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SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking a review of the December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T.
Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-
G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the
nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under
Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision,
dated August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics
Office (NSO) copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely
filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal
for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in
violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was
likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006
decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed
by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the
September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilo’s appeal; 2) the
November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the September
19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2,
2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared
psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia,
who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their
children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the
assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a
motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on
the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the
"coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988."
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising the following
ISSUES
II
III
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said
case constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied
because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from
this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be declared null were
solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity
of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this
case, the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and decided after the effectivity
of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable
because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years
before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from
the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void due to his
purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the parties who
were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations
as required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is
unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the
Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.
The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity
of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a
demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the
phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word
"petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There
is only room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is
expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention."
Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the
words of a statute there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial
justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this
case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has
stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should
not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.11 As a
corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain
proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays
and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature,
these rules are regarded as mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period
for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced
in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is
non-extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas
Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly
adhered thereto. 1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s
earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day
reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the
circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed
its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already
beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision
which denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for
review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal.14 In the recent case
of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the
right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part
of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive
a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the
sacrosanct institution of marriage.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families
weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the
concern alone of the family members.17
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
Id., citing Gonzales v. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1653, July 30, 2007, 528
12
SCRA 490.
13 510 Phil. 268, 274 (2005).
14 Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil 456, 460 (1995).
15 G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 447, 460-461,
citing Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil 864, 877 (2002), citing Labad v.
University of Southeastern Philippines, 414 Phil 815, 826 (2001).
16Almelor v. Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, Br. 253, G.R. No.
179620, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 447 citing 1987 Philippine
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 12 which provides:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. x x x
RESOLUTION
In his Letter dated May 26, 2004 addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., Judge Tito G. Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23,
avers that he is due to retire at the age of 70 (compulsory retirement) on
September 29, 2004. By then, he would have served the Judiciary for 21 years; 7
years and 11-and-1/2 months of which as Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo
City. Judge Gustilo requests that, considering his retirement is "barely one month
from November 2004," the second tranche of the Special Allowance granted to
judges under Republic Act No. 92271 be included in the computation of his
retirement benefits.
To recall, Rep. Act No. 9227, which took effect on November 11, 2003,2 granted
additional compensation in the form of Special Allowance to justices, judges and
all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court
of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court. Section 2 thereof reads:
Sec. 2. Grant of Special Allowances. – All justices, judges and all other
positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of
Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized under
existing laws shall be granted special allowances equivalent to one
hundred percent (100%) of the basic monthly salary specified for their
respective salary grades under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended,
otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, to be implemented for
a period of four (4) years.
4.2 For purposes of computing the retirement benefits, only the special
allowance actually received and that which has accrued at the time of
retirement shall be included.
Paragraph 7.0 thereof states that cases not covered thereby shall be referred to
the Chief Justice for resolution.
Judge Gustilo claims that pursuant to OCA Circular No. 48-2004 dated March 3,
2004, the first tranche of the Special Allowance equivalent to 25% was
implemented starting November 11, 2003. The next 25% (second tranche) will be
implemented on November 11, 2004. In this connection, Judge Gustilo appeals
to the Chief Justice that, in the computation of his retirement benefits, the second
tranche of the Special Allowance be included since his retirement is only one (1)
month and twelve (12) days before its implementation on November 11, 2004.
In support thereof, Judge Gustilo points out that "in the past, Judges who retire in
October are included in the grant of the December 13th month pay." He, thus,
invokes the "liberal policy" of the Court "in granting benefits to the underpaid Trial
Court Judges."
In the Memorandum dated June 18, 2004 for the Chief Justice, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA)3recommends that the request of Judge Gustilo be
granted. The OCA cites Judge Gustilo’s service record in the Judiciary, which
started on January 18, 1983, including his exemplary record of disposing cases
at an average of 2.25 cases each month. It also mentions that Judge Gustilo, as
Executive Judge, introduced several innovations in the Iloilo City courts and was
able to manage well the 17 judges under his administrative supervision. Further,
Judge Gustilo was the recipient of several "awards and
recognitions."4 Considering the foregoing, the OCA concludes that "it is but just
and fair that the second additional Special Allowance of 25% be granted to him
and included in the computation of his retirement benefits."5
In compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated July 6, 2004, referring Judge
Gustilo’s letter and the OCA’s memorandum to her for study and
recommendation, Chief Attorney Edna E. Diño submitted her Report dated July
15, 2004. The Chief Attorney recommends that Judge Gustilo’s request be
denied for not being in accord with Rep. Act No. 9227 and the Guidelines
promulgated by the Court.
