XI.

Disallowance of Wills, NCC 839, 1335, 1337, 1338;

Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the
time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of
the beneficiary or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

Art. 1335. There is violence when in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is
employed.

There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and
well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the
person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.

To determine the degree of intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be
borne in mind.

A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does
not vitiate consent.

Art. 1337. There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power
over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. The following
circumstances shall be considered: the confidential, family, spiritual and other relations
between the parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have been unduly influenced was
suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress.

Art. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the
contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he
would not have agreed to.

Cases:

BALTAZAR vs. LAXA, GR 174489, April 11, 2012;

It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the
decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will.
Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute
his estate in the manner provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable. 1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the June 15, 2006 Decision3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision 4 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G-
1186. The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia
Regala (Paciencia), to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the decision
in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one
entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.

SO ORDERED.5

Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution 6 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.

Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the
RTC which disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.

Factual Antecedents

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli
Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala"7 (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September
13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin),
was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed
her signature at the end of the said document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages
1, 2 and 4 thereof.9

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia
(Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s due execution
by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause10 and on the left margin of pages 1, 2
and 4 thereof,11 in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who
acted as notary public.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna
Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:

xxxx

Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present by the
spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all
my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and
CORAZON F. LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the
spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing
at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and
KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their parents who would
decide to bequeath since they are the children of the spouses;

xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties
mentioned in this last will and testament, I am also bequeathing and giving the same to the
spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also command
them to offer masses yearly for the repose of my soul and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala,
Epifania Regala and their spouses and with respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I
likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala in accordance with her
testament as stated in my testament. x x x12

The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s
nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated
Paciencia as his own mother.13 Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s family in Sasmuan, Pampanga
and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution
of the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA).
There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.

In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a
petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for
the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-
1186.

There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order
on June 13, 200015allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra.
Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last
will and testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981.16 The Will was executed in her father’s
(Judge Limpin) home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and
Faustino.17 Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her signatures on all its four
pages.18 She likewise positively identified the signature of her father appearing
thereon.19 Questioned by the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpin’s present mental fitness, Dra.
Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. 20 The
judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin
stated that her father can no longer testify in court.21

The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an
opposition22 to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s
Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia
had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.23

Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M.
Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo
(Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental Opposition 24 contending that
Paciencia’s Will was null and void because ownership of the properties had not been
transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3
of the Civil Code.25 Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of Administration in
Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a
citizen and resident of the USA.26 Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead
issued in favor of Antonio.27

Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition 28 asking the RTC
to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed
and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally
incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will
under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his
benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature
to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend
the document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and
Recommendation29 reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator
of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.

On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30 denying the requests of both Lorenzo and
Antonio to be appointed administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of the USA
while the latter’s claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet been
established.

Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was
recalled for cross-examination by the petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at
the time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia at the
time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place. 31

Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness stand.
Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his father’s condition. According to him his father can no
longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate was presented to
the court to support this allegation. 32

For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980,
he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia
went to the USA and lived with him and his family until her death in January 1996; the
relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia
took care of him since birth and took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster
without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencia’s death, she did
not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the
Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencia’s death
through Faustino; and he was already residing in the USA when the Will was
executed.33 Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three different
documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was familiar with Paciencia’s signature
because he accompanied her in her transactions.34 Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having
used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as
he was not in the Philippines when the same was executed.35 On cross-examination, Lorenzo
clarified that Paciencia informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but
that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death.36

As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21, 2000.

For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins.37 She claimed
to have helped in the household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay
therein from morning until evening and that during the period of her service in the said
household, Lorenzo’s wife and his children were staying in the same house. 38 She served in
the said household from 1980 until Paciencia’s departure for the USA on September 19,
1981.39

On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring "something" for Paciencia
to sign at the latter’s house.40 Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see what that
"something" was as same was placed inside an envelope.41 However, she remembered
Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money before she signs them. 42 A few days after
or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonio’s mother and brought with
her the said envelope.43 Upon going home, however, the envelope was no longer with
Paciencia.44 Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful"
because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments
later.45 On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a
psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was "magulyan" was based on her personal
assessment,46 and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify in court.47

In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt. 48 He identified the Will
and testified that he had seen the said document before because Paciencia brought the same
to his mother’s house and showed it to him along with another document on September 16,
1981.49 Antonio alleged that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still
unsigned.50 According to him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of
one of her rice lands,51 and it was he who explained that the documents were actually a special
power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for
the USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her
death.52 Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: "Why will I never
[return], why will I sell all my properties?" Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I
have other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I die
already?"53 Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not
want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, "I know nothing about those, throw them
away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign them." 54 After which, Paciencia left the
documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents

and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981. 55

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision 56 denying the petition thus:

WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows
the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.

SO ORDERED.57

The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the
time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength
of mind to have testamentary capacity.58

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia.
The appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound
mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not
make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a
Will."59 Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able to overcome the
presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events
were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will. 60
Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion was denied by the CA in its
Resolution62 dated August 31, 2006.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon
the CA the following errors:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE

PROBATE OF PACIENCIA’S WILL DESPITE RESPONDENT’S UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS

NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS

FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE
WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED63

The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was
sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.

Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate
proceedings.64 This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which
states:

Rule 75

Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall pass either real or
personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of
appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.65 These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by
the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses
of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the
left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted
to them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another
with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the
formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the
attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the witnesses
attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact,
even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic
although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary
nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the
will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.

Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan" or forgetful so
much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in
their Motion for Reconsideration66 filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only "magulyan"
but was actually suffering from paranoia.67

We are not convinced.

We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily
make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. 68 Forgetfulness
is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all
his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature
of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there
is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of
unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy
of credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter
went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing
witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where
they are truthful and intelligent."69 More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound
mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the
oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to
the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one
month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less
before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound
mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial
evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that
petitioners failed to discharge such burden.

Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As
aptly pointed out by the CA:

A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she
executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death.
She was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties
she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third
child was born after the execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee. 70

Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and
pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.

An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to
execute the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death.
Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of
fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; and that assuming
Paciencia’s signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery. These are
grounded on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981
wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.

We are not persuaded.

We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as
her own son and that love even extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children. This kind of
relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters
to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is
a prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family discords between
those favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator and those who stand to benefit in
case of intestacy.

In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencia’s relationship with Lorenzo
and his family is different from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared
for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already
married and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This
unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the
authenticity of the said document as against petitioners’ allegations of duress, influence of
fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from
being factual in nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on
record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on
concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said
allegations.71Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on dubious
grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its
foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated
would have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the
deceased]."72

Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly executed.

Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule
76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with. It provides:

RULE 76

Allowance or Disallowance of Will

Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. – If the
will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed
under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be
produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be
satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines
but outside the province where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. If any
or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested
to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court
is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that
the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.

If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who
know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in
the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court
deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)

They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented
in court since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living.

We cannot agree with petitioners.

We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court
was satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son,
Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express
himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical
certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke
in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk
and could not even remember his daughter’s name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such
condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample
opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses
nor challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents and purposes,
Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing
witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencia’s
Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s testimony proving her sanity and the due
execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that
"[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its
due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting
witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by
evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify,
that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law." 73 1âwphi1

Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as
regards the authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of
the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it
that is controlling."74 "The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the
supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein
provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full
effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby." 75 This, coupled with
Lorenzo’s established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of
disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners
apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the
authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution
dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PASCUAL vs. DE LA CRUZ, 28 SCRA 421;

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Sp. Proc. No.
3312) admitting to probate the purported will of Catalina de la Cruz.
On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or
ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14 January
1960, a petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal by Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the
decedent. 1

Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina
de la Cruz contested the validity of the will on the grounds that the formalities required by
law were not complied with; that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her
properties by will at the time of its execution; that the will was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the signature of the
testatrix was obtained through fraud.

After hearing, during which the parties presented their respective evidences, the probate court
rendered judgment upholding the due execution of the will, and, as therein provided,
appointed petitioner Andres Pascual executor and administrator of the estate of the late
Catalina de la Cruz without bond. The oppositors appealed directly to the Court, the properties
involved being valued at more than P300,000.00, raising only the issue of the due execution
of the will.

In this instance, oppositors-appellees claim that the lower court erred in giving credence to
the testimonies of the subscribing witnesses and the notary that the will was duly executed,
notwithstanding the existence of inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies, and in
disregarding their evidence that the will was not signed by all the witnesses in the presence
of one another, in violation of the requirement of the law.

On this point, the lower court said:

Regarding the alleged contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of the three
attesting witnesses and of the Notary Public, some of which have been enumerated in
the Memorandum of Oppositors' counsel, this Court has taken pains in noting said
inconsistencies but found the same not substantial in nature sufficient to discredit their
entire testimony on the due execution of Exhibit "D". It is to be noted that Exhibit "D"
was signed in 1954 and that the attesting witnesses testified in Court in 1962 or after
a lapse of eight years from the date of the signing of the document. It is, therefore,
understandable and reasonable to expect that said witnesses will not retain a vivid
picture of the details surrounding the execution and signing of the will of Catalina de
la Cruz. What is important and essential is that there be unanimity and certainty in
their testimony regarding the identity of the signatures of the testatrix, the attesting
witnesses, and the Notary Public, and the fact that they were all present at the time
those signatures were affixed on the document Exhibit "D". ....

In this jurisdiction, it is the observed rule that, where a will is contested, the subscribing with
are generally regarded as the best qualified to testify on its due execution. However, it is
similarly recognized that for the testimony of such witnesses to be entitled to full credit, it
must be reasonable and unbiased, and not overcome by competent evidence, direct or
circumstantial. 2 For it must be remembered that the law does not simply require the presence
of three instrumental witnesses; it demands that the witnesses be credible. 3

In connection with the issue under consideration, we agree with the trial judge that the
contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the testimonies of the witnesses and the
notary, pointed out by the oppositors-appellants (such as the weather condition at the time
the will was executed; the sequence of the signing by the witnesses; and the length of time
it took to complete the act), relate to unimportant details of the impressions of the witnesses
about certain details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery
of human memory, and which inconsistencies, by themselves, would not alter the probative
value of their testimonies on the due execution of the will [cf. Peo. vs. Sigue, 86 Phil. 139-
140 (3 years interval)].

In Estate of Javellana vs. Javellana, L-13781, 30 January 1960, 106 Phil. 1076, this Court
ruled:

For the purpose of determining the due execution of a will, it is not necessary that the
instrumental witnesses should give an accurate and detailed account of the
proceeding, such as recalling the order of the signing of the document by the said
witnesses. It is sufficient that they have seen or at least were so situated at the
moment that they could have seen each other sign, had they wanted to do so. In fact,
in the instant case, at least two witnesses, ... both testified that the testator and
the 3 witnesses signed in the presence of each and every one of them (Jaboneta vs.
Gustilo, 5 Phil. 451; Neyra vs. Neyra, 42 Off. Gaz. 2817; Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49
Phil. 380.).

Neither do we believe that the fact that the witnesses were better known to proponent Andres
Pascual than to the testatrix suffices to render their testimony suspect. Under the
circumstances, considering the admitted fact that when the will was executed (1954) the
testatrix was already 83 years old, suffering from rheumatism to the extent that she had to
wear thick socks and soft shoes, it did not unlikely that she should have entrusted the task of
requesting them to act as witnesses to Andres Pascual himself, albeit the said witnesses,
testifying eight years later, should have stated that they were asked by Catalina to witness
her testament. The error of recall, considering the eight-year interval, is consonant with the
well known vagaries of human memory and recollection, particularly since the main detail
that must have stuck in his minds is that they did witness the signing of the will, upon which
their attention must have principally concentrated. That they did so is attested by their
signatures and those of the deceased testatrix, which are nowhere impugned; nor is there
any claim by appellants that the latter was incapable of reading and understanding the will
that she signed. In fact, the evidence is that she did read it before signing. The authorities
are to the effect that friendly relations of the witnesses with the testator or the beneficiaries
do not affect the credibility of the former, 4 so that the proven friendship between the
proponent and the instrumental witnesses would have no bearing on the latter's qualification
to testify on the circumstances surrounding the signing of the will.

Appellant's main reliance is the alleged tape recording of a conversation between instrumental
witness Manuel Jiongco and oppositor Pedro B. Cruz at the latter's house sometime in 1960
(which recording was admittedly taken without Jiongco's knowledge) wherein said witness is
supposed to have stated that when he signed the will the other witnesses' signatures were
already affixed, and were not then present, and that he (Jiongco) signed the document in
1958 or 1959 (Exhibit 22; transcription; Exhibit 23 et. seq.).

There are two circumstances that militate against giving credence to particular evidence. The
first is that there is no adequate proof that the declarations tape recorded were in fact made
by Jiongco. The latter denied that the voice was his, and in this respect the trial judge stated
(Record on Appeal, pages 83-84):
 We do not doubt the fact that Manuel Jiongco was in the house of Pedro Cruzon the
occasion that Exhibit "23" was taken. But it is important to note that when said
recording was replayed before Manuel Jiongco in Court he denied that the voice which
uttered the above-quoted portions in the conversation was his. So that with the denial
of Manuel Jiongco, the Court was left with no other recourse than to make its own
comparison between the natural voice of the witness, Manuel Jiongco, while testifying
on the witness stand and his supposed recorded voice in Exhibit "23". It is to be
admitted that we noted some similarity between the two voices but it was not enough
to justify a categorical and definite conclusion that the recorded voice identified by
Pedro Cruz to be that of Manuel Jiongco is in truth and in fact the voice of the latter.
Between a testimony given in Court under oath which was subjected to and stood of
rigorous cross-examination and loose statements made out of Court which even then
are of doubtful source, this Court gives full faith and credence to the former. And this
is true even if this particular witness admits having a poor memory, and his
trustworthiness is assailed due to a previous record of an administrative case filed
against him wherein he was fined for a charge of falsification of public document (see
Exh. "25"). This is so, because the veracity of his testimony in Court regarding the due
execution of Exhibit "D" is corroborated and confirmed by the testimony of the two
other attesting witnesses to the document and the Notary Public who notarized the
same.

Not having heard Jiongco testify, this court is not in a position to contradict the appreciation
of the trial court that the voice in the tape recording was not really that of Jiongco. And
considering that he denied that fact under oath, that the tape recording was not supported
by truly impartial evidence, and was done without the knowledge of the witness, we cannot
see our way clear to rule that Jiongco has been successfully impeached, and shown guilty of
false testimony. It would be dangerous to rule otherwise.

The second point that renders incredible the alleged assertion of Jiongco in the tape recording,
that he signed the testament only in 1958 or 1959, is that in the Notarial Registry of the
notary, Gatdula, the ratification of the testament appears among the entries for 1954, as well
as in the corresponding copies (Exhibit I) filed by him with Bonifacio Sumulong, the employee
in charge of the Notarial Section of the Clerk of Court's office, who produced them at the trial
upon subpoena, and who testified to his having searched for and found them in the vaults of
the Clerk of Court's office. No evidence exists that these documents were not surrendered
and filed at the Clerk of Court's office, as required by law, and in the regular course of official
duty. Certainly, the notary could not have reported in 1954 what did not happen until 1958.

In view of the evidence, we do not feel justified in concluding that the trial court erred in
accepting the concordant testimony of the instrumental witnesses as warranting the probate
of the will in question, taking into account the unexcelled opportunity of the court a quo to
observe the demeanor, and judge the credibility, of the witness thereby. Furthermore, it would
not be the first time in this jurisdiction that a will has been admitted to probate even if the
instrumental witness testified contrary to the other two, provided the court is satisfied, as in
this case, that the will was executed and attested in the manner provided by law (Fernandez
vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil. 742; Cuyugan vs. Baron, 69 Phil.
639; Ramirez vs. Butte, 100 Phil 635). There is greater reason to admit the will to probate
where only the testimony of one witness is subjected to serious, if unsuccessful attack.

Contestants further assail the admission to probate on the ground that the execution of the
will was tainted by fraud and undue influence exerted by proponent on the testarix, and affirm
that it was error for the lower court to have rejected their claim. Said the court in this regard
(Record on Appeal, page 87):

It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a Will was made in favor
of a stranger is not in itself proof that the same was obtained through fraud and undue
pressure or influence, for we have numerous instances where strangers are preferred
to blood relatives in the institution of heirs. But in the case at bar, Andres Pascual,
although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not
a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact it
was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also her
sisters held him with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made
him also her sole heir to her property in her Will without any objection from Catalina
and Valentina Cruz.

Before considering the correctness of these findings, it is worthwhile to recall the basic
principles on undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence of this Court:
that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers
and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express
the will of another rather than his own (Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil. 596; Icasiano vs.
Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964; Teotico vs. Del Val, L-18753, 26 March 196); that the
contention that a will was obtained by undue influence or improper pressure cannot be
sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion, as it is enough that there was opportunity to
exercise undue influence, or a possibility that it may have been exercised (Ozaeta vs.
Cuartero, L-5597, 31 May 1956); that the exercise of improper pressure and undue influence
must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised (Ozatea vs. Cuartero,
ante; Teotico vs. Del Val, L-18753, 26 March 1965); that the burden is on the person
challenging the will to show that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution
(Teotico vs. Del Val, ante); that mere general or reasonable influence is not sufficient to
invalidate a will (Coso vs. Fernandez Deza, ante); nor is moderate and reasonable solicitation
and entreaty addressed to the testator (Barreto vs. Reyes, L-5831-31, 31 January 1956), or
omission of relatives, not forced heirs, evidence of undue influence (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil.
163; Pecson vs. Coronel, 45 Phil. 416).

Tested against these rulings, the circumstances marshalled by the contestants certainly fail
to establish actual undue influence or improper pressure exercised on the testarix by the
proponent. Their main reliance is on the assertion of the latter, in the course of his testimony,
that the deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I knew it" (t.s.n., page 7, 27 January
1962), which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything that proponent desired.
On the contrary, the evidence of contestants-appellants, that proponent purchased a building
in Manila for the testarix, placed the title in his name, but caused the name "Catalina de la
Cruz" to be painted thereon in bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if true, demonstrates
that proponent's influence was not such as to overpower to destroy the free will of the testarix.
Because if the mind of the latter were really subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the
contestants, then proponent had no need to recourse to the deception averred.lawphi1.ñet

Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testarix, who asked Dr. Sanchez to be one
of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue influence, for the reason that the
rheumetism of the testarix made it difficult for her to look for all the witnesses. That she did
not resort to relatives or friends is, likewise explainable: it would have meant the disclosure
of the terms of her will to those interested in her succession but who were not favored by her,
thereby exposing her to unpleasant importunity and recriminations that an aged person would
naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire to keep the making of a will secret can, likewise,
account for the failure to probate the testament during her lifetime.

We conclude that the trial court committed no error in finding the appellant's evidence
established at most grounds for suspicion but fell far short of establishing actual exercise of
improper pressure or influence. Considering that testarix considered proponent as her own
son, to the extent that she expressed no objection to his being made the sole heir of her
sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we find nothing abnormalin her
instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary. As stated by the Court in the Knutson case
—

The truth of the matter is that bequests and devises to those in whom the testator has
confidence and who have won his affection are more likely to be free from undue
influence that bequests or devises to others. (In re Knutson's Will, 41 Pac. 2d 793).

Appellants invoked presumption of undue influence held to exist by American authorities

where the beneficiary participates in the drafting of execution of the will favoring him; but
since the will was prepared by Atty. Pascual, although nephew of the proponent, we do not
think the presumption applies; for in the normal course of events, said attorney would follow
the instructions of the testatrix; and a member of the bar in good standing may not be
convicted of unprofessional conduct, or of having conspired to falsify a statement, except
upon clear proof.

The charge of fraud, being premised on the existence of undue influence, needs no separate
discussion.

WHEREFORE, the decree of probate appealed from is affirmed; with costs against contestants-
appellants.

OZAETA vs. CUARTERO, L-5597, May 31, 1956;

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, allowing the probate
of a will and appointing the petitioner-appellee Roman Ozaeta executor.

