En colaboración con M. A. M. Broda, mimeo.

201

THE ARGENTINE HYPERINFLATION OF 1989: RECOLLECTIONS OF TWO

SURVIVORS

Mixed feelings emerge inside an economist that lives in a country that experiences
hyperinflation. On the one side, as the rest of the human beings, experiences frustration, deep
fears, terrible aspects of the human condition that show up when man or woman feels cornered,
etc.; on the other hand, experiences the excitement of "touching" it, of looking directly at
something about which has read many stories about other countries... with curiosity, as if they
were mainly fiction.

This report was written by 2 argentine economists that lived and worked (mainly as
business consultants) in Argentina in 1989. In other words, by 2 survivors. We have a book in
preparation on this subject, that so far could not be written because... we are struggling with a
new wave of hyperinflation, and its aftermath! (which means that, strictly speaking, this report
concentrates in the "Hyper I", and was written when the "Hyper II" was in progress. The most
interesting aspect of the Hyper II is that, as a result of the learning process of the population
during the Hyper I, the latter was much more neutral than the former, and consequently less
attractive from the academic point of view.

The future book, as this report, is prepared as background material for action (for the
policymaker, for the manufacturing or financial executive, for the analyst). When under the
pressures of a 2-3% daily rate of inflation we reread the literature of previous hyperinflations,
eagerly looking for guidelines, we found that what was not useful was when the only comment
of the survivor of the other hyperinflation was that "it was horrible". In other words, like the
manuals on sexual techniques, a manuscript on hyperinflation to be useful has to be specific
(Garfunkel, 1989, has published a book on the Argentine hyperinflation of 1989. Accordingly,
ours will be neither the only one nor the first book on the subject; it will be just the best).

This report presents essential material for understanding what happened, and how to
prepare for facing a future hyperinflation, under 3 main headings: 1) basic numbers; 2) key
events; and 3) what we have learned.
1. BASIC NUMBERS

In a hyperinflation, the relevant period is the day. Table 1, that shows monthly averages
of relevant variables in Argentina 1989, is meant as just a first and crude approximation to
"reality". Table 2, in turn, shows the Carta económica estimate of the weekly inflation rate
along 1989.

Notice, in table 1, that:

1) Significant fluctuations occur inside the "uphill" and "downhill" portions of

hyperinflation.

2) In the "uphill" portion of the hyperinflation, the dollar and the price of shares
increase more than inflation, while nominal interest rates were below the inflation rate. On the
"downhill" portion the results are reversed. In a country in which the rate of inflation fluctuated
a lot, and whose average was almost 40% per month, over the year the monthly real active
interest rate was 0.1!

3) In the "uphill" portion of the hyperinflation, exports are maintained while the
domestic market is destroyed. In the "downhill" portion the results are reversed. Exports
increase in the uphill portion because the real exchange rate increases, and domestic absorption
declines.

In table 2, in turn, notice that although the maximum inflation rate corresponds to the
second week of July, more relevant inflation rate are the ones that correspond to the end of May
and beginning of June, since they are "pure" rates, and not the inflation rates that result when,
at the beginning of an antiinflationary program, relative prices are balanced again.

2. KEY EVENTS

Some idea, in calendar terms, about shocks, policy reaction and events in general, is
crucial for understanding a hyperinflation. Accordingly, this section sketches the main relevant
facts. At the end of the section, some "atemporal" hints are included.

Primavera plan. August 3, 1988. Primavera plan is launched. Aimed at reducing the rate
of inflation from 30% to a "one digit" per month. Includes a double exchange market, with a
financial segment in which the Central Bank sells dollars through "auctions". Collective
bargaining remained free. The program had institutional backing of manufacturing and
commerce associations (UIA and CAC).
 September 18. General strike organized by CGT (number 13 during the Alfonsín
period).

January 1, 1989. Electricity cuts, due to simultaneous lack of rain and technical failures
at nuclear plants.

January 9. The Central Bank auctions u$s 120 M., in response to demands of u$s 80 M
and a previous quota of u$s 50 M.

January 11. The Central Bank auctions u$s 150 M., again as a result of demands for u$s
82 M. and announced quota of u$s 70 M.

January 12. Agreement with entrepreneurs on guidelines of Primavera plan extended to

June 30.

January 31. IMF and commercial banks postpone agreement to May (after presidential
elections). In auctions, the private sector buys u$s 169 M.

February 2. The Central Bank sells u$s 101 M.

