Jaigest Poli4 PDF

Garcillano v.
House (2008)
Article VI, Sec 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.
FACTS:
• This case concerns the Hello Garci tapes (tapes), the wiretapped conversation between former Pres. Arroyo and COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano (Garci)
o The tapes allegedly contained PGMA’s instructions to Garci to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
elections.
• Consolidation of 2 cases: Prohibition&Injunction + TRO by 1. Garci and 2. Retired CA Justices Santiago Ranada and
Oswaldo Agcaoili; and intervened by Maj. Rex Sagge, witness summoned by the Senate during the hearings.
• The tapes were to be subject of legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both HoR and Senate.
o June 2005; at the HoR: Minority Leader Chiz Escudero delivered a speech “Tale of Two Tapes” & motioned a
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congressional investigation to be undertaken by 3 House committees.
o A month later, NBI Director Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and Atty. Samuel Ong submitted to the committees 7
alleged original tapes of the supposed 3-hour conversation.
o These tapes were played in the HoR despite debate on admissibility.
o Aug 3: HoR Committees decided to suspend hearings.
•
st
Garci filed the 1 case for Prohibition etc, praying:
o The HoR Committees be restrained from using the tapes of “illegally obtained” wiretapped conversations;
o Said tapes and any reference be stricken off the records of the inquiry.
o HoR Committees desist from further use of the tapes in any of the proceedings.
• HoR discussion and debates on the tapes stopped. LOL
• Two years later; at the Senate: Senator Lacson revived the issue with a privilege speech, “The Lighthouse that Brought
Darkness,” which promised the public the “whole unvarnished truth” regarding the tapes, and sought an inquiry.
o Sen. Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security.
o During the Senate’s plenary session, Sen. Gordon and Sen. D-Santiago argued that playing of the tapes would
be against the Constitution and Anti-Wiretapping Act;
o Sen. D-Santiago, however, recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the intelligence service of the
AFP, the PNP/other govt entities.
•
nd
Sept. 2007: Ranada and Agcaoili filed 2 case:
o Bar Senate from conducting legislative inquiry for such would violate the Anti-Wiretapping Act and Sec3, Art. III
of the Consti.
• Summary of the cases filed: if ayaw niyo na basahin yung prayers
o Garci: Prevent playing of the tapes in the House and subsequent inclusion in committee reports
o Ranada: Prohibit and stop conduct of the Senate inquiry on the tapes.
ISSUES/HELD:
(MAIN ISSUE) Can the Senate continue the legislative inquiry – NO.
•
nd
Note that SC only granted the 2 case (Ranada)
st
o 1 case (Garci’s) was dismissed by the SC for being moot and academic. Remember that the tapes have already
been played in the HoR and used for committee reports.
•
nd
But as to the 2 case (Ranada; bar Senate), the SC granted such because the Senate cannot be allowed to continue
with the inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
o Publication is intended to satisfy basic requirements of due process.
o It is imperative because it is unjust to punish/burden a citizen for the transgression of a law/rule of which he had
no notice whatsoever.
•
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What constitutes publication is in Art. 2 of the Civil Code.
• Quotes from Neri v. Senate: The phrase “duly published rules of procedure” requires the Senate of every Congress to
publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation.
o Every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after
o Senatorial elections are held every 3 years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, so each Senate may enact
a different set of rules as it may deem fit.

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Jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information
and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.
2
Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines.
Jaigest – PoliRev - 1

• From J. Carpio in the dissenting and concurring of Neri: the Senate under the 1987 Consti is not a continuing body because
less than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure
must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of 12 senators.
• Note on the meaning of “continuing body”: no doubt that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved
as an entity.
o BUT: the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently in the conduct of its day-to-day business
compared to the Senate of the Congress before it.
o The rules of the Senate itself confirm this. It provides: “…All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate
upon expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first
time.”
o So: for example, unpassed bills and legislative investigations of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon expiration of that Congress; merely optional on the Senate of succeeding Congress
to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time.
• It has been admitted that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers
of general circulation ONLY in 1995 and 2006.
•
th
BUT NOT with respect to the present Senate of the 14 Congress (2007).
(Sub-issue) Is publication on the Senate’s internet web page sufficient to constitute publication? – NO.
• Senate justifies non-publication by saying that the rules have never been amended since 1995, and that the same are
published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible at the Senate’s web page.
• This is not sufficient because:
o The consti provision merely says “…duly published rules of procedure…” WITHOUT any distinction whether the
rules have undergone amendments or revision or not.
o Tanada v. Tuvera: requires publication either in the O.G. or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Senate’s
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Rules confirm this, precluding any other form of publication.
• Invocation of the E-Commerce Act of 2000 is not sufficient to support claim of publication.
o Note that the consideration of electronic data/document in this law is only for evidentiary purposes
o Law merely recognizes admissibility of e-data/doc and does not make the internet a medium for publishing
laws, rules and regulation.
• Although the SC takes judicial notice, the Senate’s act of publishing its Rules in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya does not cure the infirmity.
o Legislative inquiries being challenged have been conducted pre-2008, so meh.
(Not so impt issue) Locus standi? – Both have locus standi.
• Garci: he stands to be directly injured by the HoR Committee’s actions and charges of electoral fraud.
• Ranada et al: their standing is justified for being taxpayers since the case necessarily involves expenditure of public funds.
• Case is of transcendental importance.

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Rules shall take effect 7 days after publication in 2 newspapers of general circulation.

Neri v. Senate (2008)

(edited A2015 digest)
FACTS:
• September 26, 2007 – NEDA Sec. Neri appeared before Senate Committees and testified for 11 hours on matters
concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation
and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE").
• Neri disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of
the NBN Project. He said that he informed President Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept
the bribe.
• When probed further on President Arroyo and Neri’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, he refused to answer,
invoking "executive privilege."
o Neri refused to answer questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
• The Committees required him to appear and testify once more. Later, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to the
Committees and requested them to dispense with Neri’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
• The letter of Executive Secretary Ermita (excerpt) stated that:
o Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and correspondence
between the President and public officials which are considered executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez; Chavez
v. PEA).
o Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and
policy decision making process and for the protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or
harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making.
o Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the President.
o The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
• November 20, 2007 - Neri did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive
privilege.
• November 22, 2007 - The Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt.
• November 29, 2007 - In Neri’s reply to Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate,
manifested his willingness to appear and requested that he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify."
• The Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance notice
of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008; In Re: P.S. Res. Nos.
127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN Project), citing Neri
in contempt of the Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such
time that he would appear and give his testimony.
• On the same date, Neri moved for the reconsideration of the above Order.
• The Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds:
1. The communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege – They fall under the
presidential communications privilege because
a. they related to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President,
b. they were received by a close advisor of the President, and
c. the Committees failed to adequately show a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
2. The Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order –
a. there was a valid claim of executive privilege,
b. their invitations to petitioner did not contain the questions relevant to the inquiry,
c. there was a cloud of doubt as to the regularity of the proceeding that led to their issuance of the contempt
order,
d. they violated Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution because their inquiry was not in accordance with the
"duly published rules of procedure," and
e. they issued the contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately.
• The Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration.
• Neri’s Comment:
o He charges the Committees with exaggerating and distorting the Decision of this Court.
o He Avers that there is nothing in it that prohibits respondent Committees from investigating the NBN Project or
asking him additional questions.
o Court merely applied the rule on executive privilege to the facts of the case.

ISSUE/ HELD:
(THE NEXT 2 ISSUES ARE ART. VII ISSUES) Is there a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our
legal system? YES/.
• The Committees argue that the Court’s declaration that presidential communications are presumptively privileged reverses
the "presumption" laid down in Senate v. Ermita that "inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure."
Respondent Committees then claim that the Court erred in relying on the doctrine in Nixon.
• SC The Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential communications
privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system.
o The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may
withhold from the public, " that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters"; and that "the right to information
does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by
which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings."
• The Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the "presumption that inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision.
o The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific
portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.
• While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground
invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
o Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by
the mere fact of being executive officials.
o Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
• Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the "exemption" being claimed by
the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch.
o This means that when an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464,
claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive
privilege given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
• Senate v. Ermita expounds on the premise of the foregoing ruling in this wise:
o Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain
information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the
effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement
of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to
authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
o Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive
privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial
to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or when it necessary to the
discharge of highly important executive responsibilities.
• As such, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific
matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3)
questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees’ investigation. Thus, the factual setting
of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v. Ermita.
• Senate v. Ermita explained why there should be no implied authorization or presumptive authorization to invoke executive
privilege by the President’s subordinate officials, as follows:
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom
is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power - the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of governments which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
(Underscoring supplied)
• Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President on a
matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized and be given
preference or priority, in the absence of proof of a compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one assailing such
presumption.
Is there a factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive
privilege? YES.
• The power to enter into an executive agreement is a “quintessential non-delegable presidential power.”
o The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power.
o The authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

• The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive.
o It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational proximity" was laid down in In re: Sealed Case precisely to
limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege:
§ Not every person who plays a role in the development of presidential advice, no matter how remote
and removed from the President, can qualify for the privilege. In particular, the privilege should
not extend to staff outside the White House in executive branch agencies. Only communications
at that level are close enough to the President to be revelatory of his deliberations or to pose a
risk to the candor of his advisers. See AAPS, 997 F.2d at 910 (it is "operational proximity" to the
President that matters in determining whether "[t]he President’s confidentiality interests" is
implicated). (Emphasis supplied)
o Organizational test: the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who
stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the
Executive’s organizational structure. Thus, respondent Committees’ fear that the scope of the privilege would be
unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational proximity test is unfounded.
• The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and in balancing
respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional
provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.
o It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized
interest in confidentiality.
§ The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign
nation as the bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated:
• The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature
in which this information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis supplied)
o Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.
o On disclosure: The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product
of the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the
agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with
particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
§ The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy, and
even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual
concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this might
have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger
and mischief, in relation to other powers.
o This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is
nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They
could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed
his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the
three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be
compelled to appear before respondents to answer the said questions.
o Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right to
information.
§ Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
§ Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Emphasis
supplied)
o In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, it was stated that there are no specific laws
prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be
obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to such rights, among them: (1) national security
matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.
National security matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters, as well as information
on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements. It was further held
that even where there is no need to protect such state secrets, they must be "examined in strict
confidence and given scrupulous protection."
o Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly
in aid of legislation, not the people’s right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in the assailed
Decision the distinction between these two rights. As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not to the
individual citizen.

o For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from
inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that are covered by
executive privilege.
Was the respondent Committees able to show that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the
exercise of their functions? NO.
• The jurisprudential test laid down on executive privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a
showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.
• In the MR, the Committees argue that the information elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in the discharge of
their legislative functions, among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and (b) to curb graft and
corruption.
• In U.S. v. Nixon - The Court weighed between presidential privilege and the legitimate claims of the judicial process. In
giving more weight to the latter, the Court ruled that the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
o We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal
trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
• In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a criminal case but rather
with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its legislative functions.
• Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical and
specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies.
• The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate Committees
to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be elicited by the answers
to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized
assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference
to pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills could not be determined without the said information
sought by the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed out by the Honorable Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Concurring
Opinion:
o ...If respondents are operating under the premise that the president and/or her executive officials have
committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or prevented from recurring by remedial legislation,
the answer to those three questions will not necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding
with such legislation. They could easily presume the worst of the president in enacting such legislation.
• Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that
the Senate could still come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other words,
the information being elicited is not so critical after all. Thus: (excerpt)
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
How about the third question, whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about
the alleged bribe. How critical is that to the lawmaking function of the Senate? And the question is may they craft a Bill
a remedial law without forcing petitioner Neri to answer this question?
ATTY.AGABIN
Well, they can craft it, Your Honor, based on mere speculation. And sound legislation require that a proposed Bill
should have some basis in fact.
• The failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to pinpoint the specific need for the information sought or how the
withholding of the information sought will hinder the accomplishment of their legislative purpose is very evident in the above
oral exchanges.
o Due to the failure of the respondent Committees to successfully discharge this burden, the presumption in favor
of confidentiality of presidential communication stands.
• On the graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in the exercise of this
function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature.
o This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress.
o And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by
privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight.
o Under our Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty "to investigate any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient."
(FOCUS HERE FOR ART. VI ISSUE) Did the respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt order? YES.
• The Committees insist that they did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order because (1) there
is no legitimate claim of executive privilege; (2) they did not violate the requirements laid down in Senate v. Ermita; (3) they
issued the contempt order in accordance with their internal Rules; (4) they did not violate the requirement under Article VI,
Section 21 of the Constitution requiring the publication of their Rules; and (5) their issuance of the contempt order is not
arbitrary or precipitate.

(1) Already answered.
(2) The Committees’ second argument rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, requiring invitations or subpoenas to
contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry" along with the "usual indication of the subject of inquiry
and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof" is not provided for by the Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum. The
Court disagrees.
• Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to function effectively.
o The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress’
power.
o The legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus, prevent the "roving commissions" referred
to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson.
• Likewise, witnesses have their constitutional right to due process.
o They should be adequately informed what matters are to be covered by the inquiry.
o It will also allow - them to prepare the pertinent information and documents.
• To our mind, these requirements concede too little political costs or burdens on the
part of Congress when viewed vis-à-vis the immensity of its power of inquiry.
• Clearly, Neri’s request to be furnished an advance copy of questions is a reasonable demand that should have been granted.
Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testificandum dated November 13, 2007 made no specific reference to any pending Senate
bill. It did • not also inform petitioner of the questions to be asked. As it were, the subpoena merely commanded him to
"testify on what he knows relative to the subject matter under inquiry."
(3) Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the "Rules") are beyond the reach of
this Court. While it is true that this Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of
government, however, when a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith.
• United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was stated thus: ‘The Constitution empowers each House to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained."
• In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because there appears to be a clear
abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees.
o Section 18 of the Rules provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness before it who
disobey any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions by the
Committee or any of its members." (Emphasis supplied)
In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt order because
during the deliberation of the three (3) respondent Committees, only seven (7) Senators were present. This
number could hardly fulfill the majority requirement needed by respondent Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations which has a membership of seventeen (17) Senators and respondent Committee on
National Defense and Security which has a membership of eighteen (18) Senators. With respect to respondent
Committee on Trade and Commerce which has a membership of nine (9) Senators, only three (3) members were
present.
• Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt order is flawed. Instead
of being submitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondent Committees, the contempt order was prepared and
thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As a result, the contempt order which was issued on January
30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the proceedings that took place on said date. Records clearly show that
not all of those who signed the contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when the matter was
taken up.
o Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)
• All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’ settled expectation. If the limitations are not
observed, the witness’ settled expectation is shattered.
o Here, how could there be a majority vote when the members in attendance are not enough to arrive at such
majority?
o Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in
which the matter has been fully deliberated upon.
• There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the concerns and objections of the members are fully
articulated in such proceeding.
o We do not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish.
o This is especially true here where what is involved is the contempt power.
o It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness
who has the highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules.

(4) The Committees argue that the Senate does not have to publish its Rules because the same was published in 1995 and in 2006.
Further, they claim that the Senate is a continuing body; thus, it is not required to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealed or
amended.
• There is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of
each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.
• The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV: UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by
the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time. (emphasis supplied)
• Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislative investigations,
of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely
optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if
presented for the first time.
• This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is
reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states: AMENDMENTS TO, OR
REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
o SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their
term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval.
(emphasis supplied)
o DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed. (emphasis supplied)
• Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an election and
the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators
shall begin their term. However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from
the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed.
• Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules.
o The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation."
o The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed.
In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on
legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress.
o The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within
the rule on unfinished business.
(5) The Committees’ last argument is that their issuance of the contempt order is not precipitate or arbitrary. The Court disagrees.
• As we have stressed before, petitioner is not an unwilling witness, and contrary to the assertion of respondent Committees,
petitioner did not assume that they no longer had any other questions for him.
• He repeatedly manifested his willingness to attend subsequent hearings and respond to new matters.
• His only request was that he be furnished a copy of the new questions in advance to enable him to adequately prepare as
a resource person.
• He did not attend the November 20, 2007 hearing because Executive Secretary Ermita requested respondent Committees
to dispense with his testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Note that petitioner is an executive official under the
direct control and supervision of the Chief Executive. Why punish petitioner for contempt when he was merely directed by
his superior? Besides, save for the three (3) questions, he was very cooperative during the September 26, 2007 hearing
• They could have informed petitioner of their ruling and given him time to decide whether to accede or file a motion for
reconsideration.
• After all, he is not just an ordinary witness; he is a high- ranking official in a co-equal branch of government. He is an alter
ego of the President. The same haste and impatience marked the issuance of the contempt order, despite the absence of
the majority of the members of the respondent Committees, and their subsequent disregard of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration alleging the pendency of his petition for certiorari before this Court.
AZCUNA, .J: SEPARATE OPINION
• Grant MR and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

• It was the intent of the Constitutional Commission to preserve the nature of the Senate as a continuing body to provide an
institutional memory in the legislature

QUISUMBING, . J: SEPARATE OPINION ON MR
• Deny MR
• Respondents had neglected to observe elements of due process on more than one occasion in their proceedings, and
thereby committed grave abuse of discretion which is proscribed by the present fundamental law.
• Senate is constitutionally required to publish its rules of procedure on the conduct of legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.
• In the absence of a published rule of procedure on a matter which is the subject of legislative inquiry, any action which
affects substantial rights of persons would be anathema, and risks unconstitutionality. Even if there is such a rule or statute
duly published, if it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ in its application, the rule or statute would be repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves the law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
• Respondents did not consider petitioner’s request for an advance copy of the questions that would be asked of him, when
in fact it was not unreasonable and difficult to comply with.
• Neri was entitled to a ruling on his claim of executive privilege. For initially, both sides had agreed in open court to allow
more exhaustive inquiry in the Senate on this matter. But as respondents themselves admitted, they did not rule on the
claim of executive privilege, but instead sanctioned Neri for contempt.

Arnault v. Nazareno (1950)
FACTS:
• Petition for habeas corpus to relieve Jean Arnault, a lawyer, from his confinement in Bilibid.
• He was committed to prison by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate when Arnault refused to reveal the name of the
person to whom he gave money to, in relation to a Senate inquiry.
• Antecedent facts:
o In October 1949, the PH Govt, through the Rural Progress Administration (RPA), bought 2 estates known as
Buenavista (P4.5M) and Tambobong (P500k).
o P1M was paid to Ernest Burt, a non-resident American, through his attorney-in-fact in the PH, the Associated
Estates Inc., represented by Arnault.
§ This was for Burt’s alleged interest in the Buenavista Estate.
o P500k was also paid to Burt, through his attorney in fact, the North Manila Devt. Co, also represented by Arnault,
for Burt’s alleged interest in the Tambobong Estate.
o The Buenavista Estate was originally owned by the San Juan de Dios Hospital.
o The PH Govt had a 25-year lease contract on Buenavista, with an option to purchase it for P3M within the same
period.
o However, in 1946, within that 25-year period of the lease, the Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate to Burt, on
installment.
§ But Burt was only able to pay the downpayment of P10k and failed to pay the subsequent installments.
o On the other hand, the Tambobong Estate was originally owned by the Philippine Trust Company
o In 1946, PTC sold Tambobong to Burt but since Burt was only able to make the first P10k downpayment, PTC
sold the Tambobong Estate to the RPA.
o Under Art. 1504 of the Civil Code, the RPA made a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation
of his contract to purchase with the PTC due to his failure to pay the installment of P90k within the period of 9
months.
o CFI ordered the cancellation of Burt’s certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the RPA.
o [N.B. Basically, Burt had an interest of P10k in the Buenavista Estate and another P10k in the Tambobong Estate
representing the downpayments he made. Combined interest for the 2 estates = P20k.]
• Because of these facts, the Govt, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the RPA’s Board of Directors and as
Chairman of the Philippine National Bank’s Board (from which the money was borrowed), accomplished the purchase of
the 2 estates in 1949.
• In 1950, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 8, creating a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates Deal.
• The special committee called and examined various witnesses, including Arnault.
• The most intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of
the Govt’s paying to Burt the total sum of P1.5M for his alleged interest of only P20k in the two estates.
• Arnault testified that:
o The 2 checks aggregating P1.5M payable to Burt were delivered to him on the October 29, 1949
o On the same day, he opened a new account in the name of Ernest Burt with the PNB in which he deposited both
checks
o He also drew from the account two checks:
§ 1 – for P500k which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies Inc.
§ 2 – for P440k payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
• The committee wanted to determine the ultimate recipient of the P440k that gave rise to this case.
• Arnault refused to answer, raising his right against self-incrimination.
o He only answered that the transaction was legal as it did not violate any law, but would violate the right of a citizen
to privacy in his dealings with other people, should he disclose said transaction.
• In the first 3 hearings, he claimed that he did not remember the name of the person to whom he gave the P440k but in the
last hearing, he was claiming that his answer might incriminate him.
• Due to the adoption of the resolution, Arnault was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at Arms, Leon Nazareno.
ISSUES/HELD:
The SC decided to discuss American jurisprudence and doctrines since the PH Constitution was patterned after the
American system.
• Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied.
• In other words, the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function.

• A legislative body cannot legislative wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to effect or change.
• Where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must be had to others who do possess
it.
• Experience has shown that mere requests for information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete.
• Hence, means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
• The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its members for disorderly behavior, does
not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.
• But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter
into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
• However, the PH Congress has a wider range of legislative field than either the US Congress or a State Legislature.
o So the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider.
o It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded.
• The special committee’s jurisdiction is not challenged by Arnault.
• As a result of the yet uncompleted investigation, the investigating committee has recommended and the Senate approved
3 bills
Does the Senate have power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave
the P440k? – Yes
• Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional
right against self-incrimination.
• The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a
power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member.
• Every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry or investigation.
• So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry.
• But from this it does not follow that every question that may be propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed
or possible legislation.
• The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to any proposed or possible legislation.
• The necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the
sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited
from a single question.
• Where the questions are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry a witness rightfully may refuse to answer.
• Hence, where the alleged immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to
contest its jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention.
• The fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to
correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.
Was the question for the refusal to answer which Arnault was held in contempt by the Senate pertinent to the matter under
inquiry? – YES
• Senate Resolution No. 8 requires the Special Committee to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440k involved in
said deal is pertinent to that determination—it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined.
• The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to
any proposed legislation.
• It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed
or possible legislation;
o What is required is that it is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
• Arnault has not challenged the validity of Senate Resolution No. 8 and that resolution expressly requires the committee to
determine the parties responsible for the deal.
• It must be presumed that the Senate has acted in the due performance of its constitutional function in instituting the inquiry,
if the act is capable of being so construed.
• If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed
testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience to its process may be enforced by the committee by
imprisonment.

Can Senate commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session? – Yes because Senate is a
continuing body.
• The Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and so divided that
the seats of only 1/3 become vacant every 2 years, 2/3 always continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may
occur thru death or resignation.
• Members of the House of Representatives are all elected for a term of 4 years; so that the term of every Congress is 4
years.
•
nd
The resolution of the Senate committing Arnault was adopted during the first session of the 2 Congress, which began on
th
the 4 Monday of January and ended in May 18, 1950.
• Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, it could be enforced until the final
nd
adjournment of the last session of the 2 Congress in 1953.
• There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and
not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body.
• The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its
constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
• Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the
duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation.
• To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which
that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to its legislative function.
• The power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
• But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does
not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or the House of Representatives.
• There is not limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in this case.
• If we should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would
have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the
witness until the investigation is completed—an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.
Can Arnault invoke the privilege against self-incrimination? – NO

• As against Arnault’s inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank,
sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority.
• The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen’s obligation, consistent with his right under the Constitution.