The questioned will purports to be that of Carlos "Palanca Tanguinlay, a resident of Manila
who died in said city on September 2, 1950, leaving a large estate and three sets of heirs.

Born in China of Chinese parents, Palanca came to the Philippines in 1884 and resided therein
the rest of his life. He died a Filipino citizen. In 1894 he married Cesarea Victorina Gano y
Torres, with whom he begot three children named Marciana, Angel, and Sebastian. Cesarea
died in 1907, and one year thereafter, Palanca lived unmarried with Rosa Gonzales and came
to have eight children with her. While living with Rosa, Palanca also sustained relations with
another woman, Maria Cuartero, and by her he came to have six children.

Realizing in his old age and failing health that life's end was fast approaching, Palanca made
up Ms mind to legalize his relations with Rosa Gonzales and give their children a good name.
And to put himself right with all his children, legitimate and illegitimate, he also decided to
make a will. And so it was that on April 12, 1945, in a marriage ceremony performed by a
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Mamorto Roxas, Palanca took Rosa
Gonzales as his wedded wife, and not long thereafter he engaged the services of a prominent
lawyer, Atty. Ramon Diokno, for the drafting of the will. After conferring several times with
Palanca as to what the will should contain, Diokno handed him. a draft. A day or two later,
Palanca who was then living temporarily in the house of petitioner Roman Ozaeta, his own
house having been burned in the battle for tie liberation of Manila sent for his former
employee, Adolfo Gruet, and had him put the draft of will in clean form, telling him to keep
the matter confidential.

Typewriting the will, Gruet made one original and two copies and delivered them all to Palanca
together with the draft. The will is in Spanish and consists of sis typewritten pages
correlatively numbered in letters. Each page is numbered at the top except the first, which is
numbered at the bottom.

As previously agreed, in the morning of May 19, 1945, Palanca, accompanied by Adolfo Gruet,
went to the office of Atty. Ramon Diokno at 114 Sail Rafael St., Manila for the signing of the
will. There they wore joined by Segundo Gonzales, who had been previously requested by
Palanca to be one of the witnesses. Before the signing began, Atty. Rom on Diokno conferred
in his private room with Palanca, reading and explaining to him the entire will. The conference
over, Palanca and Atty. Ramon Diokno came out of the room, followed by the latter's son Jose
Diokno, who was to be one of the attesting witnesses to the will, and the three then proceeded
to the veranda where they seated .themselves around a table together with Adolfo Greet and
So gun do Gonzales, who had preceded them there. When all were seated, Atty. Ramon
Diokno began by explaining the formalities to be followed in the signing of the will, and once
that was done, Palanca signed its original and two carbon copies page by page in the presence
of the others in the group, namely, Atty. Ramon Diokno, his son Jose, Se gain do Gonzales,
and Adolfo Gruet. Next to sign was Jose Diokno and after him Segundo Gonzales and Adolfo
Gruet in that order. In succession these three affixed their signatures to each and every page
of the original and two carbon copies in the presence of each other, as well as of Palanca and
Atty. Ramon Diokno.

The will nailed the la be President Manuel Roxas as executor, and it would appear that after
it was signed the original was put in a sealed develop and delivered to him. President Roxas,
in turn, entrusted tie envelop to his daughter Ruby, for safekeeping, and the latter put it in
her trunk. Their remained until 1950 when, upon the advice of Atty. J. Chuidian, whom she
consulted on what to do after learning of Polanca's death, she got the envelop out and opened
it. Her father, President Raxas, having already died, Ruby sought advice from her uncle,
former Judge Mamerto Roxas, and the latter told her to deliver the will to Justice Roman
Ozaota whom the will named executor in default of President Roxas. Acting on this advice
Ruby gave the will to Mrs. Roman Ozaeta three days after Palanca's death.

Designated in the will as substitute executor, Roman Ozaeta, on September 20, 1950, filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, asking for the probate of the will, for the
issuance to him of letters of administration, and for his appointment as special administrator
pending probate. The petition was published together with the date set for Its hearing, and
thereafter Maria. Cuartero and her six children filed their opposition, alleging that the will was
not executed in accordance with law, that it was procured by fraud and undue pressure and
influence on the part of some of the beneficiaries or some other person for their benefit, and
that the decedent's signatures thereon were procured thru fraud and trickery, the same
having been affixed by him without any intention of making the document his will. Sebastian
Palanca, Palanca's youngest son by his deceased first wife, also opposed the petition and, in
addition to the grounds alleged by Maria Cuartero and her children, further averred tint the
provisions of the alleged will were unjust and contrary to law and prayed that the petition be
denied, and that he himself be appointed administrator. Rosa Gonzales and her children also
appeared and joined the petition for probate.
After trial, the court rendered a decision allowing the will to probate and appointing.the
petitioner Roman Ozaeta executoro From this decision only Sebastian, Marciana and Angel,
all children of the first marriage, have appealed, the case being elevated to this Court because
the value of the estate exceeds P50,000.

After going over their briefs, we note that appellants do not seriously dispute Palanca's
signature s .on the 'will and that the whole burden of their contention is that the said will
could not have been executed by Palanca on May 19, 1945, and in the manner described by
petitioner's witnesses., and that, supposing it to have been so executed, still it should not be
allowed because it was allegedly procured thru fraud and improper pressure and influence
and did not comply with the requisites of the law.

We may state at once that the facts narrated above as to hew the questioned will was prepare
d, signed, and kept are fully established by the evidence. We entertain no doubt that the will
was drafted by Atty. Ramon Diokno at the request of Palanca himself and that once Palanca
had the draft he had it put in clean form by his former employee Adolfo Gruet, Neither do we
doubt that the will was in fact signed on the day and in the manner testified to by all of the
three attesting witnesses. They each gave a detailed and clear account of that proceeding and
identified the will presented in court as that which they and the decedent signed on May 19,
1945 in the law office of Atty. Ramon Diokno. They likewise identified their own signatures
and that of the decedent on every page of the will and stated that the decedent affixed his
signatures in their presence and that. they, themselves affixed theirs in the presence of the
decedent and of each other. Much less is there reason for us to doubt the testimony of Ruby
Roxas that she had had the will in her custody from the time it was entrusted to her by her
father about a month or two after they were liberated in Baguio in April, 1945, up to three
days after the death of the decedent in 1950.

The appellants' presented not a single witness who was in a position to deny categorically
that a will was in fact executed by the decedent at the time and in the manner testified to by
the attesting witnesses. As we see It, appellants' case is built mainly on surmises, which,
even if possible in theory as pure speculations, may not, in the absence of sufficient factual
basis, be allowed to prevail over the clear., explicit and detailed account of the circumferences
surrounding the execution of the will given by witnesses who were so straight forward on d
convincing In their assertions that the trial judge who heard and saw then testify accepted
their testimony without any hesitation.

To support their theory that the will in question was not prepared and executed as testified
to by petitioner's witnesses, the appellants, contend, in the first place, that the will could not
have been drafted by Atty, Ramon Diokno because Diokno was once hoard to complain that
petitioner Roman Ozaeta had taken away a client (Palanca) from him, including the work of
preparing his will; that Diokno could not have agreed to draft a will naming a political enemy,
..the late President Roxas, executor; that the will is couched in poor and even defective
Spanish not typical of him who had a good command of that language; that for its preparation
he charged an exhorbitant fee, more than P30,000, three years after its execution contrary
to his usual practice of charging as soon as his work was finished. And in the second place
appellants maintain that it was improbable the will was signed at the time and place and in
the manner already stated above because in May, 1945 Diokno did not reside or hold office
at 114 San Rafael St., Manila, since according to a witness for the appellants, he was then
still staying in the University of Sto. Tomas compound where he and his family had found
refuge during the occupation; that in their testimony, Atty. Ramon Diokno and Adolfo Gruet
did not agree, as to who put the will in clean form; that the testimony of lose Diokno that lie
witnessed the signing of the will on May 19, 1945, is inconsistent with the remarks lie made
in the office of Judge Ceferino de los Santos in the presence of Atty. Binglasan to the effect
that the decedent executed no will in 1945; and, lastly, that the attesting witness Segundo
Gonzales was not telling the truth when he stated that in May, 1945, he had an office in
Capitan Pepe Building in Manila and that it was from there that he was fetched by the
decedent's son, Carlos Palanca, Jr., for the signing of the will.

As against these claims, we have in the first place Atty. Ramon Diokno's categorical
declaration under oath that it was he who drafted the will in question and that . he actually
billed the decedent P30,000.00 for the preparation of the said will and for his intervention in
the signing thereof,' although actually he received only P21,000.00 in deference to the
decedent's request for a reduction. Atty." Ramon Diokno also denied the yarn about his having
complained that petitioner Roman Ozaeta had taken away from him his client, Palanca,
branding the story a nasty falsehood ("tejido de barbaridades, falsedades"), and explained
that lie could not have uttered such a complaint because up to the date of his departure for
New York on June 2 5, 1946, he was still Palanca's lawyer in 'several cases, including his
naturalization case. And then It appears that the will was drafted by Diokno long before he
went politically after President Roxas, who became a presidential candidate only. In the early
part of 1946, and, anyway, .we doubt if any practicing lawyer would refuse to draft a will and
lose a substantial fee just because a political enemy is to be therein named as executor. The
phraseology of the will may, in appellants' oponion, be defective; but that in Itself Is no sure.
indication that it was not authored by Diokno, who, on his part, explained when confronted
with the alleged defects that the will was not intended as a literary piece.

As to Atty, Ramon Diokno's residence at the time 1133 will was signed, we find that appellants'
own witness, Adel Hernandez, gave testimony that in May, 1945, Diokno had his office in 114
San Rafael St, Manila, and it also appears, that appellants' own lawyer Atty. Dinglasan,
admitted having received around that time a court pleading from Atty. Ramon Diokno in which
the letter's address was given as "114 San Rafael, Manila".

Contrary to appellants' clam, we find no contradiction between the testimony of Adolfo Gruet
and that of Atty. Ramon Diokno as to who was the one who put the will in clean and final
form, for Atty. Ramon Diokno did not deny that, as testified to by Gruet, the latter was the
one who put the final draft of the will in clean form.

Jose Diokno admitted saying on one occasion that he did not remember having witnessed a
will executed by the decedent in 1945s but explained that he was confused because he had
then in mind a reformed draft of a will prepared by his father at the request of the decedent
in 1947 which was, however, never signed.

Segundo Gonzales on his part clarified his statement about his having an office in Cap it an
Pepe Building in May, 1945, with the explanation that though he was not a lessee in the real
sense, of the word, he, however, used to frequent a room in tint building which he-considered
as his office.

The appellants also argue that if the decedent had really executed the questioned will on May
19, 1945? it is inconceivable that a man of his intelligence would include false statements
therein, and that it is also surprising that properties specifically bequeathed in that will to
some of the heirs should afterwards be disposed of by him in favor of other persons without
making the corresponding change in the will. Appellants beg the first part of this argument,
while the other part fails to take account of the fact that during the lifetime of the testator he
retains full ownership and control, including free disposal, of the properties bequeathed by
him in the will, and that a specific device fails or is impliedly re voiced as to the property
conveyed whore the testator subsequent to the execution of a will voluntarily disposes of the
property by absolute conveyance.
Calling attention to the dissimilarity in the watermarks on the different sheets of paper used
in the final draft of the will, as well as to the somewhat thicker ink diffusions in decedent's
signatures on page 6 when compared with his signatures on the other pages of the will,
appelants draw the conclusion that the will could not have been typewritten or signed in one
continuous act. The difference in the watermarks of the paper used is not denied, but the
conclusion drawn therefrom that the paper could not have come from a single bunch but from
different bunches, and therefore the will was not typewritten in one continuous set, supposing
it to be correct, is of no consequence, since there is no claim here about any page having
been substituted. Moreover, the scarcity of paper in those early days after Liberation may
easily account for the use of paper with different watermarks. And the difference in the
thickness of ink diffusion noted by the appellants does not necessarily support their deduction
that the will was not signed in one sitting. As was explained by petitioner's expert witness,
the thicker ink diffusion on page 6 is due to the fact that the page is on a paper more porous
than the other sheets used. Indeed, the expert witness for the appellants could not be positive
that the last page of the will and other pages were not signed on the same date. He would
even concede the possibility that the decedent may have signed page 6 ahead of the other
pages when his pen was still very wet, and he corroborates petitioner's expert witness on the
point that the paper of the last page was different in kind and porosity from that use for the
first five pages. In any event, as this Court observed in a case, "speculations on these matters
should give way to the positive declaration of the attesting witnesses," whose testimony
"ought to prevail over expert opinions which cannot be mathematically precise but which, on
the contrary, are 'subject to inherent infirmities." (Roxas vs. Roxas et al., 48 Off. Gaz., 2177
2182; Vaño vs. Vano et al., G. R. No. L-6303, June 30, 1954.)

As to the charge that the will was procured thru undue and improper pressure and influence
by those who stood to profit therefrom or by some other person for their benefit, we note
that no direct evidence has been presented to support it. Appellants, however, maintain that
direct evidence of undue influence is not essential; that a contest on the ground of fraud and
undue influence may be waged successfully on circumstantial evidence and that the
contestant is entitled to the benefit of all inferences which may be reasonably and legitimately
derived from established facts; and appellants then offer the theory that after the petitioner
had succeeded In convincing the decedent whom they picture to be then "a very old. man
suffering from several ailments besides cataract in both eyes," to live with him, he
(petitioner), with the tolerance and cooperation of Rosa Gonzales and her children, who were
then living with the decedent in petitioner's house, instilled fear in his mind and thereafter
controlled all his acts in such a way that he could not but do what he was told and had to sign
whatever papers he was asked to sign. And that, according to appellants, is how. he came
to sign the will In question. But this seems to us to be far-fetched deduction from the
established fact that the decedent was at the time of the execution of t?he will already old
and somewhat sickly and living with Rosa Gonzales and their children in petitioner's house.
Though appellants would want to make the court believe that the decedent was already blind
at the time the will was alleged, to have been executed and that he could, therefore, not have
read or signed it, we find that the Imputation of blindness is not witness Ariston Hermano,
Atty Dinglasan1 s brother-in-law, both testified that the decedent had to request then to road
for him reports and contracts in 1945 because of his failing eyesight, neither of them could
assure the court that the deceased was in fact blind. On the contrary, Angel Palanca ' even
stated that his father,, the deceased, was still signing checks in 1945 while Tan Guan Siu,
another witness for the appellants declared that the deceased still had a good sight in
July, 1946 and could read-papers by himself in 1949 when lie was already living in his house
on Taft Avenue., It is not denied that the deceased had cataract in both eyes even before
1941 c But Dr. W. H. Waterous. a disinterested witness who was treating the deceased,
testified that the latter' s affliction in the eyes impaired only his "distance vision" and he could
still read "inclose-up" In.June, 1946 because his "near vision- was still good. Dr. Waterous
also stated that the deceased could still see things around" and went unaided to the dark
room in-his clinic" when he went there for a check-up at that time. The decedent, though old
and suffering from diabetis would appear, to be still in full possession of his mental faculties
and was not so helpless as appellants would picture him to be, and there is no showing that
before, during,' and after the execution of the will,, he was not a master of his will but had to
take orders from' 'somebody o Moreover, the will was signed by him In the office of a
distinguished lawyer, who died a respected member of this Court, and without the presence
of any the beneficiaries named therein or of 'the petitioner himself whom appellants
apparently suspect of having used pressure or influence in favor of the said beneficiaries. It
is obvious that the claim that the will was obtained thru undue influence and improper
pressure has no substantial factual basis but is more a matter of conjecture engendered by
suspicion which .the weight of authority regards as insufficient to sustain a verdict defeating
a will on that ground (57 .Am, Jur. 308), "It is not enough that .there was an opportunity to
exorcise undue influence or a possibility that it might have been exercised. There must be
substantial evidence tint it was actually exercised." (21 A. L.R. 821 c).

Appellants' theory is, furthermore, disproved by decedent's failure to revoke or otherwise'

alter the questioned will as soon as' he stopped out of petitioner's house and moved to his
own where he led a free man's life up to five' years after the execution of the will in question.
This behaviour of the decedent constitutes a silent ratification of the contents of the impugned
will and refutes the claim of undue influence and improper pressure, even supposing that
these circumstances were, duly proved. (57 Am. Jur. p. 312c)

It is, therefore, our conclusion that the will involved In tills case cannot be disallowed on the
ground that It was procured, thru improper influence or pressure.

Not much need be said on appellants' content ion that the legal formalities for the execution
of a will, supposing that the questioned will was really, executed, were not observed In t lie
present case. Appellants do not dispute the decedent's testamentary capacity or his
knowledge of the language in which the will was written, and we think that it is beyond cavil,
that the signatures of the testator and of the attesting witnesses appearing thereon are
genuine. But appellants contend that the paging of the will rs defective in tint the first page
is numbered, at the bottom and that the will does not contain an attestation clause.

The object of the law in providing that the pages of a will "shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each sheet" is, as already declared by this Court, "to
forestall suppression or substitution of pages" (Martir v. Martir, 70 Phil. 89) or "to make
falsification more difficult," (Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil. 378.) We cannot conceive how the
placing of the number of the page at the bottom of the sheet might defeat such purpose. And
as a matter of fact this Court has already held that numbering a page of the will at the bottom
does not make the will void for that reason. (Aldaba a vs. Roque, supra.) In the case of
Mendoza vs. Pila- pil, 72 Phil. 546, this Court, even held that where the first page is not
numbered but at the bottom thereof there is written the phrase "pase a la 2.a pagina", the
will is not for that reason to be declared invalid.

There is no merit in the claim that the will in question does net contain the attestation clause
required by law in that the attestation only appears in Its last paragraph, which purports to
be the attestation clause, and that it was only the decedent who certified, to those matters
which the law requires to be stated therein. The paragraph in question reads:
"En testimonio de lo cual, he otorgado esto testament en elidioma castellano, que liablo, leo
y escribo, y lo he promulgado y firmad.o en presencia de todos y cada uno de loo tres testigos
quo firman conmigo on tod.as las seis paginas do que so compone este testaments, cada uno
de cuyos tostigos lo atestiguaron y firmaron a ml rue go, on mi presencia y en la do cada uno.
de elios, de todo lo cual yo, el testador, y nosotros, los tres testigos abajo firmados,
certificamos y damos fe, on Manila hoy 19 de mayo de 1945."

The latter part of the above paragraph which appellants seem to Ignore or overlook says: "x
x x de todo lo cual yo, el testador, y nosotros, los tres testiges abajo firmados, certificamos
y damos fe x x x." This makes it quite clear that it is not only the testator but also the attesting
witnesses who have taken part in the certification of the circumstances required to be stated
in the attestation clause. That an attestation clause of this kind, is legally sufficient has already
been decided in the cases of Aldaba vs. Roque, supra; Cuevas vs. Achacoso, G. R. No. L-
3497, May 18, 1951; Gonzales vs. Gonzales, G. R. No. L-3272-73, November 29, 1951-
Appellants cite the case of Testate Estate of Carlos Gil, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, In the belief that
the decision therein rendered favors their contention. Attention, however, must be called to
the fact that the decision first rendered in that case was on a motion for reconsideration,
subsequently revoked and the Court reverted to the liberal interpretation followed in the cases
of Aldaba vs. Roque, supra, and a long line of other cases.

Finally, appellants object to the appointment of petitioner as executor, alleging that "he is
unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of want of understanding and integrity." But
this allegation Is gratuitous, for it is not supported by any evidence. On the other hand, we
may take judicial mot ice of tie fact that petitioner is a lawyer of learning aid ability, a former
Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice, and twice a member of the highest court of the
land where he served with distinction. With nothing proved against his character and ability,
we must reject the charge that he is unfit for the position of executor to which the lower court
as well as the testator himself has seen fit to name him.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants

COSO VS. FERNANDEZ DEZA, NO. 16763, DECEMBER 22, 1921;

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila setting aside a will
on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of a testator by
one Rosario Lopez. The will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to an illegitimate son had by
the testator with said Rosario Lopez, and also provides for the payment to her of nineteen
hundred Spanish duros by way the reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care
of the testator in Barcelona during the years 1909 to 1916, when he is alleged to have suffered
from a severe illness.

