1

Marcos vs Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989

FACTS:

Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA,
sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to
order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define
what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of
certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the
Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section
17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making
power(Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section
22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
 2

Soliven v Makasiar
G.R. No. 82585 Nov 14, 1988

Facts:

Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a
coup d' etat. The President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because
the President was immune from suit.

Issue: WON Beltran's rights were violated when the RTC issued a warrant of arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses to determine probable
cause.

Held: No. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest, the judge isn't required to examine the complainant and the witnesses.

He shall only personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest on the
basis thereof.

Also, if he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and required
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Otherwise, judges would be burdened with preliminary investigation instead of hearing

cases.
 3

Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Eduardo Ermita

April 2,2009

FACTS:

-
There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examina
tion were circulated duringthe examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.
A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center.The examinees were provided with a
list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations’ five subjects, particularly
Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-
Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakageand traced it to two Board of Nurs
ing members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRCfrom proc
eeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.- President

GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566

which authorized the CHED to supervise theestablishment and operation of all review ce
nters and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Punoapproved CHED Memo
randum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations).-
Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independe
nt review centers, asked theCHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among
other things, that giving permits to operate a reviewcenter to Higher Education Instituti
ons (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectivelyabolish ind
ependent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed that suspending the i
mplementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566.-
A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place.

ISSUES:

1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power

as it expands theCHED’s jurisdiction [Yes, it expands CHED’s jurisdiction, hence unconsi
titutional]; and2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s rule-
making power. [Yes, it is invalid.]

RULING:

TheCHED’s coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of highe
r education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-
secondary educational institutions.

EO 566 directed theCHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review cent
ers and similar entities.The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows th
at it refers to one which offers "a program or course of study that is intended to
refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained i
n theformal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations" given by the P
RC. It does not offer a degree granting a program that would put it under the
jurisdiction of CHED. A review course is only intended to refresh and enhance the
knowledge and competencies. Therefore EO566 is unconstitutional.
 4

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO

versus GRP PEACE PANEL
G.R. NO. 183591
October 14, 2008

FACTS:

The case was filed by Hon. Marino Ridao and Kisin Buxani, both residents of
Cotabato City, is a petition in intervention for the prohibition of the signing of
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the respondent
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel (GRP) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF). The petition of the Province of Cotabato also seeks the
following which is to declare the MOA-AD as null and void, or in the alternative, and to
exclude all the mthirty-seven (37) barangays of Cotabato City from the coverage of the
Bangsamoro-Juridical Entity (BJE) territory.

On September 2, 1996 the GRP and MNLF entered into and signed a total and
final peace agreement implementing the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the GRP and
the MNLF. However, the MILF also wanted a separate peace. As a result, Pres. Arroyo
issued a different guideline for the GRP to promulgate a peace talk with the MILF.

On August 5, 2008 the various peace talks between the GRP and MILF lead to
the drafting of the subject of the MOA-AD which is intended to be signed in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. News report began to appear on the contents of the MOA-AD and
the scheduled date of its signing. A day before the scheduled signing, the government
issued a Temporrary Restraining Order commanding and directing the respondents and
their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the GRP Peace Panel, committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initialed the MOA-AD.

HELD:

Section 1, Article VII of the Philippine Constitution provides: " The executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”

This case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the
peace. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising
the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence. The President is also tasked with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the
day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility
in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Undoubtedly, then, the President
has power to negotiate peace with the MILF, and to determine in what form and
manner the peace process should be conducted.

Since the President already issued an order that the GRP Peace Panel has been
disbanded and that the said MOA-AD will not be signed in its present form, or any other
form, before the Honorable Court render its decision. Wherefore, the court could no
longer provide reliefs for the said controversies are no longer there. The petition was
denied the said MOA-AD and the Peace Panel is non-existent.
 5

LOUIS “BAROK” C.BIRAOGO

versus THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
G.R NO. 192935
x-----------------------------------X
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN et. al.
versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
G.R. NO. 193036
December 7, 2010

FACTS:
The two cases presented a domino effect for both of it assails the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, (Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010). Prior to May 2010 elections, Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III used a slogan
“kung walang corrupt, waalang mahirap” as a representation of his stand against
corruption. On July 30, 2010 he signed EO No. 1 establishing the Philippine truth
Commission of 2010 which is tasked to investigate reported cases of graft and
corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted
by petitioner Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails
Executive Order No. 1 as being violative of the legislative power of Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefore.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A.
Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of
the House of Representatives.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative
body. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order
their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or
sanctions. A month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked
the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Order No.1 is constitutional.
HELD:
Article VII Sec 1 states that, the executive power shall be vested in the President
of the Philippines. However, it is not among his power to create a public office such as
the Philippine Truth Commission and appropriate funds thereof. In addition, the said EO
no.1 also violates the equal protection clause as its power to investigate is only limited
to the graft and corrupt practices of the previous administration of President Arroyo.
Wherefore, the petition are granted and EO no.1 is hereby declared unconstitutional.
 6

DENIS A.B. FUNA versus

ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
ALBERTO C. AGRA
G.R. NO. 191644
February 19, 2013

FACTS:
On March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Agra as the
Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST
Devanadera in order to compete for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on
March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General inn a
concurrent capacity. On April 7, 2010 the petitioner Denis Funa, challenge the
constitutionality of Aggra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be
prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. That, Acting
Secretaries being members of the Cabinet are not exempt from the Constitutional ban.

On the other hand, the respondent argues that the appointments being hereby
challenged were in acting or temporary capacities and that in order for the appointment
to be covered by the constitutional prohibition, it must be regular and permanent,
instead of a mere designation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice,
concurrently with his position as Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional
prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the members of the Cabinet and their
deputies and assistants.

HELD:
Section 13 of Article VII states that, “The President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”

Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position
as Acting Solicitor General, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13 of Article VII.
Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as
the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.

Wherefore, the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently

with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in
violation of the constitution prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The petition is meritorious.
 7

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 194 SCRA 317

G.R. No. 83815, February 22, 1991
FACTS:
The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order
No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides that:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of
the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided
in the Constitution.
Public respondents maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution"
in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.

ISSUE:
WON the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B.
RULING:
No. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office
or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may
do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.
Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of the cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department
to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
 8

DENNIS FUNA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010

FACTS:
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente
T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator,
MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
Petitioner in his capacity as a taxpayer and a concerned citizen filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the
designation of Maria Elena H. Bautista. He argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC
Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position
of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated Sec.
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
The language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is
prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President
being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as
President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section
8 (1), Article VIII.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus
covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot
invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another
office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated
OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties
Union.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H.
Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a
concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
 9

AYTONA V. CASTILLO, 4 SCRA 1

G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962

FACTS:
Dominador Aytona was one of the 350 persons appointed by outgoing president Carlos
Garcia during Dec. 29, 1961, which is the last day of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad
interim governor of the Central Bank.
When the next president, Diosdado Macapagal took his office, he issued Order No. 2
recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointment made by President Garcia after
December 13, 1961. He then appointed Andres Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank
to replace Aytona.
In revoking the appointments, President Macapagal is said to have acted for these and
other reasons: (1) the outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give
the new President opportunity to consider names in the light of his new policies, which were
approved by the electorate in the last elections; (2) these scandalously hurried appointments in
mass do not fall within the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision authorizing the
issuance of ad interim appointments; (3) the appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust,
because they were issued only upon the condition that the appointee would immediately qualify
obviously to prevent a recall or revocation by the incoming President, with the result that those
deserving of promotion or appointment who preferred to be named by the new President
declined and were by-passed; and (4) the abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment
and qualifications evinced a desire on the part of the outgoing President merely subvert the
policies of the incoming administration.
Aytona filed a quo warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the
Central Bank governor and that he was validly appointed by the former president.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Aytona should remain in his position.

RULING:
No. Even though he is qualified for the position, his appointment can be revoked by the
President. Garcia’s appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration
and are set to obstruct the policies of the next president. Of course, the Court is aware of many
precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be reconsidered,
especially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to mass ad interim
appointments (three-hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive,
in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of
exceptional circumstances justifying revocation and if any circumstances justify revocation,
those described herein should fit the exception. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his
appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his appointment was grounded
on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. There are instances wherein not only strict legality,
but also fairness, justice and righteousness should be taken into account.
 10

IN RE: APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30, 1998 OF HON. MATEO A.

VELENZUELA AND HON. PLACIDO B. VILLARTA AS JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF BRANCH 62, BAGO CITY AND OF BRANCH24, CABANATUAN
CITY RESPECTIVELY.

A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC. November 9, 1998

FACTS: The controversy roots from two seemingly contradicting provisions.

Under Section 15 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, a president may not appoint
two months prior to the next presidential election and up to the end of his term. While
under Section 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII, the President shall appoint judges within 90
days within the occurrence of vacancy. An inevitable controversy will erupt when a
judge needs to be nominated 90 days before another judge will retire, and the 90 day
period is within the two month ban of appointments, prior to the next presidential
election. And such occurrence happened with the case at bar.
The then President, Fidel V. Ramos appointed Hon. Placido B. Vallarta and Hon.
Mateo A. Valenzuela as RTC judges on March 30, 1998, two months before the next
presidential election. A constitutional provision under Section 15, Article VII was
deemed violated.
The issue was related to a meeting in the Judicial Bar and Council regarding the
appointment of eight Court of Appeals judges within the two month ban of
appointments prior the presidential election. During the meeting,
Senior associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Consultant of the Council, who had been
member of the Committee of the Executive Department and of the Committee on the
Judicial Department of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, expressed that on the basis
of the Commission’s records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the
Court of Appeals.

