Eugenio Puyat vs Sixto De Guzman, Jr.

113 SCRA 31 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Appearance in Court

In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election
was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted –
hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to
Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten
shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de
Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear
as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited
himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case
for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without
violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?

HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even
though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing.
He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but
because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of
interest – which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved
in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.

NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice
or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction.
The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative bodies, like the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission. Courts martial and military tribunals, being
administrative agencies, are included.
 Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr. G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998

o While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all
the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who
could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.
o Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker
o Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
o Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body
adopting them

FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position of Senate
President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that,
with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader.
He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing
nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a
minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate minority leader
o Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure

RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it
simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by
any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no
showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one
half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
“minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half. This is
sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than
the majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the
majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which
is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the
Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the
Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate,
members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of
the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative
of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed
by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the rules of its proceedings.” xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause
providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of
respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within
the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of
the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body
adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely
matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly
within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority
to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to
protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign
acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither
a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
Sergio Osmeña, Jr. vs Salipada Pendatun

109 Phil. 863 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Parliamentary Immunity

In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said speech,

he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed

by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations

were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.

Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the

resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun

filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the

power to discipline its members.

ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?

HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the

legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the

legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before

the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before

the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein.

Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs Sandiganbayan

252 SCRA 641 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Suspension of a Member of Congress –
RA 3019

In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against
Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel
of Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a
Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no
arraignment notice had ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was
able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him
never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part
maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes
claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of
the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents.
Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the
Sandiganbayan.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the
Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of
congress. The SC ruled:

“x x x. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the power
of each House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel
a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of
suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct
from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the House of Representatives.”
United States vs Juan Pons

34 Phil. 729 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Journals

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from
Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently
delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed
as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers
conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the
act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently
importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act
2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim
that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned
at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made
a law on February 28, 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the
recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both
the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade
a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals
which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914.
This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs Pedro Gimenez

7 SCRA 347 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in
the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being
imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and
formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt
transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro
Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as
two separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic
resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No.
2609 which provides:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed
upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use
of end-users.

Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea
and formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and”
between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and
“formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea
formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of
the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product
from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and
time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea”
and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea
formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent
the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled
bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts
as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake
in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which
the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee
submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none,
approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep.
Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval
of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by
the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect
of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House,
chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The
claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Carmelo Lazatin vs Commission on Elections

157 SCRA 337 – Political law – The Legislative Department – Electoral Tribunals – HRET’s Jurisdiction over Electoral
Protests

Carmelo Lazatin questioned the jurisdiction of the (Commission on Elections) COMELEC to annul his proclamation after
he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of
Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not the COMELEC is the
sole judge of all election contests.

Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that Lazatin’s petition had become moot and
academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a
TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the petition should be given due course
because the proclamation was valid. The order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the
winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,” was in effect a grant of authority by the
COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging
that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by
Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself,
against certain election returns.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.

HELD: Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition. The petition
is impressed with merit because Lazatin has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district
of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. The alleged invalidity of
the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in
connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also
addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
Emigdio Bondoc vs Marciano Pineda
201 SCRA 792 – Political Law – HRET – Removal of a Member
Separation of Powers
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4thDistrict of Pampanga. Pineda was
a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista Party (NP).
Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to
Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He
confessed that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted to Camasura’s expulsion
from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that a new
election be held and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting
for Pineda in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice
Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal
is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the HRET without violating
the doctrine of separation of powers.

HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature
particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being complained
of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has
already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and
Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has
already reached a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already become moot and
academic. LDP is merely changing their representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be
reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for
termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1
coming from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.”
Chavez vs. Comelec Case Digest

Facts:

Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant
to these agreements, three billboards were set up showing petitioner promoting the products of said establishments.

On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator.

On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32:

Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing
the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or
mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office
shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, printmedia or television station within 3 days after the
effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be
presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, by
requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have violated the assailed provision. He sent another letter, this time
asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere
product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.

The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them from public view pending
the approval of his request.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the SC, asking that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing
the assailed provision. He urges the Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation
of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair
Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.

Issue:

Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?

Held:

Police power

Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image, do not at all announce his candidacy for any public office
nor solicit support for such candidacy from the electorate. They are, he claims, mere product endorsements and not election
propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the public is not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the people. To determine the validity of a police measure,
two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals?
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level
the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-
known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on
account of their resources and popularity.

Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any
support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an act
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. It includes directly or indirectly
soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a
private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly
promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue
the display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image
are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the
disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial
products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private
corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the
start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning.