Sabio v. Gordon (2006)
FACTS:
• Background:
o In 1986, Cory Aquino issued E.O. No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) to
recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
§ Section 4(b) of said E.O. provides that: "No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance."
o The Constitutionality of this section is being questioned for going against the power of the Senate to conduct
legislative inquiries under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution:
§ “the Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected”.
• Antecedent Facts:
o In 2006, Senator Santiago introduced PH Senate Resolution No. 455, directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on
the anomalous losses incurred by the:
§ Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
§ Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
§ PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC)
§ due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors
§ These companies allegedly gave out loans to its committee members or BoD without payment given
back, subjecting the companies to income losses.
o The resolution was referred to the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises.
o Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG was repeatedly invited by the Senate to be one of the resource persons of
the inquiry.
§ Sabio declined, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1.
§ He contends that the section is a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry.
§ Furthermore, the transactions referred to are subject of pending cases before the regular courts, the
SB and the SC and that because of this, he cannot testify on the principle of sub judice.
o Unconvinced, the committee issued an order directing the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms to place Sabio and others
under arrest for contempt of the Senate.
§ The order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the members of the
committee.
§ Pursuant to this, Sabio was arrested at his office and taken to the Senate premises where he was
detained.
o Sabio filed with the SC a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee. He argues, among others,
that:
§ The Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without justifiable cause
§ The Senate Committees are NOT vested with the power of contempt
ISSUES/HELD:
Was Section 4(b) of E.O. No 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution? – YES
• Discussion on the power of inquiry of Congress:

o American courts have considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate.
o Either house may institute an investigation as to any matter affecting the public interests since the right to pass
laws, necessarily implies the right to obtain information upon any matter which may become the subject of a law.
o The power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
• SC: Section 4(b) is directly against Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution.
o A mere provision of law cannot impose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, especially in the absence of
any constitutional basis.
o The power of inquiry of Congress, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.
o It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power
of Congress to regulate or even abolish” like the PCGG.
Do the Senate Committees have power to punish for contempt of the Senate? – YES
• SC held that the order, approved by the Senate President and signed by 15 senators, was not made under the authority of
a Senate Committee, but of the entire Senate.
• At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 also grants the power of inquiry to the respective committees of Congress.
o There is a direct conferral of power to these committees.
• The contempt power of congress is based on REASON and POLICY which is considered implied or incidental to the exercise
of legislative power.

o How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it
cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information if it is impotent to punish a defiance
of its power and authority?
o Hence, it is a matter of SELF-PRESERVATION that the Congress be given contempt power, independent from
the judiciary.
o The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis.
Other Constitutional violations:
• Article XI, Section 1: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives."
o Section 4(b) being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability since it
places members of the PCGG beyond the reach of the courts, Congress and other admin bodies.
• Article II, Section 28: “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.”
• Article III, Section 7: “The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.”
o The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress but also the citizenry. The
people are equally concerned with this proceeding and have the right to participate therein in order to protect
their interests.
o Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information and
other data in aid of its power to legislate.
• Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 being inconsistent with the Constitution, is deemed repealed.

Senate v. Ermita (SUPRA)
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either
House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.
SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary (2003)
Art. VI, Sec. 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
FACTS:
• Case is about the Oakwood Mutiny. Art. 6, sec. 23 (Congress’ emergency power) and Art. 7, sec. 18 (Martial Law powers)
are read together in this case.
• July 27, 2003 - 300 junior officers from the AFP, armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives stormed into the
Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati.
o They demanded the resignation of the President GMA and other executive officials due to corruption.
• PGMA then, pursuant to Sec 18, Article VII of the Constitution, issued Proclamation 427 (Declaring A State Of Rebellion)
and General Order 4 (Directing The Armed Forces Of The Philippines And The Philippine National Police To Suppress
Rebellion)
• The Oakwood occupation ended the evening of the same day. – HOWEVER, PGMA lifted the state of rebellion only on
August 1, 2003 through Proclamation 435 (Declaring That The State Of Rebellion Has Ceased To Exist).
• In the interim, several petitions which were consolidated into this case were filed by several parties against the
administration. All of which challenge the constitutionality of the Proclamation and the General Order which declared a
state of rebellion and called out the Armed Forces to suppress it.
o Cong. Suplico, et al. claim that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is a "superfluity," and is
actually an exercise of emergency powers, thus amounting to a usurpation of the power of Congress
granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
o Sen. Pimentel asserts that the issuances are an “exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the
Constitution” and that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation
of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
o Sanlakas, Partido ng mga Manggagawa (PM) and Social Justice Society (SJS) claim that Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution does not authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion. SJS submits that the proclamation
is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII (to report to Congress within
48 hours from declaring Martial Law)
§ They also claim that the issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers because
Congress has not delegated any such power.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is PGMA’s Declaration of a state of rebellion unconstitutional for constituting an indirect exercise of emergency powers,
which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress? – NO
• The proclamation of the President was not unconstitutional as it was within her powers as the Chief Executive or
as Commander-in-Chief.
• The Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion to exercise the calling out
power. Sec 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President a sequence of graduated powers:
o (1) calling out power,
o (2) power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
o (3) the power to declare martial law.
o Only the last 2 of these conditions require the conditions of an actual invasion or rebellion.
o These conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power.
o Only criterion needed for President to call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion: 'whenever it becomes necessary'
• Sec 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. – because the President
has not only Commander-in-Chief powers but also Executive powers.
• From US constitutional history, it shows that the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough and became more so
when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath.
• The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion comes from her powers as chief executive and from her Commander-
in-Chief powers.

o Section 4 Chapter 2, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 gives the president the authority to
proclaim upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend.
• Therefore, a declaration of a state of rebellion is unnecessary. It only gives notice that such a state exists and that the armed
forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
o Such a declaration is a mere superfluity & legally insignificant
Do the declarations amount to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement under
Art. VII, sec. 18? – NO, such an argument is a leap of logic.
• No indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the "theater of war" or that military authorities have taken
over the functions of civil government.
• No allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights.
• No indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers.
• In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.
[MOST RELEVEANT] Do the declarations constitute emergency powers (Art. VI, sec. 23(2)) which depend on a grant of
Congress before the President may exercise such? -- NO.
• The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of
her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers – these are purely executive powers, vested on the President
by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2),
Article VI.
MINOR ISSUES:
Are the petitions moot? – YES

• The Solicitor General is correct in saying that the petition is moot considering that the President has already lifted the so-
called state of rebellion.
• However, the Court will decide a question otherwise moot if it is “capable of repetition yet evading review” such as the case
at present.
• A similar situation already arose during President Arroyo’s declaration of a state of rebellion during the May 1, 2001 siege
of Malacanang (“EDSA TRES”) although the petitions assailing it were dismissed for being moot. This time, the Court
decided to rule on it despite being moot in order to prevent similar questions from reemerging.
Do petitioners have standing? – Only the Members of Congress
• They are the ones who allege the usurpation of the power of Congress in Section 23(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
o According to the case of Philconsa v. Enriquez, an act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by any member of Congress.
• The other petitioners don’t have standing because they have not suffered any real injury caused by the assailed
proclamation and general order.
Separate Opinions
• PANGANIBAN, J. (Dissenting)
o There is no actual or justiciable controversy in the case. The petitions must thus be dismissed.
• YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. (Dissenting)
o I vote for Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, issued on July 27, 2003 by Respondent President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, to be declared NULL and VOID for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. All other orders issued and action taken based on those issuances, especially
after the Oakwood incident ended in the evening of July 27, 2003, e.g., warrantless arrests, should also be
declared null and void.
• SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. (Dissenting)
o In fine, may I state that every presidential claim to a power must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake
is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. The powers of the President are not as particularized
as are those of Congress. Enumerated powers do not include undefined powers, as what the majority would want
to point out. I state once more that there is no provision in our Constitution authorizing the President to declare
"a state of rebellion." Not even the constitutional powers vested upon her include such power.
o WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petitions. Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

David v. Arroyo (2006)
FACTS:
•
th
February 2006, around the celebration of the 20 anniversary of EDSA I, Pres. GMA issued Presidential Proclamation 1017
(PP 1017).
o This was due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of Oplan Hackle I, or the plan to
assassinate PGMA.
o To implement PP 1017, PGMA issued General Order No. 5 (GO 5).
o Both laws were aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of these Magdalo members to dethrone the
government.
• Based on PP 1017, PGMA cancelled all plans to commemorate EDSA 1 and revoked all permits involving rallies and other
public organization or movements.
o Despite such revocation, Kilusang Mayo Uno, which was headed by Randolf David, still conducted their rally.
o This then resulted to their arrest in violation of PP 1017.
• The offices of ‘The Daily Tribune’ and ‘Malaya’, local newspapers who were known to be anti-PGMA, was raided by the
CIDG.
o They seized and confiscated anti-PGMA articles and write-ups.
• Beltran, a member of Anakpawis, was also arrested.
o His arrest was grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos.
• March 2006, GMA issued PP 1021 that declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
o David et al. contended that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared
by the president for such power is reposed in Congress.
o Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law.
o Olivares-Cacho, the editor of “Malaya” contended that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those
of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth.
• David et al. contended that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights.
• OSG contended that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration
of PP 1021.
o Moreover, it contended that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over
power.
ISSUE/HELD:
Are PP 1017 and GO 5 constitutional?—They are partly constitutional/unconstitutional!
• On the issue of the case being moot and academic due to the enactment of PP 1021 that declared the national emergency
in PP 1017 ceased to exist, SC here held that the case is still within the power of the SC to decide on. This is based on the
doctrine of operative fact.
o In this case, since the assailed actions were done during the validity of PP 1017, the same was held to be valid
at the time, hence, persons which committed acts in violation of the same could still be held the liability.
• In this case, to determine the constitutionality of the said laws, the SC divided the operative portion of PP 1017 in 3 important
provisions: (1) calling-out power, (2) take care power, and (3) power to take over.
Calling-out power
• SC cited the case of Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary that explained the calling out powers of the President as given by
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Constitution.
• Calling-out power is the power to ‘call out’ armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
o SC cited Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, which the SC held that “the only criterion for the exercise of
the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
o In this case, considering the circumstances then basing on her vast intelligence network, PGMA found it
necessary to issue PP 1017.
o SC held that she was in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.
o Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion and rebellion.
o But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this
reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers.

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Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.xxx

• SC held that PGMA’s declaration of a ‘state of rebellion’ was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment
5
or interest, a declaration allowed under Sec. 4 of the Revised Administrative Code.
o Citing Sanlakas, this declaration is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written.
• In this case, PP 1017 is more than that.
o In declaring a state of national emergency, PGMA did not only rely on Sec. 18, Art. 7 of the Constitution, a
provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. PGMA also relied on
Sec. 17, Art. 12, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and
business affected with public interest.
o PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.
• SC further held that PP 1017 was not a declaration of Martial Law. The wording of PP 1017 would clearly indicate that the
intention of PGMA was in exercise of her calling-out powers for armed forces to assist her to suppressing or preventing
lawless violence.
Take care power
• SC held that the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in
existing laws.
o He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.
o In the exercise of such function, the President may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-
in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the PNP under the DILG.
o David et al. contended that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it gives PGMA the power to enact laws and decrees in
violation of Sec. 1, Art. 6 of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the
clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.
• SC compared PP 1017 to an earlier Proclamation of Marcos that possess an enabling clause that states ‘to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.’
o In PP 1017 issued by PGMA is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
• SC held that PGMA cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by President Marcos under PP 1081.
• SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants PGMA the authority to promulgate
decrees.
o Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives.
• SC further held that PGMA has no authority to enact decrees.
o It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call
the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property
relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to
enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Power to take over
• Pursuant to Sec. 17, Art. 12 of the Constitution, PGMA, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the
military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees.
• SC held that PGMA had the power to invoke such because during the existence of the state of national emergency, PP
1017 grants the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
•
nd
SC held that the 2 paragraph of Sec. 23, Art. 6 of the Constitution refers not only to war but also to other national
emergency.
o SC held that the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to
declare a ‘state of national emergency’ pursuant to Sec. 18, Art. 7 (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress
(like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so.
o Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a ‘state of
national emergency.’
o The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national
emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.
• But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, is a
different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
• SC held that Congress is the repository of emergency powers.

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SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the
existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which
shall have the force of an executive order.

o This is evident in the tenor of Sec. 23(2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, it may not be possible
or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to
allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
o (1) There must be a war or other emergency.
o (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
o (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
o (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
• SC held that the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power
to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether
exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the type of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over.
• In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Sec. 17, Article 7 in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
In sum, PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL with regard to (1) PGMA’s calling out power on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence and (2) PGMA’s power to declare national emergency pursuant to Sec. 17, Art. 7 of the Constitution. However, the latter
does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior
legislation. However, the provision of PP 1017 regarding the power to command the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless
violence are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever
is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. However, considering
the acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Ampatuan v. Puno (2011)
FACTS:
• On the day of the Maguindanao Massacre in which 57 men and women died, GMA issued Proclamation 1946, placing the
provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.
o She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake measures to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence, as may be allowed by the Constitution.
• After three days, GMA issued Administrative Order 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the
President to the DILG.
o This was later amended due to the terminologies used. AO 273-A was issued changing the word “transferring” to
“delegating”.
o DILG Secretary was Ronaldo Puno.
• Petitioners Zaldy Ampatuan and all ARMM officials filed this petition for prohibition. They allege that:
o The proclamation and orders empowered the DILG to take over the ARMM and seize the powers of the regional
government, which is in violation of the principle of local autonomy and the Constitution.
o The power given by the president to the DILG secretary is not merely administrative in nature but is equivalent to
control, since the secretary can suspend the ARMM officials and replace them.
o That there is no factual basis to declare a state of emergency since there is no critical violent incidents that
occurred in Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato.
o That the deployment of the troops therein and the taking over of the ARMM constitute and invalid exercise of the
President’s emergency powers.
• Office of the Solicitor General:
o The purpose of the proclamation was to restore peace and order and not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy.
o GMA issued the proclamation pursuant to her “calling out” power as commander-in-chief under the first sentence
of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
§ This determination rests solely on the wisdom of the president.
o GMA merely delegated supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego. This
was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.
§ It did not grant authority to take over the ARMM or suspend or replace the officials.
ISSUES/HELD:
Was there a violation of the principle of local autonomy? – NO
• The DILG Secretary did not take over the control of the powers of the ARMM.
• When the police took the Governor (Ampatuan) of the ARMM into custody for the alleged involvement with the massacre,
it was the Vice Governor (Adiong) that assumed the vacancy.
o Adiong then named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly (Sahali-Generale) as the acting ARMM
Vice-Governor.
o Hence, there was no take over of the administration or operations by the secretary.
Was there an invalid exercise of emergency powers by GMA? – NO
• Petitioners: President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP
personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation.
• SC: Such deployment, by itself, is not an exercise of emergency powers, as stated under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution:
o (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon
the next adjournment thereof.
• In this case, the president did not proclaim a national emergency but only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned.
• The calling out of the AFP was to prevent or suppress lawless violence was a power that the Constitution directly vests in
the President. She need not be given congressional authority to exercise the same.
Was there factual basis for the actions? – YES
• While the courts may inquire into the factual bases for the exercise of the president’s power, it would generally defer to her
judgment unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion.
• In this case, the president, as commander-in-chief, has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which
may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state.
o In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations
to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property.
o Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and
decisively if it were to have any effect at all.

• Factual bases:
o Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent families in Maguindanao.
o It is known that both families have an arsenal of armed followers and that each of them also have civilian armies.
o Since the victims of the massacre are members of the Mangudadatu family and the main perpetrators are
allegedly the members and followers of the Ampatuan family, the police and military had to prepare for retaliatory
actions from the Mangudadatu clan and offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.
o There were reports that members of rebel armed groups (RAGs) were moving towards Maguindanao to support
the Mangudadatu clain in its armed fight against the Ampatuans.
• Hence, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore
and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.
o To pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action.
o She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that
continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance (1994)
SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
FACTS:
• VAT is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services.
o It is equivalent to 10% (now 12%) of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold,
bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services.
• RA No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code.
• How RA 7716 became law:
o House Bill No. 11197 was a consolidation of several bills seeking to amend the NIRC relative to the VAT. It was
approved and was sent to the Senate.
o The Senate referred it to its Committee on Ways and Means and approved the created Senate Bill No. 1630.
o They were sent to a conference committee which recommended that in H. No. 11197 in consolidation with S. No.
1630, be approved.
o The conference committee bill was approved by the HOR on Apr. 27 and the Senate on May 2.
o The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It became
Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two newspapers of general
circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect.
• These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various
grounds:
o Procedural Issues: Violation of Art. VI, §24 (on revenue bills), § 26(2), on passage of bills and the extent of the
power of the bicameral conference committee.
o Substantive Issues: Violation of provisions in the Bill of Rights (§ 1,4,5,10); Art. VI, § 28(1) – uniform and equitable
taxation, Art. VI, § 28(3) – on special fund for a special purpose
ISSUES/ HELD:
Did RA 7716 violate the Constitution by not originating from the House of Representatives? NO
• It is not the law but the revenue BILL which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives.
o It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in
the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole.
o To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not
only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments”.
• What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of
the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives.
o This is from the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to
be more sensitive to the local needs and problems.
• Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
Was the procedure in the Constitution violated since S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required
by the Constitution? NO, because of Prez certification.
• For S. No. 1730, the second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994.
o But this was VALID, because on February 24, 1994 and again on March 22, 1994, the President had certified
S. No. 1630 as urgent.
• The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days.
o The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in. Art. VI,
§26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law:
§ (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and
§ (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
o It would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment
of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency.
o For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible
as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment.
• Petitioners allege that there was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not
being an unusual condition in this country.

o Court basically said that since no member in the Senate questioned such, and there is no showing that the
Senators were deprived of the time needed to study the bills, then the factual determination by the President
stands. This is in accordance with respect of a co-equal department.
Is the bill which the Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630, which became Republic
Act No. 7716, valid? YES
• It is claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill
and that these provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is made of the fact that in the
last two days of its session on April 21 and 25, 1994 the Committee met behind closed doors.
o There is nothing unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference Committee met in executive
sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind closed doors, with
only the conferees present.
• It is VALID even if an entirely new bill emerges out of a Conference Committee.
o If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot
propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as
such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee.
o It is in the nature of an "Amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which being that the
new version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.
• It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in
the House bill or in the Senate bill.
• Moreover, it is legislative practice in Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which, though
germane, have not been committed to the committee.
• Besides, the conference committee report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become
valid as an act of the legislative department.
Does the Conference Committee report have to pass three readings? NO.
• Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone three readings in
each of the two houses.
o If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the
compromise bill.
o The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by each house on a "take it or leave it" basis, with
the only alternative that if it is not approved by both houses, another conference committee must be appointed.
• Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of
Congress, not to the conference committee report.
o In fact, the bills (H. No. 11197, S. No. 1630) both passed three readings in the HOR and the Senate.
Does the enrolled bill doctrine apply? YES.
• Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also
of its due enactment.
• Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor.
• Where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis
than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared,
we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill.
• To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.
Does it violate the one-subject rule in Art. VI, § 26(1)? NO.
• It is entitled “An Act Restructuring The Value Added Tax (Vat) System, Widening Its Tax Base And Enhancing Its
Administration, And For These Purposes Amending And Repealing The Relevant Provisions Of The National Internal
Revenue Code”
• PAL is questioning such, since the removal of their exemption is not embodied in the title.
• Court held that since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this
is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before, then such is valid.
• It is sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject
thus expressed.
Does it violate freedom of the press and religion? NO
• PPI (one of the Petitioners) contended that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those
granted to others, the law discriminates against the press.

o Since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative.
o To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay
income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
• As to the Philippine Bible Society, the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable
sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization.
• The fee of P1,000, is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of
registration. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much
less a constitutional right.
Does it violate the uniform and equitable taxation clause? NO
• Petitioners allege that the VAT is regressive. What Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to "evolve a progressive
system of taxation."
• This is a directive to Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the enhancement of
human dignity and the reduction of social, economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, § 1), or for the promotion of the right
to "quality education" (Art. XIV, § 1).
• These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
• Moreover, in view of the absence of a controversy that is ripe for adjudication, claims that the law is regressive, oppressive
and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not
justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications (1960)
FACTS:
• Case involves Pasig Provincial Gov. Wenceslao Pascual, assailing the appropriation of P85,000 under RA 920 for
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construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals.
o He claims that the feeder road terminals do not connect any govt property/important premises to the main
highway;
o That the feeder roads were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the
Antonio Subdivision;
o That this Subdivision (and lands on which the feeder roads were to be constructed) belonged to a certain Jose
Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage of the Act in June 1953, was a Senator.
o That prior to the passage of the appropriations act, Zulueta offered to donate the feeder roads to Pasig, subject
to the condition that “[Zulueta] would submit a plan and agree to change the names of two of them..”
§ No deed of donation was executed.
§ But Zulueta called attention to the approval of Act and the P85K.
• Pascual further claims that:
o Act was illegal and void ab initio because the construction of the projected feeder roads with public funds would
greatly enhance the value of Zulueta’s subdivision, a private property.
o Appropriation of P85K was made by Congress because it was made to believe that the roads were public roads
and not private streets of a private subdivision
o That Zulueta executed an alleged deed of donation 5 months after passage of Act, or in December 1953 to make
it appear that it was signed by then Executive Secretary
§ That being subject to an onerous condition, the donation was actually a contract
§ The contract stipulates: "The within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby donated for street purposes only
and for no other purposes whatsoever; it being expressly understood that should the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines violate the condition hereby imposed upon it, the title to the land
hereby donated shall, upon such violation, ipso facto revert to the DONOR, JOSE C. ZULUETA."
§ The donation violated the provision of the Consti which prohibits members of the Congress from being
directly/indirectly financially interested in any contract with the Govt.
o The project currently being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways must be stopped.
• Zulueta contends that RA 920, being a law passed by Congress and approved by the President, cannot be illegal because
Congress is the source of all laws.
ISSUES/HELD:
Can the Congress appropriate public funds for the private feeder road terminals? – NO.
• The legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose.
• Appropriation for a private purpose is null and void.
• It is the essential character of the direct object of expenditure which determines its validity as justifying a tax; AND NOT the
magnitude of interests to be affected nor degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public
welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion.
• IMPT: Incidental advantage to the public/to the state, which results from the promotion of private interests and the
prosperity of private enterprises or business, does NOT justify their aid by the use of public money.
• The test of constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote
public interests, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to
individuals may incidentally serve the public.
• Note that there’s no need to judicially nullify the donation for there to be declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
appropriation.
o The subsequent donation 5 months after passage of the Act for the purpose of giving a “semblance of legality” to
the appropriation does not cure the basic defect.
(Locus standi issue) Does Gov. Pascual have standing? – YES.
• Gov. Pascual is not just any other taxpayer contesting constitutionality of an act which can constitute misapplication of public
funds.
o He is the Provincial Governor, representing the state’s most populated political subdivision, and the taxpayers
therein bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation in the PH.
• (eto good to know lang, baka tanungin) A different view is taken by the US Supreme Court when it comes to standing, i.e.:
that insofar as federal laws are concerned, the relationship of a taxpayer of the US to its Federal Govt is different from that
of a municipal corp.

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Gen. Roxas – Gen. Araneta – Gen. Lucban – Gen. Capinpin – Gen. Segundo – Gen. Delgado – Gen. Malvar – Gen. Lim)

o This is not applied to our jurisdiction because the relation between the people of the PH and its taxpayers is not
identical between the people and taxpayers of the US and its Federal Govt.
o Our relation is closer from a domestic viewpoint; more fully direct compared to that of the US; as our simple and
unitary type of government is not subject to limitations like to those imposed by the Federal Constitution upon US.