The evidence shows that the testator, a married man and resident of the Philippine Islands,
became acquainted with Rosario Lopez in Spain in 1898 and that he had illicit returns with
her for many years thereafter. After his return to the Philippines she followed him, arriving in
Manila in February, 1918, and remained in close communication with him until his death in
February, 1919. There is no doubt that she exercised some influence over him and the only
question for our determination is whether this influence was of such a character as to vitiate
the will.

The English and American rule in regard to undue influence is thus stated in 40 Cyc., 1144-
1149.
 Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a
will; to have that effect the influence must be "undue." The rule as to what constitutes
"undue influence" has been variously stated, but the substance of the different
statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a
kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free
agency and make his express the will of another, rather than his own.1awphil.net

. . . such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to
the execution of the will in question, either at time of the execution of the will, or so
near thereto as to be still operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of
particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions which
the testator would not otherwise have made. . . .

. . . and while the same amount of influence may become "undue" when exercised by
one occupying an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that
some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a
will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the testator's free agency.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence, in the sense
above expressed, existed at the time of its execution and we do not think that this burden
has been carried in the present case. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong
affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered and
subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another
rather than his own." He was an intelligent man, a lawyer by profession, appears to have
known his own mind, and may well have been actuated only by a legitimate sense of duty in
making provisions for the welfare of his illegitimate son and by a proper feeling of gratitude
in repaying Rosario Lopez for the sacrifices she had made for him. Mere affection, even if
illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will. No imposition or fraud has
been shown in the present case.

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as `undue,' if no

imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an
unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed
to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.
(Mackall vs. Mackall, 135 U. S., 1677.)

It may be further observed that under the Civil Law the right of a person with legal heirs to
dispose of his property by will is limited to only a portion of his estate, and that under the law
in force in these Islands before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the only outside
influences affecting the validity of a will were duress, deceit, and fraud. The present doctrine
of undue influence originated in a legal system where the right of the testator to dispose of
his property by will was nearly unlimited. Manifestly, greater safeguards in regard to execution
of wills may be warranted when the right to so dispose of property is unlimited than when it
is restricted to the extent it is in this jurisdiction. There is, therefore, certainly no reason for
giving the doctrine of undue influence a wider scope here than it enjoys in the United States.

For the reasons stated, the decision of the lower court disallowing the will of Federico Gimenez
Zoboli is hereby reversed and it is ordered that the will be admitted to probate. No costs will
be allowed. So ordered.

ORTEGA vs. VALMONTE, GR 157451, December 16, 2005;

The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing
why it should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this
burden satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any reversible error on the
part of the appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision 2 and the March 7, 2003 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered approving and allowing
probate to the said last will and testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering the issuance of
letters testamentary to the petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be remanded to the
court a quo for further and concomitant proceedings."4

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:

"x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United
States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the
Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio
Village, Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their
names in TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of
80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto
Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido
died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR PULMONALE.

"Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two
(2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page
contains the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was
signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the
three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation
clause and again on the left hand margin. It provides in the body that:

‘LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:

‘I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident
of 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and being of sound and
disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare this to be my last will and testament:

1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of the Catholic
Church in accordance with the rites and said Church and that a suitable monument to be
erected and provided my by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory in the minds of my
family and friends;
2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half (1/2)
portion of the follow-described properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]:

a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro
Manila, described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-
Manila registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca Valmonte), having
share and share alike;

b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong and mixed
materials used as my residence and my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati,
Metro Manila also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482, Makati, Metro-Manila, jointly
in the name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and
share alike or equal co-owners thereof;

3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties, including my savings
account bank book in USA which is in the possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever
and wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte;

4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and
testament, and it is my will that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in Quezon
City, Philippines.’

"The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:

1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA;

2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to
give them proper notice pursuant to law;

3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities
were not complied with;

4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he
being in an advance sate of senility;

5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;

6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the
petitioner and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or

7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;’

and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of
understanding and integrity.

"At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public Atty.
Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental witnesses spouses
Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the opposition, the oppositor
Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.

"According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents house at
Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every month to get his $366.00
monthly pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were times though when to
shave off on expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was in one of his travels by his
lonesome self when the notarial will was made. The will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio
and Feliza Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she
had no knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of her husband, but just
serendipitously found it in his attache case after his death. It was only then that she learned
that the testator bequeathed to her his properties and she was named the executrix in the
said will. To her estimate, the value of property both real and personal left by the testator is
worth more or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered mental
infirmity because despite his old age he went alone to the market which is two to three
kilometers from their home cooked and cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not
accompany him, even traveled to Manila alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina also
asserts that her husband was in good health and that he was hospitalized only because of a
cold but which eventually resulted in his death.

"Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testator’s will, testified
that it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses
of the will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and
testament. After the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the
will, the notary public told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare
it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and locked in his
drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public
was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and
which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary
public explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator
spoke and understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed
by the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been
executed had he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983.
He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did
not like the document to appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to his observation
the testator was physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature on the
will.

"The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public, and
testified that the testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at
GSIS Village, Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the house of Atty. Floro
Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving his instructions to Atty. Floro
Sarmiento, they were told to return on June 15, 1983; that they returned on June 15, 1983
for the execution of the will but were asked to come back instead on August 9, 1983 because
of the absence of the notary public; that the testator executed the will in question in their
presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that he was strong and in good
health; that the contents of the will was explained by the notary public in the Ilocano and
Tagalog dialect and that all of them as witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence
of the testator and of each other. And that during the execution, the testator’s wife, Josefina
was not with them.
"The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her
there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from
him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the
execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound
mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and
asked Leticia’s family to live with him and they took care of him. During that time, the
testator’s physical and mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations and senility. This
was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and
wanted to marry.

"Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidence adduced, reduces the
opposition to two grounds, namely:

1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation
of the will; and

2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in
an advanced state of senility

"It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate." 5

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate.
The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had
acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual
exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite ways" 6 did not make him a person of
unsound mind.

Hence, this Petition.7

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

"I.

Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.

"II.

Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud or
trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his last will
and testament.

"III.

Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed
the subject will."8
In short, petitioner assails the CA’s allowance of the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.

This Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Probate of a Will

At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review
under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence
presented during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court
when, as in the instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of
the trial court.9

The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every
will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites
that must be satisfied for the probate of a will.10 Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states
the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:

"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time
of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be
his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto."

In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmonte’s will by imputing fraud
in its execution and challenging the testator’s state of mind at the time.

Existence of Fraud in the

Execution of a Will

Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will,
but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud.
Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testator’s wife and sole beneficiary,
conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign
it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of
the will.

Petitioner contends that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to]
almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who
happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado,"11 thus casting doubt on the intention of
respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason,
logic and common experience"12 for an old man with a severe psychological condition to have
willingly signed a last will and testament.

We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which
the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived
as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some
extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a
certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made."13

We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of
fraud at the time of its execution.14 The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of
the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.15 Unfortunately in this case, other
than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution
of a will.16 That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the
fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole
beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken
"the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years."17

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing
on the will does not invalidate the document, "because the law does not even require that a
[notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion." 18 More important,
the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses
who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another. 19Furthermore,
the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public. 20 In any
event, we agree with the CA that "the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed
execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public
and the instrumental witnesses."21

The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985,
October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively
as follows:

"Atty. Floro Sarmiento:

Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator and his
witnesses were supposed to be in your office?

A Yes sir.

Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house?

A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.

xxxxxxxxx

Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per acknowledgement

appearing therein. Was this the actual date when the document was acknowledged?

A Yes sir.

Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their respective
signature on the first and second pages of exhibit C?

A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.

Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body of the
document as well as the attestation clause?

A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own handwriting
August 9, 1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)

Eugenio Gomez:

Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the
acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and tell us this
discrepancy in the date?

A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses; that
was first week of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we
returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back?

A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.

Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your
companions?

A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)

Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:

Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?

xxxxxxxxx

A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out first time.
We went there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and
testament. After that what they have talked what will be placed in the testament, what Atty.
Sarmiento said was that he will go back on the 15th of June. When we returned on June 15,
Atty. Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to sign it, the will. That is why, for the
third time we went there on August 9 and that was the time we affixed our signature. (tsn,
October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)
Josie Collado:

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what transpired?

A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.

Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento?

A Yes, Sir.

Q For what purpose?

A Our purpose is just to sign the will.

Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?

A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)"22

Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a "grand conspiracy" in the commission
of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any
benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and
the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. 23 Their testimony favoring it and the
finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be
affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.24

Capacity to Make a Will

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following
guidelines:

"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the
time of its execution.

"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of
all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by
disease, injury or other cause.

"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature
of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.

"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof
to the contrary.

"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one
month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to
be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of,
(2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act.
Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding
that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the
kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As
regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole
beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not
affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.

Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,25 which held thus:

"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries
with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as
insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while
on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease
of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or
feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory
sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing
of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind
be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that
testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or
of unsound mind."26

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

XII. LEGITIME;

A. Concept, NCC 886;

Art. 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because
the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.

Cases:

FRANCISCO vs. FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, GR 138774, MARCH 08, 2001;

May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a
simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children?

The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 declaring void the deed of sale of two parcels of land conveyed to petitioners who
are illegitimate children of the deceased to the exclusion of respondent, his sole legitimate
daughter.
The facts2 are:

Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio
Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased.

Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common
law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children.

Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in
Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When
Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the
certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida
Pascual.

After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, 3 Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her
half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983.
After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a "Kasulatan sa
Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco
and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No.
T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.4

On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against
petitioners for annulment of sale with damages.5 She alleged that the signature of her late
father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was
a forgery.

In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of
the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint. The dispositive portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law applicable thereon,
the Court hereby renders judgment:

"a) sustaining the validity of the "Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan" (Exh."G") executed
on 15 August 1993 by the late Gregorio Francisco in favor of the defendants;

"b) affirming the validity of the Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-59.585 (Exh. "I")
issued to defendant Regina Francisco and No. T-59.386 (Exh. "H") issued to defendant
Zenaida Pascual; and

"c) dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants' counterclaim for damages and
attorney's fees for lack of merit." 6

In time7, respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals.8

After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
reversing that of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 21, 1994 of the court a quo is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and another rendered as follows:
 "1. The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983 (Exhibit "G") is declared
null and void from the beginning and TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59-586 (M), both
of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) in the names of Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual, respectively, are annulled and cancelled;

"2. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) is ordered to cancel the
aforementioned TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59.586 (M) and to reinstate Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-132740 and T-117160 both in the name of Gregorio
Francisco.

"3. Defendants-appellees Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual jointly and solidarily
are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Alfonso the amount of P5,000.00 as moral
damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

"4. The counterclaim of defendants-appellees is dismissed for lack of merit.

"Costs of suit against said defendants-appellees." 9

Hence, this petition.10

The main issue raised is whether the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the
appellate court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of
Appeals under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to review of pure errors of law.
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is
a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly
erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.11

The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are conclusive
and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, 12 unless the case falls under
any of the recognized exceptions to the rule.13

Petitioner has failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions. 14

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because:

First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale.
Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina
Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until
the time when Felicitas testified in 1991.15

As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating a
canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to
Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto.

Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw
money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the
property. She had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross
earnings from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the
club.16
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net
income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for
P15,000.00.17 She had no other source of income.

We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or
that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land.

The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to

whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought
below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single witness to
the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price.

Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence,
null and void.18

Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code 19 provisions
insofar as the transaction affected respondent's legitime. The sale was executed in 1983,
when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.

Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate
daughters20 at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent
respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his
death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the
property.

According to Article 888, Civil Code:

"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the

hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.

"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate
children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."

Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were
the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share
in her father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only
legitimate child.21

The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate
proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share
in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.22

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R.
CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED, in toto.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES JOAQUIN vs. CA, GR 126376, NOVEMBER 20, 2003;

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 to annul the Decision2 dated 26 June 1996 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41996. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision 3 dated
18 February 1993 rendered by Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati ("trial court")
in Civil Case No. 89-5174. The trial court dismissed the case after it found that the parties
executed the Deeds of Sale for valid consideration and that the plaintiffs did not have a cause
of action against the defendants.

The Facts

The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:

Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs
Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio,
Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are
joined in this action by their respective spouses.

Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property
executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-
defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names, to wit:

1. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-7 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395
executed on 11 July 1978, in favor of defendant Felicitas Joaquin, for a consideration
of ₱6,000.00 (Exh. "C"), pursuant to which TCT No. [36113/T-172] was issued in her
name (Exh. "C-1");

2. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-3 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394
executed on 7 June 1979, in favor of defendant Clarita Joaquin, for a consideration of
₱1[2],000.00 (Exh. "D"), pursuant to which TCT No. S-109772 was issued in her name
(Exh. "D-1");

3 Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394
executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Fidel Joaquin and Conchita
Bernardo, for a consideration of ₱54,[3]00.00 (Exh. "E"), pursuant to which TCT No.
155329 was issued to them (Exh. "E-1");

4. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-2 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394
executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Artemio Joaquin and Socorro
Angeles, for a consideration of ₱[54,3]00.00 (Exh. "F"), pursuant to which TCT No.
155330 was issued to them (Exh. "F-1"); and

5. Absolute Sale of Real Property covering Lot 168-C-4 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
256395 executed on 9 September 1988, in favor of Tomas Joaquin, for a consideration
of ₱20,000.00 (Exh. "G"), pursuant to which TCT No. 157203 was issued in her name
(Exh. "G-1").

6. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395
executed on 7 October 1988, in favor of Gavino Joaquin, for a consideration of
₱25,000.00 (Exh. "K"), pursuant to which TCT No. 157779 was issued in his name
(Exh. "K-1").]
In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title,
plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver:

- XX-

The deeds of sale, Annexes "C," "D," "E," "F," and "G," [and "K"] are simulated as they are,
are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO because –

a) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx over the
properties in litis;

b) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected in the
questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable than
the measly sums appearing therein;

c) Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the parties
(vendors and vendees); and

d) Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate
conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs
herein) of their legitime.

- XXI -

Necessarily, and as an inevitable consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 36113/T-

172, S-109772, 155329, 155330, 157203 [and 157779] issued by the Registrar of Deeds
over the properties in litis xxx are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action against
them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over the properties
in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient considerations and made by defendants parents
voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of the consequences of their deeds of sale;
and (3) that the certificates of title were issued with sufficient factual and legal
basis.4 (Emphasis in the original)

The Ruling of the Trial Court

Before the trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against defendant spouses
Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis.5 Instead of filing an Answer with their co-defendants, Gavino
Joaquin and Lea Asis filed a Motion to Dismiss.6In granting the dismissal to Gavino Joaquin
and Lea Asis, the trial court noted that "compulsory heirs have the right to a legitime but such
right is contingent since said right commences only from the moment of death of the decedent
pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code of the Philippines."7

After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The
trial court stated:

In the first place, the testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the xxx father will show
that the Deeds of Sale were all executed for valuable consideration. This assertion must
prevail over the negative allegation of plaintiffs.
And then there is the argument that plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of action against
defendants since there can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of their parents. The
court finds this contention tenable. In determining the legitime, the value of the property left
at the death of the testator shall be considered (Art. 908 of the New Civil Code). Hence, the
legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs
therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while their parents live.

All the foregoing considered, this case is DISMISSED.

In order to preserve whatever is left of the ties that should bind families together, the
counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.8

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.1âwphi1 The appellate court
ruled:

To the mind of the Court, appellants are skirting the real and decisive issue in this case, which
is, whether xxx they have a cause of action against appellees.

Upon this point, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellants, like their defendant brothers
and sisters, are compulsory heirs of defendant spouses, Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana
Landrito, who are their parents. However, their right to the properties of their defendant
parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only upon the latter’s death. While
still alive, defendant parents are free to dispose of their properties, provided that such
dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.

Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in question. Neither do they
claim to be creditors of their defendant parents. Consequently, they cannot be considered as
real parties in interest to assail the validity of said deeds either for gross inadequacy or lack
of consideration or for failure to express the true intent of the parties. In point is the ruling of
the Supreme Court in Velarde, et al. vs. Paez, et al., 101 SCRA 376, thus:

The plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or subsidiarily
bound thereby; hence, they have no legal capacity to challenge their validity.

Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their action on the supposed impairment of their legitime by the
dispositions made by their defendant parents in favor of their defendant brothers and sisters.
But, as correctly held by the court a quo, "the legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as
of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an impairment of
their legitime while their parents live."

With this posture taken by the Court, consideration of the errors assigned by plaintiffs-
appellants is inconsequential.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiffs-
appellants.
SO ORDERED.9

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues

Petitioners assign the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE IN

QUESTION HAD NO VALID CONSIDERATION.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN ASSUMING THAT
THERE WAS A CONSIDERATION, THE SAME IS GROSSLY INADEQUATE.

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEEDS OF SALE DO
NOT EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PARTIES.

4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE WAS
PART AND PARCEL OF A CONSPIRACY AIMED AT UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING THE REST OF
THE CHILDREN OF THE SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN AND FELICIANA LANDRITO OF
THEIR INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.

5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE A

GOOD, SUFFICIENT AND VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.10

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petition without merit.

We will discuss petitioners’ legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale
before discussing the issues on the purported lack of consideration and gross inadequacy of
the prices of the Deeds of Sale.

Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale

Petitioners’ Complaint betrays their motive for filing this case. In their Complaint, petitioners
asserted that the "purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate
conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of
their legitime." Petitioners’ strategy was to have the Deeds of Sale declared void so that
ownership of the lots would eventually revert to their respondent parents. If their parents die
still owning the lots, petitioners and their respondent siblings will then co-own their parents’
estate by hereditary succession.11

It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the properties subject of the
Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to show any legal right to the properties. The trial and
appellate courts should have dismissed the action for this reason alone. An action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.12

[T]he question as to "real party-in-interest" is whether he is "the party who would be

benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’"
xxx

In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who
are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced
in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which
would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not intervene in it
(Ibañez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572 [1912]) xxx.

These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest…. The phrase
‘present substantial interest’ more concretely is meant such interest of a party in the subject
matter of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence
is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the defendant will be protected in a
payment to or recovery by him."13

Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As
the appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to their parents’ properties is merely inchoate
and vests only upon their parents’ death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free
to dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime,
petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the
value of their parents’ estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent
value replaced the lots taken from the estate.

Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for lack of consideration

Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices stated in the
Deeds of Sale to their respondent father. Thus, petitioners ask the court to declare the Deeds
of Sale void.

A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a consensual contract,
a contract of sale becomes a binding and valid contract upon the meeting of the minds as to
price. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is
valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. If the
real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid but subject to
reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, because the
price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void. 14 Article 1471 of the
Civil Code states that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.

It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale. Payment
of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes
into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of
consideration. The former results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the
obligation under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid
contract.15

Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated. To
prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdoz’s testimony stating that their
father, respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he would transfer a lot to her through a
deed of sale without need for her payment of the purchase price.16The trial court did not find
the allegation of absolute simulation of price credible. Petitioners’ failure to prove absolute
simulation of price is magnified by their lack of knowledge of their respondent siblings’
financial capacity to buy the questioned lots.17 On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which
petitioners presented as evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did
respondents’ minds meet as to the purchase price, but the real price was also stated in the
Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint, respondent siblings have also fully paid the
price to their respondent father.18

Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of price

Petitioners ask that assuming that there is consideration, the same is grossly inadequate as
to invalidate the Deeds of Sale.

Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate
a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:

Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may indicate
a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or
contract. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the
Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no
requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject matter of sale. All the
respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what they gave. As we
stated in Vales v. Villa:19

Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect
him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of
foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally
incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by
another, but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things,
make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by them – indeed, all
they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must
be, in addition, a violation of the law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable
wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. (Emphasis
in the original)

Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the parties and carry
greater weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will
not weigh the evidence all over again unless there has been a showing that the findings of
the lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute
serious abuse of discretion.20 In the instant case, the trial court found that the lots were sold
for a valid consideration, and that the defendant children actually paid the purchase price
stipulated in their respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the
buyer to the seller is a factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.

