1
G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006
RENNIE DECLARADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR S. GUBATON, Presiding Judge,
Branch 14, Roxas City, and FRANK
BANSALES, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the
portion of the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Roxas City, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. C-
1419-10-2002, suspending the sentence of respondent
Frank Bansales and ordering his commitment to the
Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia,
Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.
Frank Bansales was born on June 3, 1985. He was a
student at the Cabug-Cabug National High School in
President Roxas, Capiz. At around 9:45 a.m. on July 25,
2002, Yvonne Declarador was stabbed to death. After
conducting the autopsy on the cadaver, Rural Health
Physician Pilar Posadas prepared a Post-Mortem
Certificate indicating that the victim sustained 15 stab
wounds on different parts of the body. 2
On October 10, 2002, an Information charging Frank
Bansales with murder was filed by the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor with the Family Court. The
accusatory portion reads:
That on or about 9:45 o’clock in the morning of July 25,
2002, inside a classroom in Cabug-Cabug National High
School in President Roxas, Capiz, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
armed with a knife and with intent to kill, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab with the said knife [his] teacher, one YVONNE
DECLARADOR, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the
latter multiple fatal stab wounds in the different parts of
the body which caused the immediate death of the said
Yvonne Declarador.
The crime was committed with the attendance of the
qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength considering
that the attack was made by the accused using a long
knife which the latter carried along with him from his
house to the school against his lady teacher who was
unarmed and defenseless at that time and by inflicting
upon the latter about fifteen (15) fatal knife wounds
resulting to her death. 3
In view of the plea of the accused and the evidence
presented, the RTC rendered judgment on May 20, 2003
finding Bansales guilty of murder. However, the court
suspended the sentence of the accused and ordered his
commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth at
Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
In view of the Plea of Guilty by the accused and the
evidence presented by the prosecution, the court finds
CICL Frank Bansales GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder being charged. Being a minor, 17
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense
charged, he is entitled to a special mitigating
circumstance of minority, and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) month of
reclusion temporal and to pay the heirs of Yvonne
Declarador, a civil indemnity of Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00), Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
for moral damages, Forty-Three Thousand Pesos
(P43,000.00) for funeral expenses, attorney’s fee of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and unearned
income of One Million Three Hundred Seventy
Thousand Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P1,370,000.70).
The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank
Bansales) and his teacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug
National High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are
jointly subsidiarily liable in case of insolvency, as the
crime was established to have been committed inside the
classroom of Cabug-Cabug National High School and
during school hours.
Pursuant to the provision of P.D. 603, as amended, the
sentence is suspended and the Child in conflict with the
law (CICL), Frank Bansales is ordered committed to the
Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia,
Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.
Furnish copies of this decision the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, the Private Prosecutors, the
DSWD Capiz Provincial Office, Roxas City, the
Regional Rehabilitation for Youth, Concordia, Guimaras,
the accused and his counsel, Atty. Ramcez John Honrado.
SO ORDERED. 4
On June 2, 2003, the RTC set a preliminary conference
for 10:00 a.m. of June 10, 2003 with the Public
Prosecutor, the Social Welfare Officer of the court, and
the Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Rehabilitation
Center for Youth, considering that the accused would
turn 18 on June 3, 2003. 5
Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased,
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court assailing that portion of the decision of the trial
court’s decision suspending the sentence of the accused
and committing him to the rehabilitation center.
Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as well as A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC

(otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law), the benefit of a suspended sentence does
not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense
punishable by death, 6 reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v.
Ondo, 7 petitioner avers that since Bansales was charged
with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,
he is disqualified from availing the benefits of a
suspended sentence.
In his Comment, Bansales avers that petitioner has no
standing to file the petition, considering that the offense
charged is a public crime brought in the name of the
People of the Philippines; only the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) is authorized to file a petition in court
assailing the order of the RTC which suspended the
service of his sentence. He further avers that Section 32
of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC entitles the accused to an
automatic suspension of sentence and allows the court to
commit the juvenile to the youth center; hence, the court
did not abuse its discretion in suspending the sentence of
the accused.
In reply, petitioner maintains that he has sufficient
personality to file the petition.
The OSG, for its part, posits that respondent’s sentence
cannot be suspended since he was charged with a capital
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It
insists that the entitlement of a juvenile to a suspended
sentence does not depend upon the sentence actually
imposed by the trial court but upon the imposable penalty
for the crime charged as provided for by law.
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether
petitioner has standing to file the petition; (2) whether
petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in
filing his petition with this Court; and (3) whether
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering
the suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales
and his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation
Center for the Youth.
The petition is granted.
On the first issue, we rule for the petitioner. Being the
surviving spouse of the deceased and the offended party,
he has sufficient personality to file the instant special
civil action for certiorari. 8 This is in line with the
underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules
of Court in order to promote their object. 9 Moreover, the
OSG has filed its comment on the petition and has joined
the petitioner in his plea for the nullification of the
assailed portion of the RTC decision.
On the second issue, the rule is that a petition for review
on certiorari which seeks to nullify an order of the RTC
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in aid of its
2
10
appellate jurisdiction. A direct invocation of the
original jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of
certiorari may be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. 11 This is an established policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this
Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further overcrowding of the Court’s docket. 12
However, in Fortich v. Corona, 13 the Court held that
considering the nature and importance of the issues
raised and in the interest of speedy justice, and to avoid
future litigations, the Court may take cognizance of a
petition for certiorari directly filed before it. 14 Moreover,
this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a
particular case from their operation whenever the
interests of justice so require.
In this case, we resolve to take cognizance of the case,
involving as it does a juvenile and the application of the
Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The charge against respondent Bansales was murder with
the qualifying circumstance of either evident
premeditation or abuse of superior strength. Under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 7659, the imposable penalty
for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The trial
court found him guilty of murder.
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, provides:
Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of
Youthful Offender. – If after hearing the evidence in the
proper proceedings, the court should find that the
youthful offender has committed the acts charged against
him, the court, shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him.
However, instead of pronouncing judgment of
conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful
offender and if it finds that the best interest of the public,
as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may
suspend all further proceedings and commit such minor
to the custody or care of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development or to any training institution
operated by the government or any other responsible
person until he shall have reached twenty-one years of
age, or for a shorter period as the court may deem proper,
after considering the reports and recommendations of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or the
government training institution or responsible person
under whose care he has been committed.
Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender
for suspension of his sentence, the court may require the
Department of Social Welfare and Development to

prepare and submit to the court a social case study report
over the offender and his family.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and
supervision by the representative of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or government training
institution as the court may designate subject to such
conditions as it may prescribe.
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful
offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence
under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an
offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to
one who is convicted for an offense by the Military
Tribunals.
The law was reproduced in A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC where,
except for those under paragraph 3, Section 32 of the law,
the sentence of the accused is automatically suspended:
Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and
Disposition Orders. – The sentence shall be suspended
without need of application by the juvenile in conflict
with the law. The court shall set the case for disposition
conference within fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the
social worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his
parents or guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any
or a combination of the following disposition measures
best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the
juvenile: care, guidance, and supervision orders; Drug
and alcohol treatment; Participation in group counseling
and similar activities; Commitment to the Youth
Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for
juvenile in conflict with the law authorized by the
Secretary of DSWD.
The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of
the DSWD shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile
in conflict with the law with the disposition measure and
shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status and
progress report on the matter. The Family Court may set
a conference for the evaluation of such report in the
presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or
guardian, and other persons whose presence may be
deemed necessary.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a
juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed
suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of
judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of
age or over.
Thus, it is clear that a person who is convicted of an
offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or
reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing the
benefits of a suspended sentence. "Punishable" is defined
3
as "deserving of, or capable, or liable to punishment;
liable to be punished; may be punished; liable to
punishment." 15 The word "punishable" does not mean
"must be punished," but "liable to be punished" as
specified. 16 In U.S. v. Villalon, 17the Court defined
punishable as "deserving of, or liable for, punishment."
Thus, the term refers to the possible, not to the actual
sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be,
and not which is imposed.
The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime
charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on
the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the
actual penalty imposed but the possible one which
determines the disqualification of a juvenile. 18 Despite
the disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge,
nevertheless, ordered the suspension of the sentence
meted against him. By this act, respondent Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction.
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took
effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the
child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of
the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the
various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose
the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension
of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is
already 18 years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other
disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have
not been deleted from Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344.
Evidently, the intention of Congress was to maintain the
other disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P.D.
No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-
18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a
crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to
 4
death or death, are disqualified from having their reconsideration. Paduas petition for certiorari before the
sentences suspended. Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11,
Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be 2004 and July 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
[3] [4]

read and construed together because enactments of the
same legislature on the same subject are supposed to
form part of one uniform system; later statutes are
supplementary or complimentary to the earlier
enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is
supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the
(RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his
petition for probation.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and
Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC,
Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5, Article II
[5]

subject and to have enacted the new act with reference of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
[6]

thereto. 19Statutes in pari materia should be construed Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for
together to attain the purpose of an expressed national selling dangerous drugs. The Information reads:
[7]

policy. 20
The Prosecution, through the
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is undersigned Public Prosecutor,
GRANTED. The Order of the respondent Judge charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez
suspending the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales is a.k.a. Allan and Michael Padua y Tordel
NULLIFIED. a.k.a. Mike, with the crime of violation of
SO ORDERED. Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in
relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a)
SECOND DIVISION and (i), committed as follows:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig
City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the
MICHAEL PADUA, G.R. No. 168546 accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y
Petitioner, Velchez and Michael Padua y
Present: Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17)
years old, conspiring and
confederating together and both of
QUISUMBING them mutually helping and aiding
- versus - CARPIO MORALES one another, not being lawfully
authorized to sell any dangerous
TINGA,
drug, did then and there willfully,
VELASCO, JR., and unlawfully and feloniously sell,
BRION, JJ deliver and give away to PO1
Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-
buyer, one (1) folded newsprint
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated: containing 4.86 grams of dried
Respondent. marijuana fruiting tops, which was
July 23, 2008 found positive to the tests for
marijuana, a dangerous drug, in
violation of the said law.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Contrary to law. [8]

- - - - - - - - - - - -x
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua,
DECISION assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not
guilty.
[9]

QUISUMBING, J.: During the pre-trial conference on February 2,

This petition for review assails the 2004, however, Paduas counsel manifested that his client
Decision dated April
[1]
19, 2005 and was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a
Resolution dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of
[2]
plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had offenders under Section 70 of Rep. ActNo. 9165. The
[10]

respectively dismissed Michael Paduas petition for prosecutor interposed no objection. Thus, the RTC on
[11]

certiorari and denied his motion for the same date issued an Order stating that the former
[12]

plea of Padua of not guilty was considered
withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded
guilty. Hence, in a Decision dated February 6, 2004, the
[13]
RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged:
In view of the foregoing, the Court
finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel
guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of
R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No.
8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and
therefore, sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
No subsidiary imprisonment,
however, shall be imposed should [the]
accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to
Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED. [14]
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for
Probation dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a
[15]
5
Chief of the Pasig City Parole and
Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO
Teodoro Villaverde recommended that
minor Michael Padua y Tordel be placed
on probation, anchoring his
recommendation on Articles 189 and 192
of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child
and Welfare Code, as amended, which
deal with the suspension of sentence and
commitment of youthful offender. Such
articles, therefore, do not find application
in this case, the matter before the Court
being an application for probation by
minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the
suspension of his sentence.
On the other hand, Section 70 is
under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which
deals with the Program for Treatment and
Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents.
Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of
R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations
of either Section 15 or Section

11.Nowhere in Article VIII was

minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of
the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No.
968 (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as The Probation
[16]
Law of 1976 and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He
further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications under the said laws.
The RTC in an Order dated February 10,
[17]
[v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.
More importantly, while the
provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly
Section 70 thereof deals with Probation or
Community Service for First- Time Minor
Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the

Court is of the view and so holds that

2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to minor Michael Padua y Tordel who was
conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a charged and convicted of violating
report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot
of the order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to avail of probation under said section in
submit his comment on the said petition within five days view of the provision of Section 24 which
from receipt of the order. is hereunder quoted:
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Sec. 24. Non-
Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence Applicability of the
Investigation Report to the RTC recommending Probation Law for Drug
that Padua be placed on probation. [18]

Traffickers and
However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pushers. Any person
Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order convicted for drug
denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that trafficking or
under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person
[19]
pushing under this Act,
convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege regardless of the penalty
granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus: imposed by the
Before this Court now is the Post- Court, cannot avail of the
Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on privilege granted by the
minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared Probation Law or
by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Presidential Decree No.
Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the 968, as
 6
amended. (underlining I.
supplied) THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT
WHEREFORE, premises OF APPEALS HAVE LEGAL BASIS IN
considered, the Petition for Probation filed APPLYING SECTION 24, ARTICLE II
by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as OF R.A. 9165 INSTEAD OF SECTION
it is hereby DENIED. 70, ARTICLE VIII OF THE SAME LAW.
SO ORDERED. [20]
II.
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC
order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE RULE
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH
Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in THE LAW HAS NO APPLICATION TO
a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his THE INSTANT CASE. [24]

petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of
WHEREFORE, in view of the Appeals err in dismissing Paduas petition for
foregoing, the petition is certiorari assailing the trial courts order denying his
hereby DENIED for lack of merit and petition for probation? (2) Was Paduas right under Rep.
ordered DISMISSED. Act No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
[25]

SO ORDERED. [21] 2006, violated? and (3) Does Section 32 of A.M. No.
[26]

02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Conflict with the Law have application in this case?
Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this
petition where he raises the following issues: As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing Paduas petition for
I. certiorari.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a
DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
PETITIONERS RIGHT AS A MINOR without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [27]

JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE

LAW. Without jurisdiction means that the court acted
with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of
II.
jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion
ACCUSED[S] RIGHT [TO BE implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
RELEASED UNDER judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an
VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so
KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the
JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [28]

CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER
DEPARTMENT OF
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
AND OTHER PURPOSES.
A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas
petition for probation shows that the RTC neither acted
JUSTICE without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion
because it merely applied the law and adhered to
[22]

principles of statutory construction in denying Paduas

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), petition for probation.
representing public respondent, opted to adopt its Padua was charged and convicted for violation of
Comment as its Memorandum. In its Comment, the
[23]

Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling

OSG countered that

dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act
No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking
cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the
Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and
Pushers. Any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing under this Act,
regardless of the penalty imposed by
the Court, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or
Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended. (Emphasis supplied.)
The law is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking
or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot
avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory
construction is that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute
must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute
[29]
is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-
meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of
intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis
[30]
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure. [31]
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed
out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24 of
Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher
punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking
or pushing while extending a sympathetic and
magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who
are found guilty of violation of Sections 11 and 15 of
[32] [33]
the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of
illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and
pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and
pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from
availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents,
users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend
their ways. The Court of Appeals also correctly stated
[34]
that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt
from the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and
pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law
could have easily declared so. [35]
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug
traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug
users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or
dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months
rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for
the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165,
7
while a person charged and convicted of selling
dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot
argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 was violated. Nor can he
argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise
known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law
has application in this case. Section 68 of Rep. Act No.
[36]
9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both
pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under
Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be
[37]
retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of
Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18
years of age is found guilty of the offense charged,
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344,
[38]
however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of
age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the
child, order execution of sentence, or extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until
the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years.
Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over
and thus, could no longer be considered a child for [39]
purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the
application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and
academic as far as his case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the
Resolution dated June 14, 2005of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision1 dated July 14, 2005
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao
City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding
herein accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape3 committed against AAA,4 and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the

amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, and the cost of the suit. However, the CA
modified the penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing
the death penalty, increasing the award of civil indemnity
to ₱75,000.00, and awarding ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, aside from the ₱50,000.00 for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in
1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost
four (4) years, AAA’s father filed a complaint5 for acts of
lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant on July
7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the
charge to rape.6 The Information7 dated September 5,
2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa,
Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste
design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6
years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage
and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-
appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty.8 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the
victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana
Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan,
Albay. The defense presented the accused-appellant
himself, who vehemently denied committing the crimes
imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II
of the Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its
Decision9 finding the accused-appellant guilty of the
crime of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in
view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the accused-
appellant.10
Accused-appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief11 on July
15, 2004, while the People, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed its Appellee’s Brief12 on
December 15, 2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v.
Mateo,13 modifying the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they
provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in
cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in "Internal Rules
8
of the Supreme Court," the case was transferred, for
appropriate action and disposition, to the CA where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision
of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 000717,
affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction
pronounced by the trial court. We quote the fallo of the
CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is
AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y Olivera, is
ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to pay the
victim, [AAA], the amount of (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (2) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3)
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the
Supreme Court for review, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-
03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took
effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this
Court for further review.14
In our Resolution15 of November 15, 2005, we required
the parties to simultaneously submit their respective
supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed his
Supplemental Brief16 on April 7, 2006. Having failed to
submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
was deemed to have waived the filing of its supplemental
brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised
the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF [AAA], [her
cousin] and [her father].
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN
REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED
BY THE ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED RICHARD SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the
OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together
with her [cousin and two other playmates], was playing
in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go
with him to the backyard of Saling Crisologo’s house.

She agreed. Unknown to appellant, [AAA’s cousin]
followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA’s]
shorts and underwear. He also removed his trousers and
brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her
back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis
into [AAA’s] private organ. Appellant made an up-and-
down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt
severe pain inside her private part and said "aray." She
also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAA’s cousin], who positioned herself around five (5)
meters away from them, witnessed appellant’s dastardly
act. Horrified, [AAA’s cousin] instinctively rushed to the
house of [AAA’s] mother, her aunt Emily, and told the
latter what she had seen. [AAA’s] mother answered that
they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very
young to be talking about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up
and ordered [AAA] to put on her clothes. Appellant then
left.
Perplexed, [AAA’s cousin] immediately returned to the
backyard of Saling Crisologo where she found [AAA]
crying. Appellant, however, was gone. [AAA’s cousin]
approached [AAA] and asked her what appellant had
done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin]
did not ask her any further question and just
accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant
had done to her because she feared that her mother might
slap her. Later, when her mother washed her body, she
felt a grating sensation in her private part. Thereafter,
[AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAA’s cousin] came to
their house and told [AAA’s] mother again that appellant
had earlier made an up-and-down movement on top of
[AAA]. [AAA’s mother], however did not say anything.
At that time, [AAA’s] father was working in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of
Guinobatan, Albay. She testified that: (1) it was the rural
health officer, Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical
examination on [AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and
signed a medico-legal certificate containing the result of
[AAA]’s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had
already resigned as rural health officer of Guinobatan,
Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can interpret, the
findings in said medico-legal certificate issued to [AAA];
(5) [AAA]’s medical findings are as follows: "negative
for introital vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated
hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa, vaginal
admits little finger with resistance; (6) the finding
"negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars" means,
in layman’s language, that there was no showing of any
scar or wound, and (7) there is a complete perforation of
9
the hymen which means that it could have been subjected
to a certain trauma or pressure such as strenuous exercise
or the entry of an object like a medical instrument or
penis.17
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version
of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a
resident of Doña Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay denied he
raped [AAA]. While he knows [AAA’s] parents, because
sometimes they go to their house looking for his father to
borrow money, he does not know [AAA] herself. His
father retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his
mother worked as an agriculturist in the Municipality of
Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the
Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring
seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio.
They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in
1992 they transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay.
His father is from barangay Masarawag while his mother
is from barangay Doña Tomasa both of Guinobatan,
Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his mother
continued to be an agriculturist while his father tended to
his 1-hectare coconut land. Richard testified he was
between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years old in 1992
when they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and
1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he
took his high school at Masarawag High School. His
daily routine was at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon
after school before proceeding home he would usually
play basketball at the basketball court near the church in
Doña Tomasa about 1 kilometer away from their house.
When her mother suffered a stroke in 1999 he and his
father took turns taking care of his mother. Richard
denied molesting other girls ... and was most surprised
when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows Saling
Crisologo and the latter’s place which is more than half
kilometer to their house. Richard claimed Salvacion
Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose
death on May 7, 2000 was imputed to him and for which
a case for Murder under Criminal Case No. 4087 was
filed against him with the docile cooperation of [AAA’s]
parents who are related to Salvacion, concocted and
instigated [AAA’s] rape charge against him to make the
case for Murder against him stronger and life for him
miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the
Murder charge and two (2) months later while he already
in detention, the rape case supposedly committed in 1996
was filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it
from his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime
on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited him in jail. He
naturally got angry when he heard of this rape charge
because he did not do such thing and recalled telling his

sister they can go to a doctor and have the child examine
to prove he did not rape her. Subsequently, from his sister
again he was to learn that the rape case was ordered
dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAA’s]
mother, is also related to his father, [AAA mother’s]
father, being a second cousin of his father. Richard is
convinced it is not the lending of money by his father to
the AAA’s family as the motive for the latter to file the
rape case against him but the instigation of Salvacion
Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan, Albay, testified on the
records of Criminal Case No. 7078 filed in MTC
Guinobatan, Albay against Richard Sarcia for Rape in
relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of
said rape case but the accused through counsel failed to
formally offer the marked exhibits relative to said case.18
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in
convicting him, as the prosecution was not able to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, AAA, her cousin
and her father on the following grounds: (1) the
testimonies of AAA and her cousin were inconsistent
with each other; (2) the victim was confused as to the
date and time of the commission of the offense; (3) there
was a four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and the
only reason why they filed the said case was "to help
Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused in
a murder case filed by said Salvacion Bobier for the
death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May
7, 2000." Accused-appellant stressed that the same
Salvacion Bobier helped AAA’s father in filing the said
case for rape. Accused-appellant also claimed that the
prosecution failed to prove that he employed force,
threats or intimidation to achieve his end. Finally,
accused-appellant harped on the finding in the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and interpreted by Dr.
Joana Manatlao, stating "negative for introital bulvar
laceration nor scar which means that there was no
showing of any scar or wound."
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the
inconsistencies between AAA’s and her cousin’s
testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she
played with AAA at the time of the incident, while AAA
testified that she was doing nothing before accused-
appellant invited her to the back of the house of a certain
Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when she saw
accused-appellant doing the push-and-pull motion while
on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice contrary
to AAA’s testimony that when accused-appellant was
inside her and started the up-and-down motion, she said
"aray"; (3) when the cousin returned to AAA after telling
10
the latter’s mother what accused-appellant had done to
AAA, she found AAA crying. AAA however testified
that, after putting on her clothes, she invited the cousin to
their house; and (4) the cousin testified that other
children were playing at the time of the incident, but
AAA testified that there were only four of them who
were playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses, which refer only to minor details and
collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight
of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating
the principal occurrence and the positive identification of
the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to
strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that
their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such
inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for
there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.19 The
alleged inconsistencies in this case are too
inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a
quo. It is important that the two prosecution witnesses
were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who
sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and
straightforward narrations of how AAA was sexually
abused by accused-appellant evidently deserve full faith
and credence. When the rape incident happened, AAA
was only five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin
testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old,
respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the
alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses can be explained by their age and their
inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the
most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make
confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially
true of young witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by
the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more
reason to accord them ample space for inaccuracy.20
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAA’s inability to
recall the exact date when the incident in 1996 was
committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime,
however, is not an indication of false testimony, for even
discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are
inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the
credibility of the victim as a witness.21 In People v.
Purazo,22 We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an
essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen
of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such,
the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be
accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already held that
where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an
essential element of the crime charged, conviction may
be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it
appears that the crime was not committed at the precise

time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the
existence of some immaterial fact set out in the
complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime
charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the
filing of the complaint or information within the period
of the statute of limitations and at a place within the
jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima,23 the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes
occurred does not ipso facto make the information
defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise
date or time when the victim was raped is not an element
of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of
carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances
enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at
any time as near to the actual date when the offense was
committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases,
we ruled that allegations that rapes were committed
"before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime in the
year 1991 and the days thereafter," "sometime in
November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or
subsequent thereto" and "on or about and sometime in
the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with
Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
In this case, AAA’s declaration that the rape incident took
place on December 15, 1996 was explained by the trial
court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the
Court the date December 15, 1996 mentioned by [AAA]
may have been arbitrarily chosen by the latter due to the
intense cross-examination she was subjected but the
Court believes it could have been in any month and date
in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor
[AAA’s] sworn statement mention the month and date but
only the year.24
Likewise, witnesses’ credibility is not affected by the
delay in the filing of the case against accused-appellant.
Neither does the delay bolster accused-appellant’s claim
that the only reason why this case was filed against him
was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this
same accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by
Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae
Christine Camu on May 7, 2000."
The rape victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the
crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an
indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to
prefer silence for fear of her aggressor and the lack of
courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually
abused. In People v. Coloma25 we even considered an 8-
year delay in reporting the long history of rape by the
11
victim’s father as understandable and not enough to
render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old
daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances
that show that the charge was a mere concoction and
impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the
complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here,
the failure of AAA’s parents to immediately file this case
was sufficiently justified by the complainant’s father in
the latter’s testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong,
you got angry when your wife told you that something
happened to Hazel way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you
waited until June to file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a
talk for which reason that during that time we had no
money yet to use in filing the case, so we waited. When
we were able to save enough amounts, we filed the
case.26
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be
liable for rape because there is no proof that he employed
force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge
of AAA. Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in this
case, the only subject of inquiry is whether "carnal
knowledge" took place. Proof of force, intimidation or
consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an element
of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of
absence of free consent when the rape victim is below
the age of twelve.27
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report,
particularly the conclusion quoted as follows: "negative
for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means, in
layman language, that there was no showing of any scar
or wound." The Court has consistently ruled that the
presence of lacerations in the victim’s sexual organ is not
necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence does
not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape.28 What is
important is that AAA’s testimony meets the test of
credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused.
Accused-appellant’s defense of denial was properly
rejected. Time and time again, we have ruled that denial
like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy
to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it
cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party and
other witnesses. Categorical and consistent positive
identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails
over the appellants’ defense of denial and alibi. 29 The
shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that

he was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of
Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this
score, the trial court aptly reached the following
conclusion:
…True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA’s family
file the instant case against the accused, but the Court
believes [AAA’s] parents finally decided to file the rape
case because after they have come to realize after what
happened to Mae Christine Camu that what previously
[AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the
latter had continually ignored is after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has
been stressed often enough that the testimony of rape
victims who are young and immature deserve full
credence. It is improbable for a girl of complainant’s age
to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her
family had she not been truly subjected to the painful
experience of sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of tender
years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to
brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if
it were not true.30 Parents would not sacrifice their own
daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her
to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if
they were not motivated by an honest desire to have their
daughter’s transgressor punished accordingly.31 Hence,
the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive
exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established
beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss now the proper
penalty to be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659,32 was the governing law at the
time the accused-appellant committed the rape in
question. Under the said law, the penalty of death shall be
imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven
years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was
five (5) years old at the time the rape was committed,
was alleged in the information and proven during trial by
the presentation of her birth certificate, which showed
her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty
should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the
penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the
CA’s conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be
deemed a minor at the time of the commission of the
offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) 33 of
the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant
testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24
years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of
age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could
12
have taken place "in any month and date in the year
1996." Since the prosecution was not able to prove the
exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is
not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or
after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the
attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it
being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several
cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the
basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his
age.34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death
is still the penalty to be reckoned with.35 Thus, the proper
imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in
awarding damages provided in the Civil Code, in case a
crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the
Civil Code provides that "in crimes, the damages to be
adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances." The issue now is whether the award of
damages should be reduced in view of the presence here
of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of
the accused at the time of the commission of the offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages
imposed on the convicted offender is in order. Article 107
of the Revised Penal Code defines the term
"indemnification," which is included in the civil liability
prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. –
Indemnification for consequential damages shall include
not only those caused the injured party, but also those
suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of
the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor 36 ratiocinated
as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the
award of ₱50,000.00 to the offended party as being in the
nature of moral damages. We have heretofore explained
in People v. Gementiza that the indemnity authorized by
our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the
offended party, in the amount authorized by the
prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven
actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be
considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being

based on different jural foundations and assessed by the
court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed.
Indictments for rape continue unabated and the
legislative response has been in the form of higher
penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations,
the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow
the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if
the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by
any of the circumstances under which the death penalty
is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity
for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less
than ₱75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law, and the
financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of
the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous
crimes against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral
damages are likewise compensatory in nature. In San
Andres v. Court of Appeals,37 we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are in the category of an award designed
to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and
not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis
Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American
jurisprudence as compensatory damages awarded for
mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting
from a wrong (25 C.J.S. 815).38 (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil
indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory
damages for the injury caused to the offended party and
that suffered by her family, and moral damages are
likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of
the offender at the time of the commission of the offense
has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused
to the victim and her family, particularly considering the
circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-
appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the
commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and
the date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary
certainty of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, which
warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one
degree, there is no justifiable ground to depart from the
jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case
of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of
the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This
13
was the same stance this Court took in People v.
Candelario,39 a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did
not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the
damages amounted to ₱75,000.00 for civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public penalty
imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree,
because of the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages,
under the ruling in People v. Salome40 and People v.
Quiachon41 is the penalty provided by law or imposable
for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public
penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages,
People v. Salome explained the basis for increasing the
amount of said civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded
by the Court of Appeals to Sally in accordance with the
ruling in People v. Sambrano which states:
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is
perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying
circumstances that require the imposition of the death
penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall
₱75,000.00 … Also, in rape cases, moral damages are
awarded without the need proof other than the fact of
rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered
moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However,
the trial court’s award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
should also be increased to ₱75,000 pursuant to current
jurisprudence on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for
by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense
is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the
victim is still ₱75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate
court, following prevailing jurisprudence, correctly
awarded the following amounts; ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty; ₱75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the
victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence,
entitling her to an award of moral damages even without
proof thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the
appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346,
the civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 is still proper because,
following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said
award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the
death penalty but on the fact that qualifying

circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty attended the commission of the offense. The
Court declared that the award of ₱75,000.00 shows "not
only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the
penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but
also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the
incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil
indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition
of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty
actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of
the Civil Code provides that exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary
damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The
requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1)
they may be imposed by way of example in addition to
compensatory damages, and only after the claimant’s
right to them has been established; (2) they cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, their determination
depending upon the amount of compensatory damages
that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.42 Since the
compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and
moral damages, are increased when qualified rape is
committed, the exemplary damages should likewise be
increased in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.43
In sum, the increased amount of ₱75,000.00 each as civil
indemnity and moral damages should be maintained. It is
also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary
damages be likewise increased to the amount of
₱30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on the
award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA
correctly awarded ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
However the award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages is
increased to ₱75,000.0044 and that of ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is likewise increased to
₱30,000.00.45
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the
New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his appeal
before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on
May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were
promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005,
respectively. The promulgation of the sentence of
conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the
RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age
at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth
Welfare Code46 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,
14
the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law.47 Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years
of age. He was previously detained at the Albay
Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to the New
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as
follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are
Serving Sentence. – Persons who have been convicted
and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of
this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18)
years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence,
shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of
this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive
application of the Act to those who have been convicted
and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of
this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at
the time of the commission of the offense. With more
reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the
conviction by the lower court is still under review.
Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of
R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was
below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic
suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law,
even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the
time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. It
reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the
child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the
various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose
the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to
the nature of the offense committed by the child in
conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC.48 The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC)
Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence

would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if,
among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344,
the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish.49 Since R.A. No. 9344 does not
distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a
capital offense and another who has been convicted of a
lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and
should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a
child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty
of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous
crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate
deliberations50 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent
portion of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years
old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a
serious offense, and may have acted with discernment,
then the child could be recommended by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the
Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or
by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and
Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the
welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should
still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in
heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child’s
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics
supplied)1avvphi1
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides
that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if
the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the
maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to
Court. – If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict
with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with
the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be
brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen
(18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence,
or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
15
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum
age of twenty-one (21) years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and
the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even
before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the
application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of
sentence is now moot and academic.51 However, accused-
appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition
under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in
Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the
DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the
offense is not affected by the appropriate disposition
measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.52
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14,
2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1)
the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is
reduced to reclusion perpetua;53 and (2) accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of
₱75,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and
exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil
indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00 is maintained.
However, the case shall be REMANDED to the court a
quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec.
51 of R.A. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184874 October 9, 2009
ROBERT REMIENDO y SIBLAWAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated
November 16, 2007 and the Resolution 3 dated October 3,
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
29316 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Robert
Remiendo y Siblawan."
The case arose from the filing of two criminal
informations, both dated March 10, 2008, against
petitioner Robert Remiendo y Siblawan (Remiendo), that
read—