-On May 4, 1998, the Chief Justice received a letter from the President
requesting the list of nominees.
-On May 5, 1998, the Secretary of Justice asked for the guidance of the Chief
Justice. He also waited for the meeting of the JBC for the nomination and the letter the
Chief Justice was drafting for the President.
-On May 6, 1998, the Chief Justice replied to the President stating that no
session has been scheduled. And that the matter needed to further study to avoid
constitutional violation with regards to ban on appointments.
-On May 7, 1998, the President replied to the Chief Justice contending that the
ban on appointments under Sec. 15, Art. VII only applies to the Executive Dept.
-On May 8, 1998, a regular meeting of the JBC together with the Chief Justice
made a resolution that the issue be suspended and be referred to the Supreme Court
En Banc for appropriate action.
-On May 12, 1998, the Chief Justice received from Malacañang the appointments
of two RTC judges mentioned above.
The Court Resolved to file the case as an administrative matter and cause it to
be appropriately docketed. The Court further Resolved to that no actions be taken on
the appointments of the above mentioned judges.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President can appoint judges two months before the
next presidential election and up to the end of his term?

HELD: The appointments of the Valenzuela and Vallarta were considered void.
Both judges were served orders to cease and desist from discharging the office of the
Judge of the Courts to which they were respectively appointed to.
 11

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT

GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO

G.R. NO. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The controversy arises from the constitutional provision under Section
15, Art. VII, which prohibits the President from making appointments two months
before the next presidential elections up to the end of his term. But under Sec 4 (1) Art.
VIII requires the appointment of Supreme Court Justices 90 days before the occurrence
of its vacancy. The then Chief Justice Reynato Puno was set for compulsory retirement
seven days after the 2010 presidential election. In view of this, on January 18 of the
same year, the Judicial and Bar Council in its En Banc meeting, agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

The Judicial Bar and Council then started the process of nomination. In
conformity to its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of
Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. The OSG also agrees with the decision of
the JBC that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice even within
two months before the next presidential election and up to the end of his term.
Contending that the vacancy of justices within the Supreme Court must be filled 90days
before its occurrence. Stating that had the framers had intended the prohibition to
extend up to the Supreme Court, they could have easily expressed it under the
Judiciary or Executive department in the Constitution. The framers already have set
enough restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint Supreme Court
Justices to ensure the doctrine of separation of powers. For such purpose was the JBC
created in the first place.

The process of the nomination of the JBC was also questioned by some
intervenors. Stating that the process was initiated prematurely, and it should have
commenced after May 17, 2010 or the day of the compulsory retirement by Chief
Justice Puno.

ISSUE: Does the ban on appointments stated in Sec. 15 of Art. VII also applies
to the Supreme Court?

HELD: The Prohibition under Sec. 15, Art VII does not include appointments
within the Supreme Court. The reason behind the provision should be construed
liberally and within the context. Knowing that the intent of the framers for the
prohibition is primarily aimed to ensure that the Executive department is free from
influence from the previous administration. The Judicial Department has enough safety
to ensure that it is free from influence from the other two branches of government. Had
the constitutional commission meant that the prohibition includes the appointment of
the Supreme Court justices, they would have expressed it in the constitution.
 12

SARMIENTO III VS. MISON

No. L-79974. December 17, 1987

FACTS: The herein petitioners for this petition for prohibition are taxpayers,
lawyers, members of the the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the
functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent
Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that
Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by
reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The
respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's
appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Due to public interest, and the need for stability in the public service, the Court
decided to give the case due course. Setting aside procedural questions as to whether
the prohibition is the proper remedy to test the right of the respondent to hold the
position as the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The Court also
allowed the Commission on appointments to intervene and file a petition in intervention.

This case has relevant significance because, it involves a conflict between the
Executive and Legislative department. Within the grey areas of the blending of powers.
And it so happens to be filed within the primacy of the life of the 1987 constitution. The
Court is tasked to shed light upon matter by employing the relatively clear provisions in
the Constitution.

The core of controversy was tackled mainly on the provision on Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Which provides for the positions within the executive
department which the President is tasked to nominate but will only be appointed with
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES: Whether or not the appointment is valid.

HELD: In the 1987 Constitution, the framers narrowed down the appointments
that need the confirmation from COA into four groups. Namely: 1) the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2) all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3) those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and 4) officers lower in rank
whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President to appoint. The
position of Mison does not belong to any of the above mentioned groups. The “heads of
bureaus” was not included in the enumeration for a reason. Therefore it is deemed
excluded. Which mean Mison does not need the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. Therefore it is deemed that the President acted within her constitutional
authority when she appointed respondent as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs.

The petition and petition in intervention were dismissed without costs.

 13

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, petitioner,

vs.
SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS
AND HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, respondents

G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989

FACTS: The President of the Philippines designated herein petitioner Mary Concepcion
Bautista as "Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights. Immediately, after taking
her oath of office as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, petitioner Bautista
discharged the functions and duties of the Office of Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights which, as previously stated, she had originally held merely in an acting
capacity beginning 27 August 1987.

On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments requesting her to submit to the Commission certain
information and documents as required by its rules in connection with the confirmation
of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Bautista wrote to
the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments stating that the Commission on
Appointments has no jurisdiction to review her appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights.

The Constitution, in Article VII Section 16 which expressly vested on the President the
appointing power, has expressly mentioned the government officials whose
appointments are subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of
Congress. The Commissioners of the Commission on Human Rights are not included
among those.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of the petitioner is considered as ad interim;

Commission on Appointments has jurisdiction to review petitioner’s appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights

HELD: Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution,
extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is
needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but
appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation
of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.

As provided for by the Executive Order No. 163 the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the President. Their tenure in office
shall be at the pleasure of the President. To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner
Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such, by the President on 17 December 1988,
and her acceptance thereof, is not to say that she cannot be removed from office
before the expiration of her seven (7) year term. She certainly can be removed but her
removal must be for cause and with her right to due process properly safeguarded.

Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights and the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the
benefits, privileges and emoluments of said office. Her appointment does not need
conformity from the Commission on Appointment hence; it has no jurisdiction to review
petitioner’s appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
14
15
16
 17

Flores v Drilon
223 SCRA 568

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J.
Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with
prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to
prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and
other operational expenses attached to the office.

(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as

administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the
Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex
oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority

Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec 7, first
par., Art. 9 paragraph 2;Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, which provides that "The
President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President
who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and, Sec. 261, par.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional

prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government
posts.

RULING:

The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold
multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to
let them function without the distraction of other governmental duties.

The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot
limit by providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of
Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing
authority the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of
the President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.
 18

Luego vs CSC
143 SCRA 327

FACTS:

Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City,
by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved
it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private
respondent and another employee.

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the
petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be
appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked.
Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the
new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the

order and the validity of the respondent’s appointment.

ISSUE:

WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the

ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of
this finding, order his replacement.

HELD:

No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and
was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was
permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to
reverse him and call it temporary.

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment
extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing
the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is
qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that

another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested
solely in the city mayor.
 19

POBRE V. MENDIETA

224 SCRA 738

FACTS:

These consolidated petitions under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court were filed by
Hermogenes Pobre to set aside the decision dated August 5, 1992 and writ of
prohibitory injunction dated August 19, 1992 issued by Judge (now Court of Appeals
Justice) Corona Ibay-Somera, in Civil Case No. 92-60272 entitled, "Mariano A. Mendieta,
petitioner vs. Hermogenes P. Pobre, respondent," annulling the appointment extended
by President Corazon C. Aquino to the petitioner, Hermogenes Pobre, as
Commissioner/Chairman of the Professional Regulation Commission (hereafter PRC for
brevity) and enjoining him from discharging the duties and functions of that office.

The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable Julio
B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta
was the senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second
Associate Commissioner of the PRC.

On January 6, 1992, Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon sought the opinion of Acting
Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III on whether the President's power to appoint
the Commissioner of the Professional Regulation Commission is restricted by Section 2
of P.D. No. 223, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 2. Composition. — The Commission shall be headed by one fulltime Commissioner

and two fulltime Associate Commissioners, all to be appointed by the President for a
term of nine (9) years without reappointment to start from the time they assume the
office, except the first two Associate Commissioners who shall be appointed, one for six
(6) years and the other for three (3) years, and thereafter, any vacancy in the
Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only with the most senior of the
Associate Commissioner succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term,
resignation or removal. No person shall be appointed chairman or member of the
Commission unless he is at lease forty (40) years of age, familiar with the principles and
methods of professional regulation and/or licensing and has at lease five (5) years of
executive or managerial experience.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said provision of the P.D No. 223 violates the constitutional
prescription against appointment of elective officials to government posts.

RULING:

The petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned decision dated August 5,
1992 and the writ of prohibitory injunction dated August 19, 1992 issued by respondent
Judge in Civil Case No. 92-60272 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
appointment of petitioner Hermogenes P. Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the
Professional Regulation Commission is declared lawful and in order. No costs.
 20

ARTURO DE CASTRO VS JBC AND GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO,

G.R. NO. 191002, MARCH 7, 2010

FACTS:

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven
days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article
VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from
a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,
because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply
to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme
Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution. The framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions
or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to
ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the
JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court
Justice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer
to the Members of the Supreme Court.
 21

DRILON vs. LIM

G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice
had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No.
7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance
with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing
certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari filed by
the City of Manila, the RTC declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of
control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in
the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the
Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. In this case, Judge
Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the
Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances. He cited the familiar distinction between
control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of
a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance
with law.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional.

Whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control over the Local
Government.

HELD:

Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either
or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he
is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should
be. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure
was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law,
that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the
grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As the court
sees it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. Secretary Drilon set
aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of
certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of
the tax measure.

As regards the issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the

enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court has carefully examined every one of
the exhibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed
been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties. The
minutes of the hearings are found in the exhibits and such show that the proposed
ordinances were published.
 22

JOSE D. VILLENA vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

G.R. NO L-46570, April 21, 1939

FACTS:

This is an original action of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction

against the Secretary of the Interior to restrain him and his agents from proceeding
with the investigation of the herein petitioner, Jose D. Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal,
which was scheduled to take place on March 28, 1939, until this case is finally
determined by this court. The respondent was required to answer, but the petition for
preliminary injunction was denied.

