO ENAGE
Member
I concur in toto, except as regards the proclamation of the 16
Senators-elect, on the basis of the canvassing of all the votes cast in
their favor, without excluding those of Central Luzon. (Separate
opinion prepared.)
(Sgd.) VICENTE DE VERA
Member
Acto seguido procediose a la eleccion del Presidente del Senado
saliendo elegido como tal el candidato de la mayoria Hon. Jose A.
Avelino que obtuvo 10 votos contra el candidato del partido de la
minoria Hon. Jose O. Vera que obtuvo 8. Tanto el Sr. Vera como sus
correcurrentes Sres. Diokno y Romero tomaron parte en la votacion.
Elegido el Presidente se iba a proceder a la toma del juramento
colectivo de los Senadores electos, pero en esto el Senador Hon.
Salipada Pendatun presento para su aprobacion un proyecto de
resolucion cuyo texto tambien se transcribe integro a continuacion:
Whereas, the Commission on Elections, charged under the
Constitution with the duty of insuring free, orderly, and honest
elections, in the Philippines, reported to the President of the
Philippines on May 23, 1946, that
"On election day, altho no acts of violence were officially reported to
this Commission in connection with the elections, we were advised
by our representative in Nueva Ecija that ballot boxes were stolen by
armed bands in the barrios of the municipalities of Bongabon, Gapan,
Sta. Rosa and Guimba. These incidents are still under investigation by
the Military Police Command. After the election we cannot fail to
notice the reports published in the newspapers on the attacks that
have been made by armed bands upon persons or group of persons
who were known to have voted for candidates other than the
candidates of those armed elements. Even the report submitted to
this Commission by the Provost Marshal General on May 20, 1946, . .
. contains a recital of incidents of terrorism that occured in the four
provinces of Central Luzon herein above mentioned which disturbed
or affected the national election in an undesirable manner. Reports
also reached this Commission to the effect that in the provinces of
Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija, the secrecy of the ballot
was actually violated; that armed bands saw to it that their
candidates were voted for; and that the great majority of the voters,
thus coerced or intimidated, suffered from a paralysis of judgment in
the matter of exercising the right of suffrage. Considering all those
facts of terrorism, violence and intimidation in connection with
elections which are more or less general in the provinces of
Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, this Commission believes
that the election in the provinces aforesaid did not reflect the true
and free expression of the popular will. It should be stated, however,
that the Commission is without jurisdiction, to determine whether or
not the votes cast in the said provinces which, according to these
reports have been cast under the influence of threats or violence, are
valid or invalid. Suffice to state that in accordance with the provision
of Article 1, section 2, of the Constitution, "The Commission on
Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall
exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It
shall decide — save those involving the right to vote — all
administrative questions, affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, and the
appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials . .
." and that the question of whether or not a vote has been cast legally
or illegally is not for this Commission to determine. The matter is
therefore being brought to the attention of the President and
Congress of the Philippines for such action as may be deemed proper
pursuant to the requirements of the Constitution that this
Commission submit after every election a report to the said offices
on the manner the election was conducted."
WHEREAS, the minority report of the Hon. Vicente de Vera, member
of the Commission on Elections, says among other things, that "we
know that as result of this chaotic condition, many residents of the
four provinces have voluntarily banished themselves from their home
towns in order not to be subjected to the prevailing oppression and
to avoid being victimized or losing their lives;" and that after the
election dead bodies had been found with notes attached to their
necks, reading: "Bumoto kami kay Roxas" (We voted for Roxas);
WHEREAS, the same Judge De Vera says in his minority report that in
the four provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, the
worst terrorism reigned during and after the election, and that if the
elections held in the aforesaid provinces were annulled as demanded
by circumstances mentioned in the report of the Commission, Jose O.
Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, would not and could not have
been declared elected;
WHEREAS, in his report to the Provost Marshal, col. Amando Dumlao,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, attached to the report of the Commission
on Elections, states among other things, that "all the members of the
Church of Christ(Iglesia ni Cristo) were intimidated and coerced, some
kidnapped and murdered" by the HUKBALAHAPS "because they had
expressed their opinion that they were going to vote for President-
elect Manuel A. Roxas"; that because of terrorism and coercion "a
great many barrio people have evacuated their respective places and
signified their attention not to vote"; and that ballot boxes were
taken away from barrios San Miguel, Pasong Isip, Pakap, Guimba and
Galvan, and that in some instances election inspectors were
kidnapped;
WHEREAS, the terrorism resorted to by the lawless elements in the
four provinces mentioned above in order to insure the election of the
candidates of the Conservative Wing of the Nacionalista Party is of
public knowledge and that such terrorism continues to this day; that
before the elections Jose O. Vera himself declared as campaign
manager of the Osmeña faction that he was sorry if Presidential
Candidate Manuel A. Roxas could not campaign in Huk provinces
because his life would be in endangered; and that because of the
constant murders of his candidates and leaders, Presidential
Candidate Roxas found it necessary to appeal to American High
Commissioner Paul V. Mcnutt for protection, which appeal American
High Commissioner personally referred to President Sergio Osmeña
for appropriate action, and the President in turn ordered the
Secretary of the Interior to afford the necessary protection, thus
impliedly admitting the existence and reign of such terrorism;
WHEREAS, the Philippines, a Republic state, embracing the principles
of democracy, must condemn all acts that seek to defeat the popular
will;
WHEREAS, it is essential in order to maintain alive the respect for
democratic institutions among our people, that no man or group of
men be permitted to profit from the results of election held under
coercion, in violation of law, and contrary to the principle of freedom
of choice which should underlie all elections under the Constitution;
WHEREAS, protest against the election of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno
and Jose Romero, have been filed with the Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate of the Philippines on the basis of the findings of the
Commission on Elections above quoted;
NOW THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in
session assembled, as it hereby resolves, to defer the administration
of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose
Romero, pending the hearing and decision of reports lodged against
their elections, wherein the terrorism averred in the report of the
Commission on Elections and in the report of the Provost Marshal
constitute the ground of said protests and will therefore be the
subject of investigation and determination.
Parece que cuando se puso a debate la resolucion arriba transcrita, el
Senado acordo unanimemente transferir la discusion para la sesion
del lunes siguiente, 27 de mayo. Ya se estaba discutiendo otro asunto
cuando surgio unacalorado incidente en virtud del cual los Senadores
de la minoria salierontodos del salon de sesiones, quedandose alli
solamente el Presidente Avelinocon sus once (11) compañeros de la
mayoria. Se alega en esta ocasion, ausenteslos Senadores
minoritarios y sin el necesario quorum legal para poder seguir
despachando asuntos, los Senadores de la mayoria, revocando el
acuerdo anterior de transferencia, decidieron considerar y aprobar la
resolucion sinmas debate.
Tales son, a grandes rasgos, los hechos que han dado lugar a la
demanda quedirecta y originariamente plantean ante este Tribunal
Supremo los recurrentes Jose O. Vera, Ramon diokno y Jose Romero,
y cuya parte petitoria es como sigue:
POR LO TANTO, los recurrentes respetuosamente piden a este
Honorable Tribunal y a cualquier Magistrado del mismo, tenga a bien
expedir un interdicto prohibitorio preliminar dirigido a los recurridos,
sus funcionarios, empleados, agentes y demas personas que obran
en su ayuda, ordenandoles que hasta nueva orden del Tribunal,
desistan y se abstengan de poner en ejecucion la resolucion arriba
mencionada, y impedir a los recurrentes continuen en sus asientos en
el Senado y ejerzan libremente sus funciones y derechos como
senadores de Filipinas, deshaciendo todo lo hecho en contrario hasta
esta fecha; que acorte los terminos de contestacion; que una vez
contestada esta demanda, designe un Comisionado para recibir las
pruebas, con instrucciones de que la haga sin dilaciones, y que, previa
la vista correspondiente, dicte sentencia declarando enteramente
nula y de ningun valor la citada resolucion, y prohibiendo
consecuentemente a los recurridos y a cada uno de ellos a impedir a
los recurrentes a continuar en sus cargos como senadores, y
prohibiendoles igualmente a realizar cualquier otro procediemiento
ulterior para ejecutar la resolucion citada, con las costas. Los
recurrentes piden tambien cualquier otro remedio justo y equitativo.
El magistrado Perfecto concedio el interdicto preliminar pedido
principalmenteen virtud de la alegacion expuesta en el parrafo 10 de
la demanda, en el sentido de que la resolucion cuestionada tenia por
objecto, entre otras cosas, "la realizacion de fines siniestros, tales
como la aprobacion, sin la fiscalizacion e intervencion de los
recurrentes, del Bill Bell, de una medidade reorganizacion judicial
terrorista para el personal de la judicatura y deotras semejantes, y
para doblegar a los recurrentes, por tal hitlerico procedimiento a los
manejos de tal mayoria." Sometido el interdicto preliminar a la corte
en pleno, esta lo aprobo en una votacion de seis (6) contra cuatro (4),
y al propio tiempo lo señalo a vista para la determinacion de la
cuestion de si su expedicion estaba o no justificada. En dicha vista que
duro 6 horas seguidas, desde la mañana hasta la tarde (una de las mas
largas si no la mas larga que se haya celebrado jamas en los anales de
esta Corte), arguyeron extensamente tanto la representacion de los
recurrentes como la de los recurridos. El Procurador General Tañada
comparecio y arguyo en nombre de estos ultimos, pero limitandose
en su informe a cuestionar e impugnar la jurisdiccion de este
Supremo Tribunal para conocer y enjuiciar el asunto bajo el principio
de la separacion de poderes que informa nuestra Constitucion. Puede
decirse sin exageracion que el tema se agoto discutiendose con
minuciosidad los puntos constitucionales y juridicos planteados en el
asunto. Despues de la vista esta Corte en pleno, con la solañausencia
del Magistrado Jaranilla, y con la disidencia del Magistrado Perfecto,
acordo disolver el interdicto prohibitorio preliminar mediante
lasiguente orden:
Considering that the preliminary injunction was issued in the case of
Jose O. Vera et al., petitioners, vs. Jose Avelino, respondents, ( G. R.
No. L-543), to preserve the status quo and thus prevent the execution
of the acts alleged under oath in the last part of paragraph X of the
petition, without the intervention of the petitioners; and taking into
consideration that this court, after hearing both parties, at any rate
believes and trusts that the respondents will not carry out said acts
during the pendency of this proceeding, this court, without deciding
whether or not the said injunction was justified, hereby resolves to
dissolve it in the meantime, without prejudice to whatever action or
decision this court may take or render on the questions involved in
this case including that of jurisdiction.
Resulta evidente de autos que las cuestiones que tenemos que
considerar yresolver son las siguientes: (1) a la luz de nuestra
Constitucion y de nuestras ¿es legal y sostenible la resolucion objecto
de controversia, en cuanto por ella se priva a los recurrentes de sus
asientos en el Senado de Filipinas, y de los derechos, privilegios y
prerrogativas anejos a dichos asientos?; (2) a la luz de nuestra
constitucion y de nuestrs leyes ¿tiene este Tribunal Supremo
jurisdiccion y competencia para conocer, enjuiciar y decidir el
asunto?
Primera cuestion.—A la luz de nuestre Constitucion y de nuestre leyes
¿eslegal sostenible la resolucion objecto de controversia, en cuanto
por ella sepriva a los recurrentes de sus asientos en el Senado de
Filipinas, y de losderechos, privilegios y prerrogativas anejos a dichos
asientos?
Antes de la aprobacion de la primera Constitucion del
Commonwealth de Filipinas (1935), la Legistura era el juez de las
elecciones, actas y condiciones de sus propios miembros. La
disposicion original relativa a esta materia era la contenida en la Ley
Congreso de los Estados Unidos de 1.º de julio de 1902 (Ley Organica,
articulo 7, parrafo 5), la cual preceptuaba que "La Asamblea (Filipina)
decidira de las elecciones, su resultado y las calificaciones de los
representantes. . . ." Cuando se aprobo la Ley del Congreso de 1916
(Ley Jones, de amplia automania, seccion 18, parrafo 1), la citada
disposicion se reincorporo, con una modificacion que la hacia mas
enfatica insertandose la palabra "unicos," a saber: "Que el Senado y
la Camara de Representantes, respectivamente, seran los unicos
jueces de las elecciones, del resultado, escrutinio y condiciones de
sus miembros electivos. . . ." Esta disposicion no era de ningun modo
original: no hacia mas que transplantar a este pais la tradicion y el
sistema americano provisto en la clausula 1.ª de la seccion 5 del
Articulo I de la constitucion de los Estados Unidos, que dispone que
"cada Camara sera juez de las Elecciones, Actas y Condicciones de sus
propios miembros. . ."
La Asamblea Constituyente convocada en 1934 para redactar la
Constitucionde nuestro Commonwealth pudo haber seguido sobre
esta materia diferents cursos de accion: reafirmar la tradicion
americana vigente en este pais desde1902; o seguir el ejemplo de
algunos paises — verbigracia, Canada, Australia,Hungria y Polonia —
que habian transladado esta facultad de las Camaras Legislativas al
departamento judicial, hablando mas concretamente, al
TribunalSupremo; o bien instituir un sistema mixto, creando un
cuerpo constitucional separado e independiente, con jurisdiccion
exclusiva sobre la materia. La Asemblea Constituyente opto por este
ultimo creando "una Comision Electoralque se compondra de tres
Magistrados del Tribunal Supremo que seran designadospor su
Presidente, y de seis diputados escogidos por la Asamblea Nacional,
tres de los cuales el mayor numero de votos, y tres por el partido que
lesiga en el mayor numero de votos. Esta Commision Electoral sera
presidida porel Magistrado mas antiguo y conocera exclusivamente
de todas las controversiasrelativas al resultado de la eleccion y a las
calificaciones de los miembrosde la Asamblea Nacional" (Articulo IV,
Constitucion de Filipinas, 1935). Cuando la Constitucion se reformo
en 1940 restaurandose le legislatura bicameral, la filosofia de la
comision electoral se respecto y conservo en la Constitucion
reformada y en lugar de una comision se crearon dos, una para cada
camara, y ya no se llamaba Comision electoral sino Tribunal Electoral,
como para recalcar y subrayar el caracter judicial del nuevo
organismo. El precepto constitucional pertinente es como sigue:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns,and qualifications of their respective
members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
members, three of whom shall be Justice of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three
of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in each Electral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
De lo expuesto resulta evidente que una importante fa cultad judicial
que tenian las camaras legislativas anteriormente — la facultad de
actuar como jueces sobre las elecciones, actas y calificaciones de sus
miembros — ha quedado eliminada completamente bajo la actual
Constitucion y traspasada tambien completa y plenamente al nuevo
organismo constitucional — el Tribunal Electoral. La pregunta ahora
en orden es si la resolucion cuestionada que para mayor claridad
llamaremos Resolucion Pendatun representa o constituye,por parte
de los Senadores recurridos, el ejercicio de una facultad
constitucional que no les pertenece sino al Tribunal Electoral, y
nuestra contestacion es decididamente afirmativa. Con esa
resolucion en la mano es como si los recurridos hubieran dicho a los
recurrentes lo siguiete:"Señores, aqui tenemos un informe de la
Comision sobre Elecciones en donde se dice que en cuatro provincias
del centro de Luzon no ha habido sufragio libre, sincero y or denado,
por los actos de intimadacion y violencia de vuestros partidarios. Sin
los votos de esas provincias, vosotros no hubierais triunfado. Por
tanto, hasta que se decida en vuestro favor las protestas formuladas
contra vuestras actas ante el Tribunal Electoral, os negamos el
derecho de jurar, de sentarse en estos escaños, de participar en las
deliberaciones del Senado y de gozar de los derechos, prerrogativas
y privilegios anejos al cargo de Senador." ¿Que es esto sino una
innegabale susurpacion de la facultad exclusiva que tiene el Tribunal
Electoral de ser el unico juez de las controversias relativas a la
eleccion, actas y calificaciones de los miembros de la camara a qu
corresponde dicho tribunal?
Se arguye que independientemente de la cuestion electoral cada
camara, para proteger su existencia, su buen nombre y su decoro,
tiene el poder inherente de suspender a cualquier miembro suyo; que
la Resolucion Pendatun se inspiro en estos motivos; que la suspension
de los recurrentes es un acto politico que nada tiene que ever con la
determinacion de sus actas por el Tribunal Electoral y no se halla
sujeto a revision de parte del departamento judicial por cuestionable
que fuera el mismo desde el punto de vista del derecho o de la moral
publica; y que, por tanto, no hay tal usurpacion de poderes
constitucionales, no habiendose los recurridos entrometido en la
esfera de accion del Tribunal Electoral. Sin embargo, no hay mas que
leer la resolucion en cuestion para convencerse de que su entera
motivacion se deriva de las elecciones de 23 de April, dandose en ella
por establecido, en virtud del informe de la Comision sobre
Elecciones, que el triunfo de los recurrentes se debio a un estado de
terror y violencia en las Provincias de Pampanga, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija
y Bulacan. Los "por cuantos" de la resolucion hacen referencia a las
supuestas anomalias e irregularidades que viciaron el sufragio en
dichas provincias; hacen ciertas afirmaciones de caracter general
como la de que Filipinas, a fuer de nacion y estado democratico, debe
condenar todo acto tendente a derrotar la voluntad popular, y la de
que "para mantener vivo entre nosotros el respeto a las instituciones
democraticas, a ningun hombre o grupo de hombres se debe permitir
que reporten beneficio de los resultados de una eleccion llev ada a
cabo bajo coercion"; y al final se dice "por cuanto, sobre la base de
los informes arriba citados de la Comision sobre Elecciones se han
formulado protestas ante el Tribunal Electoral de Senado contra la
eleccion de Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno y Jose E. Romero"; y luego la
parte dispositiva en virtud de la cual se priva a los recurrentes del
juramento y de sus asientos en el Senado entre tanto no se resuelvan
las protestas formuladas contra sus actos, interregno que puede
durar meses y hasta años. De todo esto resulta bien claro que los
considerandos de la resolucion versan precisamente sobre los
mismos hechos electorales cuya determinacion incumbe
exclusivamente al Tribunal Electoral, y que la interdiccion, o mejor
dicho, la suspension de los derechos, prerrogativas y privilegios de los
recurrentes se basa indudablemente en tales considerandos. No hay
en la resolucion ni la mas minima insinuacion de que se haya
aprobado por altos motivos de dignidad y decoro senatorial — eso
que algun tratadista lllama graficamente medida de profilaxis —
como para evitar el roce deshonroso con miembros que fuerean algo
aso com de la casta despreciable de lost intocables, aquejados de
lepra moral en sus personas. No hay ni el menor cargo de torpeza
moral contra los recurrentes, ni siquiera se insinua que estos fuereon
directa o indirectamente responsables del alegado estado de terror y
violencia. La conclusion indeclinable, pues, es que la Resolucion
Pendatun enjuicia y resuelve cuestiones o "issues" puramente
electorales, aceptando prima facie un informe incompetente sobre
terrorismo, violencias y fraudes, y como tal constituye una
intromision en la facultad que bajo la Constitucion tiene el Tribunal
Electoral del Senado de ser el unico juez de las controversias relativas
a la eleccion, actas y calificaciones de los miembros de dicho alto
cuerpo colegislador.
Pero admitamos por un momento que la Resolucion Pendatun tiene
ese caracter profilactico que le atribuyen a ultima hora; que, contra
lo que es evidente y claro con claridad meridiana, esa resolucion nada
tiene que ver con la determinacion judicial de las actas de los
recurrentes por el Tribunal electoral. La pregunta otra vez en orden s
la siguiente: sometida la Resolucion Pendatum a la piedra de toque
de nuestra Constitucion ¿puede resistir con exito la prueba? Nuestra
contestacion es terminantemente negativa. La Constitucion filipina es
el producto de la sabiduria, experiencia y genio politico de nuestro
pueblo. No es un documento enteramente original: en ciencia politica
las concepciones originales no abundan. Hemos volcado en ella no
solo el resultado de nuestra experiencia necessariamentelimitada,
sino lo que hemos aprendido de la sabiduria y experiencia de otros
pueblos mas avanzados que nosotros, particularmente del pueblo
Americano, con el cual nos ha ligado una convivencia de cerca de
medio sigolo. Despues de largas y laboriosas deliberaciones nuestra
Asamablea Constituyente, elegida por el pueblo (1934-1935), adopto
el sistema presidencial de gobierno dividido en tres altospoderes,
independendientes entre si pero coordinandos en un mecanismo
cuidadosamente elaborado de frenos y contrapesos. Esos poderes
son: legislativo, ejecutivo y judicial.Sus altas facultades y funciones se
hallan especificadas en la Constitucion, en capitulos separados. En el
uso del lenguaje se ha evitado la municiosidad, el pormenorismo
caractereistico de las leyesordinarias, a fin de hacer del instrumento
suficientemente amplio y flexible para acomodarse y para subvenir a
las necesidades y condiciones cambiantes de los tiempos; pero, con
todo, los trazos, los lineamientos son suficientemente claros, firmes
y seguros, y creemos puededecirse sin inmodestia que en concision,
en claridad y en buen ordenamiento nuestra Constitucion no cede a
ninguna de las constituciones escritas que se conocen.
Examinemos ahora el departamento o poder legislative que es lo que
nos concierne e interesa en el presente asunto. Es un principio
constitucional bien establecido que el poder de legislar es ilimitado
en tanto en cuanto no pugna con la Constitucion, la cual opera como
una limitacion. Todos los demas poderes y facultades que no tengan
caracter legislativo deben ser conferidos expresa o implicitamente.
Nuestro Congreso, actuando concurrentemente por medio de sus
dos camaras, tiene el poder de legislar. "El poder legislativo queda
investido en un Congreso de Filipinas, compuesto de un Senado y de
una Camara de Representates (Articulo VI, seccion 1, Constitucion de
Filipinas, 1940). Pero ademas de este poder de conjunto, cada camara
tiene ciertas facultades, entre ellas algunas de caracter disciplinario,
a saber: (a) la de compeler la asistencia de miembros ausentes en la
forma y bajo las penas que dicha camara prescriba; (b) la de castigar
a sus miembros por conducta desordenada, y, con la concurrencia de
dos terceras partes de sus miembros, expulsar a un miembro por tal
motivo (Articulo VI, seccion 10, ap. 2 y 3). Fuera de estas facultades
no hay en nuestra Constitucion ninguna otra que autorice la
imposicion de un castigo o pena, o envuelva una privacion de
derechos, prerrogativas y privilegios, siguiera sea temporal, tal como
la que se provee en la Resolucion Pendatun. ¿Encaja esta resolucion
en cualquiera de las facultades arriba enumeradas? Evidentemente
que no. No encaja en el inciso (a)—la facultad de compeler
disciplinariamente la asistencia de miembros ausentes — porque es
superfluo decir que no se trata ni remotamente de tal caso. Tampoco
encaja en el inciso "b" porque se ha admitido desde el comienzo que
el caso que nos ocupa no es el de conducta desordenada de un
miembro. Tampoco encaja en la facultad de determinar y resolver la
legalidad y solvencia de las actas y credenciales de los recurrentes
porque ya hemos demostrado hasta la saciedad que habiendose
retirado totalmente de las camaras la substancia, la esencia de esa
facultad trasladandola al Tribunal Electoral, quedo tambien ipso
facto retirada y eliminada la facultad de suspender que es nada mas
que un incidenteun aledaño de la substancia.
Pero se dice: el Tribunal Electoral no tiene la facultad de suspender,
esto se halla admitido por todo el mundo; luego esa facultad ha
quedado, por lo menos, en las camaras como residuo no afectado por
el traspaso de jurisdiccionsobre las credenciales y actas electorales.
Sin embargo,esto no es mass que una habil sustileza. En la
Constitucion no hay mas que dos categorias de poderes: el expreso o
el implicito (either by express grant or by fair implication from what
is granted). Como quiera que esa reserva, ese residuo (la facultad de
suspender) no esta conferido expresamente en la Constitucion, luego
hay que suponerlo implicito. Pero ¿implicito de que? Tiene que ser de
algo de un poder mas general y mas amplio expresamente
conferido (parte de un todo) que en este caseo tendria que ser el
poder de conocer y resolver las controversias electorales sobre las
actas de los miembros del Congreso. Es asi que este poder ya no lo
tienen las camaras bajo la Constitucion; luego tampoco queda
nada implicito en elias, so pena de sostener que lo implicito, que es
nada mas que un incidente, puede subsistir por si solo sin
la substancia — el vaso esencial que lo envuelve y entraña. El
corolario forzoso de todo esto es que los redactores de la
Constitucion filipina eliminaron por completo la facultad de
suspender no solo del Congreso sino del Tribunal Electroral; que la
voluntad soberana del pueblo expresada en el codigo fundamental,
es que ningun protestado seria privado de sus asiento ni por un solo
minuto; que ninguna presuncion se estableceria en contra de la
legitimidad y solvencia de su acta; que solamente una sentencia final
podira cerrarle las puertas del Congreso. No tenemos porque
averiguar si con esta decision la Asamblea Constituyente quiso erigir
un firme valladar a los excesos y demasias de la pasion politica
creando un clima propicio para el desarrollo de las minorias en un
pais en que, como el nuestro, ciertas causas y circunstancias han
retardado el turno periodico y saludable de los partidos; todo lo que
nos incumbe hacer es señalar y destacar el hecho inexorable, la
volicion constitucional.
Se han citado dos casos de nuestra jurisprudencia parlamentaria para
justificar la Resolucion Pendatun: el caso de Jose Fuentebella en el
Senado de Filipinas, en 1916, y el caso de Nicolas Rafols en la Camara
de Representantes, en 1925. Bajo la alegacion de haberse cometido
graves irregularidades y fraudes en las primeras elecciones
senatoriales celebradas en el 6. o distrito (provincias bicolanas)al
candidato electo Jose Fuentebella se le negoprima facie el juramento
y el asiento pendiente la resolucion de la protesta formulada contra
su acta. Lo mismo se hizo en el caso de Nicolas Rafols, por alegados
fraudes electorales cometidos en el 6.º distrito diputacional de Cebu.
Pero la endeblez e inaplicabilidad de estos precedentes salta
inmediatamente a la vista si se tiene en cuenta que cuando se
establecieron las camaras legislativas eran constitucionalmente los
unicos jueces de la eleccion, actas y calificaciones de sus miembros;
asi que la suspension prima facie del juramento y del asiento no fue
mas que un incidente en el ejercicio de esa facultad; y, prescindiendo
de si esto era justo o injusto, prudente o arbitrario, parecia
incuestionable que estaba dentro los poderes y facultades de las
camaras el hacerlo.