After a careful evaluation of Judge Gustilo’s letter, the OCA’s memorandum and
the Chief Attorney’s report, the Court, regrettably, cannot grant the request of
Judge Gustilo.
It is axiomatic that when the law is clear, the function of the courts is simple
application, not interpretation or circumvention.6 With respect to the manner of
computation of the retirement benefits in light of the Special Allowance granted
under Rep. Act No. 9227, Section 5 thereof, quoted anew below, could not be
any clearer:
A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of retirement,
only the allowances "actually received" and the tranche or tranches "already
received and implemented," upon the date of retirement, shall be included in the
computation of the retirement benefits. Otherwise put, before the Special
Allowance could be considered in the computation of retirement benefits, it
should have been "actually received" and the tranche or tranches thereof should
have been "already implemented and received" at the date of retirement.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is clear and unambiguous. There is no room for
its interpretation. Further, the foregoing exchange among the members of the
Bicameral Conference Committee7 on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill
(SB) No. 2018 and House Bill (HB) No. 51788 is particularly instructive:
...
Section 5. (Silence)
Just again for purposes of record and clarification, Section 5, lines 3 and 4,
"For purposes of retirement, only the allowances actually received…," and
so forth and so on, I just like to make it clear that the computation of
retirement would include the salary already being received, plus the special
allowance.
And I think that first word in the title of Section 5, "Inclusion" also explains
that.
REP. LIBANAN. For the sake of further clarification, would it mean that if,
for example, a judge retires on the second year of the implementation, so
his retirement benefits would be only computed….
...
SEN. VILLAR. In fact, it’s too attractive. In the first place, iyong allowance
is already part of the retirement benefit. Iyon, malaking bagay na iyon, eh.
Mr. Chairman, may add-on pa. Medyo sobra naman yata na iyon.
SEN. ARROYO. No, because by the accident of birth, when they retire,
they retire on the second year, halimbawa, 68 sila ngayon. Pagkatapos,
mandatorily they have to retire at the age of 70, di iyong benefits nila is …
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). But the fact here remains, the
allowances they have been receiving so far which is over and above,
kasama na talaga sa retirement. I mean, sobra-sobra na, eh. Lahat na lang
ng allowance na puwedeng gawin, nandoon na, eh. At saka nagre-retire pa
sila sa 70, ibig sabihin talagang marami na iyan.
Thus, the congressional records as well as the text itself of Rep. Act No. 9227
reveal the unequivocal intention of the lawmakers that only the Special
Allowance actually received at the date of retirement shall be included in the
computation of the retirement benefits.
The Guidelines promulgated by this Court pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9227 is even
more definite as it used the term "accrued" in this wise: "only the special
allowance actually received and that which has accrued at the time of retirement
shall be included." As correctly reasoned by the Chief Attorney:
Notably, the phrase "has accrued at the time of retirement" is used in the
Guidelines instead of "the tranche or tranches of the special allowance
already implemented and received" which is used in Section 5 of Rep. Act
No. 9227. Nevertheless, the same meaning is conveyed. The word
"accrue" means "to come into existence as an enforceable claim: vest as a
right" or "to come by way of increase or addition: arise as a growth or
result" or "to be periodically accumulated in the process of time whether as
an increase or a decrease." Hence, a Special Allowance that has not yet
come into existence as an enforceable claim or has not yet vested on the
recipient judge as a matter of right cannot be considered in the computation
of retirement benefits.10
Indeed, "accrue" in its past tense is "in sense of due and demandable;
vested."11 In the case of Judge Gustilo, on the date of his retirement, the second
tranche of the Special Allowance has not accrued as yet; hence, it cannot be said
that the same is due and demandable or that it has vested insofar as he is
concerned.