Villena was the then mayor of Makati. After investigation, the Secretary of
Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who
approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that
the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in
the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code.
Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over
local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in
accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of
charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must
exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing
law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter
provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective
local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must
yield to the special law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend a Local Government Unit
official under investigation

HELD:

There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a

mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears
lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code. The fact,
however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is
necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a
similar power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument
that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in
virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to
be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner
prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were
to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more
patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official
(sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to
suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive.
Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial investigation.
 23

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC.,

v.
JOSE PAÑO

G.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967

FACTS:

Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture

land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao in 1932. In
1953, he ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the said public land to the
plaintiff. In 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to the plaintiff was officially released
from the forest zone as pasture land and was declared as agricultural land.

In 1955, Paño and the nineteen others, applied for the purchase of ninety (90)
hectares of the area. In turn, the plaintiff filed its own sales application covering the
entire released area. In 1956, the Director of Lands, following an investigation of the
conflict, rendered a decision giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation
and it was affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in 1957.

The case was then elevated to the President of the Philippines and in 1958,
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo,by the authority of the President, decided the
controversy and declared that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who
are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be allocated
that portion on which they have made improvements".

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President,

may reverse the decision made by the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

RULING:

YES. Article VII of the Constitution, begins with the principle that the executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines. Moreover, the President has the
duty to execute the law and have the control of all executive departments. Hence,
based on the Constitution, the President may delegate his powers to his Executive
Secretary. The said act of the Executive Secretary is presumptively the act of the
President and the said decision is given full credit unless disapproved by the Presiden
 24

24. CITY OF ILIGAN

v.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS
G.R. No. L-30852 February 26, 1988

FACTS:

In 1952, the President issued Proclamation No. 335 withdrawing certain parcels
of public land in Iligan City from sale or settlement and reserving such for the use of
National Power Corporation (NPC). NPC then constructed a fertilizer plant known as
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant under the same proclamation. In 1960, NPC sold the
fertilizer plant to Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation with all the machineries,
equipment, buildings, quarters, structures, etc. including the right of occupancy and use
of the land. Moreover, the NPC covenanted to collaborate with the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) in facilitating the outright sale and/or right to
lease for at least 25 years, renewable for another 25 year, the lands where the plant is
located. Proclamation No. 20 and Proclamation 198 were issued. The first, excluding
from the operation of Proclamation No. 335, certain areas occupied by the Plant and
the Employees Housing Compound declaring the same open to disposition under the
provisions of Public Land Act. The second, changing the technical description of said
excluded areas (six lots). In 1964, the Marcelo Steel Corporation and/or the Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Plant filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application in the Bureau of Lands.
Marcelo Tire and Maria Cristina Plant are sister corporations and the purchaser was
Marcelo Tire (another sister corporation) while the Marcelo Steel operated and managed
the plant.

In the notice of sale of public lands issued in Manila, the Director of lands
advised the public that the Bureau of Lands of Iligan City will sell the lands of Marcelo
Steel in an auction. The President then issued Proclamation 469 excluding from the
reservation made in favor to NPC certain lands in Iligan (Lot 1, 1-a, 3, and 4) and
donating the said lands in favor of Iligan City. The Mayor of Iligan City then wrote to
the Director of Lands informing him that the City is the owner of the said lands and
foreshores in auction. No action was taken on the said request hence the City filed a
complaint for injunction in the Court of First Instance (CFI) against the Director of
Lands and was temporarily issued. While the case was pending, President Marcos
issued Proclamation 94, excluding from the donation in Proclamation 469 certain lands
(Lot 1-a, 2-a, and 3) and declaring the same for open disposition. CFI then dismissed
the complaint of the City and dissolved the injunction, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the authority to grant a
portion of public domain to the City of Iligan.

RULING:

YES. Under Section 60 of Public Land Act provides that portions of land can be
disposed of by grant, donation or transfer made to a province, municipality, branch, or
subdivision of government for purposes conducive to public interest. Even though the
Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources through Director of Lands, the
President has the capacity to control or direct the acts of the Director/Secretary. Under
Article VII, Sec. 17, the President shall control all executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. Therefore, the President has the same authority to dispose of the portions of
public domain. From this, the questioned Proclamation 469 is valid and binding and the
Proclamation 94 is null and void. The decision of CFI is Reversed.
 25

GASCON
v.

ARROYO

G.R. No. 78389 October 16, 1989

FACTS:

The Lopez family is the owner of two (2) television stations, namely: Channels 2
and 4 which they have operated through the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation.

On September 21, 1972, when martial law was declared, TV Channel 4 was
closed by the military and its facilities were taken over by the Kanlaon Broadcasting
System (KBS) which operated it as a commercial TV station. Then, the said TV station
and its facilities were taken over by the National Media Production Center (NMPC),
which operated it as the Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4 (MBS-4) in 1978.

After EDSA revolution (February 1986), the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG) sequestered the aforementioned TV Stations, thus the Office of
Media Affairs took over the operation of TV Channel 4.

On April 17, 1986, the Lopez family requested President Aquino to order the
return to them TV Stations 2 and 4. On October 18, 1986, PCGG approved the return of
TV Station Channel 2 to the family.

Lopez family then requested for the return of TV Station Channel 4 and upon the
request, respondent Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, entered into
with the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio
Lopez, Jr., an "Agreement to Arbitrate". Arbitration Committee was then created.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Executive Secretary had the power and authority to enter
into the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation.

RULING:

YES. The President exercised both legislative and executive powers of the
government wherein the administrative functions of the President is performed by and
through the executive departments. The Executive Secretary entered into the
“Agreement to Arbitrate” acted in behalf of the President of the Philippines. Hence, the
agreement is valid and binding.
 26

KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG

PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM)
vs
IGNACIO R. BUNYE et al
GR NO. 85439
FACTS:
On September 2, 1985, The Municipal government of Muntinlupa thru its
Mayor Santiago Carlos Jr., entered into contract with the KBMBPM for the latter’s
management and operation of the new public market for 25 years and renewable of the
same years unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the
parties KBMBPM is a service cooperative organized by and composed of vendors
occupying the New Muntinlupa Public Market.

Bunye claiming that the 50 year term agreement is contrary to BP Blg. 337 Section
143 and therefore to be cancelled/ rescind. The Municipal Council then issued
Resolution No. 45 abrogating the contract. Bunye with Capital Command of the
Philippine Constabulary, proceeded to the public market and announced to the general
public of the taking over and where they then thru force, violence, and intimidation
forcibly broke the petitioners building purportedly to serve the Order of respondent
Secretary of the taking over and assuming the management of the KBMBPM.

KBMBPM then filed in the RTC for breach of contract on the ground of illegal take-
over, that the respondent Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the Order that said order is violative to the by-laws of the KBMBPM and should be
declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Order of Respondent Secretary of Agriculture is valid.
Whether or not there is failure of exhausting administrative remedies.

RULING:
The Order issued by the Department is in the exercise of its regulatory and
supervisory powers. As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the requirement
does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter
ego of the President unless disapproved by him except when the questioned act is
patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Respondent Secretary arrogated unto himself
the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the
petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under P.D No. 175 Section 8
which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives; this does not give
him the right.

Administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the department or its

equivalent. Neither suspension nor cancellation includes the take- over and ouster of
incumbent directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would have expressly so
stated.
 27

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA
GR NO. 141284

FACTS:
In view of alarming increase of violent crimes in Metro Manila President Estrada in
verbal directive, ordered PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the
purpose of crime prevention and suppression. In compliance therewith, PNP Chief
formulated Letter of Instruction which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility
patrols, called Task Force Tulungan would be conducted. The President confirmed the
deployment in his Memorandum desired to improve the peace and order through more
effective crime prevention including increased patrol and that the service of the Marines
in the anti- crime campaign are merly temporary.

The IBP filed instant petition to annul LOI and to declare the deployment of the Ph
Marines, null and void and unconstitutional arguing that it is violative of the Constitution
that: a) no emergency situation would justify such deployment, b) that it constitute an
insidious incursion by the military in a civilian function of government, c) that in
militarizing the law enforcement the administration is unwittingly making the military
more powerful

ISSUE:
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the
civilian character of PNP

RULING:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in him. The Court
cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitutes its own. The
Constitution bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed
forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Art VII Sec 18 of
the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief.

In the exercise of the power to call on- the- spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. It must be done swiftly and decisively. The deployment of the
Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian
character of the police force. It onstitute permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement.

Wherefore, petition is hereby dismissed.

 28

OLEGUER ET AL.
vs
MILITARY COMMISSION
G.R. NO. L-54558

FACTS:
Herein petitioners were arrested by military authorities charged for subversion.
Respondent Chief of Staff created the respondent Military Commission to try criminal
case filed against the petitioners.

Petitioners then filed an instant prohibition and habeas corpus sought to enjoin
respondent from proceeding with the trial, that military commissions have no
jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have been committed during the
period of martial law, that proceeding under such commission is violative of
constitutional right of due process of law.

Supervening event occurred when Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2045 officially
lifting martial law in Ph. Same Proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 (creating
military tribunals) and directed that military tribunals created pursuant thereto are
hereby dissolved

ISSUE:
Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil
courts are open and functioning

RULING:
The Court ordered the transfer of the criminal proceedings to the civil courts after
noting that with martial law having been lifted, all cases pending before military
tribunals should, as a general rule, be transferred to the civilian courts. That the crime
alleged to have been committed did not have any political complexion.

Military Commissions or Tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged

offenses when the civil courts are open and functioning. Due process of law demands
that in all criminal prosecutions accused shall be entitled, due process clause of the
Constitution. Military Commissions or Tribunals are however not courts in Ph judicial
system.

Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government

and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for
the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and
navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilize under his order or those of his
authorized military representation. The power and duty of interpreting the laws as when
an individual should be considered to have violated the law is primarily a function of the
judiciary.

Wherefore, Military Commission No. 34 is hereby declared unconstitutional.