Pero, en realidad, los casos de Fuentebella y Rafols pueden citarse
para un efecto completamente opuesto al perseguido por los
abogados dee los recurridos cuando se analizan y discuten amplia y
objetivamente los motivos, circunstancias y designios que indujeron
a nuestra Asamblea Constituyente a abandonar la bien arraigada
tradicion americana de hacer de las camaras legislativas los unicos
jueces de la eleccion, actas y calificaciones de sus miembros,
trasladanddo la jurisdiccion a un organismo constitucional
completamente separado e independiente. Un analisis de este
genero viene a ser altamente revelador y expresivo. Lo primero que
embarga la atencion del observador es que cuando se adopto esta
reforma fundamental y original por la Asamblea Constituyente
dominaba en Filipinas un partido politico fuerte, denso, acaudillado
por una personalidad genial, brillante, dinamica y poderosa. Ese
partido acababa de ganar en unas elecciones apasionadisimas y muy
reidas una victoria espectacular, abrumadora, que le daba el dominio
y control de todos los resortes de la vida politica no solo en la nacion
sino hasta en las provincias y municipios.Ese partido dominaba
naturalmente tambien la Convencion Constitucional, la Asamblea
Constituyente. ¿Que hizo ese partido en medio de su omnipotencia?
¿Le emborracho ese peligroso licor de los dioses — el licor de la
victoria, el licor del poder? No. Ese partido, sus caudillos, resolvieron
ser generosos, ser justos, ser prudentes, ser democraticos, y lo
fueron; determinaron pensar en terminos de humanidad, en
terminos de nacion, en terminos de justica pero justicia de verad, en
terminos de libertad y democracia, y lo hicieron tal como lo pensaron.
Podian haber escrito una constitucion a su talante — una constitucion
que sirviese sus propios fines, que asegurase su perpetuidad en el
poder. No lo hicieron. Y no solamente no lo hicieron, sino que
hicieronalgo mas; algo extraordinario, inconcebible, juzgado a la luz y
segun la norma usual del egoismo de los partidos. Teniendo en sus
manos un poder enorme, formidable, sumamente tentador, el poder
de resolver las controversias electorales sobre las actas de los
miembros de la Legislatura, renunciaron a ese poder para alojarlo en
un cuerpo constitucional separado e independiente, el cual es
practicamente un tribunal de justicia: la Comision Electoral, hoy
Tribunal Electoral. La determinacion de hacer este cuerpo lo
mas apolitico posible se denota en el hecho de que sus miembros
legislativos estan distribuidos en igual numero, 3-3, de suerte que los
3 Magistrados componen el factor decisivo.
¿Por que los redactores de la Constitucion, y, sobre todo, por que el
partido politico mayoritario pudo hacer estarenuncia de la que pocos
ejemplos hay en la historia politica del mundo? No parece dificil
imaginarse los motivos, las causas, sobre todo para uno que como el
autor de esta opinion tuvo algo que ver, siguera muy modestamente,
con las tareas de la Asamblea Constituyente. El pueblo filipino estab
empeñado en una suprema, altisima tarea — la de estructurar el
Estado, la de escribir el codigo fundamental de la nacion no solo para
los 10 años del Commonwealth sino para la Republica que se
proclamaria despues de dicho periodo de tiempo. Todo el mundo
sabia que la suerte de la democracia en filipinas dependia
principalmente de la Constitucion que se escribiera, no solo en su
letra sino en su espiritu, y, sobre todo, de la forma y manera como
ella moldearia, penetraria e influiria en la vida cotidiana del pueblo y
del individuo. Desde luego no eramos unos ilusos, utopistas,
perfeccionistas; no aspirabamos ni mucho menos a crear un trasunto
de la republica ideal de Platon; pero deseabamos hacer lo mejor
posible dadas nuestras circunstancias y limitaciones, dada nuestra
historia y tradiciones, y dado el temperamento y genio politico y
social de nuestro pueblo. Se habia acuñado y popularizado por aquel
tiempo la frase "justicia politica" para denotar la clase de justicia
convencional que cabia esperar en relacion con las protestas
electorales planteadas ante las camaras legislativas. No solo se
aceleraba o demoraba el despacho de las mismas a ritmo con los
dictados de ciertas conveniencias de taifa o grupo, sino que no pocas
veces el complejo politico o personal era el factor determinante en
las resoluciones y decisiones que se tomaban. Todo esto lo sabian los
delegados a la asamblea constituyente, lo sabian los liders de los
partidos, lo sabian los escritores y pensadores dedicados al estudio
de las ciencias politicas y sociales.
En la Convencion habi delegados que eran miembros actuales y
pasados de la Legislatura, hombres que sabian por propia experiencia
como se resolvian las protestas electorales en las camaras legislativas
y que, ademas, sabian por sus lecturas lo que sobre el particular
ocurria en otros paises. Alli estaba, como delegado, Nicolas Rafols —
actor del drama politico que determino uno de los procedentes
parlamentarios que se citan — acaso rumiando todavia en su fuero
interno el agravio contra lo que reputara arbitrariedad cometida por
la mayoria en su caso. ¿Que de extraño habia que en medio de tal
"background", en medio de tal ambiente ideologico se formara una
fuerte opinionen favor de un cambio de sistema, en favor de
unarbitrio constitucional que sustituyera la llamada "justicia politica"
con una justicia de verdad, una "justicia judicial?"Asi se creo la
Comision Electoral. Nada mejor que las siguientes palabras del
malogrado Magistrado Abad Santos en su luminosa opinion
concurrente en el celebrado asunto de Angara contra Comision
Electoral, para definir el caracter del sistema: "El objeto que se
trataba de obtener con la creacion del a Comision Electoral no era
crear un cuerpo que estuviera por encima de la ley, sino el elevar las
elecciones legislativas de la categoria de cuestiones politicas a la de
justiciables." (Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 151, 200.)
Y el ponente en dicho asunto el Magistrado Laurel se explaya mas
todavia con los siguientes pronunciamientos que no tienen
desperdicio:
Los miembros de la Convencion Constitucional que planearon
nuestra ley fundamental eran, en su mayor parte, hombres de edad
madura y de experiencia. A buen seguro muchos de ellos estaban
familiarizados con la historia y desarrollo politico de otros paises del
mundo. Por tanto, cuando creyeron conveniente crear una Comision
Electoral como un organismo constitucional y lo invistieron con la
exclusiva funcion de conocer y fallar las controversias electorales,
actas y condiciones de los miembros de la Asamblea
Nacional,debieronde haberlo hecho asi, no solamente a la luz de su
propia experiencia, sino tambien teniendo en cuente la experiencia
de otros pueblos ilustrados del mundo. La creacion de la Comision
Electoral fue planeada para remediar ciertos males que conocian los
autores de nuestra Constitucion. No obstante la tenaz oposicion de
algunos miembros de la Convencion a su creacion, el proyecto como
antes se ha dicho, fue aprobado por ese cuerpo mediante una
votacion de 98 contra 58. Todo cuanto se puede decir ahora sobre la
aprobacion de la Constitucion, la creacion de la Comision Electoral es
la expresion de la sabiduria y "la justicia esencial al pueblo".
(Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, marzo 4, 1861.)
De las deliberaciones de nuestra Convencion Constitucional resulta
evidente que el objeto era traspasar en su totalidad toda la facultad
previamente ejercitada por la Legislatura en asuntos pertenecientes
a protestas electorales de sus miembros, a un tribunal independiente
e imparcial. Sin embargo, no fue tanto el conocimientoy apreciacion
de precedentes constitucionales contemporaneos comola ha tiempo
sentida necesidad de fallar protestas legislativas, libres de prejuicios
partidistas lo que impulso al pueblo, obrando por medio de sus
delegados a la Convencion, a establecer este Cuerpo que se conoce
por Comision Electoral. Con estas miras, se creo un cuerpo en el que
tanto el partido de la mayoria como el de la minoria estanigualmente
representados para contrarrestar la influencia partidista en sus
deliberaciones, y dotado, ademas, de caracter judicial mediantela
inclusion entre sus miembros de tres magistrados del Tribunal
Supremo.
La Comision Electoral es una creacion constitucional, investida de las
facultades necesarias para el cumplimiento y ejecucion de las
funciones limitadas y especificas que la ha asignado la Comision.
Aunque no es un Poder en nuestro Gobierno tripartito, es, para todos
los fines, cuando obra dentro de los limites de su autoridad, un
organismo independiente. Se aproxima mas, ciertamente, al
Departamento Legislativo que a cualquiera otro. El lugar que ocupa
la disposicion legal (articulo 4) que crea la Comision Electoral en el
Titulo VI, titulado "Departamento Legislativo" de nuestra
Constitucion,es muy significativo. Su composicion es tambien
significativa por cuanto etsa constituida por una mayoria de
miembros de la Legislatura. Pero es un cuerpo separado e
independiente de la Legislatura.
La concesion de facultades a la Comision Electoral para conocer de
todas las controversias relativas a las elecciones, actas y condiciones
de los miembros de la Asamblea Nacional, tiene por objeto hacer que
esas facultades sean tan completas y queden tan incolumes como si
hubieran continuado originalmente en la Legislatura. El haber
expresamente investido de esas facultades a la Comision Electoral, es
una negativa tacita del ejercicio de esas facultades por la Asamblea
Nacional. Y esto es una restriccion tan eficaz a las facultades
legislativas como una prohibicion expresa contenida en la
Constitucion (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.
Whisman,36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). . . ." (Angara contra Comision
Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 151-, 188-190.)
Acaso se pueda decir algo mas todavia acerca de los motivos que
indujeron la creacion de la Comision Electoral; acaso se pueda
aventurar la afirmacion de que con este cuerpo los redactores de la
Constitucion, los caudillos de los partidos se propusieron asegurar
por todos los medios y garantias la vida y crecimiento de la
democracia en Filipinas. Democracia es esencialmente libre discusion
de los asuntos publicos, de los problemas de la comunidad;
libreexpresion del pensamiento y de la opinion. De esto se sigue
necesariamente un regimen basado en la existencia de una mayoria
que gobierna y de una minoria que aspira a gobernar entretanto que
vigila los actos del gobierno en su doble papel de censor y de
aspirante al poder. La mejor piedra de toque para apreciar y juzgar la
calidad de un regimen politico es la manera y forma como trata a las
minorias y oposiciones. Un gobierno totalitario, despotico, las liquida,
las ahoga; un gobierno democratico no solo las respeta, sino que crea
para ellas un clima vital propicio. Mirado en esta sentido el Tribunal
electoral es un instrumento de minorias por antonomasia: la idea
basica de su creacion es el desposeer a las mayhorias del poder de
destruir, de aniquilar a las minorias mediante lo que cinicamente se
ha denominado "justicia politica," e impartir a las minorias las
maximas garantias de una justicia de verdad — una "justicia judicial"
de la mayoria en el Senado, pronunciando su discurso a favor de la
reforma en la Asamblea Constituyente, dijo entre otros conceptos las
siguientes significativas palabras: "Many have criticized, many have
complained against the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases. . .
." (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,Tomo I, pag.
263). Por eso es un absurdo sostener que la facultad de suspender
utilizada mediante la Resolucion Pendatun haya quedado en el
Congreso como residuo, independientemente de la jurisdiccion
exclusiva del Tribunal Electoral para resolver protestas electorales
legislativas. Ello equivaldria a sostener que los redactores de la
Constitucion pusieron un remedio paraderrotarlo al propio tiempo
mediante una puerta reservada y trasera por la que podria escurrirse
el pequeño monstruo de la "justicia politica". Este juego infantil no
podian haberlo hecho los redactores de la Constitucion, los liders de
los partidos que tuvieron alguna responsabilidad en la redaccion de
dicho documento. ¿Que mas? Esa facultada para suspender equivale
practicamentea una carta blanca para intervenir y estorbar las
actuaciones y procedimientos del Tribunal Electoral, provocando
suspicacias, creando anticipadamente prejuicios no solo en la mente
del publico sino de los miembros mismos, empequeñeciendo, en una
palabra, el prestigio del tribunal. ¿Como se puede pensar que la
Asamblea Constituyente permitiera y posibitara ese resultado
antijudicial, reservandoalgo al Congreso en un traspaso de facultades
que se consideraba total, absoluto e incondicional? Los
tribunalesordinarios de justicia estan por ley protegidos contra todo
estorbo y obstruccion a sus funciones. El Tribunal Electoral — criatura
de la misma Constitucion — tiene, por lo menos, iguales si no mejores
titulos a esa impermeabilidad, mejor todavia, a esa inmunidad contra
toda obstruccion y entorpecimiento. El hecho de que la intromision
venga del Congreso o de una de sus camaras no puede ser una
justificacion.
Las deliberaciones de la Asamblea Constituyente arrojan buena luz
sobre el espiritu del precepto que nos ocupa. Queel traspaso de
facultades fue total, absoluto; que al Congreso no se reservo ninguna
facultad, mucho menos la de suspender, en toda cuestion relativa a
la eleccion de sus miembros, lo denotan bien claro ciertas
observaciones, que a estas alturas resultan profeticas, del Delegado
ManuelRoxas, uno de los liders mas autorizados de la Asamblea
Constituyente, hoy primer Magistrado de la nacion. El Sr. Roxas
estaba contestando varias interpelaciones sobre el alcance del nuevo
sistema propuesto. Replicando al Delegado Ventura no parece sino
que el Sr. Roxas presintiera la Resolucion Pendatun o actos
semejantes a ella cuando dijo lo siguiente: ". . . Ademas, si la
Asamblea desea anular el poder de la Comision (Electoral), puede
hacerlo asi mediante ciertas maniobras en su primera sesion cuando
se someten las actas a la Asamblea. El objeto es dar a la Comision
Electoral todo el poder ejercitado por la Asamblea referente a las
elecciones, actas y condiciones de sus miembros"
(vease Angara contra Comision Electoral, supra, pag. 179).
Ese todo de que habla el Sr. Roxas excluye la idea de cualquier reserva
o residuo dejado a las camaras del Congreso.
Se dice, sin embargo, en la opinion de la mayoria que los debates en
la Asamblea Constituyente sobre el precepto constitucional de que se
trata demuestran que la intencion de los redactores de la
Constitucion no fue el entregar todo a la Comision Electoral (ahora
Tribunal Electoral), sino que se le confirio solamente la facultad de
ser "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."Es decir —
se arguye — que cuando no hay "contest" o contencion las camaras
tienen la facultad de entender y juzgar de "la eleccion, actas y
cualificaciones de sus miembros".Esto se desprende, segun la
ponencia, del hecho de que mientras el "draft" o proyecto original
decia lo siguiente:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its
members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission.
la redaccion final del proyecto quedo como sigue:
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly.
Se asevera enfaticamente en la opinion de la mayoria que la
supresion de la primera parte de la clausula es harto significativa. Ello
demuestra, se dice, que la clausula tenia dos partes con significados
distintos: la primera parte, relativa a casos no contenciosos, y la
segunda referente a casos contenciosos. La eliminacion de la primera
parte venia a reducir consiguientemente la jurisdiccion de la
ComisionElectoral a los casos contenciosos, reservandose los no
contenciosos a las camaras. Y para probar esta tesis a primera vista
deslumbrante se transcribe en la ponencia una larga tirada del diario
de sesiones de la Asamblea Constituyente — tirada que, en verdad,
ofrece ciertos equivocos y ambiguedades. Pero esto no es mas que
un aspecto del cuadro.
Estos nos obliga a revisar y examinar toda la parte del diario de
sesiones que abarca los debates sobre el
particular.Afortunadamente, las discusiones fueron amplias, plenas
de informacion y detalle, y sobre todo llevadas muyinteligentemente.
El Delegado Manuel Roxas, ahora Presidente de Filipinas, era quien
sostenia el lado afirmativo, esto es, el precepto original tal como lo
habia sometido el llamando Comite de Siete y tal como queda
transcritoen el parrafo anterior. Un grupo de Delegados, encabezado
por el Hon. Alejo Labrador, de Zambales, estaba fundamental y
decididamente opuesto a la formula. Estos Delegados no aceptaban
la reforma propuesta, querian que se conservase el antiguo sistema
por virtud del cual las camaras eran los jueces exclusivos de la
elecccion, actas ycualificaciones de sus miembros. Acaso sea
pertinente consignar el hecho de que si bien es verdad que los
partidos (anti y pro) habian declarado una tregua patriotica y
saludable en sus luchas dentro de la Convencion, el Sr. Roxas
pertenecia al partido minoritario — el de los pros — mientras que el
Sr. Labrador era de la mayoria, el partido fuerte y poderoso de
los antis cuyo indiscutible lider era el entonces Presidente del Senado
Sr. Quezon. La oposicion del Sr. Labrador y compa_¤_eros se fundaba
principalmente en la teoria de la separacion de poderes: ellos creian
que la reforma era demasiado radical, que la misma venia a mermar
grandemente el poder y prestigio del departamento
legislativo,reduciendolo a un estado de inferioridad y vasallaje,
particularmente al poder judicial, en virtud de la intervencion de
miembros de la Corte Suprema en la composicion de la Comision o
Tribunal Electoral. Acaso sea pertinente decir tambien que entre los
ardientes patrocinadores de la reforma figuraban distinguidos
Delegados de la mayoria entre ellos el Hon. Vicente J. Francisco, de
Cavite, en la actualidad Senador de Filipinas.
Veamos ahora el proceso de como se enmendo el "draft"original del
precepto. Las siguientes interpelaciones arrojan copiosa luz sobre la
cuestion.
Delegate VENTURA. We have a doubt here as to the scope of the
meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft
reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of anyof
its members shall be judged by an electoral Commission ."I should
like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the members whose election is not contested shall
also be judged by the Electoral Commission.
Delegate ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the
member, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word "judge"is
used to indicate a controversy. If there is no qustion about the
election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the
Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be determined.
Delegate VENTURA. But that does carry the idea also that the
Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of those whose
election is not contested?
Delegate ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman
knows, theaction of the House of Representatives in confirming the
election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the Assembly. It
is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man (adviertase bien
esto) fileshis credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient,
unless the election is contested." (Arruego, The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution,pp. 267, 268.)
Como se ve, lo que preocupada al Delegado Ventura era que con la
fraseologiaindicada la Comision Electoral tuviera jurisdiccion y
competencia hasta sobrelas credenciales no protestadas; parece que
se temia esta ambiguedad. Peroni el Delegado Ventura ni nadie en la
Convencion tuvo jamas en la mente la idea de que la fraseologia
envolvia una dual jurisdiccion: una, de parte de la Asamblea Nacional,
sobre las credenciales no protestadas; y otra, de parte de la Comision
Electoral, sobre las credenciales protestadas. Y elDelegado Roxas, con
su contestaciones, establecio bien claramente que se empleaba la
palabra "judge"; y el "contest," el litigio tenia que ser enjuiciado
naturalmente por la Comision Electoral.
De la ultima contestacion del Delegado Roxas transcrita arriba se
deduceincuestionablemente que el no admitia la posibilidad de que
la Asemblea Nacional rehusase su confirmacion a una credencial no
protestada o contendida. El sostenia que esta confirmacion no era
constitucional, no era necesaria. Poreso el dijo categoricamente:
"After a man files his credential, that issufficient, unless the election
is contested." Aplicado este criterio al casoque nos ocupa, equivale a
lo siguiente: Despues de haberse presentado alSenado las
credenciales de los recurrentes Sres. Vera, Diokno y Romero (a ello
monta el certificado de proclamacion expedido por la Comision sobre
Elecciones), ello era bastante, a menos que su eleccion fuese
cuestionada, ycuestionada legalmente, esto es, protestada
debidamente ante el Tribunal Electoral.
El pensamiento del Delegado Roxas se aclaro mas contestado otras
interpelaciones. El dijo positiva y terminantemente, replicando al
DelegadoCinco, que no habia ninguna diferencia entre la primera y
segunda parte de laclausula; que, en realidad, los casos de elections,
returns and qualifications," y que la frase "and contested elections"
se inserto meramente para los efectos de mayor claridad.
xxx xxx xxx
Delegate CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that
propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte (Mr. Ventura) when
I arose a while ago.However, I want to ask more questions from the
Delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites
cases contesting the election asseparated from the first part of the
section which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
Delegate ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases
ofcontested elections are already included in the phrase "the
elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested
elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
Delegate CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral
Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the election of the
members?
Delegate ROXAS. I do not think so unless there is a protest.
(Arruego, id.,p. 269.)
Pero hay todavia cosa mas importante. En realidad, esta misma
custion que nos ocupa ya se planteo en aquellos debates y la solucion
que entonces se le diocuadra perfectamente con el criterio que
sostenemos en esta disidencia. ElDelegado Labrador, lider, como ya
se ha dicho, de los opositores a la reforma,hizo al Delegado Roxas
algunas interpelaciones que parecian hechas enanticipacion a los
presentes acontecimientos. He aqui el dialogo Roxas-Labrador:
Delegate LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that
unless this power is granted to the Assembly, the Assembly on its own
motion does nothave the right to contest the election and
qualification of its members?
Delegate ROXAS. I have no doubt that the gentleman is right. If this
draft is retained, as it is, even if two-thirds of the Assembly believe
that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they
cannot remove him for that reason.
Delegate LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be
retained by the Electoral Commission.
Delegate ROXAS. By the Assembly for misconduct.
Delegate LABRADOR. I mean with the respect to the qualifications of
the members.
Delegate ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Delegate LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the
Assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its members?
Delegate ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he
must go to the Electoral Commission and make the question heard
before the Electoral Commission.
Delegate LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide
whether the election is not contested.
Delegate ROXAS. Yes sir; that is the purpose. (Aruego, idem, pp. 269,
270.)
Este dialogo Roxas-Labrador nos da la mejor clave para interpretar el
perfecto. Labrador pregunto si bajo el mismo la Asamblea tenia
derecho acuestionar, de su propia iniciativa (on its motion).
la eleccion y cualificacion de sus miembros; Roxas contesto que NO,
que "aunque dos terceras partes de la Asamblea creyeran que un
miembro no tenia las cualificaciones provistas por la ley, ellos no
podrian removerle por tal razon".
Labrador volvio a preguntar inquiriendo sobre quien tenia el derecho
de remover. Roxas contesto: la Asamblea Nacional por mala
conducta (for misconduct); y la Comision Electoral, con respeto a las
cualificaciones de losmiembros de la Asamblea.
Y cuando Labrador volvio a remachar preguntando si un miembro de
la AsambleaNacional podria, bajo el precepto que se discutia,
cuestionar la elegibilidadde sus miembros, Roxas contesto
categoricamente que "antes de que un miembro pudiera cuestionar
la eligibilidad (de otro) debia ir a la Comision Electoral y hacer que la
cuestion se oyera ante la Comision Electoral." Es decir que,aplicado
este criterio al caso nos ocupa, ni el Senador Pendatun, ni ningun otro
Senador, ni nadie tenia derecho a cuestionar la elegibilidad de los
recurrentes Sres. Vera, Diokno y Romero ante el Senado, sino que el
asunto debia llevarse directamente al Tribunal Electoral y hacer que
este lo enjuiciara.
Pero se preguntara: ¿entonces por que se reformo el "draft" o
proyecto original eliminando la primera clausula y dejando solo la
segunda, o sea la frase "all cases contesting the elections, returns and
qualifications," etc. etc? Es verdad, se hizo la enmienda, pero la
misma no es sustancial,no afecta al fondo del precepto, no involucra
el espiritu del sistema tal como lo definio y explico el Delegado Roxas
en sus luminosas respuestas a las diversas interpelaciones,
particularmente las dadas al Delegado Labrador. Se acepto la
enmienda mas bien por razones puramente psicologicas, esas que
conoce bien todo aquel que este familiarzado con la mecanica de los
parlamentos y asambleas deliberativas.Por un lado, el Delegado
Roxas veia que habia ciertas dudascon respecto al alcance del
proyecto tal como estaba fraseado;pero, por otro lado, el decia que
esas dudas carecian de fundamento, que las dos clausulas del
precepto tenian un mismo significado, que la segunda ya estaba
contenida en la primera y se insertaba tan solo para fines de
claridad.Asi que, habil estrategia parlamentario, creyo que podia
aceptar perfectamente la enmienda, entre cuyos proponentes (esto
es muy significativo, como se vera mas adelante) figuraba por cierto
el Delegado Rafols, pues con ello no perdia nada, no comprometia ni
un apice de su posicion, y en cambio ganaba mucho, atraia el apoyo
de los indecisos,aseguraba la aprobacion del precepto en la votacion
final, derrotando a los que estaban fundamentalmente opuestos al
mismo como, en efecto, los derroto por 98 votos contra 56. Que la
enmienda no era sustancial y de ningun modoafectaba al sistema, asi
lo declaro categoricamente el Sr. Roxas cuando, defiriendo a una
sugestion del Presidente Recto de la Convencion, definio el alcance
del cambio diciendo que era "tan solo para obviar la objecion
apuntadapor varios delegados en el sentido de que la primera
clausula del 'draft' que dice 'The election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly' parece dar a la Comision
Electoral el poder de determinar hasta la eleccion de los miembros
que no han sido protestados."Es decir, que o unico que se quiso
aclarar y establecer fuera de toda duda con la enmienda es que el
poder de la Comision Electoral no podia extenderse a las credenciales
no protestadas, pero jamas se penso que el efecto de la enmienda
era el desgajar este poder de la Comision Electoral para dejarlo como
un residuo en la Legislatura; en otros terminos, jamas se imagino que
con la enmienda la Asamblea Nacional todavia podria ser juez de las
credenciales no protestadas de sus miembros. He aqui las palabras
textuales del Sr. Roxas:
The difference, Mr. President, consists only in obviating the objection
pointed out by various delegates to the effect that the first clause
which states "The election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly" seems to give to the Electoral Commission
the power to determine also the election of the members who have
not been elected. And in order to obviate, we believe that the
amendment is right in that sense . that is, if we amend the draft so
that it should read as follows: "All cases contesting the election, etc.,"
so that the judges of the Electoral Commission will limit themselves
only to cases in which there has been a protest against the returns.
No pudo haberse concebido jamas la peregrina, fantastica idea de
que el "draft" enmendado dejaba a la Asamblea Nacional la facultad
de enjuiciar la "eleccion, actas y cualificaciones de los miembros"
contra los cuales no existiera ninguna protesta ante la Comision
Electoral, por al sencilla razon de que ello engendraria las siguientes
anomalias: (a) la creacion de dos jueces: uno, para credenciales no
protestadas — la Asamblea Nacional o Congreso; y otro, para
credenciales protestadas — la Comision o Tribunal Electoral; (b) en
un momento dado, una mayoria sin escrupulos,viendo peligrar el
poder en sus manos despues de unas elecciones reñidisimas, podria
dar un golpe de mano mediante la estratagema de hacer que sus
candidatos derrotados se inhiban de protestar ante el Tribunal
Elctoral a fin de dar lugar a que el Congreso actue directamente sobre
el caso, con la mira de ajusticiar a los candidatos minoritarios
triunfantes bajo la guillotina de lo que el cinismo de los descreidos ha
llamado justicia politica de las mayorias; (c) occurriria la paradoja de
que las credenciales no protestadas estarian en peor situacion que
las protestada, porque mientras estas ultimas tendrian el beneficio
de una justicia de verdad, la justicia judicial del Tribunal Electoral,
aquellas caerian bajo la justicia politica de las mayorias, sedientas de
sangre adversaria. Es indudable que, como hemos dicho en otra parte
de esta disidencia, la Asamblea Constituyente no podia ser parte en
un juego infantil como este; y el Delgado Roxas, con su seriedad, con
su bien conocida madurezpolitica, con su devocion a la causa de la
libertad y democracia, de ningun modo podia ser corresponsable de
un precepto constitucional que pudiera dar lugar a tan tremendas
anomalias. Y ¿que decir del Delgado Rafols? ¿Como se puede
concebir que, con sus tristes reminiscencias de la justicia politica de
las mayorias, diera su patrocinio a una enmienda que pudiera
producir tales consecuencias?