Criminal Case No. 98-CR-2999
That in or about the month of March 1997, at Badiwan,
Municipality of Tuba, Benguet Province, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
[AAA], a girl below 12 years of age.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3000
That in or about the month of May 1997, at Badiwan,
Municipality of Tuba, Benguet Province, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one
[AAA], a girl below 12 years of age.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, Remiendo pled "not guilty" to both
charges. After pretrial, a joint trial ensued before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, La Trinidad,
Benguet. Both the prosecution and the defense presented
their respective evidence, summarized by the CA in its
Decision, to wit:
The prosecution presented the following version of facts:
The complainant [AAA] was born on 16 February 1986.
At the time of the commission of the offense, she was a
minor below 12 years of age. She knew accused-
appellant Robert Remiendo as he was residing near the
house where her family used to stay. Sometime in March
1997, she was sexually assaulted by accused-appellant
inside said house. On that day, her parents and brother
left for work after breakfast, and she was left alone in the
house. Accused-appellant came in, pushed her into the
room, and threatened to kill her if she reported what
happened. He undressed himself and the complainant.
The latter was standing and refused to remove her panty
but she obliged when accused-appellant insisted. Then he
made her lie on the bed and placed his penis in her
vagina. The complainant struggled, moved, and pushed
accused-appellant. She felt pain when accused-appellant
inserted his penis into her vagina. She cried until
accused-appellant left, but she did not shout because
accused-appellant warned her not to, or else he would
kick her. She put on her clothes after accused-appellant
left. Her parents arrived in the afternoon but she did not
tell them what happened to her because her mother might
whip her.
Sometime in May 1997, [AAA] was again sexually
assaulted by accused-appellant, which took place in the
house of the latter. At that time, she was on her way to
see her mother at her workplace after she had lunch.
When she passed by the house of accused-appellant, the
16
latter pulled her into his house and brought her into his
room. She cried and shouted but accused-appellant told
her to keep quiet. She struggled but was helpless because
accused-appellant was stronger. They were alone in the
room. Accused-appellant removed his clothes and told
her to remove her panty. Afraid, she removed her panty
and was made to lie on the bed. Accused-appellant
inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. She
kept on moving but she could not push away accused-
appellant. She moved her shoulders and pushed accused-
appellant with both hands but he was stronger.
Afterwards, accused-appellant moved away and
threatened to kill her if she told anyone what happened.
She responded that she would not tell anyone. Later, she
executed a sworn statement and identified accused-
appellant as the person who raped her.
Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, Medico-Legal Officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-Cordillera
Administrative Region, physically examined the
complainant on 2 January 1998. Said medico-legal
officer testified that [AAA] was thirteen (13) years old
and a Grade III pupil at Badiwan Tuba, Benguet at the
time of the examination. She was four feet and eleven
inches (4’11") tall, weighed 78 pounds, fairly nourished,
and fairly developed. She was conscious, coherent, and
cooperative. She was ambulatory and had no extra-
genital injuries. Upon examination of her genital area, he
found old lacerations of the hymen at 5:00 and 7:00
o’clock positions, which meant that her hymen was
altered by a hard rigid instrument. The lacerations were
done more than three (3) months prior to the
examination. To determine the approximate size of the
object that the hymenal opening could accommodate, he
inserted a test tube. The 2.5-centimeter diameter of said
tube was admitted with ease by the hymenal orifice. He
noted that the vaginal walls were lax and the ridges
inside were smothered. The complainant told him that
accused-appellant raped her. He presented a written
report of his findings.
On 12 July 1998, psychiatrist Dr. Elsie I. Caducoy
conducted an examination of the mental condition of the
complainant. The latter was also scheduled for
psychological examination to be conducted by Elma
Buadken. The result of the examination showed that
[AAA] is suffering from psychosis and organicity. She
has a below average intelligence quotient of 88, but not
on the level of mental retardation. She can perform
simple tasks but needs guidance. As to her studies, she
can hardly comprehend what is being taught to her.
Having psychosis means that her brain is afflicted with a
disease. Her medical history showed that she suffered
head and body injuries brought about by being
sideswiped by a motor vehicle sometime in 1996. She

was confined in the hospital for twelve (12) days. Said
injuries substantially contributed to her present condition.
Organicity, on the other hand, means that the
complainant suffers from a cloud of memory, upward
rolling of the eyeballs, stiffening of the extremities, loss
of consciousness, and epileptic seizures. Her psychosis
occurs after seizure. She is not, however, insane. During
a seizure, she does not know what is going on, but
afterwards she returns to her level of consciousness. With
regular medication, her seizures will be greatly
minimized. During her interview, the complainant had a
seizure and the psychiatrist had to wait until her
consciousness level returned. The complainant then
revealed that accused-appellant and a certain Reynoso
Cera raped her. The psychiatrist opined that during the
rape, she did not have a seizure because if she had, she
would not have remembered what had happened. The
fact that she was able to narrate what happened and who
raped her suggested that she was on her conscious level
at such time. A written report of the foregoing findings
was submitted in court.
The defense presented the following version of facts:
Lea F. Chiwayan, thirteen (13) years old, testified that
she was a friend, playmate, and neighbor of the
complainant. She testified that she and [AAA] played
together and talked about their "crushes." The
complainant told Lea Chiwayan that she had a crush on
accused-appellant. Sometime in April or May 1997, the
complainant said that her brother had molested her, and
that he and his father had sexual intercourse with her in
their house in Poyopoy, Tuba. Sometime in August 1997,
the complainant confided that Reynoso Cera raped her in
his house. She told Lea Chiwayan that she did not feel
anything because she was used to having sexual
intercourse with brother and father. One Saturday
afternoon, Lea Chiwayan and the complainant were
playing when they saw accused-appellant going to the
basketball court near the church. They followed him and
watched a basketball game. After the game, Lea
Chiwayan went home with the others while the
complainant stayed behind. A few seconds after they left,
the complainant ran after them and told them that
something happened between her and accused-appellant.
She said that accused-appellant pulled her towards the
back of the church and had sexual intercourse with her.
The complainant later took back what she said because
she was only joking. She then asked Lea Chiwayan not to
tell the accused-appellant. However, Lea Chiwayan told
accused-appellant what the complainant told them.
Accused-appellant confronted the complainant. He
flicked a finger on her head, kicked and spanked her. He
said, "what are you saying, why did I do that, if I like and
I do it, I’ll not do it with you, you should be ashamed of
17
yourself." He then borrowed the vehicle of a certain
Junie, started the engine, and stepped on the gas such that
the fumes from the exhaust pipe were directed at the
complainant. Later, Lea Chiwayan learned that [AAA]
filed a case against accused-appellant.
Dolores L. Daniel, Grade II teacher of [AAA] for the
school year 1997-1998, testified that the latter was unruly
and a liar. The complainant would pick fights and steal
money from her classmates. However, the witness
admitted that there was no written record in school that
she reprimanded complainant for her behavior. She knew
that the complainant had an accident before.
Victor Daniel, a jitney operator, testified that accused-
appellant was one of his drivers. He described accused-
appellant as a hardworking and industrious person. When
he learned that Robert Remiendo was accused of rape, he
was outraged because he knew the daily activities of
accused-appellant. The latter could not have done such
act under his strict supervision.
Accused-appellant testified that he knew the
complainant, as she was a townmate of his mother. In
September 1996, he and his parents were then residing in
Badiwan. When the complainant figured in an accident at
that time, he was the one who informed her parents. The
first time he saw the complainant was during the time
when he was doing some repairs on his jitney. He saw the
complainant and her playmates go inside the jitney. He
told them to alight from the vehicle. Sometime in June
1997, he again saw the complainant and her sister
playing inside the jitney. He told them to alight as they
were disturbing him. On the day he was playing
basketball at the church grounds in Badiwan, Lea and
Emma Chiwayan approached him and asked him if it was
true that he raped [AAA]. He asked where the latter was
and went to see her. Out of anger, he borrowed the
vehicle of Junie, started the engine, directed the exhaust
pipe at the complainant, and revved the engine so the
smoke would go straight to her. He slapped her and said
"if I would like someone, it would not be you because
there are a lot of girls better than you." During the
Christmas party in Badiwan, he again saw the
complainant roaming around the dance area. He told her
to get out as she irritated the people dancing. The
complainant said nothing and left the dance floor.
Thereafter, he saw the complainant laughing and smiling.
He learned that he was charged with two (2) counts of
rape when he received a subpoena issued by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor in January 1998.61avvph!1
In its Joint Judgment7 dated October 27, 2004, the RTC
found Remiendo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of statutory rape. The RTC disposed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court
finds ROBERT REMIENDO y SIBLAWAN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape as
charged in the Information docketed as Criminal Case
No. 98-CR-2999 and in the Information docketed as
Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3000, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum for
each count of rape.
He shall further indemnify the offended party [AAA] the
sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) by way of
civil indemnity, the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00) by way of moral damages, and the sum of
Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) by way of exemplary
damages.
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the
Court Administrator, the Provincial Jail Warden of
Benguet Province is directed to immediately transfer the
said accused, Robert Remiendo, to the custody of the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila
after the expiration of fifteen (15) days from date of
promulgation unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
Let a copy of this Judgment be furnished the Provincial
Jail Warden of Benguet Province for his information,
guidance and compliance.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, Remiendo interposed his appeal before the
CA. In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC,
modifying only the civil liability imposed upon
Remiendo. The fallo of the CA Decision reads—
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal
is DISMISSED. The Joint Judgment dated 27 October
2004 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62,
La Trinidad, Benguet, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the civil liability of accused-
appellant. He is ordered to pay the complainant, for each
count of rape, the sum of (a) ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and (c)
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.9
Remiendo moved to reconsider the November 16, 2007
Decision, but the CA denied the motion in its October 3,
2008 Resolution; hence, this petition alleging that—
(a) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A
QUO CONVICTING PETITIONER OF STATUTORY
RAPE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO
PROVE THE TRUE AND REAL AGE OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
18
(b) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT GIVING PETITIONER THE BENEFIT
ACCORDED TO HIM BY REPUBLIC ACT 9344
KNOWN AS THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE ACT OF 2006 INCREASING THE AGE OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.10
Remiendo questions his conviction for statutory rape
despite the purported absence of competent proof that
AAA was below 12 years old at the time of the alleged
commission of the crimes. According to him, the
Certificate of Live Birth of AAA offered by the
prosecution during its formal offer of exhibits was not
admitted by the RTC in its Order 11dated September 14,
1999 because "it was neither identified by any witness,
nor marked as exhibit during the trial though reserved for
marking during the pretrial." He further posits that, on
the basis of the testimonies of the defense witnesses and
the Elementary School Permanent Record,12 AAA was
more than 12 years old in March and May 1997.
Considering that AAA was more than 12 years of age,
Remiendo then questions her credibility as a witness,
claiming that she was smiling during her testimony; and
that her failure to flee from the situation, even taking off
her panties herself, belies her charges of statutory rape
against him.
We disagree.
As provided in Article 266-A (1)(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is
statutory rape. Its two elements are: (1) that the accused
has carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the
woman is below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with a
girl under 12 years old is always rape.13
As regards the appreciation of the age of a rape victim,
the Court, in People v. Pruna,14 laid down the following
guidelines:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended
party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate
of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
victim’s mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date
of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or
relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the
age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical
finding as to the age of the victim.15
In this case, the prosecution offered in evidence a
certified true copy of AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth 16 as
part of the testimonies of AAA and her mother that AAA
was born on February 21, 1986. It was reserved for
marking as part of the exhibits for the prosecution, as
shown in the Pretrial Order17 dated November 16, 1998.
During the trial, in order to abbreviate the proceedings,
the parties agreed to stipulate on the testimony of AAA’s
mother, specifically on the following facts:
1. That she is [BBB], the natural mother of [AAA], the
victim in these two (2) Criminal Cases Nos. 98-CR-2999
and 98-CR-3000;
2. That on January 5, 1998[,] she executed an affidavit-
complaint for and on behalf of her daughter which she
subscribed before NBI agent Atty. Dave Alunan; and
3. That the subject matter of her sworn statement against
Reynoso Cera and Robert Remiendo is the alleged
statutory rape against [AAA].18
And part of the affidavit-complaint of BBB is the
statement that AAA was born on February 21, 1986.19
A certificate of live birth is a public document that
consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public
records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar). As such, it is
prima facie evidence of the fact of birth of a child, 20 and
it does not need authentication. It can only be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus,
despite the September 14, 1999 Order, the RTC correctly
appreciated the same in its Joint Judgment.
19
Nevertheless, even assuming that the Certificate of Live
Birth was not appreciated by the RTC, the prosecution
was able to establish that AAA was below 12 years old
during the two occasions of rape per the guidelines laid
down in Pruna. It is significant to note that both AAA
and BBB testified that AAA was born on February 21,
1986. This fact was neither denied nor objected to by the
defense. The argument of Remiendo that the prosecution
admitted in the course of trial that AAA’s birthday was
February 21, 1984 cannot stand. As quoted by Remiendo
in his petition—
Court:
Anyway, it is stated in that document that the birth date
of [AAA] was February 21, 1983. Do you agree that that
is an entry there?
Pros. Suanding:
Yes, your honor. We agree, your honor.21
This statement cannot qualify as a judicial admission on
the birth date of AAA. A judicial admission is an
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case and it
dispenses with proof with respect to the matter or fact
admitted. It may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.22 In this case, what was only
admitted was that the entry of AAA’s date of birth
appearing in her school record is February 21, 1983.
There was no such admission that the said date was the
correct birthday of AAA. And as between the school
record and the testimonies of AAA and her mother BBB,
the latter must prevail.
As to the credibility of AAA as a witness, jurisprudence
instructs us that the trial court’s assessment deserves
great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly
the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the
trial court is in a better position than the appellate court
to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.23
Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature
deserve full credence, inasmuch as no young woman,
especially of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts,
and thereafter pervert herself by being the subject of a
public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire
to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is
highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet
exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any
man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not
true.24

What is more, AAA’s testimony of rape was corroborated
by the NBI medico-legal examination showing healed
lacerations on her hymen. Hymenal lacerations, whether
healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible
defloration. When the consistent and forthright testimony
of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there
is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the
essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been
established. When there is no evidence to show any
improper motive on the part of the rape victim to testify
falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him in
the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that
the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. 25 In
this case, Remiendo failed to convince us to rule
otherwise.
Remiendo also posits that he should benefit from the
mandate of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, otherwise
known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.
The pertinent provision of R.A. No. 9344 reads –
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – A
child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall be likewise exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she acted with discernment, in which case, such
child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.26
Remiendo argues that the prosecution failed to establish
that he acted with discernment in the commission of the
crimes charged. Thus, he claims that he should be exempt
from criminal liability.
We differ. Discernment is the mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong. The
prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted
with discernment by evidence of physical appearance,
attitude or deportment not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and during the trial.
The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the
minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.
Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the
crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.27
Culled from the records of this case, it is manifest that
Remiendo acted with discernment, being able to
distinguish between right and wrong and knowing fully
well the consequences of his acts against AAA. During
20
the rape that occurred in March 1997, Remiendo waited
for AAA to be left alone at her house before he came,
and, while doing his dastardly act, threatened to kick her
should she shout for help. In May 1997, Remiendo again
ravished AAA in the room of his house when the latter
passed by and, thereafter, threatened to kill her if she told
anybody about what had just happened. Per his own
testimony, he knew that committing rape was wrong
because he claimed to have been enraged when he was
asked by AAA’s playmates if he indeed raped AAA, to
the point of slapping her and revving up the engine of a
jitney and directing the smoke from the exhaust pipe
towards her.
Remiendo, being above 15 and under 18 years of age at
the time of the rape,28 and having acted with discernment,
but having already reached 21 years of age at the time of
the imposition of his sentence by the trial court, his claim
for the benefits of R.A. No. 9344 is rendered moot and
academic in view of Section 4029 thereof which provides
–
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to
Court. – If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict
with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with
the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be
brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If the child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen
(18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence,
or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-
one (21) years.30
Remiendo was born on January 21, 1982. The Joint
Judgment was promulgated on October 27, 2004. Thus,
at the time of the imposition of his sentence, Remiendo
was already 22 years old and could no longer be
considered a child for the purposes of the application of
R.A. No. 9344.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the
Decision dated November 16, 2007 and the Resolution
dated October 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the
defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime.1 For it to prosper, the court must be convinced that
there was physical impossibility on the part of the
accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of
the commission of the crime.2
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose
judgment of conviction has become final and executory
only after his disqualification from availing of the
benefits of suspended sentence on the ground that he/she
has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall
still be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation,
and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No.
9344, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a
Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System,
Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under
the Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor
and for Other Purposes."
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA, 3 appellant
Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court the reversal of
the judgment of his conviction.4
The Facts
In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the
Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal Case No.
1679-13-141[1],6 appellant was accused of the crime of
RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about
7:00 o’clock in the evening more or less, at barangay
xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Hermie M.
Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with
one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating
circumstance of minority, the victim being only five
years old.7
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.8 During pre-trial,9 the defense admitted the
existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate
of AAA, showing that she was born on 3 December
1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3)
medical certificate, upon presentation of the original or
upon identification thereof by the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense
presenting witnesses to prove their respective versions of
the story.
Evidence for the Prosecution
21
10 11
The testimonies of AAA, her father FFF, and rebuttal
witness Julito Apiki [Julito]12 may be summarized in the
following manner:
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were
born. FFF’s house is along the road. That of appellant lies
at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access
the road, appellant has to pass by FFF’s house, the
frequency of which the latter describes to be "every
minute [and] every hour." Also, appellant often visits
FFF because they were close friends. He bore no grudge
against appellant prior to the incident.13
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls
him kuya. She sees him all the time – playing at the
basketball court near her house, fetching water, and
passing by her house on his way to the road. She and
appellant used to be friends until the incident.14
At about past 6 o’clock in the evening of 28 January
2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to the
store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed
CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not
alarmed. He thought she was watching television at the
house of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].15
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the
evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum. 16 At the store,
he saw appellant place AAA on his lap.17 He was wearing
sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants. 18 All of them
left the store at the same time.19 Julito proceeded to the
house of Rita to watch television, while appellant, who
held the hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the
"lower area or place."20
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing
21
a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants when he
held her hand while on the road near the store.22 They
walked towards the rice field near the house of spouses
Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the Perochos].23 There he
made her lie down on harrowed ground, removed her
panty and boxed her on the chest.24 Already half-naked
from waist down,25 he mounted her, and, while her legs
were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and
made a push and pull movement.26 She felt pain and
cried.27 Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the
Perochos.28 She, in turn, went straight home crying.29
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from
downstairs.30 She was without slippers.31 He found her
face greasy.32 There was mud on her head and blood was
oozing from the back of her head.33 He checked for any
injury and found on her neck a contusion that was
already turning black.34 She had no underwear on and he
saw white substance and mud on her vagina. 35 AAA told
him that appellant brought her from the store 36 to the
grassy area at the back of the house of the
Perochos;37 that he threw away her pair of slippers,

removed her panty, choked her and boxed her
breast;38 and that he proceeded thereafter to the
Perochos.39
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the
Perochos.40 He asked the appellant what he did to
AAA.41Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at
the store and that AAA followed him. 42 FFF went home
to check on his daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to
appellant, asked again,44 and boxed him.45
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date,
Julito was still watching television at the house of
Rita.46AAA and her mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was
crying.48 Julito pitied her, embraced her, and asked what
happened to her, to which she replied that appellant raped
her.49 Julito left and found appellant at the
Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you really
rape the child, the daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter
ignored his question.51Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, told
appellant that the policemen were coming to which the
appellant responded, "Wait a minute because I will wash
the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees." 52 Julito did
found the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt.53
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the
police station to have the incident blottered.54 FFF also
had AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal
health center.55 Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural
Health Physician, issued a medical certificate 56 dated 29
January 2003. It reads:
Injuries seen are as follows:
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall,
midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and
whitish mucoid-like material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock
position
Impression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA
submitted herself to another examination at the
provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine
Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the provincial
hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-legal
22
58
certificate dated 29 January 2003, the pertinent portion
of which reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M.
Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no bleeding
in this time of examination. (sic)59
Evidence for the Defense
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a
different version of the story. To corroborate his
testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt
Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he was at the
Perochos at the time of the commission of the
crime.60 Luzvilla even went further to state that she
actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the
road.61 In addition, Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-
law of appellant’s aunt, Gloria,62 testified on the behavior
of Julito after the rape incident was revealed.63
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his
parents whose house stands at the back of FFF’s
house.64He denied that there was a need to pass by the
house of FFF in order to access the road or to fetch
water.65 He, however, admitted that he occasionally
worked for FFF,66 and whenever he was asked to buy
something from the store, AAA always approached
him.67
At about 8 o’clock in the morning of 28 January 2003,
appellant went to the Perochos to attend a birthday party.
At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including
appellant and his uncle Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro],
were gathered together in a drinking session, appellant’s
uncle sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since
the store is only about 20 meters from the house, he was
able to return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of
the time because he had a watch .68
Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed
that he was in her house attending the birthday party; and
that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to
buy a bottle of Tanduay from the store. She recalled that
appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She
also observed that appellant’s white shorts and white
sleeveless shirt were clean.69
At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the
party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a drink with his
uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors. 71 She went
out to relieve herself at the side of the tree beside the
road next to the house of the Perochos.72 From where she
was, she saw Julito, who was wearing black short pants
and black T-shirt, carry AAA.73 AAA’s face was covered
and she was wiggling.74 This did not alarm her because
she thought it was just a game. 75 Meanwhile, appellant
was still in the kitchen when she returned.76 Around three
(3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-
shirt,77 running towards the house of Rita.78 AAA was

79 80
slowly following behind. Luzvilla followed them. Just
outside the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what
the appellant did to her.81 The child did not answer.82
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She
witnessed the punching incident and testified that
appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF
tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, boxed him, and
left. FFF came in the second time and again boxed
appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed at appellant.
Appellant’s uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and
another Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO) member
admonished FFF.83
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o’clock in the
evening, she was watching the television along with
other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito,
who was wearing only a pair of black short pants without
a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and
forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito
tightly embraced AAA and asked her what happened.
AAA did not answer. Upon Antonia’s advice, Julito
released her and went out of the house.84
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o’clock in the
evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him, brandished
a bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but
returned at around 8 o’clock in the evening. This time, he
boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his
daughter.85
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its
decision,86 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed upon a
5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and
orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs87
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly
discovered evidence stating that appellant was apparently
born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen
(17) years old when the crime was committed on 28
January 2003.88 The trial court appreciated the evidence
and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion
perpetua.89 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the
death penalty upon the accused is amended in order to
consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused,
therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the
Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of the ruling
in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
23
Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.90
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED
the decision of the trial court with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the
Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is
ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00
as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.91
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due
course to the appellant’s Notice of Appeal. 92 This Court
required the parties to simultaneously file their respective
supplemental briefs.93 Both parties manifested that they
have exhaustively discussed their positions in their
respective briefs and would no longer file any
supplement.94
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE
COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE"95 by invoking the
principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more reasonable explanations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not
pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to
support a conviction."96
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person
accused of rape, we consider the three well-entrenched
principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.97
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing
testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the
accused.98More so, when the testimony is supported by
the medico-legal findings of the examining physician.99
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
victim’s positive identification of the perpetrator of the
crime,100except when it is established that it was
 24
physically impossible for the accused to have been at test that AAA well understood the information elicited
the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the from her, said it all – she had been raped. When a
crime.101 woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all
I that is essential to show that rape was
committed.104 Significantly, youth and immaturity are
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a normally badges of truth and honesty.105
child under twelve (12) years of age even in the absence
of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr.
threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is Micabalo106 revealed that the hymenal lacerations at 5
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by o’clock and 9 o’clock positions could have been caused
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of by the penetration of an object; that the redness of the
authority.102 introitus could have been "the result of the repeated
battering of the object;" and that such object could have
That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The been an erect male organ.107
vivid narration of the acts culminating in the insertion of
appellant’s organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the
and the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently physician’s finding of penetration conclusively
proved such fact. established the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.108
AAA testified: II
PROS. OMANDAM: The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of
the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime
xxxx are now in dispute.
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito
panty and boxed you, what else did he do to you? who defiled AAA, and that appellant was elsewhere
A He mounted me. when the crime was committed.109
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you? We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim
A Yes. of rape could readily identify her assailant, especially
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move? when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she
could have a good look at him during the commission of
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement. the crime.110 AAA had known appellant all her life.
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked together from
your legs positioned? the road near the store to the situs criminus111 that it
A They were apart. would be impossible for the child not to recognize the
man who held her hand and led her all the way to the rice
Q Who pushed them apart?
field.
A Hermie.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court
Q Did Hermie push anything at you? on the unwavering testimony of AAA.
A Yes. The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so
Q What was that? young, that it was accused, whom she called "kuya" and
A His penis. who used to play basketball and fetch water near their
house, and who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts
Q Where did he push his penis? at the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive.
A To my vagina. The defense attempted to impute the crime to someone
Q Was it painful? else – one Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was
steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was
A Yes.
accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older,
Q What was painful? who molested her.112
A My vagina. In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled
Q Did you cry? that the determination by the trial court of the credibility
A Yes.103 of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect
considering that it has "the opportunity to observe the
The straightforward and consistent answers to the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their furtive glances,
questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in order to calmness, sighs and the scant or full realization of their