 29

SANLAKAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004

Facts:
In the middle of the night of 27 July 2003, the 300 enlisted men and officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines marched up armed with heavy weapons and
explosives to the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City to demand the
resignation of the President, Secretary of Defence and Chief of the PNP. The said
incident brought up the issuance of Proclamation 427 dated 27 July 2003 that declared
the state of rebellion and General Order No 4 of the same date, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police were directed to suppress and quell
the rebellion pursuant to Section 18 Article VII of the Constitution. Negotiations took
place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. Both
the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No.435, declaring
the termination of the State of rebellion was issued stating that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police have effectively suppressed and quelled
the rebellion. Petitioners contend that Section 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not
require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no
factual basis for such proclamation. They contended that the Presidential issuances
cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not
delegated any such power to the President. Solicitor General argues that the petitions
have been rendered moot and academic by the lifting of the declaration.

Issue:

Whether or not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.4 are constitutional?

Held:

Yes. The court rendered that both Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.4
are constitutional. Article VII Section 18 does not expressly prohibit declaring state of
rebellion. The President, as it was stated in the Constitution, is the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and it is not disputed that the President has full
discretionary powers to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion
amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report
requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil
government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no
indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short,
there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised
martial law powers. The mere announcement of a state of rebellion cannot obliterate or
violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of
rebellion could not bring about these conditions. The petitions dismissed. The State of
Rebellion has ceased to exist and rendered the case moot and academic.
 30

Gudani et. al. vs Lt. Gen. Senga et. al.

GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan was invited by the Senate to clarify
the allegations of 2004 election fraud and the “Hello Garci” tapes appearance. In
regards to this matter, President Gloria macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 464
prohibiting anybody from the executive department as well as from the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. A
memorandum was issued by then AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga prohibiting petitioner
Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan from appearing before the Senate Committee without
the President’s approval or consent. However, the two appeared before the Senate
inspite of the order released not to appear on any Senate inquiry.

The petitioner and the other one who testified in the Senate inquiry were
relieved of their respective positions for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the
time honoured principle of the military which is the “Chain of Command”. Gen. Senga
ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for wilfully
violating the order of a senior officer.

Issue:

Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) preventing them from testifying before a
legislative inquiry.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court agreed that the President has the authority to do so. By
virtue of her power as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP vested by the Constitution,
any military officer shall be subjected to liabilities under the military law if ever the defy
or committed acts against the order of the Commander-in-Chief. Although this privilege
does not leave the Congress with no remedies as to compel the military officers to
appear before the Senate inquiry even without the consent of the President. If the
President refuse to do so, the President may be compelled by the judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the
law of the land which the President which the President has the duty to faithfully
execute.

The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
the Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution stated and recognized the
function of the Legislative Department to conduct Senate inquiry in aid of legislation.
The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since the petitioners testified anyway
despite the president’s refusal to give her consent for them to appear and testify before
the Senate inquiry.
 31

David et. al. vs Arroyo et. al.

G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 200
Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of

the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency, on the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017
due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle
I) to assassinate the president. Pursuant to the effect of the proclamation, the President
cancelled all permits regarding the rallies and organizational meetings. However, the
alleged head of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) Randolf David organized a rally which lead to
his arrest.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national
emergency ceased to exist. David and some Congressman in the side of opposition
contended that the issuance of Presidential Proclamation 1017 is unconstitutional due to
lack of factual basis and such power cannot be validly proclaimed because such power
is reposed in Congress. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Solicitor General argued that
the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue
of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the
president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power.

Issue:

Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O No. 5 is constitutional.

Held:

The petitions are partly granted by the Supreme Court.

PP 1017 and its implementing G.O. No. 5 are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional. PP1017 issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was considered
constitutional as to the call of the President to suppress the lawless violence but it was
unconstitutional as to the provisions of the PP1017 that commands the AFP to enforces
law not related to the suppression of the lawless violence as well as the decrees
promulgated the President. Article VII Section 17 of the Constitution does not prohibit
the President to issue PP1017, declaring state of emergency but it prohibits the
President to take-over any privately-owned corporations and businesses affected with
public interest without the aid of legislation.

G.O. No.5 is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, is necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that
acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature,
such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
 32

JAMAR M. KULAYAN ET. AL. VS GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 187298 July 3, 2012

FACTS:
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio
Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project
for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later
confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee,
later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee was then formed to investigate the
kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of Governor Tan of
the Province of Sulu.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of
emergency in the province of Sulu, which cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for
the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act
(R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless
violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency
Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and
seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.
Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued
ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sec. 1 and 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers
and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief
of the armed forces.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President.

HELD:
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers,
and that is the President of the Republic, which means that when Sec. 1, Art. VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.
Thus, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Sec. 23, Art. VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became
known as the calling-out powers under Sect. 7, Art. VII thereof. While the President is
still a civilian, Art. II, Sec. 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme
military leader. The net effect of Art. II, Sec. 3, when read with Art. VII, Sec. 18, is that
recent jurisprudence, a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative
head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be
possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the
power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. He may, delegate
the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is
his.
Governor Tan does not have the power to call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency
and called upon the AFP, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-
out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and
may not be justified by the invocation of and Section 465 of the Local Government
Code.
 33

WILFREDO TORRES VS HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN,

BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF PRISONS
G.R. No. 76872 July 23, 1987

FACTS:

In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by

the president with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982,
Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board
of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the
president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court
averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the
conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and
executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary

before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD: The SC affirmed the following:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon,

and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not
subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it
may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to
proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction
therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for
the violation of his conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because
the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his
trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has
two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which
imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who
“having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the
conditions of such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an
exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
 34

SALVACION MONSANTO VS FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR. 170 SCRA 190

G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989
FACTS:
In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted Monsanto was accused of the
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. She was given an absolute pardon
by President Marcos which she accepted and requested that she be restored to her
former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant and asked for the
back wages for the entire period of her suspension. Finance Ministry ruled that
petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new
appointment.

The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a
former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and
entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the
period of his suspension pendente lite. In such a situation, the former public official
must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former position, and the
pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence.

Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case because
of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still
pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her
employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been
terminated or forfeited. The court viewed that, it is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the
Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a
new appointment.

HELD:
No. Automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon,
albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public
documents. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain
her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of
the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the
penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil
rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
But unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence, it cannot bring back lost
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
 35

PEOPLE VS SALLE JR
250 SCRA 581

FACTS:
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson and
were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On 24 March 1993,
the accused filed an appeal. However,
on 28 December 1993, they were released from the National Bilibid Prison as they were
granted a conditional pardon. On 6 January 1994, appeallant Francisco Salle, Jr filed an
Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Appellant Ricky Mengote, on the other hand, left for
the province without informing his counsel and was not able to file his motion to
withdraw his appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeallants conditional pardon is valid?

RULING:
For a pardon to be valid, a final conviction is necessary. Pardon has no
effect until his appeal is withdrawn and the person allows his conviction to be final. As
was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973
Constitution, or “conviction by final judgment,” as presently prescribed in Section 19,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before
a judgment of conviction becomes final.
Francisco Salle Jr' appeal is valid as he has accepted his conviction as final when
he withdrew his appeal.
Ricky Mengote, however, as he did not file for motion to withdrew his appeal and
hence has not accepted his conviction as final is not eligible for pardon.
“WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby
given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the
withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon granted
the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such
withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said
appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National
Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.”
 36

GARCIA VS COA
226 SCRA 356

FACTS:
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against
him, however, the president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner was later
reinstated to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether
petitioner’s was to the same position of Supervising Lineman. Petitioner thereafter filed
with respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries effective 1 April 1975, the
date of his dismissal from the service.

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having
been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD:
Our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive
prerogative to extend executive clemency under the following circumstances:

Except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the

President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress.
In this case, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and
consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial
court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was
dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof
but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense alleged of him. Aside from
finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern
and dedication as a public servant. Hence, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason
behind the grant of executive clemency to him.
The executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative
charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the
grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated
to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of
the clemency. Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles
him to back wages.
 37

LLAMAS VS ORBOS
202 SCRA 844

FACTS:
Mariano Ocampo III was the Governor of Tarlac Province and he was suspended
for 90 days when he was found guilty of administrative charges against him. Rodolfo
Llamas was the Vice-governor and assumed the Office of the Governor when Ocampo
was suspended.
However, in less than 30 days, Ocampo returned with an Administrative Order
showing that he was pardoned and hence he can assume office without completing the
90-day suspension.

ISSUE:
Has the President the power to grant an executive clemency in administrative
cases?

HELD:
Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency
only in criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise pro vided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves, commu tations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures,after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the members of the Congress.
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency
may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases.
However, the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, it refers
only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative
branches of the government.
 38

EDUARDO E. KAPUNAN V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 14821317, March 13, 2009

Facts: Olalia and Alayay were both found dead with their bodies riddled with
bullets on 13 November 1986. The double murders stirred considerable public anger,
given Olalias high profile as Chairman of the KMU at the time of his death.

On 12 January 1998, private respondents Feliciana C. Olalia and Perolina G. Alayay

filed a letter complaint before the Department of Justice (DOJ) charging petitioner
Eduardo E. Kapunan, Jr. (Kapunan, Jr.), petitioner Oscar E. Legaspi (Legaspi), and
other officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) for the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Alayay and
Olalia. The affidavits of TSgt. Medardo Barreto (Barreto) and Eduardo E. Bueno were
annexed to the complaint, which was docketed as I.S. No. 98025.

On 26 February 1998, Kapunan, Jr., filed a motion to dismiss the charges against
him before the Panel. On the same day, Legaspi likewise filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that his criminal liability had been totally extinguished by the amnesty granted
to him under Proclamation No. 347, entitled Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents,
and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order,
Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of
War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." The DOJ Prosecutor refused to
rule on the motions to dismiss and instead treated them as their counter affidavits.

In a Resolution dated 18 March 1998, the Panel recommended the filing of two
informations each for a separate count of murder against Kapunan, Jr., Legaspi, Ricardo
Dicon, Cirilio Almario, Filomeno Crizaldo Maligaya, Edger Sumido, Jose Bacera, Jr.,
Dennis Jabatan, Freddie Sumagaysay, Fernando Casanova, Gene Paris, Gilberto Galicia,
and Desiderio Perez. The Panel determined that Olalia and Alayay were seized on the
night of 12 November 1986 along Julia Vargas Avenue in Pasig. Thereafter, the two
were brought to a safehouse in Cubao, then to a secluded area in Antipolo where they
were shot dead. The alleged perpetrators belonged to a team of members of the AFP.