Para remachar la tesis de que cada camara de nuestro Congreso
todavia retiene la facultad de determinar "la eleccion, las actas y las
cualificaciones de sus miembros" en casos en que no hay protesta, la
mayoria propone en su opinion el siguiente ejemplo: "Es elegido por
un distrito congresil un hombre que habia servido previamente 10
años en las Prisiones de Bilibid, por estafa. Como no tuvo
contrincante(¡este hombre debia de ser muy popular!), ninguna
protesta se formula contra su eleccion. Y naturalmente el Tribunal
Electoral no adquiere jurisdiccion sobre el caso, pues no hay 'contest'
o controversia. Una vez informada del hecho ¡no puede la
Camara, motu propio, suspender la toma de su juramento? ¿No
puede la Camara investigarle y despues exclurle? Se observara que
cuando un miembro de la Camara suscita una cuestion respecto a las
cualificaciones de otro, de ello no se sigue un pleito electoral, pues
ninguno pretende sustituir a este ultimo."
Pareceria que estabamos excusados de replicar a este argumento por
dos razones: primera, porque evidentemente el ejemplo propone un
caso que es completamente distintodel que nos ocupa, pues los
recurrentes no estan acusados de estafa ni de nada que afecta a su
caracter, y su caso,como ya hemos dicho, es de motivacion
enteramente electoral, es decir, relacionada con la forma como
fueron elegidos que se dice viciada por actos de violencia y terrorismo
de sus partidarios; y segunda, porque si bien es verdad que el ejemplo
es meramente hipotetico, plantea, sin embargo, un caso que puede
perfectamente occurrir y pareceria que ni esta Corte ni ningun
miembro suyo deberia adelantar su opinion sobre semejante
hipotesis susceptible de realizarse. Pero como del ejemplo se
pretende hacer argumento aquiles, no tenemos mas remedio que
comentarlo y discutirlo.
Ante todo se deben deslindar bien los conceptos. El derecho o
facultad de expulsar a un miembro de una camara legislativa (Articulo
VI, seccion 10, ap. 3, Constitucion de Filipinas) es una cosa bien
diferente del derecho de rehusar la admision de uno para ser
miembro de dicha camara. En esto ultimo las cuestiones envueltas se
refieren principalmente, tal vez exclusivamente, a las cualificaciones
constitucionales de aquiellos que se presentan para ser admitidos
como miembros, o bien a la regularidad y legalidad de las elecciones
en que fueron elegidos; mientras que en lo primero, esto es, en lo
que toca a la expulsion, lo que de lugar a la accion es el caracter
personal o conducta de la parte afectada (Willoughby, On the
Constitution of the United States, tomo 1.º, pag. 611).
En el ejemplo que propone la mayoria, la condena por estafa no es
cosa que guarda relacion con las cualificaciones constitucionales del
congresista o Representante electo ni con la regularidad y legalidad
de las elecciones en que salio victorioso, por cierto sin ningun
contrincante. Es cosa que afecta a su caracter personal o conducta.
Por tanto, no cabe discutir su derecho a ser admitido como miembro
de la camara; el reune las cualificaciones constitucionales
(ciudadania, edad, etc.) para ser Representante y la limpieza de su
eleccion esta admitida. Asi que, parafraseando al Delegado Roxas, la
"presentacion de su credencial de que ha sido eligido, es bastante
para que sea admitido como miembro." Pero ¿la condena por estafa?
¿No puede la camara por este motivo investigarle y excluirle como
elemento no deseable? — pregunta la mayoria. Esta es otra cuestion.
Ya hemos visto que el derecho de admision es una cosa, y el derecho
de expulsion, otra. El derecho de expulsion, por mala conducta, lo
tienen las camaras independientemente del Tribunal Electroral. Ya lo
dijo el Delegado Roxas, contestando al Delegado Labrador: la facultad
de remover, en tratandose de la "eleccion, actas y cualificaciones de
los miembros," la tiene la Comision o Tribunal Electoral, previa
protesta; la facultad de remover, por mala conducta, la tiene la
Asamblea (Congreso)
Pero examinemos el ejemplo de la estafa que plantea la mayoria hast
sus ultimas consecuencias. Willoughby dice que sobre este respecto
el punto principal de controversia es si los actos de mala conducta
objeto de queja debenser solo los subsiguientes a la eleccion y que
afecten a la dignidad del Congreso y al debido desempeño de sus
funciones, o deben ser tambien los anteriores. "Respecto de los actos
de los miembros electos cometidos con anterioridad a su eleccion se
ha argumentado fuertemente que las Camaras no deben tenerlos
cuenta, pues se debe conceder que los electores tienen el derecho de
elegir a quienes quieran para representarles en el Congreso, y se debe
presumir que han tenido en cuenta el caracter y la conducta de
aquellos a quienes elegen."
A disregard of the foregoing doctrine, it has been urged, operates as
a denial to the States of a right or privilege constitutionally provided
for them. Thus, we find James M. Beck, former Solicitor General of
the United States, declaring : "It seems too clear for argument, that
each States has the right to select from its people any representative
in the Senate (or the House) that it sees fit, irrespective of his
intellectual or moral qualifications (provided he possesses the
qualifications specified in the Constitution), . . ." A state may have
selected a member of the Senate or secured his nomination by
unworthy means. He may be intelectually unfitted for the high office,
and his moral character may, in other respects, leave much to be
desired. The People of the United States may justifiably think that the
States has sent to Congress an unfit man, who could add nothing to
its deliberations, and whose influence might well be pernicious. None
the less, the States has the right to send him. It is its sole concern, and
to nullify its choice is to destroy the basic right of a sovereign State,
and amounts to a revolution" (Willoughby, idem, pp. 611, 612).
El primer precedente — añade el autor citado — de que, como base
para expulsion, los actos cometidos antes de la eleccion no deben ser
considerados, fue en el caso del Senador Humphrey Marshall, en
1796, quien fue acusado de que habia cometido perjurio. El Senado
en este caso se nego a tomar jurisdiccion para determinar si, de
hecho, Marshall habia sido reo de un delito, a pesar del hecho de que
el pidio que el Senato investigase y determinase el caso" (supra, p.
612). Parece que en estos casos el criteriogeneral y predominante es
que el sufragio popular es como un especie de Jordan que lava con
sus aguas purificadoras todos los pecados cometidos antes de la
eleccion. Es como si al pueblo se le supusiera investido de la facultad
suprema de indultar totalmente a sus favoritos por medio de la balota
electoral.
Se insinua que los recurridos tenian la facultad de adoptar la
Resolucion Pendum en virtud del principio de que todo
cuerpolegislativo tiene el poder inherente de adoptar reglas para su
organizacion, funcionamiento y preservacion. Se cita la practica
legislativa de que al inaugurarse un cuerpo deliberativo se forma un
comite de credienciales que examia los certificados o titulos que
presentan los miembros para su admision. Dicho comite rinde su
informe recomendando la aprobacion o desaprobacion de las
credenciales. No puede sostenerse una tesis mas peligrosa que esta.
Las camaras legislativas son mas, muchisimo mas que una camara de
comercio, por ejemplo. Los legisladores son funcionarios
constitucionales. Sus cualificaciones, la invenstidura y el ejercicio de
su cargo, el termino del mismo,estan definidos y amparados por la
Constitucion mediante preceptos y disposiciones que operan como
limitaciones constitucionales sobre el poder legislativo en general.
Esos preceptos y disposiciones no se pueden enmendar o derogar
mediante una ley ordinaria, mucho menos mediante una resolucion
simple como la del Senador Pendatun: para enmendarlos o
derogarlos hace falta que se reforme la Constitucion por los procesos
que ella preceptua. Hacer depender la admision del legislador o la
tenencia de sus cargo de una resolucion o acuerdo reglamentario es
de los mas subversivo, pues le reduciria a un a situacion tan precaria
y tan endeble que un mero empleado del servicio civil tendria mas
prestancia y mas seguridad que el.
Se nos cita, sin embargo, el caso de Barry vs. United States ex rel.
Cunningham (279 U.S., 867, 874; 73 Law, ed. 597), para demostrar
que la Resolucion Pendatun es valida y legal por entrar y recaer
dentro del poder inherente del Senado para suspender a cualquier
miembro, independientemente de la cuestion electoral. Hemos
revisado cuidadosamente la sentencia citada y la hemos hallado
inaplicable el presente caso. Es verdad que ella tiene cierta relacion
con el caso de Vare, candidatoa Senador en Pennsylvania en las
elecciones de 1926, a quien se lenegroprima facie el asiento mientras
se efectuaba una investigacion dealegadas irregularidades y practicas
corruptas cometidas para promover sunominacion y su eleccion,
entre ellas el haber hecho promesas impropiase ilegales, etc. Pero,
aparte de que la suspension del juramento y asientode Vare caia del
Senado American como "unico juez de la eleccion, actas y
calificaciones de sus miembros," solo muy incidental y
colateralmentese habla de esto en el caso de Barry. La unica y
verdadera cuestion planteadaen esta caso era la de si a un tal
Cunningham se le podia arrestrar, mediante orden del Senado, y
traerle a la barra para contestar a ciertas preguntassobre la
procedencia de ciertos fondos gastados en la nominacion y
eleccionde Vare. La Corte Suprema Federal dijo que si, que esto caia
dentro de los poderes judiciales del Senado. "Generally" — dice la
Corte — "the Senate is alegislative body, exercising in connection
with the House only the power to make laws. But it has had conferred
upon it by the Constitution certain powers which are not legislative
but judicial in character. Among these is the power to judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its members. That power
carries with it authority to take such steps as may beappropriate and
necessary to secure information upon which to decide concerning
elections" (Barry, supra, 871). Y al final de la sentencia la Corte sienta
la siguiente afirmacion que es muysignificativa para el presente caso:
"Here the question under consideration concerns the exercise by the
Senate of an indubitable power; and if judicial interference can be
successfullyinvoked it can only be upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial
of the due process of law. That condition we are unable to find in the
present case" (Barry, supra, 874). De suerte que, bien mirado, el
asunto de Barry hasta es un argumento en favor de la jurisdiccion de
esta Corte Suprema para conocer y enjuiciar la Resolucion
Pendatun,para determinar si con ella se ha infringido o no la
Constitucion.
Se arguye que los recurridos no hicieron mas que actuar sobre un
informe rendido por la Comisioon sobre Elecciones en obediencia a
un mandato constitucional. En el informe se recitaban ciertos hechos
y se sentaban conclusiones sobre alegados actos de terrorismo y
violencia que posian afectar a la eleccion de los recurrentes. Se dice
que la Resolucion Pendatun no es sino la reaccion, la respuesta de los
recurridos adicho informe; que estos tenian absoluta discrecion
sobre el particular; que ello entraba dentro de sus poderes politicos
y no era revisable por el departamento judicial. Para contestar esto
nos bastara repetir que la Resolucion Pendatun es algo mas que el
ejercicio de un poder politico y discrecional: es una usurpacion de
poderes constitucionales pertenecientes a otro organismo
constitucional; y para demostrarlo no necesitamos reproducir los
argumentos ya extensamente expuestos.
Por lo demas, el discutido informe de la Comission sobre Elecciones
no tiene el valor ni alcane que le atribuye. Ese informe no podia
autorizar ni justifica ninguna accion que como la Resolucion Pendatun
tuviese el efecto de privar a los recurrentes de sus asientos en el
Senado, siguera temporalmente. El documento sometido por la
Comision sobre Elecciones que tiene verdadero valor constitucional y
legal, que tiene fuerza obligatoria, es su proclama declaranda electos
a los recurrentes. Esa proclama impone a los recurridos el
deber ministerial de recibir y aceptar a los recurrentes como
miembros del Senado hasta que el Tribunal Electoral diga otra cosa.
¿Como un informe, que ni siquiera es al resultado de una
investigacion propia, sino que esta basado en otros informes de
fuerea, podia tener la trascendencia que se le ha dado, tomando pie
del mismo para una sacudida seismica de tales proporciones como es
la suspension de los derechos de tres miembros electos del Senado y
siete miembros electos de la Camara de Representantes? Ni la
imaginacion mas libre y erratica en la Asamblea Nacional pudo
haberse figurado jamas este efecto a cuenta de esa clausula
inofensiva de la Constitucion que manda a la Comision sobre
Elecciones presentar un informe despues de cada eleccion al Jefe
Ejecutivo y al Congreso.
La accion sobre ese informe no puede ir mas alla de los limites que
confinan cada poder. El Ejecutivo, por ejemplo, investigaria los
abusos e irregularidades los funcionarios encargados de ejecutar y
hacer cumplir la Ley Electoral en cumplimiento de su mandato
constitucional de ejecutar las leyes y de hacer que estas se ejecuten
fielmente (Constitucion de Filipinas, Articulo VII, secciones 7 y 10); y
el Congreso estudiaria y consideraria reformas a la ley con vista de
dicho informe, o bien crearia inmediatamente el Tribunal Electoral
para despachar sin demora las protestas sobre elecciones legislativas.
El Ejecutivo no podria, por ejemplo, so pretexto de tremendas
irregularidades y anomalias expuestas en el informe sobre elecciones
locales y provinciales, mandar suspender el juramento de algun
concejal, alcalde o gobernador provincial electo, puesto que esto
seria una usurpacion y una invasion de la jurisdiccion de los tribunales
de justicia.
De todo lo antedicho resulta evidente que, resolviendo la promera
cuestion propuesta, la Resolucion Pendatun objeto de controversia
es ilegal, es anticonstitucional y es, por tanto, insostenible.
Segunda cuestion. — A la luz de nuestra Constitucion y de nuestras
leyes ? tiene este Tribunal Supremo jurisdiccion y competencia para
conocer, enjuiciar y decidir el asunto?
Los recurrentes invocan nuestra jurisdiccion pidiendo un remedio a
que, segun ellos, tienen derecho bajo la Constitucion y la ley. Alegan
que son Senadores electos y, por tanto, funcionarios constitucionales
de Filipinas, pues el Senado es cuerpo constitucional; que han sido
debidamente proclamados por la Comission sobre Elecciones bajo las
dispposiciones de la Ley No. 725 y, por tanto, tienen derecho por
ministerio de la Constitucion y de la ley a ocupar sus asientos en el
Senado con todos los derechos, prerrogativas y privilegios anejos al
cargo; que, sin embargo, los recurridos, o mas bien una mayoria de
ellos, han aprobado una resolucion — la Resolucion Pendatun — por
la cual se les priva de sud asientos; que dicha resolucion infringe la
Constitucion y la ley; por tanto, piden dictemos sentencia
"declarrando entramente nula y de ningun valor la citada resolucion,
y prohibiendo consecuentemente a los recurridos y a cada uno de
ellos a impedir a los recurrentes a continuar en sus asientos en el
Senado de Filipinas y a ejercer libremente sus cargos como
Senadores, y prohibiendoles igualmente a realizer cualquier otro
procedimiento ulterior para ejeccutar la resolucion citada."
¿Podemos negarnos a asumir la jurisdiccion que se invoca? ¿Hay
alguna manera de evadir la cuestion, inhibiendose este Tribunal de
declarar si es o no verdad que se han infringido la Constitucion y la
ley, y de conceder el remedio pedido si ha habido tal infraccion? La
comodidad, la linea de menor resistencia hubiera sido por el lado de
la inaccion, de la inhibicion. Nos damos perfecta cuenta de la
tremenda responsabilidad que supone el mantener la armonia entre
los poderes del Estado. Es parte de la prudencia y sabiduria de los
gobernantes el evitar en todo lo posible cualquier ocasion de
conflicto entre dichos poderes, recordando siempre que si las
instituciones son entidades abstractas, por ende anestesicas,
insensibles, los hombres estan hechos de arcilla animada y ya no son
tan impasibles como las instituciones. Pero hemos hallado que en el
presente caso nuestro deber de actuar, y de actuar positivamente,
tiene la fuerza de un imperativo categorico. Nuestra jurisdiccion esta
escrita en la Constitutcion, se halla reafirmada en la ley. En el Titulo
VIII de la Constitucion (sobre la judicatura) esta declarada tanto
implicita como expresamente la facultad judicialde resolver y decidir
casos constitucionales; y en la regla 67 del Reglamento de los
Tribunales hallamos la implementacion procesal de esa jurisdiccion y
competencia.
Puede decirse que en este respecto nuestra Constitucion es una
edicion mejorada de la Constitucion federal de los Estados Unidos.
Como se sabe, la llamada facultad judicial de revisar la Constitucion
en controversias propiamente planteadas no se halla concedida
expresamente en la magna carta americana. Ha diso el genio audaz
de sus juristas, particularmente del gran Marshall, el que arrnaco esa
facultad de las penumbras de la Constitucion (Marbury vs. Madison
[1803], 1 Cranch, 137) contribuyendo ello grandemente, segun
opinion general de los criticos tanto nacionales como exranjeros, a
fortalecer y estabilizar las instituciones politicas de America.
Aprovechando la experiencia americana hemos escrito
expresamente en nuestra Constitucion lo que en Americ no era mas
que doctrina judicial o jurisprudencia.
Se dice, sin embargo, con todo enfasis, con todo vigor, que aun
admitiendo que los recurridos, actuando como mayoria del Senado,
hayan infringido la Constitucion al aprobar la Resolucion Pendatun y
hacerla efectiva, con todo la judicatura, la judicatura filipina no tiene
jurisdiccion para intervenir en el caso, bajo el principio de la
separacion de poderes que informa nuestra Constitucion. Se arguye
que los tres poderes del Estado son igueles; que ninguno de ellos es
superior al otro; que cada poder puede interpretar la Constitucion a
su modo y cuando asi lo hace ningun otro poder puede ni debe
entrometerse yu revisar su interpretacion; que el Senado es el unico
juez de sus actos y si algun ciudadano sale agraviado por algun
alegado atropello a sus derechos constitucionales, su recurso no esta
en acudir al poder judicial o al poder ejecutivo, sino en apelar
directamente al pueblo en la epoca de elecciones, en los comicios,
empleando el arma civil por excelencia del ciudadano — la balota; y,
finalmente, que el poder judicial no es un "curalo todo," una especie
de Don Quijote que con la lanza en ristre pretenda endereezar todos
los entuertos.
Como se ve, nos llaman a decidir custiones de tremenda importancia
para el desenvolvimiento constitutcional en este pais; lo que
resolvamos puede trascender mucho mas alla del promedio de
tiempoo en que puede durar nuestra existencia. Puede dicirse sin
inmodestia que grandes diciones del futuro — empleamos la palabra
no en su sentido exclusivamente judicial — dependeran de como
resolvamos esas cuestiones formidables que se nos plantean hoy.
En parte, el argumento expuesto es correcto y acertado. No se puede
discutir que los tres poderes del Estado son iguales e independientes
entre si; que ninguno de ellos es superior al otro, mucho menos el
poder judicial que entre los tres es el menos fuerte y el mas precario
en medios e implementos materiales. Tampoco se pude discutir que
bajo la Constitucion cada poder tiene una zona, una esfera de accion
propia y privativa, y dentro de esa esfera un cumulo de facultades
que le pertenecen exclusivamente; que dentro de esa esfera y en el
suso de esas facultades cada poder tiene absoluta discrecion y ningun
otro poder puede controlar o revisar sus actos so pretexto de que
alguien los cuestiona o tach de arbitrarios, injustos, imprudentes o
insensatos. Pero la insularidad, la separacion llega solo hasta aqui.
Desde Montesquieu que lo proclamo cientificamente hasta nuestros
dias, el principio de la separacion de poderes ha sufrido tremendas
modificaciones y limitaciones. El consenso doctrinal hoy es que la
teoria es solo relativa y que la separacion de poderes queda
condicionada mecanica constitucional — la mecanica de los frenos y
cortapisas. (Willoughby, On the Constitution of the United States,
tomo 3, pags. 1619, 1620, 2.ª edicion.) Como queda dicho, cada
poder es absoluto dentro de la esfera que le asigna la Constitucion;
alli el juego de sus facultades y funciones no se puede coartar. Pero
cuando se sale y extravasa de esa esfera invadiendo otros esferas
constitucionales, ejerciendo facultades que no le pertenecen, la
teoria de la separacion ya no le ampara, la Constitucion que es
superior a el le sale al encuentro, le restringe y le achica dentro de
sus fronteras, impidiendo sus incursiones anticonstitucionales. La
cuestion ahora a determinar es si bajo nuestro sistema de gobierno
hay un mecanismo que permite restablecer el juego normal de la
Constitucion cuando surgen estos desbarajustes, estos conflictos que
podriamos llamar de fronteras constitucionales; tambien es cuestion
a determinar si cuando surgen esos conflictos, un ciudadano sale
perjudicado en sus derechos, el mismo tiene algun remedio expedito
y adecuado bajo la Constitucion y las leyes, y quien puede concederle
ese remedio. Y con esto llegamos a la cuestion basica, cardinal en este
asunto.
Nuestra opinion es que ese mecanismo y ese remedio existen — son
los tribunales de justicia. "They very essence of the American
conception of the separation of powers is its insistence upon the
inherent distinction between lawmaking and law-interpreting, and its
assignment of the latter to the judiciary, a notion which, when
brought to bear upon the Constitution, yields judicial review"
(Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court, p. 146). En Angara contra
Comision Electoral (supra) dijimos que "prescindiendo del tipo ingles
y otros tipos europeos de gobierno constitucional, los redactores de
nuestra Constitucion han adoptado el tipo americano, en donde el
departamento judicial interpreta y da efecto a la Constitucion escrita.
En algunos paises, que han rehusado seguir el ejemplo americano, se
han insertado disposiciones en sus constituciones prohibiendo a los
tribunales que ejerciten su facultad de interpretar la ley fundamental.
Esto se toma como un reconocimiento de lo que, de otro modo, seria
la regla de que a falta de prohibicion expresa los tribunales estan
obligados a asumir lo que logicamente es deber suyo"
(Angara contra Comision Electoral, 63, Jur. Fil., 173, 174).
En el famoso asunto de Marbuyr vs. Madison, supra, el Tribunal
Supremo de los Estados Unidos, por boca de su gran Chief
Justice John Marshall, en tarminos inequivocos definio y explico las
facultades de la judicatura para poner en vigor la Constitucion como
la suprem ley del pais, y declaro que "es terminantemente de la
competencia y deber del departamento judicial el decider cual es la
ley que rige.
The reasoning of Webster and Kent is substantially the same.
Webster says: "The Constitution being the supreme law, it follows of
course, that every act of the legislature constrary to the law must be
void. But who shall decide this question? Shall the legislature itself
decide it? If so, then the Constitution ceases to be legal and becomes
only a moral restraint for the legislature. If they, and they only, are to
judge whether their acts be conformable to the Constitution, then
the Constitution is advisory and accessory only, not legally binding;
because, if the construction of it rest wholly with them, their
discretion, in particular cases, may be in favor of very erroneous
constructions. Hence the courts of law, necessarily, when the case
arises, must decide upon the validityof particular acts." Webster,
Works, Vol. III, 30. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United
States, Vol. 1, 2d edition pp. 4,5.)
En realidad, esta cuestion no es nueva en esta jurisdicion. El
precedente mas inmediato que tenemos en nuestra jurisprudencia es
el asunto de Angara contra Comision Electoral ya tantas veces citado
(1936). Por primera vez se planteaban y discutian ante esta Corte
cuestiones importantisimas resultantes de la Constitucion del
Commonwealth que acababa de promulgarse. Se trataba
precisamente de deslindar las zonas constitucionales ocupadas por la
Asamblea Nacional y la Comision electoral; es decir que,
fundamentalmente, casi, casi las mismas cuestiones que ahora se
plantea ante nosotros. La teoria de la separacion de poderes — el leit
motif de la presente controversia — se analizo y discutio alli hasta en
sus ultimas implicaciones los siguientes; Jose Angara habia sido
proclamado Representante electo por uno de los distritos de
Tayabas. Al inaugurarse la Asamblea Nacional su acta fue confirmada
por este cuerpo juntamente con las de otros Representantes contra
quienes no se habian formulado protestas. el acta de Angara no
estaba protestada entonces. Algunos dias despues Pedro Insua, su
contrincante, presento una protesta ante la Comision electoral que
acababa solamente de constituirse. Escuadado tras el hecho de que
su acta ya habia sido confirmada por la Asamblea Nacional, Angara
vino a esta Corte planteando una accion orginaria para que se
expidiera un mandamiento de inhibicion prohibiendole a la Comision
Electoral que siguera conociendo de la protesta. Esta Corte acepto el
reto asumiendo jurisdiccion sobre el caso, procediendo a
desempenar su alta funcion de interllamo deslinde de facultades
constitucionales. Reconociendo y estableciendo firmemente la
jurisdiccion exclusiva de la novisima Comision Electoral sobre
controversias relativas a la eleccion de miembros de la Asamblea
Nacional, esta Corte denego el recurso de prohibicion. Llevaando las
cosas por la tremenda, la Asamblea Nacional, bajo la teoria de la
separacion de poderes, pudo haber ignorado la decision de esta
Corte, pudo haber pasado por encima de la Comision Electoral
conservandole el asiento a Angara, ya que el acta de este habia sido
confirmada por ella cuando jjaun no habia portesta. No lo hizo. La
Constitucion, casi entre los pañales aun de su cuna, se salvo gracias a
la compostura de todo el mundo, saliendo ilesa de la prueba, rodeada
de grandes prestigios. Las conclusiones y pronunciamientos de la
Corte por boca del ponente el Magistrado Laure, parecen
estereotipados para el case que nos ocupa y para el presente
momento historico con todas sus crisis; asi que los vamos a
reproducir en toda su integridad a continuacion:
La separacion de poderes es un principio fundamental de nuestro
sistema de gobierno. Se establece, no por disposicion expresa, sino
por division real trazada en nuestra Constitucion. Cada departamento
del Gobeierno tiene conocimiento exclusivo de las materias que caen
dentro de su jurisdiccion, y es supremo dentro de su propia esfera.