SO ORDERED.
MANONGSONG vs. ESTIMO, GR 136773, JUNE 25, 2003;

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of 26 June 1998 and the
Resolution of 21 December 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643. The Court
of Appeals reversed the Decision dated 10 April 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-1685, partitioning the property in controversy and
awarding to petitioners a portion of the property.

Antecedent Facts

Spouses Agatona Guevarra ("Guevarra") and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children, namely: (1)
Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of respondents Emiliana
Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena Jumaquio Estimo ("Jumaquio sisters"); (3) Victor Lopez,
married to respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother of respondents
Narciso, Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario
Lopez-dela Cruz, married to respondent Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. and the mother of
respondents Benjamin Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all surnamed dela Cruz, and of Gloria dela
Cruz Racadio and Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner
Milagros Lopez Manongsong ("Manongsong").

The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila with an area of approximately 152 square meters ("Property"). The records do not
show that the Property is registered under the Torrens system. The Property is particularly
described in Tax Declaration No. B-001-003903 as bounded in the north by Juan Gallardo,
south by Calle Velay, east by Domingo Lavana and west by San Jose Street. Tax Declaration
No. B-001-00390 was registered with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Las Piñas on 30
September 1984 in the name of "Benigna Lopez, et al".4 However, the improvements on the
portion of the Property denominated as No. 831 San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las Piñas were
separately declared in the name of "Filomena J. Estimo" under Tax Declaration No. 90-001-
02145 dated 14 October 1991.5

Milagros and Carlito Manongsong ("petitioners") filed a Complaint 6 on 19 June 1992, alleging
that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking
Article 494 of the Civil Code,7 petitioners prayed for the partition and award to them of an
area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing market value, and for
damages.

Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon Guevarra’s
death, her children inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died without offspring,
there were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the five children, including
Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the Property. As Vicente
Lopez’ sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her father’s 1/5 share in the Property by right
of representation.

There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of Guevarra’s children
and their offspring, have been in possession of the Property for as long as they can remember.
The area actually occupied by each respondent family differs, ranging in size from
approximately 25 to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only descendants not occupying
any portion of the Property.
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and Celestino Ortiz, and Erlinda
Ortiz Ocampo ("Ortiz family"), as well as Benjamin Sr., Benjamin Jr., and Roberto dela Cruz,
Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas and Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio ("Dela Cruz family"), entered into a
compromise agreement with petitioners. Under the Stipulation of Facts and Compromise
Agreement8 dated 12 September 1992 ("Agreement"), petitioners and the Ortiz and Dela Cruz
families agreed that each group of heirs would receive an equal share in the Property. The
signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order of partition to this effect
and prayed further that "those who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced so
that those who have less and those who have none shall get the correct and proper portion." 9

Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez – who each occupy 50
square meter portions of the Property – and Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the
Agreement.10 However, only the Jumaquio sisters actively opposed petitioners’ claim. The
Jumaquio sisters contended that Justina Navarro ("Navarro"), supposedly the mother of
Guevarra, sold the Property to Guevarra’s daughter Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.

The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 911 11 for the year 1949 in the
sole name of Navarro. Tax Declaration No. 911 described a residential parcel of land with an
area of 172.51 square meters, located on San Jose St., Manuyo, Las Piñas, Rizal with the
following boundaries: Juan Gallardo to the north, I. Guevarra Street to the south, Rizal Street
to the east and San Jose Street to the west. In addition, Tax Declaration No. 911 stated that
the houses of "Agatona Lopez" and "Enriquita Lopez" stood on the Property as improvements.

The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG

LUPA12 ("Kasulatan") dated 11 October 1957, the relevant portion of which states:

AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa LAS
PIÑAS, ay siyang nagma-may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa na matatagpuan
sa Manuyo, Las Piñas, Rizal, lihis sa anomang pagkakautang lalong napagkikilala sa
pamamagitan ng mga sumusunod na palatandaan:

BOUNDARIES:

NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST. EAST: RIZAL ST., WEST: SAN JOSE ST.,

na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX DECLARATION BILANG 911.

NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN LIMANGPUNG PISO (₱250.00),

SALAPING PILIPINO, na sa akin ay kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, may
sapat na gulang, Pilipino, may asawa at naninirahan sa Las Piñas, Rizal, at sa karapatang ito
ay aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap ng nasabing halaga na buong kasiyahan ng aking
kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI, ISINALIN AT INILIPAT sa nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa
kanyang mga tagapagmana at kahalili, ang kabuuang sukat ng lupang nabanggit sa itaas nito
sa pamamagitan ng bilihang walang anomang pasubali. Ang lupang ito ay walang kasama at
hindi taniman ng palay o mais.

Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at pagtatangkilik ng nasabing lupa
kay ENRIQUETA LOPEZ sa kanilang/kanyang tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.

The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1 June 1994 that the
"‘KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA’, between Justina Navarro (Nagbili) and Enriqueta Lopez
(Bumili), was notarized by Atty. Ruperto Q. Andrada on 11 October 1957 and entered in his
Notarial Register xxx."13 The certification further stated that Atty. Andrada was a duly
appointed notary public for the City of Manila in 1957.

Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the Property for
more than thirty years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive prescription against
petitioners, and charged that petitioners were guilty of laches. The Jumaquio sisters argued
that the present action should have been filed years earlier, either by Vicente Lopez when he
was alive or by Manongsong when the latter reached legal age. Instead, petitioners filed this
action for partition only in 1992 when Manongsong was already 33 years old.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision 14 of 10 April 1995 ruled in favor of
petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was void, even absent evidence attacking
its validity. The trial court declared:

It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is controverted. According to

defendants Jumaquios, it pertains to them through conveyance by means of a Deed of Sale
executed by their common ancestor Justina Navarro to their mother Enriqueta, which deed
was presented in evidence as Exhs. "4" to "4-A". Plaintiff Milagros Manongsong debunks the
evidence as fake. The document of sale, in the observance of the Court, is however duly
authenticated by means of a certificate issued by the RTC of the Manila Clerk of Court as duly
notarized public document (Exh. "5"). No countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to
overcome or impugn the document’s legality or its validity.

xxx The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property
conveyed had a conjugal character. No positive evidence had been introduced that it was
solely a paraphernal property. The name of Justina Navarro’s spouse/husband was not
mentioned and/or whether the husband was still alive at the time the conveyance was made
to Justina Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal right to
participate with the distribution of the estate under question to the exclusion of others. She
is entitled to her legitime. The Deed of Sale [Exhs "4" & "4-1"(sic)] did not at all provide for
the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against Agatona
Guevarra and her six (6) legitimate children including the grandchildren, by right of
representation, as described in the order of intestate succession. The same Deed of Sale
should be declared a nullity ab initio. The law on the matter is clear. The compulsory heirs
cannot be deprived of their legitime, except on (sic) cases expressly specified by law like for
instance disinheritance for cause. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, the
dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision was directed against the Jumaquio sisters only,
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and

against the remaining active defendants, Emiliana Jumaquio and Felomena J. Estimo, jointly
and severally, ordering:

1. That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to above be immediately
partitioned giving plaintiff Milagros Lopez-Manongsong her lawful share of 1/5 of the
area in square meters, or the prevailing market value on the date of the decision;
 2. Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱10,000.00 as compensatory damages for
having deprived the latter the use and enjoyment of the fruits of her 1/5 share;

3. Defendants to pay plaintiffs’ litigation expenses and attorney’s fee in the sum of
₱10,000.00; and

4. Defendants to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis supplied)

When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the Jumaquio sisters appealed
to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners, in their appellee’s brief before the Court of Appeals, presented for the first time a
supposed photocopy of the death certificate16 of Guevarra, which stated that Guevarra’s
mother was a certain Juliana Gallardo. Petitioner also attached an affidavit 17 from Benjamin
dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina Navarro only by name and had never met her
personally, although he had lived for some years with Agatona Guevarra after his marriage
with Rosario Lopez. On the basis of these documents, petitioners assailed the genuineness
and authenticity of the Kasulatan.

The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and affidavit
presented by petitioners on the ground that petitioners never formally offered these
documents in evidence.

The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their admission that
Navarro was the original owner of the Property, as follows:

Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court that Justina Navarro
and not Juliana Gallardo was the original owner of the subject property and was the mother
of Agatona Navarro (sic). Plaintiffs-appellees in their Reply-Memorandum averred:

"As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly admit as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

‘History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by JUSTINA NAVARRO
who has a daughter by the name of AGATONA GUEVARRA who on the other hand has six
children namely: xxx xxx xxx.’

which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the parties. Since this is
the admitted history, facts of the case, it follows that there should have been proper document
to extinguish this status of co-ownership between the common owners either by (1) Court
action or proper deed of tradition, xxx xxx xxx."

The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The trial court held:

"x x x xxx xxx

With the parties’ admissions and their conformity to a factual common line of relationship of
the heirs with one another, it has been elicited ascendant Justina Navarro is the common
ancestor of the heirs herein mentioned, however, it must be noted that the parties failed to
amplify who was the husband and the number of compulsory heirs of Justina Navarro. xxx
xxx xxx"

Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact that Justina Navarro
was their common ancestor and was the original owner of the subject property.

The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming that the Property was
conjugal in nature when Navarro sold it. The appellate court reasoned as follows:

However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that all property of
marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coveture is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.

In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject property
was acquired by Justina Navarro during her marriage. xxx

The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in nature is not supported
by any evidence.

To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared, for taxation
purposes under the name of Justina Navarro alone. This indicates that the land is the
paraphernal property of Justina Navarro.

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered DISMISSING plaintiffs-appellees’ complaint in so far as
defendants-appellants are concerned.

Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same in its
Resolution of 21 December 1998.19

On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate court’s decision and resolution to this
Court. The Court initially denied the petition for review due to certain procedural defects. The
Court, however, gave due course to the petition in its Resolution of 31 January 2000. 20

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:

1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE ON THE ALLEGED

SALE BY ONE JUSTINA NAVARRO;
 2. WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES RAISED ARE REVIEWABLE;

3. WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;

4. WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS ON THE LAND SHOULD

PREVAIL;

5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS THE OTHER CO-HEIRS;

6. WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE SHARE OF PETITIONERS.21

The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were able to prove, by the
requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong is a co-owner of the Property and therefore
entitled to demand for its partition.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general, only questions of law
are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However, where the factual findings of the trial
court and Court of Appeals conflict, this Court has the authority to review and, if necessary,
reverse the findings of fact of the lower courts.22 This is precisely the situation in this case.

We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of evidence
and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals :23

xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon
the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in
a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict
must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng
Lupa

Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that Manongsong is a co-owner or
co-heir of the Property by inheritance, more specifically, as the heir of her father, Vicente
Lopez. Petitioners likewise allege that the Property originally belonged to Guevarra, and that
Vicente Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5 interest in the Property. As the parties claiming
the affirmative of these issues, petitioners had the burden of proof to establish their case by
preponderance of evidence.

To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax declarations
and the testimonies of witnesses. However, the Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized
KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted petitioners’ claim of co-ownership.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document
and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail the authenticity and
due execution of a notarized document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant.24 Otherwise the authenticity and due execution of the document
should be upheld.25 The trial court itself held that "(n)o countervailing proof was adduced by
plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the document’s legality or its validity."26

Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document and thus
still presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the
proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion.
It appears, on its face, to be genuine.27

Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because the Property was
conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio. We do not agree. The trial
court’s conclusion that the Property was conjugal was not based on evidence, but rather on a
misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil
Code applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage.
Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.28

There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her
marriage. There is no basis for applying the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code
to the present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911 showed that, as far back as in
1949, the Property was declared solely in Navarro’s name.29 This tends to support the
argument that the Property was not conjugal.

We likewise find no basis for the trial court’s declaration that the sale embodied in the
Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a
disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration
does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration,
there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values,30 that is, the property
sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration.1âwphi1

Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent
or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its
equivalent.31 The presence of these elements is apparent on the face of the Kasulatan itself.
The Property was sold in 1957 for ₱250.00.32

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents presented by petitioners
for the first time on appeal

We find no error in the Court of Appeals’ refusal to give any probative value to the alleged
birth certificate of Guevarra and the affidavit of Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. Petitioners belatedly
attached these documents to their appellee’s brief. Petitioners could easily have offered these
documents during the proceedings before the trial court. Instead, petitioners presented these
documents for the first time on appeal without any explanation. For reasons of their own,
petitioners did not formally offer in evidence these documents before the trial court as
required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 33 To admit these documents now is
contrary to due process, as it deprives respondents of the opportunity to examine and
controvert them.

Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not controvert Navarro’s
ownership of the Property. Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.’s affidavit stated merely that, although he
knew Navarro by name, he was not personally acquainted with her.34 Guevarra’s alleged birth
certificate casts doubt only as to whether Navarro was indeed the mother of Guevarra. These
documents do not prove that Guevarra owned the Property or that Navarro did not own the
Property.

Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. However,
petitioners denied before the Court of Appeals that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. We
agree with the appellate court that this constitutes an impermissible change of theory. When
a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he cannot change his theory on appeal. To
allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other party, it is also offensive to the basic rules
of fair play, justice and due process.35

If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine petitioners’ case.
Absent any hereditary relationship between Guevarra and Navarro, the Property would not
have passed from Navarro to Guevarra, and then to the latter’s children, including petitioners,
by succession. There would then be no basis for petitioners’ claim of co-ownership by virtue
of inheritance from Guevarra. On the other hand, this would not undermine respondents’
position since they anchor their claim on the sale under the Kasulatan and not on inheritance
from Guevarra.

Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed to refute
by clear and convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the Property belonged to Guevarra’s estate. There is therefore
no legal basis for petitioners’ complaint for partition of the Property.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643,
dismissing the complaint of petitioners against Felomena Jumaquio Estimo and Emiliana
Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

B. Who are entitled to legitimes, Compulsory Heirs, NCC 782, 887, 902;

Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law.

Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts of real and personal property are
respectively given by virtue of a will.

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2;
neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from
them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

Art. 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

Cases:

ROSALES vs. ROSALES, 148 SCRA 69;

In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the
question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit
from the latter, her mother-in-law.

It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a
resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales
and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child,
Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an
estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes
administratrix of the said estate.

In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16,
1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing
their respective share of the estate —

Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;

Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.

This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.

These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming
that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox
Rosales.

Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial
court denied her plea. Hence this petition.

In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First — is a widow
(surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second — are the Orders of the
trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as
against the said widow?

Our answer to the first question is in the negative.

Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their
own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir
can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for
in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same
law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:

Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their
own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children
who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the
latter by right of representation.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several
heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal
portions.

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or
their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same
share as that of a legitimate child.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles
her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of
representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession
(Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision
which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our
observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the
parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.

Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article
887 of the Civil Code which provides that:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

 (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with

respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in

Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned,

shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this
Code.

The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case
the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the
estate of a parent-in-law.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:

We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case
No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee
thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to
his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect
to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate
contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject
matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V.
Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as
provided by Article 981 of the Code.

The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971
of the Civil Code, viz —

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which

the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
 Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not
by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law
because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the
person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom
his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation
as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales
he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory
heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why
it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass
upon the second question posed by the petitioner.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an
intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with
costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

INING vs. VEGA, GR 174727, AUGUST 12, 2013;

One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and
cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 are the March 14, 2006 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687 and its September 7, 2006
Resolution3 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.4

Factual Antecedents

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square
meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. (24071) RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was
survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria),
who are now both deceased.

Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent
Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife
Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and
Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.

Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners Natividad Ining-
Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando.
Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo
Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria
Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is survived by Manuel Villanueva,
daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo
Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio
Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa
Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear from
the records if he was made party to the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.

In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera
(Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).

In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s
surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case
No. 52756 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against
Gregoria’s heirs. In his Amended Complaint,7 Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he
demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed his demands;
that the matter reached the level of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification
to file a court action sometime in 1980; that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership of the
property; that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions
must be collated and included as part of the portion to be awarded to Gregoria’s heirs; that
in 1979, Lucimo Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein petitioner Teodora, illegally
claimed absolute ownership of the property and transferred in his name the tax declaration
covering the property; that from 1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him
(Leonardo) of the fruits of the property estimated at ₱1,000.00 per year; that as a result,
he incurred expenses by way of attorney’s fees and litigation costs. Leonardo thus prayed
that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property; that the same be partitioned
after collation and determination of the portion to which he is entitled; that Gregoria’s heirs
be ordered to execute the necessary documents or agreements; and that he (Leonardo) be
awarded actual damages in the amount of ₱1,000.00 per year from 1988, attorney’s fees of
₱50,000.00, and lawyer’s appearance fees of ₱500.00 per hearing.

In their Answer8 with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo
claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the sole
owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by
sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and
Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious
and exclusive possession of the property with a just title; that they have been paying the
taxes on the property; that Leonardo’s claim is barred by estoppel and laches; and that they
have suffered damages and were forced to litigate as a result of Leonardo’s malicious suit.
They prayed that Civil Case No. 5275 be dismissed; that Leonardo be declared to be without
any right to the property; that Leonardo be ordered to surrender the certificate of title to
the property; and that they be awarded ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱10,000.00 as
temperate and nominal damages, ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and double costs.

The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and Tajonera were declared in default. 9
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer Rafael M.
Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the property. 10 The resulting Commissioner’s
Report and Sketch,11 as well as the Supplementary Commissioner’s Report, 12 were duly
approved by the parties. The parties then submitted the following issues for resolution of
the trial court:

Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate;

Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and

Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or laches. 13

In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was duly substituted by his heirs, the
respondents herein.14

During the course of the proceedings, the following additional relevant facts came to light:

1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with
the RTC Kalibo, but the case was dismissed and referred to the Kalibo Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1366. However, on
March 4, 1997, the MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 1366 for lack of jurisdiction and
declared that only the RTC can take cognizance of the partition case; 15

2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through an unnotarized

document dated April 4, 1943.16 Enriquez in turn allegedly sold the property to
Lucimo Sr. on November 25, 1943 via another private sale document; 17

3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for more than 30 years, while
Leonardo acquired custody of OCT RO-630;18

4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit of Ownership of

Land19 claiming sole ownership of the property which he utilized to secure in his
name Tax Declaration No. 16414 (TD 16414) over the property and to cancel Tax
Declaration No. 20102 in Leon’s name;20

5. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991; and

6. The property was partitioned among the petitioners, to the exclusion of

Leonardo.21

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision,22 which decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs’ right of action has long prescribed
under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;
Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630 (24071) to be the common property of the
heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered
cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to issue a transfer
certificate of title to the heirs of Natividad Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores
Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; and Heirs of
Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share.

For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaim is ordered dismissed.

With cost against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.23

The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale to be spurious.
It concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold
the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leon’s estate at
the time of his death in 1962. Leon’s siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the
subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to Romana’s
share as the latter’s successors.

However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon’s death in 1962 –
or up to 1992 – within which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the
partition suit only in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription. It held that under
Article 1141 of the Civil Code,24 an action for partition and recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land is a real action over immovable property which prescribes in
30 years. In addition, the trial court held that for his long inaction, Leonardo was guilty of
laches as well. Consequently, the property should go to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively.

Respondents moved for reconsideration25 but the same was denied by the RTC in its
February 7, 2002 Order.26

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74687,
the appeal questioned the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 5275, its
application of Article 1141, and the award of the property to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively.

On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned Decision,27 which contained the following
decretal portion:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Br. 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5275 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-
interest of Romana Roldan;

2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as successors-in-
interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;
 3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the portion described in
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Commissioner’s Report (Supplementary) to the herein
plaintiffs;

4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-630 (24071) in the name of Leon Roldan
and the Register of Deeds of Aklan is directed to issue transfer certificates of title to
the plaintiffs in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of the sketch plan as embodied
in the Commissioner’s Report (Supplementary) and the remaining portion thereof be
adjudged to the defendants.

Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.

Costs against the defendants-appellees.

SO ORDERED.28

The CA held that the trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November
25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and
was settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same. Proceeding from the premise that no
valid prior disposition of the property was made by its owner Leon and that the property –
which remained part of his estate at the time of his death – passed on by succession to his
two siblings, Romana and Gregoria, which thus makes the parties herein – who are
Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – co-owners of the property in equal shares, the appellate
court held that only the issues of prescription and laches were needed to be resolved.

The CA did not agree with the trial court’s pronouncement that Leonardo’s action for
partition was barred by prescription. The CA declared that prescription began to run not
from Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of
Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with
Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held that it
was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained
a new tax declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of
his co-ownership with Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the
running of the 30-year prescriptive period under Article 1141.

The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.’s sole possession of the property for more than 30 years
to the exclusion of Leonardo and the respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership
either, stating that his exclusive possession of the property and appropriation of its fruits –
even his continuous payment of the taxes thereon – while adverse as against strangers,
may not be deemed so as against Leonardo in the absence of clear and conclusive evidence
to the effect that the latter was ousted or deprived of his rights as co-owner with the
intention of assuming exclusive ownership over the property, and absent a showing that this
was effectively made known to Leonardo. Citing Bargayo v. Camumot 29 and Segura v.
Segura,30 the appellate court held that as a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be
presumed to be adverse to the other co-owners but will be held to benefit all, and that a co-
owner or co-heir is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
representation of his co-owners or co-heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest
thereof with the obligation to deliver the same to his co-owners or co-heirs, as is the case of
a depositary, lessee or trustee.
The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo Sr. and the issuance of a new tax
declaration in his name do not prove ownership; they merely indicate a claim of ownership.
Moreover, petitioners’ act of partitioning the property among themselves to the exclusion of
Leonardo cannot affect the latter; nor may it be considered a repudiation of the co-
ownership as it has not been shown that the partition was made known to Leonardo.

The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the
respondents. It held that laches is controlled by equitable considerations and it cannot be
used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to deprive the
respondents of their rightful inheritance.

On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA granted respondents’ prayer for
partition, directing that the manner of partitioning the property shall be governed by the
Commissioner’s Report and Sketch and the Supplementary Commissioner’s Report which
the parties did not contest.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration31 which the CA denied in its assailed
September 7, 2006 Resolution.32 Hence, the present Petition.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following arguments:

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING

THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO
REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.

II

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND
LACHES.33

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in
1943 and his possession thereof amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership, and that
Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.’s possession for such length of
time operated to bestow upon petitioners – as Lucimo Sr.’s successors-in-interest – the
benefits of acquisitive prescription which proceeded from the repudiation.

Petitioners contend that Leonardo’s inaction – from Lucimo Sr.’s taking possession in 1943,
up to 1995, when Leonardo filed Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo –
amounted to laches or neglect. They add that during the proceedings before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo was informed of Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in
1943; this notwithstanding, Leonardo did not take action then against Lucimo Sr. and did so
only in 1995, when he filed Civil Case No. 4983 – which was eventually dismissed and
referred to the MTC. They argue that, all this time, Leonardo did nothing while Lucimo Sr.
occupied the property and claimed all its fruits for himself.
 Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment35 that –

For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted that eighteen (18) legible copies has
[sic] not been filed in this case for consideration in banc [sic] and nine (9) copies in cases
heard before a division in that [sic] all copies of pleadings served to the offices concern [sic]
where said order [sic] was issued were not furnished two (2) copies each in violation to [sic]
the adverse parties [sic] to the clerk of court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan,
Philippines; to the Honorable Court of Appeals so that No [sic] action shall be taken on such
pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and other papers as fail [sic] to comply with the
requisites set out in this paragraph.

The foregoing is confirmed by affidavit of MERIDON F. OLANDESCA, the law secretary of the
Petitioner [sic] who sent [sic] by Registered mail to Court of Appeals, Twentieth Division,
Cebu City; to Counsel for Respondent [sic] and to the Clerk of Court Supreme Court Manila
[sic].

These will show that Petitioner has [sic] violated all the requirements of furnishing two (2)
copies each concerned party [sic] under the Rule of Courts [sic].36

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had
become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s
estate.

One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial court is whether Leon sold the
property to Lucimo Sr.1âwphi1The trial court, examining the two deeds of sale executed in
favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It then concluded that no such
sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not
appeal. Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter should be considered settled. Thus,
petitioners’ insistence on Lucimo Sr.’s 1943 purchase of the property to reinforce their claim
over the property must be ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place,
the subject property clearly remained part of Leon’s estate upon his passing in 1962.

Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.

Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus
inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties
herein – became entitled to the property upon the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the
Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death.

Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property.

Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and
respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property owned in
common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in
such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners
from using it according to their rights.37 They have the full ownership of their parts and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign or mortgage them, and
even substitute another person in their enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved.38 Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.39 Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of
one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership.40

For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share
of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the
title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-
owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other
co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-
owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing."41

From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning the
prescriptive period within which Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon in
1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that prescription shall begin to
run in favor of a co-owner and against the other co-owners only from the time he positively
renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the other co-owners.

Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardo’s co-ownership of the property only sometime in 1979 and
1980, when the former executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax
declaration exclusively in his name, and informed the latter – before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa – of his 1943 purchase of the property. These apparent acts of repudiation
were followed later on by Lucimo Sr.’s act of withholding Leonardo’s share in the fruits of
the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself claims in his Amended Complaint.
Considering these facts, the CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in
1979 – or even in 1980 – when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr.
has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA
thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted
from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141.

What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is that while it may be argued
that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of the co-
ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of
Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter
Teodora.42 Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for
succession, exclude relations by affinity.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is.
Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was
never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his
right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.

Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment in his

pleadings – that Lucimo Sr. was in possession of the property since 1943 – should be taken
against him, is unavailing. In 1943, Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and
Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew
of Leon. More significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens system and
covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon’s name. Leon’s ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his
death when the property passed on to his heirs by operation of law.

In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership,
Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14, 2006 Decision and the
September 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

USON vs. DEL ROSARIO, L-4693, JANUARY 29, 1953;

This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land
situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against
Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and
Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the
lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria
Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law
wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their
possession and enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson
and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they
agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria
Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to
inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).

After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered
decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of
the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the
present appeal.

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is
likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a
common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children,
her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior
to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed
from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil
Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the
death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a
deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that
moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested.

The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in
question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband
may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on
February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance
cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition;
Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil.,
531).

But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate
children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any
successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June,
1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the
successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new
Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the
new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights
which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event
which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only
when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus,
said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall
be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been
done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in
the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because
of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right
recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased
cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the
lands in dispute.

As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a
gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children
for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and
Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can
be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said
assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it
involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a
public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one
(Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it
results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

CASTRO vs. CA, GR 50974-75, MAY 31, 1989;

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 47262 and 47263-R, which affirmed the decision of the then Court
of First Instance of Tarlac in Civil Case Nos. 3762-3763. The dispositive portion of the trial
court's decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendants and against

plaintiffs in the above-entitled cases:

1) Declaring defendant Benita Castro Naval a duly acknowledged and

recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro;

2) Awarding the sum of P2,000.00 to defendants by way of attorney's fee and

expenses of litigation (one-half to be paid by plaintiffs, jointly and severally,
in Civil Case No. 3762 and one-half by plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3763); and

3) Pending the partition or distribution of the properties involved herein in

appropriate proceedings or by mutual agreement, and so as to preserve the
status quo, the writ of preliminary injunction of February 10, 1967 shall
continue to remain in full force and effect.

With costs against plaintiffs, one-half chargeable to plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3762 and the other half to plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3763. (Record on Appeal,
pp. 137-138)

Petitioners Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro are the brother and sister of the late Eustaquio
Castro while respondent Benita Castro Naval is the only child of Eustaquio. Respondent
Cipriano Naval is the husband of Benita Castro.

The Court of Appeals correctly summarized the facts of the case as follows:

In Civil Case No. 3762 entitled Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro v. Benita
Castro, the plaintiffs filed an action for partition of properties against the
defendant alleging, among other things that they are the forced heirs of Pedro
Castro who died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on May 27, 1923 (p. 6, Record on
Appeal).

In Civil Case No. 3763 plaintiff Marcelina Bautista also filed an action for
partition of properties against defendant Benita Castro Naval alleging, among
other things, that they are also compulsory heirs of Eustaquio Castro who
died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on August 24, 1961 and that they are entitled to the
partition of the properties of said deceased (p. 32, Record on Appeal).
The defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege that Benita
Castro Naval is the only child of the deceased Eustaquio and that said
Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro Castro, therefore, the complaint for
partition has no cause of action (p. 25, Record on Appeal).

With leave of Court, plaintiffs filed their amended complaints whereby they
converted the original action for partition into an action for quieting of title.
Defendant's husband Cipriano Naval was forthwith impleaded as party-
defendant (p. 32, Record on Appeal).

In the meantime, defendant Benita Naval filed a petition for appointment as

receiver and for preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 3762. The trial court,
however, denied said petition for appointment of receiver, but granted the
petition for writ of preliminary injunction and also adjudged Marcelina
Bautista who is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3762 guilty of contempt and
ordering her to pay a fine of P100. 00 (p. 97, Record on Appeal).

Considering that evidence in these incidents of appointing a receiver and

preliminary injunction as well as the motion for contempt were related to the
merits of the case, the parties stipulated that evidence therein be considered
as evidence in the trial on the merits.

During the pre-trial the parties agreed that the main issue to be resolved in
this case is as to whether or not defendant Benita Castro Naval is the
acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio Castro. In view of this stipulation,
defendant Benita Naval was allowed to introduce evidence to show that she
was indeed the acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio Castro.

The evidence on record shows that Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro, plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 3762 and Eustaquio Castro who was already dead were the
children of the deceased spouses Pedro Castro and Cornelia Santiago.
Marcelina Bautista, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3763, is the surviving
spouse of the deceased Eustaquio Castro. Eustaquio Castro died on August
23, 1961 and Pricola Maregmen died on September 11, 1924.

It appears that defendant Benita Castro Naval, a child of Eustaquio Castro

and Pricola Maregmen, was born on March 27, 1919 in San Bartolome, Tarlac
(Exhibit A). Eustaquio Castro, who caused the registration of said birth gave
the date indicated in the civil registry that he was the father. Benita Castro
was later baptized in the Roman Catholic Church of Camiling, Tarlac, wherein
the baptismal certificate appeared that her parents are deceased Eustaquio
Castro and Pricola Maregmen (Exhibit C). When Eustaquio Castro died,
pictures were taken wherein the immediate members of the family in
mourning were present, among whom was Benita Castro Naval (Exhibits D
and D-1). On this score, the plaintiffs in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762
admitted that defendant Benita C. Naval is the forced heir of Eustaquio Castro
and a compulsory heir of Eustaquio Castro in Civil Case No. 3763.

The evidence further shows that Pricola Maregmen, the natural mother of
Benita C. Naval who was a resident of Mayantoc, Tarlac, was wedded to Felix
de Maya of Anoling Canaling, Tarlac against her wishes on May 23, 1913.
While the celebration of the wedding in Anong, Camiling, Tarlac was going on,
 the guests soon found out that Pricola Maregmen surreptitiously left the party
and went to the house of her first cousin Bernarda Pagarigan at Barrio
Malacampa, also in Anoling Camiling, Tarlac, and there she cried that she did
not want to get married to Felix de Maya. That evening Pricola proceeded to
Barrio San Bartolome, Mayantoc, Tarlac, where she united with her real
sweetheart, Eustaquio Castro, the father of Benita Castro Naval.

Antonio Maregmen, the brother'. of Pricola Maregmen who was then in the
wedding party learned of the disappearance of his sister. He finally found her
living with Eustaquio Castro. A few days later Eustaquio Castro accompanied
by two persons went to the parents of Pricola Maregmen at Mayantoc, Tarlac
and informed them that Pricola was already living with him as husband and
wife. Pricola's parents merely submitted to their daughter's wishes, so
Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen lived as husband and wife until the
death of Pricola on September 11, 1924.

There is no dispute that Eustaquio Castro at the time he lived with Pricola
Maregmen, was a widower, and was, therefore, free to marry Pricola. As a
result of their cohabitation Benita Castro Naval, herein defendant, was born
on March 27, 1919. After the death of her mother, when she was only five
years old, she continued to live with her father Eustaquio Castro until his
death on August 22, 1961 (Exhibit 11). Moreover, when Benita Castro Naval
got married to Cipriano Naval, it was Eustaquio Castro who gave her away in
marriage. Even after Benita's marriage, she was taken care of by her father.
(Rollo, pp. 11-13).

The trial court ruled that respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and
recognized child of Eustaquio Castro and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the partition
of the properties left by him. These properties are the subject of the civil cases. As stated
earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

The main issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Benita Castro Naval is
the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.

The Court of Appeals justified its pronouncement that the private respondent is an
acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio Castro in the following manner:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The recognition of Benita Castro as a natural child of Eustaquio Castro

appears in the records of birth and partition. Recognition shall be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or any authentic
writing (Art. 278, Civil Code). It was a voluntary recognition already
established which did not need any judicial pronouncement (Gut, 68 Phil.
385; Root v. Root, (CA), 71 O.G. 3061). In Javelona v. Onteclaro, 74 Phil.
393, the Supreme Court clarified the distinction between voluntary
recognition and compulsory recognition. In the first place, a voluntary
recognition is made in a public document, whereas in the indubitable writing
under Article 135 is a private document. (Manresa, Vol. 1, p. 579). The father
would ordinarily be more careful about what he said in a public document
than in a private writing, so that even an incidental mention of the child as his
in a public document deserves full faith and credit. In the second place, in an
 action on Article 131 (voluntary recognition) the natural child merely asks for
a share in the inheritance in virtue of his having been acknowledged as such,
and is not trying to compel the father or his heirs to make the
acknowledgment, whereas the action based on Article 135 is to compel the
father or his heirs to recognize the child. In the former case, acknowledgment
has been formally and legally accomplished because the public character of
the document makes judicial pronouncement unnecessary, while in the latter
case, recognition is yet to be ordered by the courts because a private writing,
lacking the stronger guaranty and higher authenticity of a public document is
not self- executory. A judgment in favor of the status of a natural child
according to Art. 135 must therefore be based on an express recognition so
found and declared by the court after hearing. At this juncture, it is to be
noted that an action based on voluntary acknowledgment may be brought
after the death of the father, but. not an action to compel acknowledgment,
as a general rule, (Art. 137, Civil Code) which shows the liberality of the law
as to voluntary recognition, and its strictness toward compulsory
acknowledgment.

While it is true that Pricola Maregmen, Benita's mother was married to Naval
(sic), it is the rule, however, that in case the recognition is made by only one
of the parents, it will be presumed that the child is natural if the parents
recognizing it had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of the
conception (Art. 277, Civil Code; Borres and Barza v. Municipality of Panay,
42 Phil. 643; Capistrano v. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135). The presumption arises from
the act of recognition.

What is more is that plaintiffs in their amended complaint admitted that

Benita Castro was the compulsory heir of Eustaquio Castro. They cannot now
contradict their own allegations (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 232). (Rollo,
pp. 14-15)

The Court of Appeals has correctly stated the principles but the petitioners contend that it
erred in applying these principles to the facts of this case.

The law which now governs paternity and filiation is Title VI of the Family Code of the
Philippines, Executive Order No. 209, July 6,1987 as amended by Executive Order No. 227,
July 17, 1987. We have to examine the earlier provisions, however, because the Family
Code provides in its Article 256 that:

This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no question that the private respondent is an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.
Her father Eustaquio was a widower when Pricola Maregmen, her mother, went to live with
him. The two could not validly enter into a marriage because when Pricola fled from her own
wedding party on May 23, 1913, the wedding rites to Felix de Maya had already been
solemnized. In other words, the marriage was celebrated although it could not be
consummated because the bride hurriedly ran away to join the man she really loved.

Under the Civil Code, whether "new" or "old", illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural,
whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at
the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other. (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether
incestuous, adulterous or illicit, were those born of parents who, at the time of conception,
were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.

Since Eustaquio Castro was a widower when Benita was conceived, Benita is Ms natural
child. (See Borres and Barza v. Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil. 643,647 [1922]). However,
from the viewpoint of the mother who had a subsisting marriage to Felix de Maya, Benita
was her spurious child.

Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she must first be
recognized voluntarily or by court action. (Berciles v. Government Service Insurance
System, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Divinagracia v. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307 [1976]; Vda. de
Clemena v. Clemena 24 SCRA 720 [1968]; Noble v. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104 [1966]; Republic
v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA 272 [1965]; Paulino v. Paulino 3 SCRA
730 [1961]; Barles, et al. v. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil. 522 [1960]; and Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]). This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized
spurious child like a natural child has no rights from her parents or to their estate because
her rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from the child's
acknowledgment by the parent. (Alabat v. Vda. de Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise v.
Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954]; Magallanes, et al.v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795
[1954]; Canales v. Arrogante, et al., 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda v. Malonda, 61 Phil. 149
[1948]; Buenaventura v. Urbano, et al., 5 Phil. 1 [1905]; and Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, supra). In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because she
was the true or real child of her parents but because under the law, she had been
recognized or acknowledged as such a child.

This brings us to the question whether or not the private respondent is an acknowledged
and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.

Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of acknowledgment — voluntary and compulsory.
The provisions on acknowledgement are applied to natural as well as spurious children
(Clemena v. Clemena supra; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra).

Article 131 of the old Civil Code provides for voluntary acknowledgment by the father or
mother, while Article 135 and Article 136 of the same Code provide for the compulsory
acknowledgment by the father and mother respectively. Article 131 of the old Civil Code
states that "The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a
will or in some other public document."

In these cases, the appellate court ruled that the private respondent was voluntarily
recognized by her father, Eustaquio Castro through the record of birth, hence there was no
need for any judicial pronouncement.

The record of birth referred to by the appellate court is actually the birth certificate of the
private respondent. It appears in the certificate that Eustaquio Castro is the respondent's
father.

The petitioners take exception to the respondent court's ruling on voluntary recognition.
Strictly speaking, a birth certificate to be sufficient for purposes of recognizing a child must
be signed by the father and mother jointly and if the father refuses, by the mother alone
otherwise she may be penalized. (Section 5, Article 3753; Madridejo v. de Leon, 55 Phil. 1
[1930]). What is signed is a loose form whose contents are later transferred by a municipal
employee to the local registry book of births which is preserved. An examination of
Exhibition F, Birth Certificate of Benita Castro, Folder of Exhibits, p. 112, shows that this
"birth certificate" was in turn copied on October 17, 1961 from Book page No. 28, and
Registry No. 47 of the book bound records where "Eustaquio Castro" appears under the
column "Remarks." This is no question that Eustaquio himself reported the birth of his
daughter but this record is not determinative of whether or not he also signed the easily lost
looseleaf form of the certificate from where the entry in book bound or logbook record was
taken in March, 1919.

The ruling in Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila (102 Phil. 1050 [1958]) and Berciles v.
Government Service Insurance System (128 SCRA 53 [1984]) that if the father did not sign
in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other
person is incompetent evidence of paternity does not apply to this case because it was
Eustaquio himself who went to the municipal building and gave all the data about his
daughter's birth. In Berciles we find no participation whatsoever in the registration by Judge
Pascual Berciles, the alleged father.

We likewise see no application of the statement in Madridejo v. de Leon (supra), that the
father, apart from furnishing the necessary data must also sign the certificate itself In that
case, Pedro Madridejo, the father was still alive when the 1930 case was brought to court.
Pedro himself testified that Melecio Madridejo was conceived and born to him, a bachelor,
and Flaviana Perez, a widow. The two were validly maried when Flaviana was about to die.
If the situation of Benita Castro Naval were similar, there would be no need to even discuss
whether or not the father signed the birth certificate. Under the present law, the subsequent
wedding of a man and woman whose child was conceived when there were no legal
impediments to a valid marriage gives that child the lights of a legitimate off-spring. The
situation is different in the present case.