Issue: Whether or not the amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi under
Proclamation No. 347 is valid; stated differently,are Kapunan and Legaspi covered by
Proclamation No. 347 or No. 348?

Held: On their face, the murders of Olalia and Alayay do not indicate they are
components of rebellion. It is not self explanatory how the murders of two private
citizens could have been oriented to the aims of rebellion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The assailed Joint Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 December 1999, as well as its Resolution dated 22 May 2001 are
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against petitioners.
 39

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. EASTERN SEA TRADING

G.R. No. L14279 ,October 31, 1961

FACTS:Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of

onion and garlic which arrived at the Port of Manila from August 25 to September 7,
1954. Some shipments came from Japan and others from Hong Kong. In as much as
none of the shipments had the certificate required by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44
and 45 for the release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized and subjected to
forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations of section 1363(f) of the Revised
Administrative Code, in relation to the aforementioned circulars of the Central Bank. In
due course, the Collector of Customs of Manila rendered a decision on September 4,
1956, declaring said goods forfeited to the Government and — the goods having been,
in the meantime, released to the consignees on surety bonds, filed by the same, as
principal, and the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., as surety, in compliance with
orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Cases Nos. 23942 and 23852
thereof — directing that the amounts of said bonds be paid, by said principal and
surety, jointly and severally, to the Bureau of Customs, within thirty (30) days from
notice.

ISSUE:Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the

Senate.

HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the
concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by
the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive
agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more
formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of
exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated
‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and
other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive
agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of
ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety
of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive
agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been
negotiated with foreign governments. It would seem to be sufficient,in order to show
that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that
they are not treaties,and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to
certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the
approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,
navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs
matters, and commercial relations generally,international claims, postal matters, the
registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by
specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of
Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still
others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign
governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.
 40

LOURDES RUBRICO ET. AL V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO ET. AL

G.R. No. 183871, February 18,2010

FACTS: In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation
to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D. Rubrico,
Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel assail and seek to set aside the
Decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 31, 2008 in CAG.R. SP No. 00003, a
petition commenced under the Amparo Rule.The petition for the writ of amparo dated
October 25, 2007 was originally filed before this Court.

Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men
belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine
Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her
detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean
Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were
also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued,
ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act
against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to
immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for
respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material
inculpatory averments against them.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the CA committed reversible error in dismissing their

Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.

HELD: The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a
concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an
express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already
understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her
tenure.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such.In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main
prayer, that the Court order the impleaded respondents to immediately desist from
doing any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten the security of the Petitioners
and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences and offices where
they are working under pain of contempt of [this] Court. Petitioners, however, failed to
adduce the threshold substantive evidence to establish the predicate facts to support
their cause of action, i.e., the adverted harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or
security, against responding respondents, as responsible for the disappearance and
harassments complained of.
 41

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC),

et al.

GR. No. 171101 (November 22, 2011)

Facts:

Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac is a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial- residential

expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac.

On May 9, 1989, 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) signified in a

referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution Option Plan. On
May 11, 1989, the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA), styled as a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), was entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848
qualified FWBs. On December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution No.
2005-32-01 revoking the SDO Plan for Hacienda Luisita Inc.

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to dismiss/deny
the petition filed by HLI and affirm with modifications the resolutions of the PARC
revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda
Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) of the government.

Issues:

1. Whether or not PARC can revoke HLI’s SDP.

2. Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional.

3. Whether or not the operative fact doctrine is applicable to the case.

Ruling:

1. Yes, following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the
conferment of express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the agricultural
land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to recall or revoke the approval
of the plan.

2. No, the court ruled that it is not compelled to address the constitutionality of the law
because the petitioners failed to raise the issue at the earliest opportunity and the issue
of constitutionality is not the very lis mota of the case. The court reiterated that it
would only exercise its power of judicial review when the following essential requisites
are met: (a)that there is an actual case or controversy; (b)that the constitutional
question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity by a proper party or one with
locus standi or legal standing; (c)that the issue of constitutionality be the very lis mota
of the case.

3. Yes, what was actually revoked in the Resolution No. 2005-32-01 was PARC’s
approval of the SDP embodied in the Resolution No. 89-12-2. This means that what was
revoked is an executive act. The operative fact doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v.
Court of Appeals wherein it is stated that a legislative or an executive act, prior to being
declared unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with.
Consequently, the operative fact doctrine is not limited to invalid or unconstitutional
laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies
that have the force and effect of laws.
 42

Malaga v. Penachos Jr.

GR. No. 86695 (September 3, 1992)

Facts:

The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) published an invitation to bid for the construction of the
Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the
submission of pre-qualification requirements was December 2, 1988, and that the bids
would be received and opened on December 12, 1988, at 3 in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, respectively doing business under the name of the B.E.
Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their pre-qualification documents at
two o’clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeña submitted his own
PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. They were not allowed to participate in the bidding
because their documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cut-off
time of ten o’clock in the morning of December 2, 1988.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the
officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their
non-inclusion in the list of bidders.On the same date, a restraining order prohibiting
PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project was issued. The defendants
filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited
from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in
government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that
the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the
bidding had been awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition
for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the
ISCOF is covered under P.D. 1818.

Issue:

Whether or not ISCOF is subject to Presidential Decree 1818.

Ruling:

Yes, ISCOF is a chartered institution and is covered by P.D. 1818. However, there are
irregularities surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards
to the bidding and the award of the project. First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of
the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then changed these deadlines without prior
notice to prospective participants. Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified
applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book forms for the project to be bid
thirty days before the date of bidding if the estimate project cost was between P1M and
P5M. PBAC only issued these forms on Dec. 2, 1988 or 10 days before the bidding.

The irregularities committed by PBAC also defeated the purpose of rules implementing
P.D. 1594 which is to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion
and fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment of the public.

P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by
administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the challenged
restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of
preliminary injunction should not have been denied. It has been held in a long line of
cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding required by law is void,
and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it.
 43

PACU v. Secretary of Education

GR. No. L-5279 (October 31, 1955)

Facts:

Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) requests that Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional
due to (a) it deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of
liberty and property without due process of law; (b) it deprive parents of their natural
rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and (c) its provisions conferring
on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

Section 1 of Act 2706, as amended provides that: “It shall be the duty of the Secretary
of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools
and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the
public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this
purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to
advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the
efficiency of instruction given in the same”.

The Solicitor General submitted a mimeographed memorandum contending that, (a) the
matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of
deciding the constitutional questions; (b) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the
validity of the said acts; and (c) the Acts are constitutionally valid.

Issue:

Whether or not the case filed is a justiciable controversy.

Ruling:

No, the issue does not constitute a justiciable controversy. As a general rule, the
constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is
directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties concerned. None of the petitioners has the cause
to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and
are actually operating by virtue of their permits. And they do not assert that the
respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have
suffered no wrong under the terms of law and, naturally need no relief in the form they
now seek to obtain.

It could be true that the Secretary has issued rules and regulations "whimsical and
capricious" and that such discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who
bully heads and teachers of private schools. Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge
those regulations specifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in proper
administrative or judicial proceedings not to invalidate the law. For it needs no
argument, to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute
does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute.

To support their position that the law and the Secretary of Education have transcended
the governmental power of supervision and regulation, the petitioners appended a list
of circulars and memoranda issued by the said Department, however, they failed to
indicate which document was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious. Unless
a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the
court will not consider.
 44

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al.,petitioners vs. COMELEC, respondents

GR NO. 118577 March 7, 1995
JOHN OSMENA,petitioner vs. COMELEC, JEJOMAR BINAY et al.,respondents
GR NO. 118627 March 7, 1995

FACTS:

These are two petitions assailing for constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." G.R. No. 118577
involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. it was filed by petitioners
Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz,
Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and
Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others
are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the

constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.
2. Constitutionality of R.A. NO. 7854 Sections 2, 51 and 52.

HELD:

1. We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51.The

requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated: there must be an actual case or controversy, the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party, the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity, and the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are
residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

2. Section 2, The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly

urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati.Congress maintained the existing
boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject
to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we
are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain
the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard.
Section 51, We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of
section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a
law are well delineated.
Section 52, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be
made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9
clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
(250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in
enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district.
 45

POLICE GENERAL LEVY MACASIANO (Ret.) Vs. NATIONAL HOUSING

AUTHORITY, et. al.
G.R. No. 107921 July 1, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of

Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992. He predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on
Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public
Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the
Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said
Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as
drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because
of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which
he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he
has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully
disbursed."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing

RULING:

It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an

act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination
of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. To
reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the
constitutional question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional
question must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the decision of the case. A proper party is one who has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of.

It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental
requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not
claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has
been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his
rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit
under the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in
vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants."

Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against
the petitioner.
 46

DEAN JOSE JOYA ET. AL., petitioners

vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), CATALINO
MACARAIG, JR., in his official capacity, and/or the Executive Secretary, and
CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T. CAPARAS, respondents.

G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993

FACTS: Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply
concerned with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they
have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from
acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and
R.A. 4846 governing the preservation and disposition of national and important cultural
properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and
silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in
general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized
act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to
public property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition

HELD: Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. The rule is settled that no question
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must
be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must
be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the
first two (2) requisites.

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. "Legal
standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or
a mere incidental interest. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino
administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these
paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with
constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If
these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or
statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only
by the proper parties whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights
which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they
are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly
owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their
alleged unauthorized disposition. For lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and
mandamus is DISMISSED.
47
48
49
 50

TATAD VS. GARCIA JR.