Garcia v. Mata (1975)
SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for
other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available
as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law,
be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year,
the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines until his reversion to inactive
status on 15 November 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2332.
o At the time of reversion, Petitioner held the rank of Captain with a monthly emolument of P478.00, comprising his
base and longevity pay, quarters and subsistence allowances.
• June 18, 1955 - The date when R.A. No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of
accumulated active commissioned service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
o Section 1:“Reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who are
still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted into inactive status except
for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their own request: Provided, That for purposes of
computing the length of service, six months or more of active service shall be considered one year.” (italics
supplied)
o The petitioner’s accumulated active commissioned service was thus short of the minimum service requirement
prescribed in the aforequoted provision of R.A. 1382.
• July 11, 1956 - The date when R.A. No. 1600 took effect, petitioner had an accumulated active commissioned service of
10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
o Sec. 11. After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during any period
of five consecutive years: PROVIDED, That hereafter reserve officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
on active duty for more than two years on the date of the approval of this Act except those whose military and
educational training, experience and qualifications are deemed essential to the needs of the service, shall be
reverted to inactive status within one year from the approval of this Act: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That reserve
officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who are still on active duty
at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper
court-martial proceedings or upon their request; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any such reserve officer
reverted to inactive status who has at least five years of active commissioned service shall be entitled to a gratuity
equivalent to one month’s authorized base and longevity pay in the rank held at the time of such reversion for
every year of active commissioned service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any reserve officer who receives a
gratuity under the provisions of this Act shall not except during a National emergency or mobilization, be called to
a tour of active duty within five years from the date of reversion: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the Secretary of
National Defense is authorized to extend the tour of active duty of reserve officers who are qualified military pilots
and doctors; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any savings in the appropriations authorized in this Act for the
Department of National Defense notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary and any unexpended
balance of certification to accounts payable since 1 July 1949 regardless of purpose of the appropriation shall be
made available for the purpose of this paragraph: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the Secretary of National
Defense shall render a quarterly report to Congress as to the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph.”
(italics supplied)
• Petitioner’s reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 2334, and
such reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial proceedings.

• From 15 November 1960 up to the filing of the case, petitioner has been on inactive status and as such, he has neither
received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he ever employed in the Government in any
capacity;
• As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the necessary petitions with the offices of the AFP Chief
of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, and the President, respectively, but received reply only from the Chief of Staff
through the AFP Adjutant General.
• Sept. 17, 1969 – The petitioner brought an action for “Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money” in the court a quo to
compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to reinstate
him in the active commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the
emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status.
• December 2, 197 - The trial court dismissed the petition. The court ruled that paragraph 11 of the “Special Provisions
for the Armed Forces of the Philippines” in Republic Act 1600 is “invalid, unconstitutional and inoperative.” (SC
affirmed this)
• The petitioner argues that his reversion to inactive status on November 15, 1960 was in violation of Sec. 11 of R.A. No.
1600 which prohibits the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated
active commissioned service.
• The respondents contend that the said provision has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget in question or to
any appropriation item contained therein, and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2 of the 1935 Constitution of
the Philippines, which reads:
o “No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such
appropriation.”
ISSUE/HELD:
Is paragraph 11 of the “Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines” of R.A. No. 1600 constitutional? NO, it
is unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative.
• A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any appropriation item therein,
or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very first clause of paragraph 11 itself (refer to the bold/underlined text
above).
o While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said
paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion
to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout the entire
paragraph.
o (DOCTRINE ALERT! Relevant to par. 2) “it was a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation
measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against ‘riders’ to the general appropriation act.” It
was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation Act.
• The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines which provided
that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill.”
o This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act
that was not fairly included in the subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with
that subject.
o The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to “appropriating funds for the operation of
the government.”
§ Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this restricted subject or any matter
properly connected therewith is valid and operative.
§ But, if a provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision
relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of
the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.
• Upon the foregoing dissertation, we declare Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES as unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no
protection. In legal contemplation it is as though it has never beeen passed.
• Verily, not having shown a clear legal right to the position to which he desires to be restored, the petitioner cannot compel
the respondents to reinstate and/or call him to active duty, promote or readjust his rank, much less pay him back emoluments
and allowances.

Farinas v. Executive Secretary (2003)

(edited PoliA2015 digest)
FACTS:
• Farinas et al are members of the HoR minority.

• Case is consolidation of 2 Rule 65 Petitions, seeking to declare unconstitutional Sec. 14 of RA 9006 (The Fair Election
Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Sec. 67 of BP. 881 (Omnibus Election Code).
• Legislative history: RA 9006, entitled “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices” is a consolidation of the following bills:
o HoR Bill (HB) No. 9000: An Act Allowing the Use of Mass Media for Election Propaganda, Amending for the
Purpose Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, Otherwise Known as the 'Omnibus Election Code,' as amended, and for
Other Purposes;" AND
o Senate Bill No. 1742: An Act To Enhance The Holding Of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful, And Credible Elections
Through Fair Election Practices.
• A Bicameral Conference Committee (8 from Senate; 16 from HoR) was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the
HB and SB.
o (Maraming legislative floor activity ang nangyari like submission of committee reports, proposal for amendments
and reconciliation of contrasting provisions)
o But before being passed as law, the reconciled RA 9006 had already been opposed by Farinas et al, reasoning
that Section 14 thereof is a rider
o R 9006 was nevertheless enacted into law
• Sec. 14 of RA 9006:
o Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11
of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules
and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
or amended accordingly.
• OEC provides that:
o SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. — Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice- President,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
• Farinas et al argue that:
o Sec 14 is a rider, in violation of Art. VI, Sec 26 (1) which requires every law to have only one subject which should
be expressed in its title.
§ They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of RA 9006 and Section 67 of OEC
§ RA 9006: deals with the lifting of the ban on use of media for election propaganda and elimination of
unfair election practices;
§ Sec 67 of OEC: imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they
are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom.
§ They argue that the repeal of Sec. 67 is not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter
of RA 9006.
o Sec. 14 also violates equal protection because it only repeals Sec. 67, leaving intact Sec. 66 which imposes a
similar limitation to appointive official.
§ Discriminatory against appointive official;
§ By repeal of Sec. 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no
longer ipso facto resigned from filing his COC.
§ Limitation upon appointive officials remains then.
o Sec. 67 of OEC is still good law so it shouldn’t be repealed.
ISSUES/HELD;
(MAIN ISSUE) Is Section 14 of RA 9006 a rider? – NO
• To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court has laid down the rule that: (liberal construction)
o Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed
as to cripple or impede the power of legislation.
o The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a
technical construction.
o It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks
to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of
that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
o The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
• Title of RA 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through
Fair Election Practices."
o Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration of principles but also the objectives:

o Among such objectives is “[ensuring that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.”
o That the limitation under Sec. 67 was considered by legislators during their deliberations as a form of
harassment/discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed.
o As such, they even agreed that Sec. 14 repealing Sec. 67 is not a rider.
• Court is convinced that the title and objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to include repeal of Sec. 67 of the
OEC.
o To require the said repeal of Sec 67 be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content.
• While Sec. 67 of the OEC talks about the imposition of a limit on elective officials who run for an office other than the one
they are holding, and the provisions of RA 9006 deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda,
this dissimilarity does not violate the one subject-one title rule.
o An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be;
o So long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
(Minor issue1) Is Sec. 14 violative of the equal protection clause? – NO
• EPC is not absolute, but subject to reasonable classifications or substantial distinctions.

• There are substantial distinctions between elective officials and appointive officials
o Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate, and elected for a definite term and
may be removed only upon stringent conditions
o Appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority, some in a permanent
capacity and entitled to security of tenure, while others subject to the pleasure of appointing authority
• By repealing Sec. 67 but retaining Sec. 66, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these 2 classes of officials differently
with respect to the effect on their tenure
(Minor issue2) is the Enrolled Bill Doctrine Applicable to this case? – YES
• Farinas urge the Court to go beyond the enrolled copy of the bill due to alleged irregularities that attended passage of RA
9006, like:
o Creation of 2 sets of BCCs
o No communication from the senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by the BCC;
nd rd
o 2 /3 BCC has no record of proceedings; unsigned BCC report by Chairman
nd rd
o No meeting conducted during 2 /3 BCC
nd
o No record of creation of a 2 BCC
o “Effectivity” clauses of the SB, HB, and the compromise bill, provided that “The act shall take effect immediately
upon approval.”
• No need to go beyond enrolled copy.
• The Court finds no reason to deviate from the rule that signing of the copy of the bill by the Speaker of the HoR and Senate
President, and certification by the Secretaries of both Houses that it was passed are conclusive.
•
nd rd
The alleged irregularities mostly involved internal rules of Congress, i.e. creation of 2 /3 BCC.
o Court is not a proper forum for enforcement of the internal rules.
(Minor issue3) Is the Effectivity Clause defective? – YES
• It provides that RA 9006 shall “take immediately upon its approval.”

• This is defective, but does not render entire law invalid.
• Tanada v Tuvera: publication cannot be in any event, omitted, but legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15-
day period be shortened or extended.
• RA 9006, notwithstanding its express statement of immediate effectivity, took effect 15days after its publication in the
OG/newspaper of general circulation.
(Minor issue4) Is Sec. 67 still good law, which shouldn’t have been repealed? – political question!
• While some sectors believe that its repeal is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism, such policy matters are
not the concern of the Court.
• It is not for the court to look into the wisdom/propriety of legislative determination.

Belgica v. Ochoa (2013) - SUPRA
• This case involves the constitutionality of the Congressional Pork Barrel (Priority Development Fund) and the Presidential
Pork Barrel (Malampaya Fund).
• Because the subject matter is so complex, the Court discussed the pork barrel system’s conceptual underpinnings before
detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
THE FACTS:
Pork Barrel
• An appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects
• Secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district  
• Some scholars on the subject use the term to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.
• Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black
slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the
generosity of their well-fed master.
• In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature, although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
History of the Congressional Pork Barrel in the PH

Pre-Martial Law 1992- Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922) is considered as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork
1972 Barrel"
• Utilization of funds were subjected to post-enactment legislator  approval  
Martial Law The Pork Barrel System was discontinued due to the era of one-man controlled legislature, but in
1972-1986 1982, the Batasang Pambansa introduced a new item in the GAA: the “Support for Local
Development Projects”
• Practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators  began 
• Each assembylman receives ₱500k and thereafter, would  communicate their project
preferences to the Ministry of Budget  for approval 
• Projects also began to cover not only hard projects (public works)  but also soft projects (non-
public works such as education, health and livelihood)  
Post-Martial Law Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and
C. Aquino the "Visayas Development Fund"
1986-1992 • lump-sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of
development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989
The clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the
creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF)
• integrated into the 1990 GAA with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local
infrastructure and other priority community projects."
Post-EDSA • The pork barrel system was consistently adopted in the GAAs
Revolution In 2000, the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA.
• The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District"
before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was
explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article
• Realignment of funds to any expense category was allowed, provided no amount shall be
used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits
Macapagal-Arroyo 2002 GAA  
2001-2010 • Ordered release of funds directly to the implementing agency or  LGU concerned without
further qualifications  
2003 GAA
• Expansion of purpose  
• Express authority to realign  
• DPWH and DepEd projects required prior consultation with  Members of Congress on
implementation delegation and project list submission  
2005 GAA  
• PDAF shall be used to fund priority programs and projects under  the ten point agenda of the
national government  
• It shall be released directly to implementing agencies  
• Program menu concept—list of general programs and  implementing agencies from which a
particular PDAF project may be chosen by the identifying authority  
2002 to 2010 GAA 
• PDAF articles were silent as to the:
o Specific amounts allocated for individual legislators  
o Their participation in the proposal and identification  of PDAF projects  
o DPWH and DepEd School Building Program  provisions explicitly required
prior consultation  with the Member of Congress  
• Allowed formal participation of NGOs in the implementation of projects

B. Aquino, III 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles

2010-present • "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list,
standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list requirement)." But as
practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project
from the priority list
• Provisions for legislator allocations and fund realignment were included  
• Allocation for the VP was deleted  
History of the Presidential Pork Barrel in the PH

PD 910, Marcos • special fund to help intensify, strengthen and consolidate government efforts relating to the
exploration, exploitation and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic
growth
PD 1869 (PAGCOR • Special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff
Charter), Marcos; through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not
amended by PD 1993 funded under the regular budget
• Sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR
Controversies in the Philippines

First Controversy
• In 1996, former Marikina representative Candazo blew the lid on huge sums of government money that regularly went into
the pockets of legislators as kickbacks
• Kickbacks were SOP; ranged from 19-52% of the cost of each project
LAMP v. Secretary of Budget and Management
• Concerned citizens sought the nullification of PDAF in the 2004 GAA for being  unconstitutional  
• For lack of pertinent evidentiary support as to the illegal misuse of PDAF in the  form of kickbacks, the petition was dismissed  
NBI Probe (Napoles)
• Began because of allegations that the government has been defrauded of some ₱10B over the past 10 years by a syndicate
using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for ghost projects 
• 6 whistleblowers declared that JLN Corporation swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for ghost projects using
20 dummy NGOs
o The NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipient of PDAF, the money was allegedly diverted into Napoles’
private accounts
• After its investigation, criminal complaints were filed  (Plunder, Malversation, Direct Bribery, Violation of the RA 3019)
COA Report
•  Results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three
(3) years of the Arroyo administration
• Determined the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and VILP (Various Infrastructures including Local Projects) by
the DBM 
• Some of the highlights:
o Amounts released for projects identified by a number of legislators exceeded their respective allocations  
o Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts  
o Selection of NGOs was not compliant with law and regulations  
o 82 NGOs entrusted with billions of pesos were either questionable,  submitted spurious documents or failed to
liquidate their utilization of the  funds 
• For the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistleblowers alleged that at least ₱900M from royalties intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO The Procedural Antecedents  
• This case consolidated the petitions of Alcantara, Belgica, and Nepomuceno.
ISSUES/HELD:
[PROCEDURAL ISSUE, among others] Do the Court’s decisions in the Philconsa and LAMP cases bar the re-litigation of the
issue of constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System under the principle of res judicata and stare decisis? – NO.
• Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article,
o whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System."
• Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the
merits.
[SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES on Congressional Pork Barrel] Are the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate constitutional provisions on:
Separation of powers? – YES

• Constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of the government 
• Each department has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere
• When violated
o When one branch unduly encroaches upon the domain of another  
o 2 Ways:  

§ When one interferes impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function;
and 
§ When one assumes a function that more properly is  entrusted to another  
• SC: From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play ANY  ROLE in the implementation or enforcement of law violates the principle of powers and is
thus unconstitutional  
o The enforcement of the national budget is a function both constitutionally assigned and properly assigned to the
Executive branch
o This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches is a grant of all powers
inherent in them  
o Unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive should exclusively exercise all prerogatives which go
into the implementation of the national budget  
• Budget execution covers:
o Various operational aspects of budgeting  
o Evaluation of work and financial plans for individual  activities  
o Regulation and release of funds  
o Other related activities that comprise the budget execution  cycle  
• The Legislative should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget  
• Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and the Executive’s role
of implementing the national budget begins
o From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional
• However, Congress may still exercise its oversight function—a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution
allows which is limited to: (1) Scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation; budget hearings in connection
with it; power to ask department heads to appear and be heard on any matter pertaining to their departments; its power of
confirmation; and (2) Investigation and monitoring of implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation  
• Provisions of the 2013 PDAF Article have accorded legislators post-enactment authority to:
o Identify PDAF projects  
o Participate in fund release  
o Participate in fund realignment  
• Clearly, these post-enactment measures are not related to functions of congressional oversight  
• Any post-enactment measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis,
tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions
Non-delegability of legislative power? [MOST RELEVANT ISSUE] – YES

• Legislative power should be exclusively exercised by the body to  which the Constitution has conferred the same  
• Legislative power shall be vested in Congress (SEC 1, ART 6,  Constitution)  
• Only recognized exceptions:
o Delegation to LGUs which are allowed to legislate on purely  local matters  
o Power of the President to:
§ Exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war and other
national emergency  
§ Fix, within specified limits as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and  wharfage dues and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the government
o Delegate rule-making—authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either:
§ Supplementary rule-making—filling up details of the law for its enforcement
§ Contingent rule-making—ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation
• SC: The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators,
violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to INDIVIDUALLY exercise the
power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress
• Individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate:
o How much from such fund would go to  
o A specific project or beneficiary that they determine  
• These two acts^ comprise the power of appropriation and thus, the legislators have been conferred the power to legislate
which the Constitution does not allow
Checks and balances? – YES. [this might still be askd because this case is under sec. 27]
• President’s Item-Veto Power
o Power of the President to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by
Congress for approval (bill presentment) found in SEC 27(2), ART 6, Constitution
o Presentment of such bills to the President forms part of the single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered
procedures for law passage as specified in the Constitution
o The President’s veto power is essentially a legislative act

o In exercising such authority, he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise
interference of the judiciary  
o Courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto  
o [I WILL SKIP THE DETAILS OF THIS PART UNTIL WE GET TO ART. 7 KASI POTA]
• When violated
o Appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for
multiple purposes
o Such necessitates the further determination of both:
§ Actual amount to be expended; and  
§ Actual purpose of appropriation  
• SC: In the current system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator’s identification of the projects
after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on  
o Under the 2013 PDAF Article, ₱24.79B only appears as a collective allocation limit since it would be further divided
among individual legislators who would receive personal lump-sum allocations and could effectively appropriate
their PDAF based on their own discretion
o These appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, are outside the law  
o It necessarily means that actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the GAB and thus
effectuated without veto consideration  
o It subverts the procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto as the
President is forced to either:  
§ Accept the entire ₱24.79B allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators which may
or may not be consistent with his national agenda; or  
§ Reject the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects
Accountability? – YES
• Public office is a public trust (SEC 1, ART 11, Constitution) 
o Every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles
of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people’s trust 
o Congressional oversight is a mechanism in the Constitution which is designed to exact accountability from
public officers
• SC: The conduct of oversight would be tainted as legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would
in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate 
o Certain features in the 2013 PDAF Article affect congressional oversight 
o The fact that legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for
them to become disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of
appropriation law
• SC: Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to
taking undue advantage of their own office, thereby violating SEC 14, ART 6 of the Constitution
• Post-enactment authorization runs afoul to SEC 14, ART 6, Constitution which provides that:
o No member of Congress shall be directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract, franchise or special
privilege granted by the government during his term
o He shall not intervene in any matter before any government office for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office
Political dynasties? – NO
• The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined
by law. (SEC 26, ART 2, Constitution)
o This provision is not self-executing; it does not by itself provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right
• SC: Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement,
the Court must defer on ruling on this issue 
o It has also not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political
dynasties
Local Autonomy? – YES.

• The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments (SEC 25,  ART 2, Constitution)  
• The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy (SEC 2, ART 10, Constitution)  
• The Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower LGUs to develop and ultimately, become self-
sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy  
• How violated  
o By undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials
and inhabitants of such political units
• SC: Insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine
local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed
unconstitutional
o Guage of PDAF and CDF allocation or division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account
the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents

o Such allocation or division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration
o Even Senators, PL representatives and the VP, who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel
o The PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the control of each legislator and given unto them on the
sole account of their office
o Concept of legislator control also conflicts with the functions of various Local Development Councils (LDC) which
are already legally mandated to assist the sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development
§ With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the LDC and initiate projects on his own and even take
sole credit for its execution  
§ This type of personality-driven project identification has contributed to further weakening infrastructure
planning and coordination efforts of the government  
[SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES on Presidential Pork Barrel] Are the following phrases unconstitutional insofar as they constitute
undue delegations of legislative power:
“and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” (Malampaya Funds) – YES.
• While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal
appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-
making authority to the Executive for the purpose of:
§ Supplementary rule-making—filling in details; or  
§ Contingent rule-making—ascertaining facts to bring the law  into actual operation  
o Two tests to ensure legislative guidelines are adequate:  
§ Completeness test—law sets forth the policy to be carried out by the delegate
§ Sufficient standard test—provides adequate guidelines to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority
o SC: The phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he
may direct and in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the
law
§ It may have passed the completeness test (since the policy of energy development is clearly
discernible from its text), the abovementioned phrase should be stricken down as unconstitutional as it
lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law  
§ This notwithstanding, the rest of SEC 8 of the same law, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government, remains legally effective and subsisting  
“[the fund may be used] to [first] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to [second] finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President” (Presidential Social Fund) – YES, but only the first part.
• SC: The phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as
unconstitutional since it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law 
• While the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the fund only for restoration
purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for
any infrastructure project he may so determine a “priority”
o The law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the
President without any guideline to construe the same
• However, since the mentioned SEC 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993, the issue is now moot.
Concurring opinion, CJ SERENO
• The remaining concern is founded on the need to adhere to the principle of judicial economy—for the Court to rule only
on what it needs to rule on  
• A total condemnation of lump-sum funding is an extreme position that disregards the realities of national life  
• The following were declared unconstitutional in the dispositive portion of the decision:
o Entire 2013 PDAF Article  
o All legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork  Barrel Laws (previous PDAF and CDF Articles and
various  Congressional Insertions)  
o All informal practices of similar import and effect  
• Extent of their unconstitutionality:
o These authorize/d legislators (individually or collectively organized into committees) to intervene, assume or
participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of identification, modification and revision of project
identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight  
o These confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine  
• The Court made no doctrinal pronouncement that all lump-sum appropriations per se are unconstitutional
• The ponencia, in effect, considers that the PDAF’s infirmity is brought about by the confluence of:
o Sums dedicated to multiply purposes  

o Requiring post-enactment measures  

o Participated in, not by Congress, but by its individual  Members  
§ It is this three-tiered nature of the PDAF which makes it unconstitutional; any other type beyond this
aggregated formulation of “lump-sum allocation” is not covered by the Court’s declaration of
unconstitutionality
• Sereno concurs that the 2013 PDAF is unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers and being an undue delegation
of legislative functions, but believes that discussions on lump-sum appropriations, line-item appropriations and item-veto
are premature
o The Court must remember that its mandate is to interpret the law, not to create it
• Coequality of the three branches necessitates judicial restraint
o In any dispute before this Court, judicial restraint is the general rule
o Wholesale rejection of lump-sum allocations contrives a rule of constitutional law broader than what is
required by the precise facts in the case
§ To conclude that line-item budgeting scheme is a matter of constitutional requirement is to needlessly
strain the Constitution’s silence on the matter
o The above rule is bolstered by the fact that petitioners have raised other grounds more supportable by
the text of the Constitution
• As it stands now, the plain text of the Constitution and the Revised Administrative Code renders the modality of
budgeting to be a political question.

Demetria v. Alba (1987)
FACTS:
• Petitioners Demetria et al are all members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa.

• They filed the petition assailing the constitutionality of Section 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977), claiming
that the provision authorizes the illegal transfer of public funds.
• Section 44(1) of PD 1177 provides:
o The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, or office included in the GAA or approved after its enactment.
• On the other hand, the constitutional provision raised by petitioners, Sec. 15(5), Art. 8 [now Sec. 25(5), Art. 6], reads as
follows:
o No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister,
the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the SC, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized
to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is Sec. 44 of PD 1177 constitutional? – NO, unconstitutional
• The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution.
• However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions
considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing
the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body concerned.
• Leeway granted was thus limited.
• The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose
of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of
the govt branch or constitutional body.
• Sec. 44(1) of PD 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section of the Constitution raised.
o It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the
Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the GAA
or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually
savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made.
• It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation
of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
• Safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds:
o Sec. 18(1) – conditions on the release of money from the treasury
o Sec. 18(2) – restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose
o Sec. 16(5) – the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another
• In view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, PD 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded
appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and
entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand public money not on the basis of development
priorities but on political and personal expediency.

Liga v. COMELEC (1994)
FACTS:
• FOCUS on the comment of the SolGen because the decision did not fully discuss unused funds.
• Alex David is the president and secretary general of Liga ng mga Barangay which is an organization of barangays.
• They filed two petitions (same issues) with the court which was consolidated:
o They question the “threatened illegal transfer, disbursement and use of public funds in a manner contrary to the
Constitution and the law” relating to the forthcoming barangay elections.
o They claim that under the General Appropriation Act of 1994, only 137,878,000.00 were appropriated by Congress
for the 1994 barangay elections.
o However, they later made an assessment that the amount would be insufficient to defray the cost of holding said
elections.
o In order to augment this amount, COMELEC will re-allocate the ff. amounts to be sourced from the executive and
the legislative branches of government:
§ 180M from the DILG
§ 100M from the Countryside Development Fund, 70M from the Senate and 30M from the HoR.
§ 43M from the IRA of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities.
o These allegations were based on a news item entitled “Barangay Poll Funds Found” appearing in an issue of the
Manila Bulletin.
• SolGen:
o The petition was solely on the basis of reports made in a newspaper, which was not even confirmed by the
COMELEC, the DILG and/or any of the respondents. The truth is that the reports were mere unofficial proposals
or suggestions but were later discarded.
o COMELEC intends to fund the barangay elections from:
§ Its initial appropriation from Congress,
§ From its own savings as a result of unused funds.These funds were originally intended for the conduct
and supervision of elections which did not take place.
§ From a portion of its modernization program
o This scheme is allowed under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that:
§ No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
§ however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
o Note: Under the GAA:
§ Savings: Portions of balances of any programmed appropriation free of any obligation or encumbrance
still available after the satisfactory completion or unavoidable discontinuance or abandonment of the
work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized, or arising from unpaid compensation
and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay.
§ Augmentation: Implies the existence in this Act of an item, project, activity or purpose with an
appropriation which upon implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources is determined
to be deficient.
o Furthermore, the funds of local governments may also be used to help defray the cost of the elections.
§ Under Opinion No. 51 by the Secretary of Justice, under the Omnibus Election Code, local governments
are required to appropriate funds for barangay elections.
ISSUE/HELD:
Does the complaint by the Liga have factual basis to implead the COMELEC? – NO
• The SC acknowledges the vigilance of the petitioners and recognize that they acted with the best intentions.
• However, they should have first obtained an official statement or at least confirmation from COMELEC as to the veracity of
the reports/news articles.
• The perceived threat, if ever there was one, existed only in newspaper reports.