Sourrouille I. February 6 (Monday). The Central Bank stops auctions of dollars.

Exchange market and banking holiday. 3 exchange rates: commercial (increase of 6% along
February), special (25% above the commercial) and free. Export and import transactions mix
different segments of the exchange market, the mix shifting over time according to a schedule
(to increase even more the effective dollar for commercial transactions).

February 8. The Central Bank issues 2 new bonds, to compete with dollars.

February 14. President Alfonsín does not accept the resignation of the economic team
(minister Sourrouille, president of the Central Bank Machinea, coordination secretary Canitrot,
secretary of the treasury Brodersohn).

Sourrouille II. February 20. Exchange market holiday. Changes in the mix for exports
(20% through the free exchange rate), increasing the shares of the higher dollar rates; i.e.,
increasing the effective dollar for exports.

February 28. Forward market operations among the private sector, that matured at the
end of February and were made during January, are cleared... efficiently (see Szewach, 1989,
on how the private sector, without public sector intervention, minimized social costs in front of
forward contracts made at about u$s 1 = A 17, when at the end of February the spot market was
u$s 1 = A 28).

March 2. The World Bank does not send u$s 350 M and explains why.

March 30. Radical presidential candidate Angeloz asks the resignation of the economic
team.
 Pugliese I. April 1. Juan Carlos Pugliese, former minister of economics and then
president of the Representatives Chamber, is the new minister of economics. Enrique Garcia
Vazquez, first president of the Central Bank under Alfonsín, is again at the Central Bank.

April 2. Exchange market and banking holiday.

April 3. Exchange market holiday. 50% of exports and imports are channeled through
the free market.

April 5. The Central Bank creates 5 indexed deposits (linked to the official exchange
rate, the Bonex, the free exchange rate, Bonex or interest rate -the greater-, and inflation or
interest rate -the greater-).

Pugliese II. April 13. Free exchange rate. Floating export tax, so that the effective
exchange rate is fixed (at A 36) for exports.

April 27. Former ministers Roberto Alemann and Adalbert Krieger Vasena meet
Alfonsín and Pugliese.

Pugliese III. May 1. Free exchange rate, elimination of the "reference exchange rate" for
exports.

May 14. Carlos Saul Menem wins presidential election. Stays at La Rioja (the province
of which he is governor), and speaks calmly. Radical and peronist leaders reaffirm "December
the 10th" as the date for transfer of power (remember that Alfonsín was president since
December 10, 1983).

May 16. Participating in "Tiempo Nuevo", a well known T. V. program conducted by

Bernard Neustadt, president-elect Menem improves dramatically his image.

May 18. Menem: "everything that occurs between now and December 10 is
responsibility of the Alfonsín government".

May 22. Exchange rate and banking holiday. Again multiple exchange rates, with
export taxes.

May 23. Alfonsín (after the failure of negotiations to advance the transfer of power): "I
will stay until December 10, but do not come, between now and then, to tell me that it is better
an anticipation of transfer of power". Banks open but depositors can get just A 20.000 in cash
(less than u$s 150).

Rodríguez. May 25. Representative Jesus Rodriguez replaces Pugliese as new minister
of economics. New exchange rate and banking holiday.
 May 29. Supermarkets attacked, particularly in Rosario (14 people die, 80 injured, 300
in jail. Middle and upper class panic). Exchange control, single (official) exchange rate. 7 days
deposits maturity extended 7 days more, at the previous interest rate.

May 30. Menem announces that Miguel Roig, former executive of Bunge & Born, will
be his minister of economics.

Transfer of power, announced. June 5. Transfer of power, anticipated to July 9 (the

domestic purchasing power of the black market dollar picked on June 5, exactly when Alfonsín
decided to go and Menem decided to anticipate the start of his term!).

June 6. The Central Bank sells u$s 2.000 for each tourist, at the official rate (sic.).
Stopped few days later.

June 12. Alfonsín announces formally his resignation, effective at any moment after
June 30.

June 21. Orlando Ferreres, instead of Guido Di Tella, will be number 2 of the economic
team.

June 23. Javier Gonzalez Fraga will be Menem's president of the Central Bank. Menem:
"those who will not afford the increase in gasoline prices, will have to use a bicycle".

June 27. Jeffrey Sachs visits Argentina, to say what everybody (except the new
economic team) knows about hyperinflation.

July 5. Rationing of gasoline.

Menem - Roig I. July 8. Menem takes office as new president.