The Chief Attorney, likewise, correctly posits that the strict application of Section
5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is called for by the fact that, under Section 3 thereof,12 the
source for the Special Allowance is the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF),
established under Presidential Decree No. 1949, which basically comes from the
docket fees paid by litigants:
... As such, the JDF as a fund source is not constant or fixed in amount, as
its amount depends on the amount collected by the courts and the amount
of increase in docket fees that the Court would impose. The fact of the JDF
becoming insufficient has been foreseen by the Court and is reflected in the
second paragraph of 4.1 of the Guidelines quoted above. It is worth noting
that until now, the first tranche of the Special Allowance has been received
only for the months of 11 November 2003 until February 2004. The delay in
receipt thereof may continue if courts nationwide do not timely transmit the
reports of collections to the OCA, as the JDF should be disbursed only if
the reports of collections and the deposits under the JDF account for the
Special Allowance tally in accordance with accounting and auditing rules.13
While this Court had, in certain cases,14 adopted a liberal stance in interpreting
retirement laws in favor of the retiree, it cannot do so in this case because, as
earlier stated, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is quite clear and unambiguous. In
other words, there is no room for interpretation but only simple application of
the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% or
second tranche of the Special Allowance granted under Rep. Act No. 9227 be
included in the computation of his retirement benefits is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1An Act Granting Additional Compensation in the Form of Special
Allowances for Justices, Judges and all Other Positions in the Judiciary
with the Equivalent Rank of Justices of the Court of Appeals and Judges of
the Regional Trial Court, and For Other Purposes.
2Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9227 provides that it "shall take effect
fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation." It was published in Today on October 25, 2003 and
the Times on October 27, 2003.
3Signed by Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and Senior
Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño.
4These awards are: (1) National Awardee of the 3rd PNP Anniversary on
January 29, 1994 at Camp Crame, Quezon City; (2) Plaque of Recognition
for his services as Executive Judge given on March 4, 1991; (3) Plaque of
Appreciation given by the IBP, Iloilo Chapter, on April 4, 1997; (4)
Certificate of Appreciation given at the Forum with Educators, Media and
other Concerned Sectors on Enhancing Communication Between the
Judiciary and the Citizenry, given at the Days Hotel, Iloilo City, on
September 11, 1998; and (5) Certificate of Recognition for his assistance to
the Supreme Court Centenary Celebrations Executive Committee, given on
June 11, 2001.
5 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator, p. 2.
6AB Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 405 SCRA 380 (2003).
7The Senate Conferees were Senators Francis Pangilinan, Manuel Villar,
Jr., Joker Arroyo, Edgardo Angara and John Osmeña.
In the event that the said amounts are insufficient to cover the grant
of allowances on the last year of implementation of this Act, the
National Government shall subsidize the special allowance granted
for justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the
equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the
Regional Trial Court as authorized under existing laws in an amount
not exceeding One hundred sixty-five million pesos
(Php165,000,000.00) per annum.
If the collections from any increase in current fees and any new fees
imposed after the effectivity of this Act exceed the amount needed to
fund the special allowances granted to justices, judges and all other
positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the
Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized
under existing laws, the surplus may be used by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court to grant additional allowances exclusively to other
court personnel not covered by the benefits granted under this Act.
13 Id. at 6.
14 See for example In re: Ruperto G. Martin, 187 SCRA 477 (1990).
THIRD DIVISION
- versus -
THE PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION
OF 2010,
Respondent. G.R. No. 193036
x-------------------
----x Present:
REP. EDCEL C.
LAGMAN, CORONA, C.J.,
REP. RODOLFO B. CARPIO,
ALBANO, JR., REP. CARPIO
SIMEON A. MORALES,
DATUMANONG, and REP. VELASCO, JR.,
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., NACHURA,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
EXECUTIVE December 7, 2010
SECRETARY PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR. and
DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Respondents.