SANCHEZ v COMMISSION ON AUDIT (2008)
FACTS:
• R.A. 7180 (General Appropriations Act of 1992), was passed by Congress. The National Budget provided an appropriation
to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) the amount of Php 75,000,000.00 for the department’s Capability
Building Program. This was a program for enriching and furthering local autonomy.
o Under the Special Provisions of the CBP, it empowered the DILG secretary to administer and manage the funds.
Like most government projects, savings from the national budget can be transferred to the CBP to strengthen it.
• Atty. Hiram Mendoza, a Project Director of an “Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local
Autonomy” proposed to Deputy Sec. De La Serna the creation of a satellite task force to implement local autonomy. This
task force would create modules, programs, and the like, under the Office of the President. The Deputy Sec. approved the
proposal. The task force’s estimated budget was Php 2,388,000.00
• Cesar Sarino, Executive Secretary of the DILG, approved the same proposal. A cash advance of Php 600,000.00 was
made, through two separate disbursements of Php 300,000.00
o A breakdown of the first cash advance’s expense was submitted to the DILG, without receipts. Further, the
second cash advance was not even given a breakdown:
§ Payroll P 226,000.00
§ Office rentals 60,000.00
§ Office furnitures 7,500.00
§ Office supplies 3,682.50
§ Xerox 300.30
§ Transportation expense 406.00
§ Bank charges 75.00
§ Miscellaneous 60.00
§ TOTAL P298,023.80
• The Department Auditor (DILG’s resident auditor) took cognizance of this transfer, citing that: there was no legal basis for
the creation of an ad hoc task force, the transfer was contrary to the limits and requirements set out in the GAA,
and that the second cash advance was not yet held for accounting. A Notice of Disallowance was filed to the
Department Secretary.
• Sarino, the DepSec, argues that: the transfer of the funds is within the ambit of the law, as these funds were being
used for public purposes, and that the issue of WoN the transfer was valid is an issue for the courts to decide, and
that, according to the case of Binamira v Garrucho, acts committed by department heads, unless disapproved by
the President, are presumptively considered acts of the President himself and are therefore valid.
• In response, the Department Auditor avers: while they were indeed for public purposes, they were not the purposes
contemplated by the GAA’s appropriation for the CBP. Public funds must be used specifically for the purpose they
were appropriated for.
• The Commission on Audit upheld the Notice of Disallowance.
o However, Commissioner Ursal wrote a dissenting opinion, agreeing that the transfer of funds from the CBP budget
to the Ad Hoc Task Force was indeed an act of the President.
• Petitioners argue further: the Notice of Disallowance had no legal basis, the Ad Hoc Task Force is actually part and
parcel of the CBP’s goals, thus the transfer is valid.
• The OSG agreed with petitioners initially, citing that the Ad Hoc Task Force indeed augmented the CBP’s goals, hence the
transfer was valid.
• The COA argue: we have acted within our mandate in upholding the notice of disallowance.
• The OSG eventually agreed with the COA itself, citing that if an Ad Hoc Task Force was indeed needed, it should have
been done through the Local Government Academy, with approval of its Board of Trustees, pursuant to the GAA.
o Further, the findings of the OSG reveal that a) the 600,000 pesos cash advance was not properly liquidated,
there was no proper financial plan for the Ad Hoc Task Force, no breakdown of projects, no receipts, no
NOTHING.
o Hence, since bad faith is evident, the COA was acting well within its mandate in upholding the notice.
• The COA adds: the CBP fund may be a regular appropriation, but it partakes the nature of a trust fund. It was allocated for
a specific purpose.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is there legal basis for the cash transfer from the DILG CBP fund to the Ad Hoc Task Force under the OP? – None.
• Petitioner argues that, as the department head, his acts are clothed with the same authority as that of the President’s. It is
under this argument that he couches the validity of the act of transferring funds.
o SC holds this as a gratuitous argument. In the first place, Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI clearly limits the authority of
transferring funds to SEVEN people.
o It cannot be maintained that when the Constitution stated “The President” in this provision, it meant those who
shared in the same authority BY LEGAL FICTION.
• Even if the President himself approved of the fund transfer from the CBP to the Ad Hoc Task Force, it would be INVALID
because IT WASN’T TRANSFERRED FROM SAVINGS.
o The Constitution is clear: transfer of funds may only be taken from SAVINGS.

o How can there be savings when the transfer was conducted at the BEGINNING OF THE GOVERNMENT’S
FISCAL YEAR? AFTER THE PASSING OF THE NATIONAL BUDGET?
o Further investigation of the Court revealed that even if it were the beginning of the fiscal year, NO SAVINGS had
carried over from the previous budget of the DILG.
• Contrary to jurisprudence:
o The Court has declared in the landmark case of Demetria v Alba that the President cannot transfer funds from
one department to another, regardless of the purpose. And this case was decided under the 1973 Constitution!
o How can an act invalid during the Marcos era be valid NOW?
Were the conditions and requisites for a valid transfer of funds observed? – NO.
• Sec. 19 of the GAA of 1992 states: Meaning of Savings and Augmentation: Savings refer to portions or balances of any
programmed appropriation free of any obligation or encumbrance still available after the satisfactory completion or
unavoidable discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized, or
arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay.
Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of an item, project, activity or purpose with an appropriation which upon
implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources is determined to be deficient. In no case, therefore, shall a
non-existent item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use
of appropriations authorized otherwise in this act
• Clearly, there are two requisites:
o there must be savings in the programmed appropriation of the transferring agency
o there must be an existing item, project or activity with an appropriation in the receiving agency to which
the savings will be transferred.
• Actual Savings is a sine qua non to the transfer of funds. In this case, there were no actual savings!
• For the second requisite, the Court ruled that the Ad Hoc Task Force was SHADY. Temporary in nature, vague objectives,
obviously not an augmentation to the DILG’s projects, accountable to the Office of the President, no evidence as to how it
was created, who’s in it, where it came from, and in fact the 600k cash advance could not be held accounted for!
• Petition dismissed, COA ruling affirmed.

Belgica v. Ochoa (SUPRA)
Araullo v. Aquino (2014)
ARTICLE VI. Section 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
FACTS:
• This present case involves 9 petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and its related issuances.
• The World Bank made an observation that the economic growth of the PH could be reduced and weakened if it continued
its underspending and failure to address the large deficiencies in infrastructure.
o To resolve this, the Aquino administration introduced the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). It was the
product of "plain executive policy-making" to stimulate the economy by way of accelerated spending by (1)
streamlining the implementation process through the clustering of infrastructure projects of the DPWH and DepEd,
and (2) PPP-related projects.
o According to a March 2012 report of the World Bank revealed that the DAP was partially successful. It contributed
to the increase in GDP.
• 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate.
o The intention of said speech was to reveal that some Senators (him included) had been allotted Php 50M each
as an "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona.
• DBM Secretary Abad responded to the issue and explained that the funds released to the Senators was part of the DAP.
o DAP is a program by the DBM to speep up spending to accelerate economic expansion.
o It was to suppose to resolve the sluggish disbursements that caused the growth of the gross domestic product
(GDP) to slow down.
o He said that the funds used for DAP were taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services;
(2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4) budgets for
slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
• DBM laid down the legal bases for the DAP’s use of savings, namely:
o (1) Sec. 25(5), Art. 6 of the Constitution (authority of the President to augment an item for his office in the general
appropriations law;
o (2) Sec. 49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Sec. 38 (Suspension of Expenditure
Appropriations), of the Administrative Code, and;
o (3) General Appropriations Acts of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of savings;
(b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the use of savings.
o For the use of the unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special provisions on
unprogrammed fund contained in the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
• This then resulted to the whole controversy over the DAP. It is also important to note that this DAP issue rose not long after
the controversial Congressional pork barrel.
o This pork barrel was an “appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely
or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district.”
• Araullo and the others contended that NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure – Withdrawal of Agencies’
Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012) directed the withdrawal of unobligated allotments of government agencies and
offices with low levels of obligations.
ISSUES/HELD: (will only tackle the substantive issues; SC discussed the history/evolution of the budget system)
Philippine budget process: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4) Accountability. (Distinct
phases, but may overlap in implementation)
Is the DAP violative of Sec. 29(1), Art. 6 of the Constitution?—NO! DAP is not a fund, nor an appropriation. It is merely a
program that prioritized spending.
• SC held that DAP was a policy in order to stimulate the economy through accelerated spending.
o Congress did not need to legislate to implement the DAP.
o Congress could appropriate but would have nothing to do with the Budget Execution Stage.
o “Appropriation” was the act by which Congress "designates a particular fund, or sets apart a specified portion of
the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be applied to some general object of governmental
expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense."
o In the case of Gonzales v. Raquiza, the SC held that “an appropriation has been defined ‘as nothing more than
the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury,’ while
appropriation made by law refers to ‘the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain
sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.’"
• SC held that the President, in his duty to execute laws, had sufficient discretion to utilize the budget to changes in the
country’s economic situation.

o The President could adopt a plan like the DAP to serve such purpose.
o The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP did not involve any appropriation.
o The money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs.
o Basically, DAP did not withdraw any funds from the Treasury as prohibited by the Constitution.
• SC held these acts did not violate the power of Congress vested in Sec. 29(1), Art. 6 of the Constitution.
Does the transfer of funds under the DAP and other related issuances violative of Sec. 25(5), Art. 6 of the Constitution?—
YES, the transfer of funds under DAP is unconstitutional.
•
7
To be valid under Sec. 25(5), the transfer of funds must comply with the following requisites:
o (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to
transfer funds within their respective offices;
o (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and
o (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.
o All these requisites were not complied with in this case.
•
8 9 10
DBM contended that the 2011, 2012, and 2013 GAAs expressly provided for the transfer of funds.
o DBM tried to justify the use of savings under the DAP in the 2011 and 2012 GAAs, but the provisions contravene
the constitution.
o After realizing this, Congress made an amendment to the provision to make it valid under the Constitution in the
2013 GAA.
• According to the Constitution, funds appropriated to the government agencies can only be realigned if made “within their of
respective offices”.
o In this case, the transfer of funds under DAP by the Executive to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies
violated the Constitutional provision.
• Also, SC held that the transfer of funds must be made to existing projects as appropriated in the GAA.
o DAP funds were transferred to projects outside the scope for those appropriated in the GAA.
o Since these projects are not provided for in the GAA, the transfer of funds is unconstitutional.
o The 2011 and 2012 provision contravene the Constitution for they literally allowed the transfer of funds from
savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive.
o These provisions cannot be used to claim authority to transfer appropriations from the Executive to another
branch, or to a constitutional commission.
• With regard the issue of the use of “savings”, SC held that “savings” should refer to the excess money after the items that
needed to be funded have been funded, or those that needed to be paid have been paid pursuant to the budget.
o SC held that the funds used for DAP are not “savings” per se.
o Under the DAP, funds from “slow-moving” projects were transferred to other projects.
o Hence, the use of the funds is not “savings” per se. Since there is no basis for funds used for the transfer, the
same is invalid.
o SC held that “savings” should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. However, under the DAP, funds are
already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” to
be transferred.
Does DAP violates the Equal Protection Clause?—NO.
• SC held that the challenge for violating the EPC lacked factual and legal basis.
o There were allegations about Senators and Congressmen being unaware of the existence and implementation of
the DAP but the same were unsupported with relevant evidence.
• SC held that the argument that the release of funds under the DAP effectively stayed the hands of the legislators from
conducting congressional inquiries into the legality and propriety of the DAP is speculative.
• In order to sustain their constitutional challenges against official acts of the Government, petitioner must discharge the basic
burden of proving that the constitutional infirmities actually existed.

7
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their
respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
8
Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman
are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
9
are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
10
are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the
current year in any item of their respective appropriations.

Does DAP violate the principle of checks and balances?—YES.
• SC held that the system under the DAP violates the principle of separation of powers of the government.
• Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse whenever it deliberates
and acts on the budget proposal submitted by the Executive.
o Its power of the purse is touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength, and underpins "all other
legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of
government."
o Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government, to appropriate public
funds, and to spend the money.
o Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control by specifying where public money
should be spent.
Does the doctrine of operative fact apply?—YES.
• The Doctrine of Operative Fact recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.
o The doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act.
o The term executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are quasi
legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.
• SC held the same to be applicable in this case.
o It is clear that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were executive acts.
• SC further held that the funds released were to be reversed, then it would cause more harm than good.
o DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy and funded numerous projects.
o The effects of DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what
they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP.
MR
• SC held that the power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA.
• Aquino et al. contended that it is not required by the Constitution that Congress could create allotment classes within an
item.
o What is required of Congress is to create items to comply with the line-item veto of the President.
• Sec. 25(5) of the Constitution provides for the term item that may be the object of augmentation by the President, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions.
•
11
In the case of Belgica v. Ochoa, SC held that “an item that is the distinct and several part of the appropriation bill, in line
with the item veto power of the President, must contain “specific appropriations of money” and not be only general
provisions.”
• Accordingly, the item referred to by Sec. 25(5) is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law,
which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution
or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class.
o By this logic, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item
to which that expense category belongs to.
• In the case of Nazareth v. Villar, SC held that “there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of
expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation.
Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public
fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes.”
• Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate
GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings.

11
Item, definition: the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. an item of
appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for
a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a “line-item.” This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its
definition as a “specific appropriation of money” but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same.

Cordero v. Cabatuando (1962)

(A2015)
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
FACTS:
• RA 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, while RA 2263 is the new law amending the RA 1199.
o Basically, Sections 19 and 20 of the amending law are being assailed for violating Article VI, Section 26(1) of the
Constitution.
§ Section 19: Section fifty-three of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows: “Sec. 53. Duties
of Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice, acting through a tenancy mediation commission shall
carry out a rational enforcement program, which shall include among other things, mediation of tenancy
disputes”.
§ Section 20: Section fifty-four of the same act is hereby amended to read as follows: "Sec. 54.
Representation by Counsel. In all cases herein a tenant cannot afford to be represented by counsel, it
shall be the duty of the trial attorney of the tenancy mediation commission to represent him, upon proper
notification by the party concerned, or the court of competent jurisdiction shall assign or appoint counsel
de oficio for the indigent tenant”.
• Antecedent Facts: The Tenancy Counsel Unit of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the DOJ, through its Trial Attorney
(herein petitioner Cordero) filed a case with the 2nd Regional District of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
o Cordero was the counsel of Vicente Salazar, the tenant petitioner in that case, against landlord Leonardo Sta.
Romana. The case was for "for reinstatement and reliquidation of past harvests."
o Landlord Leonardo subsequently filed a "Motion to Disqualify Counsel and To Set Hearing at Cabanatuan City,
praying among others for the disqualification of petitioner Manuel A. Cordero to act as counsel tenant Vicente
Salazar.” The judge granted the said petition. MR was filed but was denied.
§ At this time, the law in force was RA 1199. Landlord Romana filed a motion to disqualify Cordero from
representing the tenant Salazar because under the law in force at the time, representation of indigent
tenants should be made by the DOLE.
o In its order, the Court of Agrarian Relations upheld landlord Leonardo’s claims and held, among others: (a) that
the representation of indigent tenants should be done by the DOLE as provided in Section 54 of RA 1199; (b)
Circular No. 5 (1957) of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission, as approved by the Secretary of Justice, creating
a Tenancy Unit Counsel in the Mediation Division, is ultra vires and has no legal force; (c) the Mediation Division
has been existing without the sanction of any statute.
§ Section 54 of RA 1199 (old law): representation of indigent tenants should be done by the DOLE.
Here, representation by Cordero is under the Tenancy Unit Council of the DOJ
o A writ of preliminary injunction was issued, enjoining the execution of the said order.
• Meanwhile, RA 2263, amending the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines (RA1199) was passed. It provided, among
others, that: In all cases wherein a tenant cannot afford to be represented by counsel, it shall be the duty of the trial attorney
of the tenancy mediation commission to represent him, upon proper notification by the party concerned, or the court of
competent jurisdiction shall assign or appoint counsel de oficio for the indigent tenant. (Section 54, Republic Act No. 1199,
as amended by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 2263).
o Because of the new law, Cordero filed a Manifestion contending that the case is now moot and academic.
o As required by this Court, respondent judge, thru counsel, filed his Comment on the said Manifestation; it was
alleged therein that before the enactment of RA 2263, there was no Tenancy Mediation Division, nor was there
any law creating the same and defining its functions.
o He said that its only basis for existence, therefore, are sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 which
are null and void because the Constitution provides that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
o He further contended that nowhere in the titles of Republic Act No. 1199 and Republic Act No. 2263 is the creation
of the Tenancy Mediation Division ever mentioned, thereby indicating that section 19, Republic Act No. 2263 falls
under the first class of prohibited bills.
ISSUE/HELD:
Are sections 19 and 20 of RA 2263, amending sections 53 and 54 of RA 1199 Constitutional - YES
• Article VI, Section 21(1) of the Philippine Constitution reads:

o No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title
of the bill.
• It is to be noted that the basic law, Republic Act 1199, is called "The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines."

• The constitutional requirement in question is satisfied if all parts of the law are related, and are germane to subject matter
expressed in the title of the bill.
o The title of Republic Act No. 2263 reads as follows: "AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC
ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY- NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINE."
o The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject
which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid
• The provisions of sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 are certainly germane to, and are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the one general subject, agricultural tenancy.
• CASES CITED:
o Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, 66 Phil. 483
§ Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation.
§ The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable
and not a technical construction.
§ It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object
which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary
or convenient for the accomplishing of the object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title
need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
o Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288
§ The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be
reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation.
§ It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. It should be a sufficient compliance
with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the
statute are germane to that general subject...
o People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535- basically said the same thing.
§ The only amendment brought about by Republic Act No. 2263 is the transfer of the function of
representing these indigent tenants to the Department of Justice, apparently to consolidate in the latter
Department the functions relative to the enforcement of tenancy laws. In essence, therefore, there is
no change in the set- up established by Republic Act No. 1199 and that provided for by Republic Act
No. 2263. There is only a transfer of functions from one department of the government to another.
• Greenbook comment: (quoting other cases):
o Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and last minute details therein.
o It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation...”
o “Thus, the title “An Act Amending Certain Sections of RA 1169, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act
of the Philippines” was sufficient to include a provision authorizing the Secretary of Justice, acting through a
tenancy mediation division, to carry out a national enforcement program, including the mediation of disputes.”

Philconsa vs. Gimenez (1965)
FACTS:
• This case is about the constitutionality of RA No. 3836, “An Act Amending Subsection (C), Section Twelve Of
Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Eighty-Six”, insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation
of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses.
• The suit was instituted by Philconsa (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.), a non-profit, civic organization, duly
incorporated under Philippine laws, by way of petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to stop the payment of the
retirement and vacation gratuities.
• As finally approved, RA 3836, allows a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives and an elective officer of
either House of Congress to retire regardless of age.
o To be eligible for retirement, he must have served for at least 12 years as such Senator and/or as member of the
House of Representatives.
o For an elective officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least 12 years, of which not
less than 4 years must have been rendered as such elective officer.
• The gratuity payable by the employer or office concerned is equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service
in the government.
o Said gratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution, and not refundable in case of
reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does Philconsa have standing? YES
• Taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. RA 3836 involves the disbursement of
public funds.
Does RA 3836 violate §14, Art. VI? YES
• The then provision stated: The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall…receive an annual
compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances…No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.
• The retirement benefits as provided for in RA 3836 fall within the purview of the term "other emoluments”.
o "Emolument" is "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services
or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.
o It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation
for services of one possessing any office.
• RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take
effect upon the approval of said Act.
o Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
o Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
Does RA 3836 violate the equal protection clause? YES
• First, the law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the House of Representatives who are elective officials.
It does not include other elective officials such as the governors of provinces and the members of the provincial boards, and
the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities.
• Secondly, all members of Congress under RA 3836 are given retirement benefits after serving 12 years, not necessarily
continuous. On the other hand, most government officers and employees are given retirement benefits after serving for at
least 20 years.
• Third, all government officers and employees are given only one retirement benefit irrespective of their length of service in
the government, whereas, under RA 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years' salary.
Does the title of the law sufficiently comply with the constitutional provisions? NO.
• SEC. 26 (1) (now… then it was Sec. 21): "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
• Commonwealth Act 186 (CA 186) establishes the Government Service Insurance System and also provides for both
retirement and insurance benefits to its members.
• RA 3836 amends CA 186.

o It is to be observed that under RA 3836, amending CA 186, the retirement benefits are granted to members of
the GSIS, who have rendered at least 20 years of service regardless of age. This paragraph is related and
germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.
o On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of RA 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers
thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System.
§ To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not
germane to CA 186.
§ In other words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and
elected officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeant-at-arms for each House) is not related in any
manner to the subject of CA 186.
• The purpose of the requirement that the subject of an act should be expressed in its title is, thus:
o (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and
o (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislation that are being considered, in order that they
may have the opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.
• Thus, the title of RA 3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the now Art. 26 of the
Constitution.
• In short, RA3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first, the prohibition regarding increase in the salaries of
Members of Congress; second, the equal protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of a bill shall not embrace
more than one subject.

Alalayan v. National Power Corporation (NPC) (1968)
FACTS:
• Alalayan, and PH Power and Devt Company are both franchise holders of electric plants in Laguna.
• NPC has valid and existing contracts with 137 natural persons and corporations, supplying, distributing, selling electric
power and energy at fixed rates schedules to such persons who re-supply, re-distribute etc.
o Alalayan and PH Power are among those.
o The contracts shall continue indefinitely unless and until either party would give to the other 2 years previous
notice in writing its intention to terminate the same.
• In June 1960, an act authorized the increase of the capital stock of the NPC to P100M.
• In June 1961, RA 3043 amending the 1960 Act was passed, to increase further the authorized capital stock.
• Alalayan et al seek to test the validity of the 1961 amendatory act; of Section 3, Republic Act No. 3043, approved June
17, 1961, entitled "An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as Amended by
Republic Act Numbered TwentySix Hundred and Forty-One."
o It enables NPC in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its
electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit
of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses."
o Under such provision, NPC could likewise "renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of
electric power and energy," so that the provisions of the Act could be given effect.
• Alalayan et al alleges that the above provision under RA 3043 is a rider, which transgressed the constitutional provision on
subject matter and title of bills as well as the due process clause.
ISSUES/HELD:
MAIN ISSUE: Is Sec. 3 of RA 3043 a rider, therefore unconstitutional? – NO.
• Under the 1935 Constitution, no bill "which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in [its] title . . ."
• This is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills as log-rolling legislation, as well as surreptitious or unconsidered
enactment.
• Where the subject of a bill is limited to particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of the
subject of proposed legislative measures.
o Hence, there can be no riders, or provisions not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
• In this case, the provision is not a rider.
• To say that it is a rider is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede proper legislation.
• It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonable to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its accomplishment.
• Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its
contents.
• The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title,
• More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be
amended, there being no need to state the precise nature of the amendment.
• Government v. HSBC case: Court held that Reorganization Law, providing for the mode in which total annual expense of
Bureau of Banking was not violative of the consti provision.
o The Consti requirement is to be given a liberal test.
• Cases from Sumulong v. Comelec up to Felwa v. Salas (1966): the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in
the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein.
o It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it informs the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
(Minor issue1) Does the provision limiting net profits to “12% annually of Alalayan et al’s investments + 2 mo. Operating
expenses” deprive Alalayan et al of the liberty to contract without due process of law? – NO.
• SC reiterated its decision in Manila Electric v Public Service Commission: that such rate was actually too generous to the
public utility, and was not confiscatory.
o It is hyperbolic for Alalayan et al to claim that it is confiscatory.
• There was no evidence to demonstrate the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision.
(Minor issue2, implied by the court) Does the provision impair obligation of contracts? – NO.
• SC reiterated its decision in Pangasinan Transpo Co. v. Public Service Commission:

o The regulation/imposition of the rate was considered by the court as a valid exercise of police power, one
applicable not only to utilities coming into existence after the law’s passage, but also to those already
established and in operation.
• Abe v. Foster Wheeler: right against impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the state, in
the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.

Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board (1987)

(edited A2015 digest)
FACTS:
• Petition assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The Decree was promulgated on October 5,
1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
• On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994
amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video- tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless
of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject
to sales tax.
• The Greateer Manila Theaters Association were allowed to intervene to protect their rights and that their "survival and very
existence is threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy."
• The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out in its preambular clauses as follows:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs,
cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and
theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop
in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses
estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and
disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry,
particularly the more than 1,200 movie houses and theaters throughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide
displacement and unemployment due to the shutdown of
numerous moviehouses and theaters;
4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the Government to create an
environment conducive to growth and development of all business industries, including the movie
industry which has an accumulated investment of about P3 Billion;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial
condition of the movie industry upon which more than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers depend for their livelihood,
but also provide an additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore
uncontrolled
distribution of videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and present
danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to
support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote their physical,
intellectual,
and social well-being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial measures to curb these blatant malpractices
which have flaunted our
censorship and copyright laws;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national
economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch;
ISSUE/HELD:
Issue: Whether P.D. 1987 is constitutional on the following grounds: CONSITUTIONAL.

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is
not germane to the subject matter thereof;
2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful
restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the
vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;
4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance,
which it is not.
Ratio:
(SYLLABUS TOPIC) Is Section 10, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government a
RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter? NOPE. Not a rider.

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province
shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition
of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax
collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
• The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof"
is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to
achieve.
o The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.
• The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple
or impede the power of legislation. It should be given practical rather than technical construction.
• Sec.10 is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE,
which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title.
• The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulationit is simply one
of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE.
• The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the
heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5.
• Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the
creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble
and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an
index to the body of the DECREE.
Is the tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution? NOPE, it’s valid.
• The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare
that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it.
• In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and
oppressive taxation.
• The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that
earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax.
• It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to the
30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which
is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket.
• The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains
a valid imposition.
Is there a factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by Amendment No.
th
6 as provided in the 8 whereas clause? Unresolved.
• Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of the DECREE by the former President
under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution providing that "whenever in the judgment of the President there exists a
grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action,
he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part
of the law of the land."
• In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the 8th "whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes
the justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic
recovery program necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch.
• Whatever the reasons "in the judgment" of the then President, considering that the issue of the validity of the exercise of
legislative power under the said Amendment still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of the
question raised at the proper time.
Was there an Undue Delegation of Authority? NO.
• The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and
units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to
perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of
authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation.
Is the DECREE violative of the ex post facto principle? NO.

• Petitioner contends that Section 15 violates the ex post facto principle in providing that:
• SEC. 15 - All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of forty-five (45) days after the effectivity
of this Decree within which to register with and secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in the videogram business and
to register with the BOARD all their inventories of videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes or other technical
improvements or variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram
found in the possession of any person engaged in the videogram business without the required proof of registration by the
BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the possession of such videogram be for private
showing and/or public exhibition.
• There is no question that there is a rational connection between the fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate
fact presumed which is violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the
DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in
character
Lastly, SC added that the enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the "demise" of the video industry. On
the contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.

Phil. Judges Association v. Prado (1993)
FACTS:
• The main target of the petition is Sec. 35 of RA 7354, as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its
Circular No. 92-28.
o These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the RTCs, the
MTCs, and the Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with certain other government
offices.
• Petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-
named measures.
• The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending
of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings.
• The law’s constitutionality is being assailed on the grounds that:
1. Its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purpose
2. It did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form
were not distributed among the members before its passage
3. It is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the law violate Sec. 26, Art. 6 of the Constitution providing that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof?” – NO
• The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single
detail of the measure.
• If the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to
mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
• RA 7354 is entitled “"An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities,
Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith.”
• The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of
RA 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.
Did the enactment of Sec. 35 violate the rule requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate have
differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both chambers? – NO
• While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question.
• It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question as returned to and duly approved by
both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
• Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House as having been
duly passed by both Houses of Congress before it was presented to and approved by the President.
• Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from
the presiding officers of Congress.
Did the removal of the franking privileges of the judiciary violate the equal protection clause? – YES
• Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.
• Similar subjections, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others.
• The EPC does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction.
• What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
• The only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the
accommodation, which should justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a
smoother flow of communication between the govt and the people.
• Hence, it cannot be fathomed why the Judiciary has been denied the franking privilege.
• The available data from the Postal Service Office show that the frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose
functions include the service of judicial process amounted to P73M and P60M, respectively.
• The conclusion of respondents is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege
must be withdrawn from it.
• The argument is self-defeating.

• The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very
much, if at all (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice).
• If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies
of govt, including those who do not need it.
• The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial
distinction.
• If Section 35 recognizes the need of the President and members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason
why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the party of the Judiciary for such privilege.

Abakada v. Ermita (SUPRA)
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the
same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall
enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall
not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
CIR v. CTA (1990)
FACTS:
• Manila Golf & Country Club Inc is a non-stock corporation.

• It maintains a gold course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar and dining room, but these facilities are for the
exclusive use of its members and accompanied guests, and it charges on cost-plus-expense basis.
• As such, it claims it should have been exempt from payment of privilege taxes were it not for the last paragraph of Section
191-A of RA 6110 (Omnibus Tax Law), imposing caterer’s tax.
• By virtue of RA 6110, CIR assessed the club fixed taxes as operators of gold links and restaurants, and also percentage
tax (caterer’s tax) for its sale of foods and fermented liquors/wines amounting to P32k.
• The club protested claiming the assessment to be without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by then President Marcos.
• The protest was denied by the CIR who maintains that Section 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words “hotels,
motels, resthouses” on the ground that it might restrain the development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry.
• The CTA, upon petition by the club, sustained the latter’s position reasoning that the veto message was clear and
unqualified, as in fact, it was confirmed by the Office of the President.
• In CIR v. Manila Hotel, the SC ruled that the presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels and
resthouses in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket but not to the whole section.
• However, the CTA opined that that President could not vote words or phrases in a bill but only an entire item.
ISSUES/HELD:
Did the presidential veto refer to the entire section? – NO
• The ineffectual veto by the President rendered the whole section 191-A as not having been vetoed at all and it therefore,
became law, since an unconstitutional veto has no effect whatsoever.
• However, inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket are “items” in themselves within the
meaning of Sec. 20(3), Art. 6 of the 1935 Constitution which, therefore, the President has the power to veto.
• An “item” in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of
the tax and the tax rate.
• In the portion of a revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and enumerates the persons liable
therefor with the corresponding tax rate.
• To construe the word “item” as referring to the whole section would tie the President’s hand in choosing either to approve
the whole section at the expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire
section at the expense of foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether.
• The evil which was sought to be prevented in giving the President the power to disapprove the items in a revenue bill would
be perpetrated rendering that power inutile.

Gonzales v. Macaraig (1990)
FACTS:
• On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989.
o It eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted to the President.
• The bill was presented to the president for consideration and approval.
o The President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become Rep. Act No. 6688.
o In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed.
• Senate then issued a resolution stating, “That the Senate express its sense that the veto by the President of Section 55 of
the GENERAL PROVISIONS of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) is unconstitutional and, therefore,
void and without any force and effect; hence, the aforesaid Section 55 remains.”
• Hence this petition, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to
enjoin respondents from implementing Rep. Act No. 6688.
o Section 55: Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and/or
Reduced by Congress:
§ No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget submitted to Congress pursuant
to Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be
restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation.
§ An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall be deemed
to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided in this Act”
• According to the President, the provisions are in violation of Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution:
o If allowed, this Section would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the President, but also
that of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
o These persons cannot even augment savings in other items of their respective appropriations even in cases of
calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation of essential public services and
infrastructure projects.
• Arguments of Petitioners before the SC:
o The line-veto power of the president is limited to items and not provisions. She exceeded her authority when she
vetoed provisions of the bill.
o When the president objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill
o The item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would amount
to legislation, and
o The power of augmentation under Article VI, Section 25(5) has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress
is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the President have the power to veto “provisions” of an Appropriations Bill? – YES
• Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution refers to two kinds of veto by the President:
o Paragraph 1 refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the
entire bill, as a general rule.
o Paragraph 2 is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power.
§ It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff
bill.
§ As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words,
the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant
the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.
• Even if the article is silent as to the veto of a provision, the extent of the President’s power to veto as previousl defined
under the 1935 Constitution has not changed:
o Court discussed the development and changes that happened from the Organic Act, to the 1935 Constitution,
1973 Constitution and up to the present.
o During the Organic Act and the 1935 Constitution, a provision may be vetoed by the President.
o However, during the 1973 Constitution, reference to the veto of a provision was eliminated.
o However, as stated, notwithstanding the elimination, the extent of the power of the president has not changed.
This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of
a bill may be the subject of a separate veto.
Can the President veto a provision without vetoing an entire bill? – YES
• SC held that this interpretation:

o Not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate
veto but also overlooks the
o Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates.
o In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some
particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
HOWEVER, even assuming that the provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, SC believes that Section 55 is not a
provision in the budgetary sense of the term.
• Under the Constitution a provision should relate specifically to some “particular appropriation”. Section 55 falls short of this
requirement.
o First, the vetoed provisions do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all
items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill.
o Second, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them,
resort will have to be made to the original recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated
by petitioners themselves.
o Third, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 is actually an inappropriate provision
that should be treated as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
Is Section 55 a condition/restriction and thus beyond the veto power? – NO
• Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct items
of appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on
expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an
appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand.
• However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some matters which are more
properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection
with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures
o Using the test of appropriateness, section 55 is an inappropriate condition. While they appear as true conditions
or limitations, they are actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate
legislation.
o Section 55 partakes of a curtailment on the power to augment from savings: in other words, a general provision
of law, which happens to be put in an appropriation bill.
So is the veto valid? YES
• When Section 55 prohibited the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations disapproved or reduced by
Congress, it impaired the constitutional and statutory authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item
or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
• These are non-appropriation items, an appropriation being a setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue
for a specific purpose.
• It is more of a substantive expression of a legislative objective to restrict the power of augmentation granted to the President
and other key officials.
o It is actually a matter of general law and more properly the subject of a separate legislation that will embody,
define and delimit the scope of the special power of augmentation from savings instead of being inappropriately
incorporated annually in the Appropriation Act.

Philconsa v. Enriquez (1994)
FACTS:
• Case is about the General Appropriations Bill of 1994. Its special provisions are being challenged because of claims that
Congress and the President have exceeded their respective powers and that the President acted with abuse of discretion
in his veto power.
• Dec. 17, 1993 – both Houses of Congress passed and approved the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 (GAB)
o As passed, the GAB imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed
budget previously submitted by the President
o It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and
to realign their respective operating budgets
• Dec. 30 – President signed GAB into law: RA No. 7663 – GAA of 1994
o On the same day, Pres. Delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed
and on which he imposed certain conditions
o No step was taken in either Congress
• Petitions assail the following provisions and sought for writs of prohibition and mandamus:
o Countrywide Development Fund provision,
o the special provision on Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses
o the special provision on Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in
excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for DECS
o The constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e)
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's)
o The constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service.
o the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
o conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU's, the DPWH,
and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
• Because of the novelty of most of the issues raised in the four petitions, the Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene Cortes to submit their respective memoranda as Amicus Curiae.
ISSUES/HELD:
Are the assailed provisions constitutional?
Provision Constitutionality Ratio

1) Countrywide Constitutional • The power of appropriation carries with it the power
Development Fund Petitioners claim that the power given to to specify the project or activity to be funded under
provision the members of Congress to propose and the appropriation law.
-identifying or identify the projects and activities to be
• The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for
specifying the pork funded by the Countrywide Development
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and
barrels Fund is an encroachment by the
computers and other priority projects and activities
legislature on executive power, since said
and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries.." It was
power in an appropriation act is in
Congress itself that determined the purposes for the
implementation of a law.
appropriation. The Executive just implements it
• The authority given to the members of Congress is
only to propose and identify projects to be
implemented by the President – merely
recommendatory. The President still examines
whether the porposals
2) Realignment of Constitutional • In the GAA, there’s a budget for both Houses. Each
Operating Expenses member of Congress is allotted with his own
-allows a member of Petitioners argue that under sec. 25(2), operating expenditure a proportionate share of the
Congress to realign the Senate President and the Speaker of appropriation for the House to which he belongs.
his allocation for the House of Representatives, but not the
• If he does not spend for one item of
operational expenses individual members of Congress, are the
expense, the provision in question allows
to any other expense ones authorized to realign the savings as
him to transfer his allocation in said item to
category appropriated.
another item of expense.
• Under this special provision, the members of
Congress only determine the necessity of the
realignment of the savings in the allotments for
their operating expenses. They are in the best
position to do so because they are the ones who

know whether there are deficiencies in other items of

their operating expenses that need augmentation.
• However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall approve the realignment. Before giving
their stamp of approval, these two officials will have
to see to it that:
• (1)The funds to be realigned or transferred
are actually savings in the items of
expenditures from which the same are to
be taken; and
• (2)The transfer or realignment is for the
purpose of augmenting the items of
expenditure to which said transfer or
realignment is to be made.
3) Highest Priority Constitutional • citing Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, the SC said that Art.
for Debt Service XIV, sec. 5(5) [providing that the State shall assign
Petitioners argue that Congress cannot the highest budgetary priority to education] is only
give debt service (P86.3B) the highest directory.
priority in the GAA, especially compared to
the appropriated amt to DECS (P37.7B)
Are the President’s vetoes on the following provisions valid?

Vetoed Provision Veto valid? Ratio
Special Provision on Debt VOID, but • The special provision that provides for the payment of foreign and local debts
Ceiling part of the sets a ceiling: any payment in excess of the amount herein appropriated shall
veto is be subject to the approval of the President with the concurrence of Congress
sustained and that in no case shall it be used to pay for liabilities of the Central Bank
Board of Liquidators.
• Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the
appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire amount of
P86,323,438.00 for said purpose.
• The said provisions are germane to and have direct connection with item on
debt service.
• As appropriate provisions, they cannot be vetoed without vetoing the
entire item/appropriation.
• HOWEVER, the veto on the proviso therein requiring that "any payment
in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall be subject to the
approval of the President” is sustained because the vetoed provision
is considered an “inappropriate provision”
• Pres. vetoed the provision because the GAA is not the appropriate
way. The vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section
31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292,
and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in
Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate
law, not in the appropriations law.
• SC found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect
repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a
log-rolling legislation.
Special provision on Valid • said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for
Revolving Funds for SCU’s.
SUC’s
• The provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges was
vetoed by the Pres, but similar provisions on government agencies were
allowed.
• This is because those agencies have been enjoying the privilege by virtue of
special laws. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law.
• SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy” –
it avoided double funding and redundancy.
Special provision on 70% VOID • The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach
(administrative)/ 30% of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of
(contract) ratio for road some existing contracts.
maintenance

• SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate

provision which can be the subject of a veto.
• It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by
administrative and 30% by contract.
• The Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions,
conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately
from the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the
budgetary sense.
Special provision on VOID • Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP
purchase of medicines by should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug
AFP. Policy of the Department of Health is an "appropriate" provision.
• It is a mere advertence by Congress to the fact that there is an existing law,
the Generics Act of 1988, that requires "the extensive use of drugs with
generic names through a rational system of procurement and distribution."
• The President believes that it is more prudent to provide for a transition
period for the smooth implementation of the law in the case of purchases by
the AFP, as implied by Section 11 (Education Drive) of the law itself.
• This belief, however, cannot justify his veto of the provision on the purchase
of medicines by the AFP.
Special provision on prior Valid • As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and
approval of Congress for prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of
purchase of military contractual obligations,
equipment
• and if allowed, “shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP
Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to
modernize the AFP”.
• Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or
requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a
separate and substantive bill.
• Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions.
Special provision on use of Valid • The provision allows the Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the
savings to augment AFP use of savings.
pension funds
• According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits
should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the
purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
• Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution.
• SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president.
• Doctrine of Inappropriate Provision: the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which
it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond
an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item.
• To be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are
intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. These are matters
of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments.
Did the President exceed its veto-power when it imposed conditions that the deactivation of CAFGU (which Congress has
appropriated funds for) should be done in accordance to his timetable, taking into consideration the peace and order
situation in the affected localities? – No.
• SC does not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended
to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at
one in 1994.
o But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention
must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-
Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU's to be amended.
• Again: a provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and
R.A. No. 6758.
• Doctrine of Impoundment: refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by
Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type.
o SC refrained from passing judgment on the constitutionality of “impoundment”. However, it applied the doctrine
of inappropriate provision as a way out.

Do the conditions imposed by the President on the appropriations for the SC, OMD, COA, CHR violate the independence and
fiscal autonomy of these entities? – No.
• The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere reminders that the implementation of the items on which the said
conditions were imposed, should be done in accordance with existing laws, regulations or policies.
o They did not add anything to what was already in place at the time of the approval of the GAA of 1994.
• There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue.
Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate.
o The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by Congress is simply an exercise
by the President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed
Separate Opinions
• PADILLA, J. (Concurring)
o I disagree with the majority's pronouncements which would validate the veto by the President of specific provisions
in the appropriations act based on the contention that such are "inappropriate provisions." Even assuming, for the
sake of argument, that a provision in the appropriations act is "inappropriate" from the Presidential standpoint, it
is still a provision, not an item, in an appropriations act and, therefore, outside the veto power of the Executive.
• VITUG, J. (Concurring) – on pork barrel
o I agree that it lies with Congress to determine in an appropriation act the activities and the projects that are
desirable and may thus be funded. Once, however, such identification and the corresponding appropriation
therefor is done, the legislative act is completed and it ends there. Thereafter, the Executive is behooved, with
exclusive responsibility and authority, to see to it that the legislative will is properly carried out. I cannot subscribe
to another theory invoked by some quarters that, in so implementing the law, the Executive does so only by way
of delegation. Congress neither may delegate what it does not have nor may encroach on the powers of a co-
equal, independent and coordinate branch.
o Within its own sphere, Congress acts as a body, not as the individuals that comprise it, in any action or decision
that can bind it, or be said to have been done by it, under its constitutional authority. Even assuming that
overseeing the laws it enacts continues to be a legislative process, one that I find difficult to accept, it is Congress
itself, not any of its members, that must exercise that function.
o I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the President and his colleagues, would have
the best feel on the needs of their own respective constituents. I see no legal obstacle, however, in their making,
just like anyone else, the proper recommendations to, albeit not necessarily conclusive on, the President for the
purpose. Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects
as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I
am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible.

CIR v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power (1988)
SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
FACTS:
• Lingayen Gulf operates an electric power plant that serves the municipalities of Lingayen and Binmaley, Pangasinan. It is
operating pursuant to the franchise granted to it by the municipalities.
o Under the franchise, it is provided that “The said grantee in consideration of the franchise hereby granted, shall
pay quarterly into the Provincial Treasury of Pangasinan, one per centum of the gross earnings obtained thru this
privilege during the first twenty years and two per centum during the remaining fifteen years of the life of said
franchise.”
• BIR assessed and demanded from Lingayen for deficiency franchise taxes & surcharges in 1946-1954.
o The assessment applied the higher 5% franchise tax under the NIRC, and not the lower rates stated in the
municipal franchises.
• Lingayen requested for a reinvestigation based on the reasoning that instead of incurring a deficiency liability, it made an
overpayment of the franchise tax.
o CIR denied this request.
o Another round of assessment based on the deficiency franchise tax, request for reinvestigation, and denial
occurred.
o The case was appealed to the CTA.
• While the case was pending in the CTA, RA 3843 was passed. It granted Lingayen a legislative franchise on the operation
of electric light, heat, and power system in the municipalities of Pangasinan. Section 4 of which is relevant to the case at
12
hand.
• CTA ruled that RA 3843 should apply. This then dismissed the claim of CIR against Lingayen.
• Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/HELD:
Does the 5% franchise tax in the NIRC assessed against Lingayen on its gross receipts realized before the effectivity of RA
3843 collectible?—NO, it is not collectible.
• CIR contended that Lingayen should be liable for the higher 5% franchise tax under the NIRC, instead of the lower franchise
tax rates provided in the municipal franchises.
• CIR contends that NIRC provision applied to existing (i.e. Lingayen) and future franchises.
• Also, it claims that Lingayen’s original franchises did not contain the proviso that the tax provided therein "shall be in lieu of
all taxes”
• Moreover, the franchises contained a reservation clause that they shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal, but
even in the absence of such cause, the power of the Legislature to alter, amend, or repeal any franchise is always deemed
reserved.
• SC held that R.A. No. 3843 granted the private respondent a legislative franchise in June, 1963, amending, altering, or even
repealing the original municipal franchises, and providing that the private respondent should pay only a 2% franchise tax on
its gross receipts, "in lieu of any and all taxes and/or licenses of any kind, nature or description levied, established, or
collected by any authority whatsoever, municipal, provincial, or national, now or in the future xxx and effective further upon

12
In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay into the Internal Revenue office of each
Municipality in which it is supplying electric current to the public under this franchise, a tax equal to two per centum of the gross
receipts from electric current sold or supplied under this franchise. Said tax shall be due and payable quarterly and shall be in lieu of
any and all taxes and/or licenses of any kind, nature or description levied, established, or collected by any authority whatsoever,
municipal, provincial or national, now or in the future, on its poles, wires, insulator ... and on its franchise, rights, privileges, receipts,
revenues and profits, from which taxes and/or licenses, the grantee is hereby expressly exempted and effective further upon the
date the original franchise was granted, no other tax and/or licenses other than the franchise tax of two per centum on the gross
receipts as provided for in the original franchise shall be collected, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding.

the date the original franchise was granted, no other tax and/or licenses other than the franchise tax of two per
centum on the gross receipts xxx shall be collected, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding."
• Hence, Lingayen is only liable to pay the 2% municipal franchise tax.
(RELEVANT ISSUE) Is Sec. 4 of RA 3843 unconstitutional for being violative of the "uniformity and equality of taxation"
clause of the Constitution?—NO, it is not unconstitutional.
• CIR contends that RA 3843 is unconstitutional as it provides for the payment by Lingayen a franchise tax of 2% of its gross
receipts, while other taxpayers similarly situated were subject to the 5% franchise tax under the NIRC. This is discriminatory
and violative of the rule on uniformity and equality of taxation.
• SC held that a tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.
o Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike.
• The Legislature has the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation, but to grant exemptions.
o Tax exemptions have never been deemed violative of the equal protection clause.
o In this case, Lingayen obtained municipal franchises under Act No. 667 of the Philippine Commission. However,
these municipal franchises were replaced by RA 3843.
o The benefits of the tax reduction apply to the Lingayen’s power plant and others circumscribed within this class.
o RA 3843 only effected the transfer of a taxable property from one class to another .
• SC further held that it does not have the authority to inquire into the wisdom of such act.
o The 5% franchise tax rate provided in the NIRC was never intended to have a universal application. NIRC
expressly allows the payment of taxes at rates lower than 5% when the charter granting the franchise of a grantee.
(i.e. the one granted to the Lingayen under Section 4 of R.A. No. 3843, precludes the imposition of a higher tax.)
o R.A. No. 3843 did not only fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts, but made it "in lieu of any
and all taxes, all laws to the contrary notwithstanding.” This then leaves no room for doubt regarding the legislative
intent.
• SC held that the CTA was correct in upholding the constitutionality of the RA 3843.
Should the said law be applied retroactively so as to render uncollectible the taxes in question which were assessed before
its enactment?—YES.
• RA 3843 provides that "effective ... upon the date the original franchise was granted, no other tax and/or licenses other than
the franchise tax of two per centum on the gross receipts ... shall be collected, any provision to the contrary notwithstanding."
• SC held that because of this express provisions, it should therefore specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law.
• Also, SC upheld CTA’s finding that Lingayen is not responsible to pay the “deficient” percentage tax because Lingayen had
already paid more than enough of what was demanded from them (based on the 2% franchise tax).