July 9. Minister Roig launches his stabilization plan. Sixfold increase in public utility
rate, devaluation, generalized freeze thereafter. Free interest rates and wages.

Rapanelli I. July 14. Minister Roig dies. Replaced by Nestor Rapanelli, also from
Bunge & Born.

July 18. The Cabinet sends Congress the Economic Emergency Act.

July 20. Menem in Stock Exchange: memorable address on capitalism.

July 25. Public utility invoices can be paid in two installments.

July 29. Significant success of new deposits in dollars.

August 1. The Central Bank issues Bocon (consolidation bond), to reschedule a portion
of the domestic public debt.
 August 2. Rapanelli announces price flexibility since September.

August 9. The Chamber of Representatives passes the Economic Emergency Act.

August 14. The Central Bank ends prefinancing of exports.

August 15. Privatization of 2 T.V. channels is announced, effective before the end of
1989.

August 22. A 4% tax is imposed on financial assets.

August 31. Cabinet analyses tax reform.

September 1. Secretary of Commerce announces postponement, for 60 days, of price

flexibilization.

September 7. Secretary of Coordination Ferreres announces that the exchange and

public utility rates will be fixed for the rest of 1989.

September 11. Reform of the Constitution is analyzed.

September 12. Privatization of the telephone company is announced. Effective for June,
1990. Discussions within the Executive delay sending the tax reform to Congress.

September 19. Letter of intention is sent to the IMF.

September 21. 7 percentual points reduction in import duties.

September 23. Welfare minister Corzo dies in plane crash. Replaced by Antonio Erman
Gonzalez, then vicepresident of the Central Bank. Roque Fernandez named vicepresident of the
Central Bank.

October 5. Vicepresident of Aerolineas Argentinas, fired for excessive wage drift.

October 11. Trade Union split: 2 CGTs (General Confederation of Labor).

October 18. Rapanelli sends Menem tax reform. Jorge Born disagrees publicly.
Treasury secretary Frigeri resigns.

October 31. Ferreres: next wage increase will last 6 months, and the next one for a year.
Fraga: if the market wants dollars, we will sell dollars. The Central Bank issues dollarized bills,
at 90 and 180 days.

November 15. Address of Rapanelli to insist on the maintenance of the program,

particularly on the fixed exchange rate.
 November 16. Emergency taxes, on cars and on profits of firms, and on net wealth of
the financial system.

November 23. Gonzalez Fraga resigns, and blames the minister of economics for the
decision to sell dollarized bills. Replaced by Egidio Iannella. Congress will discuss the tax
reform on December 10.

December 7. The Central Bank losses u$s 50 M per day.

December 8. The government fires 300 railmen. Rail strike.

Rapanelli II. December 11. Rapanelli announces new economic program, that increases
the exchange rate from A 650 to A 1.000, partially compensated with increase in export taxes
and reduction of import duties. Menem revised decision to fire 300 railmen.

González I. December 15. Exchange rate and banking holiday. Rapanelli resigns.
Replaced by Antonio Erman Gonzalez.

December 18. Gonzalez frees exchange rate and prices. Bocon will be paid with Bonex.
Exporters "induced" to sell dollars. Rodolfo Rossi replaces Iannella as president of the Central
Bank.

December 22. Privatization of 2 T. V. channels.

González II. December 28. Dollarization of the economy plans published in the press.
Government denies, but introduces a plan for paying domestic debt with Bonex 89, forcing
savers to accept 10 years Bonex 89 for their 7 days time deposits.

. . .

In addition to this brief sketch of events, it is important to present the following, among
the most remarkable hints to understand hyperinflation

A new definition of hyperinflation (generated while lunching de Pablo, Broda and Pablo
Gerchunoff). You live in a hyperinflation when the issue is not who pays the lunch, because
you can use the credit card, but who pays the tip, for which there is no alternative to cash.

People caught by the police for looting. "Why us, since we were not the first".

Announcing overall remarkation by loudspeakers. Unable to increase the price in each

item, a supermarket announced by loudspeakers that would charge an "X%" on the total
amount of each sale. People began to destroy products. The measure was quickly reversed...
and also announced by loudspeakers.
 Rationing. When the government rationed the sale of gasoline, employees continued
filling up the tanks of the cars, getting a "tip" for the "service".

Sale of numbers in exchange houses. In a hyperinflation the value of the dollar

increases every minute. "Civilized" exchange houses gives numbers, instead of forming a line.
A market for "numbers" developed, according to the expected increase of the dollar in, say, the
next half hour.

3. WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED

This final section of the essay presents, in checklist fashion, what we have learned from
the argentine hyperinflation of 1989. During April and May of that year we reread the existing
literature on past hyperinflations (both, on the european and the latin american experiences) and
from that, as well as from our consulting experience (in a hyperinflation clients talk several
times a day with their advisors), a "checklist for surviving hyperinflation" emerged, that was
presented to entrepreneurs in many seminars. The rest of this section presents a revised version
of the mentioned checklist, divided in "general remarks" and specific remarks for policymakers
and executives (manufacturing and financial).

3.1 General remarks.

1. In a hyperinflation trends are absolutely clear, because everything is exaggerated. If

someone says "I am confused", in fact he is saying "I am panicked". Obey your mind, because
she is right.

2. A hyperinflation is a temporary phenomena, like turbulence in a plane. It is terrible,

but it is temporary. Say this to all desperate people.

3. No hyperinflation is 100% like another one. But those who do not read detailed
descriptions of previous hyperinflations, make much more errors than those who do.

4. In a hyperinflation the training of the family is exactly the same as the training in the
firm (the only difference is the greater emotional involvement). And by family we mean
anyone that enters in the following principle: relative untrained, ends eating at home.
3.2 Remarks for policymakers.

5. Do not make waves. Do not try to compensate sectorial and/o regional difficulties,
generating new "economic policies".

6. The type of antihyperinflationary program to be applied depends on the type of

hyperinflation that exists.

7. What happens to stocks in the antihyperinflationary program depends on the history

of the country with regards to dealing of financial assets and liabilities.

3.3 Remarks for executives.

8. In a hyperinflation top executives work a lot. Details are crucial; consequently, most
routine operations during normal times, have to be personally monitored by top executives.

A multinational in Argentina lose 40% of the value of a loan got from headquarters, for
delaying the transfer from a Friday to a Monday... getting an exchange rate "regime" change in
the middle.

9. In a hyperinflation there is a single goal: survival. This principle has an implication

that merits elaboration. Properly understood ethical considerations give paramount importance
to survival, so after hyperinflation you exist, your enterprise exist, and your wage earners and
their families have a place where to work. In other words, do not pay attention to legislation
that jeopardize the survival of the firm (i.e.: in Argentina, in May 89, a price freeze was
decreed!).

10. A hyperinflation demands continuous renegotiation. Depersonalize the issue, stating

time and again that "something exogenous" shocked normal relations, so that "we have to talk".
Smile, be civilized... it helps a lot. After the hyperinflation an important principle became clear:
do not create physical shortages. Change payment terms, even ex-post; but significant market
shares occurred among those who continued supplying the market, and those who -temporarily-
refused to sell... at any price. In supermarkets, when a supplier stopped selling, a chart was
installed saying "this portion of the supermarket is empty because firm "X" is not selling".

11. Top executives of firms should talk among themselves, even "Manchesterian
competitors". To ease tensions, to share experiences, etc.

12. Local branches on foreign enterprises should "fax" headquarters daily, asking for
involvement or not questions afterwards. In a hyperinflation, even the brightest executives
commit gross errors. Ex-post wisdom is absolutely irrelevant, but may be particularly
embarrassing for local executives if they did not take precautions (the same principle holds in
the case of family firms, in which one of the brothers is in charge).

13. Nobody knows when the hyperinflation is going to end, nobody knows which
antihyperinflation program is going to succeed. "Error type I, error type II" reasoning suggests
that overworrying about the issue is clearly better than underestimation of the problem.

14. In a hyperinflation local sales almost disappear, while exports soar.

15. On the "uphill" road of the hyperinflation the dollar and the free interest rates
increase more than the inflation rate, when an antihyperinflationary program is expected occurs
exactly the same. Those who forecasted correctly the turning point, shifting from dollars and/o
deposits and/or bonds, to goods, made fortunes. Relation with employees. Labor relations
during the hyperinflation are crucial, and should be given top priority by the executive. The
following hints are relevant to minimize inevitable deterioration of the labor conditions.

16. In a hyperinflation there is no time for formal training. Each manager should
classify its human resources in "hyperinflation proof" and "paralyzed by the shock", working
with the former and keeping the latter for after the hyperinflation.