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------- x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for
prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in
his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive
Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of
Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution[6] as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a
public office and to appropriate funds therefor.[7]
By the President:
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers
of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-
judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can
do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but
it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing
of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it
cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or
sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other
countries which have been created as official, transitory and
non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and
context of serious violations of human rights or of international
humanitarian law in a countrys past.[9] They are usually
established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest,
civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for
transitional justice.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter
placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial
retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the
identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one
writer[12] puts it:
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under
Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised
Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be
shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
commission of crimes.
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the
reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts
committed not only during the administration of former
President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where
the same magnitude of controversies and anomalies[68] were
reported to have been committed against the Filipino
people. They assail the classification formulated by the
respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions
because first, there is no substantial distinction between the
group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order
No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public
office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification
is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end
corruption.[69] In order to attain constitutional permission, the
petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with graft
and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration
with the strong arm of the law with equal force.[70]
Position of respondents
A final word
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
I certify that Justice Velasco left his concurring vote See concurring
& dissenting opinion
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Angara v. The Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
[2]
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; A Commentary, 1996
ed., p. xxxiv, citing Miller, Lectures on the Constitution of the United States 64 (1893);
1 Schwartz, The Powers of Government 1 (1963).
[3]
Cruz, Philippine Political law, 2002 ed. p. 12.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Resolution dated August 24, 2010 consolidating G.R. No. 192935 with G.R. No.
193036, rollo, pp. 87-88.
[6]
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
[7]
Biraogo Petition, p. 5, rollo, p. 7.
[8]
Salvador Laurel v. Hon. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002, citing F.R.
Mechem, A Treatise On The Law of Public Offices and Officers.
[9]
International Center for Transitional Justice, <http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/138.html>
visited November 20, 2010.
[10]
Freeman, The Truth Commission and Procedural Fairness, 2006 Ed., p. 12,
citing Hayner, UnspeakableTruths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions.
[11]
International Center for Transitional Justice, supra note 9.
[12]
Armando Doronila, Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 2, 2010.
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100802-284444/Truth-
body-told-Take-no
prisoners> visited November 9, 2010.
[13]
Lagman Petition, pp. 50-52, rollo, pp. 58-60.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 111-216.
[15]
Otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.
[16]
Granting Continuing Authority To The President Of The Philippines To Reorganize
The National Government.
[17]
Otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 2010.
[18]
OSG Consolidated Comment, p. 33, rollo, p. 153, citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001, 354 SCRA 651, 660-661.
[19]
Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1, 35;
and Francisco v.
House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 842 (2003).
[20]
OSG Memorandum, p. 29, rollo, p. 348.
[21]
G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506, 520.
[22]
Supra note 19, citing Pimentel Jr., v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6,
2005, 462 SCRA 623, 631-632.
[23]
OSG Memorandum, p. 30, rollo, p. 349.
[24]
G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 216-218.
[25]
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency, G.R.
No. 157870, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 421; Tatad v. Secretary of the
Department of Energy,
346 Phil 321 (1997); De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA
420, 422.
[26]
G.R. 132527, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 47, 62.
[27]
84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949).
[28]
(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and, (3) the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.
[29]
G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010.
[30]
Kilosbayan,Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 139.
[31]
Biraogo Memorandum, p. 7, rollo, p. 69.
[32]
Id. at 6, rollo, p. 68.
[33]
Id. at 9, rollo, p. 71.
[34]
Id. at 10, rollo, p. 72.
[35]
Id. at 10-11, rollo pp. 72-73.
[36]
Lagman Memorandum, G.R. No 193036, pp. 10-11, rollo, pp. 270-271.
[37]
OSG Memorandum, p. 32, rollo, p. 351.
[38]
Id. at 33, rollo, p. 352.
[39]
OSG Consolidated Comment, p. 24, rollo, p. 144.
[40]
OSG Memorandum, pp. 38-39, rollo, pp. 357-358.
[41]
Citing Department of Health v. Camposano, G.R. No. 157684, April 27, 2005, 457
SCRA 438, 450.
[42]
Citing Evangelista v. Jarencio, No. L-27274, November 27, 1975, 68 SCRA 99, 104.
[43]
Citing Rodriguez v. Santos Diaz, No. L-19553, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 441, 445.