113
oath," unless it is shown that material facts and
circumstances have been "ignored, overlooked,
misconstrued, or misinterpreted."114
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness’ attempt to throw the court off
the track by imputing the crime to someone else is xxx a
vain exercise in view of the private complainant’s
positive identification of accused and other corroborative
circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same
evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked
him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus corroborating the
latter’s testimony that he confronted accused after
hearing of the incident from the child."115
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant
that the trial court erred in finding his denial and alibi
weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate
his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their
respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility
of the appellant’s very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro
Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that he
gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already
been drinking long before he bought Tanduay at the
store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt
Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-
examination, she revealed that her husband was not
around before, during, and after the rape incident because
he was then at work.116 He arrived from work only after
FFF came to their house for the second time and boxed
appellant.117 It was actually the fish vendor, not her
husband, who asked appellant to buy Tanduay.118 Further,
the drinking session started only after the appellant’s
errand to the store.119
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to
deserve consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro
joined the drinking session. This is contrary to Gloria’s
statement that her husband was at work.
Luzvilla’s testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of
sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia recalled
that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied
Luzvilla’s claim that Julito wore a white shirt on his way
to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the
prosecution, as testified to by AAA and Julito, and the
defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in
saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvilla’s
recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored
black and later changed to white), and, thus, a short-
sleeved shirt.
25
Also, contrary to Luzvilla’s story that she saw AAA
walking towards Rita’s house three (3) minutes after she
returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia
recalled that AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In
this respect, we find the trial court’s appreciation in
order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went
straight home, crying, to tell her father that Hermie had
raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita
Lingkay to cry among strangers who were watching TV,
as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When
the child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito
Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later, after she
had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita
Lingkay could take a look at her ˗ just as Julito Apiki
said.120
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the
corroboration is credible, the same having been offered
preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed
thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as such, "they
being related or were one way or another linked to each
other."121
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider
the corroborations on his whereabouts, still, the defense
of alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be
convinced that it would be physically impossible for the
accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of
the commission of the crime.122
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility
of access between the situs criminis and the location of
the accused when the crime was committed. He must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have
been physically present at the scene of the crime and its
immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.123
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand
meters from the place of the commission of the crime
was considered not physically impossible to reach in less
than an hour even by foot.125 Inasmuch as it would take
the accused not more than five minutes to rape the
victim, this Court disregarded the testimony of the
defense witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep
when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several
hours after. She could have merely presumed that the
accused slept all throughout.126
In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and
friends corroborating that of the appellant that he was in
their company at the time of the commission of the crime
were likewise disregarded by this Court in the following
manner:

Ruben Nicolas, the appellant’s part-time employer, and
Marites Capalad, the appellant’s sister-in-law and co-
worker, in unison, vouched for the appellant’s physical
presence in the fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. It
is, however, an established fact that the appellant’s
house where the rape occurred, was a stone’s throw
away from the fishpond. Their claim that the
appellant never left their sight the entire afternoon of
December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for
Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost
four hours, since she testified that she, too, was very
much occupied with her task of counting and recording
the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who,
admittedly was 50 meters away from the fishpond, could
not have focused his entire attention solely on the
appellant. It is, therefore, not farfetched that the
appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the
way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his house
and ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if
he never left.128 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense
witnesses that appellant never left their sight, save from
the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary
human experience. Moreover, considering that the
farmland where the crime was committed is just behind
the house of the Perochos, it would take appellant only a
few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store
next to the Perochos down the farmland and consummate
the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, appellant could have committed the rape after
buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to
his uncle’s house.129 Unfortunately, the testimonies of his
corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he
was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the
crime.130
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically
impossible for appellant to have been at the time and
place of the commission of the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has
sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.
III
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court
of Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No.
9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite
the commission of the crime three (3) years before it was
enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the
rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:131
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the
retroactive application of the Act to those who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
26
effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age
of 18 years at the time of the commission of the
offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to
this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is
still under review.133 (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above
fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have
acted with discernment, in which case, "the appropriate
proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be
observed.134
We determine discernment in this wise:
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.135 Such
capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by the records in each case.136
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate
that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was
wrong.137 Such circumstance includes the gruesome
nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and
shrewdness.138
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark place to
perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2)
boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense" are
indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellant’s
mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of
his unlawful action.139
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should
be modified.
The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born
on 3 December 1997. Considering that she was only five
(5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January
2003, the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is
committed against a child below seven (7) years
old141 applies.
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the
penalty: (1) the prohibition against the imposition of the
penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No.
9346;142 and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority of the appellant, which has the effect of
reducing the penalty one degree lower than that
prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code.143
Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals
excluded death from the graduation of penalties provided
in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.145 Consequently,
in its appreciation of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the

penalty one degree from reclusion perpetua and
sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, in its medium
period, as maximum.146
We differ.
In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the
Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro,
clarified:
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the
penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned
with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the
accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Civil Liability
We have consistently ruled that:
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil
indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition
of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty
actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.149
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at
the time he committed the crime has no bearing on the
gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and
her family.150 The respective awards of civil indemnity
and moral damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00 each
are, therefore, proper.151
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority which effectively
lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the
damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in the amount
of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages. And, consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary damages
should be increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration;
Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of
Suspension of Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law
notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of
majority at the time the judgment of conviction is
pronounced. Thus:
27
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the
child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time
of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis
supplied.)
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was
promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals
held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended,154 the aforestated provision
does not apply to one who has been convicted of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.155
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court
promulgated the decision in Sarcia,156 overturning the
ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature
of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the
law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The
said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the
benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child
in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of
R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle
of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No.
9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been
convicted of a capital offense and another who has been
convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not
distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of
sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been
found guilty of a heinous crime.157
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate
deliberations158 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further
strengthened the new position of this Court to cover
heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the
automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict
with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation
reads:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years
old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a
serious offense, and may have acted with discernment,
 28
then the child could be recommended by the Department WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213
Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond
by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s] proposed reasonable doubt of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with
Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty
a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and imposed on the appellant is reduced to reclusion
restoration of the child should still be a primordial or perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim
primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
intention should still be the child’s restoration, damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The
rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its
in Sarcia.)159 appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated Republic Act No. 9344.
the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the SO ORDERED.
Law,which reflected the same position.160
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the SECOND DIVISION
benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to
appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the
child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age
of twenty-one (21) years.161 Section 40162 of the law and PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 186523
Section 48163 of the Rule are clear on the matter. PHILIPPINES,
Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years
old. Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent
of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in CARPIO, J., Chairpers
conflict with the law should extend even to one who has on,
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long
- versus - LEONARDO-DE
as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a
CASTRO,*
child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance PERALTA,
with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to ABAD, and
live a normal life and become a productive member of MENDOZA, JJ.
the community. The age of the child in conflict with the URBAN SALCEDO
law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of ABDURAHMAN Promulgated:
conviction is not material. What matters is that the ISMAEL DIOLAGRA,
offender committed the offense when he/she was still of ABDULAJID NGAYA,
June 22, 2011
tender age. HABER ASARI,
ABSMAR ALUK,
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp BASHIER ABDUL,
or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 TOTING HANO, JR.,
of Republic Act No. 9344.164 JAID AWALAL,
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in ANNIK/RENE ABBAS,
Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A MUBIN IBBAH,
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and MAGARNI HAPILON
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her IBLONG, LIDJALON
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal SAKANDAL, IMRAM
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training HAKIMIN
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised SULAIMAN,
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the NADSMER ISNANI
DSWD. SULAIMAN,
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall NADSMER ISNANI
be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant’s MANDANGAN
confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training KAMAR JAAFAR,
facility. SONNY ASALI and
 29
BASHIER ORDOEZ, in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3611-
1165, and 3674-1187 to the Death Penalty.
Accused-Appellants,

The Decision in Criminal Case No. 3537-

1129 decreed as follows:
KHADAFFY WHEREFORE, in
JANJALANI, ALDAM Criminal Case No. 3537-
TILAO alias ABU 1129, for the kidnapping of
SABAYA, ET AL., and Joe Guillo, the Court finds
MANY OTHER JOHN the following accused
DOES, PETER DOES guilty beyond reasonable
and RICHARD DOES, doubt as principals:
Accused.
x-------------------------------------- 1. Urban
- - - - - - - - - - - - -x Salcedo, a.k.a. Wahid
Guillermo
Salcedo/Abu Urban
2. Abdurahman
DECISION Ismael Diolagla, a.k.a. Abu
Sahrin
3. Abdulajid
Ngaya, a.k.a. Abu Ajid
PERALTA, J.: 4. Haber Asari,
a.k.a. Abu Habs
This is an automatic review of the Decision [1] of the 5. Absmar Aluk,
Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on November 24, a.k.a. Abu Adzmar/Abu
2008, in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 125, in Aluk
relation to Section 3 of Rule 56 of the Rules of 6. Bashier Abdul,
Court. The CA found accused-appellants guilty a.k.a. Abu Jar
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping
in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3611-1165, and 7. Toting Hano,
3674-1187 and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. Jr., a.k.a. Abu Jakaria (in
abstentia)
8. Jaid Awalal,
A close examination of the records would reveal the a.k.a. Abu Jaid (in
CA's narration of the antecedent facts to be accurate, abstencia)
to wit:
9. Mubin Ibbah,
a.ka. Abu Black (in
Accused-appellants interpose the present abstentia)
appeal to the Decision of branch 2 of the 10. Annik/Rene
Regional Trial Court of Isabela City, Abbas, a.k.a. Abu Annik
Basilan, convicting them for the crime of (in
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
with Ransom, as defined and penalized abstentia)
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal 11. Margani
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. Hapilon Iblong, a.k.a. Abu
7659. After arraignment and due trial, Nadim
accused-appellants were found guilty and, 12. Lidjalong
accordingly, sentenced in Criminal Case Sakandal/Sabandal
No. 3537-1129 to Reclusion Perpetua, and
 30
13. Imran Hakimin Salcedo/Abu Urban
y Sulaiman, a.k.a. Abu 2. Abdurahman
Nadim Ismael Diolagla, a.k.a Abu
14. Nadzmer Isnani Sahrin
Mangangan, a.k.a. Abu 3. Abdulajid
Harun Ngaya, a.k.a. Abu Ajid
15. Kamar Jaagar, 4. Haber Asari,
a.k.a. Abu Jude a.k.a. Abu Habs
16. Sonny Asali, 5. Absmar Aluk,
a.k.a. Abu Teng/Abu a.k.a. Abu Adzmar/Abu
Umbra, and Aluk
17. Bashier 6. Bashier Abdul,
Ordonez, a.k.a. Abu a.k.a. Abu Jar
Bashier
7. Toting Hano,
Jr., a.k.a. Abu Jakaria (in
as defined and penalized abstentia)
under Section 8 of 8. Jaid Awalal,
Republic Act No. 7659, a.k.a. Abu Jaid (in
amending Article 267 of abstentia)
the Revised Penal Code,
9. Mubin Ibbah,
and applying Art. 63 of the
a.k.a. Abu Black (in
Code, the lesser penalty of
abstentia)
RECLUSION PERPETUA
is hereby imposed on them. 10. Annik/Rene
Abbas, a.k.a. Abu Annik
(in
The aforementioned
abstentia)
accused shall jointly and
severally pay Joel Guillo 11. Margani
by way of moral damages Hapilon Iblong, a.k.a. Abu
the sum of P200,000.00, Nadim
pursuant to paragraph 5, 12. Lidjalong
Article 2217 of the Civil Sakandal/Sabandal
Code, with proportionate 13. Imran Hakimin
costs against them. y Sulaiman, a.k.a. Abu
Nadim
On the other hand, the court a quo in 14. Nadzmer Isnani
Criminal Case No. 3608-1164 decreed as Mangangan, a.k.a. Abu
follows: Harun
15. Kamar Jaagar,
In Criminal Case No. a.k.a. Abu Jude
3608-1164, for the 16. Sonny Asali,
kidnapping of Reina a.k.a. Abu Teng/Abu
Malonzo, the court finds Umbra, and
the following accused 17. Bashier
guilty beyond reasonable Ordonez, a.k.a. Abu
doubt as principals: Bashier

1. Urban as defined and penalized

Salcedo, a.k.a. Wahid under Section 8 of
Guillermo
 31
Republic Act No. 7659, 8. Jaid Awalal,
amending Article 267 of a.k.a. Abu Jaid (in
the Revised Penal Code, abstentia)
and applying Art. 63 of the 9. Mubin Ibbah,
Code, are hereby sentenced a.k.a. Abu Black (in
to the extreme penalty of abstentia)
DEATH.
10. Annik/Rene
Abbas, a.k.a. Abu Annik
The aforementioned (in
accused shall jointly and abstentia)
severally pay Reina
11. Margani
Malonzo by way of moral
Hapilon Iblong, a.k.a. Abu
damages the sum
Nadim
of P200,000.00, pursuant
to paragraph 5, Article 12. Lidjalong
2217 of the Civil Code, Sakandal/Sabandal
with proportionate costs 13. Imran Hakimin
against them. y Sulaiman, a.k.a. Abu
Nadim
Likewise, the lower court, in Criminal Case 14. Nadzmer Isnani
No. 3611-1165 decreed as follows: Mangangan, a.k.a. Abu
Harun
15. Kamar Jaagar,
In Criminal Case No. 3611-
a.k.a. Abu Jude
1165, for the kidnapping of
Shiela Tabuag, the (court) 16. Sonny Asali,
finds the following accused a.k.a. Abu Teng/Abu
guilty beyond reasonable Umbra, and
doubt as principals: 17. Bashier
Ordonez, a.k.a. Abu
Bashier
1. Urban
Salcedo, a.k.a. Wahid
Guillermo as defined and penalized
Salcedo/Abu Urban under Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 7659,
2. Abdurahman
amending Article 267 of
Ismael Diolagla, a.k.a. Abu
the Revised Penal Code,
Sahrin
and applying Art. 63 of the
3. Abdulajid Code, are hereby sentenced
Ngaya, a.k.a. Abu Ajid to the extreme penalty of
4. Haber Asari, DEATH.
a.k.a. Abu Habs
5. Absmar Aluk, The aforementioned
a.k.a. Abu Adzmar/Abu accused shall jointly and
Aluk severally pay Shiela
6. Bashier Abdul, Tabuag by way of moral
a.k.a. Abu Jar damages the sum
7. Toting Hano, of P200,000.00, pursuant
Jr., a.k.a. Abu Jakaria (in to paragraph 5, Article
abstentia) 2217 of the Civil Code,
with proportionate costs
against them.

And in Criminal Case No. 3674-1187, it
entered its judgment against the accused-
appellants as follows:
In Criminal Case No.
3674-1187, for the
kidnapping of Ediborah
Yap, the court finds the
following accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as
principals:
Urban Salcedo, a.k.a. Wahid
Guillermo Salcedo/Abu Urban
Abdurahman Ismael
Diolagla, a.k.a Abu Sahrin
Abdulajid Ngaya, a.k.a. Abu
Ajid
Haber Asari, a.k.a. Abu Habs
Absmar Aluk, a.k.a. Abu
Adzmar/Abu Aluk
Bashier Abdul, a.k.a. Abu Jar
Toting Hano, Jr., a.k.a. Abu
Jakaria (in abstentia)
Jaid Awalal, a.k.a. Abu Jaid
(in abstentia)
Mubin Ibbah, a.k.a. Abu
Black (in abstentia)
Annik/Rene Abbas, a.k.a.
Abu Annik (in abstentia)
Margani Hapilon Iblong,
a.k.a. Abu Nadim
Lidjalong
Sakandal/Sabandal
Imran Hakimin y Sulaiman,
a.k.a. Abu Nadim
Nadzmer Isnani Mangangan,
a.k.a. Abu Harun
Kamar Jaagar, a.k.a. Abu
Jude
Sonny Asali, a.k.a. Abu
Teng/Abu Umbra, and
Bashier Ordonez, a.k.a. Abu
Bashier
32
as defined and penalized
under Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 7659,
amending Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code,
and applying Art. 63 of the
Code, are hereby sentenced
to the extreme penalty of
DEATH.
The aforementioned
accused shall jointly and
severally pay to the heirs of
Ediborah Yap by way of
civil indemnity the sum
of P50,000.00, moral
damages in the sum
of P200,000.00 and,
considering the attendant
aggravating circumstances,
the sum of P100,000.00 by
way of exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
The salient facts in this case are the
following:
On June 1, 2001, Shiela Tabuag, Reina
Malonzo, and Ediborah Yap, were serving
their duty shift as nurses at Jose Maria
Torres Memorial Hospital in Lamitan,
Basilan. Joel Guillo, the hospital
accountant, on the other hand, had just
finished his duty and decided to rest in the
doctors quarter.
At around 12:30 past midnight of June 2,
2001, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG for
brevity) led by Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu
Sabaya, with 30 armed followers entered
and took control over said
hospital.Previously, however, another
group of ASG with 60 followers led by Abu
Umran hiked towards Lamitan for the sole
purpose of reinforcing the group of
Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu
Sabaya. However, upon reaching the
vicinity of the hospital, a firefight had
already ensued between the military forces

and the group of Janjalani and
Sabaya. Simultaneously, the band also
became entangled in a firefight with a
civilian group led by one retired Col. Baet,
who was killed during the
encounter. Moments later, the band fled to
different directions, with its members
losing track of one another.
Pandemonium ensued in the hospital on
that early morning, as the people were
thrown into a frenzy by the shouting,
window glass breaking, and herding of
hostages from one room to another by the
ASG.The group was also looking for
medicine and syringes for their wounded
comrades as well as food and clothing. The
firefight lasted until the afternoon of June
2, 2001. Finally, at around 6:00 in the
evening, the ASG and the hostages,
including those from the Dos Palmas
Resort, were able to slip out of the hospital
through the backdoor, despite the intense
gunfire that was ongoing. Hence, the long
and arduous hiking towards the mountains
began.
On June 3, 2001, at about noontime, the
group of Janjalani and Sabaya met with the
group of Abu Ben in Sinagkapan,
Tuburan. The next day, Himsiraji Sali with
approximately 60 followers also joined the
group. It was only on the third week on
July that year that the whole group of Abu
Sayaff was completed, when it was joined
by the group of Sattar Yacup, a.k.a. Abu
Umran.
Subsequently, new hostages from the
Golden Harvest plantation in Tairan,
Lantawan were abducted by the Hamsiraji
Sali and Isnilun Hapilon.
On June 12, 2001, Abu Sabaya informed
the hostages that Sobero had been beheaded
and was warned of the consequences
should said hostages fail to cooperate with
the ASG. Hence, the ASG formed a striking
force that then proceeded to behead 10
innocent civilians.
33
On October 1, 2001, Reina Malonzo was
separated from the other hostages and taken
to Zamboanga City by Abu Arabi with two
other ASG members on board a passenger
watercraft to stay at a house in Sta.
Maria. Later on October 13, 2001, a
firefight broke out between the ASG and
the military, giving Joel Guillo and 3 other
hostages the opportunity to escape from
their captors. On even date, Sheila Tabuag
was released together with 2 other hostages
from Dos Palmas, allegedly after paying
ransom. Reina Malonzo was soon after also
released by order of Khaddafy Janjalani on
November 1, 2001.
Finally, after a shootout between the ASG
and the military on June 7, 2002, at
Siraway, Zamboanga del Norte, Ediborah
Yap, died at the hands of her
captors. Thereafter, a manhunt by the
military was conducted, where the accused-
appellants were subsequently captured and
held for trial.
Hence, criminal informations for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention
under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7659
were filed against 17 ASG members on
August 14, 2001, October 29, 2001, March
6, 2002, and March 12, 2002. As defense
for the accused-appellants, 11 of the 17 of
them raise the defense of alibi. Among
them were Jaid Awalal, Imran Hakimin
Sulaiman, Toting Hano, Jr., Abdurahman
Ismael Diolagla, Mubin Ibbah, Absmar
Aluk, Bashier Abdul, Annik/Rene Abbas,
Haber Asari, Margani Hapilon Iblong, and
Nadzmer Mandangan. On the other hand,
Bashier Ordonez, Sonny Asali, Lidjalon
Sakandal/Sabandal, and Abdulajid Ngaya
claimed that they were merely forced by
the Abu Sayyaf to join the group. The
defense of being deep penetration agents of
the military was conversely raised by 2
accused-appellants, Urban Salcedo and
Kamar Jaafar.
After due trial, the court a quo, on August
13, 2004, rendered the appealed decisions
which convicted all the accused-appellants

of the crime of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention.[2]
In Criminal Case No. 3537-1129, for the kidnapping of
Joel Guillo, accused-appellants were sentenced
to reclusion perpetua; in Criminal Case No. 3608-1164,
for the kidnapping of Reina Malonzo, they were
sentenced to Death; in Criminal Case No. 3611-1165, for
the kidnapping of Sheila Tabuag, they were sentenced to
Death; and in Criminal Case No. 3674-1187, for the
kidnapping of Ediborah Yap, they were also sentenced to
Death.
The case was then brought to this Court for automatic
review in view of the penalty of death imposed on
accused-appellants. However, in accordance with the
ruling in People v. Mateo,[3]and the amendments made to
Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124,
and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the Court transferred this case to the
CA for intermediate review.
On November 24, 2008, the CA promulgated its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
premises, We hold to AFFIRM the
appealed judgments with the modification
that the penalty of death be reduced
to Reclusion Perpetua in Criminal Case
Nos. 3608-1164, 3611-1165, and 3674-
1187.
SO ORDERED. [4]
Thus, the case is now before this Court on automatic
review. Both the prosecution and the accused-appellants
opted not to file their respective supplemental briefs with
this Court.
In the Brief for Accused-Appellants filed with the CA, it
was argued that the prosecutions evidence was
insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It
was further averred that some of the accused-appellants
were merely forced to join the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
for fear for their lives and those of their relatives, while
34
four (4) of them, namely, Wahid Salcedo, Magarni
Hapilon Iblong, Nadzmer Mandangan and Kamar Jaafar,
were supposedly minors at the time the alleged
kidnapping took place; hence, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9344 (otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006), should apply to said accused-
appellants. It was then prayed that accused-appellants
Nadzmer Isnani Madangan, Magarni Hapilon Iblong,
Wahid Salcedo, Kamar Jaafar, Abdulajid Ngaya, Lidjalon
Sakandal and Sonny Asali be acquitted, while the
sentence for the rest of the accused-appellants be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
On the other hand, appellee maintained that the State had
been able to prove accused-appellants' guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that the defense failed to adduce
proof of minority of the four accused-appellants.
The Court finds no reason to reverse or modify the ruling
and penalty imposed by the CA.
The defense itself admitted that the kidnapped victims
who testified for the prosecution had been able to point
out or positively identify in open court all the accused-
appellants[5] as members of the ASG who held them in
captivity. Records reveal that the prosecution witnesses
were unwavering in their account of how accused-
appellants worked together to abduct and guard their
kidnapped victims, fight-off military forces who were
searching and trying to rescue said victims, and how
ransom was demanded and paid. The prosecution
likewise presented two former members of the ASG who
testified that they were part of the group that reinforced
the kidnappers and helped guard the hostages. They both
identified accused-appellants as their former comrades.
In the face of all that evidence, the only defense accused-
appellants could muster are denial and alibi, and for
accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and
Jaafar, their alleged minority. Accused-appellants'
proffered defense are sorely wanting when pitted against
the prosecutions evidence. It is established jurisprudence
that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the witnesses'
positive identification of the accused-appellants. More so
where, as in the present case, the accused-appellants
failed to present convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to have been present at
the crime scene at the time of the commission thereof.
[6]
In People v. Molina,[7] the Court expounded, thus:
In light of the positive identification of
appellant by the prosecution witnesses and
since no ill motive on their part or on that

of their families was shown that could have
made either of them institute the case
against the appellant and falsely implicate
him in a serious crime he did not commit,
appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily
fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction that
the defense of alibi, being inherently
weak, cannot prevail over the clear and
positive identification of the accused as
the perpetrator of the crime. x x x[8]
Furthermore, the detention of the hostages lasted for
several months and they were transferred from one place
to another, being always on the move for several
days. Thus, in this case, for accused-appellants' alibi to
prosper, they are required to prove their whereabouts for
all those months. This they were not able to do, making
the defense of alibi absolutely unavailing.
Some of the accused-appellants maintained that they
were merely forced to join the ASG. However, the trial
court did not find their stories persuasive. The trial
court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is conclusive on this Court as it is the trial
court which had the opportunity to closely observe the
demeanor of witnesses.[9] The Court again explained the
rationale for this principle in Molina,[10] to wit:
As oft repeated by this Court, the
trial court's evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled
to the highest respect because it is more
competent to so conclude, having had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses'
demeanor and deportment on the stand,
and the manner in which they gave their
testimonies. The trial judge therefore can
better determine if such witnesses were
telling the truth, being in the ideal position
to weigh conflicting testimonies. Further,
factual findings of the trial court as
regards its assessment of the witnesses'
credibility are entitled to great weight and
respect by this Court, particularly when
the Court of Appeals affirms the said
findings, and will not be disturbed absent
any showing that the trial court
overlooked certain facts and
circumstances which could substantially
affect the outcome of the case.[11]
35
The Court cannot find anything on record to
justify deviation from said rule.
Lastly, the Court sustains the trial court's and the
appellate court's ruling regarding the minority of
accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and
Jaafar. Iblong claimed he was born on August 5, 1987;
Mandangan stated his birth date as July 6, 1987; Salcedo
said he was born on January 10, 1985; and Jaafar claimed
he was born on July 13, 1981. If Jaafar's birth date was
indeed July 13, 1981, then he was over 18 years of age
when the crime was committed in June of 2001 and, thus,
he cannot claim minority. It should be noted that the
defense absolutely failed to present any document
showing accused-appellants' date of birth, neither did
they present testimonies of other persons such as parents
or teachers to corroborate their claim of minority.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that:
Sec. 7. Determination of Age. - The child
in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall
enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict
with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years old or older. The age
of a child may be determined from the
child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based
on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the
child and other relevant evidence. In case
of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall
be resolved in his/her favor.
xxxx
If a case has been filed against the child in
conflict with the law and is pending in the
appropriate court, the person shall file a
motion to determine the age of the child in
the same court where the case is
pending. Pending hearing on the said
motion, proceedings on the main case
shall be suspended.