We apply the more liberal provisions of the new Family Code considering the facts and
equities of this case.

First, Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio Castro who
was qualified to legally marry when she was conceived and born. From her birth on March
27, 1919 until the father's death on August 22, 1961 or for 42 years, Benita lived with her
father and enjoyed the love and care that a parent bestows on an only child. The private
respondents, themselves, admitted in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762 that Benita is a
forced heir of Eustaquio Castro.

Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no special
relevance here because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate
family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children born of a legitimate wife contesting the
inheritance of Benita.

Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and registered. There is
no indication in the records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart from
reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and seen to it that it
was preserved for 60 years. Or that he should have taken all legal steps including judicial
action to establish her status as his recognized natural child during the reglementary period
to do so.

Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval. The
couple continued to live with the father even after the wedding and until the latter's death.

Fifth, the certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for
Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of recognition under the Civil Code (Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, supra; People v. Villeza. 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434
[1968]; Capistrano, et al. v. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907]) but they add to the equities of this
case favoring the petitioner.

To remove any possible doubts about the correctness of the findings and conclusions of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, we, therefore, apply the provision of the Family Code
which states that it shall have retroactive effect since the respondents have no clear vested
rights in their favor.

Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and Filiation there are only two classes of children —
legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children
have been eliminated.

Article 175 provides that "Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children." (Emphasis supplied).

Articles 172 and 173 on establishing the filiation of legitimate children provide:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be

proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a,
266a; 267a)

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a
period of five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties. (268a)
There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in
defending her status in this case is similar to an "action to claim legitimacy" brought during
her lifetime.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

TAYAG vs. CA, GR 95229, JUNE 9,1992;

The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C.
Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilde Dayrit
Cuyugan," promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review, dismissed petitioner's Petition
for Certiorariand Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the denial of the
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory order and
cannot be the subject of the said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being
petitioner's remedy.

In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal
guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim
for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said complaint are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan,
by the father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the
defendant is the known administratrix of the real and personal properties left
by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City
on September 28, 1983;

3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several
years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had
illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof,
they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the
ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo;

4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born
in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired, showered with exceptional
affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son as
can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty.
Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder
reproduced;
 . . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone
and for me all the time. As I have now I shall save my heart to
you and to Chad.

. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Niño for our sake
and for the child sake.

. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.

. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him and
you. Let me bless him by my name and let me entitle him to all
what I am and what I've got.

. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.

. . . How is CHAD and you . . .

. . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against

the whole world. After all we love each other and CHAD is the
product of our love.

5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled

to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;

6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the
owner of real and personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and
in the Province of Pampanga with approximate value of several millions of
pesos;

7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the
defendant and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said
Chad has not likewise been ascertained;

8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are
his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo,
Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant
complaint is filed;

9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of
friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is
urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended financial
support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;

10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant to
grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant failed
and refused and still fails and refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the
claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo; 3

xxx xxx xxx

Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to
render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the
deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.

Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987,
disputing the material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by way of affirmative
defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the action is
premature; that the suit as barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal
and judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court was no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder of causes of action. 4

After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses,
the trial court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:

xxx xxx xxx

The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further

proceedings to adduce evidence on the various claims of the parties so as to
hear their respective sides

WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the

nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence is in the meantime
held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the case as set
for pre-trial . . . 5

With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19,
1987, 6 petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was granted by the
Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined respondent judge to
resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the
affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 7

In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter
denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil
Case No. 7938, in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the said motion in the
following manner:

xxx xxx xxx

The Court now resolves:

No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in favor
of the plaintiff. A cause of action being the "primary right to redress a wrong"
(Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which apparently on the face of the
complaint, plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case. Defendant's
protestation that there is no sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable.

No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is not premature. It
is exactly filed in order to prove filiation, and then recognition. To go about
the step by step procedure outlined by the defendant by filing one action after
 another is definitely violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of
action.

No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court. It
is (her) spurious child that she represents as natural guardian that is
instituting the action.

No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child may file
an action for recognition within four years from his attainment of majority
(New Civil Code. Art, 285, No. 2). Whether the letters of the putative father,
Atty. Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in a hearing on the
merits.

No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was done
in this case. The defendant's claim that there was a misjoinder is untenable.

No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special

jurisdiction, such as a probate court has capacity to entertain a complaint
such as the one now before it.

The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does not control the body
of the complaint.

From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient' in form
and substance and, therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be granted
until after trial on the merits in which it should be shown that the allegations
of the complaint are unfounded or a special defense to the action exists.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on January
30, 1990. 9 As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent court,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24, 1989 and
January 30, 1990 of the trial court be annulled and set aside for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing
the petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review on certiorari.

In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:

a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's Petition

for Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT providing clear exceptions to the
general rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the
special civil action of certiorari;

b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner

before the Regional Trial Court and before Respondent Court of Appeals
 involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined by this
Honorable Court, such as the interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the
Civil Code requiring judicial approval when the recognition of an illegitimate
minor child does not take place in a record of birth or in a will: of Art. 175,
Par. 2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing for the
prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate filiation;
and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period with
respect to the action for recognition of a natural child; and

c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional Trial Court

from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. 10

Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private
respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint
states no cause of action, she submits that the recognition of the minor child, either
voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father must first be established
before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate in the estate of the latter.
Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of such recognition in the complaint
denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then there exists no basis for private respondent's
aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint should be dismissed.

The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the petitioner,
as plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as defendants, to compel
them to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and
alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for
the settlement of the deceased's estate had been commenced in court; and that the
defendants had refused and failed to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased. She
accordingly prayed that the defendants therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share.
The defendants moved for the dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no
cause of action and that, even if it does, the same is barred by prescription.

The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of
the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached the age of
majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that
an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or
presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to
allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the
illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right
to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to
compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the
petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the
action.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is
an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the
allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further that
the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may
be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et
al., 12 wherein we said:

The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can any
event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and
at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which,
in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided
always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of
action are present in the particular case. In, other words, there is no absolute
necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have
been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action
in which that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir.
Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different
from that generally applicable in other cases. . .

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by

this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions.
Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered
well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment,
but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs . . .; and
the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the
estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of these
situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior
decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition
suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by
inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate
to such proceedings.

The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has prescribed.

Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition,
private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is
sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish
filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
putative father. In the case at bar, considering that the complaint was filed after the death
of the alleged parent, the action has prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal
of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to
the case at bar and, instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given
retroactive effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law
being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to
apply retroactively.

Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:
 (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.

Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of
birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a
public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and
continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action
must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 13

Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint
should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same
must be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that
Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the
minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the
attainment of majority of the minor child.

Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor
child to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not.

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the
minor child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the
Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14 We herein adopt our ruling in
the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15 where we held
that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to
have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time,
and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is
procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect
pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its
operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings
taken before it goes into effective, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating
it at the time the question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be
prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the
instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and,
consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the
filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions
of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has
not yet prescribed.

Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of the
court below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a
petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly
obtaining in the case at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.

WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

C. Concurrence of Compulsory heirs and their corresponding legitimes; NCC 888 –

890; 892-901; 903;

Art. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children
and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.

Art. 889. The legitime of legitimate parents or ascendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estates of their children and descendants.

The children or descendants may freely dispose of the other half, subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.

Art. 890. The legitime reserved for the legitimate parents shall be divided between them
equally; if one of the parents should have died, the whole shall pass to the survivor.

If the testator leaves neither father nor mother, but is survived by ascendants of equal degree
of the paternal and maternal lines, the legitime shall be divided equally between both lines.
If the ascendants should be of different degrees, it shall pertain entirely to the ones nearest
in degree of either line.

Art. 892. If only one legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives, the widow or
widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. In case of a legal separation,
the surviving spouse may inherit if it was the deceased who had given cause for the same.

If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be
entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants.

In both cases, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be taken from the portion that can
be freely disposed of by the testator.

Art. 893. If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants,
the surviving spouse shall have a right to one-fourth of the hereditary estate.
This fourth shall be taken from the free portion of the estate.

Art. 894. If the testator leaves illegitimate children, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to
one-third of the hereditary estate of the deceased and the illegitimate children to another
third. The remaining third shall be at the free disposal of the testator.

Art. 895. The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the natural
children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate
children or descendants.

The legitime of an illegitimate child who is neither an acknowledged natural, nor a natural
child by legal fiction, shall be equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an
acknowledged natural child.

The legitime of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the
free disposal of the testator, provided that in no case shall the total legitime of such
illegitimate children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse
must first be fully satisfied. (840a)

Art. 896. Illegitimate children who may survive with legitimate parents or ascendants of the
deceased shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate to be taken from the portion
at the free disposal of the testator.

Art. 897. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or descendants, and
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction, such surviving spouse shall
be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children which must be
taken from that part of the estate which the testator can freely dispose of.

Art. 898. If the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or descendants, and with
illegitimate children other than acknowledged natural, or natural children by legal fiction, the
share of the surviving spouse shall be the same as that provided in the preceding article.

Art. 899. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate parents or ascendants and
with illegitimate children, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-eighth of the
hereditary estate of the deceased which must be taken from the free portion, and the
illegitimate children shall be entitled to one-fourth of the estate which shall be taken also from
the disposable portion. The testator may freely dispose of the remaining one-eighth of the
estate.

Art. 900. If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half
of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the
other half. (837a)

If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized in articulo
mortis, and the testator died within three months from the time of the marriage, the legitime
of the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate, except
when they have been living as husband and wife for more than five years. In the latter case,
the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the preceding paragraph. (n)

Art. 901. When the testator dies leaving illegitimate children and no other compulsory heirs,
such illegitimate children shall have a right to one-half of the hereditary estate of the
deceased.
The other half shall be at the free disposal of the testator.

Art. 903. The legitime of the parents who have an illegitimate child, when such child leaves
neither legitimate descendants, nor a surviving spouse, nor illegitimate children, is one-half
of the hereditary estate of such illegitimate child. If only legitimate or illegitimate children are
left, the parents are not entitled to any legitime whatsoever. If only the widow or widower
survives with parents of the illegitimate child, the legitime of the parents is one-fourth of the
hereditary estate of the child, and that of the surviving spouse also one-fourth of the estate.

P.D. 603, ART. 39;

Article 39. Effects of Adoption. - The adoption shall:

1. Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter: Provided, That an adopted child cannot acquire Philippine
citizenship by virtue of such adoption; lawphi1.net

2. Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parent or parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;

3. Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname; and

4. Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter: Provided, That if the adopter
is survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and by an adopted person, the latter
shall not have more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child: Provided,
further, That any property received gratuitously by the adopted from the adopter shall
revert to the adopter should the former predecease the latter without legitimate issue
unless the adopted has, during his lifetime, alienated such property: Provided, finally,
That in the last case, should the adopted leave no property other than that received
from the adopter, and he is survived by illegitimate issue or a spouse, such illegitimate
issue collectively or the spouse shall receive one-fourth of such property; if the
adopted is survived by illegitimate issue and a spouse, then the former collectively
shall receive one-fourth and the latter also one-fourth, the rest in any case reverting
to the adopter, observing in the case of the illegitimate issue the proportion provided
for in Article 895 of the Civil Code.

The adopter shall not be a legal heir of the adopted person, whose parents by nature shall
inherit from him, except that if the latter are both dead, the adopting parent or parents take
the place of the natural parents in the line of succession, whether testate or interstate.

RA 8552, Sec. 18;

Section 18. Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However,
if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary
succession shall govern.

FC 189-190;

Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters
and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be
vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the
adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and

(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed
by the following rules:
(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving spouse of the
adopted shall inherit from the adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or
intestate succession;
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted
concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the
parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted concur with the
adopters, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the
spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted and the other half, by the adopters.

(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving spouse of the
adopted, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the
illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving spouse, and one-third by the adopters;

(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of
legal or intestate succession shall apply.

Cases:

SAYSON vs. CA, GR 89224-25, January 23, 1992;

At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit
from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting
if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.

The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios
and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro,
who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on
March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and
Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate
estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13
of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel
Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful
descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the
couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional
Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil
Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit
Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of
practically the same evidence.

Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,

1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their
legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27,
1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by
right of representation.

In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case No.
1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as
established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their
estate.

Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own
decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the
appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are
disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno
and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the
respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners
and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the private
respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.

The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted
because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption
was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting.
The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot
adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
natural children by legal fiction."

Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a
petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the
adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a
legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by
denying that Doribel was born to the couple.

On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the
decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in
1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was
seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified
Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should
have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although
Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.

As the respondent court correctly observed:

When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before
the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the
court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or
perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission
of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by
law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the
considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO
SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having
been revoked or rescinded.

Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge
cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the
adopting parents were not disqualified.

A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of
the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct
proceeding frontally addressing the issue.

The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists,
whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for
a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus
attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:

Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd
Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:

An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and

the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be
considered void merely because the fact needed to show
statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination
of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of
kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of
jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it
 essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact
be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in
accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the
jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on
appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were
not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be
uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by
different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court
to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have
been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as
affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article
265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress,
that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of
Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of
course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts.
Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court
of Appeals, 11where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.

The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely
evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a
civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a
direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the
period limited by law.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a

collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the
exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code:

Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and
other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should
come from different marriages.
 An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the
same manner as a legitimate child.

The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children
and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his
collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to
leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for
their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions
of the Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which

the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by
the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one who the person represented would have succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children
who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the
latter by right of representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter
of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution
of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled
to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal
to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to
be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the
right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the
adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party. 14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and
Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their
exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the
right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other
private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA, GR 148311, March 31, 2005;

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.

The facts are undisputed.

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among
others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2that her mother is Gemma Astorga
Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that
he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname
"Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.

On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption,
thus:

"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the
absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent,
and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted;
that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioner’s care and
custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough
compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,

Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be
the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned
pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.

SO ORDERED."4

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration 5 praying
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as
her middle name.

On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that
there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.

Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from
having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for
every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or
initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of
the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5)
permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the
stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not
opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural
mother for the following reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the
latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship
or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family
Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will
be before the surname of the mother."7

We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word
or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also,
as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as
public interest that every person must have a name.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from
parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.9

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the
use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may
be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married
woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

xxx

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as
‘Mrs.’

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her
maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former
husband's surname, unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living,
in accordance with Article 370.

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged
to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants,
the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants
shall either:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

x x x"

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name.
Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise
known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is
silent as to what middle name a child may use.

The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted
above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname
of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname
of the adopters;

x x x"

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding
the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint
Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the
suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father, thus

"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the
surname and that of the child because the father’s surname indicates the family to
which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s
surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname
of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother,
how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point
is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and
permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364,
which reads:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself
precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso
Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody
calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his
mother’s surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect
that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may
use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane
stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in
the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that
the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.

xxx

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa
that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions
like the American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin
tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.

xxx

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use
of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the
Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname
of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only
expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname
of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14

The Underlying Intent of

Adoption Is In Favor of the

Adopted Child –

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. 15 It is a juridical act, a
proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which
results from legitimate paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption
not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act
which endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989,
when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed
with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to
favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.20

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and
Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is

entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a
Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in
the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built
by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all
their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them
"Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie
to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of

Adoption Statutes In Favor Of

Adoption –

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of
the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.27

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."

This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law."28

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her
middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.

SO ORDERED.

REYES vs. SOTERO, GR 167405, February 16, 2006;

This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14,
2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the Resolution dated May 14, 2005 denying the
motion for reconsideration. In the assailed judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled and set
aside the September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 Resolutions of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204 but refrained from
dismissing the petition for letters of administration and settlement of estate on the ground
that petitioner must first prove that she was legally adopted by the decedent, Elena Lising.

On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of
Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67.
Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July 31,
1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda
Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents
Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.

According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the municipalities of
Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and money which were
allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.
Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of a
bond, pending settlement and distribution of Lising’s properties to the legal heirs. 1

On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition2 to the petition, claiming that
she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband, Serafin Delos Santos, who died
on November 30, 1970. She asserted that the petition should be dismissed and that the
appointment of an administrator was unnecessary, since she was the only heir of Lising who
passed away without leaving any debts. She further asserted that Chichioco is unfit to serve
as administrator of Lising’s estate because of her "antagonistic interests" against the
decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs have questioned the decedent’s title to a piece
of real property which forms a large part of the estate.

On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition3 attaching thereto
the Certification4 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on
page 76, Book No. 01 of the Register of Court Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising
and Serafin Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by Judge
Julian Lustre of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3, promulgated on
December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar on January 29,
1969.

Petitioner also submitted a Certification5 issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC-Tarlac City,
stating that a judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 on December 21, 1968
decreeing petitioner’s adoption by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. She also
presented a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 6 indicating that the adoption decree was on file in
the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption
decree was recorded as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case for adoption and
therefore grants the same. Consequently, the Court declares that henceforth, the child Ana
Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect
to her natural parents Orlando Zalzos and May C. Castro, and is to all legal intents and
purposes the child of the petitioners Serafin delos Santos and Elena Lising.7

Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution 8 issued by the Philippine

Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that, upon the death of Serafin Delos Santos, death
benefits were paid to his widow, Elena Lising, and his "daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos,
in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary evidence to prove
the jurisdictional facts of the case and to comment on petitioner’s opposition. 9 Only Rosario
L. Zalsos appears to have filed a Comment/Reply to Oppositor’s Opposition, 10 after which
the RTC ordered the parties to submit memoranda thereon. 11 On July 22, 1999, the case
was deemed submitted for resolution.12

Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for annulment of the adoption decree docketed as SP No. 53457. 13 They
claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of petitioner took place in 1968 since the
Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had no records
of the adoption case. Petitioner’s natural mother supposedly connived with the court
personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adopted by the Delos Santos spouses and
that the CFI’s order for initial hearing was published in a weekly newspaper which was not
authorized to publish court orders in special proceedings.

Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the suspension of hearings
in Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP No. 53457. 14 Subsequently, however, the
Court of Appeals dismissed15 SP No. 53457 for failure to comply with the third paragraph of
Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.16 The said dismissal became final and executory on
March 8, 2000.17

Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC praying that the
opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally resolved and that the petition be
dismissed.18 This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte Motion19filed by petitioner on October
17, 2000 praying for the immediate resolution of her opposition.

On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment20 to the opposition stating that
reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted due
allegedly to certain "badges of fraud." Respondents also informed the RTC that they have
filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
Tarlac City, for alleged falsification of the adoption decree and Judicial Form No. 43,
docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016.

Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution21 dated December 12, 2000 deferring resolution
of petitioner’s opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204, pending the outcome of the criminal case
filed against the latter. In the meantime, the parties were enjoined from dissipating or
disposing any or all of the properties included in the estate of Elena Lising without order
from this Court.
On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special
Administrator22 before the RTC on the ground that there was yet no true determination and
appraisal of the decedent’s universal estate. It was prayed therein that the Branch Clerk of
Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be appointed special administrator as he was "an experienced
and able person in the management of properties" and is "honest, impartial, competent and
acceptable to the majority of the interested parties."

In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge petitioner with
falsification of public documents per resolution dated January 5, 2001. 23 Petitioner thus
appealed the said finding to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.

On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents’ motion for the appointment of a special
administrator and appointed its branch clerk of court, Atty. Saguyod. 24 Petitioner moved for
reconsideration on the grounds that the branch clerk of court was disqualified from taking
on the task of special administrator, and that Atty. Saguyod was appointed without being
required to file a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the petition should be dismissed
because she is the sole heir of the decedent.25 However, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration on November 5, 2001.26

On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the findings of
the Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal complaint against
petitioner.27 Undaunted, Chichioco filed a petition for review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).

Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion before the RTC to
enjoin petitioner from conducting business in a property belonging to the estate.
Respondent Chichioco alleged that petitioner converted the basement of Lising’s residence
into a billiard hall without authority of the special administrator.28

Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002, the dispositive
part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from conducting business
activity in any of the properties left by the decedent. The Special Administrator is also
empowered to take control and possession of the listed personal and real properties of the
decedent and those that may be found to be owned or registered in the name of the same.