Abra v. Aquino (1988)

(A2015)
FACTS:
• This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Judge Aquino:

o distraint seizure and sale by the Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra, the Provincial Treasurer against the lot
and building of the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc., rep. by Borgonia located at Bangued, Abra, is valid
o since the school is not exempt from paying taxes, it should therefore pay all back taxes in the amount of P5,140.31
and back taxes and penalties from the promulgation of this decision;
o amount deposited by the plaintaff him the sum of P60,000.00 before the trial, be confiscated to apply for the
payment of the back taxes and for the redemption of the property in question, if the amount is less than P6,000.00,
the remainder must be returned to the Director of Pedro Borgonia, who represents the plaintiff
o deposit of the Municipal Treasurer in the amount of P6,000.00 also before the trial must be returned to said
Municipal Treasurer
• Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the SEC in 1948, filed a
complaint in the court a quo to annul and declare void the "Notice of Seizure' and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and building
located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31
o The "Notice of Sale" was caused to be served upon the petitioner by the respondent treasurers for the sale at
public auction of said college lot and building. Dr. Millare, then Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the
highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly accepted. The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.
• Millare (now deceased) filed through counsel a motion to dismiss the complaint. Provincial Treasurer and Municipal
Treasurer, through then Provincial Fiscal Loreto C. Roldan, filed their answer, which was followed by an amended answer.
Thereafter, Millare filed his answer.
• With the aforesaid sale of the school premises at public auction, Judge Aquino of the CFI of Abra ordered the provincial and
municipal treasurers to deliver to the Clerk of Court the proceeds of the auction sale. Hence, petitioner, through Director
Borgonia, deposited with the trial court the sum of P6,000.00 evidenced by PNB Check No. 904369.
• Stipulation of Facts which was adopted by the trial court:
o That the personal circumstances of the parties as stated in paragraph 1 of the complaint is admitted; but the
particular person of Mr. Cariaga is to be substituted, however, by anyone who is actually holding the position of
Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Abra
o That the plaintiff Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. is the owner of the lot and buildings thereon located in Bangued,
Abra under OCT No. 0-83
o That the defendant Bosque, as Municipal treasurer of Bangued, Abra caused to be served upon the Abra Valley
Junior College, Inc. a Notice of Seizure on the property of said school under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-83
for the satisfaction of real property taxes thereon, amounting to P5,140.31; the Notice of Seizure being the one
attached to the complaint as Exhibit A
o That on June 8, 1972 the above properties of the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. was sold at public auction for
the satisfaction of the unpaid real property taxes thereon and the same was sold to defendant Millare who offered
the highest bid of P6,000.00 and a Certificate of Sale in his favor was issued by the defendant Municipal
Treasurer.
• Aside from the Stipulation of Facts, the trial court among others, found the following:
o (a) that the school is recognized by the government and is offering Primary, High School and College Courses,
and has a school population of more than one thousand students all in all;
o (b) that it is located right in the heart of the town of Bangued, a few meters from the plaza and about 120 meters
from the Court of First Instance building;
o (c) that the elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the street;
o (d) that the high school and college students are housed in the main building;
o (e) that the Director with his family is in the second floor of the main building; and
o (f) that the annual gross income of the school reaches more than 100K pesos.
• Succeeding Provincial Fiscal Solomon and his Assistant, HonMontero, filed a Memorandum for the Government, and a
Supplemental Memorandum, wherein they opined "that based on the evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and
jurisprudence, the school building and school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra Valley College, Inc., are
exempted from the payment of taxes."
• Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of petitioner school for
residential purposes. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision.
• Argument of petitioner Abra Valley College before the court:
o the primary use of the lot and building for educational purposes, and not the incidental use thereof, determines
and exemption from property taxes under Section 22 (3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure
and sale of subject college lot and building, which are contrary thereto as well as to the provision of
Commonwealth Act No. 470 (Assessment Law) are without legal basis and therefore void.
• Argument of Aquino:
o maintain that the college lot and building in question are used:
§ (1) for the educational purposes of the college;
§ (2) as the permanent residence of the President and Director thereof, Borgonia, and his family including
the in-laws and grandchildren; and

§ (3) for commercial purposes because the ground floor of the college building is being used and
rented by a commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corp
ISSUES/HELD:
Is the lot and building in question used exclusively for educational purposes?
• Under Sec 22, par. 3, Art VI, of the then 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes...” are
exempt from realty taxes.
• In several cases cited by the SC, the test of exemption is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution:
o YMCA v. CIR: YMCA keeps a lodging and a boarding house and maintains a restaurant for its members, which
do not constitute business, but an institution used exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes,
and as such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation.
o Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board of Ilocos: included in the exemption a vegetable garden in an adjacent lot and
another lot formerly used as a cemetery. It was clarified that the term "used exclusively" considers incidental use
also.
o Herrera v. Quezon City: the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes
is 'not limited to property actually indispensable' therefore, but extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes.
• Exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence.
• In this case:
o While the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director
and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or
primary purpose—educational,
o The lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination
be considered incidental to the purpose of education.

John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim (2003)
FACTS:
• R.A. No. 7227, or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 set out the policy of the government to accelerate
the conversion into alternative uses of the former military bases.
o Includes Clark and Subic as well as their extensions including Camp John Hay in Baguio.
• R.A. No. 7227:
o Created the BCDA.
o It likewise created the Subic Special Economic Zone (Subic SEZ).
§ It granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of
businesses therein from local and national taxes, and others.
o It also gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the
local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in different areas including Camp
John Hay.
• In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City passed a Resolutoin seeking and supporting, subject to its
concurrence, the issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring an area of the camp as a SEZ
in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7227.
• On July 1994, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420, which established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay –
the John Hay Special Economic Zone.
o An important provision is Sec. 3 of the Proclamation which grants to the John Hay SEZ, the same incentives as
those being enjoyed by the Subic SEZ, such as tax exemption.
o Sec. 3 of Proclamation 420, the zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone
under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones,
the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that may
hereinafter be enacted.
o Sec. 12 of RA 7227, enumerates the privileges given to the Subic SEZ. That is: (a) exemption from tariff or
customs duties, national and local taxes of business entities therein (b) free market and trade of specified goods
or properties (c) liberalized banking and finance and (d) relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors.
• The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the present petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief.
o Petitioners allege that the grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ, contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of
the Constitution which provides that "No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence
of a majority of all the members of Congress."
ISSUES/HELD:
Is Sec. 3 of Proclamation 420 constitutional? NO
• Under Sec. 12 of RA 7227, it is only the Subic SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment
incentives and the like. There is no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time.
• The deliberations of the Senate confirm the exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and investment privileges accorded it under
Sec. 12 of the law.
o Thus, the exemptions under RA 7227, is only limited to Subic.
• It is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or
corporation or class of property from taxation.
o Other than Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax exemptions, or local governments may
pass ordinances on exemption only from local taxes.
o The grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ would circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a law granting
any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.
• Tax exemption cannot be implied. It has to be so expressly provided in RA 7227.
• If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption and incentives given to the Subic
SEZ, it would have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227. It did not.
• Thus, the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is void for being violative
of the Constitution.
o Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID
o Proclamation No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective.
• Note: On local autonomy, no violation of autonomy of LGUS, since the prior concurrence requirement was deemed fulfilled
when the LGU passed the resolution seeking the establishment of the John Hay SEZ.

Lung Center v. QC (2004)

(A2015)
FACTS:
• Lung Center is a non-stock and non-profit entity established on January 16, 1981 by virtue of PD No. 1823. It is the registered
owner of a parcel of land:
o Located at Quezon Ave. cor. Elliptical Road, Central District, QC, approximately 121k sq. m.
o Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines
o A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to
medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge
for their professional services.
o Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the building is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right
side is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden
Center
• Lung Center accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-
paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government.
• On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for RPT in the amount of P4,554,860
by the City Assessor of QC. Accordingly, Tax Declarations were issued for the land and the hospital building.
• Lung Center filed a Claim for Exemption from RPT with the City Assessor, predicated on its claim that it is a charitable
institution. Lung Center’s request was denied.
• A petition was filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (“LBAA”) for the reversal of the resolution
of the City Assessor.
• LBAA: Dismissed the petition and held the petitioner liable for RPT
• Central Board of Assessment Appeals (“CBAA”): LBAA's decision was affirmed on appeal. It ruled that the petitioner was
not a charitable institution and that its real properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
• CA: Affirmed the decision of the CBAA. Thus, petitioner brought it to the SC via Petition for
• Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
• Arguments of Lung Center:
o It is a charitable institution within the context of Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which is not
altered by the fact that it admits paying patients and renders medical services to them, leases portions of the land
to private parties, and rents out portions of the hospital to private medical practitioners from which it derives
income to be used for operational expenses.
o For the years 1995 to 1999, 100% of its out-patients were charity patients and of the hospital's 282-bed capacity,
60% thereof, or 170 beds, is allotted to charity patients.
o It receives subsidies from the government attests to its character as a charitable institution.
o The "exclusivity" required in the Constitution does not necessarily mean "solely."
o Even if P.D. No. 1823 does not exempt it from the payment of real estate taxes, it is not precluded from seeking
tax exemption under the 1987 Constitution.
• Argument of the City:
o It failed to prove that it is a charitable institution and that the said property is actually, directly and exclusively used
for charitable purposes.
o It failed to adduce substantial evidence that 100% of its out-patients and 170 beds in the hospital are reserved
for indigent patients. The respondents further assert, thus:
§ That before a patient is admitted for treatment in the Center, first impression is that it is pay-patient and
required to pay a certain amount as deposit.
§ That even if a patient is living below the poverty line, he is charged with high hospital bills. And, without
these bills being first settled, the poor patient cannot be allowed to leave the hospital or be discharged
without first paying the hospital bills or issue a promissory note guaranteed and indorsed by an
influential agency or person known only to the Center; That even the remains of deceased poor patients
suffered the same fate.
§ Moreover, before a patient is admitted for treatment as free or charity patient, one must undergo a
series of interviews and must submit all the requirements needed by the Center, usually accompanied
by endorsement by an influential agency or person known only to the Center.
ISSUE/HELD:
Is Lung Center a Charitable Institution? – YES
• To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the elements which should be considered include:
o the statute creating the enterprise,
o its corporate purposes,
o its constitution and by-laws,
o the methods of administration,
o the nature of the actual work performed,
o the character of the services rendered,
o the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and

o the use and occupation of the properties.

• The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable
or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage.
• Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation organized for the welfare and benefit of the
Filipino people principally to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines.
• The purposes for which the petitioner was created are spelled out in its Articles of Incorporation, thus:
o Secure the well-being of the people by providing them specialized health and medical services.
o Promote general health of the community
• Hence, the medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in general in any and all walks of life including
those who are poor and the needy without discrimination.
• As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply
because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from
the government.
o As long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to
achieve; and
o no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.
• In this case:
o The money received by the petitioner becomes a part of the trust fund and must be devoted to public trust
purposes.
o Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is entitled to receive donations. The petitioner does not lose its character as
a charitable institution simply because the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the government.
• The petitioner adduced substantial evidence that it spent its income, including the subsidies from the government for 1991
and 1992 for its patients and for the operation of the hospital. It even incurred a net loss in 1991 and 1992 from its operations.
Are the properties of the Lung Center exempt from Real Property Tax? – Some. Portions of its property leased to private
entities are not exempt since these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
• The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are construed strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power.
• For "lands, buildings, and improvements" of the charitable institution to be considered exempt, the same should not only be
"exclusively" used for charitable purposes; it is required that such property be used "actually" and "directly" for such
purposes
o Exclusive - as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment; and
"exclusively" is defined, "in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively."
§ If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted
purposes but is subject to taxation. The words "dominant use" or "principal use" cannot be substituted
for the words "used exclusively" without doing violence to the Constitutions and the law. Solely is
synonymous with exclusively.
o What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the direct and
immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for which the charitable institution is
organized.
o It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of whether the property is used for tax-
exempt purposes
• Hence, the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals
are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the
hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.

CIR v. St. Luke’s (2012)
FACTS:
• St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (St. Luke’s) is a hospital organized as a non-stock and non-profit corporation. Under its
articles of incorporation, among its corporate purposes are:
(a) To establish, equip, operate and maintain a non-stock, non-profit Christian, benevolent, charitable and scientific
hospital which shall give curative, rehabilitative and spiritual care to the sick, diseased and disabled persons; provided
that purely medical and surgical services shall be performed by duly licensed physicians and surgeons who may be
freely and individually contracted by patients;
(b) To provide a career of health science education and provide medical services to the community through
organized clinics in such specialties as the facilities and resources of the corporation make possible;
(c) To carry on educational activities related to the maintenance and promotion of health as well as provide facilities
for scientific and medical researches which, in the opinion of the Board of Trustees, may be justified by the facilities,
personnel, funds, or other requirements that are available;
(d) To cooperate with organized medical societies, agencies of both government and private sector; establish rules
and regulations consistent with the highest professional ethics;
• 16 December 2002 – BIR assessed St. Luke’s deficiency taxes amounting to P76,063,116.06 for 1998, comprised of
deficiency income tax, value-added tax, withholding tax on compensation and expanded withholding tax.
o The BIR reduced the amount to P63,935,351.57 during trial in the First Division of the CTA.
• 14 January 2003 - St. Luke’s filed an administrative protest with the BIR against the deficiency tax assessments.
o The BIR did not act on the protest within the 180-day period under Section 228 of the NIRC.
o Thus, St. Luke’s appealed to the CTA.
• The BIR argued before the CTA that Section 27(B) of the NIRC, which imposes a 10% preferential tax rate on the income
of proprietary non-profit hospitals, should be applicable to St. Luke’s.
o According to the BIR, Section 27(B), introduced in 1997, “is a new provision intended to amend the exemption on
non-profit hospitals that were previously categorized as non-stock, non-profit corporations under Section 26 of
the 1997 Tax Code x x x.”
o It is a specific provision which prevails over the general exemption on income tax granted under Section 30(E)
and (G) for non-stock, non-profit charitable institutions and civic organizations promoting social welfare.
o The BIR claimed that St. Luke’s was actually operating for profit in 1998 because only 13% of its revenues came
from charitable purposes. Moreover, the hospital’s board of trustees, officers and employees directly benefit from
its profits and assets. St. Luke’s had total revenues of P1,730,367,965 or approximately P1.73 billion from patient
services in 1998.
• St. Luke’s contended that the BIR should not consider its total revenues, because its free services to patients was
P218,187,498 or 65.20% of its 1998 operating income (i.e., total revenues less operating expenses) of P334,642,615.
o St. Luke’s also claimed that its income does not inure to the benefit of any individual.
o St. Luke’s maintained that it is a non-stock and non-profit institution for charitable and social welfare purposes
under Section 30(E) and (G) of the NIRC.
o It argued that the making of profit per se does not destroy its income tax exemption.
Note: SC denied the petition of St. Luke’s in G.R. No. 195960 because the petition raises factual issues.
SEC. 27. Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporations.―

xxxx
(B) Proprietary Educational Institutions and Hospitals.―
Proprietary educational institutions and hospitals which are non-profit shall pay a tax of ten percent (10%) on their taxable
income except those covered by Subsection (D) hereof: Provided, That if the gross income from unrelated trade, business or other
activity exceeds fifty percent (50%) of the total gross income derived by such educational institutions or hospitals from all sources, the
tax prescribed in Subsection (A) hereof shall be imposed on the entire taxable income. For purposes of this Subsection, the term
‘unrelated trade, business or other activity’ means any trade, business or other activity, the conduct of which is not substantially related
to the exercise or performance by such educational institution or hospital of its primary purpose or function. A ‘proprietary educational
institution’ is any private school maintained and administered by private individuals or groups with an issued permit to operate from
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), or the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), or the Technical Education
and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), as the case may be, in accordance with existing laws and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 30. Exemptions from Tax on Corporations.―The following organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to
income received by them as such:
xxxx
(E) Nonstock corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, athletic, or
cultural purposes, or for the rehabilitation of veterans, no part of its net income or asset shall belong to or inure to the benefit
of any member, organizer, officer or any specific person;
xxxx

(G) Civic league or organization not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare;
xxxx
Notwithstanding the provisions in the preceding paragraphs, the income of whatever kind and character of the foregoing
organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit regardless of the
disposition made of such income, shall be subject to tax imposed under this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUES/HELD:
What is the effect of the introduction of Section 27(B) in the NIRC of 1997 vis-à-vis Section 30(E) and (G) on the income tax
exemption of charitable and social welfare institutions?
• We hold that Section 27(B) of the NIRC does not remove the income tax exemption of proprietary non-profit hospitals under
Section 30(E) and (G).
• Section 27(B) of the NIRC imposes a 10% preferential tax rate on the income of
o (1) proprietary non-profit educational institutions and
o (2) proprietary non-profit hospitals.
• The only qualifications for hospitals are that they must be proprietary and non-profit.
o “Proprietary” means private, following the definition of a “proprietary educational institution” as “any private school
maintained and administered by private individuals or groups” with a government permit.
o “Non-profit” means no net income or asset accrues to or benefits any member or specific person, with all the net
income or asset devoted to the institution’s purposes and all its activities conducted not for profit.
• The Constitution exempts charitable institutions only from real property taxes.
o In the NIRC, Congress decided to extend the exemption to income taxes.
o (DOCTRINE ALERT!) However, the way Congress crafted Section 30(E) of the NIRC is materially different from
Section 28(3), Article VI of the Constitution.
§ Section 30(E) of the NIRC defines the corporation or association that is exempt from income tax. It
provides that a charitable institution must be:
(1) A non-stock corporation or association;
(2) Organized exclusively for charitable purposes;
(3) Operated exclusively for charitable purposes; and
(4) No part of its net income or asset shall belong to or inure to the benefit of any member, organizer,
officer or any specific person.
• The last paragraph of Section 30 provides that if a tax exempt charitable institution conducts
“any” activity for profit, such activity is not tax exempt even as its not-for-profit activities
remain tax exempt.
• Thus, even if the charitable institution must be “organized and operated exclusively” for
charitable purposes, it is nevertheless allowed to engage in “activities conducted for profit”
without losing its tax exempt status for its not-for-profit activities.
• The only consequence is that the “income of whatever kind and character” of a charitable
institution “from any of its activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition
made of such income, shall be subject to tax.”
• Prior to the introduction of Section 27(B), the tax rate on such income from for-profit activities
was the ordinary corporate rate under Section 27(A). With the introduction of Section 27(B),
the tax rate is now 10%.
§ On the other hand, Section 28(3), Article VI of the Constitution does not define a charitable institution,
but requires that the institution “actually, directly and exclusively” use the property for a charitable
purpose.
• Thus, both the organization and operations of the charitable institution must be devoted “exclusively” for charitable
purposes.
o The organization of the institution refers to its corporate form, as shown by its articles of incorporation, by-laws
and other constitutive documents.
o Section 30(E) of the NIRC specifically requires that the corporation or association be non-stock, which is defined
by the Corporation Code as “one where no part of its income is distributable as dividends to its members, trustees,
or officers” and that any profit “obtain[ed] as an incident to its operations shall, whenever necessary or proper,
be used for the furtherance of the purpose or purposes for which the corporation was organized.”50
o However, under Lung Center, any profit by a charitable institution must not only be plowed back “whenever
necessary or proper,” but must be “devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to
achieve.”
• The operations of the charitable institution generally refer to its regular activities. Section 30(E) of the NIRC requires that
these operations be exclusive to charity.
o There is also a specific requirement that “no part of [the] net income or asset shall belong to or inure to the benefit
of any member, organizer, officer or any specific person.”
o The use of lands, buildings and improvements of the institution is but a part of its operations.

Is St. Luke’s liable for deficiency income tax under Sec. 27 (B) of the NIRC? YES, St. Luke’s must pay the deficiency income
tax based on the 10% preferential tax rate under Sec. 27 (b). However, it is not liable for surcharges and interest on such
deficiency income.
• There is no dispute that St. Luke’s is organized as a non-stock and non-profit charitable institution. However, this does not
automatically exempt St. Luke’s from paying taxes. This only refers to the organization of St. Luke’s.
• Even if St. Luke’s meets the test of charity, a charitable institution is not ipso facto tax exempt (apply standards above in
“Doctrine Alert!”).
• In 1998, St. Luke’s had total revenues of P1,730,367,965 from services to paying patients. It cannot be disputed that a
hospital which receives approximately P1.73 billion from paying patients is not an institution “operated exclusively” for
charitable purposes.
o Clearly, revenues from paying patients are income received from “activities conducted for profit.” Indeed, St.
Luke’s admits that it derived profits from its paying patients.
o St. Luke’s declared P1,730,367,965 as “Revenues from Services to Patients” in contrast to its “Free Services”
expenditure of P218,187,498.
o In its Comment in G.R. No. 195909, St. Luke’s showed the following “calculation” to support its claim that 65.20%
of its “income after expenses was allocated to free or charitable services” in 1998.
• St. Luke’s claims that its charity expenditure of P218,187,498 is 65.20% of its operating income in 1998.
o However, if a part of the remaining 34.80% of the operating income is reinvested in property, equipment or facilities
used for services to paying and non-paying patients, then it cannot be said that the income is “devoted or
used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve.”
o The income is plowed back to the corporation not entirely for charitable purposes, but for profit as well. In any
case, the last paragraph of Section 30 of the NIRC expressly qualifies that income from activities for profit is
taxable “regardless of the disposition made of such income.”
• The Court finds that St. Luke’s is a corporation that is not “operated exclusively” for charitable or social welfare
purposes insofar as its revenues from paying patients are concerned.
o St. Luke’s fails to meet the requirements under Section 30(E) and (G) of the NIRC to be completely tax exempt
from all its income.
o However, it remains a proprietary non-profit hospital under Section 27(B) of the NIRC as long as it does not
distribute any of its profits to its members and such profits are reinvested pursuant to its corporate purposes.
o St. Luke’s, as a proprietary non-profit hospital, is entitled to the preferential tax rate of 10% on its net income from
its for-profit activities.
• St. Luke’s is therefore liable for deficiency income tax in 1998 under Section 27(B) of the NIRC. However, St. Luke’s has
good reasons to rely on the letter dated 6 June 1990 by the BIR, which opined that St. Luke’s is “a corporation
for purely charitable and social welfare purposes” and thus exempt from income tax.