In all proceedings, law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, judges and other
government officials concerned shall exert
all efforts at determining the age of the
child in conflict with the law.[12]
It should be emphasized that at the time the trial court
was hearing the case and even at the time it handed down
the judgment of conviction against accused-appellants on
August 13, 2004, R.A. No. 9344 had not yet been
enacted into law. The procedures laid down by the law to
prove the minority of accused-appellants were not yet in
place. Hence, the rule was still that the burden of proving
the minority of the accused rested solely on the
defense. The trial court, in the absence of any document
stating the age of the aforementioned four accused-
appellants, or any corroborating testimony, had to rely on
its own observation of the physical appearance of
accused-appellants to estimate said accused-appellants'
age. A reading of the afore-quoted Section 7 of R.A. No.
9344 shows that this manner of determining accused-
appellants' age is also sanctioned by the law. The
accused-appellants appeared to the trial court as no
younger than twenty-four years of age, or in their mid-
twenties, meaning they could not have been under
eighteen (18) years old when the crime was committed.
[13]
As discussed above, such factual finding of the trial
court on the age of the four accused-appellants, affirmed
by the CA, must be accorded great respect, even finality
by this Court.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the four
accused-appellants were indeed less than eighteen years
old at the time the crime was committed, at this point in
time, the applicability of R.A. No. 9344 is seriously in
doubt. Pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 are as
follows:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of
Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court
shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application: Provided,
however, That the suspension of sentence
shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
36
already eighteen years (18) of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt.
xxxx
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict
with the Law to Court. -
xxxx
If said child in conflict with the law has
reached eighteen (18) years of age while
under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
[14]
If accused-appellants' claim are true, that they were born
in 1985 and 1987, then they have already reached 21
years of age, or over by this time and thus, the
application of Sections 38 and 40 of R.A. No. 9344 is
now moot and academic.[15]
However, just for the guidance of the bench and bar, it
should be borne in mind that if indeed, an accused was
under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the commission of the crime, then as held in People v.
Sarcia,[16] such offenders, even if already over twenty-
one (21) years old at the time of conviction, may still
avail of the benefits accorded by Section 51 of R.A. No.
9344 which provides, thus:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted
Children in Agricultural Camps and Other
Training Facilities. - A child in conflict
with the law may, after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may
be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in cooperation
with the DSWD.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, the evidence
before the Court show that accused-appellants Iblong,
Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar, were not minors at the

time of the commission of the crime, hence, they cannot
benefit from R.A. No. 9344.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated November 24, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C No.
00239, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172707 October 1, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE,
vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y
USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO
Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG
DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y
AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN
PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA
PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the
Decision1 dated 28 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed
with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated 16 October
1998, finding accused-appellants Halil Gambao y Esmail,
Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony
Abao y Sula, Raul Udal y Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron,
Theng Dilangalen y Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol y Katol,
Monette Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and Thian
Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified
person, were charged under the criminal
information3 which reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-0928
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in the
evening at No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay City and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named-accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another and grouping themselves together,
did then and there by force and intimidation, and the use
of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y
37
Lee of her liberty against her will for the purpose of
extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was
made as a condition for her release amounting to FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱400,000.00) to the
damage and prejudice of Lucia L. Chan in the said
amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to
her under the provisions of the Civil Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the
case:4
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila.
She usually expected fish deliveries, which were shipped
by her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the
afternoon of 11 August 1998, two persons, one of whom
was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to
Chan’s residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to
inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been
mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to
her. Unable to locate said passport, the two left. The next
morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion
identified as Tony Abao (Abao), returned looking for
Chan but were told that she was out. When the two
returned in the afternoon, Chan informed them that the
fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to
accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish
allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao
declined and told Chan that they would be back later that
evening.5
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who
remains at large, returned to Chan’s residence that
evening. Chan’s houseboy ushered them in and Chan met
them by the stairs.6 Thereat, the unidentified companion
of Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chan’s son, Levy Chan
(Levy), and the house companions.7 As the unidentified
man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried to stop
the man by grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this,
Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levy’s head forcing the
latter to release his grip on Chan’s feet. 8 Levy thereafter
proceeded to the Pasay Police Headquarters to report the
incident.9
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van. 10 After
travelling for about two hours, the group stopped at a
certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman
(Dukilman) warned Chan not to shout as he had his gun
pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two
women,11 later identified in court by Chan as appellants
Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad). 12 Chan
was brought inside a house and was made to lie down on
a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and Jaman
Macalinbol (Macalinbol).13 Ronas and Evad threatened
Chan that she would be killed unless she paid 20 Million
Pesos.14

On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and
was asked to board the "Tamaraw FX" van. After
travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the
group alighted. Chan was brought to a room on the
second floor of the house. Inside the room were three
persons whom Chan identified in court as Macalinbol,
Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao
15
(Gambao). Another woman, later identified as Thian
Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived.16 At about 9:00 o’clock in
the evening, a man who was later identified as Teng
Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and
asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa
pulis?"17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as
Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room.
Karim informed Chan that he was sent by their boss to
ask her how much money she has.18 Chan was instructed
to talk to her son through a cell phone and she gave
instructions to her son to get the ₱75, 000.00 she kept in
her cabinet.19 The group then talked to Chan’s son and
negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his
mother’s release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to
deliver ₱400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at
Buendia Avenue.20
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and
Cesar Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who were assigned at
the Pasay City area to conduct the investigation regarding
the kidnapping, were informed that the abductors called
and demanded for ransom in exchange for Chan’s
release.21 During their surveillance the following day,
Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red Transport
taxicab entering the route which led to the victim’s
residence. The inspectors observed that the occupants of
the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the
house. The inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab
until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the
Elizabeth Resort and stopped in front of Cottage 1.
Convinced that the woman the team saw in the cottage
was the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine
Anti Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to conduct
a rescue operation.22
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector
Arnado) received information that the abductors acceded
to a ₱400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at
"Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around
2:00 am. Upon learning of the information, the team
immediately and strategically positioned themselves
around the vicinity of the restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a
light blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on board
arrived. The four took the ransom money and headed
towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance
team successfully intercepted the van and arrested the 4
men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao
38
and Dukilman. The team was also able to recover the
₱400,000.00 ransom.23
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the
police team assaulted Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe
rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of her
abductors, later identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal,
Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.24
During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and
her son testified, Karim manifested his desire to change
his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding
judge then explained the consequences of a change of
plea, stating: "It would mean the moment you withdraw
your previous pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of
guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, as in
fact it has received the testimonies of [the] two
witnesses, will [outrightly] sentence you to the penalty
provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished
the presentation of its evidence. Now that I have
explained to you the consequences of your entering a
plea of guilty, are you still desirous of entering a plea of
‘guilty’?" Eddie Karim answered, "Yes."25 On hearing
this clarification, the other appellants likewise
manifested, through their counsel who had earlier
conferred with them and explained to each of them the
consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change
the pleas they entered. The trial court separately asked
each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal,
Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they
understood the consequence of changing their pleas. All
of them answered in the affirmative. 26 Similarly,
Dukilman manifested his desire to change his plea and
assured the trial court that he understood the
consequences of such change of plea.27 Thereupon, the
trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they
pleaded guilty,28 the trial court directed the prosecution to
present evidence, which it did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision
convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal,
Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and
Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom. Hence, they
appealed to the CA.
In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court
affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding
accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL,
EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y
SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y
KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG
DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL
y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA
EVAD y MULOK guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme
penalty of death is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION
that each of them is ordered to pay jointly and severally
the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of moral
damages.
It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN
y RAFON was only 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, she is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by
Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate
court certified the case to this Court and accordingly
ordered the elevation of the records.
In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the
parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. The
issues raised by the accused-appellants in their respective
briefs, supplemental briefs and manifestations will be
discussed collectively.
Insufficiency of Evidence
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have
this Court believe that the witness, Chan, was not able to
positively identify them because of her failing eyesight
due to old age.
This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the
trial court and the CA found Chan’s testimony credible
and straightforward. During her testimony, she positively
identified the accused-appellants. If she had not met them
before, she could not have positively identified them in
open court. In fact, the participation of these accused-
appellants was further established through the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court has maintained that the
question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the
trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations
and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal.
They are conclusive and binding unless shown to be
tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight,
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has
not been considered.31 In People v. Tañedo,32 this Court
had occasion to reiterate the ruling that findings of fact of
the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses
command great respect since it had the opportunity to
observe their demeanor while they testified in court.33 It
can be observed that the briefs submitted by the accused-
appellants are replete with generalities and wanting in
relevant particulars. It is for this reason that we are
giving full credence to the findings of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witness Chan.
39
Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her
conviction is insufficient. We also find her argument
bereft of merit.
The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing
Perpenian as one of the seven people apprehended when
they conducted the rescue operation at around 5:00
o’clock in the morning of 14 August 1998,34 and the
positive identification of Perpenian by Chan constituted
adequate evidence working against her defense of denial.
Further, it should be noted that the only defense the
accused-appellants proffered was denial. It is established
jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail over the
witnesses’ positive identification of the accused-
appellants, more so where the defense did not present
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
them to have been present at the crime scene at the time
of the commission of the crime.35
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by
Chan, the relevant testimonies of witnesses and the
absence of evidence other than mere denial proffered by
the defense lead this Court to give due weight to the
findings of the lower courts.
Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for
kidnapping for ransom is death. A review of the
records36 shows that on 7 October 1998, the accused-
appellants withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and were
re-arraigned. They subsequently entered pleas of "guilty"
to the crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense.
This Court, in People v. Oden,37 laid down the duties of
the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense. The trial court is mandated:
(1)
to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of
guilt,
(2)
to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3)
to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present
evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must
proceed with more care where the possible punishment is
in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the
execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The
primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt
on the part of an accused where grave crimes are

involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the
court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without
having fully understood the meaning, significance and
consequence of his plea.39 Moreover, the requirement of
taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate
review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the
plea.40
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines
whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and
informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the
voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of
the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no cogent
reason for deviating from the guidelines provided by
jurisprudence41 and thus, adopts the same:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how
a trial judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have
held that the following guidelines should be observed:
Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel
during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to
rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced
or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats
of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or
simply because of the judge’s intimidating robes.
Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to
whether he had conferred with, and completely explained
to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea
of guilty.
Elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty.
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or
nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that
he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or
upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities
or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that
the accused does not labor under these mistaken
impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not
only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but
also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
charged and fully explain to him the elements of the
crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the
40
court to do so would constitute a violation of his
fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of
the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due
process.
All questions posed to the accused should be in a
language known and understood by the latter.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be
required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or
furnish its missing details.
It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules
have not been fully complied with. The questions
propounded by the trial court judge failed to ensure that
accused-appellants fully understood the consequences of
their plea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the
records43 that Karim had the mistaken assumption that his
plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and
that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to
him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty
pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim
was not warned by the trial court judge that in cases
where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the
penalty is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. The trial court judge’s seemingly annoyed
statement that a conditional plea is not allowed, as
provided below, is inadequate:
Atty. Ferrer:
Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something
before the trial. For accused Eddie Karim we manifest
and petition this court that he be allowed to be re-
arraigned Your Honor please, considering that he will
plead guilty as charged but the imposable penalty is
lowered, Your Honor.
Court:
You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what
the law says. You plead guilty, no condition attached.
Conditional plea is not allowed.
Atty. Ferrer:
Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is
already repenting
Court:
Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of
guilty there should be no condition attached. We cannot
make that condition and dictate to the court the penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were
improvidently made, this Court will still not set aside the
condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judge’s
shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-
appellants’ culpability.

As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident
plea of guilt are set aside and the cases are remanded for
further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of
judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient
and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in
this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then
it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on
evidence proving the commission of the offense
charged.45 The manner by which the plea of guilty is
made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal
significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission of the
crime by the accused.46
Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were
convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of their plea
of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by
the prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the
trial court.47 The prosecution was able to prove the guilt
of the accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability
beyond reasonable doubt.
Degree of Culpability
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in
their respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they
were concerned, was not convincingly established.
Dukilman hinges his argument on the fact that he was not
one of those arrested during the rescue operation based
on the testimony of Inspector Ouano.48 On the other
hand, Ronas and Evad base their argument on the fact
that they had no participation whatsoever in the
negotiation for the ransom money.
We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of
those apprehended at the cottage during the rescue
operation, the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado
sufficiently established that he was one of the four people
apprehended when the police intercepted the "Tamaraw
FX" at the Nichols Tollgate.49 Likewise, the testimony of
Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently established that
Ronas and Evad were two of those who were arrested
during the rescue operation.50 This Court has held before
that to be a conspirator, one need not participate in every
detail of the execution; he need not even take part in
every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy.51 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are
52
principals. Moreover, Chan positively identified the
accused-appellants and placed all of them at the crime
scenes.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is
conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
41
agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it.
It has been a long standing opinion of this Court that
proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence,
as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct
of the parties before, during or after the commission of
the crime indicating a common understanding among
them with respect to the commission of the offense. 53 The
testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common
purpose of the accused-appellants and how they were all
united in its execution from beginning to end. There were
testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two of
the accused-appellants kept coming back to the victim’s
house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused-appellants
changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the
accused appellants were those present when the ransom
money was recovered and when the rescue operation was
conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim,
Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol,
Ronas and Evad was established beyond reasonable
doubt based on the proffered evidence of the prosecution,
the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
In Perpenian’s Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this
Court’s attention to the manifestation made by the
prosecution regarding their disinterest in prosecuting,
insofar as she was concerned.55 However, pursuant to the
ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Judge Mogul,56 once the
information is filed, any disposition of the case or
dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests
within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and
discretion of the courts; more so in this case, where no
Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution.
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave
inconsistent answers and lied several times under oath
during the trial.57 Perpenian lied about substantial details
such as her real name, age, address and the fact that she
saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why she
lied several times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to
be included or identified with the other accused-
appellants. The lying and the fear of being identified with
people whom she knew had done wrong are indicative of
discernment. She knew, therefore, that there was an
ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she
was there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the
consequences of the unlawful act.
As reflected in the records,58 the prosecution was not able
to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a
principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution
had was the testimony59 of Chan to the effect that on 13
August 1998 Perpenian entered the room where the
victim was detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas
regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court

opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-
principal, but rather only as an accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in
accordance with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in
order that a person may be considered an accomplice,
namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is
knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or
simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material
or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an
efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between
the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to
exonerate her criminal liability.1âwphi1 Assuming
arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a
swimming party, it was inevitable that she acquired
knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when
she saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational
person would have suspected something was wrong and
would have reported such incident to the police.
Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to
that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been
held before that being present and giving moral support
when a crime is being committed will make a person
responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed.61 It
should be noted that the accused-appellant’s presence and
company were not indispensable and essential to the
perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is
only liable as an accomplice.62Moreover, this Court is
guided by the ruling in People v. Clemente, et al.,63 where
it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of
the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice
rather than that of a principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and considering the evidence
presented by the prosecution, linking accused-appellants’
participation in the crime, no doubt can be entertained as
to their guilt. The CA convicted the accused-appellants of
kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them the
supreme penalty of death, applying the provisions of
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this
Court finds accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping for
ransom. However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, 64 we
modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and reduce
the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility for
parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal
liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A.
No. 9344,65 a determination of whether she acted with or
without discernment is necessary. Considering that
42
Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17 years
old at the time of the commission of the offense, her
minority should be appreciated not as an exempting
circumstance, but as a privileged mitigating circumstance
pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344, 66 the suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law shall still be
applied even if he/she is already eighteen (18) years of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no
longer benefit from the aforesaid provision, because
under Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344, 67 the suspension of
sentence can be availed of only until the child in conflict
with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one
(21) years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to
pronounce judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled that
death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code
shall no longer form part of the equation in the
graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, 68 the
penalty imposed by law on accomplices in the
commission of consummated kidnapping for ransom is
Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree lower than
what the principals would bear (Reclusion
Perpetua).69 Applying Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code, the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law for
accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to
Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty
lower than that prescribed by law (Reclusion Temporal),
should be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum penalty, which is one degree lower
than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the
range of Prision Correccional; and the maximum penalty
shall be within the minimum period of Prision Mayor,
absent any aggravating circumstance and there being one
mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day
of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and
one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an
agricultural camp or other training facility in accordance
with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in People
v. Jacinto70 that the age of the child in conflict with the
law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment is
not material. What matters is that the offender committed
the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This
Court, however, finds such arrangement no longer
necessary in view of the fact that Perpenian’s actual
served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty

for her offense. For such reason, she may be immediately
released from detention.
We note that in the Order71 dated 9 October 1998, the
trial court admitted the documentary evidence offered by
the counsel for the defense proving that the real name of
Thian Perpenian is Larina Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of
this case, he is relieved of all personal and pecuniary
penalties attendant to the crime, his death72 having
occurred before rendition of final judgement.73
There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities
arising from the commission of kidnapping for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The
persons convicted were held liable for ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of
indemnity and damages, where, as in this case, the
penalty for the crime committed is death which, however,
cannot be imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No.
9346:75
1. ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is
assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and
3. ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example
for the public good.
These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and
damages where death is the penalty warranted by the
facts but is not imposable under present law.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros 76 is
instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among
all the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil
liabilities should be apportioned among all those who
cooperated in the commission of the crime according to
the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities
and actual participation. Hence, each principal accused-
appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total
amount of indemnity and damages than Perpenian who
was adjudged as only an accomplice.
Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their
participation, all of them shall be liable for the total
amount of ₱300,000.00 divided among the principals
who shall be liable for ₱288,000.00 (or ₱32,000.00 each)
and Perpenian who shall be liable for ₱12,000.00. This is
broken down into ₱10,666.67 civil indemnity,
₱10,666.67 moral damages and ₱10,666.67 exemplary
damages for each principal; and ₱4,000.00 civil
indemnity, ₱4,000.00 moral damages and ₱4,000.00
exemplary damages for the lone accomplice.
43
WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR–H.C. No. 00863 is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE
KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH,
TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI,
THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y
AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of
parole. Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y
RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and
one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-
appellants are ordered to indemnify the victim in the
amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00
as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages apportioned in the following manner: the
principals to the crime shall jointly and severally pay the
victim the total amount of ₱288,000.00 while the
accomplice shall pay the victim ₱12,000.00, subject to
Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code on several and
subsidiary liability.
The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to
immediately release THIAN PERPENIAN A.K.A.
LARINA PERPENIAN due to her having fully served
the penalty imposed on her, unless her further detention
is warranted for any other lawful causes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate
implementation to the Director of the Correctional
Institute for Women by personal service. The Director of
the Correctional Institute for Women shall submit to this
Court, within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the
decision, the action he has taken thereon.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176102 November 26, 2014
ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No.
9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) to
protect the best interest of the child in conflict with the
law through measures that will ensure the observance of
international standards of child protection,1 and to apply

the principles of restorative justice in all laws, policies
and programs applicable to children in conflict with the
law.2 The mandate notwithstanding, the Court will not
hesitate or halt to impose the penalty of imprisonment
whenever warranted on a child in conflict with the law.
Antecedents
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur
charged the petitioner with homicide under the following
information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2000-0275 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Naga City,
to wit:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about
7:30 P.M., in Barangay Dalupaon, Pasacao, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, and
without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab one
JAYSON ESPINOLA Y BANTA with a knife , inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds in his body, thus, directly
causing his death, per Death Certification hereto attached
as annex "A" and made an integral part hereof, to the
damage and prejudice of the deceased’s heirs in such
amount as may be proven in court.
Acts Contrary to Law.3
The CA summarized the facts established by the
Prosecution and the Defense as follows: Alejandro
Dequito testified that around seven in the evening or so
of March 30, 2000, he, together with his compadre
Nicasio, was at the gate of Dalupaon Elementary School
watching the graduation ceremony if the high school
students. While watching, his cousin Jason Espinola,
herein victim, arrived. Later, however, appellant
approached the victim and stabbed the latter. When asked
to demonstrate in open court how the appellant stabbed
the victim, this witness demonstrated that with the
appellant’s left arm around the neck of the victim,
appellant stabbed the victim using a bladed weapon.
He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to
his feet and later brought him to the hospital.
Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequito’s companion at the
time of the incident, corroborated the testimony of
Dequito on all material points.
Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified
that her son was stabbed in front of the [elementary]
school and later brought to the Bicol Medical Center. She
stated that her son stayed for more than a month in the
hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later,
however, when her son went back to the hospital for a
check-up, it was discovered that her son’s stab wound
had a complication. Her son was subjected to another
operation, but died the day after. She, further, stated that
44
the stabbing incident was reported to the police
authorities. She, likewise, stated the amounts she
incurred for the wake and burial of her son.
Robert Casin, the medico legal expert, testified that the
cause of death of the victim, as stated by Dr. Bichara, his
co-admitting physician, was organ failure overwhelming
infection. He, further, stated that the underlined cause of
death was a stab wound.
The appellant, in his testimony, narrates his statement of
facts in this manner:
He testified that around seven inthe evening or so of
March 30, 2000, he was at the Dalupaon High School
campus watching the high school graduation rites. At half
past seven, while walking towards the gate of Dalupaon
High School on his way home, he was ganged up by a
group of four (4) men.
The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack
he felt dizzy and fell to the ground. He was not able to
see or even recognize who attacked him, so he proceeded
home. Shortly after leaving the campus, however, he met
somebody whom he thought was one of the four men
who ganged up on him. He stabbed the person with the
knife he was, then, carrying. When asked why he was in
possession of a knife, he stated that he used it in
preparing food for his friend, Richard Candelaria, who
was graduating that day. He went home after the incident.
While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took
him and brought him to the barangay hall, and later to the
Pasacao PNP. On his way to the town proper, he came to
know that the person he stabbed was Jason Espinola. He
felt sad after hearing it.4
Judgment of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the
petitioner guilty of homicide as charged, and sentenced
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
for four years and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum; and to pay to the heirs of the victim
₱81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and funeral
expenses, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.5
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
petitioner’s conviction but modified the penalty and the
civil liability through the decision promulgated on July
19, 2006,6 disposing thus: WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-
0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby,
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellants (sic)
sentence is reduced to six months and one day to six

years of prision correccionalas minimum, to six years
and one day to twelve years of prision mayor as
maximum.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The
award of actual damages in the amount of Php 81,890.04,
representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is
reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the
amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of
the victim Jason Espinola. Weaffirm in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA
promulgated its amended decision on December 7, 2006,
decreeing as follows:7
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our decision promulgated on
July 16, 2006, which is the subject of the instant motion
is, hereby AMENDED such that the judgment shall now
read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in
Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant
Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The
award of actual damages in the amount of Php 81,890.04,
representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is
reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the
amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of
the victim Jason Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.
The case is, hereby, remanded to the Regional Trial Court
of Naga, Branch 20, for appropriate action on the
application for probation of, herein, appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave
error to the CA for not correctly imposing the penalty,
and for not suspending his sentence as a juvenile in
conflict with the law pursuant to the mandate of Republic
Act No. 9344. In fine, he no longer assails the findings of
fact by the lower courts as well as his conviction, and
limits his appeal to the following issues, namely: (1)
whether or not the CA imposed the correct penalty
imposable on him taking into consideration the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the Revised Penal
Codeand Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law);
(2) whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of
probation and suspension of sentence under Republic Act
45
No. 9344; and (3) whether or not imposing the penalty of
imprisonment contravened the provisions of Republic
Act No. 9344 and other international agreements.
Ruling of the Court
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the
penalty of reclusion temporalfor homicide. Considering
that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months
and 28 days old when he committed the homicide on
March 30, 2000,8 such minority was a privileged
mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to
prision mayor.9
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of
the indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty
next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein,
was prision correccional (i.e., six months and one day to
six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence, prision mayor in its medium period – eight
years and one day to 10 years – was proper because there
were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.
Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of
prision mayor, as maximum.
The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his
indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of
prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of
prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation
under Presidential Decree No. 968.
The petitioner’s insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither
the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor
any other relevant law or rules support or justify the
further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose
an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to
deliberately violate the law.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law) provides certain guiding principles in the
trial and judging in cases involving a child in conflict
with the law. One of them is that found in Section 46 (2),
in conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the
restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be
limited to the minimum.11Consistent with this principle,
the amended decision of the CA imposed the ultimate
minimums of the indeterminate penalty for homicide
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part,
Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and
appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the
penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the child in
conflict with the law to qualify for probation.
Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree
968,12 which disqualifies from probation an offender

sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of
more than six years, the petitioner could not qualify for
probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the
CA to remand the case to the trial court to determine if he
was qualified for probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows
the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with
the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is
available only until the child offender turns 21 years of
age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to
wit:
Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law
to Court.– If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict
with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has wilfully failed to comply with
the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be
brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen
(18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence,
or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum
age of twenty-one (21) years.
We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age
at the time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC on
July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was
no longer legally feasible or permissible.
Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to
prison would be in violation of his rights as a child
inconflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No.
9344 and international agreements.1avvphi1 A review of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals,
however, that imprisonment of children in conflict with
the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of
Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict
with the law the rightnot to be unlawfully or arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper
disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain
restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely:
(a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last
resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for
the shortest appropriate period of time.Thereby, the trial
and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of
Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of
imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the
penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him
to be disqualified from probation and from the
suspension of his sentence, and the term of his
46
imprisonment was for the shortestduration permitted by
the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements 13 supports
the course of action taken herein. The United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines),14 the United
Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile
Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations
Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of
Liberty15 are consistent in recognizing that imprisonment
is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed asa
last resort and for the minimum necessary period.
Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344,
the petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may
serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities
to be established, maintained, supervised and controlled
by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a
manner consistent with the offender child’s best interest.
Such service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the
regular penal institution.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for
review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended decision
promulgated on December 7, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
29295, but DELETING the order to remand the judgment
to the trial court for implementation; and DIRECTS the
Bureau of Corrections to commit the petitioner for the
service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or other
training facilities under its control, supervision and
management, in coordination with the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16,
RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was
charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on
June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E.
Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died
on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory
arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to
hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the

Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view
that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case
of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should
still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his
conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability
is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand,
opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that
the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is
pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked
the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo
and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a
criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and,
therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should
die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of
the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish
his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this
issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue
posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of
Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility
and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged
crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling
statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. —
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no
question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such
liability is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us
is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term
"final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it
a judgment which is final and executory?
47
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept
contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the
Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales
siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the
term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under
the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473,
furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la
fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las
partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los
terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one
which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is
such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is
confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the words
of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una
verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die,
according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni
reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna
clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a
defendant dies before judgment becomes executory,
"there cannot be any determination by final judgment
whether or not the felony upon which the civil action
might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no
party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same
view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed.,
pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly
reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78
of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in
the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings
to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which
states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final
"after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here
collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The
term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code
means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be

truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the
felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is
without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to
institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the
decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both
the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People
vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964.
See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco,
Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236.
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil
action is based solely on the felony committed and of
which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the
offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan,
Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case:
Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is
sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability.
But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action
and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the
anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to
clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof —
criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was well
stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found
and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely
would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in
the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in
the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio
Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et
al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by
dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused
pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in
the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having
been established, and considering that there is as yet no
final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the
criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant
Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised
Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717,
citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G.
4045); consequently, the case against him should be
dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases
of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court
of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue
decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of
one accused of physical injuries who died before final
48
judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of
barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the
contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the
death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished
all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the
offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has
been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that
became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal
Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of
the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on
account of physical injuries, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both
proceedings were terminated without final adjudication,
the civil action of the offended party under Article 33
may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under
Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the
criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where
the civil liability does not exist independently of the
criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by
death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of
course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The
said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the
civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from
the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and
sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil
liability of the accused who was charged with estafa
could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21
of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the
first and second vendees of the property subject matter of
the contract of sale. It therefore concluded:
"Consequently, while the death of the accused herein
extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil
liability based on the laws of human relations remains."

Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the
civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the
extinction of his criminal liability due to his death
pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to
survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination:
Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires
the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant
whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the
Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that
actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard
on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes
after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case,
explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party
shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-
appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the
deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-
appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from
Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the
survival of the civil liability depends on whether the
same can be predicated on sources of obligations other
than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability
is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it
were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego,
et al. 10 departed from this long-established principle of
law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with
and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru
falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his
conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his
criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to
survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was
exclusively dependent on the criminal action already
extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for
the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction
over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the
criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is
civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution
of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the
civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death
occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of
three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province
in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
49
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action in the absence of
express waiver or its reservation in a separate action
(Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action
for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the
criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105
Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a
money judgment had been rendered against him by the
Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-
40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable
for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no
criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230;
Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal
of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his
possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal
acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been
instituted against him, thus making applicable, in
determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil
Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to
inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his
estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for
the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3,
Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have
maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in
other words, they were a reaffirmance of our
abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely
anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to
the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A
re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us
to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego:
The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in
the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's
extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of

his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code
and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the
civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend
support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text
is there a grant of authority to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex
delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What
Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil
action which may be brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense independently of any
criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings
are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the
quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act
will have to be that which is compatible with civil
liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or
invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil
action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect
merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex
delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action
due to death of the accused during appeal of his
conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil
liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the
accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. —
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the
expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil
liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the
civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one
filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings
had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had
the effect of converting such claims from one which is
dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an
entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which
does not even necessitate the filing of criminal
proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the
statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be
borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto,
50
the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal
action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render
fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases,
extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the
concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia
Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising
from crime, the final determination of the criminal
liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the
civil action, such that when the criminal action is
extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending
appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The
claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent
upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such
civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal
liability and is to be declared and enforced in the
criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that
which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code
which refers to the institution of a separate civil action
that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding.
The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however,
failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it
allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a
separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely,
it will take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil
action to an independent one such as that contemplated
under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did
not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977
notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the
purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the
basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be
liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his
civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on
whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced,
was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as
the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the
criminal action already extinguished which served as
basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is

no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also
invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec.
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the
inference that civil actions of the type involved
in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of
which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies
pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate
liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a
money judgment had been rendered against him by the
Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced.
From the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken
in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly
observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced
in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
drew the strained implication therefrom that where the
civil liability instituted together with the criminal
liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the
then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial
Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise
appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the
extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the
deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed
in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant
to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and
abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in
ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor
justification for its application in criminal procedure to
civil actions instituted together with and as part of
criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the
summary conversion from the latter category of an
ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a
criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money
51
claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3
enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3
must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which
in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil
liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3,
in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual
money claims while the claims involved in civil
liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of
personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides
an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed
against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses
for the last illness, judgments for money and claim
arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear
that money claims arising from delict do not form part of
this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no
legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an
ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to
survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the
deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death
of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon
extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to
recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule
111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended)
file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the
felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
separate civil action is premised determines against
whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises
from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an
injury to person or property (real or personal), the
separate civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to
Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. — No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages
for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may
be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in
Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages
for injury to persons thru an independent civil action

based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be
filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of
deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5,
Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to
those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness
of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising
from contract, express or implied. Contractual money
claims, we stressed, refers only topurely personal
obligations other than those which have their source in
delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of
also arises from contract, the separate civil action must
be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec.
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling
herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
52
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold
that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on
the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal
is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is
DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201447
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca
(Amistoso) was charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No.
10106, with the rape of his daughter, AAA,[1] alleged to
be 12 years old at the time of the incident. The
Information[2] specifically charged Amistoso with
statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
After trial, on March 23, 2006, the RTC promulgated its
Decision[3] finding Amistoso guilty, not of statutory
rape, but of qualified rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph
(1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, accused ANASTACIO AMISTOSO,
having been convicted of Qualified Rape, he is hereby
sentenced to the capital penalty of DEATH; to pay the
victim the sum of Seventy[-]Five Thousand Pesos
(PhP75,000.00) as indemnity; to pay the said victim the
sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP50,000.00) as for
moral damages, and to pay the costs.[4]
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision[5] dated August 25,
2011, in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04012, affirmed
Amistoso's conviction for qualified rape but modified the
penalties imposed in accordance with Republic Act No.
9346[6] and the latest jurisprudence on awards of
damages. The appellate court decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the
assailed Decision dated March 23, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case
No. 10106 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole. In addition to civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00, he is ordered to pay the victim

P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.[7]
Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to this
Court. In its Decision[8] dated January 9, 2013, the
Court affirmed with modification the judgment of
conviction against Amistoso, expressly making him
liable for interest on the amounts of damages awarded, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
appeal of Anastacio Amistoso y Broca is DENIED. The
Decision dated August 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04012 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that Amistoso is
further ORDERED to pay interest on all damages
awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of this Decision.[9]
However, in a letter[10] dated February 7, 2013,
Ramoncito D. Roque (Roque), Officer-in-Charge, Inmate
Documents and Processing Division of the Bureau of
Corrections, informed the Court that Amistoso had died
on December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP),
Muntinlupa City. Roque attached to his letter a
photocopy of the Death Report[11] signed by Marylou V.
Arbatin, MD, Medical Officer III, NBP, stating that
Amistoso, 62 years old, died at about 5:00 p.m. on
December 11, 2012 of Cardio Respiratory Arrest.
Roque's letter was received by the Court on February 12,
2013.
Penal Institution Supervisor (PIS) Fajardo R. Lansangan,
Sr. (Lansangan), Officer-in-Charge, Maximum Security
Compound, NBP, wrote another letter[12] dated February
12, 2013, likewise informing the Court of Amistoso's
death on December 11, 2012. PIS Lansangan appended
to his letter a mere photocopy of Amistoso's Death
Certificate.[13] The Court received PIS Lansangan's
letter on February 18, 2013.
Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), which represented Amistoso and which was
apparently also unaware of its client's demise, still filed a
Motion for Reconsideration[14] of the Court's Decision
dated January 9, 2013.
In a Resolution[15] dated March 20, 2013, the Court
required Roque to submit a certified true copy of
Amistoso's Death Certificate within 10 days from notice
and deferred action on the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the PAO pending compliance with the Court's
former directive.
In a letter[16] dated June 20, 2013, and received by the
Court on June 25, 2013, PIS Lansangan finally provided
53
the Court with a certified true copy of Amistoso's Death
Certificate.[17]
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment[.]
In People v. Bayotas,[18] the Court laid down the rules in
case the accused dies prior to final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
 54
offended party instituted together therewith the civil RESOLUTION
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
NACHURA, J.:
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. (Citations omitted.)
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his This resolves the motion for extinguishment of
civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the
the criminal action and reconsideration of our Resolution
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex dated July 20, 2009 filed by appellant Ronie de Guzman.
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
[19]

Undeniably, Amistoso's death on December 11, 2012 preceded the Appellant was indicted before the Regional Trial
promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When
Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and
Court, Branch 163, Pasig City, for two counts of rape. He
unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistoso's appeal only because it was pled not guilty when arraigned. After pretrial and trial,
not immediately informed of his death.
the trial court found him guilty as charged and imposed
Amistoso's death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court's Decision on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistoso's conviction,
irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become
count. The trial court further ordered him to indemnify
final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside. the victim P50,000.00 in each case or a total amount
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to:
of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.
(1) NOTE PIS Lansangan's letter dated June 20, 2013 providing the
Court with a certified true copy of Amistoso's Death Certificate;
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed,
(2) SET ASIDE its Decision dated January 9, 2013 and DISMISS in its Decision dated March 27, 2008, appellants
Criminal Case No. 10106 before the RTC of Masbate City, Branch 48 by
reason of Amistoso's death on December 11, 2012; and
conviction, but modified it with an additional award
of P50,000.00 for each case, or an aggregate amount
(3) NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court's Decision dated January 9, 2013 filed by the PAO given the
of P100,000.00, as moral damages.
Court's actions in the preceding paragraphs.

SO ORDERED.
Appellant elevated the case to this Court on
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appeal.
G.R. No. 185843

Appellee,
Present: In a Resolution dated July 20, 2009, we dismissed
the appeal for failure of appellant to sufficiently show
reversible error in the challenged decision as would
CORONA,
warrant the exercise of the Courts appellate
Chairperson,
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the March 27, 2008 Decision
- versus - VELASCO,of the JR.,
CA was affirmed in toto.
NACHURA,
DEL In the instant motion, appellant alleges that he
MENDOZA,and private complainant contracted marriage on August
19, 2009, solemnized by Reverend Lucas R. Dangatan of
Jeruel Christ-Centered Ministries, Inc. at the Amazing
Promulgated:
Grace Christian Ministries, Inc., Bldg. XI-A, Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City. Attached to the motion is
RONIE DE GUZMAN,
March the pertinent Certificate of Marriage and a joint sworn
[1]

Appellant. 3, 2010
statement (Magkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay)
executed by appellant and private complainant,
[2]

attesting to the existence of a valid and legal marriage

x------------------------------------------------------------------------ between them. Appellant, thus, prays that he be absolved
------------x of his conviction for the two counts of rape and be
released from imprisonment, pursuant to Article 266-
C of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
[3]
 55
that prior to the case at bar, the last case bearing similar
In its Comment/Manifestation, appellee, through
[4] circumstances was decided by this Court in 1974, or
the Office of the Solicitor General, interposed no around 36 years ago.
objection to the motion, finding the marriage to have
been contracted in good faith, and the motion to be Based on the documents, including copies of
legally in order. pictures[7] taken after the ceremony and attached to the
motion, we find the marriage between appellant and
The motion should be granted. private complainant to have been contracted validly,
legally, and in good faith, as an expression of their
mutual love for each other and their desire to establish a
In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 family of their own. Given public policy considerations
of the same Code reads of respect for the sanctity of marriage and the highest
regard for the solidarity of the family, we must accord
ART. 89. How criminal liability is appellant the full benefits of Article 89, in relation to
totally extinguished. Criminal liability is Article 344 and Article 266-C of the RPC.
totally extinguished:
WHEREFORE, the motion
xxxx is GRANTED. Appellant Ronie de Guzman
is ABSOLVED of the two (2) counts of rape against
private complainant Juvilyn Velasco, on account of their
7. By the subsequent marriage, and is ordered RELEASED from
marriage of the imprisonment.
offended woman, as
provided in
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the
Article 344 of this Code. Bureau of Corrections for appropriate action. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Article 344 of the same Code also provides G.R. No. 163879 July 30, 2014
DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO, Petitioner,
ART. 344. Prosecution of the vs.
crimes of adultery, concubinage, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES
seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of RODOLFO M. PALMA and ROSARIO F.
lasciviousness. x x x. PALMA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
In cases of seduction, abduction, G.R. No. 165805
acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the DR. CLENIO YNZON, Petitioner,
marriage of the offender with the offended vs.
party shall extinguish the criminal action PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES
or remit the penalty already imposed upon RODOLFO M. PALMA AND ROSARIO F.
him. x x x. PALMA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
On several occasions, we applied these provisions Before this Court are appeals via Rule 45 from the
to marriages contracted between the offender and the Decision1 dated June 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
offended party in the crime of rape,[5] as well as in the CA-G.R. CR No. 27293, affirming the Decision 2 dated
crime of abuse of chastity,[6] to totally extinguish the February 28,2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that convicting appellant Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao (Dr.
may have been imposed upon those found guilty of the Cabugao) and Dr. Clenio Ynzon (Dr. Ynzon) of the crime
felony. Parenthetically, we would like to mention here of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.

3
The Information alleged –
That on or about June 17, 2000in the City of Dagupan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, DR. ANTONIO
P.CABUGAO and DR. CLENIO YNZON, being then the
attending physicians of one RODOLFO PALMA, JR., a
minor 10 years old, confederating and acting jointly with
one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail through negligence, carelessness and
imprudence to perform immediate operation upon their
patient, RODOLFO PALMA, JR. of acute appendicitis,
when they, the said physicians, should have been done so
considering that examinations conducted upon their
patient Rodolfo Palma, Jr. seriously manifest todo so,
causing by such negligence, carelessness, and
imprudence the victim, RODOLFO PALMA JR., to die
due to:
"CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST, METABOLIC
ENCEPHALOPATHY, SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE
APPENDICITIS), CEREBRAL ANEURYSM
RUPTURED (?)"
As per Certificate of Death issued by accused Dr.
Antonio P. Cabugao, to the damage and prejudice of the
legal heirs of said deceased RODOLFO PALMA, JR. and
other consequential damages relative thereto.
CONTRARY to Article 365, 1st par. of the Revised Penal
Code.
Dagupan City, Philippines, January 29, 2001.
Arising from the same events, the Court resolved to
consolidate these cases.4 The facts, as culled from the
records, are as follows:
On June 14, 2000, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon,
ten (10)-year old Rodolfo F. Palma, Jr. (JR) complained
of abdominal pain to his mother, Rosario Palma. At 5
o’clock that sameafternoon, Palma's mother and father,
Atty. Rodolfo Palma Sr., brought JR to the clinic of
accused Dr. Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao, a general
practitioner, specializing in familymedicine gave
medicines for the pain and told Palma's parents to call
him up if his stomach pains continue. Due to persistent
abdominal pains, at 4:30 in the early morning of June 15,
2000, they returnedto Dr. Cabugao, who advised them to
bring JR to the Nazareth General Hospital in Dagupan
City, for confinement. JR was admitted at the said
hospital at 5:30 in the morning.5
Blood samples were taken from JR for laboratory testing.
The complete blood count conveyed the following result:
wbc – 27.80 x 10 9/L; lymphocytes – 0.10 and
neutrophils – 0.90. Diagnostic ultrasound was likewise
conducted on the patient's lower abdomen by radiologist,
Dr. Ricky V. Querubin, with the following findings:
56
Normal liver, bile ducts, gallbladder, pancreas, spleen,
kidneys and urinary bladder.
There is no free peritoneal fluid.
There is localized tenderness in the paraumbilical region,
more so in the supra and right paraumbilical areas.
There is a vague elongated hypoechoic focus in the right
periumbilical region roughly about 47 x 18 mm
surrounded by undistended gas-filled bowels. This is
suggestive of an inflammatory process wherein
appendiceal or periappendiceal pathology cannot be
excluded. Clinical correlation is essential."6
Dr. Cabugao did a rectal examination noting the
following: "rectal: good sphincter, negative tenderness,
negative mass." The initial impression was Acute
Appendicitis,7 and hence, he referred the case to his co-
accused, Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon.8 In the later part of the
morning of June 15, 2000, Dr. Ynzon went to the hospital
and readthe CBC and ultrasound results. The
administration of massive antibiotics and pain reliever to
JRwere ordered. Thereafter, JR was placed on
observation for twenty-four (24) hours.
In the morning of June 16, 2000, JR complained again of
abdominal pain and his parents noticeda swelling in his
scrotum. In the afternoon of the same day, JR vomitted
out greenish stuff three (3) times and had watery bowels
also three (3) times. The nurses on-duty relayed JR's
condition to Dr. Ynzon who merely gaveorders via
telephone.9Accused continued medications to alleviate
JR's abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight, JR
again vomitted twice, had loose bowel movements and
was unable to sleep. The following morning, June
17,2000, JR's condition worsened, he had a running fever
of 38°C. JR's fever remained uncontrolled and he became
unconscious, he was given Aeknil (1 ampule) and Valium
(1 ampule). JR's condition continued to deteriorate that
by 2 o'clock in the afternoon, JR's temperature soared to
42°C, had convulsions and finally died.
The Death Certificate10 dated June 19, 2000 prepared by
Dr. Cabugao indicated the following causes of death:
Immediate cause: CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST
Antecedent cause: METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY
Underlying cause: SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE
APPENDICITIS)
Other significant conditionscontributing to death:
CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)
No post-mortem examination was conducted on JR. On
February 1, 2001, an Information was filed against
accused for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
At their arraignment, both accused, duly assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.

On February 28, 2003, in convicting both the accused,
the trial court found the following circumstances as
sufficient basis to conclude that accused were indeed
negligent in the performance of their duties:
It is unquestionable that JR was under the medical care of
the accused from the time of his admission for
confinement at the Nazareth General Hospital until his
death. Upon his admission, the initial working diagnosis
was to consider acute appendicitis. To assist the accused
in the consideration of acute appendicitis, Dr. Cabugao
requested for a complete blood count (CBC) and a
diagnostic ultrasound on JR. The findings of the CBC
and ultrasound showed that an inflammatory process or
infection was going on inside the body of JR. Said
inflammatory process was happening in the periumbilical
region where the appendix could be located. The initial
diagnosis of acute appendicitis appears to be a distinct
possibility. x x x.
Dr. Ynzon ordered medications to treat the symptoms
being manifested by JR. Thereafter, he ordered that JR be
observed for 24 hours. However, the accused, as the
attending physicians, did not personally monitor JR in
order to check on subtle changes that may occur. Rather,
they left the monitoring and actual observation to
resident physicians who are just on residency training
and in doing so, they substituted their own expertise, skill
and competence with those of physicians who are merely
new doctors still on training. Not having personally
observed JR during this 24-hour critical period of
observation, the accused relinquished their duty and
thereby were unable to give the proper and correct
evaluation as to the real condition of JR. In situations
where massive infection is going on as shown by the
aggressive medication of antibiotics, the condition of the
patient is serious which necessitated personal, not
delegated, attention of attending physicians, namely JR
and the accused in this case.
xxxx
Throughout the course of the hospitalization and
treatment of JR, the accused failed to address the acute
appendicitis which was the initial diagnosis. They did not
take steps to find out if indeed acute appendicitis was
what was causing the massive infection that was ongoing
inside the body of JR even when the inflammatory
process was located at the paraumbilical region where the
appendix can be located. x x x
There may have been other diseases but the records do
not show that the accused took steps to find outwhat
disease exactly was plaguing JR. It was their duty to find
out the disease causing the health problem of JR, but they
did not perform any process of elimination. Appendicitis,
according to expert testimonies, could be eliminated only
57
by surgery but no surgery was done by the accused. But
the accused could not have found out the real disease of
JR because they were treating merely and exclusively the
symptoms by means of the different medications to arrest
the manifested symptoms. In fact, by treating the
symptoms alone, the accused were recklessly and
wantonly ignoring the same as signs of the graver health
problem of JR. This gross negligence on the part of the
accused allowed the infection to spread inside the body
of JR unabated. The infection obviously spread so
fastand was so massive that within a period of only two
and a half (2 ½) days from the day of admission to the
hospital on June 15, 2000, JR who was otherwise healthy
died [of] Septicemia (Acute Appendicitis) on June 17,
2000.11
On June 4, 2004, in affirming the accused' conviction,
the Court of Appeals gave similar observations, to wit:
The foregoing expert testimony clearly revealed such
want of reasonable skill and care on the part of JR's
attending physicians, appellants Dr. Cabugao and Dr.
Ynzon in neglecting to monitor effectively and
sufficiently the developments/changes during the
observation period and act upon the situation after said
24-hour period when his abdominal pain subsisted, his
condition even worsened with the appearance of more
serious symptoms of nausea, vomiting and diarrhea.
Considering the brief visit only made on regular rounds,
the records clearly show such gross negligence in failing
to take appropriate steps to determine the real cause of
JR's abdominal pain so that the crucial decision to
perform surgery (appendectomy) had even been ruled out
precisely because of the inexcusable neglect to undertake
suchefficient diagnosis by process of elimination, as
correctly pointed out by the trial court. As has been
succinctly emphasized by Dr. Mateo, acute appendicitis
was the working diagnosis, and with the emergence of
symptoms after the 24-hour observation (high fever,
vomiting, diarrhea) still, appellants ruled out surgery, not
even considering exploratory laparoscopy. Dr. Mateo also
expressed the opinion that the decision to operate could
have been made after the result of the ultrasound test,
considering that acute appendicitis was the initial
diagnosis by Dr. Cabugao after he had conducted a rectal
examination.
Medical records buttress the trial court's finding that in
treating JR, appellants have demonstrated indifference
and neglect of the patient's condition as a serious case.
Indeed, appendicitis remains a clinical emergencyand a
surgical disease, as correctly underscored by Dr. Mateo, a
practicing surgeon who has already performed over a
thousand appendectomy. In fact, appendectomy is the
only rational therapy for acute appendicitis; it avoids
clinical deterioration and may avoid chronic or recurrent
 58
appendicitis. Although difficult, prompt recognition and REFERRED SUBJECT PATIENT TO A SURGEON,
immediate treatment of the disease prevent DR. CLENIO YNZON;
complications. Under the factual circumstances, the IV
inaction, neglect and indifference of appellants who, after
WHETHER THE DEFENSE NEVER STATED THAT
the day of admission and after being apprised of the
THERE IS GUARANTEE THAT DOING SURGERY
ongoing infection from the CBC and initial diagnosis as
WOULD HAVE SAVED THE PATIENT;
acute appendicitis from rectal examination and
ultrasound testand only briefly visited JR once during V
regular rounds and gave medication orders by telephone WHETHER THE WITNESSES FOR THE
– constitutes gross negligenceleading to the continued PROSECUTION INCLUDING PROSECUTION'S
deterioration of the patient, his infection having spread in EXPERT WITNESSES EVER
sofast a pace that he died within just two and a half (2 ½) DECLARED/TESTIFIED THAT PETITIONER DR.
days’ stay inthe hospital. Authorities state that if the CABUGAO HAD THE DUTY TO PERFORM
clinical picture is unclear a short period of 4 to 6 hours of IMMEDIATE OPERATION ON RODOLFO PALMA,
watchful waiting and a CT scan may improve diagnostic JR., AND THEY FAILED TO STATE/SHOW THAT
accuracy and help to hasten diagnosis.Even assuming THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH OF JR WAS
that JR's case had an atypical presentation in view of the ACUTE APPENDICITIS;
location of his appendix, laboratory tests could have VI
helped to confirm diagnosis, as Dr. Mateo opined thatthe
possibility of JR having a retrocecal appendicitis should WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED
have been a strong consideration. Lamentably, however, BY THE PROSECUTION EVER QUESTIONED THE
as found by the trial court, appellants had not taken steps MANAGEMENT AND CARE APPLIED BY
towards correct diagnosis and demonstrated laxity even PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO;
when JR was already running a high fever in the morning VII
of June 17, 2000 and continued vomiting with diarrhea, WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED
his abdominal pain becoming more intense. This is the BY THE DEFENSE ARE UNANIMOUS IN
reason why private complainants were not even apprised APPROVING THE METHOD OF TREATMENT
of the progress of appellants' diagnosis – appellants have APPLIED BY BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS ON
nothing to report because they did nothing towards the SUBJECT PATIENT, AND THEY
end and merely gave medications to address the DECLARED/AFFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD
symptoms.12 FIRST PLACE SUBJECT THE PATIENT UNDER
Thus, these appeals brought beforethis Court raising the OBSERVATION, AND WOULD NOT PERFORM
following arguments: IMMEDIATE OPERATION;
I VIII
WHETHER THE CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AS WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DR.
CONTAINED IN THE INFORMATION IS "FAILURE YNZON WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE REQUIRED
TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION UPON THE QUANTUM OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
PATIENT ROFOLFO PALMA JR. OF ACUTE DOUBT THAT THE PATIENT WAS SPECIFICALLY
APPENDICITIS; SUFFERING FROM AND DIED OF ACUTE
II APPENDICITIS; and
WHETHER THE SUBJECT INFORMATION IX
APPEARS TO HAVE ACCUSED BOTH ACCUSED WHETHER THE FAILURE TO CONDUCT THE
DOCTORS OF CONSPIRACY AND THE APPEALED SPECIFIC SURGICAL OPERATION KNOWN AS
DECISION SEEMS TO HAVE TREATED BOTH APPENDECTOMY CONSTITUTED CRIMINAL
ACCUSED DOCTORS TO BE IN CONSPIRACY; NEGLIGENCE.
III In a nutshell, the petition brought before this Court raises
WHETHER PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO IS A the issue of whether or not petitioners' conviction of the
GENERAL PRACTITIONER (NOT A SURGEON) crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
AND HAVE EXCLUDED SURGERY FROM THE arising from analleged medical malpractice, is supported
LIMITS OFHIS PRACTICE, AND IT WAS NOT AND by the evidence on record.
NEVER HIS DUTY TO OPERATE THE PATIENT Worth noting is that the assigned errors are actually
RODOLFO PALMA JR., THAT WAS WHY HE factual in nature, which as a general rule, findings of

factof the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding
and conclusiveupon this Court, and we will not normally
disturb such factual findings unless the findings of the
court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record
or unless the judgment itself is based on misapprehension
of facts. Inthe instant case, we find the need to make
certain exception.
AS TO DR. YNZON'S LIABILITY:
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or
failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precautionon the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act.13 The elements of reckless
imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do
an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is
voluntary; (3) that it bewithout malice; (4) that material
damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5)
that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the offender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition,
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.14
With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the
offense have been clearly established by the evidence on
record. The court a quoand the appellate court were one
in concluding that Dr. Ynzon failed to observe the
required standard of care expected from doctors.
In the instant case, it was sufficiently established that to
prevent certain death, it was necessary to perform surgery
on JR immediately. Even the prosecution’s own expert
witness, Dr. Antonio Mateo,15 testified during cross-
examination that he would perform surgery on JR:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q. Given these data soft non-tender abdomen,
ambulatory, watery diarrhea, Exhibit C which is the
ultrasound result, with that laboratory would you operate
the patient?
A Yes, I would do surgery.
Q And you should have done surgery with this particular
case?"
A Yes, sir.16
xxxx
COURT:
Q You stated a while ago doctor thatyou are going to [do]
surgery to the patient, why doctor, if you are notgoing to
do surgery, what will happen?
A If this would be appendicitis, the usual progress would
be that it would be ruptured and generalized peritonitis
and eventually septicemia, sir.
Q What do you mean by that doctor?
59
A That means that infection would spread throughout the
body, sir.
Q If unchecked doctor, what will happen?
A It will result to death.17
xxxx
Q And what would have you doneif you entertain other
considerations from the time the patient was admitted?
A From the time the patient was admitted until the report
of the sonologist, I would have made a decision by then.
Q And when to decide the surgery would it be a
particular exact time, would it be the same for all
surgeons?
A If you are asking acute appendicitis, it would be about
24 hours because acute appendicitis is a 24-hour disease,
sir.
Q. And would it be correct to say that it depends on the
changes on the condition of the patient?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, are you saying more than 24 hours when there are
changes?
A. If there are changes in the patient pointing towards
appendicitis then you have to decide right there and then,
sir.
Q. So if there are changes in the patient pointing to
appendicitis?
A. It depends now on what you are trying to wait for in
the observation period, sir.
Q. So precisely if the change is a condition which bring
you in doubt that there is something else other than
appendicitis, would you extend over a period of 24
hours?
A. It depends on the emergent development, sir.
Q. That is the point, if you are the attending physician
and there is a change not pointing to appendicitis, would
you extend over a period of 24 hours?
A. In 24 hours you have to decide, sir.
xxxx
Q. And that is based on the assessment of the attending
physician?
A. Yes, sir.18
Dr. Mateo further testified on cross-examination:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q: So you will know yourself, as far as the record is
concerned, because if you will agree with me, you did
not even touch the patient?
A. Yes, I based my opinion on what is put on record, sir.
The records show that after the observation period, the

abdominal pain is still there plus there are already other
signs and symptoms which are not seen or noted.
Q. But insofar as you yourself not having touched the
abdomen of the patient, would you give a comment on
that?
A. Yes, based on the record, after 24 hours of
observation, the pain apparently was still there and there
was more vomiting and there was diarrhea. In my
personal opinion, I think the condition of the patient was
deteriorating.
Q. Even though you have not touched the patient?
A. I based on what was on the record, sir.19
From the foregoing, it is clear that if JR’s condition
remained unchecked it would ultimately result in his
death, as what actually happened in the present case.
Another expert witness for the defense, Dr. Vivencio
Villaflor, Jr. testified on direct examination that he would
perform a personal and thorough physical examination of
the patient as frequent as every 4 to 6 hours, to wit:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q. As an expert doctor, if you were faced with a history
of abdominal pain with nausea, vomiting, fever, anurecia
(sic), elevated white blood cell count, physical
examination of a positive psoas sign, observation of the
sonologist of abdominal tenderness and the ultrasound
findings of the probability of appendiceal (sic) pathology,
what will you do if you have faced these problems,
Doctor?
A. I will examine the patient thoroughly and it will
depend on my physical examination and that isprobably
every 4 to 6 hours, sir.20
On cross-examination, Dr. Villaflor affirmed:
Cross Exam. By Atty. Marteja:
Q. x x x However, there are corrections and admissions
made at that time, your Honor, do I understand thatT/C
does not mean ruled out but rather to consider the matter?
A. Yes, now that I have seen the records of the patient, it
says here, impression and T/C means to consider the
appendicitis.
Q. Isn't it that it is worth then to say that the initial
working diagnosis on Rodolfo Palma, Jr., otherwise
known as JR, to whom I shall now refer to as JR, the
primary consideration then is acute appendicitis, is that
correct to say Doctor?
A. I think so, that is the impression.
Q. x x x Now if it is to be considered as the primary
consideration in the initial working diagnosis, isn't it a
fact that it has tobe ruled out in order to consider it as not
the disease of JR?
60
A. Yes. Sir.
Q. Isn't it a fact thatto rule out acute appendicitis as not
the disease of JR, surgery or operation must be done, isn't
it Doctor?
A. You have to correlate all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute
appendicitis there must be an operation, that is right
Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is toreally determine if it is
an acute appendicitis, you have to operate.21
xxxx
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering
that there was a [symptom] that causes pain, considering
that JR likewise was feverish and that he was vomiting,
does that not show a disease of acute appendicitis
Doctor?
A. Its possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the
impression then Doctor what you have earlier mentioned
that the only way to rule out the suspect which is acute
appendicitis is by surgery, you have said that earlier
Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir.22
Verily, whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the
requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his
patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert
opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinions of
qualified physicians stems from its realization that the
latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in
most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating.23 From the testimonies of the expert witnesses
presented, it was irrefutably proven that Dr. Ynzon failed
to practice that degree of skill and care required in the
treatment of his patient.
As correctly observed by the appellate court, Dr. Ynzon
revealed want of reasonable skill and care in attending to
the needs of JR by neglecting to monitor effectively the
developmentsand changes on JR's condition during the
observation period, and to act upon the situation after the
24-hour period when his abdominal pain persisted and
his condition worsened. Lamentable, Dr. Ynzon appeared
to have visited JRbriefly only during regular rounds in
the mornings. He was not there during the crucial times
on June 16, 2000 when JR's condition started to
deteriorate until JR's death. As the attending surgeon, he
should be primarily responsible in monitoring the
condition of JR, as he is in the best position considering
his skills and experience to know if the patient's