Non-impairment of contract

Section 32 is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the
loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of
financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to enact and implement
rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the
provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not
militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

Ex post facto law

Petitioner argued that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such
advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a person, whose
name or image is featured in any such advertisement, liable for premature campaigning under the Omnibus Election Code.

Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate
prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the assailed
provision is not the putting up of propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials
showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or
mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office. Nor
does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently
becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to
use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly
prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he
shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the
assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
Fair Elections Act

Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act. According to him, under this law, billboards are already
permitted as lawful election propaganda. He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a
form of election propaganda through the assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners argument is not tenable. The
Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only
regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by
preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and
popularity. Moreover, by regulating the use of such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the
law.

Overbreadth

A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only disallows the continued display of a persons
propaganda materials and advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of the campaign period.
Said materials and advertisements must also show his name and image.

There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be
used subject only to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing premature campaigning
and promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates. The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of
overbreadth. Chavez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, Aug 31, 2004
pimentel vs. hret

Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal

GR 141489
29 November 2002;

also Pimentel, et al. v. Commission on Appointments [GR 141490]

Facts:

On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national
elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose
nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations,
including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list
groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at
Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE).
Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one
representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House
constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure
involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998
elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of
the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET
and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and
Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of
the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET
Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General
Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary
Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its
Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should
have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc
directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend
their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as
one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the
present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a
member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-
petitioners.

Issue:

[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportional
representation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret.

[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.

Held:

[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to
choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and
the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their
members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These
constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The
discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional
rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the
exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government
to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list
representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that
respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA.
Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time
simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to
the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election
to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court
cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.

[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel.
Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power
to reconstitute themselves.
Abayon V. HRET, Palparan V. HRET

FACTS:

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the
House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against
petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.

It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions
involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.

In G.R.189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections
for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of
Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay
represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security
guards.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that
was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee.
Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought,
he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

HELD: Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a
member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(Underscoring supplied)

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things,
the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected
members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass
upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee
has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against
Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan.
Bello vs comelec

The Factual Antecedents

 AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 10, 2010
elections.
 Subsequently, It filed its Certificate of Nomination together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees wherein the
first nominee is Mike Arroyo. Several petitions for disqualification of Arroyo emerged but have been dismissed both by
Comelec Second division and comelec en banc. In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10,2010 elections the required percentage of
votes sufficient to secure a single seat.
 This entitled Arroyo, as AGPP’s first nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives.
 He was proclaimed as AGPP’s duly-elected party-list representative in the House of Representatives. On the same day, Arroyo
took his oath of office, as AGPP’s Representative and, his name was, thereafter, entered in the Roll of Members of the House
of Representatives.
 Thereafter two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto were filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) questioning Arroyo’s eligibility as AGPP’s representative in the House of Representatives. The HRET took cognizance
of the petitions byissuing a Summons directing Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions.

Issue:

Whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s qualifications as AGPP’snominee after his proclamation and
assumption to office as a member of the House of Representatives.

Ruling:

The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their
proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives
although the entity directly voted upon was their party. Hence the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Since Arroyo, AGPP’s first nominee, has already been proclaimed and taken
his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives, Thus, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, we hold that the Court
has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon
Arroyo’s qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.
Daza v. Singson
FACTS:

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve
seats in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A.
Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the
House of Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in
the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed
LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and
including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments
and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on Appointments

HELD:

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all
the Members.

The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect
at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such
changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of
political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is
entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
COSETENG V MITRA G.R. No. 86649

Facts:
Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to
appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a request backed by nine congressmen.

Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan,
Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party,
prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP)
with Rep. Singson (LDP).

Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo
warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members
null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the New
Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is
qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.

The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was
in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the
Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.

Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.

Held:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question but because revision in House
representation in CA wasbased on proportional representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79% of the House
membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties.
KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone
member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in
CA.

Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed
identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been nominated and elected by their parties because of
members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the House.

Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the Constitution conferred the Court with
expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed
by the other government branches.
Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali Gonzales
HRET’s Composition – Rounding Off

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD
senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in
the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No.
of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5
members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8
senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the
same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.
Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of
the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article
VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2
to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a
whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other
party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18
because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the
LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have
at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate,
a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties
may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may
have affiliations with the other party.
TAÑADA v. COMELEC (Wigberto R. Tañada, Petitioner, v. COMELEC, et al., Respondents.)