CIR v. DLSU (2016)
FACTS:
• Sometime in 2004, the BIR issued to DLSU Letter of Authority (LOA) No. 2793 authorizing its revenue officers to examine
the latter’s books of accounts and other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for Fiscal Year 2003 and Unverified
Prior Years.
• BIR later issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) to DLSU.
• Subsequently, the BIR, through a Formal Letter of Demand, assessed DLSU the following deficiency taxes:
1. Income tax on rental earnings from restaurants/canteens and bookstores operating within the campus
2. VAT on business income
3. DST on loans and lease contracts.
• The BIR demanded the payment of P17M, inclusive of surcharge, interest and penalty for 2001-2003.
• DLSU protested the assessment and since the CIR failed to act on the said protest, DLSU filed a petition for review with the
CTA.
• DLSU, a non-stock, non-profit educational institution, principally anchored its petition on Art. 14, Section 4(3) of the
Constitution:
o All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively
for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties.
• CTA Division partially granted DLSU’s petition for review.
• CTA en Banc held that while DLSU successfully proved that a portion of its rental income was transmitted to and used to
pay the loan obtained to fund the construction of its sports complex, the rental income from other sources were not shown
to have been actually, directly, and exclusively used for educational purposes.
ISSUES/HELD:
Did the Tax Code qualify the tax exemption constitutionally-granted to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions? -
NO
• Art. 14, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution refers to 2 kinds of educational institutions: (1) non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions and (2) proprietary educational institutions.
• DLSU falls under the first category.
• While DLSU’s claim for tax exemption arises from and is based on the Constitution, the Constitution, in the same
provision, also imposes certain conditions to avail of the exemption.
• There is a marked distinction between the treatment of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions and proprietary
educational institutions.
o The tax exemption granted to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions is conditioned only on the actual,
direct and exclusive use of their revenues and assets for educational purposes.
o While tax exemptions may also be granted to proprietary educational institutions, these exemptions may be
subject to limitations imposed by Congress.
• The Commissioner posits that the 1997 Tax Code qualified the tax exemption granted to non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions such that the revenues and income they derived from their assets, or from any of their activities
conducted for profit, are taxable even if these revenues and income are used for educational purposes.
• The issue in YMCA was whether the income derived from rentals of real property owned by the YMCA, established as
a “welfare, educational and charitable non-profit corporation” was subject to income tax under the Tax Code and the
Constitution.
o The SC denied YMCA’s claim for exemption on the ground that as a charitable institution falling under Art.
6, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution, YMCA is not tax exempt per se.
o What is exempted is not the institution itself…those exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings
and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational
purposes.
o The exemption claimed by the YMCA is expressly disallowed by the last paragraph of Section 30 of the
Tax Code, which mandates that the income of exempt organizations from any of their properties, real or
personal, are subject to the same tax imposed by the Tax Code, regardless of how that income is used.
o Hence, YMCA is exempt only from property tax but not from income tax.
• YMCA case: requisites for availing the tax exemption under Art. 14, Sec. 4(3):
o The taxpayer falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution
o The income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes.
• As held in the YMCA case, which is adopted in this case:
o The last paragraph of Sec. 30 of the Tax Code is without force and effect with respect to non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions, provided that the non-stock, non-profit educational institutions prove that its
assets and revenues are used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes.

o The tax-exemption constitutionally granted to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions, is not subject to
limitations imposed by law.
• Unlike in Art. 6, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution (pertaining to charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents,
mosques, and non-profit cemeteries), which exempts from tax only the assets, i.e. all “lands, buildings, improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes…”
• Article 14, Sec. 4(3) categorically states that “all revenues and assets…used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties.”
• The addition and express use of the word revenues in Art. 14 is not without significance.
o The exemption was seen as beneficial to students who may otherwise be charged unreasonable tuition fees
if not for the tax exemption extended to all revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions.
• The phrase “all revenues” is unqualified by any reference to the source of revenues.
Can the tax exemption granted by the Constitution to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions be subjected to
limitations imposed by law? – NO
• Section 30 of the Tax Code provides that exempt organizations like NSNP educational institutions shall not be taxed on
income received by them as such.
• Section 27 (B) states that proprietary educational institutions are entitled only to the reduced rate of 10% corporate income
tax.
• The reduced rate is applicable only if:
1. The proprietary educational institution is non-profit
2. Its gross income from unrelated trade, business or activity does not exceed 50% of its total gross income.
• Thus, the last paragraph of Section 30 is without force and effect for being contrary to the Constitution insofar as it subjects
to tax the income and revenues of NSNP educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purpose.
Were DLSU’s income and revenues proven to have been used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes
are exempt from duties and taxes? – YES
• The CTA reduced DLSU’s deficiency income tax and VAT liabilities in view of the submission of the supplemental evidence,
which consisted of statement of receipts, statement of disbursement and fund balance and statement of fund changes.
• These documents showed that DLSU borrowed P93.86M, which was used to build the university’s sports complex.
• Based on these pieces of evidence, the CTA found that DLSU’s rental income from its concessionaires were indeed
transmitted and used for the payment of this loan.
• The lower court held that the degree of preponderance of evidence was sufficiently met to prove actual, direct and exclusive
use for educational purposes.
• But the CTA also found that DLSU’s rental income from other concessionaires, which were allegedly deposited to a fund
(CF-CPA Account), intended for the university’s capital projects, was not proved to have been used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes.
• The CTA’s factual findings were based on and supported by the report of the independent CPA who reviewed, audited and
examined the voluminous documents submitted by DLSU.
• Based on the independent CPA’s report and its own appreciation of the evidence, the CTA held that only a portion of the
rental income pertaining to the substantiated disbursements from the CF-CPA Account was considered as used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes.
• While the SC generally respects the factual findings of the CTA, it does not mean that its conclusions are binding.
• Here, the method used by the CTA to arrive at DLSU’s unsubstantiated rental income is not correct.
• To be exempt from tax, DLSU has the burden of proving that the proceeds of its rental income (amounting to P10.61M)
were used for educational purposes.
• This amount was divided into two parts:
o The P4.01M used to pay the loan obtained for the construction of the Sports Complex
o The P6.6M transferred to the CF-CPA Account.
• In 2003, the total disbursement from the CF-CPA Account amounted to P23.46M.
• However, DLSU did not claim that the whole total CF-CPA disbursement of P23.46M is tax exempt such that it is required
to prove that all these disbursements had been made for educational purposes.
• That the CF-CPA might have had other sources of funding is irrelevant because the assessment in this case pertains only
to the rental income which DLSU earned as revenue in 2003.
• That the proven CF-CPA funds used to educational purposes should not be prorated as part of its total CF-CPA
disbursements for purposes of crediting to DLSU is also logical because no claim whatsoever had been made that the
totality of the CF-CPA disbursements had been made for educational purposes.
• No prorating is necessary: exemption is based on actual and direct use and this, DLSU has indisputably proven.

Guingona v. Carague (1991)

(A2015)
SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support
of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.
If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government.
FACTS:
• The constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget is being questioned here. Three PDs
provided for automatic appropriations to pay for the debts of the Philippines. The PDs were assailed on the ground that they
violate the Constitution and it is an undue delegation of legislative power.
• The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion
appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,
while the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
o The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by the following Presidential Decrees. Basically,
they just authorize automatic appropriation of funds to pay our foreign debts as they become due.
• P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as
Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)
o Sec. 6. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines
to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or
on the bonds, debentures, securities or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred
under the authority of this Act, the proceeds of which are deemed appropriated for the projects, all the revenue
realized from the projects financed by such loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures, securities
or other evidences of indebtedness, shall be turned over in full, after deducting actual and necessary expenses
for the operation and maintenance of said projects, to the National Treasury by the government office, agency or
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation concerned, which is hereby appropriated for the
purpose as and when they shall become due.
• P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New
Society”
o Sec. 31. Automatic appropriations. –– All expenditures for (a) personnel retirement premiums, government
service insurance, and other similar fixed expenditures, (b)principal and interest on public debt, (c) national
government guarantees of obligations which are drawn upon, are automatically appropriated; Provided, that no
obligations shall be incurred or payments made from funds thus automatically appropriated except as issued in
the form of regular budgetary allotments.
• P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on
Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
o Sec. 1. There is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such
amounts as may be necessary to effect payments on foreign or domestic loans, or foreign or domestic loans
whereon creditors make a call on the direct and indirect guarantee of the Republic of the Philippines...
• The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967.
The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is the law unconstitutional for allocating the budget for debt services more than education? – NO
• Article XIV, Section 5: “The state shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education…..”
• Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from
the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially,
the very survival of our economy is at stake.
• Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the
Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
Are the PDs still operative under the Constitution? – Yes, unless otherwise repealed.
• Petitioners argue that the appropriations of the then President Marcos became functus officio when he was ousted.

o That there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to
the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990
budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
• An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the payment
of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those guaranteed by the national government, should be made
available when they shall become due precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating
funds therefor, since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.
• The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and are therefore inconsistent
with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which requires, among others, that "all appropriations, ... bills
authorizing increase of public debt" must be passed by Congress and approved by the President is untenable.
o Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including
existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through
the legislative million.
• The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation
measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should have expressed
their decision in a more direct or express manner.
Is there an undue delegation of legislative power? – NO
• The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount
needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest,
taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall
become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises.
o The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to
protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.
• Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the
problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees.
o The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is
to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness,
or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred
by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due.
• The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967
constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The
Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.

Philippine Coconut v. Republic (2012)
FACTS:
• These are consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 assailing certain issuances of the Sandiganbayan regarding the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth commenced by the PCGG against Marcos and several individuals:
o Civil Case No. 0033-A (Republic v. Cojuangco et.al.) and Civil Case No. 0033-F (Republic v. Cojuangco et.al.)
o These two cases are originally 8 amended complaints.
o Among those charged is petitioner Ursua with Lobregat. Both used to hold top management positions in either
the PH Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED) or the PH Coconut Authority (PCA), or both.
• The CASES:
o G.R. Nos. 177857-58 – Class action by COCOFED, its members and a group of coconut farmers. They seek the
reversal of several judgements and resolutions of the anti-graft court. (Partial summary judgements)
o G.R. No. 178193 – By petitioner Ursua on the shares of stock in UCPB.
o G.R. 180705 – Questions relating to Cojuangco Jr.s ownership of the UCPB shares which he allegedly received
as option shares.
• Antecedent facts:
o SUMMARY: During martial law, the coco levy fund was used to acquire the First United Bank (Now UCPB) and
its shares of stock. When the 1986 EDSA event took place, Aquino ordered the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses. One of these was the anomalous purchase of the shares of stock with UCPB.
o R.A. 6260 was enacted in 1971 to create the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut
Investment Fund (CIF).
§ The fund would be sourced from a levy on the sale of Copra. PhP 0.55 would be levied on the sale of
every 100kg of copra. Out of this fund, PhP 0.02 was placed at the disposal of COCOFED (the national
association of coconut producers)
o When martial law was declared in September 1972, several presidential decrees were issued all to improve the
coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund.
§ The PH Coconut Administration (PCA) was charged with the collection and administration of the fund.
§ Basically, several PDs were issued regarding the collection and utilization of the coco levy fund and
how the proceeds will be dispensed and the purpose of each.
§ Relevant to us is PD No. 755 which authorized the PCA to utilize the collections to acquire a commercial
bank and to deposit the levy collections in said bank, withdrawable only when the bank has attained a
certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital:
• It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide readily available credit facilities
to the coconut farmers at a preferential rates; that this policy can be expeditiously and
efficiently realized by the implementation of the Agreement for the Acquisition of a
Commercial Bank for the benefit of Coconut Farmers executed by the [PCA]; and that the
[PCA] is hereby authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired
to the coconut farmers.
§ The fund was used to acquire the First United Bank (FUB), later renamed UCPB. (UCPB also acquired
a large block of SMC shares).
• FUB was a bank controlled by the Cojuangco group. The original plan was for the PCA to
buy all of Cojuangco’s share in FUB.
• However, the simple direct sale became complicated. Instead, it was made to appear that
Cojuangco Jr. has the exclusive option to acquire the controlling interests of PCA:
o Agreement – Cojuangco accorded Cojuangco Jr. the option to buy 72.2% of FUBs
outstanding capital stock.
o Contract – Agreement for the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of
the coconut farmers.
§ This contract had PCA purchase from Cojuangco Jr. the shares of stock
subject to the previous agreement (Option to buy)
§ It was also stipulated that Cojuangco Jr. shall receive equity in FUB
amounting to 7.22% of the 72.2% shares.
o When the 1986 EDSA event happened, one of the priorities of then President Cory Aquino was to recover the ill-
gotten wealth reportedly amassed by Marcos, his family, close relatives, their nominees and associates.
§ She issued:
• EO no. 1 creating the PCGG;
• EO no. 2 asserting that the ill-gotten assets and properties come in the form of shares of
stocks etc.
• EO no. 14 conferred upon the SB the exclusive and original jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth
cases.
§ The PCGG issued numerous sequestration orders against the shares of stock in UCPB owned by (1)
more than a million coconut farmers and (2) the CIIF companies.

§ The PCGG then instituted before the SB a recovery suit – CC No. 0033 – this first case pivoting mainly
on the series of transactions culminating in the alleged anomalous purchase of 72.2% of FUBs
outstanding capital stock and the transfer by PCA of a portion thereof to private individuals
• On appeal with the SC, the relevant argument to us is on whether the coconut levy laws, constitute undue delegation of
legislative power in allowing the PCA to promulgate rules and regulations governing the distribution of the UCPB to the
coconut farmers.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the SB have jurisdiction over the offenses – YES

• There was no need for the Republic to adduce evidence to show that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaints as it leaned on the averments in the initiatory pleadings to make visible the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
• The allegations easily reveal the sufficiency of the statement of matters disclosing the claim of the government against the
coco levy funds and the assets acquired directly or indirectly through said funds as ill-gotten wealth.
• Furthermore, there is no rule that directs the plaintiff to first prove the subject matter jurisdiction of the court before which
the complaint is filed. Such burden falls on the shoulders of defendant in the hearing of a motion to dismiss anchored on
said ground or a preliminary hearing thereon when such ground is alleged in the answer.
Are the coconut farmers subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees of Cojuangco Jr.
or the Marcoses? – YES
• They are nominees. The term refers to one who is designated to act for another usually in a limited way.
o A person whose name a stock is registered, but who is not the actual owner thereof is considered a nominee.
• To give full effect to the EOs issued by Aquino, the term nominee must be taken to mean to include any person or group of
persons, natural or juridical, in whose name government funds or assets were transferred to by Pres. Marcos, his cronies
or his associates.
o The term includes the more than one million faceless and nameless coconut farmers who are the alleged
beneficiaries of the distributed UCPB shares.
o When the bank required them to execute an irrevocable proxy in favor of the Banks manager, it shows that the
PCA had no intent to constitute the coconut farmer UCPB stockholder as a bona fide stockholder; that the 1.5
million registered farmer-stockholders were mere nominal stockholders.
Were petitioners deprived of their right to be heard? – NO

• Their demand to adduce evidence was disallowed because it was premature. Their right to present evidence on the main
case had not yet ripened.
• The Republic as well as herein petitioners were well within their rights to move, as they in fact separately did, for a partial
summary judgment.
o Summary judgment may be allowed where, save for the amount of damages, there is, as shown by affidavits and
like evidentiary documents, no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
Was there a violation of the right to speed trial? – NO

• Right to speed disposition v. Right to speedy trial
o Speed disposition – Obtains regardless of the nature of the case (judicial, quasi-judicial or admin).
o Speedy trial – Available only to an accused and is a criminal law concept.
• In this case, the appropriate right is the right to a speedy disposition of cases since the recovery of ill-gotten wealth is a civil
suit.
• Furthermore, petitioners are deemed to have waived their right to a speedy disposition of the case.
o They never alleged before the SB for the dismissal of the case on account of vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays that attended the proceedings.
Can the law of the case of COCOFED v. PCGG and Republic v. SB be invoked? – NO
• The law of the case means that questions of law that have been previously raised and disposed of in the proceedings shall
be controlling in succeeding instances where the (1) same legal question is raised, provided that the (2) facts on which the
legal issue was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
• The law of the case principle cannot apply in this case:
o The issue in COCOFED v. PCGG is on the legality of the transfer of shares of stock bought with the coco levy
funds to coconut farmers.
o In this case, the issue is on whether there was a violaton of Section 29 (3) of Article VI and on whether there was
undue delegation of legislative power.
§ 29(3) of Art. VI - All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special
fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been
fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
o In Republic v. SB the court declined to pass upon the constitutionality of the coco levy laws. It did not declare that
the UCPB shares acquired with the use of the coco levy funds have become private.

What are the nature of coconut levy funds? – TAXES

• The coconut levy was imposed in the exercise of the States inherent power of taxation. It is in the nature of taxes and can
only be used for public purpose. They cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals.
• Since they are for a special purpose, the balance should revert back to the general fund.
o The PDs made during martial law classifying the coconut levy fund as a private fund to be disbursed and/or
invested for the benefit of private individuals in their private capacities, contrary to the original purpose for which
the fund was created.
Was the delegation of legislative power under the law (PD 755 et.al) valid? – NO
• PD 755 in allowing the PCA to promulgate its own rules and regulations governing the distribution of the UCPB shares,
involves an invalid delegation of legislative power.
o The GR is that Congress may not delegate its legislative power. What cannot be delegated is the authority to
make laws and to alter and repeal them.
o For there to be a valid delegation of legislative power, two tests must be complied with:
§ Completeness test - A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate.
§ Sufficient standard test - It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must:
• specify the limits of the delegates authority,
• announce the legislative policy and
• identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
o In this case, the standard are absent under PD 755.
§ The law authorizes the PCA to distribute to coconut farmers the shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay
from the CCSF levy the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the
acquisition of such bank
§ However, (1) the decree does not state who are to be considered coconut farmers, (2) it did not identify
any condition as to how the disposition of the shares will redound to the advancement of the national
policy, (3) it did not provide for any guideline, standard, condition or restriction by which the said shares
shall be distributed to the coconut farmers that would ensure that the same will be undertaken to
accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry pursuant to its national policy.
§ Basically, the law gave away public funds to private individuals, and converted them exclusively into
private property without any restriction as to its use that would reflect the avowed national policy or
public purpose.
• PCA Administrative Order 1 and PCA Resolution No. 078-74 are also invalid delegations. (On how to distribute the
remaining shares)
o The provisions of the orders directs and authorizes the distribution of fractional and undistributed shares as a
consequence of the failure of the coconut farmers with Coco Fund receipts to register them, even without a clear
mandate or instruction on the same in any pertinent existing law.
o PCA Resolution No. 078-74 had a similar provision, albeit providing more detailed information. The said
Resolution identified 51,200,806 shares of the bank that remained undistributed and PCA devised its own rules
as to how these undistributed and fractional shares shall be disposed of, notwithstanding the dearth as to the
standards or parameters in the laws which it sought to implement.

First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA (1994)
SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.
FACTS:
•
nd
BACKGROUND: This case is a Motion for Reconsideration. The original decision by the SC 2 Division declared that the
CA has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions made by the Board of Investments (BOI).
o In the earlier SC decision, Marisawa Company questioned the decision of the BOI that allowed FLC’s application
to amend its BOI certification of registration to amend their product line from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles”.
Mariwasa went to the CA to question the said approval.
o FLC contended that the approval was wrong because the SC, not the CA, has jurisdiction pursuant to BP 129.
13
SC held that under Circular No. 1-91, CA had jurisdiction. Hence, this MR.
• FLC contended that the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (OIC) should be followed and that Circular No. 1-91 did not
supersede the OIC.
o It contended that when Pres. Cory Aquino promulgated the Code, this was an exercise of her legislative authority.
Hence, it was in the nature of a substantive act of Congress that defined the jurisdiction of courts.
o On the other hand, the Circular was a rule of procedure that the SC promulgated pursuant to its rule-making
power.
• Ultimately, FLC was contending that the appeal should have been brought to the SC, not the CA.
ISSUE/HELD:
Who has jurisdiction over the appeals of the decisions/final orders of the BOI?—CA has jurisdiction!
•
14
Art. 78 of the OIC states that all appeals of the decisions of the BOI shall be filed directly the SC.
15
o Art. 78 was later amended by BP 129 that granted exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the IAC (now the CA) over
decisions/final order of quasi-judicial agencies (i.e. BOI).
• However, when the OIC was promulgated, it still had the provision that the appeal should be with the SC.
• HOWEVER (AGAIN), when the OIC was promulgated, the 1987 Constitution had already taken effect.
o Sec. 30, Art. 6 states that: "No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence."
o This was intended to the give the SC control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction and to prevent an
enactment of Congress enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of the SC that can unnecessarily burden the same.
• SC held that Art. 82 of OIC increased the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.
o Since it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the SC, the provision never became effective.
Hence, it could never be said that it amended BP 129 and increased SC’s appellate jurisdiction.
• SC held that the CA has the power to decide cases appealed to it from the BOI.
o They must be conferred by BP 129 in accordance with the procedure under Circular No. 1-91.
• SC finally held that there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI must be directly appealed to the SC.
o The purpose of BP 129 is to provide uniform appeals to the CA from the decisions and final orders of all quasi-
judicial agencies (except issues under the Labor Code and decisions rendered by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals).
• IN THE END, since the advice and concurrence of the SC was not acquired in the adoption of the OIC, the increase in the
appellate jurisdiction of the SC in the OIC never took effect.
o HENCE, CA has jurisdiction over the decisions/final orders from the BOI.

13
Scope. — These rules shall apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals. They shall also apply to
appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. xxx
14
Art. 78. Judicial Relief . — All orders or decisions of the Board in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be
executory. No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay such order or
decision: Provided, That all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or
decision.
15
B.P. 129, Sec. 9: the appellate jurisdiction to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now the CA) over the decisions and final
orders of quasi-judicial agencies.

SBMA v. COMELEC (1996)
SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
FACTS:
• R.A. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992) was enacted by Congress, which Act provided for the
creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone. Sec. 12 provided for:
o The creation of Special Economic and Free-port Zones in Olongapo City and the Municipality of Subic, Zambales,
and all the areas covered and as defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement which are within the Municipalities
of Morong and Hermosa, Bataan herein referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone. The LGUs mentioned
shall signify their concurrence to their inclusion in the Zone.
o The RA also created the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority to convert the Subic military reservation into alternative
productive uses. SBMA was organized with P20B authorized capital stock, all fully subscribed by the Rep of the
Phils. and paid for with the lands/improvements under Sec.12 above.
• The American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Phils in Nov. 1992.
• The Sanggunian Bayan of Morong passed Reso. No. 10 (Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10), expressing absolute
concurrence to Morong’s inclusion in the Eco Zone.
o Garcia et. al. now assails Reso 10 and filed for a petition to annul. The prayer was to annul and/or provided
conditions to Morong’s inclusion in the Zone. The conditions were mainly to revert back to Bataan the Virgin
Forests and the Grande Island; include the areas within the SBMA in the computation of the IRA; and base the
allocation of employment opportunities on respective land areas.
o The SB of Morong consequently promulgated Reso 18, requesting Congress to amend certain provision of RA
7227 in accord with Garcia’s Petition. The SB also informed Garcia that some items in their Petition were already
favorably acted upon by the Bases Conversion Development Authority and the Office of the Pres. (i.e. allow each
town in Morong, Hermosa and Dinalupihan to establish its own ‘special eco zones’ and SBMA to open its gates
to other towns also in Bataan)
• Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, Garcia resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC,
Sec. 122.
o COMELEC en Banc denied their petition (Comelec Reso 93-1623) for local initiative on the ground that the subject
of the initiative was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
o Another COMELEC en Banc Reso 93-1676 directed the Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the
authentication of signatures being solicited by Garcia et al
• Meanwhile, on Feb. 1, 1995, the President of the Philippines, issued Proc No. 532 defining metes and bounds of the SSEZ,
which included Grande Island and a portion of Morong.
• Then on June 18, 1996, COMELEC issued Reso 2845 adopting “Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain
municipal ordinance passed by the SB Morong, Bataan” and Reso 2848 providing also for the rules and guidelines on the
conduct of the referendum to annul or repeal Reso 10.
• On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the validity of Reso No.
2848 is invalid as “is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.”
ISSUE/HELD:
Whether this petition seeks to overturn a decision which has long become final and executory? – NO
• The issue in Enrique Garcia, et al. v. COMELEC, et al. is different from the present case.
o The issue in the Enrique case is whether a municipal resolution as contra-distinguished from an ordinance may
be the proper subject of an initiative and/or referendum. We held YES.
o The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as well as proper subjects of initiative and
referendum. Art. VI Sec. 32. An act includes a resolution.
o In the present case, the issue is the wording of Reso 10. W/N it is sufficient in form and substance for submission
to the people for their approval; and W/N the COMELEC acted judiciously in promulgating and implementing
Reso No. 2848.
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing Reso 2848? – YES
• The process started by Garcia et al was an INITIATIVE by respondent COMELEC made preparations for a REFERENDUM
only. Reso 2848 mentions REFERENDUM 27 times, while INITIATIVE, was not mentioned at all (Sir might ask this
haha). All activities/docs under the Reso were labeled ‘referendum’.
• The question sought to be answered by the “referendum” was DO YOU APPROVE OF THE PROPOSITIONS CONTAINED
IN THE SIGNED PETITION TO ANNUL OR REPEAL RESO 10 OF THE SB MORONG? Then the conditions set forth in

Garcia’s petition were enumerated (ex. Revert to Bataan the Virgin Forest, and grande Island, employment opportunities,
computation of IRA, finish the works for concrete road constructions, etc). CLEARLY, this calls also for an INITIATIVE and
not ONLY a REFERENDUM.
o An initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose. 3 systems of initiative:
o - initiative on the Consti: proposing amendments to the Consti;
o - initiative on Statutes: proposing to enact a national legislation; and
o - initiative on local legislation: proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution, or ordinance.
o Indirect initiative: initiative by the people through proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for
action.
o Referendum: the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the
purpose. 2 classes:
o - referendum on statutes: refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed
by Congress; and
o - referendum on local law: refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted
by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
o DIFFERENTIATION BY JUSTICE ISAGANI CRUZ: Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and
laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. Referendum is the right
reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and
which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.
o Initiative is resorted to whenever the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or
act that the people desires, or because the people want to amend or modify one already existing.
o - Local Legislative body has authority to enact the proposal under Sec. 13 RA 6735.
o - If it refuses or neglects to do so within 30 days from presentation of petition, the proponents may
invoke their power of initiative. Collect the number of signatures required (number not stated in the decision) and
the people then submits to COMELEC, and give notice to the Local Legislative body. Then the COMELEC shall
schedule an INITIATIVE and not a Referendum, wherein the petition shall be submitted to the registered voters
in the local govt unit concerned.
o - On the other hand, a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered voters of its
territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by
such lawmaking authority. The voting is usually Yes or No only.
o Therefore, the COMELEC in an initiative, must see to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the
proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. Especially when the
proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated. (just like this digest) In which case it should be broken down in
several autonomous parts. Petition should also embrace only 1 subject; but can contain 2 or more propositions.
o COMELEC shall supervise and administer initiative and referendums.
o COMELEC cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. It may however issue guidelines
and rules for the orderly exercise of these “people-power” feature of the Consti.
Is the proposition sought to be submitted in the plebiscite ultra vires or beyond the powers of the SB to enact because under
the LGC, the subject of local initiative shall cover only matters within the legal powers of the SB to enact – Remanded to
COMELEC
• Petitioner insists that the creation of SSEZ is now a fait accompli for the benefit of the entire nation.
o That, Morong cannot unilaterally withdraw its concurrence or impose new conditions for such concurrence to be
effective.
• Garcia counters: that such argument is premature and conjectural because at this point, the resolution is just a proposal. If
people is to reject the proposal, then, there is nothing to be declared illegal kasi nga proposal palang siya.
• SC agreed with Garcia.
o Courts may only decide on actual controversies.
o Also, the SC is a review court. Passes upon errors of law, as well as determines GADALEJ on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Therefore, SC can review Reso 2848. However, it does not have the
same authority with “regards to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed
upon by any branch or instrumentality.”
o The matters in the proposed initiative are within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to determine and decide upon.
So, COMELEC first should pass upon the proposal in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
o Accordingly, the question of w/n the subject of the initiative is within the capacity of the Mun. of Morong to enact
may be ruled upon by the COMELEC.
o Hence, the SC remanded the matter to the COMELEC.