condition had deteriorated. While the resident-doctors-
onduty could likewise monitor the patient’scondition, he
is the one directly responsible for the patient as the
attending surgeon. Indeed, it is reckless and gross
negligence of duty to relegate his personal responsibility
to observe the condition of the patient. Again, acute
appendicitis was the working diagnosis, and with the
emergence of graver symptoms after the 24-hour
observation, Dr. Ynzon ruled out surgery for no apparent
reason. We, likewise, note that the records are devoid of
showing of any reasonable cause which would lead Dr.
Ynzon tooverrule appendectomy despite the initial
diagnosis of appendicitis. Neitherwas there any showing
that he was entertaining another diagnosis nor he took
appropriate steps towards another diagnosis.
Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence,
what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the
conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited,
by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack
of precaution. It is that which supplies the criminal intent
so indispensable as tobring an act of mere negligence and
imprudence under the operation of the penal law. This is
because a conscious indifference to the consequences of
the conduct is all that is required from the standpoint of
the frame of mind of the accused.24 Quasioffenses
penalize the mental attitudeor condition behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, the lack of care or foresight,
the "imprudencia punible," unlike willful offenses which
punish the intentional criminal act.25 This is precisely
where this Court found Dr. Ynzon to be guilty of - his
seemingly indifference to the deteriorating condition of
JR that he as a consequence, failed to exercise lack of
precaution which eventually led to JR's death.
To be sure, whether or not a physician has committed an
"inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to the standard of
care observed by other members of the profession in
good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment or the present state of medical science. In
accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having
the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ
such training, care and skill in the treatment of his
patients. He, therefore, has a duty to use at least the same
level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances.26 Sadly, Dr. Ynzon did not display that
degree of care and precaution demanded by the
circumstances.
AS TO DR. CABUGAO'S LIABILITY:
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to
prove two things — the fact of the crime, i.e., the
61
presence of all the elements of the crime for which the
accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is
the perpetrator of the crime. Based on the above
disquisitions, however, the prosecution failed to prove
these two things. The Court is not convinced with moral
certainty that Dr. Cabugao isguilty of reckless
imprudence as the elements thereof were not proven by
the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
Both the trial court and the appellate court bewail the
failure to perform appendectomy on JR, or the failure to
determine the source of infection which caused the
deterioration of JR's condition. However, a review of the
records fail to show that Dr. Cabugao is in any position
to perform the required appendectomy.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of
this case is the fact that Dr. Cabugao is not a surgeon,but
a general practitioner specializing in family
medicine;27 thus, even if he wanted to, he cannot do an
operation, much less an appendectomy on JR. It is
precisely for this reason why he referred JR to Dr. Ynzon
after he suspected appendicitis. Dr. Mateo, the
prosecution’s expert witness, emphasized the role of the
surgeon during direct examination, to wit:
ATTY. MARTEJA:
Q. You had mentioned that under this circumstances and
condition, you have mentioned that surgery is the
solution, would you have allowed then a 24 hour
observation?
A. If there is a lingering doubt, inshort period of
observation of 18-24 hours can be allowed provided that
there would be close monitoring of the patient, sir.
Q. Would you please tell us who would be doing the
monitoring doctor?
A. The best person should be the first examiner, the best
surgeon, sir.
Q. So that would you say that it is incumbent on the
surgeon attending to the case to have been the one to
observe within the period of observation?
A. Yes, because he will be in the best position to observe
the sudden changes in the condition of the patient, sir.
Q. And how often would in your experience doctor, how
often would the surgeon re-assist (sic) the condition of
the patient during the period of observation?
A. Most foreign authors would recommend every four
(4) hours, some centers will recommend hourly or every
two hours but here in the Philippines, would recommend
for 4 to 6 hours, sir.28
Dr. Cabugao’s supervision does not cease upon his
endorsement of his patient to the surgeon. Here, Dr.
Cabugao has shown to have exerted all efforts to monitor

his patient and under these circumstances he did not have
any cause to doubt Dr. Ynzon’s competence and
diligence. Expert testimonies have been offered to prove
the circumstances surrounding the case of JR and the
need to perform an operation. Defense witness, Dr.
Villaflor, on cross examination testified, to wit:
Q. Isn't it a fact that torule out acute appendicitis as
notthe disease of JR, surgery or operation mustbe done,
isn't it Doctor?
A. You have to [correlate] all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute
appendicitis there must be an operation, that is right
Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is to really determine if it is
an acute appendicitis, you have to operate.29
xxxx
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering
that there was a [symptom] that causes pain, considering
that JR likewise was feverish and that he was vomitting,
does that not show a disease of acute appendicitis
Doctor?
A. It’s possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the
impression then Doctor what you have earlier mentioned
that the only way to rule out the suspect which is acute
appendicitis is by surgery, you have said that earlier
Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir.30
Neither do we find evidence that Dr. Cabugao has been
negligent or lacked the necessary precaution in his
performance of his duty as a family doctor. On the
contrary, a perusal ofthe medical records would show
that during the 24-hour monitoring on JR, it was Dr.
Cabugao who frequently made orders on the
administration of antibiotics and pain relievers. There
was also repetitive instructions from Dr. Cabugao to refer
JR to Dr. Ynzon as it appeared that he is suspecting
appendicitis. The referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon,
is actually an exercise of precaution as he knew that
appendicitis is not within his scope of expertise. This
clearly showed that he employed the best of his
knowledge and skill in attending to JR's condition, even
after the referral of JR to Dr. Ynzon. To be sure, the
calculated assessment of Dr. Cabugao to refer JRto a
surgeon who has sufficient training and experience to
handle JR’s case belies the finding that he displayed
inexcusable lack of precaution in handling his patient.31
62
We likewise note that Dr. Cabugao was out of town when
JR's condition began to deteriorate. Even so, before he
left, he made endorsement and notified the resident-
doctor and nurses-on-duty that he will be on leave.
Moreover, while both appeared to be the attending
physicians of JR during his hospital confinement, it
cannot be said that the finding of guilt on Dr. Ynzon
necessitates the same finding on the co-accused Dr.
Cabugao. Conspiracy is inconsistent with the idea of a
felony committed by means of culpa.32 Thus, the
accused-doctors to be found guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, it must be shown that
both accused-doctors demonstratedan act executed
without malice or criminal intent – but with lack of
foresight, carelessness, or negligence. Noteworthy, the
evidence on record clearly points to the reckless
imprudence of Dr. Ynzon; however, the same cannot be
said in Dr. Cabugao's case.
AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY
While this case is pending appeal, counsel for petitioner
Dr. Ynzon informed the Court that the latter died on
December 23, 2011 due to "multiorgan failure" as
evidenced by a copy of death certificate.33 Thus, the
effect of death, pending appeal of his conviction of
petitioner Dr. Ynzon with regard to his criminal and
pecuniary liabilities should be in accordance to People v.
Bayotas,34 wherein the Court laid down the rules in case
the accused dies prior to final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e.,civil liability ex
delictoin senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation fromwhich the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on

Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either againstthe
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitationson the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.35
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the
accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery
of civil liability subsists as the same is not based on
delictbut by contract and the reckless imprudence he was
guilty of under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.1âwphi1For this reason, a separate civil action may
be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based, 36 and in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, we quote:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. – The death of the
accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising
from the delict. However, the independent civil action
instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter
is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources
of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or
against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the
accused may besubstituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative
or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party
shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in
these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the
deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the
offended party may file against the estate of the
deceased. (Emphases ours)
63
In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and
the offended party desires to recover damages from the
same act or omission complained of, the party may file a
separate civil action based on the other sources of
obligation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111.37 If
the same act or omission complained of arises from
quasi-delict,as in this case, a separate civil action must be
filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of
the accused, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court:38
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be
brought against executor or administrator. — No action
upon a claim for the recovery of money or debtor interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but to recover real or personal property, or
an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against him. (Emphases ours)
Conversely, if the offended party desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of
arising from contract, the filing of a separate civil action
must be filed against the estate, pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice.
If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for money
against the decent, arising from contract, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent,
all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money
against the decent, must be filed within the time limited
in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except
that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants. Where an executor or administrator
commencesan action, or prosecutes an action already
commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor
may set forth by answer the claims he has against the
decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the
court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set
off against each other in such action; and if final
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been
presented directly beforethe court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be
approved at their present value.
As a final note, we reiterate thatthe policy against double
recovery requires that only one action be maintained for
the same act or omission whether the action is brought
against the executor or administrator, or the estate. 39 The
heirs of JR must choose which of the available causes of
action for damages they will bring.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR.
ANTONIO P. CABUGAO is hereby ACQUITTEDof the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the
disposition of this case, his criminal liability is
extinguished; however, his civil liability subsists. A
separate civil action may be filed either against the
executor/administrator, or the estateof Dr. Ynzon,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same are based.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998
ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita
Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue,
Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car
of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result,
complainant sustained physical injuries, while the
damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the
complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint 1 against
petitioner with the Fiscal's Office.
On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed
as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Slight Physical Injury." The
information read:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita
Reodica of the crime of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical
Injury as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused,
Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver
and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate
no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same
in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent
manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and
regulations and without taking the necessary care and
precaution to avoid damage to property and injuries
64
to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness
and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with
a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven
and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing
damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and
prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned amount
of P8,542.00.
That as further consequence due to the strong impact,
said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which
required medical attendance for a period of less that
nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing
his customary labor for the same period of time.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Trial then ensued.
On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145,
rendered a decision 3 convicting petitioner of the
"quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with slight physical injuries," and
sentencing her:
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol
y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five
Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency,
without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency;
and to pay the costs. 4
The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison
term in this wise:
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused,
complainant suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D,
H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the
penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment
(Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review,
Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence is now punished with
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
(People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in
Gregorio's book, p. 718). 5
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost
of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses
(P5,000.00).
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of
Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No.
14660. After her motions for extension of time to file
her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to
Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to
Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing
Appellant's Brief. However, respondent Court of
Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to
file her brief. 6
After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner
to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals

7
rendered a decision on 31 January 1996 affirming
the appealed decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for
reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus:
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS
IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY
AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET
ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY
SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT
OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT
COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND EVEN
ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT
IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9
xxx xxx xxx
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS
POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR
LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10
In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of
Appeals denied petitioner's motion
reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her
supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court premised on the following
grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS
RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE
CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY
ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A
PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT
AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS
OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY
SOURCE.
A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE
SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED
ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE
ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE
PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO
MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE
RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER
MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE
PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR
COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.
65
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN
ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF
PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the
courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise
the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the
penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was
not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the
ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense
was arresto menor — not arresto mayor.
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers
that the courts below should have pronounced that
for there were two separate light felonies involved,
namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical
injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to
property, instead of considering them a complex
crime. Two light felonies, she insists, "do not . . . rate
a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of
six months," citing Lontok v. Gorgonio, 12 thus:
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double
less serious physical injuries, damage to property
amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries,
a chief of police did not err in filing a separate
IS complaint for the slight physical injuries and another
complaint for the lesiones menos graves and damage
to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31,
1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by
investigating fiscal, is different from the instant case
because in that case the negligent act resulted in the
offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to
property which were both less grave felonies and
which, therefore, constituted a complex crime.
In the instant case, following the ruling in
the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through
reckless imprudence should have been charged in a
separate information.
She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two
light offenses, both imposable in their maximum
period and computed or added together, only sum up
to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as
imposed by the lower courts."

On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the
offense of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor,
is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months.
Here, since the information was filed only on 13
January 1988, or almost three months from the date
the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had
already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:
In the instant case, following the ruling in
the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through
reckless imprudence should have been charged in a
separate information. And since, as a light offense, it
prescribes in two months, Lontok's criminal liability
therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and
91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f],
Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed
a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's
motion to quash that part of the information charging
him with that light offense.
Petitioner further claims that the information was
filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial
Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She
submits that damage to property and slight physical
injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the
rules on summary procedure; therefore, only the
filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could
have tolled the statute of limitations, this time
invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13
In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with
petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto
menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto
mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends
that conformably with Buerano v. Court of
Appeals, 14which frowns upon splitting of crimes and
prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to
"complex" reckless imprudence with slight physical
injuries and damage to property because what the law
seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless
imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was
no need for two separate informations.
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits
that although the Municipal Trial Court had
jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight
physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly
took cognizance of this case because it had the
jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the
damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice
the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG
cites Cuyos v. Garcia. 15
66
The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of
prescription of the crime, arguing that the
prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the
incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma 16 and Chico
v. Isidro. 17
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner
expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in
joining cause with her as to the first assigned error.
However, she considers the OSG's reliance
on Buerano v. Court of Appeals 18 as misplaced, for
nothing there validates the "complexing" of the crime
of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and
damage to property; besides, in that case, two
separate informations were filed — one for slight and
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
and the other for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case,
following Arcaya v. Teleron 19 and Lontok v.
20
Gorgonio, two informations should have been filed.
She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would
only apply here on the assumption that it was proper
to "complex" damage to property through reckless
imprudence with slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro 22 is likewise
"inapposite," for it deals with attempted homicide,
which is not covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Petitioner finally avers that People v.
23
Cuaresma should not be given retroactive effect;
otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or
render nugatory the en banc ruling
in Zaldivia 24 favorable to her.
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is
correct.
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property in the amount of
P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries are light felonies.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to
the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be
questioned for the first time on appeal.
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction
over the offenses in question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have
already prescribed.
I. The Proper Penalty

We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the
penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the
trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of
Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to
their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in
its maximum period is the proper penalty.
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person
who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony,
the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period
shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence,
shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute
a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article
shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than 25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be
imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence
or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall
exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be
applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal
to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts
shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than
that which should be imposed in the period which
they may deem proper to apply.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted
Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto
menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21
to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is,
67
however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is
penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30
days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may
be either lower than or equal to the penalty
prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365.
This being the case, the exception in the sixth
paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper
penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries is public censure, this being the
penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. 25
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third
paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the
penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless
imprudence in this case did not result in damage to
property only. What applies is the first paragraph of
Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to
4 months) for an act committed through reckless
imprudence which, had it been intentional, would
have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the
damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused
deliberately, the crime would have been malicious
mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code,
and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day
to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in
the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty
under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that
provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth
paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty
next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its
maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum
period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months.
Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property to the
extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, which could be
anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a
maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court,
since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that
in the imposition of the penalties therein provided
"the courts shall exercise their sound discretion
without regard to the rules prescribed in article 64."
II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.
Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo),
but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit
when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate
intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight
or lack of skill. 26

As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries is punishable by public
censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised
Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law
carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is
classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light
penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale
provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty
lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting
in damage to property is, as earlier discussed,
penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional
penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code,
the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony —
not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.
III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more
than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code
on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as
follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act
results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v.
Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where one of the
resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a
light felony, there is no complex crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is
light, there is no complex crime. The resulting
offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony
may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light
felonies of damage to property and slight physical
injuries, both resulting from a single act of
imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They
cannot be charged in one information. They are
separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People
vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70
Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double
less serious physical injuries, damage to property
amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a
chief of police did not err in filing a separate
complaint for the slight physical injuries and another
68
complaint for the lesiones menor graves and damage
to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31,
1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the
following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave
felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light
felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries.
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here,
that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries should have been
charged in a separate information because it is not
covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, petitioner may no longer question, at this
stage, the duplicitous character of the
information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in
one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This
defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in
a motion to quash before she pleaded to the
information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a
single complaint or information and the accused fails
to object to it before trial, the court may convict the
accused of as many offenses as are charged and
proved and impose on him the penalty for each of
them. 29
V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the
Quasi Offenses in Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be
determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, unless the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
intended to operate as to actions pending before its
enactment. 30
At the time of the filing of the information in this
case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980." Section 32(2) 31 thereof provided that
except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had
exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses
punishable with imprisonment of got exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other

penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof."
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then
determined by the duration of the imprisonment and
the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense
charged. The question thus arises as to which court
has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure,
such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that
a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had
jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the
duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6
years, which was co-extensive with prision
correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise:
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized
with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of
the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article
71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has
placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower
penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express
provision of law to the contrary it is logical and
reasonable to infer from said provisions that its
intention was to place offenses penalized
with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of
the peace and municipal courts and not under that of
courts of first instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment
of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the
jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and
MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure,
which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the
graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal
Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also
fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus,
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was
also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or
MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor
was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods — the duration of which was from 1 month
and 1 day to 4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC of Makati.
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
69
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two
months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property in the amount of
P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty
is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
prescribes in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses
have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine
whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's
office three days after the incident in question tolled
the running of the prescriptive period.
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. —
The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint
of information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped by any reason not imputable to him.
(emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the
prescriptive period "shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information," does not distinguish
whether the complaint is filed for preliminary
examination or investigation only or for an action on
the merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals 34 and People v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court held
that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's
office suspends the running of the statute of
limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, which provides that in cases covered
thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the
prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC
without need of a prior preliminary examination or
investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila
and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced
only by information." However, this Section cannot
be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is
interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases
is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in
the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
diminish, increase or modify substantive

37
rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule
on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court
and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must
be recalled that what was involved therein was a
violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the
applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act
to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to
Run." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of
prescription is suspended only when judicial
proceedings are instituted against the guilty party.
Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive
period was not interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial
proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive
period there was only the filing of the information in
the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are
covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof
and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply.
Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in
question was interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the
vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the
termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold
petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses
charged in the information in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The challenge decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as
the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was
affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 33919.
Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41692 April 30, 1976
EUGENIO CABRAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF
BULACAN, and SILVINO SAN DIEGO, respondents.
Arturo Agustines for petitioner.
Celso B. Poblete for private respondent.
ANTONIO, J.:p
70
Certiorari and prohibition to nullify the Order of
respondent Judge dated May 21, 1975, reviving the
Information in Criminal Case No. B-537-74 of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, Baliwag Branch, and to
prohibit said court from conducting further proceedings
on the case.
On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San
Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information on
September 24, 1974 with respondent court, accusing
petitioner Eugenio Cabral of the crime of Falsification of
Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14,
1948 the signature of Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale
of a parcel of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved
to quash the Information on the ground of prescription of
the crime charge, as the said document of sale of Lot No.
378-C was notarized on August 14, 1948, registered with
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on August 26, 1948 and
as a consequence the original certificate of title was
cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title issued,
and since then Eugenio Cabral had publicly and
continuously possessed said property and exercised acts
of ownership thereon, which facts are apparently
admitted in the letter of San Diego's lawyer to Cabral on
September 17, 1953. After hearing said motion, Judge
Juan F. Echiverri, in a Resolution dated March 25, 1975,
granted the motion to quash and dismissed the
Information on the ground of prescription. The order of
dismissal was predicated upon said court's finding that
the factual averments contained in the notion to quash
were supported by the evidence. Private prosecutor, who
was not present during the hearing of the motion to
quash, filed a motion dated April 8, 1975, for the
reconsideration of said Resolution. This was opposed by
petitioner on the ground that San Diego can no longer
intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action
in April 1974 against the same accused (Eugenio Cabral)
on the basis of the same factual averments contained in
the criminal Information. Acting on the motion for
reconsideration, respondent. Judge Benigno M. Puno,
now presiding, ordered on May 12, 1975 the Fiscal to
"make known his position to the Court." In compliance
with said Order, the Fiscal submitted his comment dated
May 19, 1975, expressing the view that the crime, has
not prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he only
discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and "...
that, in the interest of justice, arraignment and trial is
proper to ventilate the respective evidence of both parties
in their total meaning and import in determining once
and for all the direction direction and thrust of these
evidence of both parties."
Two (2) days later on, or on May 21, 1975, respondent
Judge set aside the Resolution of March 25, 1975, and
reinstated the Information. Petitioner moved for

reconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a) "the
judgment of acquittal which became final immediately
upon promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled
for correction or amendment"; and (b) by instituting Civil
Case No. 120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his right
to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. This
motion was denied, as well as the second motion for
reconsideration, hence this petition, raising the issue of
whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside
its Resolution of March 25, 1975.
The issue being purely legal and considering that the
matter has been amply discuss in the pleadings, 1 this
case was deemed submitted for decision without need of
memoranda.
The Solicitor General was required to appear in this case,
and he recommends giving due course to the petition and
the reversal of the challenged order. According to the
Solicitor General, the Resolution of March 25, 1975
dismissing the Information on the ground of prescription
of the crime became a bar to another charge of
falsification, including the revival of the Information.
This is more so, because said Resolution had already
become final and executory, inasmuch as the Fiscal
neither sought its reconsideration nor appealed therefrom
within the. reglementary period of fifteen (15) days after
his receipt of a copy thereof on March 31, 1975. When
the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975,
or about two (2) months from receipt of a copy of the
order of dismissal, the same had already long been final.
We agree with the Solicitor General. The Rules of Court
is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to quash
based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense. 2 Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
also provides that "prescription of the crime" is one of
the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability."
Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification
under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, which carries an imposable penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. This
crime prescribes ten (10) years. 3 Here, San Diego had
actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery
after the document was registered in the Register of
Deeds on August 26, 1948.
In Pangan v. Pasicolan, 4 where the trial court set aside
its own order dismissing the criminal case nine (9)
months thereafter, this Court held that the order was null
and void for want of jurisdiction, as the first order had
already become final and executory.
Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga setting aside its order of
September 10, 1956 dismissing the case against
71
petitioners nine months thereafter, or on June 11, 1957.
The issue is whether or not the court had jurisdiction to
enter that order. While the court may find it necessary to
hear the views of a private prosecutor before acting on a
motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal, it does not follow
that it can set aside its order dismissing the case even if
the same has already become final. There is no law
which requires notice to a private prosecutor, because
under the rules all criminal actions are prosecuted "under
the direction and control of the fiscal" (Section 4, Rule
106). It appearing that the order already final, the court
acted without jurisdiction in in issuing the the subsequent
order.
And likewise, in People v. Sanchez, 5 it was held that "a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse
of the period for perfecting an appeal, ... Under the
circumstances, the sentence having become final, no
court, not even this high Tribunal, can modify it even if
erroneous ...". We hold that these rulings are applicable
to the case at bar.
While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San
Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for
reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day
period, such move did not stop the running of the period
for appeal. He did not have the legal personality to
appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his
behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the
private prosecutor is under the direction and control of
the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or
appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the
period for appeal. 6
The right of the offended party to appeal is recognized
under the old Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Section
4 of Rule 110 which provides that the prosecution shall
be "under the direction and control of the fiscal" without
the limitation imposed by section 107 of General Order
No. 58 subjecting the direction of the prosecution to the
right "of the person injured to appeal from any decision
of the court denying him a legal right", said right to
appeal by an offended party from an order of dismissal is
no longer recognized in the offended party. ... (U)nder
the new Rules of Court, the fiscal has the direction and
control of the prosecution, without being subject to the
right of intervention on the part of the offended party to
appeal from an order dismis ing a criminal case upon
petition of the fiscal would be tantamount to giving said
party as much right the direction and control of a
criminal proceeding as that of fiscal. 7
More important, he lost his right to intervene in the
criminal case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on
September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and
Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations
that San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14,

1948 was a forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action
against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the
Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. 120-V-
74) for the recovery of the same property and damages. It
appearing, therefore, from the record that at the time the
order of dismissal was issued there was a pending civil
action arising out of the same alleged forged document
filed by the offended party against the same defendant,
the offended party has no right to intervene in the
prosecution of the criminal case,, and consequently
cannot ask for the reconsideration of the order of
dismissal, or appeal from said order.8
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and
Orders of May 21, 1975, August 4, 1975 and September
3, 1975, of respondent Judge are hereby set aside. No
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. Nos. 74226-27 July 27, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MIZPAH R. REYES, respondent.
Pacianito B. Cabaron for respondent.
Celso C. Dimayuga co-counsel for respondent.
CORTES, J.:
The crime of falsification of a public document carries
with it an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more
than P5,000.00 [Art. 172, Revised Penal Code (RPC)].
Being punishable by a correctional penalty, this crime
prescribes in ten (10) years [Art. 90, par. 3 (RPC)]. The
ten (10) year prescriptive period commences to run "from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents . . ." [Art. 91,
(RCP)]. In the instant case, the public document
allegedly falsified was a notarized deed of sale registered
on May 26, 1961 with the Register of Deeds in the name
of the accused, private respondent herein, Mizpah R.
Reyes. The two informations for falsification of a public
document subject matter of the controversy were,
however, filed only on October 18, 1984. The
complainants claim that they discovered the falsified
notarized deed of sale in June 1983. The Court is tasked
with determining whether the crime has prescribed which
hinges on whether or not its discovery may be deemed to
have taken place from the time the document was
registered with the Register of Deeds, consistent with the
rule on constructive notice.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a
parcel of land located in Lipa City registered in their
names under TCT No. T-7471. Both are now deceased,
72
the husband having died on September 6, 1970 and his
wife on August 7, 1977. They were survived by the
following children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the
complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara and
Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.
In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered
from the records of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City
that the abovementioned property had already been
transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, single, of legal
age, Filipino and resident of the City of Lipa,
Philippines" under TCT No. T-9885. They further
allegedly discovered that the conveyance was effected
through a notarized deed of sale executed and signed on
May 19, 1961 by their parents Julio Rizare and Patricia
Pampo. The deed of sale was registered with the Register
of Deeds of Lipa City on May 26, 1961. Upon
examination of the document, they found that the
signature of their parents were allegedly falsified and that
accused also made an untruthful statement that she was
single although she was married to one Benjamin Reyes
on May 2, 1950. The document was referred by the
complainants to the National Bureau of Investigation
(N.B.I.) for examination of the signatures of their parents
and a report was returned with the finding that the
signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia
Pampo was forged. Upon complaint by the sisters of the
accused and after conducting an investigation, the fiscal
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch
XIII, Lipa City on October 18, 1984 two (2) informations
both for falsification of public document, the first in
Criminal Case No. V-1163, for allegedly making it
appear in the notarized deed of sale that Patricia Pampo,
the mother of the accused, participated in the sale of a
parcel of land by falsifying Pampo's signature, and the
second in Criminal Case No. V-1164, for allegedly
making an untruthful statement of fact in the deed of
sale, more specifically, by stating that accused was
single.
Before arraignment, accused filed a motion to quash both
informations on grounds that: (1) "The criminal action or
liability has been extinguished by prescription of the
crime in the light of Cabral v. Puno, 70 SCRA 606;" and
(2) "The trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense
charged and the person of accused because of non-
compliance with the pre-conciliation requirement of P.D.
No. 1508." [Rollo, p. 33].
The trial court granted the motion and quashed the
informations in the two (2) cases stating that:
xxx
...The title, once registered, is a notice to the world. All
Persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of
registration.