17. The only goal of the employees is also survival, and consequently, it is the only
subject of conversation. It is important that the top management shows up physically in the
offices, in the plants, to show that "they are there". In conversation with employees, top
executives should not underestimate the problem (because that would give the impression that
they are not understanding, and that is terrible), but should remember that it is temporary
phenomena. People gets crazy when see no end in sight (in terms of welfare, the worst weeks in
Argentina were those of the end of May and beginning of June, with looting, Alfonsín not
resigning and Menem waiting for December, and not July, when a greater rate of inflation was
"at the service of the antihyperinflationary program").

18. Personnel managers should be particularly sensible to real needs of employees. In a

hyperinflation wage advances are daily bread, contingent plan for supplying medicines and
food should be prepared, etc. This is an area where the monitoring of the top executive is
particularly crucial.

19. "Understanding" does not imply forgetting than in a hyperinflation people works
double and gets real payments halved. Top executive, while understanding, should clarify
among its employees about to need to concentrate on the job, to avoid errors; because what in
normal circumstances are minor errors, in a hyperinflation jeopardize the existence of the firm).

The end of each day. As explained, in a hyperinflation the relevant period is the day.
Accordingly, the top managers and his key employees should not abandon the firm before an
"end of the day meeting" in which a daily balance sheet of macro and micro relevant data is
analyzed.
 Relevant macro data: 1) news about power transfer (when applicable); 2) news about
the future economic program and integration of the economic team; 3) performance of daily
indicators: exchange rate, interest rates, stock market, meat and grain markets, etc.

Relevant micro data: 1) sales; 2) price and payments terms; 3) physical shortages of
inputs, food and medicines.

4. FINAL ADVICE

The least thing we would like for you is that you have to survive a hyperinflation. But if
you have to, then keep a diary, writing key events, your feelings, etc.; during that period, it will
help a lot your understanding; and when the hyperinflation is finished, it will help you to write
an essay almost as brilliant as this one.

Garfunkel, J. (1989): 59 semanas y media que conmovieron a la Argentina, Emecé.

Szewach, E. (1989): "La gran enseñanza que dejó el 28 de febrero", El Cronista Comercial,
March 14.
TABLE 1.

ARGENTINA: RELEVANT ECONOMIC INDICATORS

(1988, average of monthly averages; 1989, monthly rates -average to average-. Except indicated)

---------------- ------------ ------------ --- ----------- ----------- --- ----------- ----------- --- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ --- ------------ --- ------------ ------------ --- ------------ ------------ ------------ --- -------------- ------------ --------------
Inflation rate Interest rate Dollar Shares Prices of key |
Industrial production Purcha- Employment
------------ ------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ at the exportables | (seasonally adjusted) sing ------------ --------------
Period Consu- Whole- Passive Active Commer- Black Black/ Black/ Commer- stock ------------ ------------ | ------------ ------------ ------------ power Unem- Under-
mer sale ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- cial mar- PPP Commer- PPP cial/ market Meat Grains | Ove- Domest. Ex- of wages ployment
prices prices Nomi- Real Nomi- Real (offi- ket rate cial (%) PPP (montly variations, | rall market ports (3)(Jan. (% labor force)
nal (1) nal (2) cial) (%) (%) in current australs, %) | (1970 = 100) 84=100) (4)
---------------- ------------ ------------ --- ----------- ----------- --- ----------- ----------- --- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ --- ------------ --- ------------ ------------ --- ------------ ------------ ------------ --- -------------- ------------ --------------
|
1988 14,3 15,3 14,1 -0,2 14,5 -0,7 | 66,4 6,0 7,5
|
Jan.89 8,9 6,9 12,1 2,9 12,4 5,1 4,0 6,6 6,7 23,0 0,7 -18,1 16,8 -0,6 | 115 105 155 74,8
Feb. 9,6 8,4 18,9 8,5 21,3 11,9 12,5 48,7 8,0 62,6 38,7 -14,7 11,7 14,2 | 130 117 166 73,6
Mar. 17,0 18,9 21,7 4,0 22,0 2,6 32,2 61,9 18,1 99,1 90,1 -4,5 70,6 22,4 | 116 104 161 69,2
Apr. 33,4 58,0 44,5 8,3 53,7 -2,7 182,5 59,1 41,1 12,1 114,3 91,1 40,8 34,7 | 111 102 158 60,2
May. 78,5 104,5 127,8 27,6 145,0 19,8 116,8 109,7 82,9 8,4 145,7 126,6 113,9 117,4 | 93 82 150 55,0 7,7 8,3
Jun. 114,5 133,5 135,1 9,6 150,0 7,1 67,3 208,5 129,7 99,9 230,0 65,1 340,3 237,7 | 98 84 155 44,3
Jul. 196,6 209,1 40,1 -52,8 50,5 -51,3 170,4 58,7 227,2 17,3 60,0 36,4 99,4 103,7 | 99 80 152 56,1
Ago. 37,9 8,5 12,8 -18,2 14,1 5,2 15,4 2,0 21,3 3,7 34,5 29,7 5,1 6,7 5,6 | 99 83 146 54,3
Set. 9,4 2,5 7,4 -1,8 8,5 5,9 0,0 -3,0 5,1 0,5 24,1 23,5 62,2 -0,2 -5,2 | 105 86 140 53,9
Oct. 5,6 1,5 6,1 0,5 7,5 5,9 0,0 7,6 2,8 8,2 29,9 20,1 30,1 -2,2 7,6 | 105 87 138 57,4 7,0 8,3
Nov. 6,5 1,8 9,6 2,9 11,1 9,1 0,0 26,3 4,7 36,6 56,7 14,7 -8,1 9,2 8,0 | 106 89 135 63,0
Dic. 40,1 48,6 55,0 10,6 70,0 14,4 72,6 48,9 30,0 17,8 79,4 52,3 26,7 64,8 65,7 | 58,6