SO ORDERED.29

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which was denied by the
RTC on November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also issued a resolution dismissing
respondent Chichioco’s petition for review in the criminal case.30

Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047,31 assailing the September 18, 2002 and November 12,
2002 resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner alleged that said resolutions were issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had
the right to possess and use the decedent’s property, title over which automatically passed
on to her upon the latter’s death. Moreover, the special administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had
yet to file a bond and submit an inventory of the decedent’s estate.
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed since the
dismissal by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457 constituted res judicata as to the former.
There was likewise no valid challenge to her adoption and she consequently remains to be
the sole heir of the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there was no need for the
appointment of an administrator or for the settlement proceedings.

In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment32 nullifying the resolutions of the
trial court. It held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M. Sotero, gravely abused his
discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court as special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr.
v. Martinez,33 the appellate court reasoned that such act could engender a suspicion that
Judge Sotero and his clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedent’s estate. Moreover, Atty.
Saguyod failed to comply with the requirements of a bond and inventory and could not
therefore take control and possession of any of the decedent’s properties.

However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the dismissal of
SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did not operate as res judicata to the
former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was
indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses since, according to the appellate court,
"imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a
cloud of doubt."

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15, 2005,34 hence this
petition on the following assigned errors:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE

THE VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN
VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE 39.35

B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL IN SP NO.

53457 WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS.36

The petition is meritorious.

On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove her legal
adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already presented before the trial
court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification from the local civil registrar’s office that
the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a
certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of
the RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications were issued under the seal of the issuing offices and
were signed by the proper officers. These are thus presumed to have been regularly issued
as part of the official duties that said public officers perform. 37

It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document 38 required by law
to be entered into the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other
judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office
as well as the court which rendered the judgment.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a

public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 39 As such, the
certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of
petitioner’s adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are
prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of
the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome
by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on
the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof
to the contrary is offered.

In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a
separate action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The
latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s
estate, as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso. 40 Accordingly, respondents cannot
assail in these proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s
claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an
appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications regarding the
matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real.
Petitioner’s status as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no serious
challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as
petitioner’s adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the
decedent’s estate. For this reason, we agree with petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should
be dismissed.

As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like them x x x,
claim an interest in the estate x x x as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in
the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession
adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same
holds true as long as the adoption must be - as in the instant case - considered valid.
(Emphasis added)

Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude respondents

from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere collateral relatives of the latter. To
allow the proceedings below to continue would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the
resolution of the instant case. After all, the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical
consequence of our pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of petitioner’s
adoption.

Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the resolution of the
petitioner’s opposition, which is actually a motion to dismiss the petition for letters of
administration and settlement of the estate, is a matter of record in the instant case. The
same has in fact been submitted for resolution before the RTC more than six years ago and
is so far the only pending incident before the RTC. The parties have likewise amply
ventilated their positions on the matter through their respective pleadings filed before the
lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be served if we let the RTC resolve the matter,
only for its ruling to be elevated again to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this
Court. The remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the evidence
before it.42 This is in keeping with the avowed purpose of the rules of procedure which is to
secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding.43 Hence, since the grounds for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant
in the records and there is no cogent reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No.
204 should be dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioner’s second assigned
error.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No. 204 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM, GR 1689921, May 21, 1990;

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set
aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos
City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed
without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude
P. Lim.

The Facts

The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June

1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents
were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager
to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear
that they were the children’s parents. The children 2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle)
and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the
clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban
brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and
documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000,
petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty 5 given under
Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259,
respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits
of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent 9 for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael.

In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents
were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.11
 The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial
court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the
Family Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the
Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did
not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s
argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under
the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely
for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not
only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires
certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue

Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner,
who has remarried, can singly adopt.

The Court’s Ruling

Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of
the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since,
at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they
have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.

We deny the petition.

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario.
We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for
adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least
 sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and
care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of
sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of
the adoptee’s parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic
of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by
his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that
he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her
government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification
of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the
following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship
and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate

son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her
consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter
of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption
were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was
correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And
third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he
must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2)
he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption
decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the
adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of
these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

Effects of Adoption

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children
have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-
being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons
of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children.15

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the
age of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation terminates parental authority over the
person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of
civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of
the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed
and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and
support in keeping with the means of the family.

SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on
testamentary succession shall govern.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and
adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be
known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of
each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is
still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights19 of a legitimate child
such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from
their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the
benefits to which biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional
rights.22

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children
and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of
the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner
that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with
compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide
homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in
a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the
law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against
judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we
cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption. (Emphasis
supplied)1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have
jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and
unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004
of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

DE PAPA vs. CAMACHO, 144 SCRA 281;

This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following
"Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":

1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the

plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are
legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and
granduncles.

2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho

have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the
name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant. The family relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart
attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an integral part of this stipulation.

3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated
four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of
plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila,
copies of which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.

4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon
and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and
leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her
said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.

5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and
legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of
his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of
which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the
inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father,
Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two
legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso
shares.

6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and
without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7)
parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole
intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal
which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title
Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.

7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her
rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by
her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to
the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.

8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate,
survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho.

9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns

one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her
inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.

10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the
other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of
the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and
under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal
advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the
one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the
said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon.

11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case
the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled
to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the
plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios
(together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein
which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and
entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three
eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights
(3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P.
Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the
expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the
rentals.

12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have
acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to
restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all
their claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest on
plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem proper to
 award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the
respective parties. 1

On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco
and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled,
as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions,
rendering judgment as follows:

... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the
court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are
entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-
eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action.
Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals
collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from
the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate
taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived

all their claims against each other for damages including attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the
rentals, the court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-
eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate
of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is
hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents received by her on the
properties involved in this action for the purpose of determining the legal
interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of
the property in question.

SO ORDERED. 2

Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.

The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower
Court, all relatives of thepraepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed
without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to
be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which
the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property came. (811),

or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and
should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.

That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where
the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of
origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made that all
eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and
ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that
of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil
Code. Said the Court:

The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva

troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and
belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus),
but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the
whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among
them equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as
large as that of the nephews of the half blood?

xxx xxx xxx

The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators
on the subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of
the appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed
primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree
relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and
avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant
(reservista).

xxx xxx xxx

The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has
devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on,
there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between
one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for applying
Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the
reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate
succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has
resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable
property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those
nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March
1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews
(Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest
relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the
one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such
property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811
is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated
persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the
 succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the
part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree
of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the
case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property
came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis
supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary

intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews
are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and
the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double
share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise
operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of

relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within
that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the
applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not
specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that
the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to
what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by
Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):

... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe

ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la
excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la
disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en
materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos extremes no resueltos de un modo expreso,
y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que se crea.

The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil
Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the
suppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889
(Art. 812 and 968-980).

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession,
the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles,
respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by
his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree
as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris4 where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009
of the Civil Code were cited and applied:

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy
nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and
uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from
Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that
provide as follows:
 Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares.

Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full
blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles,
cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly
the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the
Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of
1889 prescribed as follows:

Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces,

children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving
spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased.

Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers
or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed
to the estate of deceased.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of the whole blood.

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inheritedab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse,
while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The
present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with
the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without
altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.

xxx xxx xxx

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed. ...

This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the
reservable property, thereservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant praepositus:
 ... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there
are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter,
therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez
Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp.
274, 310) ... .

To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that intestacy
proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are not necessary where the final
decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista over
property subject to reserva troncal Identifies the reservatario and there are no other
claimants to the latter's rights as such:

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the
assumption that thereservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the reservable
property from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not
the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of
thereservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional
heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line
of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there
being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must be deemed to
have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of

the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this
case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate
of the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. ... .

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that
the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the
rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply
because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of
the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise
to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant
Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the
exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the
complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

PADURA VS. BALDOVINO, 104 PHIL. 1065;

SV: Fortunato Padura without any heirs, hence the four parcels of land he received from his
father were transmitted to her mother. After her mother died, Fortunato’s nephews and
nieces from his full sister and half-brother took possession of the property. The court ruled
that these nephews and nieces will have equal shares over the property.

SC: Rule on Reserva troncal should be applied, meaning the relatives of Fortunato up to the
third degree will get the reservable property after his mother dies. The children of such
relatives (the reservatarios) can receive the property by way of right of representation. But
after applying the rule, the reservatarios and their relationship will be considered in
determining their shares. The rules on ordinary intestate succession would be followed after
the reservatarios have been determined.

1. Agustin Padura married twice. His first wife was Gervacio Landig with whom he
had one child named Manuel Padura. His second wife was Benita Garing with
whom he had 2 children named Fortunato and Candelaria Padura
2. He died leaving a last will and testament duly probated wherein he bequeathed
his properties among his children, Manuel, CAndelaria and Fortunato, and his
surviving spouse Benita (2nd wife). Fortunato was adjudicated 4 parcels of land
a. Fortunato died unmarried and without having executed a will; and not
having any issue, the 4 parcels of land were inherited exclusively by
Benita. Benita applied for an later was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title
in her name, BUT subject to the condition that the properties were
reservable in favor of relatives within the 3rd degree belonging to the line
from which the property came (Fortunato)
b. Candelaria (Fortunato’s “full” sister) died leaving as her heirs her 4
legitimate children (the appellants) Melania, Anicia and Pablo all surnamed
Baldovino
c. Manuel (Fortunato’s half brother) also died. His heirs were his legitimate
children (the appellees) Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana
and Severino, all surnamed Padura1
3. Benita Garing (the reservista) died. The children of Candelaria and Fortunato took
possession of the 4 parcels of land (the reservable properties).
a. CFI Laguna issued a resolution declaring the legitimate children of Manuel
and Candelaria are the rightful reserves and as such entitled to the 4
parcels of land
4. The Baldovinos filed this present petition wherein they seek to have the
properties partitioned suh that one-half of the same be adjudicated to them, the
other half to the Paduras on the basis that they inherited by right of
representation from their respective parents, the original reserves.
5. The Paduras opposed, arguing that they should all (all 11 of them) be deemed
inheriting in their own right hence, they should have equal shares.
6. TC rendered judgment declaring them all reservees without distinction and have
equal shares over the properties as co-owners, pro indiviso.

ISSUE: should the properties be apportioned among the nephews 2 of the whole blood and
nephews of the hald-blood equally? Or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share
twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood? The nephews of the whole blood get
twice the share.

1 You will see later, kung bakit lugi talaga yung mga Baldovinos.
2 or niblings kasi may nieces din na kasama
  The Baldovinos contend that notwithstanding the rule on Reservable character of the
property under Art. 891, the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to
a share twice as large as that of the others pursuant to Arts. 1006 3, 10084 on
intestate succession.
 The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by their relatives of
the inheriting ascendant (reservista)
o Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came. (871)
o The motives for such rule were explained by D. Manuel Alonso Martinez in his
book “El Codigo Civil en sus relaciones con Las Legislaciones Forales” 5
 Summary of not so good translation: consider this sample case: father
dies leaving his wife and lone son as heirs. Wife remarries and had
children with 2nd husband. Lone son dies and his mother (wife) inherits
whatever he got from the father. In case the wife dies, the relatives of
the lone son are prejudiced since the wife’s children from the second
marriage will inherit the properties of the lone son as opposed to his
uncle (father’s brother)
 The code commission chose to give more importance to lineal
succession than the presumed affection of the deceased.
 The commission settled with the suggestion of Manresa, among others,
to reserve the property in case the ascendants inherit in favor of
relatives up to the third degree. No reason was given why 3 rd degree.
 Aside from the sample case, another reason why this rule was adopted
was to make it the law more democratic (Democracy was becoming a
trend when the civil code was being made by the Spaniards, so fetch).
 The purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to
the specified relatives of the line of origin. After that, Art. 891 has nothing to do
with the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree. Their
shares should be foverned by the ordinary rules of intestate succession.
Upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not
to all reservatarios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant
(prepositus), excluding those reseravatarios more remote in degree.
o The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming the same
as a reservatario of the property is not among those relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the property came. Relatives of the
fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios,
since the law does not recognize them as such
o But there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within
the third degree mentioned by law as in the case of nephews of the deceased
person from whom the reservable property came

3 Article 1006. Should brother and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the
half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter. (949)
4 Article 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in

accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood. (915)
5 Passage was in Spanish. Google translate was not much help.
  Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of intestate
succession so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a
share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood.
o In determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree
and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of
double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be
operative.
 Reserva Troncal merely determines the group pof relatives to whom the property
should be returned. Within the group, the individual right to the property should be
decided by applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession (since art. 891 is silent
on the matter).
 Reserva Troncal is an exceptional case and its application should be limited to what
is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law
 Even during the lifetime of the reservista, the reservatarios could compel the
annotation of their right (over the property) in the registry of property. The
reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose
them by will so long as there are reservatarios existing. The reservatarios are in fact
inheriting from the descendant prepositus from whom the reservista inherited the
property.
 If the nephews of whole and half-blood inherited the prepositus directly, the whole
bloods would receive a double share compared to those of the half-blood. Why then
should the half-bloods inherit equally just because of the delay in the transmission of
the property (when it was with the reservista)? The hereditary portions should not
change
 Philippine (and Spanish Jurisprudence) agrees with this despite the contrary opinions
of authors such as Sanchez Roman and Mucius Scaevola.

Appealed order REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Whole blood nephews will get twice the share of
those who are nephews of Half-blood.

GONZALES vs. CFI, 104 SCRA 161;

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and
holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races
inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17,
1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four
daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito,
Alejandro and Jose.

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in
three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son
Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole
heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself
the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said
properties consist of the following: 1äwphï1.ñët

(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit
balance of P3,699.63.

(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7
interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd.,
Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila
Times.

(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7
titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.

1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202,
48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of
Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of
the registry of deeds of Baguio;

1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862
of the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181
San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of
deeds;

1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of
deeds (Streets);

l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila
registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):

2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of
T0ayabas.

These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication,
Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the
properties held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of
her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document
reads: 1äwphï1.ñët

A mis hijos :

Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los
bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de
la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values
Legarda.
 De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he
0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit

La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella
esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1äwphï1.ñët

(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA

6 Marzo 1953

During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving
children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito
Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito
Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The
decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R.
No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on
May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties
which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said
properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three
sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an
ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's
estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable
properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her
grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs.
Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).

As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal
under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower
court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article
891 of the Civil Code.

On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend

that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her
daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the
estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales
waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel,
laches and prescription.

The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs.
Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16,
1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed
facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of
whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue
to be resolved in this appeal.

The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual
matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues,
there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.

The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891
of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could
dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her
daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in
the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the
second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?

As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was
resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this
case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to
make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar,
extraordinaria o semi-troncal.

Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on
the nature of reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion
legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being
entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which
uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the
confinement of property within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly
leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.

The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented
agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is
considered unjust and inequitable.

However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored
the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has
provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.

Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891,
which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët

ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este

hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano,
se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley
en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la
linea de donde los bienes proceden

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
 ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came.

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from
an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another
ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the
said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within
the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line
from which the said property came.

So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance
or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a
posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the
deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor
or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to
the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased
descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased
descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna
died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan,
those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first
cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the meaning of article 811
(Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).

The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from
whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the
descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by
operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for
whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098;
Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA
412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).

The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente
por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas por el azar de los
enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a
una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan
Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case,
Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902,
single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels
of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees
were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus.
Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the
land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her,
should be noted in the title.

In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a
parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When Juliana died
intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Mañalac who
owned the other one-half portion.

Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was
held that the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac
and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of
Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Mañalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-
half portion came (Aglibot vs. Mañalac 114 Phil. 964).

Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480;
Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs.
Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa
vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58
Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the
end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by
descent. He is called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).

In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia
Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands,
the property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the
property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative
within the third degree.

First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot
even represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third
degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).

Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of
representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from
the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and

relationship by affinity are excluded.

Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives
nothing in return such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186,
189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant
obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the
resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee.
The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the
reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor.
The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the
death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.
(Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs.
Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63
Phil. 279.)

The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de
retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.

The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition,

meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of
the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the
reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil.
664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).

On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His
expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute
should the reservor predecease the reserves.

The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that
the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha
48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is
illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil.
89, 96).

And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and
dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the
vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil.
349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant

(prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it
had temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The
authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the
reservists, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than
interest in the reservable property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of
Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate
acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary
right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in
 the registry of property even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria
de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).

This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the
natural heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property
is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by
will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil.
226, 237).

The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the
descendant (prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.
(Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6,
6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-
11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the
hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a
certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the
reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her
sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three
daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res
judicata or cosa juzgada.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena
because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva,
44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.

As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable
properties from the prepositus, not from the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the
nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six
children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable
property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable
properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the
reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That
testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët

Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of

ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of
his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance
nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be
reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant
has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree,
of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of
the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time the right
of a reservatario (reserves).

ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina
Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties
from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his
mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as
heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through
their son, Apolonio III.

The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and
the descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for
the recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had
inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and
which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.

Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be
disposed of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this
Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of
Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.

As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the
properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.

Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the
doctrine of the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's
lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the
reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its
reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot,
by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property should be
awarded.

The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only
relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant
and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in
the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable
properties because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have
survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren,
who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the
reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained
therein".

That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the
reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the
other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.

In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the
reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's
estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus
within the third degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one
reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the
heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon
law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable
property (pp. 894-5).

Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her
will the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the
third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should
go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena
Legarda.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the
reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject
to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the
non-existence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the
reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who
pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.

That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the
absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death,
there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed
properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the said properties
should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in
accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs.
Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that
the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena
Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to
Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as
reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and
1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private
respondents.

CARILLO vs. DE PAZ, GR L-22601, OCTOBER 28, 1996;

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing a suit to recover
ownership and possession of 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac.

Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 41543, with an area of 1,334 square meters. Petra Garcia
died on September 21, 1941. On August 16, 1943, Severino Salak sold to Honoria Salak for
P812.00 his ½ portion of said lot. A year later, on December 5, 1944, Severino Salak died.

Sometime in January 1945, Honoria Salak and other members of her family died — massacred by
the Japanese.

As a result, two settlement proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac: (1)
Special Proceeding No. 3, to settle the estates of Severino Salak and Petra Garcia and (2) Special
Proceeding No. 23, to settle the estates of the Salak family (parents Simeon Salak and Isabel
Carrillo; and children Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya).

On September 4, 1946, a Project of Partition was submitted in Special Proceeding No. 3, which the
court approved on November 19, 1946. Said project adjudicated inter alia Lot No. 221, which was
given thereunder to Francisca Salak de Paz (1/4 of it in her capacity as heir, and the other 3/4 by
purchase and/or exchange with her co-heirs, Rita Sahagun, Aurea Sahagun and Ernesto Bautista).
From 1946 up to the present Francisca Salak has possessed all of Lot No. 221.

On the other hand, in Special Proceeding No. 23, on February 26, 1948, the court a quo held that
the heirs entitled to the estates of the Salak family were Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carillo (3/4
share) and Ernesto Bautista (1/4 share), applying the survivorship presumption [Rule 123, Sec.
69(ii), now Rule 131, Sec. 5(jj) of the Rules of Court], thus: (1) Simeon Salak died first — his
properties went to the children Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya (1/4 each); (2) Honoria,
Consuelo and Ligaya died next — Honoria's and Consuelo's properties went to their mother, Isabel;
those of Ligaya went to her son, Ernesto Bautista;1 (3) Isabel died next — her properties went to her
son Adolfo; and (4) Adolfo died last — his properties went to his maternal grandmother, Agustina.
Agustina thereby succeeded to the properties that came by intes-state succession from Honoria
Salak and Isabel Carrillo, including ½ of Lot No. 221.