Pero del hecho de que los tres poderes han de conservarse separados
yu distintos no se sigue que la Constitucion se propuso que fuerean
absolutamente irrestringidos e independientes unos de otros. La
Constitucion ha dispuesto un sistema elaborado de frenos y
cortapisas para asegurar coordinacion en los trabajos de los varios
departamentos del Gobierno. Por ejemplo, el Jefe Ejecutivo, bajo
nuestra Constitucion, es hasta tal punto erigido en un freno para el
poder legislativo que se requiere su asentimiento en la aprobacion de
las leyes. Sin embargo, esto esta sujeto al ulterior freno de que un
proyecto de ley puede convertirse en ley no obstante la negativa del
Presidente de aprobarlo, por medio de una votacion de dos tercios
tiene el Presidente facultad de convocar a la Asamblea cuando lo crea
conveniente. Por otra parte, la Asamblea Nacional funciona como un
freno sobre el Ejecutivo, en el sentido de que es necesario su
consentimiento, por medio de la Comision de Nombramientos, en el
nombramiento de ciertos funcionarlos; y es esencial la conformidad
de todos sus miembros para la conclusien de tratados. Ademas, en su
facultad de determinar que tribunales, que no sea el Tribunal
Supremo, se habran de establecer, para definir su competencia, y de
destinar fondos para su sostenimiento, la Asamblea Nacional rigte al
departamento judicial en cierto grado y medida. La Asamblea
ejercita, tambien, la facultad judicial de conocer de recusaciones. Y la
judicatura, a su vez, con el Tribunal Supremo por arbitro final, frena
con efectividad a los demas departamentos en el ejercicio de su
facultad de determinar la ley, y de aqui que pueda declarar nulos los
actos ejecutivos y legislativos que contravengan la Constitucion.
Pero, en esencia, la Constitucion ha delineado con mano firme y en
terminos energicos la sasignacion de facultade as los departamentos
ejecutivo, legislativo y judicial de Gobierno. La superposicion y el
entralazamiento de funciones y deberees de los varios
departamentos, sin embargo, a veces hace dificil decir precisamente
donde termina uno y empieza otro. En tiempos de intraquilidad social
o excitacion politica, las grandes piedras angulares de la Constitucion
son susceptibles de ser olvidadas o anubladas, si no desatendidas
enteramente. En casos de conflicto, el departamento judicial es el
unico organismo constitucional que puede ser llamado para
deteminar el proprio deslinde de facultades entre los varios
departamentos y entre las unidades integrales o constituyentes de
los mismos.
Como cualquier producto humano, nuestra Constitucion carece,
desde luego, de perfeccion y perfectibilidad; pero, en tanto en cuanto
estaba en manos de nuestro pueblo disponerlo asi, obrando por
medio de sus delegados, ese instrumento, que es expresion de su
soberania, por limitada que se, ha establecido un gobierno
republicano destinado a obrar y funcionar como un conjunto
armonico, bajo un sistema de frenos y cortapisas, y con sujecion a las
limitaciones y restricciones que se disponen en dicho instrumento. La
Constitucion señala, en un lenguaje nada incierto, las restricciones y
limitaciones de los poderes y organismos gubernamentales. Si estas
restrcciones y limitaciones fueran traspuestas, seria inconcebible que
la Constitucion no hubiera dispuesto un mecanismo por el cual
pudiera encauzarse el curso del Gobierno por los canales
constitucionales, pues entoneces la distribucion de poderes seria
merea palabreria, el bill de derechos meras expresiones
sentimentales, y los principios de buen gobierno meros apotegmas
politicos. Ciertamente, las limitaciones y restricciones que
comprende nuestra Constitucion son reales, como debe serlo en
cualquier Constitucion. En loos Estados Unidos en donde no se
encuentra ninguna concesion constitucional expresa en su
Constitucion, la posesion de este poder moderador de los tribunales,
por no diceir ya nada de su origen historico y desenvolvimiento aqui,
ha sido dejado en reposo por la aquiescencia popular por un periodo
de mas de un siglo y medio. En nuestro caso, este poder moderador
esta concedido, si no expresamente, por decuccion tacita del articulo
2, Titulo VIII, de nuestra Constitucion.
La Constitucion es una defnicion de las facultades del Gobierno.
¿Quien es el llamado a determinar la naturaleza, proposito y alcance
de esas facultades? La Constitucion misma ha dispuesto el organismo
de la judicatura como el medio racional. Y, cuando la judicatura media
para determinar los linderos constitucionales, no mantiene ninguna
superioridad sobre los otros departamentos; en realida no anula ni
invalida un acto de la Legislatura, sino que solamente asevera la
solemne y sagrada obligacion a ella asignada por la Constitucion de
determinar pretensiones incompatibles de autoridad dimanada de la
Constitucion, y de establecer para las partes en una contraversia
actual los derechos que ese intrumento asegura y garantiza a las
mismas. Esto, a la verdad, es todo lo que va implicito en la expresion
"supremacia judicial", que propiamente es la facultad de revision
judicial bajo la Constitucion. Aun entonces, este poder de revision
judicial esta limitado a casos y controversias reales, que se ha de
ejercitar despues de que las partes han tenido plena libertad de
hacerse oir, y esta, ademas, limitado a la cuestion constitucional
suscitada, o a la misma lis mota planteada. Cualquier tentativa de
abstraccion , solo conduciria a la dialectica, y obstaculizaria las
cuestiones legales, y a conclusiones esteriles que nada tendrian que
ver con los hechos reales. Circunsrita de este modo a sus funciones,
la judicatura no se ocupa de resolver cuestiones sobre la cordura,
justicia o convenciencia de la legislacion. Aun mas, los tribunales
conceden la presucnion de constitucionalidad a las leyes aprobadas
por la Legisltura, no solamente porque se presume que esta acata la
Constitucion, sino, tambien, porque la judicatura, en el fallo de
actuales casos y controversias, debe reflejar la sabiduria y la justicia
del pueblo, tal y como se han expresado por medio de sus
representantes y por los departamentos ejecutivo y legislativo del
Gobierno.
Pero por mucho que pudieramos postular sobre los frenos internos
de poderes que dispone nuestra Constitucion, debe, con todo,
recordarse que, segun las palabras de James Madison, el sistema
mismo no es el principal paladin de la libertad constitucional . . . el
pueblo, que es el autor de esta bendicion, debe, tambien, ser su
guardian . . . sus ojos deben siempre estar alertos para señalar, su voz
para delatar . . . agresiones a la autoridad de su constitucion. En
ultimo analisis, pues, el trinof de nuestro Gobierno en los años
venideros debera ser puesto a prueba en el crisol de las mentes y en
los corazones de los filipinos, mas bien que en las salas de consultas
y camaras de audiencia de los tribunales." (Angara contra Comision
Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 169-172.)
Algo mas se puede añadir sobre el caso de Angara. Alli la Corte
descarto sin vacilaciones la posibilidad de un vacio, de un estado
juridico de inerme impotencia frente a conflictos constitucionales,
sentando la siguiente conclusion: "En nuestro caso, la indole de la
actual contrversia revela la necesidad de un arbitro constitucional
ultimo que determine la incompatibilidad de facultades entre dos
organismos creados por la Constitucion. Si fueramos a rehusar el
conocer de la contrversia ?quien determinaria el conflicto? Y si se
dejara sin decidir ni determinar el conflicto ¿no se crearia en si un
vacio en nuestro sistema constitucional que la larga daria por
resultado echar a perder toda la labor? El hacer estas preguntas es
contestarlas. Natura vacuum abhorret, por lo que debemos evitar
toda postracion en nuestro sistema constitucional." No solamente
esto — añadimos — sino que a toda costa debemos evitar que fuera
de la legalidad sse forme un "territorio de nadie" donde puedan
germinar situaciones peligrosas y explosivas.
Pero ademas del caos de Angara tenemos en nuestra jurisprudencia
otro precedente mas inmediato todavia en apoyo de la tesis de la
supremacia judicial en tratandose de interpretar la Constitucion y de
dirimir conflictos constitucionales; nos referimos al asunto de
Carmen Planas, recurrente, contra Jose Gil, Comisionado del Servicio
Civil, recurrido, decidido por este Tribunal Supremo el 18 de enero de
1939 bajo la ponencia del mismo Magistrado Laurel (67 Phil., 62).
Carmen Planas, siendo miembro de la Junta Municipal de Manila,
publico un articulo en La Vanguardia criticando duramente a ciertos
funcionarios del Gobierno, entre ellos el Presidente de Filipinas Sr.
Quezon, en relacion con las elecciones de Diputados a la Asamblea
Nacional celebradas el 8 de noviembre de 1938. Entre los fuertes
cargos formulados por la articulista contra los dioses del Olimpo
oficial , figuraban los siguientes: que, no obstante el tacito interdicto
impuesto por la Constitucion al disponer que el Presidente de
Filipinas ejerciese su cargo por un solo periodo — años — sin
reeleccion, situandosele de esta manera en las serenas alturas del
Poder como un supremo arbitro, moderador y neutral, el Sr. Quezon
intervino activamente en aquellas elecciones a favor de los
nacionalistas poniendo en juego toda la enorme influencia de su
cargo y apalstando asi a los condidatos de la oposicion; que toda la
maquinaria del Gobierno se movilizo favor de los candidatos
nacionalistas, colocandose en la vanguardia de dicha movlizaccion los
miembros del Gabinete; y que no se escatimaron medios para
asegurar el trifunfo de los coandidatos de la adminstracion, el fraude
y la corrupcion inclusive. Al dia si guiente de haberse publicado este
articulo sensacional, la Srta. Planasa recibio una carta firmada de la
siguiente manera: "By authority of the President: Jorge B. Vargas,
Secretary to the President," en donde se le decia: "Por la presente se
le instruye que comparezca ante el Comisionado del Servicio Civil,
sola o acompañada por un abogado, a las 9 de la mañana, Noviembre
22, para porbar las declaraciones hechas por usted. El que tales cargo
no se puedan sostener o no se pruebe que se han hecho de buena fe,
sera considerado como razon suficiente para su suspension o
destitucion del cargo."
La Srta. Planas objeto a la investigacion rescusando al Comissionaldo
del Servicio Civil. Este, sin embargo, insistio en proseguir la
investigacion y fue entonces cuando ella vino ante este Tribunal
Supremo pidiendo un mandamiento de prohibicion contra el
Comisionado, por los siguientes fundamentos, entre otros: que bajo
la Constitucion y las leyes que protegen la libertad de palabra y de
expresion, ella tenia derecho o formular la censura de que se trata
como libre ciudadana de un pais democretico; que, en efecto, ella
escribio el articulo no como concejal sino como persona particular;
que como funcionario ella solamente podia ser investigada y
exigirsele responsabilidad por motivo de prevaricacion, mala
conducta o infraccion relacionada con su cargo, y este no era el caso;
que suponiendo que el articulo en cuestion fuera libeloso o
contuviera algo por lo cual la articulista pudiera ser cirminalmente
responsable, el Codigo Penal y el Procedimiento Criminal Señalan el
modo de hacerefectiva esa responsabilidad ante los tribunales de
justicia. El Procurador General, al impugnar el recurso, aleego entre
otros fundamentos que este Tribunal, bajo "el principio de la
separacion de poderes establecido por la Constitucion, no tenia
jurisdiccion para revisar las ordenes del jefe Ejecutivo de que se trata,
las cuales son de caracter puramente administrativo," citandose en
apoyo de la impugnacion las sentencias de este Tribunal en los asunto
de Severino contra El Gobernador General y Junta Provincial de
Negros Occidental, Abueva contra Wood y
Alejandrion contra Quezon, citados en otra parte de esta disiddencia.
Esta Corte desestimo la objecion y resolvio que tenia jurisdiccion y
competencia sobre el caso, diciendo que si bien "los actos del
Ejecutivo ejecutados dentro de los limites de su jurisdiccion son sus
actos oficialies y los tribunales no dirigiran ni controlaran la accion
ejecutiva en tales casos" (la regla es la de no-intervencion), sin
embargo, "de esta premisa legal no se sigue necesariamente que no
podemo inquirir la validez o constitucionalidad de sus actos cuando
estos se cuestionan y atacan en un procedimiento legal apropiado."
"Por lo que respecta a la judicatura" — añadio esta Corte — "si bien
es verdad que ella no agara `ni la estpada ni la bolsa," es por arreglo
constitucional el organo llmado para deslindar las fronteras
constitucionales, y al Tribunal Supremo esta encomendada
expresamente o por necesari aimplicacion la oblligacion de
determinar en procedimientos appropieados la validea o
constitucionalidad de cualquier tratado, ley, ordenanaza, orden
ejecutiva o regulacion."
Es verdad que esta Corte denego el recurso interpuesto por la Srta.
Planas, pero no por el fundamento de la falta de jurisdiccion alegado
poor el Procurador General, sino porque llego a la conclusion de que
la orden de investigacion cuestionada caia dentro de los limites
constitucionales de la jurisdiccion del Presidente, y, por tanto, era
valida, constitucional y legalmente. He aqui los prononciamientos
pertinentes de la Corte, los cuales no tienen desperdicio y reafirman
con todo vigor la doctrina de la supremacia judicial en materia de
deslindes constitucionales, establecida en el asunto de Angara, a
saber:
The Solicitor General, under the last paragraph (par. 10) of his
amended answer, raises the question of jurisdiction of this court over
the acts of the Chief Executive. He contends that "under the
separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no
jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive, evidenced by
Annex A and Annex C of the petition, which are of purely
administrative character." Reliance is had on the prrvious decisions
of this court: Severino vs. Governor-General ([1910], 16 Phil.,
366);Abueva vs. Wood ([1924], 45 Phil., 612); and Alejandrino vs.
Quezon ([1924], 46 Phil., 83). Although this is the last point raised by
the Government in its answer, it should, for reasons that are
apparent, be first to be considered. If this court does not have
jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings, then, the same should be
dismissed as a matter of course; otherwise the merits of the
controversy should be passed upon and determined.
It must be conceded that the acts of the Chief Executive performed
within the limits of his jurisidction are his official acts and courts will
neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is
noninterference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily
follow that we are precluded from making an inquirey into the validity
or constitutionality of his acts when those are properly challenged in
an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of
governmental powers, whether viewed in the light of the political
philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or Montesquieu, or of the postulations
of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government.
There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in
independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice
Holmes in a case of Philippine orgin, we cannot lay down "with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight
compartments" not only because "the great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of blacks and white"
but also because "even the more specific of them are found to
terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other." (Springer vs. Government [1928], 277 U.S. 189; 72 Law ed.,
845, 852.) As far as the judiciary is concerned, while it holds "neither
the sword nor the purse" it is by constitutional placement the organ
called upon to allocate constitutional boundaries, and to the
Supreme Court is entrusted expressly or by necessary implication the
obligation of determinig in appropriate cases the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Article VIII, Constitution of the Philippines.) In
this sense and to this extent, the judiciary restrains the other
departments of the government and this result is one of the
necessary corollaries of the "system of checks and balances" of the
government established.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He
is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. the
Commissioner of Civil Service is the party respondent and the theory
is advanced by the Government that because an investigation
undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the
Philippines, this court has no jurisdiction over the present
proceedings instituted by the petitioner, Carmen Planas. The
argument is ferafetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the
government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be
an important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon
this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of
the Chief Executive from judicial interference is not in the nature of a
sovereign passport for all the subordinate officials and employees of
the Executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation
of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire
into the validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated
or suspended. The facts in Severino vs. Governor-General (supra),
Abueva vs. Wood (supra), and Alejandrino vs. Quezon, (supra), are
different, and the doctrines laid down therein must be confined to
the facts and legal environment involved and whatever general
observations might have been made in elaboratioon of the views
therein expressed but which are not essential to the determination
of the issues presented are mere obiter dicta.
While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ willnot
issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or
quasi-judicial functions (50 C.J., 658), its issuance and enforcement
are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction it may issue to any
inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising
functions judicial or ministerial, whose acts are without or in excess
of jurisidction. (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms
"judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the
statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged
investigation by the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service, which
investigation if unauthorized and is violative of the Constitution as
contended is a fortiori without or in excess or jurisdiction. The
statutory rule in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not
confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the
limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching
upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate
cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of
his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is
necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive
manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs.
Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307; Aglipay vs. Ruiz [1937], 35 Off.
Gaz., 1264.) This court, therefore, has jurisdiction over the instant
proceedings and will accordingly proceed to determine the merits of
the present controversy.
Se arguye, sin embargo, que de permitirse la interventcionjudicial
para deslinde constitucional o para dirimir conflictos
constitucionales, ello tiene que ser en casos o procedimientos
apropiados. Se dice que en el asunto de Angara la intromision judicial
era procedente y justificada porque en el la parte litigante era solo la
Comision (Tribunal) Electoral, como recurrida, y la Asamblea
Nacional, como uno de los tres poderes del Estado, no era ni
recurrente ni recurrida. Por analogia se insinua tambien que en el
asunto de Planas contra Gil Presidente de Filipinas no era parte
directa sino tan solo el Comisionado del Servicio Civil.
El argumento es de esos que, por su sutileza, provocan una batalla de
argucxias hasta sobre el filo de una navaja, como se suele dicir. Es
verdad que en el caso de Angara la Asamblea Nacional no era parte
directa porque de su inclusion no habi necesidad; pero ¿cambia ello
el aspecto de la cuestion? ¿Se puede negar que alli habia conflicto de
jurisdicciones contituciones constitucionales entre la Asamablea y la
Comision electoral y que cuando, a instancia de parte, se invoco y
pidio la intervencioon de esta Corte, la misma intermvino y se declaro
competente para hacer el deslinde constituticonal y finalmente
adjudico la zona disputada a la Comision (Tribunal) Electoral?
Supongase que una mayoria de los miembros de la Asamblea
Nacional, pasando por encima de la sentencia de esta Corte, hubieran
insistido en hacer efectiva la confirmacion del acta de Angara y le
hubieran dado un asiento en los escanos de dicha Asamblea,
despojando a la Comision Electoral de su derecho de conocer y
enjuiciar la protesta de Insua ?hubiera ello modificado la fase
fundamental del caso, haciendo constitucional lo que era
anticonstitucional, y hubiera perdido este Tribunal Supremo la
jurisdiccion para entender del asunto? Indudablemente que no: la
infraccion de la Constitucion seria misma, tal vez mayor y mas grave;
y la jurisdiccion de este Tribunal para interveneir en el conflicto, mas
obligada y mas forzosa, a fin de mantener inviolada la suprema Ley
de la nacion. En otras palabras, la inhibicion judicial no seria una
actitud mas correcta, mas sana y mas prudente tan solo porque la
infraccion de la Constitucion fuera mas audaz y mas agresiva. Aqui no
habria medias tintas: to be or not to be, que dijo Hamlet.
Y lo propio se puede decir del asunto de Planas contra Gil. Es verdad
que el Presidente no estaba nombrado como parte directa en el
litigio. Pero ?que mas da? ?No se trataba de una orden ejecutiva
expedida por directa autorizacion del Presidente? Y asi como se pudo
dictar una sentencia a favor del recurrido por el fundamento de que
con la expedicion de la orden cuestionada el Presidente ne se habia
extralimitado de sus facultades constitucionales y estatutorias, a
sensu contrario tambien se hubiera podido dictar una sentencia
adversa, es decir, si se hubiese tratado de un acto ejecutivo que cae
fuera de las facultades conferidas al Presidente por la Constitucion; y
en este ultimo caso la sentencia no hubiera sido menos derogatoria
tan solo porque hubiese estado dirigida contra el Comisionado del
Servicio Civil que actuaba por mandato directo del Presidente. El que
esta a las maduras, tambien debe estar a las duras. . . .
Se nos dice, sin embargo, que el caso de Angara no es la cita
pertinente aplicable, sino el de Alejandrino contra Quezon (46 Jur.
Fil., 87, 151), decidido en 1924. El Senador Alejandrino agredio a otro
miembro del Senado fuera de la sala de sesiones de resultas de un
debate acalorado. Con motivo del incidente la mayoria aprobo una
resulucion. suspendiendo a Alejandrino por un año y privandole,
ademas, de todas sus prerrogativas, privilegios y emolumentos
durante dicho periodo de tiempo. Alejandrino planteo ante esta
Corte una accion originaria pidiendo la expedicion de una orden
de mandamus o interdicto para que se le repusiera en su cargo on
todos los drechos y privilegios anexos. Se denego el recurso por el
fundamento de que esta Corte carecia de jurisdiccion para conocer
del asunto.
Un somero examen del caso Alejandrino demuestra, sin embargo,
que no tiene ninguna paridad con el que nos ocupa. Es evidente que
el Senado tenia el derecho de castigar a Alejandrino dentro de sus
facultades disciplinarias provistas por la ley organica — la Ley Jones.
Esta era una facultad discrecional y constitucional cuyo ejercicio no
podia ser regido ni revisado por ningun otro poder. Como hemos
dicho mas arriba, cada poder es arbitro unico y exclusivo dentro de
su esfera constitucional. (Planas contra Gil, 67 Phil., 62.) Ninguno
tiene derecho a entrometerse en la forma como se las arregla alli.
Pero nuestro caso es completamente diferente. Aqui los recurridos o
la mayoria de los Senadores han ejercido una facultad que
constitucionalmente no les pertenece. Por tanto, han traspasado los
confined de su predio constitucional, invadiendo otro; por tanto, la
Resolucion Pendatun es completamente ultra vires. Y no es necesario
que repitamos los argumentos ya extensamente desarrollados
acercade este punto.
Todas las autoridades que se citan en la decision de la mayoria en el
asunto de Alejandrino tienen la misma ratio decidendi, el mismo leit
motif. Se trata de casos en que los actos discutidos recaian dentro de
las facultades constitucionales del poder envuelto en el litigio; de ahi
la negativa del departamento judicial a intervenir, a entrometerse.
Y si examinamos los precedentes locales sobre la materia, vemos que
la veta de la jurisprudencia tiene el mismo tipo, la misma naturaleza.
En el asunto de Barcelon contra Baker y Thompson (5 Jur. Fil., 89) se
declaro legal lo hecho por el Gobernador General por la razon de que
caia dentro de sus poderes politicos o ejecutivos bajo la constitucion.
Lo propio se hizo en los siguientes asuntos:
Forbes contra Chuoco Tiaco y Crossfield, 16 Jur. Fil., 535; Asunto
de McCulloch Dick, 38 Jur. Fil., 43, 225, 240;
Severino contra gobernador General y Junta Provincial de Negros
Occidental, 16 Jur. Fil., 369; Abueva contra Wood, 45 Jur. Fil., 643.
Al negarse esta Corte a revisar lo actuado por el Jefe Ejecutivo en los
casos citados, ha tenido indudablemente en cuenta el siguiente
pronunciamiento del Chief Justice Marshall en el citado asunto de
Marburry vs. Madison: "The Constitution itself endows the President
with certain important political powers in the exercise of which he is
to use his own discretion, and is accountable onlyu to his country in
his political character, and to his own conscience." De modo que, en
ultimo resultado, en tales casos se ha reconocido que el ejecutivo ha
ejercido solamente sus poderes constitucionales; nada hay en ellos
que sugiera la idea de la inmunidad e irresponsabilidad por una
infraccion de la Constitucion.
Contra la pretension de que el departamento judicial no puede
revisar los procedimientos de una Camara legislativa en casos de
extralimitacion constitucional y dictar la orden correspondiente,
militan varios precedentes en la jurisprudencia americana. El mas
conocido y celebrado entre ellos es el asunto de Kilbourn vs.
Thompson (103 U.S., 168; 26 Law. ed., 377). En 1876 la Camara de
Representantes de los Estados Unidos aprobo una resolucion
disponiendo que se investigara cierta compania en la que el gobierno
federal, por medio del Secretario de la Marina, habia hecho depositos
improvidentes de dinero publico. Se decia que la compania estaba en
quiebra y el gobierno federal era uno de los mayores acreedores. Se
alegaba, ademas, en la resolucion que los tribunales eran impotentes
para hacer algo en el caso y proteger el interes publico. Se nombraba
en la resolucion un comite de cinco Representates para efectuar la
investigacion.
En el curso de la investigacion se le cito al recurrente Hallet
Kilbourn subpoena duces tecum para que produjera ante el comite
ciertos documentos y contestase ciertas preguntas. Killbourn se nego
a hacer lo uno y lo otro. Kilbourn fue entonces arrestado por orden
del Speaker y como quiera que siguio rehusando contestar las mismas
preguntas formulada ahora por el Speaker y producir los documentos
requeridos por el comite, la Camara aprobo otra resolucion
disponiendo que Kilbourn fuese otra vez arrestado y detenido en la
carcel de Distrito de Columbia hasta que se aviniese a cumplir la
orden contenida en las resoluciones de la Camara de representantes.
Kilbourn no solo inistio en su negativa, sino que formulo una queja
contra el sargento de armas de la Camara y los cinco miembros del
Comite por "trespass for false imprisonment," acusandoles de
haberle arrancado de su casa mediante fuerza y detnido por 45 dias
en la carcel. Elevado el asunto al Tribunal Supremo Federal, este
declaro que la resolucion de investigacion era anticonstitucional; que
la investigacion no tenia por objeto una accion legislativa sino que era
mas bien para una inquisicion de caracter judicial; asi que la Corte
declaro lo siguiente:
In looking to the Preamble and Resolution under which the
committee acted, before which Mr. Kilbourn refused to testify, we
are of opinion that the House of Representatives not only exceeded
the limit of its own authority, but assumed a power which could only
be properly exercised by another branch of the government, because
the power was in its nature clearly judicial.
The Constitution declares that the judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain. If what we have said of
the division of the powers of the government among the three
departments be sound, this is equivalent to a declaration that no
judicial power is vested in the Congress or either branch of it, save in
the cases specifically enumerated to which we have referred . . .
We are of opinion, for these reasons, that the Resolution of the House
of Representatives authorizing the investigation, was in excess of the
power conferred on that body by the Constitution; that the
committee, therefore, had no lawful authority to require Mr. Kilbourn
to testify as a witness beyond what he voluntarily chose to tell; that
the orders and resolutions of the House, and the warrant of the
Speaker, under which Mr. Kilbourn was improsined, are, in like
manner, void for want of jurisdiction in that body, and that his
imprisonment was without any lawful authority. (Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, 103 U.S., 168; 26 Law. ed., 377.)
Finalmente, la Corte dispuso que la causa contra Thompson, el
sargento de armas, se devolviera al tribunal de origen para ulteriores
procedimientos. Se estimo el sobreseimiento con respecto a los
miembros del comite bajo el principio de la libertad parlamentaria de
debate qu les hacia imunes. A proposito de esto ultimo son muy
significativas las siguientes palabras de la Corte:
It is not necessary to decided here that there may not be things done,
in the one House or other, of an extraordinary character, for which
the members who take part in the act may be held legally responsible.