October 22, 2013

Chapter 8: Legislative Department – The Electoral Tribunals

SHORT SUMMARY: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Wigberto
R. Tañada assailing the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated April 25, 2013 (declaring that Alvin John S. Tañada was not a nuisance
candidate as defined under Section 69, OEC). Consequently, he seeks that the votes cast in favor of Alvin John S. Tañada be credited to
him and that he be declared the winning candidate for the congressional post instead of Angelina D. Tan. The SC dismissed the petition
considering that respondent Angelina D. Tan had already been proclaimed as Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th
District of Quezon Province, taken her oath and assumed office. The SC is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. The issues
concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina D. Tan are matters properly fall under the HRET’s sole
jurisdiction.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr. or Wigberto (Liberal Party) and respondents Angelina D. Tan or Angelina (National People’s
Coalition) and Alvin John S. Tañada or Alvin John (Lapiang Manggagawa) were contenders for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province in the May 13, 2013 National Elections.

2. On October 10, 2012, Wigberto filed before the COMELEC 2 separate petitions: 1 st petition – to cancel Alvin John’s CoC; 2nd petition
– to declare Alvin John as a nuisance candidate.

3. On Jan. 29, 2013, COMELEC 1st Division dismissed both petitions for lack of merit.

4. 1st Petition: COMELEC En Banc granted the MR and canceled Alvin John’s CoC for having committed false material representations
concerning his residency in accordance with Section 7812 of BP Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (OEC).

5. 2nd Petition: On Wigberto’s MR, COMELEC En Banc's April 25, 2013 Resolution, upheld the 1st Division’s ruling that Alvin John was not
a nuisance candidate as defined under Sec. 69 of the OEC.

 May 15, 2013: Wigberto filed a 2nd Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the COMELEC En Banc ’s ruling on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. He alleged that Alvin John’s candidacy was not bona fide because: (a) Alvin John was merely forced by his
father to file his CoC; (b) he had no election paraphernalia posted in official COMELEC posting areas in several barangays of
Gumaca, Quezon Province; (c) he did not even vote during the May 13, 2013 National Elections; and (d) his legal representation
appeared to have been in collusion with the lawyers of Angelina.

6. Despite the cancellation of Alvin John’s CoC, his name was not deleted from the ballot, prompting Wigberto to file a motion with the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Quezon Province (PBOC) asking that the votes cast in the name of Alvin John be credited to him
instead in accordance with the Court’s ruling in Dela Cruz v. COMELEC and COMELEC Resolution No. 9599. The PBOC denied
Wigberto’s motion on May 16, 2013 because the cancellation of the Alvin John’s CoC was on the basis of his material
misrepresentations under Sec. 78 of the OEC and not on being a nuisance candidate under Sec. 69 of the same law.

7. On May 16, 2013, PBOC proclaimed Angelina as the winning candidate. According to Wigberto, it was for the foregoing reason that
he impleaded Angelina as a party-respondent in the instant petition for certiorari.

8. It appears, however, that Wigberto had already filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Annul the Proclamation of Angelina asserting
that had the PBOC followed pertinent rulings, the votes cast for Alvin John would have been counted in his favor which could have
resulted in his victory. While the Petition to Annul was still pending resolution, Wigberto initiated the instant certiorari case against
the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated April 25, 2013 declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate.
9. On July 3, 2013, Wigberto filed a Manifestation informing the SC that he had caused the filing of an Election Protest Ad Cautelam
(Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr. v. Angelina ‘Helen’ D. Tan) before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). He prayed that
he be declared the winner in the 2013 congressional race in the 4th District of Quezon Province. He also alleged that on June 28,
2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution annulling the proclamation of Angelina as Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province. The propriety of this ruling is now pending resolution before the COMELEC
En Banc.

ISSUE/S: W/N the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of respondent Angelina D. Tan fall
under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.(YES.)

HELD: Petition is dismissed. Considering that respondent Angelina D. Tan had already been proclaimed as Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past
noon time of June 30, 2013, the SC is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. The issues concerning the conduct of the
canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina D. Tan are matters, which fall under the scope of the terms “election” and “returns”
and hence, properly fall under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.

RATIO:

 Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members. 1
 Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET.
 The phrase “election, returns and qualifications” refers to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title.
 “Election” refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting
and counting of the votes.
 “Returns” refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the
composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns.
 “Qualifications” refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his
disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC.

1 Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal, shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Jose Bengzon, Jr. vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
203 SCRA 767 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – When
not Allowed

It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly
enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office
and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the
country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government
owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a
motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may
unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa
however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.

Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding
the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and
testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and
blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and
that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al
filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the
law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There
appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really
“in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of
RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts
rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case.
Camilo Sabio vs Richard Gordon
504 SCRA 704 – Political Law – Inquiry in aid of legislation – public officers

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an inquiry in aid
of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation
(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on
May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource
persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises
and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae
Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically
ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their
constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring
Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the
Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other
Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the
executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the
Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which
requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of
executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in
pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information,
in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If
the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information
without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking
said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
GUDANI VS. SENGA

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci”
tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et
al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite
the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the
Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the
General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a
legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress
which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to
compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned
by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive
privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to
prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as
commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-
in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial
relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch
as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition,
since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that
the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before
Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief
Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
Romulo Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

549 SCRA 77 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – Inquiry in aid of legislation –
Executive Privilege

Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply
of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed
various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein
he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M
in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other
hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged
and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation.

The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter
into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity”
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
ROMERO V. ESTRADA (2009)
G.R. No. 174105

FACTS

Petitioners Romero II and other members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc., were invited on an investigation with regards

to the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The said investigation

will aid the Senate in determining possible amendments of Republic Act 8042 other known as the Migrant Workers Act.

ISSUE

Whether the Senate Committee’s inquiry is sub judice to the subject raised at hand?

HELD

YES. As briefly stated in Arnualt vs. Nazareno;

The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body

cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect

or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must

be had to others who possess it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of
Finance

235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) – Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT – Amendment by

Substitution

Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added

Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives

as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed

the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1 st reading it was referred

to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino

averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text

of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of

the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.

HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent

with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the

Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that

there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as

revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted.

The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant

difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
Heherson Alvarez vs Teofisto Guingona, Jr.

252 SCRA 695 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – LGU Requirement – Income – Inclusion of IRAs

In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to
be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House of Representatives.

In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate.

In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on
SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of
HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).

Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill
creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of Santiago was not able to comply with the
income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average income
of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not be.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.

2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGU’s income.

HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate held in
abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only
conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the
said HB as well).

2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s average annual income as was done in the case at bar.
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit.
The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the
local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source
of much needed funds.

To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund
or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support
from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.
Garcia vs Mata Digest
Garcia vs Mata

G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975

Facts:

The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that
the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing
power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the
advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to
Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

Issue:

Whether RA 1600 is valid. Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held:

The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item.
RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of
calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition
against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act
contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void,
inoperative and without effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

Demetrio Demetria vs Manuel Alba
148 SCRA 208 – Political Law – Transfer of Funds – Power of the President to Realign Funds

Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then
Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree
of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:

“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved
after its enactment.”

Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however,
the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the
Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred
are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose
of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set
in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond
the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may be
allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.
PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 - Appropriations]

FACTS:

Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.

GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment
of Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not
exceeded.

Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the
individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain
provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment
the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the
realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings,
and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said
transfer to be made.

As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5)
and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to
transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.
Valentin Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board

151 SCRA 208 – Political Law – The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill

Delegation of Power – Delegation to Administrative Bodies

In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was
enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said
law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms
as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened
the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms
are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.

In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.

2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law
allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in
enforcing the said PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general
purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane
to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the
regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent
with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory
and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What
was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement,
and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to
solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being
“subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].”
Philippine Judges Association vs Pete Prado
227 SCRA 703 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Franking Privilege of the Judiciary

Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges from certain
government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of
charge.

In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal service comes from the judiciary’s
use of the postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn
from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.

The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the
said provision is violative of the equal protection clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so
badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster
cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is
untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should
have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking
privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem
is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those
favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the
Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction (it is true
that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because
its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for
example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty
of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant
the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of
justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of
Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege.
 Tan v Del Rosario

Facts:

1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain
provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law.

2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedlyviolates the following provisions of the Constitution:

-Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
- Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.

3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional
partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified
Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No.
109289) when the full text of the title actually reads,
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their
Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due
process.

5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.

6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due process

NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations
in the exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident in herein case.

1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are
to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not violate classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used
therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all
things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the
same class.

2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular
approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on taxable
corporations. The Court does not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents exceeded their authority in promulgating the RR

No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in
significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who
do it through a general professional partnership.
Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig

Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill

Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989

Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec

16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited

to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89)

and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she

cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the

power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of

powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided

for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that

power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put,

has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.

HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly

enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,”

which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules

that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and

Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that

should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin Drilon
208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the time
of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices,
and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize
retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No.
16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust
their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of
those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed
due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted
additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following manner:
Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable
obligations in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired
justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the
judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B.
16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the
veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.

HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to
Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of
the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove
any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained
the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive
must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of
the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did
not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan v Tan (1988)

FACTS:

EO 372 was issued by the President of the Philippines which amended the Revenue Code, adopting the value-added tax (VAT)
effective January 1, 1988. Four petitions assailed the validity of the VAT Law from being beyond the President to enact; for being
oppressive, discriminatory, regressive and violative of the due process and equal protection clauses, among others, of the
Constitution. The Integrated Customs Brokers Association particularly contend that it unduly discriminate against customs brokers
(Section 103r) as the amended provision of the Tax Code provides that “service performed in the exercise of profession or calling
(except custom brokers) subject to occupational tax under the Local Tax Code and professional services performed by registered
general professional partnerships are exempt from VAT.

ISSUE:

Whether the E-VAT law is void for being discriminatory against customs brokers

RULING:

No. The phrase “except custom brokers” is not meant to discriminate against custom brokers but to avert a potential conflict between
Sections 102 and 103 of the Tax Code, as amended. The distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are
subject to occupation tax under the Local Tax Code is based on material differences, in that the activities of customs partake more of a
business, rather than a profession and were thus subjected to the percentage tax under Section 174 of the Tax Code prior to its
amendment by EO 273. EO 273 abolished the percentage tax and replaced it with the VAT. If the Association did not protest the
classification of customs brokers then, there is no reason why it should protest now.
Abra vs Hernando (1981)
Facts: The provincial assessor made a tax assessment on the properties of the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Bangued. The bishop claims tax exemption from real estate tax,
through an action for declaratory relief. A summary judgment was made granting the
exemption without hearing the side of the Province of Abra.

Issue: Whether the properties of the Bishop of Bangued are tax-exempt.

Held: The 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions differ in language as to the exemption of
religious property from taxes as tehy should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually”
and “directly” used for religious purposes. Herein, the judge accepted at its face the
allegation of the Bishop instead of demonstrating that there is compliance with the
constitutional provision that allows an exemption. There was an allegation of lack of
jurisdiction and of lack of cause of action, which should have compelled the judge to
accord a hearing to the province rather than deciding the case immediately in favor of
the Bishop. Exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if
granted, it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. There must be proof of the
actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious (or
charitable) purposes to be exempted from taxation.

The case was remanded to the lower court for a trial on merits.
Abra Valley College vs Aquino (G.R. No. L-39086)
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the Securities and Exchange

Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building

located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by

respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled

for the government, holding that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the

ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not being used

exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari

with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.

HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for

cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for

religious, charitable or educational purposes.ﾝ Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to facilities

which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school building or lot

for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the

building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of

education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.

The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner.

The modification is derived from the fact that the ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor

being used as incidental to education (residence of the director).

Wenceslao Pascual vs Secretary of
Public Works and Communications

110 Phil. 331 – Political Law – Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed

In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed
the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals
sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta
who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta
misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched
at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an
afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.

HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent donation of the
property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law
was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that
the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads
were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and,
hence, was null and void.
Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague
G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion
appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations
for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of
Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget
for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary
priority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary
priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond
to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably
service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the
very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the
share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
 Osmeña vs. Orbos
OSMEÑA vs. ORBOS
220 SCRA 703
GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993

" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard which implies that the legislature
determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."

FACTS: Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as amended by EO 137, empowering
the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum
products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing
oil companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oil products establishments
is an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since a 'special fund'
consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use
thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by the
petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of
the nature of the taxation power of the State.

ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?

HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of
the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O.
137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the
fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply
with the constitutional description of a "special fund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power,
the Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum
products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the
law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the
ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.
 First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA Digest
Facts:

1. Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court
which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of
Investments (BOI).

2. BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the
scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same
nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.

4. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after
its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.

5. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the
BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987.

6. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules
Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down
therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be
filed directly with the Supreme Court.

7. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226
on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was
promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing
the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was
previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996

FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic
Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation
into alternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines government.
Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings,
houses and other installations left by the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its
absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office
of the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10,
Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b)
to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting
Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and
not an ordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion
of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum
and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum.

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent
is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.
Issue:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the
referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative
"seeks the amendment of a national law."

Ruling:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM
only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but
"initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a
"Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and
the ballots themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution
No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.

As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the
legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has
been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the
conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be
nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution
that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition
cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not
hypothetical questions or cases.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission
of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been
promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on
Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch,
instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.