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Культура Документы
*
No. L-58286. May 16, 1983.
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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ta, Canada at the St. Anthony Church and that he knows this fact
of marriage since he was present during the wedding ceremony
and pictures marked Exhibits “H”, “I”, “J” and “J-1” were taken of
the wedding party after the ceremony and wherein he identified
himself in the picture (Exh. “J”) as “the gentleman in dark jacket
on the right side” (t.s.n., June 5, 1979, pp. 19-21; pp. 177-179,
Records).
Same; Same; Same; Statement of a brother that his brother
got married is a statement concerning pedigree and should not
have been excluded in evidence, including the marriage certificate.
—And with the testimony of Arturo Ducusin, a brother of Agapito
Jr., which may be considered under Rule 130, Sec. 33 as an act or
declaration about pedigree, the word “pedigree” including
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of
the relatives, as well as the presentation of the marriage
certificate of Agapito Ducusin, Jr. and Adela Villacorta (all of
which evidence were noted, admitted and considered in the
decision of the case before the CFI of Manila, Branch XVI (p. 87,
Records) and in the decision of the City Court of Manila, Branch
XVI (p. 62, Records) both holding that the marriage has been
sufficiently proved, We rule that the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in excluding the evidence described above and presented to
prove the marriage of Agapito Ducusin, Jr.
Same; Same; Testimony that lessor’s son who got married in
Canada intends to settle in the Philippines is sufficient evidence to
establish lessor’s son’s need for leased premises.—We likewise
conclude that the intention to use the leased premises as the
residence of Ducusin, Jr. has been satisfactorily and sufficiently
proved by clear, strong, and substantial evidence found in the
records of the case. The testimony of the petitioner, Ducusin, Sr.,
that his son needs the leased premises as he was getting married
and did in fact got married, for which reason petitioner sent the
“Notice to Terminate His Contract” (Exh. “B”); the testimony of
Arturo Ducusin that he had an overseas telephone talk with his
brother Agapito, Jr. informing that the latter was coming home
and that he and his wife were preparing their documents and
arriving within the month (t.s.n., pp. 13, 17, June 5, 1979; p. 15,
Records) and the documentary evidence (Exh. “F” and “G”) which
is the letter of the private respondent Agapito Ducusin, Jr. where
it stated that he intended to settle in the Philippines instead of
Canada where he was presently residing with his wife (CA
decision, p. 108, Records)—all these evidence clearly and
competently prove the intention of petitioner Agapito Ducusin,
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Jr. to reside in the Philippines and use the leased premises for his
residence and his wife.
Same; Same; A month-to-month lease contract is a definite
contractual term.—The contention of the petitioner that the
contract of lease in question is for a definite period, being on a
month-to-month basis beginning February 19, 1975 and is,
therefore, not covered by P.D. No. 20, is correct. The rule We laid
down in Rantael vs. Court of Appeals and Teresa Llave, L-47519,
April 30, 1980, 97 SCRA 453, is squarely on all fours with the case
at bar and is controlling.
Same; Same; A landowner’s statement that one of his
apartment units is about to be vacated is purely speculative and
cannot be a basis for the conclusion that need for premises was not
sufficiently established.—As to the holding of the respondent court
that petitioner Ducusin, Sr. “did not show that the one-door
apartment leased to the petitioners was the only place available
for the use of his son, Agapito Ducusin, Jr.” on the contrary, We
find in the records evidence that out of the eight doors apartment
building belonging to the petitioner Ducusin, Sr., three doors, now
31 years old, became untenantable due to wear and tear and the
remaining five doors were all occupied by tenants; first door,
3319, is occupied by Mr. Coluso, 3319-A by the Baliola spouses,
3319-B by Mr. & Mrs. Magsano, 3319-C by Mr. & Mrs. de los
Santos, and 3319-D by Videz. (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., July 27, 1978; see
p. 14, Records). From this evidence may be deduced that there is
no other place available for the use and residence of petitioner’s
son, Agapito Ducusin, Jr. Assuming that Agapito Ducusin, Sr.
informed his tenant Virgilio Baliola that another apartment unit
No. 3319, would soon be vacated, the alleged vacancy is nearly
speculative and there is no showing that it actually became
vacant and available.