[44]
G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
[45]
Consolidated Comment, p. 45, rollo, p. 165.
[46]
G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718, also cited in Banda, supra.
[47]
The Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, G. R. No. 155027, February 28,
2006, 483 SCRA 526, 564; DOTC v. Mabalot, 428 Phil. 154, 164-165
(2002); Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955).
[48]
OSG Memorandum, p. 56, rollo, p. 375.
[49]
G.R. No. 112745, October 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 713, 730.
[50]
TSN, September 28, 2010, pp. 205-207.
[51]
OSG Memorandum, p. 37, rollo, p.356.
[52]
G.R. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 688.
[53]
Id. at 691.
[54]
496 Phil. 886, 896-897 (2005).
[55]
Consolidated Comment, p. 48; rollo, p. 168.
[56]
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
[57]
Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 967 (1998).
[58]
Smart Communications, Inc. et al. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 456
Phil. 145, 156 (2003).
[59]
G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 483.
[60]
Id. at 492.
[61]
TSN, September 28, 2010, pp. 39-44; and OSG Memorandum, p. 67, rollo, p. 339.
[62]
OSG Consolidated Comment, p. 55, rollo, p. 175.
[63]
Id. at 56, rollo, p. 176.
[64]
Id.
[65]
G.R. No. 167711, October 10, 2008, 568 SCRA 327, 339.
[66]
Lagman Petition, pp. 43, 50-52, rollo, pp. 51, 50-60.
[67]
Lagman Memorandum, G.R. 193036, pp. 28-29, rollo, pp. 347-348.
[68]
Lagman Petition, p. 31, rollo, p. 39.
[69]
Id. at 28-29, rollo, pp. 36-37.
[70]
Id. at 29, rollo, p. 37.
[71]
OSG Memorandum, p. 88; rollo, p. 407.
[72]
OSG Consolidated Comment. p. 68, rollo, p. 188.
[73]
OSG Memorandum, pp. 90-93, rollo, pp. 409-412.
[74]
The Philippine Judges Association v. Hon. Pardo, G.R. No. 105371, November 11,
1993, 227 SCRA 703, 711.
[75]
Id. at 712, citing Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957); Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, No.
L-59431, July 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 654; Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 7842, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA
343, 375.
[76]
Guino v. Senkowski, 54 F 3d 1050 (2d. Cir. 1995) cited in Am. Jur, 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p.
302.
[77]
Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake Country, 343 N.C. 426 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b),
p. 303.
[78]
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 US 248, 103 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 303.
[79]
See Columbus Bd. of Ed. v. Penick, 443 US 449 cited Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), pp. 316-
317.
[80]
See Lombard v. State of La., 373 US 267 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 316.
[81]
Beltran v. Secretary of Health, 512 Phil 560, 583 (2005).
[82]
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003 ed., p. 128.
[83]
McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 367.
[84]
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003 ed., pp. 135-136.
[85]
No. L-25246, 59 SCRA 54, 77-78 (September 12, 1974).
[86]
Basa v. Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de
Filipinas (FOITAF), No. L-27113, November 19, 1974, 61 SCRA 93, 110-
111; Anuncension v. National Labor Union, No. L-26097, November 29, 1977, 80 SCRA
350, 372-373; Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, No. L-29646, November 10, 1978,
86 SCRA 270, 275; Dumlao v. Comelec, No. L-52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392,
404; Ceniza v. Comelec, No. L-52304, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 763, 772-
773; Himagan v. People, G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 538; The
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA, G.R. No. 114714, April 21,
1995, 243 SCRA 666, 677; JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996, 260 SCRA 319, 331332; and Tiu v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 278, 288-289. See also Ichong v.
Hernandez, No. L-7995, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957); Vera v. Cuevas, Nos. L-33693-94, May
31, 1979, 90 SCRA 379, 388; and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455,
115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873, and 115931, August 25,
1994, 235 SCRA 630, 684.
[87] th
7 Whereas clause, Executive Order No. 1.
[88]
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2003 ed., p. 128.
[89]
OSG, Memorandum, p. 89, rollo, p. 408.
[90] th
6 Whereas clause, Executive Order No. 1
[91]
Lee, Handbook of Legal Maxims, 2002 Ed., p.