If we could suppose the members of these bodies so far to forget
their high functions and the noble instrument under which they act
as to imitate the Long Pariliament in the execution of the Chief
Magistrate of the Nation, or to follow the example of the French
Assembly in assuming the functions of a court for capital punishment,
we are not prepared to say that such an utter perversion of their
powers to a criminal purpose would be screened from punishment by
the constitutional provision for freedom of debate. (Idem. p. 392.)
Ademas de la precedente cita, varias decisiones de los mas altos
tribunales pueden ictarse en apoyo de la doctrina de que "todos los
funcionarios, departamentos o agencias gubernamentales estan
sujetos a restriccion judicial cuando obran fuereaa de sus facultades,
legales o constitucionales, y por virtud de dicha extralimitacion privan
a un ciudadano de sus derechos" (Osborn vs. United States Bank, 9
Wheaton [U.S.], 739; Board of Liquidation vs. McComb, 92 [U.S.], 531;
United States vs. Lee, 106 U.S., 196; Virginia Cases, 114 U.S., 311;
Regan vs. Farmers & Co., 154 U.S., 362; Smith vs. Ames, 169 U.S. 466;
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123; Philadelphia Co. vs. Stimson, 223 U.S.
605.)
Respecto de la facultad judicial para expedir, en casos apropiados,
ordenes coercitivas dirigidas a funcionarios de la Legislatura, hay en
la jurisprudencia americana una buena copia de autoridades. He aqui
algunas de ellas:
. . . En el asunto Ex parte Pickett (24 Ala., 91) se libro el mandamiento
contra el Presidente de la Camara de representantes para obligarle a
que certificara al Interventor de Cuentas Publicas la cantidad a que
tenia derecho el recurrente como miembro de lal Camara como
compensacion por millaje y dietas. En el asunto de State vs. Elder (31
Neb., 169), se libro el mandamiento para obligar al Presidente de la
Camara de Representantes para que abriera y publicara los
resultados de la eleccion general. En el asunto de State vs. Moffitt (5
Ohio, 350) se declaro que procedia expedir un mandamus contra el
Presidente de la Camara de Representantes para obligarle que
certificara la eleccion y nombramiento de funcionarios. En el asunto
de Wolfe vs. McCaull (76 Va., 87) se expidio el mandmiento para
obligar al Archivero de las Nominas de la Camara de Representantes
a que imprimiera y publicara un proyecto de ley aprobado por la
Legislatura y, a solicitud, que facilitara copia del mismo propiamente
certificada. (Veanse tambien los asuntos de Kilbourn vs. Thompson,
103 U.S., 168; Statee vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41People vs. Marton, 156
N.Y., 136.) (Alejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil, 87, 149.)
De lo expuesto resulta evidente que esta Corte tiene facultad para
dictar la sentencia y expedir el interdicto que se solicita. La orden ira
dirigida no contra el Senado de Filipinas, entidad abastracta que nada
ha hecho contra la Constitucion. La orden resitringente ira dirigida
contra los recurridos en cuanto ellos intentan hacer efectiva una
resolucion que es ilegal, que es anticonstitucional, lo mismo que se
hizo en el asunto de Kilbourn. Se les restringe y cohibe como se les
restringiria y cohibiria si, por ejemplo, en vez de la Resolucion
Pendatun, hubieran aporbado otra resolucion mandando a la carcel
a los recurrentes hasta que el Tribunal Electoral resuelva la cuestion
de sus actas. ¿Habria alguien que sostuviera que si en tal caso vinieran
a esta Corte los afectados para pedir el adecuado remedio contra el
atropello, esta Corte no podria concederlo bajo la teoria de la
sepracion de poderes? Luego la cuestion se reduce a una de grado,
de tamaño de la transgresion constitucional; pero es obvio que
nuestra jurisdiccion y competencia no queda condicionada por el
volumen de la transgresion. ¿Y quien diria en tal caso que el Senado
de Filipinas ha sido el sujeto de la orden de interdicto, con grave
desdoro de sus altos prestigios como uno de los tres poderes del
Estado?
Puesto que la accion en el presente caso va dirigida no contra el
Senado como corporacion o institucion, sino contra una mayoria de
sus miembros como personas, como individuos, si bien en su
concepto de Senadores, dicho se esta que tenemos competencia para
conceder el recurso, no solo por las razones constitucionales ya
expuestas, sino porque esta claramente reconocida y definida dicha
competencia en nuestros estatutos: anteriormente en los articulos
226 y 516 de la Ley No. 190 (Cod. de Proc. Civ.), y ahora en la regla
67, secciones 2 y 4, Reglamento de los Tribunales. Estas disposiciones
legales prescriben que el mandamiento de inhibicion (prohibition)
puede expedirse a "una corporacion, junta, o persona, en ejercicio de
sus funciones judicales o ministeriales, siempre que se demuestre
que carecian de competencia o se han extralimitado de ella en las
actuaciones que hayan practicado" (Planas contra Gil ut supra). Sin
embargo, se arguye que los recurridos como Senadores no ejercen
funciones judiciales ni ministeriales, sino legislativas; luego la regla no
es aplicable a ellos. Pero es evidente que en el presente caso la
funcion de que se trata no es de caracter legislativo sino ministerial;
apenas es necesario decir que la Resolucion Pendatun no es un acto
legislativo. Bajo la Constitucion y los estatutos el derecho de un
miembro electo del Congreso a ser admitido y a ocupar su asiento es
de naturaleza ministerial, imperativa. La Ley No. 725 del
Commonwealth, aprobada por el pasado Congreso para implimentar
la Ley Electoral con vista a Las elecciones nacionales del pasado 23 de
Abril, dice en parte lo siguiente:
ART. 11. La Comision de Elecciones hara el escrutinio de los
resultados para Senadores tan pronto como se hayan recibido las
actas decada provincia y ciaudad, pero no depues del viente de mayo
de milnovecientos cuarenta y seis. Sera proclamados elegidos los
dieciseis candidatos inscritos que obtuvieren el mayor numero de
votos para el cargo de Seandor. En caso de que apareciere de los
resultados del escrutinio de los votos para Senadores que dos os mas
candidatos han obtenido el mismo numero de votos para el
decimosexto puesto, la Comision de Elecciones, despues de hacer
constar este hecho en el acta correspondiente, celebrara otra sesion
publica, previa notificacion con tres dias de antelacion a todos los
candidatos empatados, para que ellos os sus representantes
debidamente autorizados puedan estar presentes si asi lo desearen,
en la cual procedera al sorteo de los candidatos empatados y
proclamara el candidato que saliere favorecido por la suerte. El
condidato asi proclamado tendra derecho a tomar posesion del cargo
del mismo modo que si hubiere sido elegido por pluralidad de votos.
Acto seguido, la Comision de Elecciones levantara acta del
procedimiento seguido en el sorteo, de su resultado y de la
proclamacion subsiquiente. Se enviaran copias cerfificadas de dicha
acta por correo certificado al Secretario del Senado y a cada uno de
os candidatos empatados.
Art. 12. . . . The candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives and those for Senator who have been proclaimed
elected by the respective Board of Canvassers and the Commission
on Elections shall assume office and shall hold regular session for the
year 1946 on May 25, 1946 (las bastardillas son nuestras).
Si bajo estas disposisciones legales los recurrentes tienen el derecho
de asumir el cargo, es obvio que los demas Senadores, entre ellos los
recurridos, tienen el correlativo deber ministerial de no impedirles el
ejercicio de ese derecho, o dicho de otro modo, el correlativo deber
ministerial de admitirles para que tomen posesion de sus cargos a la
sola presentacion de sus credenciales que en este caso viene a ser la
proclama expedidda por la Comision sobre Elecciones declarandolos
electos (Delegado Roxas, debates en la Asamblea Constituyente, ut
supra). Se dice que la frase shall assume office, con ser imperative, no
impone una obligacion especifica de admitir a cualquier miembro
electo, sino que es tan solo un mandamiento, un directive al
legislador electo para que tome posesion de su cargo
inmediatamente, como si un candidato triunfante que, es de
presumir, se presento voluntariamente candidato y a lo mejor gasto
una fortuna para promover su eleccion, necesitara de
ese ukase legislativo para asumir su oficio. Pero concedamos por un
momento, arguendo, que esa disposicion legal no tiene mas que el
significado de una especie de conscripcion civil, todavia cabe
preguntar: ¿como prodri el legislador electoasumir forzosamente
(shall) su cargo, si, por otro lado, un mayoria de sus compañeros en
conclave tuvieran la facultad discrecional — que puede degenerar en
arbitraria — de negarle el asiento, siquiera sea con caracter
temporal? ¿No seria ello claramente un absurdo, un contrasentido?
Luego la conclusion logica y natural es que esa frase imperativa es
de doble via, esto es, tanto para admitir al miembro electo como para
que este asuma el cargo.
Se apunta el temor de que la intervencion judicial en el caso que nos
ocupa puede dar lugar a una grave consecuencia — la de que una
orden adversa sea desobedecida por los recurridos, suscitandose por
tal motivo un conflicto de poderes. Pero, aparte de que el deber —
maxime si esta impuesto por la Constitucion y las leyes — se tiene
que cumplir rigurosamdnete por penoso que fuese sin
consideraciona las consecuencias, parece impropio e injusto
presumir que los recurridos sean capaces, en un momento dado, de
desplazar las cuestiones que entraña la presente controversia del
elevado nivel en que deben discutirse y resolverse, en medio de un
atmosfera de absouta impersonalidad y objetividad, libre de los
miasmas de la pasion y suspicacia Y no se diga, fulanizando
ostensiblemente la cuestion que cuando la judicatura, en el
apropiado ejercicio de su facultad de interpretar la Constitucion y los
estatutos, dicta un fallo adverso a ciertos intereses y a ciertos
hombres pertenecientes a otro poder del Estado, humilla y
empequeñece con ello a ese poder, colocandolo en condicion inferior
y subalterna. en los grandes conflictos y disputas sobre la cosa publica
lo que, en verdad, empequeñece y deslustra no es el contrateimpo y
reves que se sufre — incidente inevitable en toda noble lid por la
razon, la verdad y la justicia — sino la falta de esa serena dignidad, de
ese sentido sobrio de propia inhibicion y propio dominio paa aceptar
y sufrir el reves, de todo eso que es la mejor piedra de toque de la
madurez politica y de las virtudes publicas en un regimen de caracter
popular y democratico. Los hombres van y vienen, pasan con sus
miserias y sus disputas en la interminable caravana del tiempo; las
instituciones quedan, y eso es lo que importa salvar a toda costa por
encima de las pasiones y caprichos transeuntes del momento.
Se esta corte tiene, segun la Constitucion, facultad para conceder el
remedio solictado, es de suponer que los recurridos acataran el fallo
que se dicte, pues son hombres de orden y de ley, y seran los
primeros en dar el ejemplo de cumplir los mandatos de la
Constitucion, interpretados y aplicados por la judicatura; pero si — lo
que para nosotros es imposible que ocurra — escudandose tras sus
privilegios, llegaren al extremo de cometer desacato, que cada cual
asuma su responsabilidad ante su conciencia, ante el pais y ante la
historia. Esta Corte habra cumplido solamente consu deber, sin
miedo y sin favor, y en la forma mejor que le haya sido dable hacerlo
en la medida de sus luces y alcances.
En esta jurisdiccion tenemos un precedente tipico, claro y terminante
de orden coercitiva dirigida por el departamento judicial al
departamento ejecutivo del gobierno. Nos referimos al asunto de
Concepcion contra Paredes (42 Jur. Fil., 630) en el cual se trataba de
una solicitud de mandamiento de inhibicion ordenando al recurrido
Secretario de Justicia de inhibicion ordenando al recurrido Secretario
de Justicia que desistiera de poner en vigor las disposiciones de la Ley
No. 2941 que exigia a los jueces de primera instancia que echasen
suertes cada cinco años para el cambio de distritos. Esta Corte
declaro que la ley popularmente conocida por ley de la "loteria
judicial" era anticonstitucional. Se concedio, por tanto, el
mandamiento de prohibicion, haciendose definitivo el interdicto
preliminar expedido.
Solo nos queda por considerar el argumento deprimente,
desalentador de que el caso que nos ocupa no tiene remedio ni bajo
la Constitucion ni bajo las leyes ordinarias. A los recurrentes se les
dice que no tienen mas que un recurso: esperar las elecciones y
plantear directamente la cuestion ante el pueblo elector. Si los
recurrentes tienen razon, el pueblo les reivindicara eleigiendoles o
elevando a su partido al poder, repudiando, en cambio, a los
recurridos o a su partido. algunas cosas se podrian decir acerca de
este argumento. Se podria decir, por ejemplo, que el remedio no es
expedito ni adecuado porque la mayoria de los recurridos han sido
elegidos para un periodo de seis años, asi que no se les podra exigir
ninguna responsabilidad por tan largo tiempo. Se podria decir
tambien que en una eleccion politica entra muchos factores, y es
posible que la cuestion que se discute hoy, con ser tan fervida y tan
palpitante, quede, cuando llegue el caso, obscurecida por otros
"issues" mas presionantes y decisvos. Tambien se podria decir que,
independientemente de la justicia de su causa, un partido minoritario
siempre lucha con desventaja contra el partido mayoritario.
Pero, a nuestro juicio, la mejor contestacion al argumento es que no
cabe concebir que los redactores de la Constitucion filipina hayan
dejado en medio de nuestro sistema de gobierno un peligroso vacio
en donde quedan paralizados los resortes de la Constitucion y de la
ley, y el ciudadano queda inerme, importente frente a lo que el
considera flagrante transgresion de sus derechos. Los redactores de
la Constitucion conocian muy bien nuestro sistema de gobierno —
sistema presidenecial. Sabian mauy bien que este no tiene la
flexibilidad del tipo ingles — el parlamentario. En Inglaterra y en los
paises que siguen su sistema hay una magnifica valvula de seguridad
politica; cuando surge una grave crisis, de esas que sacuden los
cimientos de la nacion, el parlamento se disuelve y se convocan
elecciones generales para que el pueblo decida los grandes "issues"
del dia. Asi se consuman verdaderas revoluciones, sin sangre, sin
violencia. El sistema presidencial no tiene esa valvula. El periodo que
media de eleccion a eleccion es inflexible. Entre nosotros, por
ejemplo, el periodo es de seis años para el Senado, y de cuatro años
para la Camara de Representantes y los gobiernos provinciales y
municipales. Solamente se celebran elecciones especiales para cubrir
vacantes que ocurran entre unas elecciones generales y otras. Se
comprendera facilmente que bajo un sistema asi es harto peligroso,
es jugar con fuego el posibilitar situaciones donde el individuo y el
pueblo no pueden buscar el amparo de la Constitucion y de las leyes,
bajo procesos ordenandos y expeditos, para proteger sus derechos.
respectos es una superacion del modelo. Uno de sus aspectos mas
originales y progresivos es indudablemente la creacion del Tribunal
Electoral. Esta reforma constituye el valiente reconocimiento de una
dura realidad, al propio tiempo que un energico remedio.
Pero en las constituciones la letra no es el todo, ni siquiera lo
principal. Lo imporatante, lo fundamental es el espiritu, el caracter
del pueblo; son las practicas, las costumbres, los habitos politicos que
vivifican e implementan la letra esrita que es inorganica e inerte.
Exceptuando el parentesis tragico de la guerraa, nuestra Constitucion
lleva unos ocho años de vigencia. En ese breve periodo de tiempo se
ha formado en su derredor una limitada jurisprudencia, encaminada
a robustecerla y expandirla como intrumento de libertad y
democracia. Los casos de Angara y Planas, tan copiosamente
comentados en esta modesta disidencia, son tipicamente
representativos de esa magnifica tendencia. La custion ahoraa es si
esta ha de poder continuar sin estorbos, sin trabas, o ha de sufrir un
serio reves en su marcha ascendente. Nuestro sentir es que se debe
permitir el ordenado desenvolvimiento de la Constitucion en toda su
anchura, bajo los amplisimos auspicios de la libertad, en terminos y
perspectivas que hagan de ella la formidable herramienta de
democracia y justicia que debe ser.
¡ Ojala el resultado del presente asunto no sea parte para estorbar
ese desenvolvimiento!

En resumen, direcmos lo siguiente:

Tenemos una Constitucion escrita que representa el genio politico y

socio de nuestro pueblo, que encarna nuestra historia, nuestras
tradiciones, nuestra civilizacion y cultura influida por las mas grandes
civilizaciones y culturas conocidas en el mundo. Esa Constitucion se
escribio no solo para el Commonwealth, sino para la Republica: esta
hecha para perdurar y sobrevivir a todas las crisis y vicisitudes.
Sobrevivio casi milagrosamente a la peor de estas — la ocupacion
japonesa. Es un formidable instrumento de libertad y democracia. Su
modelo mas cercano es la Constitucion americana, pero en ciertos
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, respondents.
Teodoro Padilla, for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor
General Jose G. Bautista and Troadio T. Quianzon, Jr., for
respondents.
FELIX, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao seeking the reversal of a resolution by the
Land Registration Commissioner in L.R.C. Consulta No. 14. The facts
of the case are as follows:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of
the City of Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located
in the same city covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., s
corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with Philippine
Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual
incumbent. When the deed of sale was presented to Register of
Deeds of Davao for registration, the latter.
having in mind a previous resolution of the Fourth Branch of the Court
of First Instance of Manila wherein the Carmelite Nuns of Davao were
made to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60 per cent of the
members of their corporation were Filipino citizens when they sought
to register in favor of their congregation of deed of donation of a
parcel of land—
required said corporation sole to submit a similar affidavit declaring
that 60 per cent of the members thereof were Filipino citizens.
The vendee in the letter dated June 28, 1954, expressed willingness
to submit an affidavit, both not in the same tenor as that made the
Progress of the Carmelite Nuns because the two cases were not
similar, for whereas the congregation of the Carmelite Nuns had five
incorporators, the corporation sole has only one; that according to
their articles of incorporation, the organization of the Carmelite Nuns
became the owner of properties donated to it, whereas the case at
bar, the totality of the Catholic population of Davao would become
the owner of the property bought to be registered.
As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the
registerability if the document, the matter was referred to the Land
Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution in accordance
with section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151. Proper hearing on the matter
was conducted by the Commissioner and after the petitioner
corporation had filed its memorandum, a resolution was rendered on
September 21, 1954, holding that in view of the provisions of Section
1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was
not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence
of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital, property, or assets
of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was
actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being no
question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a
Canadian citizen. It was also the opinion of the Land Registration
Commissioner that section 159 of the corporation Law relied upon by
the vendee was rendered operative by the aforementioned
provisions of the Constitution with respect to real estate, unless the
precise condition set therein — that at least 60 per cent of its capital
is owned by Filipino citizens — be present, and, therefore, ordered
the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed of
sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such condition.
After the motion to reconsider said resolution was denied, an action
for mandamus was instituted with this Court by said corporation sole,
alleging that under the Corporation Law as well as the settled
jurisprudence on the matter, the deed of sale executed by Mateo L.
Rodis in favor of petitioner is actually a deed of sale in favor of the
Catholic Church which is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands
for the establishment and maintenance of places of worship, and
prayed that judgment be rendered reserving and setting aside the
resolution of the Land Registration Commissioner in question. In its
resolution of November 15, 1954, this Court gave due course to this
petition providing that the procedure prescribed for appeals from the
Public Service Commission of the Securities and Exchange
Commissions (Rule 43), be followed.
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution reads as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.
Section 1 of the same Article also provides the following:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to cititzens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, SUBJECT TO
ANY EXISTING RIGHT, grant, lease, or concession AT THE TIME OF THE
INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER
CONSTITUTION. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession,
or leases for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of
the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, in which cases other
than the development and limit of the grant.
In virtue of the foregoing mandates of the Constitution, who are
considered "qualified" to acquire and hold agricultural lands in the
Philippines? What is the effect of these constitutional prohibition of
the right of a religious corporation recognized by our Corporation Law
and registered as a corporation sole, to possess, acquire and register
real estates in its name when the Head, Manager, Administrator or
actual incumbent is an alien?
Petitioner consistently maintained that a corporation sole,
irrespective of the citizenship of its incumbent, is not prohibited or
disqualified to acquire and hold real properties. The Corporation Law
and the Canon Law are explicit in their provisions that a corporation
sole or "ordinary" is not the owner of the of the properties that he
may acquire but merely the administrator thereof. The Canon Law
also specified that church temporalities are owned by the Catholic
Church as a "moral person" or by the diocess as minor "moral
persons" with the ordinary or bishop as administrator.
And elaborating on the composition of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, petitioner explained that as a religious society or
organization, it is made up of 2 elements or divisions — the clergy or
religious members and the faithful or lay members. The 1948 figures
of the Bureau of Census showed that there were 277,551 Catholics in
Davao and aliens residing therein numbered 3,465. Ever granting that
all these foreigners are Catholics, petitioner contends that Filipino
citizens form more than 80 per cent of the entire Catholics population
of that area. As to its clergy and religious composition, counsel for
petitioner presented the Catholic Directory of the Philippines for
1954 (Annex A) which revealed that as of that year, Filipino clergy and
women novices comprise already 60.5 per cent of the group. It was,
therefore, allowed that the constitutional requirement was fully met
and satisfied.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that although it might be
true that petitioner is not the owner of the land purchased, yet he
has control over the same, with full power to administer, take
possession of, alienate, transfer, encumber, sell or dispose of any or
all lands and their improvements registered in the name of the
corporation sole and can collect, receive, demand or sue for all
money or values of any kind that may be kind that may become due
or owing to said corporation, and vested with authority to enter into
agreements with any persons, concerns or entities in connection with
said real properties, or in other words, actually exercising all rights of
ownership over the properties. It was their stand that the theory that
properties registered in the name of the corporation sole are held in
true for the benefit of the Catholic population of a place, as of Davao
in the case at bar should be sustained because a conglomeration of
persons cannot just be pointed out as the cestui que trust or recipient
of the benefits from the property allegedly administered in their
behalf. Neither can it be said that the mass of people referred to as
such beneficiary exercise ant right of ownership over the same. This
set-up, respondents argued, falls short of a trust. The respondents
instead tried to prove that in reality, the beneficiary of ecclesiastical
properties are not members or faithful of the church but someone
else, by quoting a portion a portion of the ought of fidelity subscribed
by a bishop upon his elevation to the episcopacy wherein he promises
to render to the Pontificial Father or his successors an account of
his pastoral office and of all things appertaining to the state of this
church.
Respondents likewise advanced the opinion that in construing the
constitutional provision calling for 60 per cent of Filipino citizenship,
the criterion of the properties or assets thereof.
In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can
say the following: A corporation sole is a special form of corporation
usually associated with the clergy. Conceived and introduced into the
common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which was
referred to as "that unhappy freak of English law" was designed to
facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership carried on by the
clerics for and on behalf of the church which was regarded as the
property owner (See I Couvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683).
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors
(who will always be one at a time), in some particular station, who
are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities
and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural
persons they could not have had. In this sense, the king is a sole
corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their several
chapters (Reid vs. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846).
The provisions of our Corporation law on religious corporations are
illuminating and sustain the stand of petitioner. Section 154 thereof
provides:
SEC. 154. — For the administration of the temporalities of any
religious denomination, society or church and the management of
the estates and the properties thereof, it shall be lawful for the
bishop, chief priest, or presiding either of any such religious
denomination, society or church to become a corporation sole, unless
inconsistent wit the rules, regulations or discipline of his religious
denomination, society or church or forbidden by competent
authority thereof.
See also the pertinent provisions of the succeeding sections of the
same Corporation Law copied hereunder:
SEC. 155. In order to become a corporation sole the bishop, chief
priest, or presiding elder of any religious denomination, society or
church must file with the Securities and Exchange Commissioner
articles of incorporation setting forth the following facts:
xxx xxx xxx.
(3) That as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder he is charged
with the administration of the temporalities and the management of
the estates and properties of his religious denomination, society, or
church within its territorial jurisdiction, describing it;
xxx xxx xxx.
(As amended by Commonwealth Act No. 287).
SEC. 157. From and after the filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commissioner of the said articles of incorporation, which verified by
affidavit or affirmation as aforesaid and accompanied by the copy of
the commission, certificate of election, or letters of appointment of
the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, duly certified as prescribed
in the section immediately preceding such the bishop, chief priest, or
presiding elder, as the case may be, shall become a corporation sole
and all temporalities, estates, and properties the religious
denomination, society, or church therefore administered or managed
by him as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, shall be held in
trust by him as a corporation sole, for the use, purpose, behalf, and
sole benefit of his religious denomination, society, or church, including
hospitals, schools, colleges, orphan, asylums, parsonages, and
cemeteries thereof. For the filing of such articles of incorporation, the
Securities and Exchange Commissioner shall collect twenty-five
pesos. (As amended by Commonwealth Act. No. 287); and.
SEC. 163. The right to administer all temporalities and all property
held or owned by a religious order or society, or by the diocese,
synod, or district organization of any religious denomination or
church shall, on its incorporation, pass to the corporation and shall
be held in trust for the use, purpose behalf, and benefit of the
religious society, or order so incorporated or of the church of which
the diocese, or district organization is an organized and constituent
part.
The Cannon Law contains similar provisions regarding the duties of
the corporation sole or ordinary as administrator of the church
properties, as follows:
Al Ordinario local pertenence vigilar diligentemente sobre
la administracion de todos los bienes eclesiasticos que se hallan en su
territorio y no estuvieren sustraidos de su jurisdiccion, salvs las
prescriciones legitimas que le concedan mas aamplios derechos.
Teniendo en cuenta los derechos y las legitimas costumbres y
circunstancias, procuraran los Ordinarios regular todo lo
concerniente a la administracion de los bienes eclesciasticos, dando
las oportunas instucciones particularles dentro del narco del derecho
comun. (Title XXVIII, Codigo de Derecho Canonico, Lib. III, Canon
1519).1
That leaves no room for doubt that the bishops or archbishops, as the
case may be, as corporation's sole are merely administrators of the
church properties that come to their possession, in which they hold
in trust for the church. It can also be said that while it is true that
church properties could be administered by a natural persons,
problems regarding succession to said properties can not be avoided
to rise upon his death. Through this legal fiction, however, church
properties acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by
operation of law, upon his death not his personal heirs but to his
successor in office. It could be seen, therefore, that a corporation sole
is created not only to administer the temporalities of the church or
religious society where he belongs but also to hold and transmit the
same to his successor in said office. If the ownership or title to the
properties do not pass to the administrators, who are the owners of
church properties?.
Bouscaren and Elis, S.J., authorities on cannon law, on their treatise
comment:
In matters regarding property belonging to the Universal Church and
to the Apostolic See, the Supreme Pontiff exercises his office of
supreme administrator through the Roman Curia; in matters
regarding other church property, through the administrators of the
individual moral persons in the Church according to that norms, laid
down in the Code of Cannon Law. This does not mean, however, that
the Roman Pontiff is the owner of all the church property; but merely
that he is the supreme guardian (Bouscaren and Ellis, Cannon Law, A
Text and Commentary, p. 764).
and this Court, citing Campes y Pulido, Legislacion y Jurisprudencia
Canonica, ruled in the case of Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila, 63 Phil. 881, that:
The second question to be decided is in whom the ownership of the
properties constituting the endowment of the ecclesiastical or
collative chaplaincies is vested.