Defensor Santiago vs. COMELEC (1997)
FACTS:
• This case talks about the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative under Sec. 2, Art. 17 of the Constitution.
• In 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by People's Initiative" (Delfin Petition)
o He wanted to amend Sec. 4 & 7 of Art. VI, Sec. 4 of Art. VII, and Sec. 8 of Article X.
o Basically, remove the term limits of the Senators, Representatives, President and VP, and of local officials.
• According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12%
of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
o In short, when he filed the petition, the required signatures were not yet taken.
• Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, the COMELEC issued an Order:
a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition, and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of
general circulation at his own expense"; and
b) setting the case for hearing
• Note also that before all these, in 1991, COMELEC had already passed Resolution No. 2300, to govern the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
• Petitioners (Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin) filed a special civil action for
prohibition, alleging that:
a) IMPT: No implementing legislation. The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution
can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has yet been passed. In fact, there is a
pending Senate Bill for this.
b) RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, (1) initiative on the Constitution, (2) on statutes, and (3)
on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle / subsection talking about initiative on the Constitution
(it is inadequate), unlike in the other 2 modes of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of
people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
c) RA 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers
only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
d) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned,
since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to
amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
e) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
• Respondents on the other hand allege that:
o RA 6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of people initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution;
o The lifting of the limitation on the term of office of elective officials provided under the 1987 Constitution is not a
“revision” of the Constitution, but only an “amendment”
o The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity
or sufficiency of law;
o Resolution No. 2300 is valid, since the Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and
Sec. 20 of RA 6735, empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of the Act.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is implementing legislation necessary for people’s initiative to amend the Constitution? YES.
•
16
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
• While the Constitution has recognized or granted the right to amend the constitution, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
• Furthermore, in the Constitutional Deliberations, the interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out
Section 2 are left to the legislature.
• Thus, Congress must first pass a law to enable the exercise of the people’s initiative to amend the constitution.

16
Art. 17, SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least... three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section
shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. (IMPT)

What is included in People’s initiative, amendment, revision or both? Only Amendment
• It was made clear during the interpellations that Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the
Constitution.
Is RA 6735 sufficient to be the implementing legislation for the exercise of people’s initiative? NO
• RA 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. However, as it
is presently worded, it is NOT a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of
the exercise of the right”
•
17
First. Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of RA 6735 does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
o The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought.
o That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum
on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution.
o As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND.
§ The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.
§ They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
• Second. RA 6735 does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution.
o Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be.
o It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended,
in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
o The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only
strengthens the conclusion that it, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
• Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
o This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum
on national and local laws.
o If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor.
o Especially considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national
and local laws.
• Fourth. We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle
on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope.
o It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only
Congress can pass.
o It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the
legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
can pass.
• Fifth. While RA 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and
referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on
the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. As to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No.
6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely:
a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2;
b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section
3;
c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved
or rejected by the people;
d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition;
e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
2. The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms
and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
3. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
Since RA 6735 is incomplete, can COMELEC issue implementing rules to fill up this incompleteness? NO

17
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

• For there to be a valid delegation, the law must be complete in itself and fixes a sufficient standard.
• Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation.
• The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid. Thus, Resolution No, 2300, insofar, as it prescribes rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution, is void.
Did COMELEC have jurisdiction to entertain the Delfin Petition? NO
• Under Sec. 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution:
o must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein.
• The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet
gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures.
• Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
WHEREFORE:
1. GRANTING the instant petition for prohibition. Enjoining the COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for
the implementation of the system.
2. DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have
failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
3. DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations
on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution;
4. ORDERING the COMELEC to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition.
Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (1997) Motion for Reconsideration

(edited A2015 poli digest)
Preliminary Note:
• A majority of eight (8) Justices fully concurred with the first Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC ruling (Mar. 1997), while five
(5) subscribed to the opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.
• In this motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their positions. One (1) filed an inhibition
and the other one (1) joined the minority opinion.
o As a consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who participated in the deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the
majority opinion, while the other six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion.
• Furthermore, in this MR, since only six (6) voted to grant the motions for reconsideration, said motions should be as they
are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY, the arguments therein set forth not being sufficient cogency to persuade the requisite
majority of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1997 (the first Defensor-Santiago ruling).
• The separate opinions of Davide, Puno, Francisco and Hermosisima, JJ., are also hereto attached.
DAVIDE, J.
• Contrary to the claim of the movants, these two issues do, in fact, raise the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735.
At its core lays the principle of non-delegation of legislative power and the exceptions thereto, both of which are fixed and
invariable subjects of constitutional law.
• What we said, in plain and simple language, was that R.A. No. 6735 failed to comply with the "completeness" and "sufficient
standard" tests, hence Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 authorizing the COMELEC to promulgate implementing rules could not
cure the infirmity. It is settled that the validity and enforceability of a delegation of rule-making power hinges upon compliance
with the aforementioned tests.
• The plea then that we hearken to the intent of R.A. No. 6735 in dealing with initiative on constitutional amendments, or that
we apply a liberal construction to give life to an intent not so expressed in the statute as passed, is but a ploy to tempt us to
engage in judicial legislation.
• We need only stress that the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is not
self-executory. The exercise of the right thereunder is dependent upon a valid implementing law.
PUNO, J.: SEPARATE OPINION

• Consistent with my prior stand, I vote to partially grant the motions for reconsideration that seek a modification of our decision
holding that "R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution in concerned" and "declaring void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the COMELEC
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of the initiative or amendment to the Constitution."
• The first overriding concern is the need to recognize the clear intent of Congress in enacting R.A. No. 6735.
• The second overriding concern is the need to comply with our traditional duty to interpret R.A. No. 6735 to effectuate its
intent. R.A. No. 6735 represents the wisdom and the will of two co-equal branches of government — the Legislative and
the Executive. Due respect to these two branches of government demands that we utilize all rules of statutory construction

to effectuate R.A. No. 6735. It has been the teaching of this Court for ages that when a law admits of two interpretations,
one that will sustain it and another that will invalidate it, the interpretation that will save the law should be adopted.
• The third overriding concern is the need to avoid the danger of over-checking the power of Congress to make laws, which
will put in peril the fundamental principle of separation of powers. From time immemorial, courts have only invalidated laws
that offend the Constitution.
• The fourth overriding concern is the need to enforce the new provision of the provision of the Constitution giving our people
a direct, participatory role in its amendment.
• The core issue in this case has been obscured mostly by non-legal arguments. The plain issue is whether the people should
be-given the opportunity to speak and decide on the need to amend our Constitution. The view that R.A. No. 6735 is not an
inadequate law gives them this rare opportunity. There is now a greater need to know the will of the people considering the
conflicting claims of many that they are the vocal chords of the people. The voice of the people should be heard directly and
a deaf ear should be given even to those who will dictate their will on the people on the erroneous belief that they hold an
exclusive franchise on righteousness. It should be underscored in scarlet that the Court is not pushing for any amendment
to the Constitution. There is yet no telling whether the Constitution will be amended thru people's initiative.
FRANCISCO, J: SEPARATE OPINION

• I retain the view I have already expressed in my previous Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in this case.
• Private respondents' proposal is a mere "amendment" and not a "revision" of the constitution. A cursory reading of private
respondents' petition and its attached petition for initiative in the 1987 Constitution filed with the Commission on Elections
envisages the alteration of some specific provisions of the constitution all relating to a single subject.
• The guiding original intention of private respondents is merely to improve on provisions by adding new ones and suppressing
some existing parts thereof. There is nothing from the records to indicate that private respondents intended to re-examine
the entire 1987 Constitution and determine to what extent should the same be altered.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J: CONCURRING AND DISSENTING

• I reiterate my adherence to the position of the majority that the Delfin petition should be dismissed on the ground that, failing
to contain names and/or signatures of "at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein," the Delfin petition is
fatally defective, being in violation of Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
• I see now that there is an equally compelling and valid rationale which builds and sustains the interpretation that R.A. No.
6735 is a substantial compliance on the part of Congress with its constitutional duty and power to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right." The subject matter of R.A. No. 6735 clearly includes a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution.
• More importantly, I humbly submit that R.A. No. 6735 does not have to contain every detail conceivable in the matter of
initiative proceedings for the amendment of the Constitution and that as it provides for the minimum voter percentage
requirement, the essential requisites in the initiatory petition, the five-year time limit on the exercise of the right of initiative
on the Constitution, the special registration day prior to the plebiscite, and the conduct of signature verification as to the
initiatory petition, R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently laid down the necessary minimum standards for a valid and complete statute
treating of the matter of, among others, the initiative proceedings to amend the Constitution.
• R.A. No. 6735 having provided for the basic and indispensable who's, what's, where's, when's and why's in the matter of
the initiative proceedings to amend the Constitution, the details as to how such proceedings are to be step-by-step
undertaken, are properly left to the Commission on Elections to promulgate in the form of subordinate legislation.

Lambino v. COMELEC (2006)
FACTS: (loooong case)
• Feb 2006: Atty. Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado (Lambino group), together with other groups and individuals began
gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution.
• Aug. 2006: they petitioned COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735 or the Initiative
and Referendum Act.
o Lambino Group alleged that they had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of ALL
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters.
o They claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3M.
• The petition wants to modify Sections 1-7 of Art. VI (Legislative Dept) and Secs. 1-4 of Art. VII (Executive), and an
amended petition was filed to add a new set of Art. XVIII (Transitory Provisions)
o Will shift present Bicameral-Presidential System to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government
• The petition prayed that after due publication, COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the
voter’s ratification:
o Do you approve the amendment of articles vi and vii of the 1987 constitution, changing the form of
government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system, and providing
article xviii as transitory provisions for the orderly shift from one system to the other?
• COMELEC denied due course to the Lambino Group’s petition.
o Lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.
o Santiago v. COMELEC: declared that RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.
• Hence, the different petitions before the SC:
o Lambino Group: certiorari and mandamus; COMELEC committed GAD because Santiago is NOT binding
precedent, and that their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of “the will of the sovereign people.”
o Binay group: prays that COMELEC Commissioners show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for
COMELEC’s verification of signatures.
o Other supporting intervenors: COMELEC committed GAD in relying on Santiago
o Other opposing intervenors questioned Lambino’s standing, validity of the signatures and the verification process,
the compliance with the minimum requirement for the initiative petition under Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Consti, on
the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments, and compliance with Sec. 10(a) of
RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
ISSUES/HELD:
(MAIN ISSUE) Is the Lambino Group’s initiative petition compliant with Sec. 2, Article XVII of the Consti on amendments to
the Constitution? – NO.
• The provision provides that: “Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein…”
o Meaning of “directly proposed…”:
o This means that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready and shown to the
people before they sign such proposal;
o That the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must prepare that proposal and pass
it around for signature.
o SO 2 elements must be present:
• people must author and thus sign the entire proposal; no agent/representative can
sign on their behalf; and
• a petition; the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
• Elements are present only if:
o Full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing the same
complete proposal in a petition.
• Am amendment is “directly proposed by the people…” ONLY if the people sign on a petition that contains the FULL text
of the proposed amendments.
o Full text may be on the face of the petition or attached.
o If attached, the petition must state fact of such attachment, as assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
• Why the requirement of seeing the full text before signing? Sec. 2, Art. XVII does not expressly state the above elements
BUT Consti framers intended to adopt relevant US Jurisprudence:
o Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission (US case): A signature requirement would be meaningless if the person
supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing; [non-compliance] poses a significant
potential for fraud.
o Kerr v. Bradbury: to provide sufficient info so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the
initiative petition.

o An initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing the nature and effect of that which is proposed and
failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.
• In this case, the petition did not contain or incorporate the full text of the proposed amendments.
o It merely submitted to the Supreme Court a copy of a signature sheet, which is the same signature sheet
attached to an opposition filed 7 Sept, 2006 by a certain Atty. Quirino-Quadra.
o The signature sheet contains the following info: (1) province/city/municipality; (2) legislative district; (3) barangay;
(4) no. of verified signatures; the proposition (the question quoted above); and the statement “I hereby approve
the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for
initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
o There is not a single word phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group’s proposed changes in the signature
sheet, nor is there a statement that the text of the proposed changes is attached.
o The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of govt.
o It does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes.
o CLEARLY, this is not the petition needed under the Constitution.
•
18
Neither does the ULAP Resolution supporting the proposals of the people’s consultative commission on charter change
through people’s initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the Constitution sufficient authorization to file the initiative
petition.
o The proposals of the Consultative Comm. are vastly different from the initiative petition filed by the Lambino Group
w the COMELEC.
Proposals of the Consultative Commission under the ULAP Lambino Petition

Reso
• Affects ALL provisions of the existing Consti; from • Affects only ART. VI and VII, + introduction of a new set
Preamble to Transitory Provisions of Transitory Provisions.
• Adopted 6 months before filing of the Lambino petition -
• DOES NOT refer at all to the draft petition or to the
Lambino Group’s proposed changes
• Lambino Group never alleged in their petition that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the
signature sheets.
o Signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the
signature sheets.
o It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that they first claimed that they circulated
the petition, which appears as an afterthought.
o Even assuming that they circulated the amended petition, the Lambino Group admitted that they only circulated
100,000 copies of the draft petition.
o This admission binds them and establishes beyond any doubt that they failed to show the full text of the proposed
changes to the great majority of the people who signed.
o Note that of the 6.3M signatories, only 100K signatories could have received with certainty one copy of the
petition, assuming 100% distribution. Each sig sheet contains space for 10 signatures, and assuming all 10 people
signed, max number who would hae seen the petition would not exceed 1M. (10 signatures/sheet x 100K copies
= 1M max)
o Inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3M the full text of the proposed
changes.
• These 6.3M could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes:
o Term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted; allowing for indefinite reelection;
o Members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office;
o W/in 45 days from ratification of changes, interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments.
• The above amendments are not even indicated in the signature sheets, so the people who signed had no idea that they
were proposing these amendments. Below are the items NOT found on the signature sheets.
o Proposed Sec 5(2) on Transitory Provisions which allows the Interim Parliament to provide for the election of the
IP, synchronized and held simultaneously with election of all locgov officials without specifying the year.
§ Without this specification, this can enable the IP to schedule elections for the regular parliament
simultaneously with ANY future local elections. So pwedeng forever silang part ng Parliament.
o Proposed Sec 4(4) on Transitory Provisions allowing the IP to convene to propose amendments/revisions the
Constitution w/in 45 days from ratification of the amendments
§ Atty. Lambino admitted in the oral arguments that this was a surplusage
§ But more than that, such provision is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift on the form of
government being proposed. This is logrolling, which is prohibited.
§ This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either Y/N to the entire proposition,
forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains 2 propositions.
§ Under American jur, effect of logrolling would be to nullify entire proposition.
o The reason on why the rush in amending or revising so soon the Constitution

18
Union of Local Authorities of the PH

o Proposed Sec 4(3) which allows Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 to be members of parliament only
th
until noon of 30 day of June 2010.
§ No counterpart provision for the present members of HoR is inserted so all present members of the
HoR will remain members of the Parliament even after June 2010.
§ Note that the President’s term ends on June 30, 2010 as well. So, if the IP does not sched elections for
regular Parliament by then, the Prime Minister can only come from the present HoR to the exclusion of
the present Senators.
§ The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against Senators.
§ The people could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against Senators.
• An initiative that gathers signatures from people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments
is most likely a deception, a gigantic fraud on the people.
• This is why the Constitution requires that an initiative be directly proposed by the people…in a petition.
(ISSUE2) Does the initiative violate the Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives? – YES.
• People’s initiative to change the Consti only applies to an amendment, NOT to its revision.
• In contrast, Congress/a ConCon can propose both amendments and revisions.
• Art. XVII speaks of 3 modes of amending the Consti:
o Through Congress upon ¾ vote of ALL of its members for any amendment to, revision of the Constitution (Sec
1.)
o Constitutional Convention for any amendment to, revision of the Constitution (Sec. 1 also); OR
o People’s initiative, only insofar as “amendments” are concerned (Sec 2). This was intentional as per the
Constitutional Committee Deliberations.
§ Amendment does not contemplate a total overhaul of the Constitution.
• McFadden v. Jordan: initiative power reserved by the people by amendment applies only to the proposing and the adopting
or rejecting of laws and amendments, and does not extend to a constitutional revision.”
• Note: definition of a “constitution”: an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein
for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial
entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature.
• Revision v. Amendment IMPT
Revision Amendment
• Altering a basic principle in the constitution (like altering • A change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering
principle of separation of powers or system of checks-and- the basic principle involved.
balances)
• Altering the substantial entirety (when change affects
substantial provisions)
• Generally affects several provisions • Generally affects only the specific provision being
amendment
• (Examples as mentioned above) • Examples: reducing voting age from 18 to 15; reducing
Filipino ownership of mass media from 100% to 60%;
requiring college degree as an additional qualification for
election to the Presidency
• Californian two-part test, where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions, like our Consti:
o Quantitative test asks “is the change so extensive in its provisionsn as to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’
of the constitution by the deletion/alteration of numerous existing provisions?”
o Qualitative: “will the change accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic government plan as
to amount to a revision?” (govt plan pertaining to fundamental framework/fundamental powers of the Branches)
• Under both tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision AND NOT MERELY AN AMENDMENT.
o Quantitatively: the initiative wants to affect a total of 105 provisions
o Qualitatively: will alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
§ This alters the separation of powers. From 3 branches down to 2. (Only Judiciary and Legislative-
Executive as one)
§ Abolition of one chamber of Congress alters system of checks-and-balances within the legislature.
• Note that the difference between “amendment” and “revision” is not a mere procedural matter, but one of substance
• Why is can’t a people’s initiative undertake a revision?
o Since it affects basic principles or of several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded
proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision.
o Revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain
unaltered.
o People’s initiatives do not have these fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies/recorded proceedings
• In this case, a shift on the form of government requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Consti. A
revision of the Consti through a people’s initiative will only result in gross absurdities.
• Lambino’s initiative, is no doubt, a revision, not an amendment. Hence, it is void and unconstitutional because it violates
Sec 2, Art.XVII limiting the scope of a people’s initiative to mere Amendments.

Does the Court need to revisit Santiago – NO.
• Court will not revisit a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the current case (on Lambino’s petition) can be
resolved on some other grounds
• Nonetheless, even if RA 6735 is constitutional to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives, the current petition is
still void for being constitutionally infirm.
Other note: COMELEC did not commit GAD, because it merely followed the SC’s ruling in Santiago and in PIRMA v COMELEC.

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Garcillano v.

(Not so impt issue) Locus standi? – Both have locus standi.

Neri v. Senate (2008)

(1) Already answered.

AZCUNA, .J: SEPARATE OPINION

• Grant MR and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

QUISUMBING, . J: SEPARATE OPINION ON MR

Arnault v. Nazareno (1950)

Can Arnault invoke the privilege against self-incrimination? – NO

Sabio v. Gordon (2006)

Was Section 4(b) of E.O. No 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution? – YES

• Discussion on the power of inquiry of Congress:

Other Constitutional violations:

Senate v. Ermita (SUPRA)

SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary (2003)

Are the petitions moot? – YES

Do petitioners have standing? – Only the Members of Congress

David v. Arroyo (2006)

Are PP 1017 and GO 5 constitutional?—They are partly constitutional/unconstitutional!

Take care power

Power to take over

Ampatuan v. Puno (2011)

Was there a violation of the principle of local autonomy? – NO

Was there an invalid exercise of emergency powers by GMA? – NO

Was there factual basis for the actions? – YES

Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance (1994)

Does the enrolled bill doctrine apply? YES.

Does it violate the one-subject rule in Art. VI, § 26(1)? NO.

Does it violate freedom of the press and religion? NO

Does it violate the uniform and equitable taxation clause? NO

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications (1960)

(Locus standi issue) Does Gov. Pascual have standing? – YES.

Garcia v. Mata (1975)

Farinas v. Executive Secretary (2003)

• Farinas et al are members of the HoR minority.

(MAIN ISSUE) Is Section 14 of RA 9006 a rider? – NO

(Minor issue1) Is Sec. 14 violative of the equal protection clause? – NO

• EPC is not absolute, but subject to reasonable classifications or substantial distinctions.

(Minor issue3) Is the Effectivity Clause defective? – YES

• It provides that RA 9006 shall “take immediately upon its approval.”

Belgica v. Ochoa (2013) - SUPRA

History of the Congressional Pork Barrel in the PH

B. Aquino, III 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles

History of the Presidential Pork Barrel in the PH

Controversies in the Philippines

Separation of powers? – YES

Non-delegability of legislative power? [MOST RELEVANT ISSUE] – YES

Local Autonomy? – YES.

Concurring opinion, CJ SERENO

o Requiring post-enactment measures

Demetria v. Alba (1987)

• Petitioners Demetria et al are all members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa.

Is Sec. 44 of PD 1177 constitutional? – NO, unconstitutional

Liga v. COMELEC (1994)

SANCHEZ v COMMISSION ON AUDIT (2008)

Belgica v. Ochoa (SUPRA)

Araullo v. Aquino (2014)

Does DAP violates the Equal Protection Clause?—NO.

Does DAP violate the principle of checks and balances?—YES.

Does the doctrine of operative fact apply?—YES.

Cordero v. Cabatuando (1962)

• Article VI, Section 21(1) of the Philippine Constitution reads:

Philconsa vs. Gimenez (1965)

o Requiring post-enactment measures  