On November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac (docketed therein as Case No. 351) against the heirs in Special Proceeding No. 3
to recover ½ of Lot No. 221 which as aforementioned has been possessed by Francisca Salak de
Paz.

On April 24, 1950, Agustina died.

On June 8, 1950 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in
Special Proceeding No. 23, and further decreed that the properties inherited by Agustina de Guzman
Vda. de Carrillo were subject to reserva troncal.
On November 6, 1950, Ernesto Bautista filed a petition in Special Proceeding No. 23 for the
execution of the judgment therein. Said petition was heard on November 10, 1959, after a copy was
served on the lawyer of Prima Carrillo, the latter being a party thereto as administratix of the estate
of her deceased mother Agustina. Acting on said petition, the lower court issued its order of
November 14, 1950, which reads in part:

. . . the Court, in view of the death of the reservista, Doña Agustina de Guzman Vda. de
Carrillo, declares all the interest of the said reservista Doña Agustina de Guzman Vda. de
Carrillo as well as that of her heirs in the three-fourths share adjudged to the reservista,
definitely terminated, and that the reservee, the minor Ernesto Bautista, is entitled to the
immediate delivery to him of the said three-fourths share declared reserved to him in the
decision of the Court of Appeals of June 8, 1950. . . . (Record on Appeals, pp. 213-214)

On December 20, 1960, the lower court dismissed Civil Case No. 351. The order of dismissal reads
in part:

By virtue of the existence of third-degree relatives of Adolfo Salak, the portion of Lot No. 221,
inherited by Agustina de Guzman was never released from the reserva, so as to convert the
ownership of Agustina de Guzman into an absolute one. Upon her death on April 24, 1950,
therefore, the property did not pass by inheritance to her legal heirs, but rather reverted to
the family trunk of the Isabel-Adolfo line. Such being the case, the estate of Agustina de
Guzman, the Present plaintiff in this case, has no cause of action against the defendants.

In resume, the adjudication in Special Proceeding No. 23, Intestate Estate of the late Simeon
Salak and Isabel Carrillo, which included Lot No. 221, has become res judicata which cannot
be disturbed in this case. (Record on Appeal, p. 209)

On April 22, 1963, Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup filed the present suit for recovery of 2/3 of 1/2 of
No. 221 against Francisca Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautista.2

On June 20, 1963, defendants Francisco Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautita filed a motion to dismiss
upon the grounds that the cause of action is barred by prior judgement and by the statute of
limitations.

On November 19, 1963, the court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata,
finding the suit barred by the order of delivery dated November 14, 1950 in Special Proceeding No.
23.

Plaintiffs Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup thereupon appealed to Us upon questions of law.

Several grounds were advanced to support the motion to dismiss: that the cause of action is barred
by prior judgment and by the statute of limitations. Although the action was dismissed by the lower
court expressly upon the ground of res judicata, it did not totally disregard the defense of
prescription. Thus, said court pointed out that:

Prima Carrillo being then the administratrix of the estate of her mother, she is also deemed
to have been notified of the petition for execution of judgment in Special Proceeding No. 23,
and of the order of November 14, 1950. As of then, therefore, Prima Carrillo (even though as
administratrix) personally knew that Ernesto Bautista claimed to be the sole reservee of all
the properties inherited by Da. Agustina from the Salak Family, among which was Lot No.
221 in question, but she did not file any opposition thereto. It was her opportunity to assert
her right as reservee by opposing the petition or, failing in this, to contest or to ask to be
 relieved from the order of November 14, 1950. Instead, she allowed about thirteen (13) years
before she commenced the present action. (Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 214-215;
emphasis supplied)

At any rate, this Court can resolve this appeal on the issue of prescription. As ruled in the cases
of Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana Tuazon, 40 Phil. 943 and Relativo v. Castro, 76 Phil. 563, when the
trial judge decides a case in favor of a party on a certain ground, the appellate court may uphold the
decision below upon some other point which was ignored or erroneously decided in favor of the
appellant by the trial court.

Reserva troncal in this jurisdiction is treated in Article 891 of the new Civil Code and Article 811 of
the old Civil Code, which states:

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came.

The reserva troncal arose — as had been finally decided by the Court of Appeals in Special
Proceeding No. 23 — when Agustina acquired by operation of law all the properties of her
descendant Adolfo (grandson), who acquired them by gratuitous title from another ascendant, Isabel
(Adolfo's mother).

According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservista, as it then
becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit
therefor. Nonetheless, this right, if not exercised within the time for recovering real properties, can be
lost by prescription:

Pero extinguida la reserva por la muerte del reservista, cambian por completo las relaciones
y condiciones juridicas de las personas y de las cosas, como ya se ha indicado. La
obligacion de reservar se convierte en la de entregar los bienes a quien correspondan,
obligacion que pasa a la herencia del reservista fallecido y deben complir sus herederos. Y
el derecho a la reserva se convierte en el derecho al dominio pleno de esos bienes. Si a la
muerte del reservista se comple la condicion resolutoria de existir parientes dentro del tercer
grado que pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden, a estos parientes pasa
desde aquel momento por ministerio de la ley el dominio absoluto de aquellos bienes, y, por
consiguiente, el derecho para reclamarlos, pudiendo disponer libremente de aquellos o de
este, y transmitirlos a sus herederos, puesto que la ley no lo prohibe. Y si no sobrevive al
reservista ninguno de dichos parientes, queda extinguida la obligacion de reservar, por no
haberse complido aquella condicion resolutoria impuesta por la ley, y en su virtud vuelven
los bienes al pleno dominio del ascendiente, y pertenecen a su herencia conforme al art.
651. Y como nada ordena la ley en sentido contrario, tenemos por indudable que no tiene el
caracter de personalisimo ninguno de esos derechos, que nacen con la extincion de la
reserva, pertenecen a la herencia y se transmiten a los herederos, aunque el causante no
los hubiere ejercitado por si mismo, salvo cases de renuncia, incapacidad o prescripcion.

xxx xxx xxx

C) Extincion de la reserva.—Las mismas condiciones exigidas para el nacimiento de la

reserva son necesarias para su existencia. Al faltar una de ellas, la reserva muerte. Tres
son, por tanto, las principales causas de extincion:
 1.a. Muerte del ascendiente.—Sea el que quiera el destino definitivo de los bienes, en virtud
de la naturaleza condicional de los derechos que crea el art. 811, es lo cierto que la reserva,
como tal, una vez necida a compaña al ascendiente obligado a ella hasta su muerte. Muerto
el ascendiente, cesa toda obligacion de reservar; falta el sujeto pasivo de la reserva.

xxx xxx xxx

Ademas de las tres causas expresadas, pueden señalarse otras que expondremos a
continuacion.

xxx xxx xxx

Y 5.a La prescripcion, si se disfrutan como libres los bienes por los herederos del
ascendiente durante el tiempo y con las condiciones marcadas por la ley.
(Manresa, Comentarios Al Codigo Civil Español, Vol. 6, 1911 Ed., pp. 288-289, 316-318).

Scaevola also states the view that prescription can apply against the reservatarios to cut off their
right to the reservable property:

f) Prescipcion.—Este modo extintivo de los derechos tiene solo applicacion a los parientes
del tercer grado del descendiente, porque no habiendo reserva si no acepta el ascendiente,
no hay que hablar de prescripcion extintiva respecto de el.

Tocante a los parientes con derecho a la reserva, es aplicable la doctrina, porque pueden no
ejercer su derecho por ignorar la muerte del descendiente opor otra causa.

Dada esta posibilidad, entendemos que, tratandose de un derecho real sobre bienes
inmuebles, prescribira a los treinta años (art. 1.693) (1), contados desde la aceptacion de la
herencia por el ascendiente, momento determinante del derecho al ejercicio de la reserva
(art. 1.969) ; transcurridos, pues, treinta años desde la aceptacion sin que los parientes
favorecidos por la ley hayan solicitado la constitucion de la reserva, se extenguira esta, y el
ascendiente o sus derecho-habientes adquiriran el pleno dominio de los bienes reservables
por su naturaleza, pero que no fueron objeto de reserva. (Scaevola, Codigo Civil
Comentado, Vol. 14, 1944 Ed., p. 360).

Plaintiffs-appellants herein, as reservatarios, had the right to claim the property 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No.
221 — from Francisca Salak de Paz, who has been possessing it in the concept of an owner, from
April 24, 1950 when Agustina died. And the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the existence
of reserva troncal, promulgated on June 8, 1950, rendered it all the more doubtless that such right
had accrued in their favor from the time Agustina died. It is clear, therefore, that the right or cause of
action accrued in favor of the plaintiffs-reservatarios herein on April 24, 1950.

Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes 10 years as the period of prescription for actions to
recover real property, counted from the time the cause of action accrued. This is the applicable law
because Article 1116 of the New Civil Code provides that "Prescription already running before the
effectivity of this Code [August 30, 1950] shall be governed by laws previously in force."

Plaintiffs-appellants' suit herein, having been filed only on April 22, 1963, or more than ten (10) years
from April 24, 1950, has prescribed.
And having reached such conclusion, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the question of whether
the suit is also barred on the ground of res judicata.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed on the ground of
prescription, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

XV. DISINHERITANCE, NCC 915 – 923;

Art. 915. A compulsory heir may, in consequence of disinheritance, be deprived of his
legitime, for causes expressly stated by law.

Art. 916. Disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor
shall be specified.

Art. 917. The burden of proving the truth of the cause for disinheritance shall rest upon the
other heirs of the testator, if the disinherited heir should deny it.

Art. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which,
if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul
the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and
legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair
the legitime.

Art. 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;

(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;

(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse
of the testator;

(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one already made;

(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or ascendant who disinherits such
child or descendant;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;

(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;

(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.

Art. 920. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of parents or
ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) When the parents have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to live a
corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their virtue;
(2) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;

(3) When the parent or ascendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found to be false;

(4) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;

(5) When the parent or ascendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one already made;

(6) The loss of parental authority for causes specified in this Code;

(7) The refusal to support the children or descendants without justifiable cause;

(8) An attempt by one of the parents against the life of the other, unless there has been a
reconciliation between them.

Art. 921. The following shall be sufficient causes for disinheriting a spouse:
(1) When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or
her descendants, or ascendants;

(2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment of six years or more, and the accusation has been found to be false;

(3) When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence cause the testator
to make a will or to change one already made;

(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation;

(5) When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of parental authority;

(6) Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the other spouse. (756, 855, 674a)

Art. 922. A subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives
the latter of the right to disinherit, and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have
been made.

Art. 923. The children and descendants of the person disinherited shall take his or her place
and shall preserve the rights of compulsory heirs with respect to the legitime; but the
disinherited parent shall not have the usufruct or administration of the property which
constitutes the legitime.

Case:
CHANG vs. HON. RODRIGUEZ, GR 192828, NOVEMBER 28, 2011;

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
December 14, 2009 Decision2 and July 8, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 99856. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by
us DENYING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed Orders dated March 15,
2007 and May 16, 2007 issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
6, in Manila in Civil Case No. 02-105251.4

The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The Factual Antecedents

Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,5 the respondents filed a
Complaint6 against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc.
(formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds
of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his
successors-in-interest.

The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and
Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title
with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary
Injunction," was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (RTC).

In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of action:

First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio Ching / Tiong
Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime
Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with his common-law wife, respondent
Mercedes Igne (Mercedes). Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a
common-law wife of Antonio. The respondents averred that Ramon misrepresented himself
as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth
certificate was merely simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio died of a stab wound. Police
investigators identified Ramon as the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused
in a criminal case for murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued against him have
remained unserved as he is at large. From the foregoing circumstances and upon the
authority of Article 9197 of the New Civil Code (NCC), the respondents concluded that
Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence, prohibited from receiving any share from the
estate of Antonio.

Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the police
investigations tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder of Antonio, the former
made an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that there were only six real
estate properties left by Antonio. The respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally
transferred to his name the titles to the said properties. Further, there are two other parcels
of land, cash and jewelries, plus properties in Hongkong, which were in Ramon's
possession.

Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was sweet-talked by
Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of
Time Deposit of ₱4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and the certificates of title covering
two condominium units in Binondo which were purchased by Antonio using his own money
but which were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented to
Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive
of the stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting
 undue influence, Ramon had convinced them to execute an Agreement8 and a Waiver9 on
August 20, 1996. The terms and conditions stipulated in the Agreement and Waiver,
specifically, on the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the amount of
₱22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, Lucina was not informed of the execution
of the said instruments and had not received any amount from Ramon. Hence, the
instruments are null and void.

Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which constitute 60% of the
latter's total capital stock, were illegally transferred by Ramon to his own name through a
forged document of sale executed after Antonio died. Po Wing owns a ten-storey building in
Binondo. Ramon's claim that he bought the stocks from Antonio before the latter died is
baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also banished into thin air through
Ramon's machinations.

Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate10 adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of
the respondents. By virtue of the said instrument, new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs)
covering eight real properties owned by Antonio were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to
the Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to post a Surety
Bond conditioned to answer for whatever claims which may eventually surface in connection
with the said stocks. Co-defendant Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in
Ramon's behalf.

Sixth Cause of Action. Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-
defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of
Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably
low price. By reason of Ramon's lack of authority to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate,
the conveyances are null and void ab initio.

Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages Antonio's estate. She has no
intent to convey to the respondents their shares in the estate of Antonio.

The respondents thus prayed for the following in their Complaint:

1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the defendant RAMON CHING and/or his
attorney-in-fact Belen Dy Tan Ching from disposing, selling or alienating any property that belongs to
the estate of the deceased ANTONIO CHING;

xxx

4. x x x

a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered his father ANTONIO CHING
disqualified as heir and from inheriting to (sic) the estate of his father;

b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels
of land from the name of his father ANTONIO CHING to his name covered by TCT No. x x x;

c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed by plaintiffs x x x in
favor of x x x RAMON CHING for being patently immoral, invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic)
sham;
 d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks at (sic) PO WING from the
names of ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the defendant ANTONIO CHING's
name for having been illegally procured through the falsification of their signatures in the
document purporting the transfer thereof;

e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT
OF ESTATE executed by x x x RAMON CHING for being contrary to law and existing
jurisprudence;

f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed by x x x RAMON CHING (i)
over two (2) parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES,
Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for having
illegally procured the ownership and titles of the above properties;

x x x.11

The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss12 alleging forum shopping, litis pendentia, res
judicata and the respondents as not being the real parties in interest.

On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order13 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.

The respondents filed an Amended Complaint14 dated April 7, 2005 impleading Metrobank as the
successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank. The Amended Complaint also added a seventh
cause of action relative to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the
amount of ₱4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed that they
be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to them.
Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to
preserve it during the pendency of the case.

On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim.15

On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order16 admitting the respondents' Amended Complaint.
The RTC stressed that Metrobank had already filed Manifestations admitting that as successor-in-
interest of Global Bank, it now possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed
willingness to abide by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's deposits. The
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail the aforecited Order was denied by the RTC on
May 3, 2006.

On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim to the
respondents' Amended Complaint.

On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.17

On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss18 the respondents' Amended
Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the Amended Complaint sought the release of the
CPPA to the respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's
disinheritance, the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for
declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC
acting as an ordinary court.
On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order19 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss on
grounds:

In the case at bar, an examination of the Complaint would disclose that the action delves mainly on
the question of ownership of the properties described in the Complaint which can be properly settled
in an ordinary civil action. And as pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to declare the
nullity of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Transfer Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly executed by defendant Ramon Ching to
defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have
translated this action into a special proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended
Complaint. With regard [to] the prayer to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of the
CPPA and that the same be immediately released to them, in itself poses an issue of
ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial evidence. And as emphasized by
the plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint was intended to implead Metrobank as a co-defendant.

As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during the Pre-trial of this case, one of
the issues raised by the defendants Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties is: Whether or not there
can be disinheritance in intestate succession? Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be
legally disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the Court, the issue of
disinheritance, which is one of the causes of action in the Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial
on the merits. And at this stage, it has not been sufficiently established whether or not there is a
will.20 (Emphasis supplied.)

The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. The petition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856, raised the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that the Amended
Complaint sought to establish the status or rights of the respondents which subjects are within the
ambit of a special proceeding.

On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision21 denying the petition
for certiorari on grounds:

Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the causes of action of the
amended complaint induced us to infer that nothing in the said complaint shows that the action
of the private respondents should be threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing that
their allegations were substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the alleged
fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The private respondents also
instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect them from the consequence of the
fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from
Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him from disposing or alienating the subject properties,
including the ₱4 Million deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction
to adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that the probate court
could not take cognizance of the prayer to disinherit Ramon Ching, given the undisputed fact that
there was no will to be contested in a probate court.

The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended complaint and complicates the issue of
jurisdiction by reiterating the grounds or defenses set up in the petitioners' earlier pleadings.
Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations
of the complaint without regard to whether or not the private respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to
recover upon all or some of the causes of action asserted therein. In this regard, the jurisdiction of
the court does not depend upon the defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest
the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the petitioners (defendants).22 Hence,
we focus our resolution on the issue of jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and
not on the defenses pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the subsequent pleadings of the
petitioners.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject the action of the petitioners in a special proceeding since the nullification of the
subject documents could be achieved in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon the issues that it defined
during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 02-105251.23 (emphasis supplied)

The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a Resolution24 issued on
July 8, 2010.

The Issue

The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25 is anchored on the issue of:

Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by the PETITIONERS on
the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Amended
Complaint, to wit, (a) filiations with Antonio of Ramon, Jaime and Joseph; (b) rights of common-law
wives, Lucina and Mercedes, to be considered as heirs of Antonio; (c) determination of the extent of
Antonio's estate; and (d) other matters which can only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in
an ordinary civil action.

The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine (a) who are the heirs
of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d)
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or the exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.26 Further, the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of the contending parties and the
respondents' alleged entitlement as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in
Metrobank's custody are matters which are more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding
and not of an ordinary civil action.

The respondents opposed27 the instant petition claiming that the petitioners are engaged in forum
shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos. 17550728 and 183840,29 both involving the contending parties in the
instant petition were filed by the petitioners and are currently pending before this Court. Further,
in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,30 the SC declared that whether a particular matter should be resolved by
the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a
jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides, the petitioners, having validly
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC and having actively participated in the trial of the
case, are already estopped from challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint
and Amended Complaint.31

The Court's Ruling

We resolve to deny the instant petition.

The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing them to file their reply to the
respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant Petition. While the prescribed period to comply
expired on March 15, 2011, the petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file a reply
only on October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost seven months.
Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both ruled that the
denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 02-105251 was proper.

Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents that the petitioners engaged
in forum shopping and are already estopped from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having
validly submitted to it when the latter participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition
is still in order. Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among others,
the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA now under
Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a
special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by
the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.32 A special proceeding is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.33 It is distinguished from an
ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.34 To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint
should be filed.

Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal
cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the
respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will
or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever
mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does
not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of
its limited jurisdiction.

The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint, seeking the release in favor
of the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's custody and the nullification of the instruments
subject of the complaint, necessarily require the determination of the respondents' status as
Antonio's heirs.

It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be declared as the rightful
owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the Agreement
and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the
RTC of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the
pendency of the case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was
premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and
not on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized that
the respondents were parties to the execution of the Agreement35 and Waiver36 prayed to be
nullified. Hence, even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents
have the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there
was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed
fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Antonio’s estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the
said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall
first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not
determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.

In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,37 the Court declared:
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon
the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon
the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of
the relief sought are the matters to be consulted. 1âwphi1

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case No.
02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to
protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC
will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the
reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251
was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and
distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.

The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound,
because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from
Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the
RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of
respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated
therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a) Opposition to the respondents'
Motion to Admit Substitution of Party;38 and (b) Manifestation39 through counsel that they will no
longer file a reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.

SO ORDERED.

PRINCIPLES AFFECTING THE FREELY DISPOSABLE PORTION;