243 SCRA 436

FACTS: In 1989, DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA.
Among the five applicants of contractors who seek to finance and implement the
project, only the EDSA LRT Consortium met the prequalification requirements set forth
by the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee. DOTC and respondent EDSA LRT
Corporation, Ltd., in substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium, entered into an
agreement under the terms of the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by RA
6957, as amended by RA 7718. Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium, private
respondent, shall undertake and finance the entire project required for a complete
operational light rail transit system. Upon full or partial completion and viability thereof,
it shall deliver the use and possession of the completed portion to DOTC which shall
operate the same. DOTC shall pay private respondent rentals on a monthly basis. As
agreed upon, private respondent's capital shall be recovered from the rentals to be paid
by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come from the earnings of the EDSA LRT. After 25
years and DOTC shall have completed payment of the rentals, ownership of the project
shall be transferred to the latter for a consideration of only USD 1.00.

However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmeña, and Rodolfo Biazon, in their capacity
as Senators and taxpayers, opposed the implementation of said agreement contending
that such agreement grants EDSA LRT Consortium ownership of EDSA LRT III, a public
utility, which violates the Constitution, the latter being a foreign corporation as it was
organized under Hongkong laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation, own EDSA
LRT III, a public utility.

HELD: No. Private respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. is admittedly a foreign
corporation but what it actually owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches,
rail stations, terminals, the power plant, but not the EDSA LRT III, a public utility. While
a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by
themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their
ownership but their use to serve the public. The Constitution, in no uncertain terms,
requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility. However, it does not require a
franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as
it does not operate them to serve the public. The right to operate a public utility may
exist independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can
own said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one may
operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public. The
devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in
control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.

While private respondent is the owner of the facilities necessary to operate the EDSA
LRT III, it admits that it is not enfranchised to operate a public utility. In view of this
incapacity, private respondent and DOTC agreed that on completion date, private
respondent will immediately deliver possession of the LRT system by way of lease for
25 years, during which period DOTC shall operate the same as a common carrier and
private respondent shall provide technical maintenance and repair services to DOTC.

Private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles and collect fees from the riding
public. It will have no dealings with the public and the public will have no right to
demand any services from it.
 51

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

FACTS: The plaintiffs are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The
complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit alleging that they are entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests. They contended that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn
and that the continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological
balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. They seek for the court to
order the respondent to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

The RTC Judge, however, sustained the motion to dismiss filed by defendant on the ground
that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
Further, the court ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would violate the non-
impairment clause provided for in the Constitution.

Hence, the petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
2. Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
3. Whether or not the petition violates the non-impairment of contract clause as provided
for in the Constitution

HELD:

(1) Yes. This petition bears upon Filipinos’ fundamental right to a balanced and healthful
ecology as provided for in the Constitution. DENR is the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, it has the duty to protect and advance
the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
claim that there was grave abuse of discretion in the granting of TLAs. After careful
examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. Hence, plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) No. Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution allows the Supreme
Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to
declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the case at bar is a justiciable controversy.

(3) No. The Court held that a timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case. Hence, the non-impairment of contract clause cannot be invoked.
 52

KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

246 SCRA 540

FACTS: In the case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, the contract between Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system was held
invalid. The contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO
from holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration, association, or joint
venture. On January 25, 1995, the same parties entered again into an eight-year
Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and accessories. The
agreement provides that the rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at
which in no case be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in
commercial operation. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the
facilities and upon expiration of term, it can purchase the equipment at P25M.

Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because it is the same
as the old contract of lease. It is still violative of PCSO’s charter, the law regarding
public bidding, and of Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no
longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case. PCSO and PGMC filed
separate comments contending that ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There
is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the
Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds and hence, cannot purchase its
own online lottery equipment. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they
were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing to sue.

(2) Whether or not the Equipment Lease Agreement is valid.

HELD:

(1) No. Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue. Stare decisis does not apply. The
previous ruling in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional
issues were actually involved. It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the
validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the
PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of
constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the
agreement, cannot raise.

The "law of the case" doctrine is also inapplicable, because this case is not a
continuation of the first one. The questions raised in this case are legal questions and
the claims involved are substantially different from those involved in the prior case
between the parties. As already stated, the ELA is substantially different from the
Contract of Lease declared void in the first case.

(2) Yes. The ELA is valid because it is different from the prior lease agreement. The
operation of the system is clearly in the hands of PCSO. It was as held in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona that PCSO does not have the power to enter into any contract which would
involve it in any form of “collaboration, association, or joint venture” for the holding of
sweepstakes activities. This only mentions that PCSO is prohibited from investing in
any activities that would compete in their own activities. Also, with regard to public
bidding, E.O. 301 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment and not on contracts of lease.
 53

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO, vs.

SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of
Representatives,
G.R. No. 187883

Facts:
The petition filed by the petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and
taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution
Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to
Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of
Congress. In essence, the petition seeks to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant
a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the
procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the court can exercise the power of judicial review in this case.

Ruling:
The court cannot exercise the power of judicial review.
It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. The
determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive
province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of
constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its
solemn and sacred obligation under the Constitution.
The case-or-controversy requirement bans this court from deciding abstract,
hypothetical or contingent questions, lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice
concerning legislative or executive action. An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is
the requisite of ripeness
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is
grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or
hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only
resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of
proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired
and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been
made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In
short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent
future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has
not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.
Yet another requisite rooted in the very nature of judicial power is locus standi or
standing to sue. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can
demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In
the case at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them
with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a
controversy for significant reasons. The lack of petitioners personal stake in this case is no more
evident than in Lozanos three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis.
In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not available simply
at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete
injury. When warranted by the presence of indispensible minimums for judicial review, this
Court shall not shun the duty to resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.
 54

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 177499

Facts:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities
into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12 Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million
th

income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in
the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.
However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of
the Local Government Code.

Issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
We grant the petitions as the Cityhood Laws violate the constitution.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the
cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they
prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from
the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the
Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions
are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood
Laws herein petition.
 55

VENANCIO INONOG vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY

July 28, 2009

Facts:
The administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Venancio P. Inonog,
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on April 26, 2005, charging Judge
Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135, Makati City with gross abuse of
authority. The complaint involved an incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for
which respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because complainant parked his
superiors vehicle at the parking space reserved for respondent judge. Respondent judge
initiated the proceeding for indirect contempt by issuing an order directing the complainant to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. That same day, respondent judge
issued another order, finding complainant guilty of contempt.
The complainant was informed that the respondent judge blamed the usurpation of the
said parking space for the delay in the promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-
1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69, and 03-392-393 scheduled at 8:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005
because the latter had a hard time looking for another parking space. Complainant was also
informed that if he failed to appear at the hearing, a warrant for his arrest will be issued.
With this, respondent judge ordered a fine of P2,000.00 against herein complainant,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely. In
compliance, complainant paid the additional amount of P1,000.00 as fine.
Aggrieved by the said orders of respondent judge, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross abuse of authority.

Ruling:
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in
judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise
the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a
safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. Besides possessing the
requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark of judicial temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge.
Thus, the Court agrees with the findings of the OCA (which ordered that the instant case
be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and Judge Francisco B. Ibay, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 35, Makati City, be penalized to pay a FINE in the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely) but deems it proper to impose a penalty different from the OCAs
recommendation.
As for the appropriate penalty to be imposed, we note that this is not the first time
respondent judge was charged with grave abuse of authority in connection with his misuse of
his contempt power.
Considering that this is not the first time that respondent judge committed the same
offense and in Nuez, which had similar factual antecedents as the case at bar, the Court already
saw fit to impose upon him a fine in the amount of P40,000.00, it is proper to impose on him
the same penalty in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay is found
guilty of grave abuse of authority. He is ordered to pay a FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
 56

LOUIS “BAROK” C.BIRAOGO

versus THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
G.R NO. 192935
x-----------------------------------X
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN et. al.
versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
G.R. NO. 193036
December 7, 2010

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the
Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is
essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control.
Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body
as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no
power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant
the filing of information in our courts of law.
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive order No. 1, the petitioners asked
the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions.

ISSUE:
WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.

HELD:
PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of
the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.
The Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but
is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. The same holds true
with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV
in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared
with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
 57

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL versus

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 191618
November 23, 2010

FACTS:
Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution.
Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.”
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of
the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art
VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing
on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all
election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether the designation of members of the Supreme Court as members of the
presidential electoral tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.” The set up embodied in the
Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially
an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential
or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary.
And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by
the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and
vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. It
is intended by the framers of the Constitution to be an institution independent, but not
separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of
law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election
contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit
constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and
Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.
The decision of the Court still stands on its constitutionality.
 58

CESAR BENGZON, et al. versus

HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON
G.R. No. 103524
April 15, 1992

FACTS:
The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
who are currently receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended
by Republic Act No. 1797. They filed the instant petition on their own behalf and in
representation of all other retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals similarly situated.
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 on January 25, 1975 repealing
Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic
Act No. 1568 and Presidential Decree No. 578) which authorized the adjustment of the
pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and
members of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of
the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries.
RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. However, President Corazon
Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not
give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
However, they pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644)
because of the absence of its publication, thus there was no law. Hence, the repealing
law never existed due to non-publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed.
The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of
the retired justices in the judiciary in the General Appropriation Bill. She explained that
that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY
1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is
constitutional or valid.

HELD:
The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due
to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The veto of these specific provisions in
the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary of its funds should be utilized, which
is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. It is a constitutional mandate that the Judiciary
must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations
law.
The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the
Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes
promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the
appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve
the remaining portion of said item.
The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the
Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the
president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely
vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the
other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.
Therefore, the petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the
provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and subsisting.
59
 60

DRILON VS. LIM

G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994

FACTS: The Secretary of Justice, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and
void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared
Section 187 of the Local Government Code (LGC) as unconstitutional because it vests
on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section
187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax
ordinances as specified in the LGC had indeed not been observed. The petition was
originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the
decision, but reinstated it anyway.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of Section 187 of the LGC.