(monthly equivalent)

Jan-jul. 54,6 64,2 50,6 -2,6 57,1 -4,3 71,1 70,5 59,6 41,5 84,9 30,7 79,0 61,0 109 96 157 61,9
Aug-dec. 15,5 9,3 13,9 -1,4 16,6 6,7 12,2 12,3 10,1 10,4 35,1 22,4 17,1 11,0 104 86 140 57,4
Year 36,9 38,6 34,1 -2,1 38,7 0,1 43,5 43,3 36,7 27,6 62,2 27,2 50,0 37,9 107 93 151 60,0

SOURCES: INDEC, Central Bank and Carta Economica.

(1) Deflated by consumer prices

(2) Deflated by wholesale prices
(3) Real wages adjusted by the payment of inflationary tax beteewn payment period. The calculation assumes the maintenance of monthly payments.
(4) Those who work less than 35 hours per week.
TABLE 2.

INFLATION (CONSUMER PRICES)

(%)

---------------- -------------- ---------------- -------------- --------------

Weekly Equivalent
Month Week rate -------------- --------------
Day Month
---------------- -------------- ---------------- -------------- --------------

Jan.89 1 4,1 0,6 18,8

2 1,4 0,2 6,3
3 1,5 0,2 6,6
4 0,9 0,1 3,9
Feb.89 1 3,8 0,5 17,3
2 2,1 0,3 9,3
3 2,9 0,4 13,0
4 2,5 0,4 11,2
Mar.89 1 6,8 0,9 32,6
2 5,8 0,8 27,3
3 4,7 0,7 21,8
4 1,8 0,3 7,9
Apr.89 1 8,3 1,1 40,7
2 8,2 1,1 40,2
3 8,0 1,1 39,1
4 12,7 1,7 66,9
May.89 1 16,8 2,2 94,6
2 13,3 1,8 70,8
3 12,0 1,6 62,5
4 31,8 4,0 226,5
Jun.89 1 31,4 4,0 222,3
2 16,9 2,3 95,3
3 15,5 2,1 85,4
4 24,0 3,1 151,4
Jul.89 1 28,5 3,6 192,9
2 64,7 7,4 748,6
3 34,2 4,3 252,8
4 9,6 1,3 48,1
Aug.89 1 6,2 0,9 29,4
2 1,5 0,2 6,6
3 1,0 0,1 4,4
4 1,0 0,1 4,4
Set.89 1 6,0 0,8 28,4
2 0,6 0,1 2,6
3 0,1 0,0 0,4
4 2,8 0,4 12,6
Oct.89 1 3,9 0,5 17,8
2 1,2 0,2 5,2
3 0,8 0,1 3,5
4 1,0 0,1 4,4
Nov.89 1 1,0 0,1 4,4
2 1,6 0,2 7,0
3 1,4 0,2 6,1
4 2,2 0,3 9,8
Dec.89 1 3,8 0,5 17,3
2 14,2 1,9 76,7
3 21,2 2,8 128,0
4 20,6 2,7 123,2

Source: Carta Economica