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When norms go wrong: An evaluation of the ‘boomerang effect’ in descriptive and injunctive
norms, from Schultz et al. (2007) and Livingston, Young and Manstead (2011).

Marketing and anti-consumerism campaigns often rely on shifts in social and behavioural
psychology for inspiration. The most common method of persuasion relies on social norms
(Donaldson, Graham, Piccinin & Hansen, 1995). Social norms inform us about what behaviours
groups expect of their members (Smith & Louis, 2009). Although social norms predict behaviour
and intentions moderately, their sub-components, injunctive and descriptive norms, are often
stronger predictors (Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 1990). Injunctive norms refer to what people
think others should do, while descriptive norms portray what people actually do. However,
norms can be incongruent or antagonistic with personal expectations of behaviours; here, there is
an adverse effect on the behaviours being targeted for change, known as the boomerang effect
(Smith, Louis & Abraham, 2017).

Schultz et al. (2007) argue that when descriptive and injunctive norms are presented
together, they reconstruct a negative 'boomerang effect' in target behaviours caused by
descriptive norms. To test this, they conducted a field experiment using descriptive and/or
injunctive feedback to homeowners about their energy consumption, and measured future energy
use at two time-points. Results showed that descriptive norms promoted undesirable energy
increase in below-average consumers, but a desirable decrease in above-average consumers;
adding an injunctive norm neutralised the boomerang effect in below-average consumers. The
researchers concluded that descriptive norms should be used with care in public health or anti-
consumerist campaigns, to avoid unwanted effects on behaviour in a non-targeted population.

As an added explanation for behavioural intentions, Livingston, Young and Manstead

(2011) argue that the nature of the behaviour may be important in explaining the boomerang
effect. They theorised that importance of a behaviour to a groups' identity, plus personal group-
identification is important for predicting behavioural intentions. Livingston et al. conducted a
survey that manipulated the in-group norm as either moderate or heavy alcohol use, using a
descriptive norm. They measured several factors relating to identity, drinking attitude and norm
enforcement on peers, finding that identification interacted with positive drinking attitude and
group norm in opposing directions; high identifiers increased drinking intentions for the

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moderate norm while low identifiers increased intentions in the high drinking norm. A
complementary pattern arose for peer norm enforcement. The researchers concluded that
behaviours that are group-defining, along with group-member regulation of other members'
behaviours, are important factors to account for when predicting behavioural intentions.

In this paper, I will review the two above studies in terms of three main issues. Schultz et
al.'s (2007) study describes the effect of descriptive and injunctive norms, however, fails to
explain the causes for this; I propose that taking into account the possibility of identification as a
predictor, as in Livingston et al. (2011), is important. I also take issue with a lack of qualitative
methods and data, so discuss how correcting for this may allow better theoretical interpretation
of the results. Finally, I will discuss how lack of control conditions and lack of baseline or
identification measures in the papers limits the conclusions of both studies.

Livingston et al. (2011) state group identification can be an important predictor of

behaviour. However, although Schultz et al. (2007) stated that the comparison group was the
neighbourhood, they did not measure participant identification with neighbours, or identification
as ‘being environmentally friendly’. Because behaviour change through social norms is driven
by social punishment avoidance, one might assume that participants have a meaningful identity
they were trying to show (Bicchieri & Muldoon, 2011). However, if participants did not identify
with their neighbours, then unlike Livingston et al. (2011), identification with a salient ‘ingroup’
cannot explain the results. Participants possibly identified with the concept of ‘environmentally
friendly’ when energy consumption is salient, or with subjective societal norms about caring for
the environment; subjective norms are perceived social pressures to conform to certain
behaviours (Ajzen, 1991). Below-baseline consumers increased their energy use in Schultz et al.,
so this would be counterintuitive to a congruent descriptive and personal norm of
‘environmentally friendly'; thus, the first possibility is unlikely. It is more likely that the results
show an interaction between subjective, descriptive and injunctive norms. Here, although
Livingston et al. and Schultz et al.’s results appear to be similar, the mechanisms behind them
may not be. Given the differentiation between group-norms in Livingston et al. and potential
subjective norms in Schultz et al., I propose that future literature should clarify this difference to
improve the model of planned behaviour.