HELD: Yes. B.P. 129 vests in the Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction over all civil cases
in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover,
Article VIII, Section 5(2)(a), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation
of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with
the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the
theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative
departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed
an infraction of the Constitution.
 61

LARRANAGA VS. CA

G.R. No. 130644, October 27, 1997

FACTS: On September 15, 1997, some members of the Philippine National Police
Criminal Investigation Group (PNPCIG) went to the Center for Culinary Arts in Quezon
City to arrest petitioner, albeit without warrant. Petitioner resisted the arrest and
immediately phoned his sister and brother-in-law. Petitioner’s sister sought the aid of
Atty. Raymundo A. Armovit. Atty. Armovit, over the phone, dissuaded the Police
Officers from carrying out the warrantless arrest before CIG Legal Officer Ruben
Zacarias. After consulting with his superiors, Legal Officer Zacarias ordered to stop the
arrest and allowed petitioner to go home. Atty. Armovit made an undertaking in writing
that he and petitioner would appear before the Cebu City Prosecutor on September 17,
1997 for preliminary investigation. Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was
arrested and detained without the filing of the necessary information and warrant of
arrest. The petitioner alleged that he must be released and must be subject to a
preliminary investigation. However, pending the resolution of the Court for the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest
directed to petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of Petitioner Larranaga without a warrant was legal.

HELD: No. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place, not arrested either by a peace
officer or a private person. To be sure, even if petitioner were arrested by the PNP CIG
personnel, such arrest would still be illegal because of the absence of a warrant. It
does not appear in the case at bar that petitioner has just committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense when the Police Officers tried to
arrest him on September 15, 1997. In fact, the petitioner was attending classes at the
Center for Culinary Arts at that time.
 62

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. VS. CA

G.R. No. 117680, February 9, 1996

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and
a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts
for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investment
(BOI). BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.’s application to amend its
BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from
“glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles.” Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did
not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for
reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA. CA temporarily restrained
the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms of twenty
(20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary
injunction. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order
contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is
exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 of B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, “Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the
Court of Appeals from a Final Order of Decision of the Court of Appeals and Quasi-
Judicial Agencies”, cannot be the basis of Mariwasa’s appeal to respondent court
because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O.
226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed
directly with the Supreme Court. Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there
may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue
for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was
promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: Yes. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or suspended Article 82 of E.O. 226
insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the
BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously
allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court
of Appeals.
 63

G.R. No. 107852 October 20, 1993

GREGORIO M. ARUELO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BULACAN, BRANCH 17, MALOLOS BULACAN, and DANILO F.
GATCHALIAN, respondents.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court, to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 24, 1992 in
CA-G.R. SP No, 28621, which ruled that the answer and counter-protest of respondent
Danilo F. Gatchalian was filed timely and ordered the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17,
Malolos, Bulacan to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 343-M-92, the
protest case filed by petitioner Gregorio N. Aruelo, Jr.
Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the
office of the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian
won over Aruelo by a margin of four votes, such that on May 13, 1992, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Balagtas,
Bulacan. Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives
the respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his
answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed
when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and
motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the
running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his
answer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading
beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that they find no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial
Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to
proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part
I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2,
Rule 1, Part I provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and
proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests
and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is
it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election
protests or quowarranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing
of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court
(Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
 64

G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992

EDWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LUIS T. SANTOS,
SECRETARY, respondents.
FACTS:

Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros
Occidental. On October 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed
Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of
Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in
relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2
of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and
abuse of authority.

Divinagracia’s complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City

Council or SanggunianPanglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has
continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose
from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of
the same department. Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the
DLG for a permit to continue his practice of law for the reasons stated in his letter-
request. On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 setting forth guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective
officials. In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana’s motion to dismiss was denied by
the public respondents. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20,
1991. Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991
(RA 7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:

Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

XXX XXX XXX

ISSUE:

Whether or not DILG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional
because it prohibits public officials to practice their profession while they are in position

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that DILG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 is not
unconstitutional. Petitioner’s contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches
upon the Supreme Court’s power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law.
The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe
rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge
of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances
where the law allows it.
 65

RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GSIS FROM

PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0
February 11, 2010
FACTS:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under
Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the ROC. The said provision states:
SEC. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local
government corporations and government-owned or controlled corporations with or
without independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees. xx
The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is hereby declared to be the
policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be
preserved and maintained at all times and that contribution rates necessary to sustain
the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the
members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair
the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to
sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary,
the GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be
exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These
exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment
against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.
Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence
contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded
and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. xx
Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the OSG maintains that the petition should
be denied. On this Court’s order, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a
report and recommendation on the petition of the GSIS and the comment of the OSG
thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment
of legal fees has no legal basis.
ISSUE:
May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on GOCCs
and local government units?
RULING:
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the
payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional
safeguard of the Court’s independence — fiscal autonomy. Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of
the ROC was promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers under
Sec 5(5), Art VIII of the Constitution: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to
the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. xx
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the ROC is an
integral part of the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or
docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, much less with the Executive.
 66

BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA

vs
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 102781
April 22, 1993.

FACTS:

Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial
Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to
refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22,
1951 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.

In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, respondents alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service
1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying “that all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998,” when in truth and in fact,
petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10)
criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.

Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of
service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and
the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17)
months. On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the
Supreme Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.

ISSUE:

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the
alleged falsification of a judge’s certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and
assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court

HELD:

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Supreme Court
with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue
of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court
personnel’s compliance with all laws, and took the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner’s certificates of service
to the Supreme Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true
status of his pending case load, as the Supreme Court has the necessary records to
make such a determination.
 67

ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA
vs
DISTRICT JUDGE MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR.
A.M. No. 1312-CFI
January 31, 1978

FACTS:

Petitioner files a petition to order the transfer of Special Proceedings No. 6824 of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Testate Estate of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi)
from the sala of respondent judge, Hon. Mariano Castañeda to another branch and
administrative complaint against the same judge namely:

I. Violation of the Anti Graft Law (Corrupt practices of public officers under Section
3, Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti- Graft Law);
II. Decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal (violation of Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code);
III. Extortion by means of oppression; and
IV. Bribery

After respondent judge had filed his comment on said petition and administrative
complaint, the Court resolved on August 3, 1976 to refer the administrative complaint
to Justice Jose G. Bautista of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation. After the conduct of the investigation, Justice Bautista recommends
the dismissal of the charges against the judge for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a basis on the recommendation of the investigator to dismiss

the respondent judge.

HELD:

The court reviewed the records, testimonies of the witnesses, and other evidences
submitted by the parties and find the recommendation of the investigator as fully
supported with enough evidence to merit the dismissal of the complainant against the
respondent judge.

The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the respondent Judge should
be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented
against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary, to
which respondent belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it
should be only after due investigation and based on competent proofs, no less. This is
all the more so when as in this case the charges are penal in nature.

The ground for removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable
doubt and especially if it involves misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption,
incompetency, etc.
 68

DAVID G. NITAFAN, ET. AL.

vs
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ET. AL

G.R. No. 78780

July 23, 1987

FACTS:

The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and
Budget Office to continue the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of
the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was
affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on December 4, 1987.

Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all with
stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries

They submit that “any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision
of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from payment of income
taxes.

HELD:

No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations,
was NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation. Members of the
judiciary, just like members of the other branches of the government, are subject to
income taxation. What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may
not be decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may
not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges
shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.

The 1973 Constitution has provided that “no salary or any form of emolument of any
public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from
payment of income tax (Section 6, Article XV)” which was not present in the 1987
Constitution. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitution Commission relevant to Section
10, Article VIII (The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased), negate the contention that
the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of
salaries of judicial officers.
 69

DE LA LLANA VS ALBA

G.R. NO. L-57883 MARCH 12, 1982

Facts:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled
"An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes."

The assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from
the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the
termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it
being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been
ignored and disregarded. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges
not the Congress.

Issue:

Whether or not reorganization under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 violates the security
of tenure?

Held:

The reorganization under B.P. Blg. 129 is valid and does not violate security of
tenure. It is a well-settled rule that abolition of an office is not tantamount to illegal
removal of its incumbent but in order to be valid, it must be done in good faith.

Removal must be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the

office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in
law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would
thereby lose his position.

It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of
inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned,
this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its
say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so
but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is
there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in
the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would
invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
 70

PEOPLE VS JUDGE GACOTT

G.R. NO. 116049 JULY 13, 1995

Facts:

Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott has failed to check citations of the prosecutions, the
order of respondent RTC Judge dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the Supreme
Court. Respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to check the citations of the
prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court on the applicable
law to a particular case devolves solely upon the prosecution or whoever may be the
advocate before the court.

The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in
the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to
abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the
aforequoted LOI.

The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP 10k
for gross ignorance of law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the
Supreme Court. Stress is apparently laid by respondent judge on the inclusion of the
adverbial phrase "en banc" in referring to this Court in the quoted provision of the 1987
Constitution and, from this, he argues that it is only the full Court, not a division
thereof, that can administratively punish him.

Issue:

Whether or not the a Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to
administratively discipline respondent judge?

Held:

The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows
that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states
that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is a
declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the
procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended
that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole
Court since it would result in an absurdity.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all
administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed,
would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the
Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of
reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the
constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the
decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the lower
courts, 9 and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of
three, five, or seven members. 10

Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of

lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance
of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members
of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of
more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter
may be decided in division.
 71

IN RE: RODOLFO MANZANO

A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988

Facts:

On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 19 sent a letter requesting a resolution from the Supreme Court
favorable to his appointment as a member of Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice.

He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to
an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st
Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.

Issue:

Whether or not his membership in the Committee will not violate the Constitution.

Held:

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative

functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it
is provided that:

Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under

the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be
submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial

Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of
the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced

with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire
application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a
position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle.
Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust
reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo,
can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official,
however eminent.

ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

 72

NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Case number 31 (November 7, 2016)

FACTS: The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it
violates the aforementioned constitutional requirement of Article 8 Section 14 of the
Constitution. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does n
ot clearly anddistinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. Petitioners
complain that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits,
the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement that the sheriff's sale was
valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. There was therefore no
adequate factual or legal basis for the decision that could justify its review and
affirmance by the Court of Appeals. On January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation
obtained a loan of P2, 000,000.00 from private respondent United Coconut Planters
Bank and to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of
land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-
payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held on July 11, 1983, without re-
publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction was
changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. CA decision: We hold that
the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo while leaving much to be
desired, substantially complies with the rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the trial court is unconstitutional.