Canonists entertain different opinions as to the persons in whom the
ownership of the ecclesiastical properties is vested, with respect to
which we shall, for our purpose, confine ourselves to stating with
Donoso that, while many doctors cited by Fagnano believe that it
resides in the Roman Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, it is
more probable that ownership, strictly speaking, does not reside in
the latter, and, consequently, ecclesiastical properties are owned by
the churches, institutions and canonically established private
corporations to which said properties have been donated.
Considering that nowhere can We find any provision conferring
ownership of church properties on the Pope although he appears to
be the supreme administrator or guardian of his flock, nor on the
corporation sole or heads of dioceses as they are admittedly
mere administrators of said properties, ownership of these
temporalities logically fall and develop upon the church, diocese or
congregation acquiring the same. Although this question of
ownership of ecclesiastical properties has off and on been mentioned
in several decisions of the Court yet in no instance was the subject of
citizenship of this religious society been passed upon.
We are not unaware of the opinion expressed by the late Justice
Perfecto in his dissent in the case of Agustines vs. Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, 80 Phil. 565, to the effect that "the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila is only a branch of a universal church
by the Pope, with permanent residence in Rome, Italy". There is no
question that the Roman Catholic Church existing in the Philippines is
a tributary and part of the international religious organization, for the
word "Roman" clearly expresses its unity with and recognizes the
authority of the Pope in Rome. However, lest We become hasty in
drawing conclusions, We have to analyze and take note of the nature
of the government established in the Vatican City, of which it was
said:
GOVERNMENT. In the Roman Catholic Church supreme authority and
jurisdiction over clergy and laity alike as held by the pope who (since
the Middle Ages) is elected by the cardinals assembled in conclave,
and holds office until his death or legitimate abdication. . . While the
pope is obviously independent of the laws made, and the officials
appointed, by himself or his predecessors, he usually exercises his
administrative authority according to the code of canon law and
through the congregations, tribunals and offices of the Curia Romana.
In their respective territories (called generally dioceses) and over
their respective subjects, the patriarchs, metropolitans or
archbishops and bishops exercise a jurisdiction which is called
ordinary (as attached by law to an office given to a person. . . (Collier's
Encyclopedia, Vol. 17, p. 93).
While it is true and We have to concede that in the profession of their
faith, the Roman Pontiff is the supreme head; that in the religious
matters, in the exercise of their belief, the Catholic congregation of
the faithful throughout the world seeks the guidance and direction of
their Spiritual Father in the Vatican, yet it cannot be said that there is
a merger of personalities resultant therein. Neither can it be said that
the political and civil rights of the faithful, inherent or acquired under
the laws of their country, are affected by that relationship with the
Pope. The fact that the Roman Catholic Church in almost every
country springs from that society that saw its beginning in Europe and
the fact that the clergy of this faith derive their authorities and
receive orders from the Holy See do not give or bestow the citizenship
of the Pope upon these branches. Citizenship is a political right which
cannot be acquired by a sort of "radiation". We have to realize that
although there is a fraternity among all the catholic countries and the
dioceses therein all over the globe, the universality that the word
"catholic" implies, merely characterize their faith, a uniformity in the
practice and the interpretation of their dogma and in the exercise of
their belief, but certainly they are separate and independent from
one another in jurisdiction, governed by different laws under which
they are incorporated, and entirely independent on the others in the
management and ownership of their temporalities. To allow theory
that the Roman Catholic Churches all over the world follow the
citizenship of their Supreme Head, the Pontifical Father, would lead
to the absurdity of finding the citizens of a country who embrace the
Catholic faith and become members of that religious society, likewise
citizens of the Vatican or of Italy. And this is more so if We consider
that the Pope himself may be an Italian or national of any other
country of the world. The same thing be said with regard to the
nationality or citizenship of the corporation sole created under the
laws of the Philippines, which is not altered by the change of
citizenship of the incumbent bishops or head of said corporation sole.
We must therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, every Roman Catholic Church in
different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully
incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country where it is
located, is considered an entity or person with all the rights and
privileges granted to such artificial being under the laws of that
country, separate and distinct from the personality of the Roman
Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations
with the latter which are governed by the Canon Law or their rules
and regulations.
We certainly are conscious of the fact that whatever conclusion We
may draw on this matter will have a far reaching influence, nor can
We overlook the pages of history that arouse indignation and
criticisms against church landholdings. This nurtured feeling that
snowbailed into a strong nationalistic sentiment manifested itself
when the provisions on natural to be embodied in the Philippine
Constitution were framed, but all that has been said on this regard
referred more particularly to landholdings of religious corporations
known as "Friar Estates" which have already bee acquired by our
government, and not to properties held by corporations sole which,
We repeat, are properties held in trust for the benefit of the faithful
residing within its territorial jurisdiction. Though that same feeling
probably precipitated and influenced to a large extent the doctrine
laid down in the celebrated Krivenco decision, We have to take this
matter in the light of legal provisions and jurisprudence actually
obtaining, irrespective of sentiments.
The question now left for our determination is whether the Universal
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines, or better still, the
corporation sole named the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator
of Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the
Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the
Constitution.
We see from sections 1 and 5 of said Article quoted before, that only
persons or corporations qualified to acquire hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines may acquire or be assigned and hold private
agricultural lands. Consequently, the decisive factor in the present
controversy hinges on the proposition or whether or not the
petitioner in this case can acquire agricultural lands of the public
domain.
From the data secured from the Securities and Exchange Commission,
We find that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga was
incorporated (as a corporation sole) in September, 1912, principally
to administer its temporalities and manage its properties. Probably
due to the ravages of the last war, its articles of incorporation
were reconstructed in the Securities and Exchange Commission on
April 8, 1948. At first, this corporation sole administered all the
temporalities of the church existing or located in the island of
Mindanao. Later on, however, new dioceses were formed and new
corporations sole were created to correspond with the territorial
jurisdiction of the new dioceses, one of them being petitioner herein,
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which was
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
September 12, 1950, and succeeded in the administrative for all the
"temporalities" of the Roman Catholic Church existing in Davao.
According to our Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1549, approved
April 1, 1906, a corporation sole.
is organized and composed of a single individual, the head of any
religious society or church, for the ADMINISTRATION of the
temporalities of such society or church. By "temporalities" is meant
estate and properties not used exclusively for religious worship. The
successor in office of such religious head or chief priest incorporated
as a corporation sole shall become the corporation sole on ascension
to office, and shall be permitted to transact business as such on filing
with the Securities and Exchange Commission a copy of his
commission, certificate of election or letter of appointment duly
certified by any notary public or clerk of court of record (Guevara's
The Philippine Corporation Law, p. 223).
The Corporation Law also contains the following provisions:
SECTION 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate
and personal; property for its church, charitable, benevolent, or
educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts of such
purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real property held
by it upon obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of First
Instance of the province in which the property is situated; but before
making the order proof must be made to the satisfaction of the Court
that notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell has been
given by publication or otherwise in such manner and for such time
as said Court or the Judge thereof may have directed, and that it is to
the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or sell must be
made by petition, duly verified by the bishop, chief priest, or
presiding elder acting as corporation sole, and may be opposed by
any member of the religious denomination, society or church
represented by the corporation sole: Provided, however, That in
cases where the rules, regulations, and discipline of the religious
denomination, society or church concerned represented by such
corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding, selling
and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules,
regulations, and discipline shall control and the intervention of the
Courts shall not be necessary.
It can, therefore, be noticed that the power of a corporation sole to
purchase real property, like the power exercised in the case at bar, it
is not restricted although the power to sell or mortgage sometimes
is, depending upon the rules, regulations, and discipline of the church
concerned represented by said corporation sole. If corporations sole
can purchase and sell real estate for its church, charitable,
benevolent, or educational purposes, can they register said real
properties? As provided by law, lands held in trust for specific
purposes me be subject of registration (section 69, Act 496), and the
capacity of a corporation sole, like petitioner herein, to register lands
belonging to it is acknowledged, and title thereto may be issued in its
name (Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Insular Government, 26 Phil. 300-
1913). Indeed it is absurd that while the corporations sole that might
be in need of acquiring lands for the erection of temples where the
faithful can pray, or schools and cemeteries which they are expressly
authorized by law to acquire in connection with the propagation of
the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith or in furtherance of their freedom
of religion they could not register said properties in their name. As
professor Javier J. Nepomuceno very well says "Man in his search for
the immortal and imponderable, has, even before the dawn of
recorded history, erected temples to the Unknown God, and there is
no doubt that he will continue to do so for all time to come, as long
as he continues 'imploring the aid of Divine Providence'"
(Nepomuceno's Corporation Sole, VI Ateneo Law Journal, No. 1, p. 41,
September, 1956). Under the circumstances of this case, We might
safely state that even before the establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every
corporation sole then organized and registered had by express
provision of law the necessary power and qualification to purchase in
its name private lands located in the territory in which it exercised its
functions or ministry and for which it was created, independently of
the nationality of its incumbent unique and single member and head,
the bishop of the dioceses. It can be also maintained without fear of
being gainsaid that the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the
Philippines has no nationality and that the framers of the
Constitution, as will be hereunder explained, did not have in mind the
religious corporations sole when they provided that 60 per centum of
the capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens.
There could be no controversy as to the fact that a duly registered
corporation sole is an artificial being having the right of succession
and the power, attributes, and properties expressly authorized by law
or incident to its existence (section 1, Corporation Law). In outlining
the general powers of a corporation. Public Act. No. 1459 provides
among others:
SEC. 13. Every corporation has the power:
(5) To purchase, hold, convey, sell, lease, lot, mortgage, encumber,
and otherwise deal with such real and personal property as the
purpose for which the corporation was formed may permit, and the
transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may reasonably
and necessarily require, unless otherwise prescribed in this Act: . . .
In implementation of the same and specially made applicable to a
form of corporation recognized by the same law, Section 159
aforequoted expressly allowed the corporation sole to purchase and
hold real as well as personal properties necessary for the promotion
of the objects for which said corporation sole is created. Respondent
Land Registration Commissioner, however, maintained that since the
Philippine Constitution is a later enactment than public Act No. 1459,
the provisions of Section 159 in amplification of Section 13 thereof,
as regard real properties, should be considered repealed by the
former.
There is a reason to believe that when the specific provision of the
Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner was under
consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or
overlooked this particular form of corporation. It is undeniable that
the naturalization and conservation of our national resources was
one of the dominating objectives of the Convention and in drafting
the present Article XII of the Constitution, the delegates were goaded
by the desire (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2)
to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping prevent the
extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful
economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a
source of international conflicts with the consequent danger to its
internal security and independence (See The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution by Professor Jose M. Aruego, a Delegate to
the Constitutional Convention, Vol. II. P. 592-604). In the same book
Delegate Aruego, explaining the reason behind the first
consideration, wrote:
At the time of the framing of Philippine Constitution, Filipino capital
had been to be rather shy. Filipinos hesitated s a general rule to invest
a considerable sum of their capital for the development, exploitation
and utilization of the natural resources of the country. They had not
as yet been so used to corporate as the peoples of the west. This
general apathy, the delegates knew, would mean the retardation of
the development of the natural resources, unless foreign capital
would be encouraged to come and help in that development. They
knew that the naturalization of the natural resources would certainly
not encourage the INVESTMENT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL into them. But
there was a general feeling in the Convention that it was better to
have such a development retarded or even postpone together until
such time when the Filipinos would be ready and willing to undertake
it rather than permit the natural resources to be placed under the
ownership or control of foreigners in order that they might be
immediately be developed, with the Filipinos of the future serving not
as owners but utmost as tenants or workers under foreign masters.
By all means, the delegates believed, the natural resources should be
conserved for Filipino posterity.
It could be distilled from the foregoing that the farmers of the
Constitution intended said provisions as barrier for foreigners or
corporations financed by such foreigners to acquire, exploit and
develop our natural resources, saving these undeveloped wealth for
our people to clear and enrich when they are already prepared and
capable of doing so. But that is not the case of corporations sole in
the Philippines, for, We repeat, they are mere administrators of the
"temporalities" or properties titled in their name and for the benefit
of the members of their respective religion composed of an
overwhelming majority of Filipinos. No mention nor allusion
whatsoever is made in the Constitution as to the prohibition against
or the liability of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines to
acquire and hold agricultural lands. Although there were some
discussions on landholdings, they were mostly confined in the
inclusion of the provision allowing the Government to break big
landed estates to put an end to absentee landlordism.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the above referred
to inhibitory clause of Section 1 of Article XIII of the constitution does
have bearing on the petitioner's case; even so the clause requiring
that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the corporation be owned
by Filipinos is subordinated to the petitioner's aforesaid right already
existing at the time of the inauguration of the Commonwealth and
the Republic of the Philippines. In the language of Mr. Justice Jose P.
Laurel (a delegate to the Constitutional Convention), in his concurring
opinion of the case of Gold Creek mining Corporation, petitioner vs.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and
Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, respondent, 66
Phil. 259:
The saving clause in the section involved of the Constitution was
originally embodied in the report submitted by the Committee on
Naturalization and Preservation of Land and Other Natural Resources
to the Constitutional Convention on September 17, 1954. It was later
inserted in the first draft of the Constitution as section 13 of Article
XIII thereof, and finally incorporated as we find it now. Slight have
been the changes undergone by the proviso from the time when it
comes out of the committee until it was finally adopted. When first
submitted and as inserted to the first draft of the Constitution it
reads: 'subject to any right, grant, lease, or concession existing in
respect thereto on the date of the adoption of the Constitution'. As
finally adopted, the proviso reads: 'subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution'. This recognition is
not mere graciousness but springs form the just character of the
government established. The framers of the Constitution were not
obscured by the rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an
intense spirit of nationalism. They well knew that conservation of our
natural resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of
acquired property rights. Withal, they erected a government neither
episodic nor stationary but well-nigh conservative in the protection
of property rights. This notwithstanding nationalistic and socialistic
traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of the
provisions embodied in the instrument.
The writer of this decision wishes to state at this juncture that during
the deliberation of this case he submitted to the consideration of the
Court the question that may be termed the "vested right saving
clause" contained in Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, but
some of the members of this Court either did not agree with the
theory of the writer, or were not ready to take a definite stand on the
particular point I am now to discuss deferring our ruling on such
debatable question for a better occasion, inasmuch as the
determination thereof is not absolutely necessary for the solution of
the problem involved in this case. In his desire to face the issues
squarely, the writer will endeavor, at least as a disgression, to explain
and develop his theory, not as a lucubration of the Court, but of his
own, for he deems it better and convenient to go over the cycle of
reasons that are linked to one another and that step by step lead Us
to conclude as We do in the dispositive part of this decision.
It will be noticed that Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution
provides, among other things, that "all agricultural lands of the public
domain and their disposition shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations at least 60 per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, SUBJECT TO ANY EXISTING RIGHT AT
THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION."
As recounted by Mr. Justice Laurel in the aforementioned case of
Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs. Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil. 259, "this
recognition (in the clause already quoted), is not mere
graciousness but springs from the just character of the government
established. The farmers of the Constitution were not obscured by the
rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of
nationalism. They well knew that conservation of our natural
resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of ACQUIRED
PROPERTY RIGHTS".
But respondents' counsel may argue that the preexisting right of
acquisition of public or private lands by a corporation which does not
fulfill this 60 per cent requisite, refers to purchases of the
Constitution and not to later transactions. This argument would imply
that even assuming that petitioner had at the time of the enactment
of the Constitution the right to purchase real property or right could
not be exercised after the effectivity of our Constitution, because said
power or right of corporations sole, like the herein petitioner,
conferred in virtue of the aforequoted provisions of the Corporation
Law, could no longer be exercised in view of the requisite therein
prescribed that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the
corporation had to be Filipino. It has been shown before that: (1) the
corporation sole, unlike the ordinary corporations which are formed
by no less than 5 incorporators, is composed of only one persons,
usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject
to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage
whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is only the administrator and
not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised
by said corporation sole; (3) such temporalities are administered for
and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the
corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as such, has no nationality and
the citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the
operation, management or administration of the corporation sole,
nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their
respective dioceses or corporation sole.
In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem
obvious that when the specific provision of the Constitution invoked
by respondent Commissioner (section 1, Art. XIII), was under
consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or
overlooked this particular form of corporation. If this were so, as the
facts and circumstances already indicated tend to prove it to be so,
then the inescapable conclusion would be that this requirement of at
least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never intended to apply to
corporations sole, and the existence or not a vested right becomes
unquestionably immaterial.
But let us assumed that the questioned proviso is material. yet We
might say that a reading of said Section 1 will show that it does not
refer to any actual acquisition of land up to the right, qualification or
power to acquire and hold private real property. The population of
the Philippines, Catholic to a high percentage, is ever increasing. In
the practice of religion of their faithful the corporation sole may be in
need of more temples where to pray, more schools where the
children of the congregation could be taught in the principles of their
religion, more hospitals where their sick could be treated, more
hallow or consecrated grounds or cemeteries where Catholics could
be buried, many more than those actually existing at the time of the
enactment of our Constitution. This being the case, could it be
logically maintained that because the corporation sole which, by
express provision of law, has the power to hold and acquire real
estate and personal property of its churches, charitable benevolent,
or educational purposes (section 159, Corporation Law) it has to stop
its growth and restrain its necessities just because the corporation
sole is a non-stock corporation composed of only one person who in
his unity does not admit of any percentage, especially when that
person is not the owner but merely an administrator of the
temporalities of the corporation sole? The writer leaves the answer
to whoever may read and consider this portion of the decision.
Anyway, as stated before, this question is not a decisive factor in
disposing the case, for even if We were to disregard such saving
clause of the Constitution, which reads: subject to any existing right,
grant, etc., at the same time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution, yet We would have, under the
evidence on record, sufficient grounds to uphold petitioner's
contention on this matter.
In this case of the Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si
Temple, 2 G.R. No. L-6776, promulgated May 21, 1955, wherein this
question was considered from a different angle, this Court through
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said:
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock
does not suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is
admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of
the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that
corporation or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to
exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the
spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital
stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino
citizens.
In that case respondent-appellant Ung Siu Si Temple was not a
corporation sole but a corporation aggregate, i.e., an unregistered
organization operating through 3 trustees, all of Chinese nationality,
and that is why this Court laid down the doctrine just quoted. With
regard to petitioner, which likewise is a non-stock corporation, the
case is different, because it is a registered corporation sole, evidently
of no nationality and registered mainly to administer the
temporalities and manage the properties belonging to the faithful of
said church residing in Davao. But even if we were to go over the
record to inquire into the composing membership to determine
whether the citizenship requirement is satisfied or not, we would find
undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
faith within the territory of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizens.
As indicated before, petitioner has presented evidence to establish
that the clergy and lay members of this religion fully covers the
percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution. These
facts are not controverted by respondents and our conclusion in this
point is sensibly obvious.
Dissenting Opinion—Discussed. — After having developed our theory
in the case and arrived at the findings and conclusions already
expressed in this decision. We now deem it proper to analyze and
delve into the basic foundation on which the dissenting opinion
stands up. Being aware of the transcendental and far-reaching effects
that Our ruling on the matter might have, this case was thoroughly
considered from all points of view, the Court sparing no effort to solve
the delicate problems involved herein.
At the deliberations had to attain this end, two ways were open to a
prompt dispatch of the case: (1) the reversal of the doctrine We laid
down in the celebrated Krivenko case by excluding urban lots and
properties from the group of the term "private agricultural lands" use
in this section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution; and (2) by driving Our
reasons to a point that might indirectly cause the appointment of
Filipino bishops or Ordinary to head the corporations sole created to
administer the temporalities of the Roman Catholic Church in the
Philippines. With regard to the first way, a great majority of the
members of this Court were not yet prepared nor agreeable to follow
that course, for reasons that are obvious. As to the second way, it
seems to be misleading because the nationality of the head of a
diocese constituted as a corporation sole has no material bearing on
the functions of the latter, which are limited to the administration of
the temporalities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the
Philippines.
Upon going over the grounds on which the dissenting opinion is
based, it may be noticed that its author lingered on the outskirts of
the issues, thus throwing the main points in controversy out of focus.
Of course We fully agree, as stated by Professor Aruego, that the
framers of our Constitution had at heart to insure the conservation of
the natural resources of Our motherland of Filipino posterity; to serve
them as an instrument of national defense, helping prevent the
extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful
economic penetration; and to prevent making the Philippines a
source of international conflicts with the consequent danger to its
internal security and independence. But all these precautions
adopted by the Delegates to Our Constitutional Assembly could have
not been intended for or directed against cases like the one at bar.
The emphasis and wonderings on the statement that once the
capacity of a corporation sole to acquire private agricultural lands is
admitted there will be no limit to the areas that it may hold and that
this will pave the way for the "revival or revitalization of religious
landholdings that proved so troublesome in our past", cannot even
furnish the "penumbra" of a threat to the future of the Filipino
people. In the first place, the right of Filipino citizens, including those
of foreign extraction, and Philippine corporations, to acquire private
lands is not subject to any restriction or limit as to quantity or area,
and We certainly do not see any wrong in that. The right of Filipino
citizens and corporations to acquire public agricultural lands is
already limited by law. In the second place, corporations sole cannot
be considered as aliens because they have no nationality at all.
Corporations sole are, under the law, mere administrators of the
temporalities of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. In the
third place, every corporation, be it aggregate or sole, is only entitled
to purchase, convey, sell, lease, let, mortgage, encumber and
otherwise deal with real properties when it is pursuant to or in
consonance with the purposes for which the corporation was formed,
and when the transactions of the lawful business of the corporation
reasonably and necessarily require such dealing — section 13-(5) of
the Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1459 — and considering these
provisions in conjunction with Section 159 of the same law which
provides that a corporation sole may only "purchase and hold real
estate and personal properties for its church, charitable, benevolent
or educational purposes", the above mentioned fear of revitalization
of religious landholdings in the Philippines is absolutely dispelled. The
fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole
to receive bequests or gifts of real properties (which were the main
source that the friars had to acquire their big haciendas during the
Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the requisite that bequests
or gifts of real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or educational
purposes, was, in the opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient
and adequate protection against the revitalization of religious
landholdings.
Finally, and as previously stated, We have reason to believe that
when the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention drafted and
approved Article XIII of the Constitution they do not have in mind the
corporation sole. We come to this finding because the Constitutional
Assembly, composed as it was by a great number of eminent lawyers
and jurists, was like any other legislative body empowered to enact
either the Constitution of the country or any public statute, presumed
to know the conditions existing as to particular subject matter when
it enacted a statute (Board of Commerce of Orange Country vs. Bain,
92 S.E. 176; N. C. 377).
Immemorial customs are presumed to have been always in the mind
of the Legislature in enacting legislation. (In re Kruger's Estate, 121 A.
109; 277 P. 326).
The Legislative is presumed to have a knowledge of the state of the
law on the subjects upon which it legislates. (Clover Valley Land and
Stock Co. vs. Lamb et al., 187, p. 723,726.)
The Court in construing a statute, will assume that the legislature
acted with full knowledge of the prior legislation on the subject and
its construction by the courts. (Johns vs. Town of Sheridan, 89 N. E.
899, 44 Ind. App. 620.).
The Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the subject
with which it was dealing . . . . (Landers vs. Commonwealth, 101 S. E.
778, 781.).
The Legislature is presumed to know principles of statutory
construction. (People vs. Lowell, 230 N. W. 202, 250 Mich. 349,
followed in P. vs. Woodworth, 230 N.W. 211, 250 Mich. 436.).
It is not to be presumed that a provision was inserted in a constitution
or statute without reason, or that a result was intended inconsistent
with the judgment of men of common sense guided by reason"
(Mitchell vs. Lawden, 123 N.E. 566, 288 Ill. 326.) See City of Decatur
vs. German, 142 N. E. 252, 310 Ill. 591, and may other authorities that
can be cited in support hereof.
Consequently, the Constitutional Assembly must have known:
1. That a corporation sole is organized by and composed of a single
individual, the head of any religious society or church operating
within the zone, area or jurisdiction covered by said corporation sole
(Article 155, Public Act No. 1459);
2. That a corporation sole is a non-stock corporation;
3. That the Ordinary ( the corporation sole proper) does not own the
temporalities which he merely administers;
4. That under the law the nationality of said Ordinary or of any
administrator has absolutely no bearing on the nationality of the
person desiring to acquire real property in the Philippines by
purchase or other lawful means other than by hereditary succession,
who according to the Constitution must be a Filipino (sections 1 and
5, Article XIII).
5. That section 159 of the Corporation Law expressly authorized the
corporation sole to purchase and holdreal estate for its church,
charitable, benevolent or educational purposes, and to receive
bequests or gifts for such purposes;
6. That in approving our Magna Carta the Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, almost all of whom were Roman
Catholics, could not have intended to curtail the propagation of the
Roman Catholic faith or the expansion of the activities of their church,
knowing pretty well that with the growth of our population more
places of worship, more schools where our youth could be taught and
trained; more hallow grounds where to bury our dead would be
needed in the course of time.
Long before the enactment of our Constitution the law authorized the
corporations sole even to receive bequests or gifts of real estates and
this Court could not, without any clear and specific provision of the
Constitution, declare that any real property donated, let as say this
year, could no longer be registered in the name of the corporation
sole to which it was conveyed. That would be an absurdity that should
not receive our sanction on the pretext that corporations sole which
have no nationality and are non-stock corporations composed of only
one person in the capacity of administrator, have to establish first
that at least sixty per centum of their capital belong to Filipino
citizens. The new Civil Code even provides:
ART. 10. — In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail.
Moreover, under the laws of the Philippines, the administrator of the
properties of a Filipino can acquire, in the name of the latter, private
lands without any limitation whatsoever, and that is so because the
properties thus acquired are not for and would not belong to the
administrator but to the Filipino whom he represents. But the
dissenting Justice inquires: If the Ordinary is only the administrator,
for whom does he administer? And who can alter or overrule his acts?
We will forthwith proceed to answer these questions. The
corporations sole by reason of their peculiar constitution and form of
operation have no designed owner of its temporalities, although by
the terms of the law it can be safely implied that the Ordinary holds
them in trust for the benefit of the Roman Catholic faithful to their
respective locality or diocese. Borrowing the very words of the law,
We may say that the temporalities of every corporation sole are
held in trust for the use, purpose, behalf and benefit of the religious
society, or order so incorporated or of the church to which the
diocese, synod, or district organization is an organized and
constituent part (section 163 of the Corporation Law).