[92]
118 US
357, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=118&invol=35 <ac
cessed on December 4, 2010>.
[93]
Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, 405 SCRA 614, pp. 631-
632; Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, 335 Phil. 82, 101 (1997).
[94]
Id. at 632.
[95]
756 F. Supp. 388, N.. D. Ind., 1991, Jan 30, 1991, Crim No. HCR 90-42;
also http://in.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19910130_0000002.
NIN.htm/qx <accessed December 5, 2010>
[96]
McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 367.
[97]
Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wash. 2d 211 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), pp. 367-368 .
[98]
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 US 425 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16
(b), p. 371.
[99]
Hunter v. Flowers, 43 So 2d 435 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 370.
[100]
Clements v. Fashing, 457 US 957.
[101]
See Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), pp. 370-371, as footnote (A state legislature may,
consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, address a problem one step at a time, or
even select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.
[Jeffeson v. Hackney, 406 US 535].
[102]
McDonald v. Board of Election Comrs of Chicago, 394 US 802 cited in Am Jur 2d,
Footnote No. 9.
[103]
Ricketts v. City of Hardford, 74 F. 3d 1397 cited in Am. Jur. 2d, Vol. 16 (b), p. 303.
[104]
OSG Consolidated Comment, p. 66, rollo, p.186.
[105]
Lagman Memorandum, p. 30; rollo, p. 118.
[106]
G.R. No. 86926, October 15, 1991; 202 SCRA 680.
[107]
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
[108]
Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 ed., pp. 12-13.
[109]
Id.
[110]
Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 156951, September 22,
2006.
EN BANC
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote
from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission -
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as
the Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of
PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be
understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-
visFilipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it
clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner
Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS as against whom?As against aliens or over aliens
?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We
use the word QUALIFIED because the existing laws or
prospective laws will always lay down conditions under which
business may be done. For example, qualifications on capital,
qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera(underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched
in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the
legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce
the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may
still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly
granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for
the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on
the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make
it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not
[17]
welfare, the sanctity of family life, the vital role of the youth in
[30] [31]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The
Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. During World
[37]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not
just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the
sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece
of property in a commercial district. We are talking about a
historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events
in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking
about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed
as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of
the highest state function to their official visits to the
Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to
play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth
century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has
become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a
history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a
part in the shaping of a country. [51]
[1]
See Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
[2]
Par. I. Introduction and Highlights, Guidelines and Procedures: Second
Prequalifications and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization; Annex A,
Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents; Rollo, p.142.
[3]
Par. V. Guidelines for the Public Bidding, Id., pp. 153-154.
[4]
Annex A, Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining
Order; Rollo, pp.13-14.
[5]
Annex B, Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining
Order; Id., p.15.
[6]
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order, pp. 5-
6; Id., pp.6-7.
[7]
Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, p. 17; Id., p.133.
[8]
Par. V. J. 1,Guidelines for Public Bidding, Guidelines and Procedures: Second
Prequalifications and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization, Annex A,
Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents; Id., p. 154.
[9]
Respondents Joint Comment with Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining
Order, p.9; Rollo, p. 44.
[10]
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 138 (1803).
[11]
11 Am Jur. 606.
[12]
16 Am Jur. 2d 281.
[13]
Id., p. 282.
[14]
See Note 12.
[15]
Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10.
[16]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, 22 August 1986, p. 608.
[17]
16 Am Jur 2d 283-284.
Sec. 10, first par., reads: The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the
[18]
economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as
Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose
capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
Sec. 10, third par., reads: The State shall regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its
national goals and priorities.
[19]
State ex rel. Miller v. OMalley, 342 Mo 641, 117 SW2d 319.
[20]
G.R. No. 91649, 14 May 1991, 197 SCRA 52.
[21]
Sec. 11, Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides that [t]he
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.
[22]
Sec. 12, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the government.
[23]
Sec. 13, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Sec. 1, Art. XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), provides that [t]he Congress
[24]
shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
Sec. 2, Art. XIII, provides that [t]he promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative
and self-reliance.
Sec. 2, Art. XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports),
[25]