The essence, therefore, of registration is to serve notice
to the whole world of the legal status and the dealing
therewith.
If registration is a notice to the whole world, then
registration is in itself a notice and therefore, the
prescriptive period of registered document must start to
run from the date the same was annotated in the Register
of Deeds.
In these two cases in question, prescriptive period of ten
(10) years should have started from May 26, 1960 (sic).
Considering the lapse of more than twenty (20) years
before the two informations were filed, the crimes for
which the accused, Mizpah Reyes, are charged have
already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, Criminal Cases Nos.
V-1163 and V-1164 are quashed. [Rollo, pp. 33-34].
From the trial court's order quashing the two (2)
informations, the People, petitioner herein, filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals (then designated as the
Intermediate Appellate Court). In
decision ** promulgated on April 3, 1986, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. The Court of
Appeals rejected the theory of petitioner that the
prescriptive period should commence on June 1983,
when the complainants actually discovered the fraudulent
deed of sale. The appellate court sustained the trial
court's ruling that the prescriptive period started on May
26, 1961, when the deed of sale was registered with the
Register of Deeds of Lipa City. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, filed by the People, through the Solicitor-
General.
Among the authorities relied upon by the Court of
Appeals in dismissing petitioner's appeal is the case
of Cabral v. Puno, G.R. No. L-41692, April 30, 1976, 70
SCRA 606, where the Supreme Court made a statement
to the effect that in the crime of falsification of a public
document, the prescriptive period commences from the
time the offended party had constructive notice of the
alleged forgery after the document was registered with
the Register of Deeds. However, petitioner contends that
this particular statement is not doctrine but merely
an obiter dictum.
The Cabral case stemmed from the filing on September
24, 1974 of an information accusing Eugenio Cabral of
the crime of falsification of public document for
allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of
the complainant Silvino San Andres in a deed of sale of a
parcel of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved to
quash the information on the ground of prescription of
the crime, as the notarized deed of sale was registered
with the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948. After
73
hearing the motion, the judge issued a resolution granting
the motion to quash and dismissing the information on
the ground of prescription. Private prosecutor filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the resolution. Acting
on said motion, the trial court ordered the fiscal to make
known his position. The fiscal filed a comment stating
that the crime has not prescribed as the complainant San
Diego claimed that he only discovered the crime in
October 1970. Thereafter, the trial court set aside its
resolution granting the accused's motion to quash and
reinstated the information. The accused brought the case
to the Supreme Court questioning the trial court's
authority to set aside its resolution granting his motion to
quash. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused
by holding that the aforementioned resolution has already
become final and executory for failure of the fiscal to file
a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period. The motion for reconsideration filed by the
private prosecutor was disregarded because of the latter's
lack of legal standing. Another reason given by the Court
a for its decision is the following:
. . .The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining
a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense [Secs. 2(f) and
8, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court]. Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code also provides that "prescription of
the crime is one of the grounds for "total extinction of
criminal liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime
of falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and
(2) of the Revised Penal Code, which carries an
imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
P5,000.00. This crime prescribes in ten (10) years
[Article 90, Revised Penal Code]. Here, San Diego had
actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery
after the document was registered in the Register of
Deeds on August 26, 1948.
xxx
[Cabral v. Puno, supra at p. 609].
Although the prescription of the crime was not squarely
in issue in Cabral, it is apparent that the statement of the
Court on prescription and constructive notice was not
totally irrelevant to the disposition of the case. Moreover,
it is not without any legal basis.
The rule is well-established that registration in a public
registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is
constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests,
legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are
charged with knowledge of what it contains [Legarda and
Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915); Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 22,
1980, 95 SCRA 380; Hongkong and Shanghai Banking

Corporation v. Pauli, et al., G.R. No. L-38303, May 30,
1988,161 SCRA 634; See also Sec. 52, Pres. Decree No.
1529 (1978)].
Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that a purchaser of
registered land is presumed to be charged with notice of
every fact shown by the record. The Court, in explaining
the nature of the rule on constructive notice and the
presumption arising therefrom stated in Gatioan v.
Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28 1969, 27 SCRA
706, 712-713, that:
xxx
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such
record is constructive notice of its contents and all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein ...
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser
has examined every instrument of record affecting the
title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with
notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed
to know every fact which an examination of the record
would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be
overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise
the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record
would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the
record contains any more than one may be permitted to
show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law.
The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts
which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule
must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless
confusion and useless litigation.
xxx
It has also been ruled that when an extrajudicial partition
of the property of the deceased was executed by some of
his heirs, the registration of the instrument of partition
with the Register of Deeds is constructive notice that said
heirs have repudiated the fiduciary relationship between
them and the other heirs vis-a-vis the property in
question. The heirs who were not included in the deed of
partition are deemed to have notice of its existence from
the time it was registered with the Register of Deeds [De
la Cerna v. De la Cerna, G.R. No. L-28838, August 31,
1976, 72 SCRA 514]. Likewise, the rule on constructive
notice has been applied in the interpretation of a
provision in the Civil Code on the prescription of actions
for annulment of contracts which is parallel to Art. 91 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Civil Code provision states:
Art. 391. The action for annulment shall be brought
within four years.
This period shall begin:
xxx
74
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the
discovery of the same [Emphasis supplied].
In Armentia v. Patriarca, G.R. No. L-18210, December
29, 1966,18 SCRA 1253, where a notarial document
recorded with the Registry of Deeds was sought to be
annulled, the Court, interpreting the phrase "from the
time of the discovery" found in the aforequoted provision
of the Civil Code, ruled that "in legal contemplation,
discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the
time the document was registered in the Register of
Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice
to the whole world . . ." [See also Avecilla v. Yatco, 103
Phil. 666 (1958); Gerona v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-
19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153; Carantes v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33360, April 25, 1977, 76 SCRA
514; Cultura v. Tupacar, G.R. No. L-48430, December 3,
1985,140 SCRA 311; Cimafranco v. IAC, G.R. No. L-
68687, January 31, 1987, 147 SCRA 611; Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Pauli, et al., supra.]
However, petitioner contends that Art. 91 of the Revised
Penal Code which states that "the period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day the crime
is discovered by the offended party,the authorities, or
their agents. . cannot be construed in the same manner
because the rule on constructive notice is limited in
application to land registration cases. It is argued that
haste should be avoided in applying civil law
presumptions to criminal suits.
Although caution should be observed in applying the
rules of construction in civil cases in the interpretation of
criminal statutes, the Court will not hesitate to do so if
the factual and legal circumstances so warrant. Hence,
in Mercado v. Santos, 66 Phil. 215 (1938), the Court
applied the presumption arising from the allowance of a
will to bar a criminal action. In theft particular case, the
petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will of his
deceased wife. The will was duly probated. Sixteen (16)
months thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed against
petitioner for falsification or forgery of the will.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case claiming that
the order probating the will is conclusive as to its
authenticity and due execution. The motion having been
denied, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals (CA) which ruled that "the
judgment admitting the will to probate is binding upon
the whole world as to the due execution and genuineness
of the will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are
concerned, but not for the purpose of punishment of a
crime." But the Supreme Court reversed the CA decision
by ruling that, in accordance with See. 625 of the then
Code of Civil Procedure which provides that "the
allowance by the court of a will of real and personal
estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution," *** a

criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the
forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate
by a court of competent jurisdiction.
It is, however, insisted in this case that the rule on
constructive notice applies only in civil cases. It is argued
that the law on prescription of crimes is founded on a
principle different from that of the law on prescription in
civil actions. The difference, it is claimed, precludes the
application of the rule on constructive notice in criminal
actions.
The statute of limitations of civil actions was explained
in Penales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
73611, October 27, 1986, 115 SCRA 223, 228 in the
following manner:
Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose
whose object is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims
from springing up at great distances of time and
surprising the parties or their representatives when the
facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or
death or removal of witnesses . . .
On the other hand, the Court in People v. Moran, 44 Phil.
389, 405-406 (1923), discussed the nature of the statute
of limitations in criminal cases as follows:
xxx
. . . The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily
and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that
after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the
offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to
his country; and resume his immunities as a citizen; and
that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs
of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted
out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be
liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only
because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts
of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of
the statute is a recognition and notification by the
legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears
out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and
positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.
Independently of these views, it must be remembered
that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only
productive of expense to the State, but of peril to public
justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere
natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of
the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that
statutes enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously
maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but checks
imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity
from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the
best evidence that can be obtained.
xxx
75
It is evident that there is merit in petitioner's claim that
the law on prescription of civil suits is founded on
different policy considerations from that of the law on
prescription of criminal actions. However, the Court does
not subscribe to the conclusion that the presumptions and
rules of interpretation used in the law on prescription of
civil suits, including the rule on constructive notice, can
not be applied in criminal actions.
The considerations in providing for prescription of civil
suits are based mainly on practical and equitable
grounds. The lapse of a considerably long period of time
obscures the surrounding circumstances of a particular
claim or right and erodes the integrity of whatever
evidence may be presented in support of an action to
enforce or contest such claim or right. Moreover, where a
particular right has accrued in favor of a party, the
enjoyment of such right cannot forever be left on a
precarious balance, always susceptible to possible
challenge by an adverse party. After a certain period of
time fixed by law, the right enjoyed by a party must be
accorded respect by prohibiting adverse claims the
factual basis of which can no longer be verified with
certainty. Hence, the law on prescription of civil suits is
properly called a statute of repose.
The practical factor of securing for civil suits the best
evidence that can be obtained is also a major
consideration in criminal trials. However, the law on
prescription of crimes rests on a more fundamental
principle. Being more than a statute of repose, it is an act
of grace whereby the state, after the lapse of a certain
period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to
prosecute the criminal act. While the law on prescription
of civil suits is interposed by the legislature as an
impartial arbiter between two contending parties, the law
on prescription of crimes is an act of amnesty and
liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender
[People v. Moran, supra, at p. 405]. Hence, in the
interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that
which is most favorable to the accused is to be adopted
[People v. Moran, supra; People v. Parel, 44 Phil. 437
(1923); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725 (1956)]. The
application of the rule on constructive notice in the
construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code would
most certainly be favorable to the accused since the
prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned
with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale
was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant
case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May
26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a
public document having been filed only on October 18,
1984, or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961,
the crime for which the accused was charged has
prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed

no reversible error in affirming the trial court's order
quashing the two informations on the ground of
prescription.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994
JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division,
HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and
JOSEPH SINSAY, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña and Nolasco for
petitioner.
Ponciano L. Escuadra for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.1 Bigamy
carries with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor.
Being punishable by an afflictive penalty, this crime
prescribes in fifteen (15) years.2 The fifteen-year
prescriptive period commences to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents . . .3
That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems
impliedly admitted.4 At least, it is not expressly denied.
Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his
prosecution for bigamy is already time-barred, which
hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken
place from the time the offended party actually knew of
the second marriage or from the time the document
evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with
the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive
notice.
The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May
1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with
bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151,
for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15
February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C.
Nievera remained valid and subsisting. 5
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground
that his criminal liability for bigamy has been
extinguished by prescription.
76
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied
the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise
denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court
of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. In the assailed decision of
21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of
merit. 6
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal
liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription.
He avers that since the second marriage contract was
duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in
1975,7such fact of registration makes it a matter of public
record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world.
The offended party therefore is considered to have had
constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of
1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day
the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the
corresponding information for bigamy should have been
filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged
concealment of the bigamous marriage" as declared by
the appellate court, insisting that the second marriage
was publicly held at Our Lady of Nativity Church in
Marikina on
15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that
from the moment of registration the marriage contract
was open to inspection by any interested person.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the
prescriptive period does not begin from the commission
of the crime but from the time of discovery by
complainant which was in July 1991.
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive
notice in civil cases may be applied in criminal actions if
the factual and legal circumstances so warrant,8 we agree
with the view expounded by the Court of Appeals that it
cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the
possibility of its being more favorable to the accused.
The appellate court succinctly explains —
Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of
constructive notice should be applied in the case at bar,
principally citing in support of his stand, the cases
of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597); and People
v.Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).
This Court is of the view that the principle of
constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the
crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the
fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by
the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous
subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is
generally entered into in a place where the offender is not

known to be still a married person, in order to conceal his
legal impediment to contract another marriage.
In the case of real property, the registration of any
transaction involving any right or interest therein is made
in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said
property is located. Verification in the office of the
Register of Deeds concerned of the transactions
involving the said property can easily be made by any
interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage,
verification by the offended person or the authorities of
the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a
marriage may be entered into in a place where the
offender is not known to be still a married person.
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the
petitioner wherein constructive notice was applied,
involved therein were land or property disputes and
certainly, marriage is not property.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the
principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the well
entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed
liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from
registration thereof would amount to almost absolving
the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the
celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be
open and made of public record by its registration, the
offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the
officiating authority and those concerned the existence of
his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to
them that he is still a married person. He likewise
conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous
marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a
married person. And such a place may be anywhere,
under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous
marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time.
It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for
the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day
on which the said crime was discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage
by the offender, if the prescriptive period for the offense
of bigamy were to be counted from the date of
registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators of
the said offense would almost be impossible. The
interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage
fearless violations of a social institution cherished and
protected by law. 9
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive
notice will make
de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the
marriages listed in the National Census Office and in
77
various local civil registries all over the country to make
certain that no second or even third marriage has been
contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate
spouse. This is too formidable a task to even
contemplate.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) provides for constructive notice to
all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry
affecting registered land filed or entered in the office of
the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the
land to which it relates lies from the time of such
registering, filing or entering, there is no counterpart
provision either in Act
No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts.
407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the
conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the
constructive notice rule to the documents registered in
the Civil Register.
Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there
was no concealment at all because his marriage contract
with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which
is open to all and sundry for inspection. We cannot go
along with his argument because why did he indicate in
the marriage contract that he was "single" thus obviously
hiding his true status as a married man? Or for that
matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the
subsequent marriage in Marikina so that everything
would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He
knew that no priest or minister would knowingly perform
or authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject
him to punishment under the Marriage Law. 10 Obviously,
petitioner had no intention of revealing his duplicity to
his first spouse and gambled instead on the probability
that she or any third party would ever go to the local civil
registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the simple
expedience of having the second marriage recorded in
the local civil registry, he has set into motion the running
of the fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary
and the unsuspecting victim of his philandering.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by
petitioner, in all likelihood we would be playing right
into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating
the contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of
conveyance and other similar documents without due
regard for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social
institution, the preservation of which is a primary
concern of our society.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals, the same is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47684 June 10, 1941
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
DIONISIO A. MANEJA, defendant-appellee.
First Assistant Solicitor-General Reyes and Solicitor
Barcelona for appellant.
Del Rosario & Del Rosario, Pelaez & Pelaez and
Hilario B. Abellana for appellee.
Godofredo Reyes and Enrique Medina as private
prosecutors.
MORAN, J.:
The sole question raised in this appeal is whether the
period of prescription for the offense of false testimony
which, in the instant case, is five years (art. 180, No. 4, in
relation to art. 90, Revised Penal Code), should
commence from the time the appellee, Dionisio A.
Maneja, adduced the supposed false testimony in
criminal case No. 1872 on December 16, 1933, as the
lower court held, or, from the time the decision of the
Court of Appeals in the aforesaid basic case became final
in December, 1938, as the prosecution contends.
We hold that the theory of the prosecution is the correct
one. The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91,
Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of false
testimony, considering that the penalties provided
therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in
every case, made to depend upon the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of
testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an
actionable offense until the principal case is finally
decided. (Cf. U. S. vs. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663;
People vs. Marcos, et al., G.R. No. 47388, Oct. 22,
1940.) And before an act becomes a punishable offense,
it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the offended
party, the authorities or their agents.
If the period of prescription is to be computed from the
date the supposed false testimony is given, it would be
impossible to determine the length of such period in any
particular case, depending, as it does depend, on the final
outcome of the basic case. For instance, a witness
testifies falsely against an accused who is charged with
murder. If the accused is found guilty, the penalty
prescribed by law for the perjurer is reclusion
temporal (art. 180, No. 1, Revised Penal Code), in which
case the period of prescription is twenty years (art.
90, idem). On the other hand, if the accused is acquitted,
the penalty prescribed for the perjurer is only arresto
mayor (art. 180, No. 4, idem), in which case the period
for prescription is only five years. Upon these
78
hypotheses, if the perjurer is to be prosecuted before final
judgment in the basic case, it would be impossible to
determine the period of prescription — whether twenty
years or five years — as either of these two periods is
fixed by law on the basis of conviction or acquittal of the
defendant in the main case.
The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the
offense of false testimony is the same, whether the
defendant in criminal case No. 1872 were convicted or
acquitted, is of no moment, it being a matter of pure
coincidence. The four cases enumerated in article 180 of
the Revised Penal Code — and the instant case falls on
one of them — uniformly presuppose a final judgment of
conviction or acquittal in the basic case as a prerequisite
to the action ability of the crime of false testimony.
Order of dismissal is reversed, and let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings,
without costs.
G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as
Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law
specifying the prescriptive period for violations of
municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial
purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of
Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11,
1990.1 The referral-complaint of the police was received
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on
May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was
filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on
October 2, 1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the
ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was
denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
the denial was sustained by the respondent judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the
petitioner first argues that the charge against her is
governed by the following provisions of the Rule on
Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial

Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed
by law for the offenses charged does not exceed six
months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable
penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal
cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either
by complaint or by information filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or
preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases
shall be commenced only by information; Provided,
further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and
sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled
"An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin to Run," reading as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin
to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be
acts defining and penalizing violations of law not
included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way
beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged
commission of the offense, the charge against her should
have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.
79
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive
period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint
against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor
General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the
rule on summary procedure in special cases, the
institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the
appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said
courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However,
in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the
complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of
prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent
maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase
"such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases"
applies to all cases, without distinction, including those
falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an
adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court
of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to
provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-
examined the question and, after mature consideration,
has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and
should be, the one established by the decisions holding
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court,
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt
the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons
buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of
prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information" without distinguishing
whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary
examination or investigation merely, or for action on the
merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed may only proceed to investigate the
case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to
deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication

on account of delays that are not under his control. All
that the victim of the offense may do on his part to
initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated
on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of
the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On
the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been
incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the
last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for
offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases," which plainly signifies that the section
does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary
procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last
paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the
Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule
on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to
the canon that words in a statute should be read in
relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure,
to discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary
Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should
follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for
violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of
"offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the
obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129,
vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the
complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or
preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this
provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
80
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only
when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This
means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and
not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-
quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial
proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does
not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict
between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1
of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield
because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not
irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been
conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense
involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the
Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By
contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for
violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty
cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a
crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or
not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility
should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules
beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from
their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the
meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent
the problem here sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the
crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its
alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two
months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with
Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the
filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial

Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial
proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have
interrupted the period was the filing of the information
with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was
done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had
already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the
challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court
of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the
ground of prescription. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 140231 July 9, 2007
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG), represented by
ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, Office of the
Ombudsman-Manila, CONCERNED MEMBERS OF
THE PNB BOARD OF DIRECTORS, REYNALDO
TUASON, CARLOS CAJELO, JOSE BARQUILLO,
JR., LORETO SOLSONA, PRIMICIAS BANAGA,
JOHN DOES, and NORTHERN COTABATO
SUGAR INDUSTRIES, INC.
(NOCOSII), respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The Presidential Commission on Good
Government1 (petitioner) filed the herein Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution2 dated May 21, 1999 of
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB No. 0-95-0890
which dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint for
violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 30193 against concerned members of Philippine
National Bank (PNB) Board of Directors and Northern
Cotabato Sugar Industries, Inc. (NOCOSII) officers,
namely: Reynaldo Tuason, Carlos Cajelo, Jose Barquillo,
Jr., Loreto Solsona, Primicias Banaga and John Does
(respondents); and the Order4 dated July 23, 1999 which
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all
behest loans, determine the parties involved and
recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued
thereby.
81
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued
Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of
the Committee to include the inventory and review of all
non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the
earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it is
undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is
undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by
high government officials like presence of marginal
notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the
borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a
deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose
intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-
feasibility of the project for which financing is being
sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan
release was made."
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's
Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan
transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
After it had examined and studied all the documents
relative to the said loan transactions, the Committee
classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as
behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and
inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's
investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained
loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the
PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value
from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the
required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as
one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the
General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note
of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo,
NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site
and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB;
that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the
approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only
about 6% of its obligation.
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant
Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents.
Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following
provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxx
e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the
Government or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through

manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxx
g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading
before the the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator
Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the
case based on the available evidence.
In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-
0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of
the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or
lack of probable cause against the respondents and for
prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto
approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999.5
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 6 but it was
denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9,
1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on
July 23, 1999.7
Forthwith, petitioner elevated the case to this Court and
in support of its petition alleges that:
A) The Respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his
discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the complaint filed by the Petitioner on the
ground of Prescription considering that:
1. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER
BEHEST LOANS AS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH IS
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER ARTICLE XI, SECTION
15, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
2. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A
TRUSTEE TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
BENEFICIARY;
3. THE OFFENSES CHARGED ARE IN THE NATURE
OF CONTINUING CRIMES AS THE STATE
CONTINUES TO SUFFER INJURY ON EACH DAY
OF DEFAULT IN PAYMENT. HENCE,
PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT APPLY;
4. PRESCRIPTION AS A MATTER OF DEFENSE
MUST BE PLEADED, OTHERWISE, IT IS DEEMED
WAIVED;
5. PRESCRIPTION HAS NOT BEEN INVOKED IN
THIS CASE. SINCE IT MAY BE WAIVED OR MAY
NOT BE SET IN DEFENSE, THE OMBUDSMAN
CANNOT MOTU PROPRIO DISMISS THE
COMPLAINT ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION;
82
6. ARTICLE 91 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
WHICH ADOPTS THE "DISCOVERY RULE" SHALL
APPLY IN THIS CASE;
7. THE LOAN CONTRACT AS OTHER LOAN
TRANSACTIONS IN THE NATURE OF BEHEST
LOANS ARE KEPT SECRET.8
B) The respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his
discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
not finding that a probable cause exists for violation by
the private respondents of section 3 (e) and (g) of RA
3019 despite the presence of clear, overwhelming and
unrebutted evidence.9
In its Comment, the Ombudsman, without delving on the
issue of prescription, in view of Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto (1999),10 contends that its finding of
insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause
against respondents deserves great weight and respect,
and must be accorded full weight and credit.
No comment was filed by the rest of the respondents.
The issue before the Court is whether the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that: (a) the
offense leveled against respondents has prescribed; and
(b) no probable cause exists against respondents.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the subject complaint on the
ground of prescription.
Respondents members of the PNB Board of Directors
and Officers of NOCOSII are charged with violation of
R.A. No. 3019, a special law. Amending said law,
Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,11 increased the
prescriptive period from ten to fifteen years.
The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive
period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, 12 as amended, which
provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
The issue of prescription has long been laid to rest in the
aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,13 where the
Court held:

x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the
aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A.
No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were
made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned
connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the
loans.' Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the
prescriptive period for the offenses with which
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be
computed from the discovery of the commission thereof
and not from the day of such commission.
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase 'if the
same not be known' in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does
not mean 'lack of knowledge' but that the crime 'is not
reasonably knowable' is unacceptable, as it provides an
interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law,
which is written in a clear and unambiguous language
and thus provides no room for interpretation but only
application.14
The Court reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto(2001),15 thus:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019
committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa Revolution
that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that
the government as the aggrieved party could not have
known of the violations at the time the questioned
transactions were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No.
140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo v.
Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,
supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person would have dared
to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the
counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an
exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee on Behest Loans.
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the
second paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as
amended, provides that prescription is interrupted 'when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.16
Records show that the act complained of was discovered
in 1992. The complaint was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 5, 1995,17 or within three (3) years
from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the
complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15
years.
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable
cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that
the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether
there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
83
thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts.18 Settled is the
rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere
with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers without good and compelling
reasons to indicate otherwise.19 Said exercise of powers
is based upon his constitutional mandate20 and the courts
will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not
only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise,
innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will
grievously hamper the functions of the office and the
courts, in much the same way that courts will be
swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion
on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided
to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.21
While there are certain instances when this Court may
intervene in the prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when
necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary
for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a
prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the
acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is
clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction
over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution
rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against
the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has
been denied,22 none apply here.
After examination of the records and the evidence
presented by petitioner, the Court finds no cogent reason
to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.23 The exercise of
power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.24
The disquisition of GIO Diaz-Salcedo, in dismissing the
criminal complaint, as approved by Ombudsman
Desierto, is worth-quoting, thus:

Taking into consideration the provisions of
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order
No. 61, the subject transactions can not be classified as
behest.
Evaluation of the records of this case reveals that the
loans acquired by NOCOSII are actually foreign loans
from Midland Bank Ltd. of London. There were no direct
loans released by PNB but merely credit
accommodations to guaranty the loans from Midland
Bank.
Anent complainant's claim that the collaterals offered by
NOCOSII are insufficient, it should be noted that under
PNB Board Resolution No. 689 dated July 30, 1975, one
of the conditions imposed to NOCOSII was the execution
of contract assigning all NOCOSII's share of sugar and
molasses to PNB. NOCOSII was also required to
increase its paid up capital at P5,000,000.00 a year
starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980 or a total
of P25,000,000.00. In addition thereto, the stockholders
of NOCOSII were required to pledge or assign all their
present and future shares to PNB while the
accommodation remains standing. The proposed plant
site which was offered as collateral was estimated to
cost P307,903,000.00. The foregoing collaterals offered
by NOCOSII are more than sufficient to cover the loans
of P333,465,260.00.
Furthermore, since the loan was approved by PNB, it
presupposes that all the required clearances were
submitted by NOCOSII including the clearance from the
Office of the President; and having complied with all the
documentary requirements, NOCOSII became entitled to
the release of the loan.
Complainant further alleged that NOCOSII was
undercapitalized because its paid up capital was
only P50,000,000.00. Complainant, however, failed to
consider the other assets of NOCOSII which also form
part of its capital. x x x25
The finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of
probable cause by the Ombudsman is borne out by the
evidence presented by petitioner: firstly, there were no
direct loans released by PNB but merely credit
accommodations to guaranty NOCOSII's foreign loans
from Midland Bank Ltd. of London; secondly, NOCOSII
effectively came under government control since 1975
when PNB acquired a majority of the voting rights in
NOCOSII and was given the power to appoint a
comptroller therein; thirdly, PNB's credit
accommodations to NOCOSII between 1975 and 1981 in
the aggregate sum of P333,465,260.00 were sufficiently
secured by: (1) the Assignment of Subscription Rights
and/or Pledge of Shares dated September 5, 1975
whereby NOCOSII officers pledged their shares of stock,
84
representing 90% of NOCOSII's subscribed capital stock,
and assigned their subscription rights to future stocks in
favor of PNB;26 (2) the Deed of Assignment dated
September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII assigned its share
of sugar and molasses from the operation of its sugar
central located at Barrio Mateo, Matalam, North
Cotabato in favor of PNB;27 (3) the Joint and Solidary
Agreement dated September 5, 1975 whereby the
NOCOSII officers bound themselves jointly and
severally liable with the corporation for the payment of
NOCOSII's obligations to PNB;28 (4) the Real Estate
Mortgage dated October 2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII
mortgaged various buildings, machineries and
equipments, otherwise known as the NOCOSII Sugar
Mill Plant, with an estimated value of P307,593,000.00
in favor of PNB;29 and (5) the Chattel Mortgage with
Power of Attorney dated October 2, 1981 whereby
NOCOSII mortgaged various transportation, agricultural
and heavy equipment in favor of the PNB;30fourthly,
PNB imposed other conditions, such as, (1) the
submission by NOCOSII of the Central Bank's approval
of its foreign loans; (2) the submission by NOCOSII of
the required clearances from the National Economic
Development Authority (NEDA) and/or Presidential
Committee on Sugar Industry (PHILSUGIN); (3)
submission by NOCOSII of its milling contracts covering
a total area of not less than 14,000 hectares; (4)
submission by NOCOSII of the government permit that
the planters can cultivate the required hectarage; (5)
further increase in NOCOSII's total paid-in capital
to P25,000,000.00 at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April
30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980; (6) deposit in NOCOSII's
account with the PNB of all cash proceeds of NOCOSII's
foreign loans the disposition of which shall be subject to
the bank's control; and, (7) designation by the PNB of its
own representatives in NOCOSII's Board of Directors
and its own comptroller who shall have the authority to
control all disbursements and receipts of funds of
NOCOSII.31
The herein assailed Orders being supported by
substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court to
exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the
Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports
the Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be
overturned.32
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as
to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated May 21,
1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman
in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C.
TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review of the resolutions of the
1
Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March
2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis
Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and
his subsequent motion for reconsideration. 2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums
of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner.
On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate,
Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of
petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans.
Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of
both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment
on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either
for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the
account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the
amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and
upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail. 3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against
Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa
4 more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no
Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City
5 information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the
Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation,
only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-
affidavit. Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly
6 the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter
included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner
had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity.
Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to
Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He
averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in
fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against
Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that
he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his
signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several
documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were
purportedly the same as the those appearing on the
checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse
7
claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be
Cawili's business associate.8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor
9
III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against
Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.
Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of
Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was
85
filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated
11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for
10
Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had
deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings
submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned
signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution,
but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma.
Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter
to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In
her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had
11
already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as
amended, which provides that violations penalized by
12
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this
case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the
checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18
March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the
Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the
law contemplates judicial, and not administrative
proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998,
alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had
already prescribed. Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that
13
to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section
3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because
the initiative should come from petitioner himself and
not the investigating prosecutor. Finally, ACP Sampaga
14
found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner. 15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through
Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the
same, stating that the offense had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for
16
reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April
2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary
17
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and
declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the
filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period
citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan. Thus, the Office of the
18
City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three
(3) separate informations against Tongson for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's
19
Office filed an information charging petitioner with
20
three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ,
22
presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed
by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already
prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3)
informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against
Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ
explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of
special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period
for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a
special act, does not provide for the prescription of the
offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to
it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which
governs the prescription of offenses penalized
thereunder. The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v.
23
Reyes, Jr., wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the
24
proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are
judicial proceedings, and not the one before the
prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the
25
Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution
of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper
verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3
April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition
is a mere photocopy. Petitioner moved for the
26
reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution,
attaching to said motion an amended
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. Still, 27
the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating
that subsequent compliance with the formal requirements
would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its
resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the
petition is patently without merit and the questions raised
therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of
Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition
on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before
it was patently without merit and the questions are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of
29
Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-
compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that
the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running
of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It
argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does
not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses
prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No.
3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing
that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
86
petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act
No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay,
attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his
petition before the Court of Appeals substantially
complies with the rules, the verification being intended
simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not a product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that
this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency
in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the
defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement
intended to secure an assurance that matters which are
alleged are true and correct–the court may simply order
the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and
waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the
ends of justice may be served, as in the instant case. In
32
the case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent
verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner
sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the petition on the ground that there was
failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original
of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A
plain reading of the petition before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the
DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004, a certified true
33
copy of which was attached as Annex "A." Obviously,
34
28
the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v.
Reyes, a case involving the violation of a municipal
35
ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is
tolled only upon filing of the information in court.
According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case
is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, wherein this Court ruled that
36
the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for
preliminary investigation suspends the running of the
prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco
case similarly involved the violation of a special law,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner
notes. He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court
37
of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave
injustice to him since the delays in the present case were
clearly beyond his control. 38