HELD:Thechallenged decision of theCourt of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of

basis. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10,
for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6, 1986,
conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject
to the appeal thereof, if desired, in accordance with law. (a) The questioned order is
an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the letter and spirit of Article 8,
Section 14 of the Constitution.
(b) It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be infor
med of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons
that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is
rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may
appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the
law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached
and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. (c) Brevity is doubtless
an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the
ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure
to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order. (d) Kilometric
decisions without much substance must be
avoided, to be sure, but the other extreme, where substance is also lost in the
wish to be brief, is no lessunacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which,
with welcome economy of words, arrives at the factual findings reaches the legal
conclusions renders its ruling and having done so ends.
 73

KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.), INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Case number 32 (November 7, 2016)

FACTS:

National Investment and Development Corporation granted KIPI a direct loan of Eight
Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) and a Two Million ((P2,000,000.00) guarantee to secure
PNB. (Exh. M of petitioner and Exh. 22 of respondent PNB and intervenor SLDC, T.S.N.
October 14, 1992 pp. 19-28). As security thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated
April 24, 1975 was executed by Petitioner KIPI in favor of NIDC, covering, among
others, a parcel of land with all its improvements embraced in and covered by TCT NO.
469737. KIPI then executed an Amendment of Mortage Deed of Release and
Cancellation of Mortgage. By virtue of this release, NIDC returned the owner’s copy of
the TCT to KIPI and registered the Deed of Release with the Registry of Deed.
However, PNB requested the return of the TCT due to unsettled accounts based on the
subsequent amendment of the mortgage. The return was made but after a year, PNB
filed for extrajudicial foreclosure of the property. KIPI contests the foreclosure saying
that the release by NIDC had the effect of releasing the real estate mortgage. Petitioner
KIPI filed a petition for review on certiorari of the adverse decision of respondent, Court
of Appeals. However, it was denied by this Court for failure to sufficiently show that
respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment.
Hence, in its second motion for reconsideration, petitioner tried a different approach by
assailing the minute resolutions are in violation of the constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not issuance of Minute Resolutions is valid under Article 8, Section 14 of the
Constitution.

HELD:

“Resolutions” are not “decisions” within the above constitutional requirements; they
merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained. And the petition to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing,
the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases “submitted for decision,”

i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefor
stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Supreme Court, after deliberating on a
petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and
states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the
resolution.
 74

PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. CASTRO

Case number 33 (November 7, 2016)

FACTS:

The case at bar relates to the disbarment of Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia. Prudential Bank
instituted an administrative case and ask the court for the initiation of proceedings for
his disbarment or suspension in connection with his actuations in a civil case ("Macro
Textile Millsdel Rosario, Notary Public for Quezon City, Defendants"), where he
represented the plaintiff.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Court’s decision violates the Constitution since it lacks
certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the
opinion of the Court.

2. Whether or not a constitutional provision has been disregarded in the Court's

Minute Resolution dated January 12, 1988.

HELD:

The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases.

From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have
not been accompanied by any formal certification. Such a certification would be a
superfluity in administrative cases. But even if such certification were required, it is
beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after
consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually took part in
the deliberations and voted attest to that. No constitutional provision has been
disregarded either in the Court's Minute Resolution, dated January 12,1988, denying the
motion for reconsideration "for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having been
previously duly considered and passed upon." It bears repeating that this is an
administrative case so that the Constitutional mandate that "no ... motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be ... denied without stating the legal
basis therefore" is inapplicable. And even if it were, said Resolution stated the legal
basis for the denial and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutional requirement.
"Lack of merit," which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis
 75

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114323. July 23, 1998

FACTS: This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by

the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS
COMMISSION and against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the
Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The present conflict between
the petitioner and the private respondent has its roots in a contract entered into by and
between both parties whereby the private respondent undertook to supply the
petitioner FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement.
In consideration therefore, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private respondent the
amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S.
DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by opening an irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of
credit in favor of the latter. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint of
the petitioner on the following grounds: (1) plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue; (2)
lack of cause of action; and (3) plaintiffs claim or demand has been waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. The RTC characterized the erroneous
submission of the dispute to the arbitrator as a "mistake of law or fact amounting to
want of jurisdiction". Consequently, the proceedings had before the arbitrator were null
and void and the foreign court had therefore, adopted no legal award which could be
the source of an enforceable right.

ISSUE: Whether or not Memorandum Decisions are violative of Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution

HELD: No. The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based does not preclude the validity of “memorandum decisions” which adopt by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of
inferior tribunals. Even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only
to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions
thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is particularly true when the decision
sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and
conclusions arrived at. Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment
is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in
which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in
which the judgment is relied on. This Court has held that matters of remedy and
procedure are governed by the lexfori or the internal law of the forum. Thus, if under
the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be
rendered by adopting the arbitrator's findings, then the same must be accorded
respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order
of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees,
then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply
because our rules provide otherwise. The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing
else left to be done than to order its enforcement, despite the fact that the petitioner
merely prays for the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. As this
Court has ruled on the validity and enforceability of the said foreign judgment in this
jurisdiction, further proceedings in the RTC for the reception of evidence to prove
otherwise are no longer necessary.
 76

ATTY ALICE ODCHIGUE-BONDOC VS. TAN TIONG BIO AKA HENRY TAN
G.R. No. 186652, October 6, 2010

FACTS: Tan Tiong Bio (respondent) had fully paid the installment payments of a 683-
square-meter lot in the Manila Southwoods Residential Estates, a project of Fil-Estate
Golf & Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate) in Carmona, Cavite, but Fil-Estate failed to deliver
to him the title covering the lot, despite repeated demands. Fil-Estate also failed to
heed the demand for the refund of the purchase price. Respondent, later learning that
the lot "sold" to him was inexistent, filed a complaint for Estafa against Fil-Estate
officials including its Corporate Secretary Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc (petitioner) and
other employees. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution of January 23, 2006, he filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals which, by Decision of September 5, 2008, set aside the DOJ Secretary’s
Resolution, holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution
dismissing respondent’s petition for review without therein expressing clearly and
distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution. The appellate court went on to hold that the matter of
disposing the petition outright is clearly delineated, not under Section 12 but, under
Section 7 of the NPS Rule on Appeal which categorically directs the Secretary to dismiss
outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment; and that under
Section 7, the Secretary may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same to be
patently without merit, or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised are
too unsubstantial to require consideration. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
having been denied by the appellate court, she filed the present petition for review on
certiorari. Petitioner asserts that the requirement in Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution applies only to decisions of "courts of justice"; that, citing Solid Homes,
Inc. v. Laserna, the constitutional provision does not extend to decisions or rulings of
executive departments such as the DOJ; and that Section 12(c) of the NPS Rule on
Appeal allows the DOJ to dismiss a petition for review motuproprio, and the use of the
word "outright" in the DOJ Resolution simply means "altogether," "entirely" or "openly."
In his Comment, respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited
to courts, citing Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, as it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to
preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.

ISSUE: Whether or not DOJ Secretary’s Resolution violates provision of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution?

HELD: No. Under the ruling of Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, in fact, it iterates that
even the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or
resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial
proceeding since the "DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. While the [prosecutor] makes
that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the [prosecutor]. Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ
Secretary. Respondent posits, however, that Balangauan finds no application in the
present case for, as the Supreme Court stated, the DOJ "rectified the shortness of its
first resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved [the therein] respondent[’s] .
. . motion for reconsideration."Respondent’s position fails. Whether the DOJ in
Balangauan issued an extended resolution in resolving the therein respondent’s motion
for reconsideration is immaterial. The extended resolution did not detract from settling
that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Respondent’s citation of Presidential Ad hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans is misplaced as the Ombudsman dismissed the
therein subject complaint prior to any preliminary investigation.
 77

VALDEZ vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 85082 February 25, 1991

FACTS: This is a case of double sale of real property where both vendees registered
the sales with Register of Deeds and each produced their respective owner’s duplicate
copy of the certificate of title to the property. A certain spouse owned a parcel of land.
They executed a special power of attorney of the said lot in favor of their son Atty.
Ante. The said lot has an occupant to which Atty. Ante offered the lot for sale. But the
former declined due to lack of capacity to but the said lot.

Atty. Ante had the lot subdivided. And Sold the portion labeled Lot A in favor of
the Valdez spouse. A few years later, he also sold Lot B to the spouses, the herein
petitioners. The spouses demanded the Transfer Certificate of Title of both Lots A and B
from the seller, Atty. Ante. The latter promised to deliver the said title which the
petitioners believed in good faith.

In the meanwhile, the spouses started fencing the lots. The occupants were told
by the spouses that they are fencing the lot as they purchased it from Atty Ante. As
Ante failed to deliver the title, the spouses filed for adverse claim. Only to find out the
Atty. Ante had the lots used as collateral for his loan.

Atty. Ante had the TCT’s he promised to the original buyers canceled and had a
new TCT issued in favor of new buyers in good faith. When the spouses approached
Atty. Ante to inquire as to why he sold the lots to different buyers. Atty. Ante simply
replied that they can file a case against him. Thus an original case was filed by the
couple against Atty. Ante.

The original decision, simply penalized Atty. Ante for damages as form of claims.
But the couple were not satisfied. For they believed that they have the right to
ownership of the lots.

ISSUE: Who are the rightful owners of the lots?

HELD: The original decision was declared Null and Void. And the lots were awarded for
ownership to the petitioners. “After considering the evidence on record, this Court finds
that plaintiffs have failed to prove their case as against defendants who were the
occupants but proved their case against defaulted defendants Antes. The Court finds
that there is no sufficient proof of knowledge or bad faith on the part of the occupants,
and on the basis of existing jurisprudence, a third person who in good faith purchases
and registers a property cannot be deprived of his title as against plaintiff who had
previously purchased same property but failed to register the same.