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Both studies used a different range of measured variables; Schultz et al. used the
neighbourhood average, while Livingston et al. used above-average quotas; moderate and high
drinking. This range difference makes it difficult to compare the similar directions of
results. One explanation for the similar direction comes from participants having an underlying
value-system of materialism that drives the boomerang effect (i.e. the belief that consuming and
owning things will lead to happiness). Exposure to descriptive norms elicits the boomerang
effect in people with low materialistic beliefs, via reactance caused by a threat to their freedom
of choice (Yakobovitch & Grinstein, 2016). Those who are higher in materialistic beliefs are also
more sensitive to social influence, hence their behaviour will decrease if it goes against the norm
(Flouri, 1999). Materialism potentially explains Schultz et al.’s norm backlash, but struggles to
explain Livingston et al.’s participants drive to exceed their personal beliefs for a group norm.
Schultz et al.’s below-baseline participants would be less sensitive to social influence, thus
exhibit more reactance from perceived affront to their agency. Livingston et al.’s low-identity
participants would supposedly also have low-consumption, however, react to a high norm rather
than a moderate norm. These results suggest that an omnipresent group identity, like student
identity while living at university, causes social influence to become a stronger predictor of
behaviour, rather than backlash to subjective norms. If true, this means it is even more important
to separate the effect of descriptive and injunctive norms on group and subjective norms in a
model of behaviour. The main way to test this would be to include measures of materialism and
identification in both studies as predictor variables.

The ambiguity of the descriptive norms means that below-baseline consumers may have
perceived it as implicitly stating they should stay as they are or be more like the average; without
explicit injunctive context, the norm may be cognitively converted into an injunctive norm. This
happens in the opposite direction, where injunctive norms implicitly reveal a descriptive norm,
so it is possible this effect also occurs the other way (Smith et al., 2017). Participants may
perceive this as an attempt to control them, causing the boomerang effect in the below-baseline
consumers (Yakobovitch & Grinstein, 2016). The descriptive ambiguity leads me to suggest that
both studies would have benefitted from collecting quantitative data. For Livingston et al., I
would ask participants why they excluded the drinking or non-drinking peer. If Livingston et
al.’s theory about fear of social sanction is true, I would expect participants to state something

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like “well, everyone else is doing it, so why shouldn’t I/they?”. This would show
acknowledgement that the group-norm is greater alcohol use, and that it implicitly makes little
sense for them to go against this norm. For Schultz et al., I would suggest telling participants
about their increase/decrease in consumption and asking why their behaviour
increased/decreased. If participants relate reasons back to their neighbours, identification could
be assumed as the cause of the boomerang effect; if not, then materialism would be more likely.
Using a qualitative method in these studies may improve the ability of the researchers to
conclude causes cause and effect, rather than relying on speculation or describing effects.
Finally, an in both Livingston et al. and Schultz et al. is the lack of control condition.
Conceptual replication of Schultz et al., using food consumption instead of energy consumption,
previously showed that when the study included a control condition, these results were not
significantly different from any of the experimental conditions (Verkooijen, Stok & Mollen,
2015). This highlights a major issue for the study's internal validity; it is not possible to know
whether the original study results are from regression to the mean, or reflect actual differences in
the experimental conditions. Similarly, Livingston et al. (2011) did not include a non-
manipulated control condition, meaning it is impossible to know if student identity or variable
manipulation caused the results. More confusingly, they did not measure baseline intentions to
drink before norm manipulation. Thus, there is no baseline for experimental comparison,
increasing the ambiguity of the results and possible regression to the mean. To improve this, I
would suggest conceptually replicating the experiment, but measure drinking intentions in a pilot
study, along with the original pilot measures. This would be better than measuring before and
after in the main study as it avoids practice effects or participant confusion. If the same results
occurred, then Livingston et al.’s study is internally valid; if not, then I would question whether
descriptive norms are at all effective in changing behaviour.

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References
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