There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately
entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to
offenses under special laws which do not provide their
own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall,
unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after
four years for those punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under
B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days
but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act
No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four
(4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that
only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of
the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was
passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace,
thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and 39
the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint
is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. 40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No.
3326 is illuminating. Act No. 3226 was approved on 4
41
December 1926 at a time when the function of
conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the
prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S.
v. Lazada and People v. Joson, is that the prescription
42 43
of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation
inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the
accused. These cases were followed by our declaration
44
in People v. Parao and Parao that the first step taken in
45
the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the
87
nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the
prescription of the offense. Subsequently, in People v.
46
Olarte, we held that the filing of the complaint in the
47
Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and
does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In
addition, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed may only proceed to investigate the
case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender, and hence, the
48
prescriptive period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company
49
Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-
50
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the
Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are
both special laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. In the more recent case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et al., the Court ruled that the nature and
51
purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised
Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the
52
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the
prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport
Resources case is instructive, thus:
53
While it may be observed that the term "judicial
proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before
"investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the
subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of
the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the
exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood either executive
or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial
and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution
should be sufficient to toll prescription. 54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party
the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control. A clear example would be this
55
case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on
24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year
prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals
and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of
the charges against

Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within
the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner
filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ
issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine
(9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond
petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the
active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995,
only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping
resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on
their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not
be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because
of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's
delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet
prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit
before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August
1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for
the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they
had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since
there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the
debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer
any impediment to the filing of the information against
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October
2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice
dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
REFILE the information against the petitioner.
No costs.
G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS
CORPORATION represented by its manager and
authorized representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding
Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio
City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG,
"JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15,
2005 be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934
88
and 112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted before
the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a
private parking operator duly authorized to operate and
manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to
City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under
Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor
vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the
vehicle is illegally parked.1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the
facts leading to the filing of the Informations are the
following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru
[sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell
personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay
alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003,
the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang,
Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and
carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of
a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned
by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally
parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading
Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell
which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of
metal is ₱26,250.00. The fines of ₱500.00 for illegal
parking and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were also not
paid by the respondents herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General
Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo
Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May
7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein
respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two
(2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel
of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933,
belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered
illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking
fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such
clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing
the clamp, respondents took and carried it away
depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is
₱26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of
₱500.00 and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were not
paid by the respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and
respondents against each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed
two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos.
2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-
Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia,
Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom
was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The
Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City

3
Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. A
preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case
charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of
Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of
Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for
himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent
Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked
illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp
restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the
placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an
illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp
not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so
that he and his family could continue using the car. He
also confirmed that he had the clamp with him, and he
intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the
Complaint he filed against Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City
Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause
to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the
petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery against
respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these
two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The elements of
Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon
things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating
the existence of the crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of
respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels
of the cars involved in these cases and their failure to pay
the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio
City Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and
penalties for violations of the provisions of such
ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the law
into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable
cause against all the respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or
Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this
controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the
registered owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation
of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases
and we hereby file the corresponding informations
against them in Court.6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25,
2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were
filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated
July 25, 2003, stating:
89
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with unity of action and concerted design, did
then and there, with unity of action and concerted design,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled
[sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached
to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle
with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which
was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by
Jadewell Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City
ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and prejudice of
private complainant Jadewell Parking System
Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth
₱26,250.00 and other consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th
day of July 2003.7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934
and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the
other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed
a January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or
Manifestation8 on February 2, 2004. The Motion to
Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the
two Informations on the following grounds:
extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to
prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that
charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on
respondents with more than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of
Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished by prescription
of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides:
"Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in
this case was committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As can be
seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the
latter was filed with this Honorable Court on October 2,
2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged
commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal
liability of the accused in this case, if any, was already
extinguished by prescription when the Information was
filed.9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge
Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the
accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004
Order11 to argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet
prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription of
offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information. While it may be true that the
Informations in these cases have been filed only on
October 2, 2003, the private complainant has, however,
filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within
the prescribed period.12
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004,
and petitioner filed a Reply14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April
16, 2004 upholding the Order granting respondents'
Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an
extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for the
motion to quash, which is that the criminal action has
been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure being alleged violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary
Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on
any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No.
102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as
the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326
or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF
PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY
SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL
BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule
65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The
case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case
Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription.
Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled
erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the
offenses charged against the private respondents was
halted by the filing of the Complaint/Information in court
and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City.
Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure:
90
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x
other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with
the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in
their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that
"the institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the
running of the period of prescription of the offense
charged unless otherwise provided in special laws."17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the
criminal information before this Honorable Court, is the
reckoning point in determining whether or not the
criminal action in these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and
112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure.
Considering that the offenses charged are for violations
of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be
commenced by informations. Thus, it was only legally
and procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules
on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be
commenced only by information." These criminal cases
cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia
vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not apply
in this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation
of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint
should have been filed directly in court as required by
Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On
the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935
are for violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated,
"shall be commenced only by information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor stopped
the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence,
the offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the
respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion.
They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended,
provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to

run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the
proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court,
in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial
proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the
alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7,
2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since
the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial
Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos.
112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence
F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The
Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city
ordinance violations may only be commenced by the
filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription
period may only be interrupted by the filing of
Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000)
against the respondents in court. The Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the
respondents and upheld the respondent judge’s Order
dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April
16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial
Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of
the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on
May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the
commission of the offense charged against respondents
Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the
offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763,
does not apply because respondents were charged with
the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal
ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that the
prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a
Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled
the prescription period of two months. This is because
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila
and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent
Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases based on
prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other
grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to
91
Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted no
offense and that respondents were charged with more
than one offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan
Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner had
no legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell
was not assailing the civil liability of the case but the
assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the
ruling in People v. Judge Santiago23 which held that the
private complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of
the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge
only dismissed the case on the ground of prescription,
since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that
ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated
but did not specify the grounds on which the cases were
dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings
contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include
the preliminary investigation proceedings before the
National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal
personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons
aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition" 26 before the
court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of
both the substantive law and the procedural rules
governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to
the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the
only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for
the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances.
No other special law provides any other prescriptive
period, and the law does not provide any other
distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as
amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the
parameters of prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense
charged, the following should be considered: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the
time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the
time the prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation
omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now
without question that it is two months for the offense
charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also
governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code reads:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The
period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was
discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same
day. These actions effectively commenced the running of
the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope – This rule shall govern the summary
procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases
falling within their jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal
cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either
by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that
in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such
cases shall be commenced only by information, except
when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the
classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. – A city may either be
component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, that
the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the
classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials. Independent component
cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can
either be highly urbanized cities or component cities. An
independent component city has a charter that proscribes
its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It
stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered
cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual
Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio
92
Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise
known as the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved
in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when
he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal
ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts
and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense
was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was
received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on
October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary
Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should
follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for
violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of
"offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the
obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129,
vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure,
"the complaint or information shall be filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary examination or
preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this
provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only
when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This
means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and
not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-
quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial
proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does
not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict
between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1
of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield
because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right.30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the
Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling
the prescription period. The recent People v.
Pangilinan31categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is
not controlling as far as special laws are concerned.
Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this
principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan
pertains to violations of special laws but not to
ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the
Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure.
When the representatives of the petitioner filed the
Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio,
the prescription period was running. It continued to run
until the filing of the Information. They had two months
to file the Information and institute the judicial
proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal
Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation,
the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent
finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the
period within which to file the Information. Respondents
were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two
months from the discovery and commission of the
offense before it prescribed within which to file the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the
Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already
prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did
not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents. According to the Department of Justice –
93
National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an
Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation
in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed
by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The
information need not be placed under oath by the
prosecutor signing the same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that –
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against him; and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the
Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The
complaint or information is sufficient if it states that the
crime charged was committed or some of the ingredients
thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of
the court, unless the particular place in which the crime
was committed is an essential element of the crime, e.g.
in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the
Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly
weapon in a "polling place," or if it is necessary to
identify the offense charged, e.g., the domicile in the
offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual
provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and
Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under the Revised
Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the Office of the
Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the
court even if it is merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, or even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case
on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or
information in court.
xxxx

For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day of the
commission of the violation, and if the same is not
known at the time, from the discovery and the institution
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by
the filing of the complaint or information in court and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis
supplied).1âwphi1
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the
Department of Justice’s Prosecution Staff and established
Regional State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State
Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular
regions where the Informations will be filed. Section 6
provides that the area of responsibility of the Region 1
Center located in San Fernando, La Union includes Abra,
Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt.
Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan,
Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly
assigned prosecutor was designated to file the
Information within the two-month period provided for in
Act No. 3326, as amended.1âwphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the
Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal
of the case against the private respondents. It stands that
the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and
their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of
filing the Information in court in order to toll the period.
Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its
ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a
crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or
not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility
should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules
beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from
their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules
but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here
sought to be corrected.33
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 139033. December 18, 2002]
JOVENDO DEL CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. HON.
ROSARIO TORRECAMPO, Presiding Judge,
RTC of Camarines Sur, Branch 33 and
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
94
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The instant petition is one for the review, by way of
appeal by certiorari, of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated November 20, 1998, and of the Resolution
dated June 14, 1999 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with
violation of Section 178 (nn)[2] of the 1978 Election Code
in Criminal Case No. F-1447 before Branch 33, Regional
Trial Court, Camarines Sur. The Information alleged:
That on May 17, 1982, (Barangay Election Day), at
around 8:15 P.M. in Barangay Ombao, Municipality of
Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused did, then and there unlawfully conducted
himself in a disorderly manner, by striking the electric
bulb and two (2) kerosene petromax lamps lighting the
room where voting center no. 24 is located, during the
counting of the votes in said voting center plunging the
room in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and
disrupting the proceedings of the Board of Election
Tellers.[3]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered
judgment and declared petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD
1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code, as
amended, and sentenced petitioner to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as
minimum to 3 years as maximum.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his conviction to the
Court of Appeals which eventually affirmed the decision
of the trial court in toto. Said decision became final and
executory. Thus, the execution of judgment was
scheduled on October 14, 1987.
On October 12, 1987, an urgent motion to reset the
execution of judgment was submitted by petitioner
through his counsel. But it was denied for lack of merit.
During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed
to appear which prompted the presiding judge to issue an
order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his
bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He
remained at large.
Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed
before the trial court a motion to quash the warrant
issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the
penalty imposed upon him. However, it was denied. His
motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailing the orders of
the trial court denying both his motion to quash the
warrant of arrest and motion for reconsideration.
On November 20, 1998, the Court of Appeals
rendered its now assailed decision dismissing the petition
for lack of merit.
Following the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, the instant petition was filed before us.
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in holding that the penalty imposed upon petitioner
has not prescribed.Petitioner maintains that Article 93 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of
prescription shall commence to run from the date when
the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The
Court of Appeals, in its interpretation of the said
provision, engaged in judicial legislation when it added
the phrase by escaping during the term of the sentence
thereto, so petitioner claims.
Going over the merits of the petition, the Court finds
that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
petition for certiorari.
The threshold issue in the instant case is the
interpretation of Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Article 157 of the same Code.
In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals
ruled:
Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code provides as
follows:
When and how penalties prescribe The penalties imposed
by the final sentence prescribed as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty
years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen
years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with
the exception of the penalty of arresto
mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
And Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, provides as
follows:
Computation of the prescription of penalties The period
of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from
the date when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant
should give himself up, be captured, should go to some
foreign country with which his Government has no
extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before
the expiration of the period of prescription.
95
The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year
of imprisonment as minimum to three (3) years of
imprisonment as maximum.
The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a
special law, the 1978 Election Code. This law does not
provide for the prescription of penalties. This being the
case, We have to apply the provision of the Revised
Penal Code which allows the application of said code in
suppletory character when it provides that:
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provision of this
code. This code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is a correctional
penalty under Article 25 in relation to Article 27 of the
Revised Penal Code. Being a correctional penalty it
prescribed in ten (10) years.
The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June
14, 1986. Such judgment would have been executed on
October 14, 1986 but the accused did not appear for such
proceeding. And he has never been apprehended.
The contention of the petitioner is that said judgment
prescribed on October 24, 1996.
The issue here is whether or not the penalty imposed
upon the petitioner has prescribed.
The elements in order that the penalty imposed has
prescribed are as follows:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final
sentence.
2. That the convict evaded the service of the
sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence.
3. That the convict who escaped from prison has
not given himself up, or been captured, or
gone to a foreign country with which we have
no extradition treaty or committed another
crime.
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of
the lapse of time form the date of the evasion
of the service of the sentence by the convict.
(p. 93, Revised Penal Code by L. Reyes 93 ed.)
From the foregoing elements, it is clear that the penalty
imposed has not prescribed because the circumstances of
the case at bench failed to satisfy the second element, to
wit That the convict evaded the service of the
sentence by escaping during the service of his
sentence. As a matter of fact, the petitioner never served
a single minute of his sentence.
The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is
consistent with the ruling of this Court in Tanega vs.

[4]
Masakayan, et. al., where we declared that, for
prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to
commence to run, the culprit should escape during the
term of such imprisonment.
The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not
perceive any compelling reason to deviate from our
earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in
the Tanega case.
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when
the prescription of penalties shall commence to run.
Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the
date the felon evades the service of his
sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code,
evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by
those who have been convicted by final judgment by
escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
escape in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93
and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of
prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who
has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have
escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to
prison. In fact, even before the execution of the judgment
for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because
he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after
he failed to appear in court for the execution of his
sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a
fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those
who are deserving. Petitioners guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong
he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded
therefor.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
based on settled jurisprudence and applicable laws. It did
not engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted
the pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed
in confinement, prescription never started to run in his
favor.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
BENJAMIN PANGAN y RIVERA, petitioner, vs.
HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITE, as the
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 56, and COL. JAMES D.
LABORDO, as the City Jail Warden of
Angeles City, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
96
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, Branch 56, rendered on January
31, 2000.[1]
The facts of this case are undisputed. The petitioner
was indicted for simple seduction in Criminal Case No.
85-816, at the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch 3.
During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda,
counsel for petitioner, submitted the case for decision
without offering any evidence, due to the petitioners
constant absence at hearings.
On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted
of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a
penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24,
1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court.
On August 9, 1991, the case was called for
promulgation of the decision in the court of origin.
Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not
appear. Notice to petitioner was returned unserved with
the notation that he no longer resided at the given
address. As a consequence, he also failed to appear at the
scheduled promulgation. The court of origin issued an
order directing the recording of the decision in the
criminal docket of the court and an order of arrest against
the petitioner.[2]
Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000,
the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the
Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000,
petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at
the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. He impleaded
as respondent the Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat,
Pampanga.[3] Petitioner contended that his arrest was
illegal and unjustified on the grounds that:
(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of
arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3,
Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and
(b) having been able to continuously evade service
of sentence for almost nine years, his criminal
liability has long been totally extinguished under No.
6, Article 89 [of the] Revised Penal Code.[4]
After his transfer to the City Jail of Angeles City on
January 25, 2000, petitioner filed an Amended Petition
with the Regional Trial Court, impleading herein
respondent Col. James D. Labordo, the Jail Warden of
Angeles City, as respondent.[5]
In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioners
detention was pursuant to the order of commitment

(mittimus), issued by Marlon P. Roque, Clerk of Court III
of the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3,
dated January 25, 2000.[6]
On January 31, 2000, respondent Judge rendered the
decision, which is the subject of this present appeal,
which pronounced:
The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the
petitioner that the penalty imposed on him in the decision
adverted to above had already prescribed, hence, his
detention is illegal for under Article 93 of the Revised
Penal Code:
The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to
run from the date when the culprit should evade the
service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the
defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go
to some foreign country with which this Government has
no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime
before the expiration of the period of prescription.
The elements of prescription are:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final
judgment;
2. That convict evaded the service of the
sentence by escaping during the term of
his sentence;
3. That the convict who had escaped from
prison has not given himself up, or been
captured, or gone to a foreign country with
which we have no extradition treaty, or
committed another crime;
4. The penalty has prescribed, because of
the lapse of time from the date of the
evasion of the service of the sentence by
the convict.
In this case, the essential element of prescription which is
the evasion of the service of sentence is absent.
Admittedly, the petitioner herein has not served the
penalty imposed on him in prison and that during the
service of the sentence, he escaped therefrom. Notably, at
the trial of Crim. Case No. 85-816 in the Municipal Trial
Court, Branch III, Angeles City and on the date set for
the promulgation of the affirmed decision, the petitioner
failed to appear and remained at large.
There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in
this case, because such evasion presupposes escaping
during the service of the sentence consisting in
deprivation of liberty. (Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G. No.
122) (92 Phil. 310).
Corollarily, the detention of the petitioner in Angeles
City Jail in compliance with the Order of Commitment
(Exhibit E) is not illegal for
97
A commitment in due form, based on a final judgment,
convicting and sentencing the defendant in a criminal
case, is conclusive evidence of the legality of his
detention, unless it appears that the court which
pronounced the judgment was without jurisdiction or
exceeded it. (U.S. vs. Jayne, 24 Phil 90, 24 J.F. 94, Phil.
Digest, Vol. 2, 1398).
WHEREFORE, for not being meritorious and well-
founded, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Angeles City, January 31, 2000.[7]
From the above quoted decision, petitioner filed the
instant petition for review on a question purely of law
and raised the following issue:
HOW SHOULD THE PHRASE SHALL COMMENCE
TO RUN FROM THE DATE WHEN THE CULPRIT
SHOULD EVADE THE SERVICE OF SENTENCE IN
ARTICLE 93 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE ON
THE COMPUTATION OF THE PRESCRIPTION OF
PENALTIES BE CONSTRUED? PUT A LITTLE
DIFFERENTLY, WHEN DOES THE PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD OF PENALTIES BEGIN TO RUN?[8]
Petitioner claims that:
xxx the period for the computation of penalties under
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code begins to run from
the moment the judgment of conviction becomes final
and the convict successfully evades, eludes, and dodges
arrest for him to serve sentence.[9]
Petitioner supports his claim in the following
manner:
The Decision subject of this appeal, which was based on
the 1952 ruling rendered in Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G.
No. 122, 92 Phil. 310, is, petitioner most respectfully
submits, not good case law. It imposes upon the convict a
condition not stated in the law. It is contrary to the spirit,
nature or essence of prescription of penalties, creates an
ambiguity in the law and opens the law to abuse by
government.
THE INFANTE RULING IMPOSES A
CONDITION NOT STATED IN THE LAW.
It appears that the Infante ruling imposes that, as an
essential element, the convict must serve at least a few
seconds, minutes, days, weeks or years of his jail
sentence and then escapes before the computation of
prescription of penalties begins to run. This, petitioner
respectfully submits is not a condition stated in Article
93, which states that, the prescription of penalties shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of sentence.

There is no dispute that the duty of government to
compel the service of sentence sets in when the judgment
of conviction becomes final.
The dispute, however, is in the construction of the
phrase should evade the service of sentence. When does
the period of prescription of penalties begin to run? The
Infante ruling construes this to mean that the convict
must escape from jail because such evasion presupposes
escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in
deprivation of liberty.
Petitioner, with due respect, disagrees because if that
were the intention of the law, then the phrase should
evade the service of sentence in Article 93 would have
read: should escape during the service of the sentence
consisting in deprivation of liberty. The legislature could
have very easily written Article 93 to read this way
The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to
run from the date when the culprit should escape during
the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of
liberty, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should
give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign
country with which this Government has no extradition
treaty, or should commit another crime before the
expiration of the period of prescription.
But they did not.
The legislature wrote should evade the service of
sentence to cover or include convicts like him who,
although convicted by final judgment, were never
arrested or apprehended by government for the service of
their sentence. With all the powers of government at its
disposal, petitioner was able to successfully evade
service of his 2 months and 1 day jail sentence for at least
nine (9) years, from August 9, 1991 to January 20, 2000.
This is approximately 3 years and 5 months longer than
the 5-year prescriptive period of the penalty imposed on
him.
That, as the respondent RTC Judge noted, petitioner did
not attend the trial at the Municipal Trial Court and the
promulgation of his judgment of conviction in August 9,
1991 is of no moment. His bond for provisional release
was surely cancelled and an order of arrest was surely
issued against petitioner. The undisputed fact is that on
August 9, 1991 the judgment of conviction was
promulgated in absentia and an order for petitioners
arrest was issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles
City, Branch III.
The duty of government, therefore, to arrest petitioner
and compel him to serve his sentence began on August 9,
1991. The 5-year prescriptive period of his arresto
mayor penalty also began to run on that day considering
that no relief was taken therefrom. Since petitioner never
gave himself up [n]or was [he], until January 20, 2000,
98
ever captured, for the service of his sentence nor did he
flee to some foreign country with which [our]
government has no extradition treaty, that 5-year
prescriptive period of his penalty ran continuously from
August 9, 1991 when his judgment of conviction was
promulgated in absentia and was never interrupted.
For reasons known only to it, however, government
failed or neglected, for almost nine (9) years, to arrest
petitioner for the service of his arresto mayor sentence
[which] should not be taken against petitioner. He was
able to successfully evade service of his sentence for a
period longer than the 5-year prescriptive period of his
penalty and, as such, is entitled to total extinction of his
criminal liability.
To say, as was said in Infante, that the prescriptive period
of the penalty never began to run in favor of petitioner
because he never escaped from jail during the service of
his sentence imposes a condition not written in the law. It
also violates the basic principle that the criminal statutes
are construed liberally in favor of the accused and/or
convict and is contrary to the spirit behind or essence of
statutes of limitations [and] prescription, in criminal
cases.[10]
The Regional Trial Court based its decision on the
case of Infante v. Warden[11]. In said case, Infante, the
petitioner, was convicted of murder and was sentenced to
seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal. After serving fifteen years, seven months and
eleven days, he was granted a conditional pardon. The
condition was that he shall not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines. Ten years after his release
on conditional pardon, Infante was found guilty by a
Municipal Court for driving without a license. Infante
was immediately ordered rearrested for breach of the
condition of his pardon. One of the issues raised by
Infante in his petition,
xxx was that the remitted penalty for which the petitioner
had been recommitted to jail one year and 11 days had
prescribed. xxx [12]
The Court disagreed and reasoned out thus:
The contention is not well taken. According to article 93
of the Revised Penal Code the period of prescription of
penalties commences to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence. It is
evident from this provision that evasion of the sentence is
an essential element of prescription. There has been no
such evasion in this case. Even if there had been one and
prescription were to be applied, its basis would have to
be the evasion of the unserved sentence, and computation
could not have started earlier than the date of the order
for the prisoner's rearrest.[13]

A perusal of the facts in Infante v. Warden reveals
that it is not on all fours with the present case. In Infante,
the convict was on conditional pardon when he was re-
arrested. Hence, he had started serving sentence but the
State released him. In the present case, the convict
evaded service of sentence from the start, and was
arrested eight years later.
The RTC decision, however, must stand, since it is in
accord with applicable decisions of this Court. The issue
raised by petitioner is not novel. Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code[14] has been interpreted several times
by the Court.
The case of Tanega v. Masakayan[15] falls squarely
within the issues of the present case. In that case,
petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear on the day of
the execution of her sentence. On the same day,
respondent judge issued a warrant for her arrest. She was
never arrested. More than a year later, petitioner through
counsel moved to quash the warrant of arrest, on the
ground that the penalty had prescribed. Petitioner
claimed that she was convicted for a light offense and
since light offenses prescribe in one year, her penalty had
already prescribed. The Court disagreed, thus:
xxx The period of prescription of penalties the
succeeding Article 93 provides "shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service
of his sentence". What then is the concept of evasion of
service of sentence? Article 157 of the Revised Penal
Code furnishes the ready answer. Says Article 157:
"ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall
evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term
of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. xxx"
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the
offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving
his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty";
and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during
the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the
express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of
his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape
should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized
by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157
which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or
escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful
entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or
floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit,
violence or intimidation, or through connivance with
other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . ."
Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of
the term "jail breaking."
99
xxx
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of
imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to
run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict
who sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment was
thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of
penalty, then, does not run in her favor.[16]
In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo[17], the Court cited and
reiterated Tanega. Petitioner, Del Castillo, was charged
for violation of Section 178 (nn) of the 1978 Election
Code. The trial court found Del Castillo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of 1 year as
minimum to 3 years as maximum. On appeal the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.
During the execution of judgment on October 14, 1987,
petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge issued an
order of arrest and the confiscation of his bond.
Petitioner was never apprehended. Ten years later,
petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest on
the ground that the penalty imposed upon him had
already prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial
court. Del Castillo, on a petition for certiorari to the
Court of Appeals, questioned the denial by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration,
Del Castillo raised the matter to this Court. The Court
decided against Del Castillo and after quoting the ratio
decidendi of the Court of Appeals in full, it ratiocinated,
thus:
The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is
consistent with the ruling of this Court in Tanega vs.
Masakayan, et al., where we declared that, for
prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to
commence to run, the culprit should escape during the
term of such imprisonment.
The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive
any compelling reason to deviate from our earlier
pronouncement clearly exemplified in the Tanega case.
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the
prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under
said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the
felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to
Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of
sentence can be committed only by those who have been
convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term
of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
"escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93
and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of
 100
prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who
has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have
escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to
prison. In fact, even before the execution of the judgment
for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because
he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after
he failed to appear in court for the execution of his
sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a
fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those
who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong
he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded
therefor.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on
settled jurisprudence and applicable laws. It did not
engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted the
pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed in
confinement, prescription never started to run in his
favor.[18]
Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court
pronounces that the prescription of penalties found in
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to
those who are convicted by final judgment and are
serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty.
The period for prescription of penalties begins only when
the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during
the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered
deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20,
2000 and as a consequence never evaded sentence by
escaping during the term of his service, the period for
prescription never began.
Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his
sentence of two months and one day of arresto mayor and
should forthwith be released unless he is being detained
for another offense or charge.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, Branch 56 is AFFIRMED, but
petitioner is ordered released effective immediately for
having fully served his sentence unless he is detained for
another offense or charge.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.