In connection with the powers of the Ordinary over the temporalities
of the corporation sole, let us see now what is the meaning and scope
of the word "control". According to the Merriam-Webster's New
International Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 580, on of the acceptations of the
word "control" is:
4. To exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate;
regulate; hence, to hold from action; to curb; subject; also, Obs. — to
overpower.
SYN: restrain, rule, govern, guide, direct; check, subdue.
It is true that under section 159 of the Corporation Law, the
intervention of the courts is not necessary, to mortgageor sell real
property held by the corporation sole where the rules, regulations
and discipline of the religious denomination, society or church
concerned presented by such corporation sole regulates the methods
of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate, and that the
Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction of the corporation
sole has no say either in the manner of acquiring or of selling real
property. It may be also admitted that the faithful of the diocese
cannot govern or overrule the acts of the Ordinary, but all this does
not mean that the latter can administer the temporalities of the
corporation sole without check or restraint. We must not forget that
when a corporation sole is incorporated under Philippine laws, the
head and only member thereof subjects himself to the jurisdiction of
the Philippine courts of justice and these tribunals can thus entertain
grievances arising out of or with respect to the temporalities of the
church which came into the possession of the corporation sole as
administrator. It may be alleged that the courts cannot intervene as
to the matters of doctrine or teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.
That is correct, but the courts may step in, at the instance of the
faithful for whom the temporalities are being held in trust, to check
undue exercise by the corporation sole of its power as administrator
to insure that they are used for the purpose or purposes for which
the corporation sole was created.
American authorities have these to say:
It has been held that the courts have jurisdiction over an action
brought by persons claiming to be members of a church, who allege a
wrongful and fraudulent diversion of the church property to uses
foreign to the purposes of the church, since no ecclesiastical question
is involved and equity will protect from wrongful diversion of the
property (Hendryx vs. Peoples United Church, 42 Wash. 336, 4 L.R.A.
— n.s. — 1154).
The courts of the State have no general jurisdiction and control over
the officers of such corporations in respect to the performance of
their official duties; but as in respect to the property which they hold
for the corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the courts
may exercise the same supervision as in other cases of trust (Ramsey
vs. Hicks, 174 Ind. 428, 91 N.E. 344, 92 N.E. 164, 30 L.R.A. — n.s. —
665; Hendryx vs. Peoples United Church, supra.).
Courts of the state do not interfere with the administration of church
rules or discipline unless civil rights become involved and which must
be protected (Morris St., Baptist Church vs. Dart, 67 S.C. 338, 45 S.E.
753, and others). (All cited in Vol. II, Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, p. 960-964.).
If the Constitutional Assembly was aware of all the facts above
enumerated and of the provisions of law relative to existing
conditions as to management and operation of corporations sole in
the Philippines, and if, on the other hand, almost all of the Delegates
thereto embraced the Roman Catholic faith, can it be imagined even
for an instant that when Article XIII of the Constitution was approved
the framers thereof intended to prevent or curtail from then on the
acquisition sole, either by purchase or donation, of real properties
that they might need for the propagation of the faith and for there
religious and Christian activities such as the moral education of the
youth, the care, attention and treatment of the sick and the burial of
the dead of the Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction of
the respective corporations sole? The mere indulgence in said
thought would impress upon Us a feeling of apprehension and
absurdity. And that is precisely the leit motiv that permeates the
whole fabric of the dissenting opinion.
It seems from the foregoing that the main problem We are
confronted with in this appeal, hinges around the necessity of a
proper and adequate interpretation of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII
of the Constitution. Let Us then be guided by the principles of
statutory construction laid down by the authorities on the matter:
The most important single factor in determining the intention of the
people from whom the constitution emanated is the language in
which it is expressed. The words employed are to be taken in their
natural sense, except that legal or technical terms are to be given
their technical meaning. The imperfections of language as a vehicle
for conveying meanings result in ambiguities that must be resolved
by result to extraneous aids for discovering the intent of the framers.
Among the more important of these are a consideration of the history
of the times when the provision was adopted and of the purposes
aimed at in its adoption. The debates of constitutional convention,
contemporaneous construction, and practical construction by the
legislative and executive departments, especially if long continued,
may be resorted to resolve, but not to create, ambiguities. . .
. Consideration of the consequences flowing from alternative
constructions of doubtful provisions constitutes an important
interpretative device. . . . The purposes of many of the broadly
phrased constitutional limitations were the promotion of policies that
do not lend themselves to definite and specific formulation. The
courts have had to define those policies and have often drawn on
natural law and natural rights theories in doing so. The interpretation
of constitutions tends to respond to changing conceptions of political
and social values. The extent to which these extraneous aids affect
the judicial construction of constitutions cannot be formulated in
precise rules, but their influence cannot be ignored in describing the
essentials of the process (Rottschaeffer on Constitutional Law, 1939
ed., p. 18-19).
There are times that when even the literal expression of legislation
may be inconsistent with the general objectives of policy behind it,
and on the basis of equity or spirit of the statute the courts rationalize
a restricted meaning of the latter. A restricted interpretation is
usually applied where the effect of literal interpretation will make for
injustice and absurdity or, in the words of one court, the language
must be so unreasonable 'as to shock general common sense'. (Vol.
3, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., 150.).
A constitution is not intended to be a limitation on the development
of a country nor an obstruction to its progress and foreign relations
(Moscow Fire Ins. Co. of Moscow, Russia vs. Bank of New York and
Trust Co., 294 N. Y. S.648; 56 N.E. 2d. 745, 293 N.Y. 749).
Although the meaning or principles of a constitution remain fixed and
unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be
construed as if intended to stand for a great length of time, and it is
progressive and not static. Accordingly, it should not receive too
narrow or literal an interpretation but rather the meaning given it
should be applied in such manner as to meet new or changed
conditions as they arise (U.S. vs. Lassic, 313 U.S. 299, 85 L. Ed., 1368).
Effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair
interpretation of the language used and that construction which
effectuates, rather than that which destroys a plain intent or purpose
of a constitutional provision, is not only favored but will be adopted
(State ex rel. Randolph Country vs. Walden, 206 S.W. 2d 979).
It is quite generally held that in arriving at the intent and purpose the
construction should be broad or liberal or equitable, as the better
method of ascertaining that intent, rather than technical (Great
Southern Life Ins. Co. vs. City of Austin, 243 S.W. 778).
All these authorities uphold our conviction that the framers of the
Constitution had not in mind the corporations sole, nor intended to
apply them the provisions of section 1 and 5 of said Article XIII when
they passed and approved the same. And if it were so as We think it
is, herein petitioner, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao, Inc., could not be deprived of the right to acquire by purchase
or donation real properties for charitable, benevolent and
educational purposes, nor of the right to register the same in its name
with the Register of Deeds of Davao, an indispensable requisite
prescribed by the Land Registration Act for lands covered by the
Torrens system.
We leave as the last theme for discussion the much debated question
above referred to as "the vested right saving clause" contained in
section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution. The dissenting Justice hurls
upon the personal opinion expressed on the matter by the writer of
the decision the most pointed darts of his severe criticism. We think,
however, that this strong dissent should have been spared, because
as clearly indicated before, some members of this Court either did
not agree with the theory of the writer or were not ready to take a
definite stand on that particular point, so that there being no majority
opinion thereon there was no need of any dissension therefrom. But
as the criticism has been made the writer deems it necessary to say a
few words of explanation.
The writer fully agrees with the dissenting Justice that ordinarily "a
capacity to acquire (property) in futuro, is not in itself a vested or
existing property right that the Constitution protects from
impairment. For a property right to be vested (or acquired) there
must be a transition from the potential or contingent to the actual,
and the proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must
have become 'fixed and established'" (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil.
498). But the case at bar has to be considered as an exception to the
rule because among the rights granted by section 159 of the
Corporation Law was the right to receive bequests or gifts of real
properties for charitable, benevolent and educational purposes. And
this right to receive such bequests or gifts (which implies donations
in futuro), is not a mere potentiality that could be impaired without
any specific provision in the Constitution to that effect, especially
when the impairment would disturbingly affect the propagation of
the religious faith of the immense majority of the Filipino people and
the curtailment of the activities of their Church. That is why the writer
gave us a basis of his contention what Professor Aruego said in his
book "The Framing of the Philippine Constitution" and the
enlightening opinion of Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, another Delegate
to the Constitutional Convention, in his concurring opinion in the case
of Goldcreek Mining Co. vs. Eulogio Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil. 259.
Anyway the majority of the Court did not deem necessary to pass
upon said "vested right saving clause" for the final determination of
this case.

JUDGMENT

Wherefore, the resolution of the respondent Land Registration

Commission of September 21, 1954, holding that in view of the
provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine
Constitution the vendee (petitioner) is not qualified to acquire lands
in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum
of the capital, properties or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao, Inc. is actually owned or controlled by
Filipino citizens, and denying the registration of the deed of sale in
the absence of proof of compliance with such requisite, is hereby
reversed. Consequently, the respondent Register of Deeds of the City
of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale executed by Mateo L.
Rodis in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao, Inc., which is the subject of the present litigation. No
pronouncement is made as to costs. It is so ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957
LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO
CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES,
and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing
officer,respondents.
Tañada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio
T. Quiazon, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the
Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner
Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of
the Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party
for the Senate, at the General elections held in November, 1955, in
which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes,
Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto
and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the
elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their
respective seats in the Senate-was contested by petitioner
Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario
Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who
had, also, run for the Senate, in said election-in Senate Electoral Case
No. 4, now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. .
The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of
Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose
Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of
petitioner Senator Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said
petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal.
Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of
Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents
Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of
the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter
appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical
assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as
supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his
recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and
Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private secretary,
respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said
Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman
Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in
his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at
present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the
Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo
M. Tañada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on
Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado,
and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or
color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of
the Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office
therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of
appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the
Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that, consequently, the
appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as
technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and
Delgado-who caused said appointments to be made-as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that
Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take
cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as
alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner
Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party
and as representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner
Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election
protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not
more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination
of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate and not
more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having the
second largest number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of
by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the
Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to
which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in
Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators
having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged..
hereinabove.".
Petitioners pray that:.
"1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be
determined by this Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary injunction
be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco,
Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to
usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices
respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the
salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action.
"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano
J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public
offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether
excluded therefrom and making the Preliminary injunction
permanent, with costs against the respondents.".
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the
petition, except insofar as it questions the legality, and validity of the
election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of
respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and
Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said
respondents Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of
special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power,
authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate
in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the
petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Tañada has
exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and
refused to nominate two (2) more Senators", because said petitioner
is in estoppel, and because the present action is not the proper
remedy. .
I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon
the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the
Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft
submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective
political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in
the Electoral Commission provided for in the original Constitution of
the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners
herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the
bar of public opinion.".
We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the
foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs.
Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon
by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it
does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to
allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said
House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall
choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.).
Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the
exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the
manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a
very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:.
"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain
powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine
whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In
performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the
powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the
determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the
performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain
upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other
case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution
has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive
official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp.
221, 224, 244, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied,).
The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent
refutes their own pretense. This Court exercised its jurisdiction over
said case and decided the same on the merits thereof, despite the
fact that it involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its
President over the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel
thereof. .
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested
exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power
includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted
by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there
can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like
that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined
in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial
supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct
National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the
former Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and annulled certain acts of
the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation
cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act
of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only
jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which
cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving
the way to its eventual destruction. 4.
Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili
vs. Francisco (88 Phil., 654), likewise, invoked by respondents, in
point. In the Mabanag case, it was held that the courts could not
review the finding of the Senate to the effect that the members
thereof who had been suspended by said House should not be
considered in determining whether the votes cast therein, in favor of
a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution, sufficed to
satisfy the requirements of the latter, such question being a political
one. The weight of this decision, as a precedent, has been weakened,
however, by our resolutions in Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil., 17), in
which this Court proceeded to determine the number essential to
constitute a quorum in the Senate. Besides, the case at bar does not
hinge on the number of votes needed for a particular act of said body.
The issue before us is whether the Senate-after acknowledging that
the Citizens Party is the party, having the second largest number of
votes in the Senate, to which party the Constitution gives the right to
nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could
validly choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators, upon
nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate,
Senator Primicias claiming to act on behalf of the Committee on Rules
for the Senate.
The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution
of the Senate reorganizing its representation in the Commission on
Appointments. This was decided in the negative, upon the authority
of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra) and Vera vs. Avelino (supra), the
main purpose of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the
reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the Commission on
Appointments," one-half (1/2) of the members of which is to be
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation of
the political parties therein. Hence, the issue depended mainly on the
determination of the political alignment of the members of the
Senate at the time of said reorganization and of the necessity or
advisability of effecting said reorganization, which is a political
question. We are not called upon, in the case at bar, to pass upon an
identical or similar question, it being conceded, impliedly, but clearly,
that the Citizens Party is the party with the second largest number of
votes in the Senate. The issue, therefore, is whether a right vested by
the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised, either
by the Nacionalista Party, or by the Committee on Rules for the
Senate, over the objection of said Citizens Party.
xxx xxx xxx
The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the
jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that the proper
remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but an appeal
to public opinion, could possibly be entertained is, therefore,
whether the case at bar raises merely a political question, not one
justiciable in nature.
In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the
remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum, but, to use
petitioner, Tañada's own words, to bring the matter to the bar of
public opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on the Creation of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, February 21, 1956)." This allegation may give the
impression that said petitioner had declared, on the floor of the
Senate, that his only relief against the acts complained of in the
petition is to take up the issue before the people- which is not a fact.
During the discussions in the Senate, in the course of the organization
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956, Senator
Tañada was asked what remedies he would suggest if he nominated
two (2) Nacionialista Senators and the latter declined the,
nomination. Senator Tañada replied:.
"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr.
Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us that if we feel aggrieved
and there is no recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to
public opinion. Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court. Of
course, as Senator Rodriguez, our President here, has said one day;
"If you take this matter to the Supreme Court, you will lose, because
until now the Supreme Court has always ruled against any action that
would constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining
to the Senate. The theory of separation of powers will be upheld by
the Supreme Court." But that learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez,
our President, notwithstanding, I may take the case to the Supreme
Court if my right herein is not respected. I may lose, Mr. President,
but who has not lost in the Supreme Court? I may lose because of the
theory of the separation of powers, but that does not mean, Mr.
President, that what has been done here is pursuant to the provision
of the Constitution." (Congressional Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis
supplied.).
This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias,
and the election, by the Senate, of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as
members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and election took
place the day after the aforementioned statement of Senator Tañada
was made. At any rate, the latter announced that he might "take the
case to the Supreme Court if my right here is not respected.".
As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the
question whether the issue before us is political or not. In this
connection, Willoughby lucidly states:.
"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established
principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts
to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action.
Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the
Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore,
concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and
extent of these discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive
departments are spoken of as the political departments of
government because in very many cases their action is necessarily
dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These
considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit
the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to
exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by, statute,
but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately
or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a
given status exists, and these determinations, together with the
consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the
courts." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3,
p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).
To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum,
from which we quote:.
"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with
such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provisions.
"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor
to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used
to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial
questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also
Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio
St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108; emphasis
supplied.).
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain
amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with
the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be
settled by the Courts. 5 .
In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of
political question was considered carefully. The Court said:.
"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the
questions involved are political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the
court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing
board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the
amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it
has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the
Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled.
xxx xxx x x x.
" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political,
and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the
people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer
of the government, with discretionary power to act. See State vs.
Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32
Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A.
516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R.
A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion
determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed
constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial
control over such matters, not merely because they involve political
question, but because they are matters which the people have by the
Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise
the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he
observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred.
His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because
they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws
have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer
under a constitutional government must act according to law and
subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people,
acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the
Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other,
and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special
duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all
official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in
Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that the
government may be one of laws and not men'-words which Webster
said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional
document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance,
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In
other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it
refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the
present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election
of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a
member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes
the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the
second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and
void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with
"full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in
nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial
department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection
therewith.
".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with
law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department
has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in
conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute
has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional
or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but,
also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by
the parties herein.
II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?.
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three
of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
(Emphasis supplied.).
It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate
of the Philippines consists of twenty three (23) members of the
Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely,
Senator Tañada, who is, also, the president of said party. In the
session of the Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido
moved that Senator Tañada, "the President of the Citizens Party, be
given the privilege to nominate .. three (3) members" of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp.
328-329), referring to those who, according to the provision above-
quoted, should be nominated by "the party having the second largest
number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Tañada objected formally to
this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs, not to the
Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators
are members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having the second
largest number of votes in the Senate, so that, being devoid of
authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal,
the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens Party, which,
already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that
Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator Tañada to nominate
three (3) Senators to said Tribunal, although as representative of the
minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two
or three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Tañada
further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he
would nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in
support of his motion. After some discussion, in which Senators
Primicias, Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the
Senate adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do,
pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338, 339, 343).
Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator
Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition of Senator Tañada, but,
also, maintaining that "Senator Tañada should nominate only one"
member of the Senate, namely, himself, he being the only Senator
who belongs to the minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-
364, 369). Thus, a new issue was raised - whether or not one who
does not belong to said party may be nominated by its spokesman,
Senator Tañada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and
Laurel, as well as the other Senators already mentioned, expressed
their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349, 350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although
the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole morning and
afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the
question before the Senate appeared to be remote. So, at 7:40 p.m.,
the meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator Laurel, with a view
to seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When session
was resumed at 8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion
above referred to. Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the
Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators
Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Tañada stated:.
"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I
nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body, and that is
Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada.".
Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House.
Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:.
"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the
Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am now
making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on
behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two other
members to complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators
Delgado and Cuenco.".
What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from
the Congressional Record for the Senate.
"SENATOR TAÑADA. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.
"SENATOR TAÑADA. I would like to record my opposition to the
nominations of the last two named gentlemen, Senators Delgado and
Cuenco, not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be
appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm
conviction that these additional nominations are not sanctioned by
the Constitution. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party
or the party having the largest number of votes to nominate three.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few
moments ago when I took the floor, I also wish to record my objection
to the last nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to
the Electoral Tribunal.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios
Senadores: Si.) Los que esten conformes con la nominacion hecha por
el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores
Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral, digan, si.
(Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan, no (Silencio.) Queda
aprobada." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 377;
emphasis supplied.).
Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have
been made without power or color of authority, for, after the
nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators
Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other
Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be
nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in
the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which
Senator Tañada belongs and which he represents.
Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the
effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9)
members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that
when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority
party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal-Senator Tañada nominated himself only, on behalf
of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more
Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco
and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and
the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of
the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco
and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment
of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.
At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a motion of Senator
Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon,
the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate
the three Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why
the movant had used the word "privilege". Senator Sabido explained
that the present composition of the Senate had created a condition
or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our
Constitution; that although Senator Tañada formed part of the
Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955, he subsequently parted
ways with" said party; and that Senator Tañada "is the distinguished
president of the Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation
desired by the framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for
the Senate Vol. III, pp. 329-330). Then Senator Lim intervened,
stating:.
"At present Senator Tañada is considered as forming the only
minority or the one that has the second largest number of votes in
the existing Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he should be
given this as a matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't
believe that we should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator
Tañada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right."
(Id., id., p. 32; emphasis supplied.).
Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Tañada, as
Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not a mere privilege to
nominate," adding that:.
".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second
largest number of votes, and it is clear in my mind that there is such
a party, and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from
Quezon belongs. .. We have to bear in mind, .. that when Senator
Tañada was included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was
by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and
the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I maintain that when Senator
Tañada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the
Nacionalista Party, he did not thereby become a Nacionalista because
that was a mere coalition, not a fusion. When the Citizens Party
entered into a mere coalition, that party did not lose its personality
as a party separate and distinct from the, Nacionalista Party. And we
should also remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by
Senator Tañada in the 1953 election was one to the effect that he
belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p. 360; emphasis supplied.).
The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to
Senator Tañada:.
"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first
place, and that, therefore, he belongs to the minority. And whether
we like it or not, that is the reality of the actual situation-that he is
not a Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the representative of
the Citizens Party. I think that on equitable ground and from the point
of view of public opinion, his situation .. approximates or approaches
what is within the spirit of that Constitution. .. and from the point of
view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good thing if we
grant the opportunity to Senator Tañada to help us in the
organization of this Electoral Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis
supplied.).
The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator
Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Tañada the "privilege"
to nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on
behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body"-not only
without any, objection whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of the
Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate-leave no room for
doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party, represented
by Senator Tañada, as the party having the second largest number of
votes in said House.
Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main
argument in support of the mandatory character of the constitutional
provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal is that the word "shall", therein used, is imperative in nature
and that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice
dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts of which are quoted at the
footnote. 6.
Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and
public official, said opinion has little, if any, weight in the solution of
the question before this Court, for the practical construction of a
Constitution is of little, if any, unless it has been uniform .." 6a Again,
"as a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and
ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical
construction has any application". As a consequence, "where the
meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or
practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight,
and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural
meaning." The reason is that "the application of the doctrine of
contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the
interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to
statutory provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed by
the Constitution, itself to the discretion of some other department,
contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding
upon the courts, even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment
of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further
application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations
of public policy, it may he rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-72; emphasis
supplied.) 6b.
The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up
by a, "uniform" application of the view therein adopted, so essential
to give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on
contemporaneous constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to
change the natural meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution, which is clear. What is more, there is not the slightest
doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said provisions do
not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is
demanded by paramount considerations of public policy. .
The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent
herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word
"shall", as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals,
it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the
method prescribed for their election, and that both form part of a
single sentence and must be considered, therefore, as integral
portions of one and the same thought. Indeed, respondents have not
even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be
deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members of each
Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards the
procedure for their selection. More important still, the history of
section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the
Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and back up the theory of
petitioners herein.
Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of providing for
the adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M.
Aruego, a member of said Convention, says:.
"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the
organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the determination of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not
altogether satisfactory. There were many complaints against the lack
of political justice in this determination; for in a great number of
cases, party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. The
undue delay in the dispatch of election contests for legislative seats,
the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them,
and the very apparent injection of partisanship in the determination
of a great number of the cases were decried by a great number of the
people as well as by the organs of public opinion.
"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in
the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic laws was
by no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice
in the decisions that there was, gradually built up a camp of thought
in the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of
election contests, following the practice in some countries, like
England and Canada.
"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the
convention." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego,
Vol. 1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).
This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in
its session of February 22, 1956, Senator Sumulong declared:.
".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests
involving its own members, that is virtually placing the majority party
in a position to dictate the decision in those election cases, because
each House will be composed of a majority and a minority, and when
you make each House the judge of every election protest involving
any member of that House, you place the majority in a position to
dominate and dictate the decision in the case and result was, there
were so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by
the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of the minority
protestants. Statements have been made here that justice was done
even under the old system, like that case involving Senator Mabanag,
when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an
election case, and it was only through the intervention of President
Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority
injustices.
"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system,
but the record will show that those cases were few and they were the
rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests
decided under the old system was that the majority being then in a
position to dictate the, decision in the election protest, was tempted
to commit as it did commit many abuses and injustices."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. 111, p. 361; emphasis
supplied.).
Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the
House of Representatives, said:.
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to
create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members: Three of
them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and
three from the party having the second largest number votes so that
these members may represent the party, and the members of said
party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For
when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there ground to believe that
decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for
the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our
Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.
"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the
election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the
legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time
when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative
department. So the election, returns and qualifications of the
members, of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that
body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election, returns
and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also
expressed as to whether that should continue or not, and the greatest
argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that
was, among other things, the system obtaining in the United States
under the Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was
no reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body
should not be retained. But it was thought that would make the
determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political
as has been observed in the past." (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.).
It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate
contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed.
Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional
provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:.
"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon
the hope and belief that the abolition of Party line because of the
equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority
parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some
members of the Supreme Court who, under the proposed
constitutional provision, would also be members of the same, would
insure greater political justice in the determination of election
contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the
power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself. Delegate
Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral
Commission in the following words:.
"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the
hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the
minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which would
make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from
experience that many times in the many protests tried in the House
or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from
getting in. From the moment that it is required that not only the
majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions,
we have already enough guarantee that there would be no tyranny
on the part of the majority.
`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me
most, and that is the intervention of three justices. So that with this
intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the
justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be any
fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but
questions purely of party in which the members of the majority as
well as those of the minority should wish to take lightly a protest
because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this
case, as a check upon the two parties, the actuations of the three
justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied in the
determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of
justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well, it
is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the Supreme Court.
If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the application of the
laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as
we shall have three justices who will act impartially in these electoral
questions.
`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact
that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party interests.
Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice
to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied rightfully
or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme
Court will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall
have, I repeat, is the intervention of the three justices. And with the
formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as
well as the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they
will receive the justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from
this precept the intervention of the party of the minority and that of
the three justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the
hands of the party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in
practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many
have complained against, the tyranny of the majority in electoral
cases .. I repeat that the best guarantee the fact that these questions
will be judged not only by three members of the majority but also by
three members of the minority, with the additional guarantee of the
impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court." (The
Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263;
emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this
Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), he asserted:.
"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our
fundamental law were in their majority-men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history
and political development of other countries of the world. When,
therefore they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as
a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive function of
passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so
not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view
the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The
creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain
evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the
Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was
approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said
now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the
Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate
justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address,
March 4, 1861.).
"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident
that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial
tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of
contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long felt
need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people acting through their
delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the
Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in
which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented
to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and
further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership
three justices of the Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.
As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention,
Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir
informacion del Subcomite de Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho
gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft., dando tres
miembrosala mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte
Suprerma, no cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a dejar
el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta
cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los
de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema
consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que
el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunbo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese,
podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria
prescindieran del partidisrno?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el
triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169;
emphasis supplied.).
It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers
of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an
Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each
House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality
in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the
lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted
to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the
party having the second largest number of votes, in the National
Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number
of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that
they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the
adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater
impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the
same number of representatives as each one of said political parties,
so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said
Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision
under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido-who had moved to grant
to Senator Tañada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf
of party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-
agrees with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.
"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the
Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as
to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in
the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330;
emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sabido replied:.
"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).
Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.
".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its
composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and
make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to
speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is
the ideal situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p.
349; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .
"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the
three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is hoped
that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect
the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they will act as
judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function. But the
framers of, the Constitution besides being learned were men of
experience. They knew that even Senators like us are not angels, that
we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the
Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from
partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope that
the three from the majority and the three from the minority who will
act as Judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act
as judges but they go there and vote along party liner, still there is
the guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be
that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices
who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the
protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority
from controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to
make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the Congressmen
or Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the
Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan
motives to serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my
understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution
when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.
xxx xxx x x x.
"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in
creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and
independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never
allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by
seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the
hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor
either protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).
So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political
parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several members of the Senate
questioned the right of the party having the second largest number
of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Tañada, as
representative of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate
Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators
Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the
Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral
Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively making the
nominations. 10.