Evidence; Courts; Findings of fact of lower court where not
accepted.—And that brings Us to the last point in the review of
the case at bar. Generally, the findings of fact by the Court of
Appeals are deemed accepted as the basis for review of the
appellate court’s decision. But this rule is not without exception
such as shown in the case before Us where the Court of Appeals
reversed the findings of fact made by the trial court (the City
Court of Manila) and also the Court of First Instance, by
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court and so warrants and justifies a review not only of the law
but also the facts.
GUERRERO, J.:
“x x x
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subleasing the premises; that the lessees have not used the
premises solely for residential purposes but have used the
same as factory and/or manufacturing premises for their
commercial goods; and that they have neglected to
undertake repairs of the apartment and the premises
according to their agreement.
The lessees denied the allegations of the lessor and
claimed in their Answer that the ejectment suit “is a well-
planned scheme to rid the defendants and family out of
their apartment, and to circumvent the law prohibiting
raising the rental of apartments and houses.”
The City Court of Manila, Branch XVI, decided in favor
of the lessor Ducusin on the ground that the “defendants’
contract with the plaintiff has already terminated with the
notice of termination sent by the plaintiff to the defendants
on the ground that he needs the premises for his own
children.” The trial court’s decision states the following
dispositive portion:
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pump and attorney’s fees; and (d) That the lower court
erred in not allowing defendants-appellants’ counter-claim.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVI,
affirmed the decision of the City Court of Manila, Branch
XVI, based on its findings that: (1) mere allegation of the
landlord in his need of the premises for the use of the
immediate members of his family “constitutes a cause to
eject the tenants x x x”; (2) the marriage of private
respondent Agapito Ducusin, Jr. was proved by the
testimony of private respondent Agapito Ducusin, Sr., the
latter’s son Arturo, photographs depicting married couple
and a marriage certificate (Exhibits “F” “G”, “H” and “I”);
and (3) that petitioners admitted the existence of the verbal
agreement to share the expenses incurred for the use of the
booster pump.
The lessees, still not satisfied with the CFI decision,
went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review
submitting that: “(1) that the respondent CFI of Manila
erred in holding that the need of the premises in question
by the private
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‘x x x
‘2. The term of this contract shall be in a month-to-month basis
commencing on February 19, 1975 until terminated by mutual agreement
or terminated by the lessor on the ground that his children need the
premises for their own use or residence or upon any ground provided for in
accordance with law;
‘x x x
(Italics supplied.)
“The parties to the contract of lease agreed that the obligations
arising from the said contract shall be extinguished due to the
following causes: (1) termination of the contract by mutual
consent of the parties; (2) when the lessor elects to terminate the
contract on the ground that his children need the premises for
their own use or residence; and (3) for any cause as provided in
accordance with law.
“In the complaint for ejectment, private respondents rely on
three causes of action to support their claim that the contract of
lease
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‘Art. 1308. The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or
compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.’
‘Art. 1182. When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole
will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. If it depends
upon chance or upon the will of a third person, the obligation shall take
effect in conformity with the provisions of this Code.’
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xxx
“However, by express exception of P.D. No. 20, judicial
ejectment lies ‘when the lease is for a definite period’ or when the
fixed or definite period agreed upon has expired. The lease in the
case at bar having a definite period, it indubitably follows that the
exception, rather than the general rule, applies and, therefore,
respondent Llave’s right to judicially eject petitioner Rantael from
the premises may be duly enforced. This has been the consistent
administrative interpretation of the Office of the President, supra.
Therefore, no error was committed by respondent appellate court
x x x”
SO ORDERED.
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——o0o——
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