It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine
whether the parties having the largest, and the second largest,
number of votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral
Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the party
nominating them. It is patent, however, that the most vital feature of
the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties
therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the
Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the
words of the members of the present Senate, said feature reflects the
"intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to
which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized
(Congressional Record for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351,
355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).
Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as
to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true
intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.
"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of
a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the
spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not within the
letter, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit
of a statute, is not within the statute; but, where the law is free and
clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the
pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J. S., 613.).
"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory
provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from
those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this
question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the
prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative
intent must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and
the determination does not depend on the form of the statute.
Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its
object, and the consequences which would result from construing it
one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in
connection with other related statutes. Words of permissive
character may be given a mandatory significance in order to effect
the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that
they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of
them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as
mandatory, such construction should be given; .. On the other hand,
the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be
deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried
out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require
a mandatory construction; but the construction of mandatory words
as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would
in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. ..
Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the
thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required, or is
a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be
determined only by judicial construction. Accordingly, when a
particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter,
as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience
rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given
merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of
business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by
words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as directory
were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from
ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in
a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same
result. On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the
thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and
when a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or
proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the legislature
intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the
validity of the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-
requisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must
be performed before certain other powers can be exercise, the
statute must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also,
Words and Phrases, Vol. 26, pp. 463-467; emphasis supplied.).
What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to,
and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the
majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the
structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the
majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the
Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the
resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said
provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is
vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence
of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is
mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void.
11.
It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the
membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to
seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the
present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers
of our Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp.
329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law
prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the
spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be
decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme
Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either
one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the
second largest number of votes in the House concerned.
Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents'
contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12 has
only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada felt he should
nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the
Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis
the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Tañada did not
nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen
the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party.
Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista
Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members
of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained
by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the
same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political
parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive
moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped
out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the
predominance of political considerations in the determination of
election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely
what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. 13.
This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned. As a matter of
fact, when Senator Tañada objected to their nomination, he explicitly
made of record that his opposition was based, not upon their
character, but upon the principle involved. When the election of
members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent
upon the nomination of the political parties above referred to, the
Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of
selection thus established, regardless of the individual qualities of
those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of experience of the
delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great note, as veteran
politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor, they could not,
and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to
giving general patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly,
with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that,
even the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake
off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to
resist the demands of political exigencies, the pressure of which is
bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of
the party from which it comes. As above stated, this was confirmed
by distinguished members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33,
34, supra.).
In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to
the effect that when "there is no minority party represented in the
Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears",
the following observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of
notice:.
" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very
frauds or terrorism committed by a party would establish the legal
basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at
least. Let us suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16
senators with unexpired terms belong to the party A. In the senatorial
elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates of party A
are proclaimed elected through alleged fraud and/or terrorism. (The
ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since
liberation attests to the reality of election frauds and terrorism in our
country.) There being no senator or only one senator belonging to the
minority, who would sit in judgment on the election candidates of the
minority parties? According to the contention of the respondents, it
would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of three Supreme
Court Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of
fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully, we pray this Honorable Court
to reject an interpretation that would make of a democratic
constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless
party could entrench itself in power the legislature and thus destroy
democracy in the Philippines.
xxx xxx x x x.
".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party,
or when the only electoral protests filed are by candidates of the
majority against members-elect of the same majority party, there
might be no objection to the statement. But if electoral protests are
filed by candidates of the minority party, it is at this point that a need
for a check on the majority party is greatest, and contrary to the
observation made in the above-quoted opinion, such a cheek is a
function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the
Supreme Court, for the obvious and simple reason that they could
easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in the
Tribunal.
xxx xxx x x x.
"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered
in 1939, it, did not appear that there were minority party candidates
who were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice
and who could have brought a test case to court." (Emphasis
supplied.).
The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Tañada
are untenable. Although "an individual may waive constitutional
provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the
protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to
secure his personal liberty", the power to waive does not exist when
"public policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371). The procedure
outlined in the Constitution for the organization, of the Electoral
Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of the common
weal, and it has been held that where a statute is founded on public
policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its
provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there can be no waiver without
an intent to such effect, which Senator Tañada did not have. Again,
the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the
exercise thereof by a person or party, other than that to which it is
vested exclusively by the Constitution.
The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel
act or omissions, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said
a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents
permitted to falsify it" (Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and
at bar, petitioner Senator Tañada did not lead the Senate to believe of, the decision in the case at bar.
that Senator Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents
On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not
exclusive right to make the nomination. He, likewise, specifically been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that
contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Again, they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they
the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law, about the are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of
truth of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490, 495). Such is not the nature of the in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the
situation that confronted Senator Tañada and the other members of qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards
the Senate. Lastly, the case of Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and
cited by respondents, is not in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
by virtue of an appointment, the legality of which he later on assailed. ordered.
In the case at bar, the nomination and election of Senator Tañada as Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes,
member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate, distinct and J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.
independent from the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco
and Delgado.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have
not been nominated by the political parties specified in the
Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the
Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to
said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the
other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral
Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may
be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative
therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing
to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said
respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and
void ab initio.
As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however,
that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended
by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman,
presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members
of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2007 January 31, 1949
WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN, petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO DE LEON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs,
JOSE GALLOFIN, in his capacity as Collector of Customs of the Port
of Cebu, and VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as General
Manager of the Philippine Shipping Administration, respondents:
PHILIPPINE SHIPOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, intervenor.
Tañada, Pelaez & Teehankee, Pandatun, Arches & Sayo, and De
Santos, Herrera & Delfino for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Lucas
Lacson for respondents.
Roxas, Picazo & Mejia for intervenor.
Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Miguel Cuenco and Nicolas Belmonte as amici
curiae.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition seeking to permanently prohibit respondent
Customs Officials from cancelling the registration certificates of
petitioner's vessels, and respondent Philippine Shipping
Administration from rescinding the sale of three vessels to petitioner.
The primary basis for respondents' and intervenor's acts is the
allegation that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and therefore not
qualified by law to operate and own vessels of Philippine registry. The
Philippine Shipping Administration also alleges that petitioner
violated the contract of sale of three vessels executed between them,
on the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in said
contract that his father was a naturalized Filipino citizen. The
Philippine Shipowners' Association was later allowed to intervene
and it filed its answer against the petitioner.
The entire case hinges on whether or not petitioner William
Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen, and this Court holds that he is one.
Article IV of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SEC. 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the transmission of citizenship
provided by law. in such a particular case, they would have so clearly stated.
In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and father of the The second argument of respondents is similarly untenable. The mere
herein petitioner William Chiongbian, was elected to and held the deletion of the phrase — "and their descendants," — is not
office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel, Occidental determinative of any conclusion. It could have been done because
Misamis. This fact is sufficiently established by the evidence the learned framers of our Constitution considered it superfluous,
submitted to this Court; by the findings of the National Bureau of knowing full well that the meaning of such a phrase was adequately
Investigation cited in Opinion No. 27, s. 1948, of the Secretary of covered by subsection 3. Deletion in the preliminary drafts of the
Justice; and as admitted by respondents in their pleadings. It is also Convention are, at best, negative guides, which cannot prevail over
shown and admitted that at the time of the adoption of the the positive provisions of the finally adopted Constitution.
Constitution, petitioner William Chiongbian was still a minor. Respondents' allegation that the petitioner violated the contract of
it is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, Victoriano sale with the Philippine Shipping Administration on the ground of
Chiongbian, father of herein petitioner, having been elected to a misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in said contract that his
public office in the Philippines before the adoption of the father was a naturalized Filipino, is without merit. Such was not a
Constitution, became a Filipino citizen by virtue of Article IV, section deliberate misrepresentation but an error. which any person not
1, subsection 2 of the Constitution. William Chiongbian, the herein versed in the law is prone to commit. It is clear that petitioner merely
petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino citizen by meant that his father was a Filipino citizen by operation of law and
reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution, his father not by birth.
having become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption of said In view of all the foregoing, the petition for the issuance of the writ
Constitution. This is also in conformity with the settled rule of our of prohibition is hereby granted and respondent Customs officials are
jurisprudence that a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of hereby enjoined from cancelling the registration certificates of
his father. petitioner's vessels and respondent Philippine Administration is
It is argued by respondent that this privilege of citizenship granted by hereby enjoined from rescinding the sale of the three vessels made
subsection 2 (Article IV, Constitution) is strictly personal and does not to petitioner. No costs. It is ordered.
extend to the children of the grantee. In support of this contention
they offer two principal arguments. Firstly, that this subsection was
adopted by the Constitutional Convention merely to grant Filipino
citizenship to Delegate Caram and thus obviate the possibility of a
non-Filipino signing the Constitution as one of its framers. Secondly,
it is argued that the original draft of said subsection 2 contained the
phrase — "and their descendants," — which was deleted from the
final draft, thus showing that this privilege of citizenship was intended
to be strictly personal to the one who had been elected to public
office and did not extend to his descendants.
With regard to the first argument, it may be said that the members
of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person
without considering that it could also affect others. When they
adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said
provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its
terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions
of that great document. They adopted said provision fully cognizant
of the transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in subsection
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985
SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN AND
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES AUGUSTO AMORES AND BIENVENIDO VERA
CRUZ OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HONORABLE BERNARDO
FERNANDEZ, TANODBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR
GENERAL PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS
FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT.
PROSPERO BONA AND AlC ANICETO ACUPIDO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 71212-13 August 30, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the TANODBAYAN
(OMBUDSMAN), petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR GEN.
PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS
FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT.
PROSPERO BONA AND AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO, respondents.
CUEVAS, JR., J.:
On August 21, 1983, a crime unparalleled in repercussions and
ramifications was committed inside the premises of the Manila
International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. Former Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr., an opposition stalwart who was returning to the country
after a long-sojourn abroad, was gunned down to death. The
assassination rippled shock-waves throughout the entire country
which reverberated beyond the territorial confines of this Republic.
The after-shocks stunned the nation even more as this ramified to all
aspects of Philippine political, economic and social life.
To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and
to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects
of the tragedy, 1 P.D. 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact
Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the
Agrava Board. 2 Pursuant to the powers vested in it by P.D. 1886, the
Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses
appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other
evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an
invitation issued by the Board Among the witnesses who appeared,
testified and produced evidence before the Board were the herein
private respondents General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero
Olivas, 3 Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo
Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto
Acupido. 4
UPON termination of the investigation, two (2) reports were
submitted to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by
its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another
one, jointly authored by the other members of the Board — namely:
Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon.
Ernesto Herrera. 'the reports were thereafter referred and turned
over to the TANODBAYAN for appropriate action. After conducting
the necessary preliminary investigation, the TANODBAYAN 5 filed
with the SANDIGANBAYAN two (2) Informations for MURDER-one for
the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 10010 and another, criminal Case No. 10011, for the killing
of Rolando Galman, who was found dead on the airport tarmac not
far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day.
In both criminal cases, private respondents were charged as
accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, including the herein private ate
Respondents pleaded NOT GUILTY.
In the course of the joint trial of the two (2) aforementioned cases,
the Prosecution represented by the Office of the petition
TANODBAYAN, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence,
the individual testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava
Board. 6 Private respondents, through their respective counsel
objected to the admission of said exhibits. Private respondent Gen.
Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C.
Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in the
above-entitled cases" 7 contending that its admission will be in
derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and
violative of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. He prayed that his
aforesaid testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution.
Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other private respondents
likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective individual
testimonies invoking the same ground. 8 Petitioner TANODBAYAN
opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by
the private respondents in support of their motions to exclude their
respective testimonies, was not available to them because of their
failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad
hoc Fact Finding Board. 9 Respondent SANDIGANBAYAN ordered the
TANODBAYAN and the private respondents to submit their respective
memorandum on the issue after which said motions will be
considered submitted for resolution. 10
On May 30, 1985, petitioner having no further witnesses to present
and having been required to make its offer of evidence in writing,
respondent SANDIGANBAYAN, without the pending motions for
exclusion being resolved, issued a Resolution directing that by
agreement of the parties, the pending motions for exclusion and the
opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support
thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments, raised therein are
to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the prosecution's
formal offer of exhibits and other documentary evidences. 11 On June
3, 1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence"
which includes, among others, the testimonies of private
respondents and other evidences produced by them before the
Board, all of which have been previously marked in the course of the
trial.12
All the private respondents objected to the prosecution's formal offer
of evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their
respective motion for exclusion.
On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution,
now assailed in these two (2) petitions, admitting all the evidences
offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other
evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the
immunity granted by P.D. 1886. 13
Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the said Resolution
having been DENIED, they now come before Us by way of
certiorari 14 praying for the amendment and/or setting aside of the
challenged Resolution on the ground that it was issued without
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Private prosecutor below, as counsel for the mother
of deceased Rolando Galman, also filed a separate petition for
certiorari 15 on the same ground. Having arisen from the same factual
beginnings and raising practically Identical issues, the two (2)
petitioners were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with
and resolved in this Decision.
The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of
the testimonies given by the eight (8) private respondents who did
not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava
Board.
It is the submission of the prosecution, now represented by the
petitioner TANODBAYAN, that said testimonies are admissible against
the private respondents, respectively, because of the latter's failure
to invoke before the Agrava Board the immunity granted by P.D.
1886. Since private respondents did not invoke said privilege, the
immunity did not attach. Petitioners went further by contending that
such failure to claim said constitutional privilege amounts to a waiver
thereof. 16 The private respondents, on the other hand, claim that
notwithstanding failure to set up the privilege against self-
incrimination before the Agrava Board, said evidences cannot be
used against them as mandated by Section 5 of the said P.D. 1886.
They contend that without the immunity provided for by the second
clause of Section 5, P.D. 1886, the legal compulsion imposed by the
first clause of the same Section would suffer from constitutional
infirmity for being violative of the witness' right against self-
incrimination. 17 Thus, the protagonists are locked in horns on the
effect and legal significance of failure to set up the privilege against
self-incrimination.
The question presented before Us is a novel one. Heretofore, this
Court has not been previously called upon to rule on issues involving
immunity statutes. The relative novelty of the question coupled with
the extraordinary circumstance that had precipitated the same did
nothing to ease the burden of laying down the criteria upon which
this Court will henceforth build future jurisprudence on a heretofore
unexplored area of judicial inquiry. In carrying out this monumental
task, however, We shall be guided, as always, by the constitution and
existing laws.
The Agrava Board, 18 came into existence in response to a popular
public clamor that an impartial and independent body, instead of any
ordinary police agency, be charged with the task of conducting the
investigation. The then early distortions and exaggerations, both in
foreign and local media, relative to the probable motive behind the
assassination and the person or persons responsible for or involved
in the assassination hastened its creation and heavily contributed to
its early formation. 19
Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board,
the Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes,
an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts
and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the
determination of the person or persons criminally responsible
therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. For
indeed, what good will it be to the entire nation and the more than
50 million Filipinos to know the facts and circumstances of the killing
if the culprit or culprits will nevertheless not be dealt with criminally?
This purpose is implicit from Section 12 of the said Presidential
Decree, the pertinent portion of which provides —
SECTION 12. The findings of the Board shall be made public. Should
the findings warrant the prosecution of any person, the Board may
initiate the filing of proper complaint with the appropriate got
government agency. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar
investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination
of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and
ultimately, their conviction. And as safeguard, the P.D. guarantees
"any person called to testify before the Board the right to counsel at
any stage of the proceedings." 20 Considering the foregoing
environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the course of
receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not
merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-
participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned
and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one
where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing
investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in
order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the
assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and
extent of his participation therein.
Among this class of witnesses were the herein private respondents,
suspects in the said assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver
and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time they
were summoned and gave their testimonies before the Agrava Board.
This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied them the
right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses
against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They
have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under
pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. 21 The jeopardy of
being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled
before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to
be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly
enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. 21-a Both these
constitutional rights (to remain silent and not to be compelled to be
a witness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D.
1886. And yet when they so testified and produced evidence as
ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the
testimony given by them.
Of course, it may be argued is not the right to remain silent available
only to a person undergoing custodial interrogation? We find no
categorical statement in the constitutional provision on the matter
which reads:
... Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. ... 22 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, we now have a mass of
jurisprudence 23 on this specific portion of the subject provision. In all
these cases, it has been categorically declared that a person detained
for the commission of an offense undergoing investigation has a right
to be informed of his right to remain silent, to counsel, and to an
admonition that any and all statements to be given by him may be
used against him. Significantly however, there has been no
pronouncement in any of these cases nor in any other that a person
similarly undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense,
if not detained, is not entitled to the constitutional admonition
mandated by said Section 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights.
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use
the term "custodial" by having it inserted between the words "under"
and investigation", as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any
person " goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric
of the Miranda doctrine. 24 Neither are we impressed by petitioners'
contention that the use of the word "confession" in the last sentence
of said Section 20, Article 4 connotes the Idea that it applies only to
police investigation, for although the word "confession" is used, the
protection covers not only "confessions" but also "admissions" made
in violation of this section. They are inadmissible against the source
of the confession or admission and against third person. 25
It is true a person in custody undergoing investigation labors under a
more formidable ordeal and graver trying conditions than one who is
at liberty while being investigated. But the common denominator in
both which is sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the
very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute
and thereafter convict him. This is the lamentable situation we have
at hand.
All the private respondents, except Generals Ver and Olivas, are
members of the military contingent that escorted Sen. Aquino while
disembarking from the plane that brought him home to Manila on
that fateful day. Being at the scene of the crime as such, they were
among the first line of suspects in the subject assassination. General
Ver on the other hand, being the highest military authority of his co-
petitioners labored under the same suspicion and so with General
Olivas, the first designated investigator of the tragedy, but whom
others suspected, felt and believed to have bungled the case. The
papers, especially the foreign media, and rumors from uglywagging
tongues, all point to them as having, in one way or another
participated or have something to do, in the alleged conspiracy that
brought about the assassination. Could there still be any doubt then
that their being asked to testify, was to determine whether they were
really conspirators and if so, the extent of their participation in the
said conspiracy? It is too taxing upon one's credulity to believe that
private respondents' being called to the witness stand was merely to
elicit from them facts and circumstances surrounding the tragedy,
which was already so abundantly supplied by other ordinary
witnesses who had testified earlier. In fact, the records show that
Generals Ver and Olivas were among the last witnesses called by the
Agrava Board. The subject matter dealt with and the line of
questioning as shown by the transcript of their testimonies before the
Agrava Board, indubitably evinced purposes other than merely
eliciting and determining the so-called surrounding facts and
circumstances of the assassination. In the light of the examination
reflected by the record, it is not far-fetched to conclude that they
were called to the stand to determine their probable involvement in
the crime being investigated. Yet they have not been informed or at
the very least even warned while so testifying, even at that particular
stage of their testimonies, of their right to remain silent and that any
statement given by them may be used against them. If the
investigation was conducted, say by the PC, NBI or by other police
agency, all the herein private respondents could not have been
compelled to give any statement whether incriminatory or
exculpatory. Not only that. They are also entitled to be admonished
of their constitutional right to remain silent, to counsel, and be
informed that any and all statements given by them may be used
against them. Did they lose their aforesaid constitutional rights
simply because the investigation was by the Agrava Board and not by
any police investigator, officer or agency? True, they continued
testifying. May that be construed as a waiver of their rights to remain
silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves?
The answer is yes, if they have the option to do so. But in the light of
the first portion of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome contempt
power of the Board to punish any refusal to testify or produce
evidence, We are not persuaded that when they testified, they
voluntarily waived their constitutional rights not to be compelled to
be a witness against themselves much less their right to remain
silent.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the
use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements.
Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from
making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational
judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion
'tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant. 26
Similarly, in the case of Louis J. Lefkowitz v. Russel 27 Turley"
citing Garrity vs. New Jersey" where certain police officers
summoned to an inquiry being conducted by the Attorney General
involving the fixing of traffic tickets were asked questions following a
warning that if they did not answer they would be removed from
office and that anything they said might be used against them in any
criminal proceeding, and the questions were answered, the answers
given cannot over their objection be later used in their prosecutions
for conspiracy. The United States Supreme Court went further in
holding that:
the protection of the individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment
against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent proceedings
of statements obtained under threat or removal from office, and that
it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of
the body politic. 385 US at 500, 17 L Ed. 562. The Court also held that
in the context of threats of removal from office the act of responding
to interrogation was not voluntary and was not an effective waiver of
the privilege against self- incrimination.
To buttress their precarious stand and breathe life into a seemingly
hopeless cause, petitioners and amicus curiae (Ex-Senator Ambrosio
Padilla) assert that the "right not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself" applies only in favor of an accused in a criminal case.
Hence, it may not be invoked by any of the herein private
respondents before the Agrava Board. The Cabal vs.
Kapunan 28 doctrine militates very heavily against this theory. Said
case is not a criminal case as its title very clearly indicates. It is
not People vs. Cabal nor a prosecution for a criminal offense. And yet,
when Cabal refused to take the stand, to be sworn and to testify upon
being called as a witness for complainant Col. Maristela in a forfeiture
of illegally acquired assets, this Court sustained Cabal's plea that for
him to be compelled to testify will be in violation of his right against
self- incrimination. We did not therein state that since he is not an
accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to
take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right
against self-incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit
an answer that will incriminate him is profounded to him. Clearly
then, it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the
proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistently been held to
extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which
punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party
or not. 29 If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were
involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason
it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact
Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements
to be given by him, hang on the balance. Further enlightenment on
the subject can be found in the historical background of this
constitutional provision against self- incrimination. The privilege
against self- incrimination is guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution. In the Philippines, the same principle
obtains as a direct result of American influence. At first, the provision
in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United
States and was as follows:
That no person shall be ... compelled in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself. 30
As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other
import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other
than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to
testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents
notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not,
in its strictest sense, a criminal case
No doubt, the private respondents were not merely denied the afore-
discussed sacred constitutional rights, but also the right to "due
process" which is fundamental fairness. 31 Quoting the highly-
respected eminent constitutionalist that once graced this Court, the
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, due process —
... is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official
action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason
and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any
official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly, it has been
Identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the
sporting Idea of fair play (Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the
Supreme Court, 1983, pp. 32-33). It exacts fealty "to those strivings
for justice and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in
the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect
(democratic) traditions of legal and political thought."(Frankfurter,
Hannah v. Larche 1960, 363 US 20, at 487). It is not a narrow or
'"echnical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances."(Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy 1961, 367 US
1230) Decisions based on such a clause requiring a 'close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society. (Bartkus
vs. Illinois, 1959, 359 US 121). Questions of due process are not to be
treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.
(Pearson v. McGraw, 1939, 308 US 313).
Our review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral
arguments, manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to
reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. The manner
in which the testimonies were taken from private respondents fall
short of the constitutional standards both under the DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE and under the EXCLUSIONARY RULE in Section 20, Article IV.
In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual
testimonies of private respondents cannot be admitted against them
in ally criminal proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim
of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of immunity
by law. Nevertheless, We shall rule on the effect of such absence of
claim to the availability to private respondents of the immunity
provided for in Section 5, P.D. 1886 which issue was squarely raised
and extensively discussed in the pleadings and oral arguments of the
parties.
Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which
grants "use immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as
"transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as
follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled
testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal
prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional
immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an
offense to which his compelled testimony relates." 32 Examining
Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, which
reads:
SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or
from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or
other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on
the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may
tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but
his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used
against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that
such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution
and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he
be exempt from demotion or removal from office. (Emphasis
supplied)
it is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity
statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given
before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or
on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do
not render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding
his invocation of the right against self- incrimination. He is merely
saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more.
Stated otherwise ... he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if
he sets up his right against self- incrimination. The dictates of fair
play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that private
respondents should have been informed of their rights to remain
silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them
may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the
pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no
obligation to so inform them.
It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view adopted and
urged upon Us by the petitioners that the right against self-
incrimination must be invoked before the Board in order to prevent
use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a
subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation fashioned
upon Us is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution,
which is the first test of admissibility. It reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible
in evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision renders inadmissible any confession
obtained in violation thereof. As herein earlier discussed, this
exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to
admissions, 33 whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an
accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense. Any interpretation of a statute
which will give it a meaning in conflict with the Constitution must be
avoided. So much so that if two or more constructions or
interpretations could possibly be resorted to, then that one which will
avoid unconstitutionality must be adopted even though it may be
necessary for this purpose to disregard the more usual and apparent
import of the language used. 34 To save the statute from a declaration
of unconstitutionality it must be given a reasonable construction that
will bring it within the fundamental law. 35Apparent conflict between
two clauses should be harmonized. 36
But a literal application of a requirement of a claim of the privilege
against self- incrimination as a condition sine qua non to the grant of
immunity presupposes that from a layman's point of view, he has the
option to refuse to answer questions and therefore, to make such
claim. P.D. 1886, however, forecloses such option of refusal by
imposing sanctions upon its exercise, thus:
SEC. 4. The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt,
and impose appropriate penalties therefor. A person guilty of ....
including ... refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness or to
subscribe to an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do
so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by the Board. ...
Such threat of punishment for making a claim of the privilege leaves
the witness no choice but to answer and thereby forfeit the immunity
purportedly granted by Sec. 5. The absurdity of such application is
apparent Sec. 5 requires a claim which it, however, forecloses under
threat of contempt proceedings against anyone who makes such
claim. But the strong testimonial compulsion imposed by Section 5 of
P.D. 1886 viewed in the light of the sanctions provided in Section
4,infringes upon the witness' right against self-incrimination. As a
rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative
the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be
compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of
IMMUNITY is offered. 37 Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of
P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he
can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred
constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already
produced its desired results the private respondents had all testified
without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are therefore,
in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional
effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been
offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions
imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4
of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed
immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the
immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim
of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same law
practically strips away from the witness.
With the stand we take on the issue before Us, and considering the
temper of the times, we run the risk of being consigned to
unpopularity. Conscious as we are of, but undaunted by, the
frightening consequences that hover before Us, we have strictly
adhered to the Constitution in upholding the rule of law finding
solace in the view very aptly articulated by that well-known civil
libertarian and admired defender of human rights of this Court, Mr.
Justice Claudio Teehankee, in the case of People vs. Manalang 38 and
we quote:
I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests
of society with the rights and freedoms of the individuals. I have
advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in an situations which call
for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of
consequential dimensions. But I reject any proposition that would
blindly uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of
any human being. (Emphasis supplied)
Lest we be misunderstood, let it be known that we are not by this
disposition passing upon the guilt or innocence of the herein private
respondents an issue which is before the Sandiganbayan. We are
merely resolving a question of law and the pronouncement herein
made applies to all similarly situated, irrespective of one's rank and
status in society.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS and finding the
instant petitions without merit, same are DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.