Republic of the Philippines Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
by first
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.
Leonardo Abola for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila in the summary settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his
wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro,
deceased. All of them having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo
handed down a single decision which was appealed to the Court of
Appeals, whose decision, modifying that the Court of First Instance, in
turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
The main question represented in the first two courts related to the
sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their
children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese
troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of this
persons to have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named
Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela
Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals
concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin
de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have
survived his mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being
contested by the petitioner. The importance of the question whether
Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice
versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of
Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural
child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and
marriage.
The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the
decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was
raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together
with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their
son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought
refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at
the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During their
stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding
around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese
started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who
were trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground
near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to
abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not convince
Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr.,
his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a
friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning
edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a
Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the
ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later,
the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people
inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez
managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three
days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter
be- cause the shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa
Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Japanese
Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his
daughter-in-law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife
Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30;
Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother; while the
other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were
between 23 and 25."
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of
Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon
1
them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as between the mother Angela
Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the
survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption
must be applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is
thus stated:
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be
established by proof of the death of only one of the parties; but that there
must be adequate proof that one was alive when the other had already
died. Now in this case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez
is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after
the living the German Club in the company of his father and the witness,
and that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after the shooting
of the son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial,
from which we may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin,
during the appreciable interval from the instant his son turned his back to
her, to dash out to the Club, until he died. All we can glean from the
evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to
escape from the German Club; but she could have died almost
immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might have been shot by
the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling beams from the burning
edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the
exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available on
the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left
her aside, and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this
circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than her
son, and we are thus compelled to fall back upon the statutory
presumption. In deed, it could be said that the purpose of the
presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to
uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30,
must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was
admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules
of Court).
"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes
of the question whether she and her deceased children perished in the
same calamity. There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is
the occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for
the liberation of Manila. A second reason is that the law, in declaring that
those fallen in the same battle are to be regarded as perishing in the
same calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death can
( and usually do) operate in the source of combats. During the same
battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It
is clear that the law disregards episodic details, and treats the battle as
an overall cause of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of
the Navarro-Joaquin family met their end is as follows: first, the three
daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela
Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there
is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section
334(37) of Act No. 129, now section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of
Court, has repealed article 33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of
the New Civil Code. It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and
that on the assumption that there is total lack of evidence, as the Court of
Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should,
under article 33, be held to have died at the same time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the
consideration when obsolute necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant
because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions is applicable for
the reasons to be presently set forth.
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck,
battle or conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and
there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it can be
inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities
resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes, according to
the following rules:
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the
two or more persons who would inherent one from the other, the
persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the
allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that
they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from
one to the other shall take place.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a
substitute for lacks and so are not to be available when there are facts.
2
With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation
which it present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but
unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time
of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . .
Since the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law
of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises." (IX
Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited
the applied with the respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing
out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of California said:
When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it
can be inferred" that one died before the other it means that there
are circumstances from which the fact of death by one before the
other may be inferred as a relation conclusion from the facts
proven. The statue does not mean circumstances which would
shown, or which would tend to show, probably that one died
before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App.
28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence alone, a party
seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory
presumption, the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the
survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when
tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases. The
inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere surmise,
speculation, or conjecture. As was said in Grand
Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to probably, then the
statue of the presumption."
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that
of the foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not
be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are
facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made,
the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable
inference of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and her son can be
drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent and sufficient for this
purpose? For a better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and
necessary to detail the testimony, which was described by the trial court
as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as
"entitled to credence."
Lopez testified:
Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the
German Club with Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and
the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down.
Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We
were out 15 meters away from the building but I could see what
was going on.
Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between
the two events, that is the shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and
the collapse of the German Club? — A. Yes, sir, I could not say
exactly, Occasions like that, you know, you are confused.
Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of
fifteen minutes? — A. Possible, but not probable.
Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40
minutes.
Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin
die? — A. Well, a few minutes after we have dashed out, the
German Club, which was burning, collapsed over them, including
Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give
positive evidence to the fact that Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad
Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give the
same positive evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin also died?
— A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her actually die, but
3
 when the building collapsed over her I saw and I am positive and
I did not see her come out of that building so I presumed she died
there.
Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr.
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's
wife? — A. Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club and
they were shooting people outside, so we thought of running
away rather than be roasted.
Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German
Club all the Navarro girls, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, were
already wounded? — A. to my knowledge, yes.
Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground
near the entrance, because most of the people who were shot by
the Japanese were those who were trying to escape, and as far
as I can remember they were among those killed.
Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a
few minutes before you left the place? — A. That is what I think,
because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the people
inside especially those trying to escape.
Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you
mean? A — . There were many people shot because they were
trying to escape.
Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside
the building, can you explain that? — A. They were trying to
escape probably.
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite
adequate to solve the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin
and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the
case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a
fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled
out, it must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must
yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other
way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while
running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the
prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or
less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the
building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started
to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so
that the Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She
could have perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the
probabilities that she did seem very remote. True, people in the building
were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who
had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was
not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape.
She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from
leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may
well give an idea, at the same time, of a condition of relative safety in the
clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her.
It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of
death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr.
Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40
minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped
dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The
Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and
the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much
longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs.
Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of
the building, by which Mrs. Navarro could have been killed. All these are
speculative , and the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are
against them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by
her refusal to follow the only remaining living members of her family, she
could not have kept away form protective walls. Besides, the building had
been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for
the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who tried to
leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by
falling beams because the building was made of concrete and its
collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not
4
cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief space of five
seconds between her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive.
Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the inference necessary
to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the
"particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that
are required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking
of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never
certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In re
Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New
York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.).
622.) As the California courts have said, it is enough that "the
circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be
such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of
evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate, supra.) "Juries must
often reason," says one author, "according to probabilities, drawing an
inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts not
directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital
question in such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the
secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is the existence of
the primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec.
596.) The same author tells us of a case where "a jury was justified in
drawing the inference that the person who was caught firing a shot at an
animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot about an
hour before at the same animal also trespassing." That conclusion was
not airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave
greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case at hand.
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died
before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures
without any sure foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory — that
the mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which,
weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong
probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by,
which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can not be
defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon,
"bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was
suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired was not charged
with shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence of the fright."
(1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)
It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the
appellant impugns, and which has been discussed, involves findings of
fact which can not be disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well
considered. The particular circumstances from which the parties and the
Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen, undisputed, and
this being the case, the correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions
raises a question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the
Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing,
and contradicted evidence is another. An incredible witness does not
cease to be such because he is not impeached or contradicted. But when
the evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not
questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed thereon, or
where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the
facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court."
The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory
presumption is to be invoked is a question of law.
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of
evidence refers to decisions supported by substantial evidence. By
substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least evidence about
which reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures come within the exception to the
general rule.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that
the distribution of the decedents' estates should be made in accordance
with the decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of
passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on
the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that
of her son. Without costs.
5
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the
husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could
recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio
Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the
evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff
Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00
as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On
appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the
award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a
separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for
the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950
she became pregnant by her present husband before they were
legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her
parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she
again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in
October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired
to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in
Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was
again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the
sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this
time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to
the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to
the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this
action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz
we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages
in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of
Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be
error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the
death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura
abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es
un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de
Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and
obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no
action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by
its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from
on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished
from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality
of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the
Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional
personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute
that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
6
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead
generally held that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which
(Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the
editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639). It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of
appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned;
at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it.
distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of
right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal
either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally basis.
be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their dismissed. Without costs.
parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary
damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and
the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not the Board of Medical Examiners for their information and such
found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts
appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused may warrant.
by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with
the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court
expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not
contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the
suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to
investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of
the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the
appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and
criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have
been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since
he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an
"indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly
exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who

righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife has
deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern
would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an
unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to
personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the

7
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE,
deceased, respondent.
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through
Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision in case No.
4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan,
Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence therein showed
that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and
suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of
another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San
Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen
at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable
of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore,
overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the
provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a
certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its
Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily
productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of
San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said
Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal,
and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail
(petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in
accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not
reasonably supported by evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner
and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc.,
as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the
increased demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an
unwarranted departure from its announced policy with respect to
the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's
brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the
commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the
estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case
then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to
said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention
of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he
would have had the right to prosecute his application before the
commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that
right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had invested in
the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the commission said
regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have
been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died.
His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month.
He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The
commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that
his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The
aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its
conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death.
Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a right
was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might
have denied application, although under the facts of the case, the
commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the
estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his
memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the certificate of
public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate
8
as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to
acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law,
belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and
judicial administrator after his death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece
of land and during the life of the option he died, if the option had been
given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of special
consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and
the right to exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal
representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of
failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal
representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case
at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the
desired certificate of public convenience — the evidence established that
the public needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned only
upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and
operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such
certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its
objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation
here is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the
illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring
or defend actions, among other cases, for the protection of the property
or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may
be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the
executor or administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to
his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other person
for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages
366, 367) the present chief Justice of this Court draws the following
conclusion from the decisions cited by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any
action affecting the property or rights (emphasis supplied) of a
deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he
were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or
against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it
cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public
convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But
the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's
rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up
a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under
the control and management of the executor or administrator, can not be
exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the
creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And
if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished
proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of
the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that
the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate
to make the right effective in that proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article
336 of the Civil Code, respectively, consider as immovable and movable
things rights which are not material. The same eminent commentator
says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has
been deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all
incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term,
property includes, among other things, "an option", and "the certificate of
the railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on
page 748 of the same volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have
also been declared to include every species of title, inchoate or
complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether
executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of
Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service
Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following
doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a
forgery committed after the death of the man whose name
9
 purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as
with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind.,
54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a
case of forgery committed after the death of one Morgan for the purpose
of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that the information did
not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any
person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the
law does not regard the estate of a decedent as a person. This
intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent
is a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr.
Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes
artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs.
Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8
Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two
kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being.
Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural
persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to
which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties.
The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited
extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or
deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases
inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by
the authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is
sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to
designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person,
naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this
definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases
where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of a
person whose name is forged; and this is a result to be avoided if
it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty
in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable
that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial
person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a
disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although
natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in
the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The
interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until
there has been a due administration; and one who forges the
name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a
promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud
the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having
diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed to have
known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their
respective interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial
person, — the estate — and not the natural persons who have
direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-
915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing of
the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail
prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by
the commission, not counting the expenses and disbursements which the
proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime,
let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there
are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is
also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs.
Among the most recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota
vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the
estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in
favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it
holds that defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to
he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code
of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were considered in
contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the
provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the
rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It
was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However,
after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil
Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil.,
13, 22. In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after
the innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of
estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine that it is
the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent,
instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his
rights and obligations which survive after his demise.
10
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's
personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and
blood — the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived
from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of
the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations
as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate
of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there
would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or
administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the
deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical
and the same in both cases. This is why according to the Supreme Court
of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary,
954, among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection
of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and
duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of
Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within
the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended,
particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the
power of the commission to issue certificates of public convenience or
certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the
Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships,
associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under
the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum
of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong entirely to
citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason
for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the
deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or
prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights
and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his
death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially the same reason is
assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of
Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme
Court of said State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be
regarded as an artificial person. it is the creation of law for the
purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly
made .
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just
one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil
rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural
persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed
to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be
without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property
without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to
include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these
constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these
artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence,
we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro
O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the
purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those
rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after
his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending
application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case,
consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As
stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is
considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and
surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be exercised for
the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and
cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his
citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the
purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public
Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful,
would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs.
Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the legal
sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer
and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his
citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the
same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is
made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors
and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment
amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not
counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from
the Public Service Commission of this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the
constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude
11
the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already
stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such
reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an
artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no justification for refusing
to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the
purposes of this proceeding.

Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in

view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the
commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has
suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a
Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately
operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it
received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary
showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also
Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of
revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the
prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to
its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O.
Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of
the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is
so adjudged and decreed.

Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

12
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner
vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA,
IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO
BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA, respondents.
Mauro C. Cabading, Jr. for petitioner.
Simeon G. Hipol for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the nullification or modification
of the proceedings and the orders issued by the respondent Judge
Romeo N. Firme, in his capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of
First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, Branch IV, Bauang,
La Union in Civil Case No. 107-BG, entitled "Juana Rimando Baniña, et
al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et al." dated November 4, 1975; July 13, 1976;
August 23,1976; February 23, 1977; March 16, 1977; July 26, 1979;
September 7, 1979; November 7, 1979 and December 3, 1979 and the
decision dated October 10, 1979 ordering defendants Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the
plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual damages consisting of the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees and costs of suit and
dismissing the complaint against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal
corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo N.
Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union. While
private respondents Juana Rimando-Baniña, Laureano Baniña, Jr., Sor
Marietta Baniña, Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia R. Baniña are
heirs of the deceased Laureano Baniña Sr. and plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
107-Bg before the aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision
occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and
owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven
by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump
truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo
Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including
Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and
four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for
damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot,
owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney, which was
docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in the Court of First Instance of La Union,
Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However, the aforesaid defendants
filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a
dump truck of petitioner.
Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided
over by respondent judge and was subsequently docketed as Civil Case
No. 107-Bg. By virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the private
respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its
regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as
defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses
such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of
cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the
passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.
In the course of the proceedings, the respondent judge issued the
following questioned orders, to wit:
(1) Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the cross-claim
against Bernardo Balagot;
(2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended Answer of
the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Bislig and setting
the hearing on the affirmative defenses only with respect to the
supposed lack of jurisdiction;
13
 (3) Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring there resolution of the
grounds for the Motion to Dismiss until the trial;
(4) Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976 filed by the
Municipality and Bislig for having been filed out of time;
(5) Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976;
(6) Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed
submitted for decision it appearing that parties have not yet
submitted their respective memoranda despite the court's
direction; and
(7) Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and/or order to recall prosecution
witnesses for cross examination.
On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion is hereunder quoted as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered for the plaintiffs, and defendants Municipality of San Fernando,
La Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and severally,
plaintiffs Juana Rimando-Baniña, Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano
Baniña Jr., Sor Marietta Baniña, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano, Montano Baniña,
Orja Baniña and Lydia B. Baniña the sums of P1,500.00 as funeral
expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the late
Laureano Baniña Sr., P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as
attorney's fees. Costs against said defendants.
The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario Nieveras
and Bernardo Balagot. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial without
prejudice to another motion which was then pending. However,
respondent judge issued another order dated November 7, 1979 denying
the motion for reconsideration of the order of September 7, 1979 for
having been filed out of time.
Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3, 1979
providing that if defendants municipality and Bislig further wish to pursue
the matter disposed of in the order of July 26, 1979, such should be
elevated to a higher court in accordance with the Rules of Court. Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid
orders and in rendering a decision. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that
while appeal of the decision maybe available, the same is not the speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the
petitioner and allege that the petition is devoid of merit, utterly lacking the
good faith which is indispensable in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. (Rollo, p. 42.) In addition, the private respondents stress that
petitioner has not considered that every court, including respondent court,
has the inherent power to amend and control its process and orders so
as to make them conformable to law and justice. (Rollo, p. 43.)
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred
and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of the
defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction until
trial. However, said respondent judge failed to resolve such defense,
proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the
municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in
the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of
non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, said
judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision dated
October 10, 1979 he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict
committed by its regular employee.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in
Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be
sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be
sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of
express or implied consent.
14
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The
standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims
involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special
law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an
alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands
(34 Phil 311). (see United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607,
February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644, 654.)
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts,
thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also
when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
(Ibid)
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are
agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions
and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit.
Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such
functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
(Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, p. 39)
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability
depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable
law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable
does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never
be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued.
When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable." (United
States of America vs. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660)
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts
committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends
on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in the
case of Torio vs. Fontanilla (G. R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978. 85
SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of powers becomes important for
purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its
agents which result in an injury to third persons.
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo vs. Loy, decided
by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916, thus:
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions
are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining
thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers
and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by
them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public
service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the
state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private,
proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal
persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in
the performance of such functions act in behalf of the
municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for
the state or sovereign power." (112 N.E., 994-995) (Ibid, pp. 605-
606.)
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable
because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in
the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant
the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
(Cruz, supra, p. 44.)
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists
that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and
gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." (Rollo, p. 29.)
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the
performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule
131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the
dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos
Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186)
that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the
driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental
activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive
at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts
15
committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger
–– tragic and deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the municipality
no duty to pay monetary compensation.

All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent

judge's dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non-suability did not
amount to grave abuse of discretion. But said judge exceeded his
jurisdiction when it ruled on the issue of liability.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the

respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality
of any liability in favor of private respondents. SO ORDERED.

16
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33172 October 18, 1979
ERNESTO CEASE, CECILIA CEASE, MARION CEASE, TERESA
CEASE-LACEBAL and the F.L. CEASE PLANTATION CO., INC. as
Trustee of properties of the defunct TIAONG MILLING &
PLANTATION CO., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Special Seventh Division),
HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Quezon, BENJAMIN CEASE and FLORENCE
CEASE, respondents.
GUERRERO, J:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 45474, entitled "Ernesto Cease, et al. vs. Hon. Manolo L. Maddela,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, et al." 1 which dismissed
the petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition instituted by the
petitioners against the respondent judge and the private respondents.
The antecedents of the case, as found by the appellate court, are as
follows:
IT RESULTING: That the antecedents are not difficult to
understand; sometime in June 1908, one Forrest L.
Cease common predecessor in interest of the parties
together with five (5) other American citizens organized
the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company and in the
course of its corporate existence the company acquired
various properties but at the same time all the other
original incorporators were bought out by Forrest L.
Cease together with his children namely Ernest, Cecilia,
Teresita, Benjamin, Florence and one Bonifacia Tirante
also considered a member of the family; the charter of the
company lapsed in June 1958; but whether there were
steps to liquidate it, the record is silent; on 13 August
1959, Forrest L. Cease died and by extrajudicial partition
of his shares, among the children, this was disposed of on
19 October 1959; it was here where the trouble among
them came to arise because it would appear that
Benjamin and Florence wanted an actual division while
the other children wanted reincorporation; and proceeding
on that, these other children Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia
and aforementioned other stockholder Bonifacia Tirante
proceeded to incorporate themselves into the F.L. Cease
Plantation Company and registered it with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on 9 December, 1959;
apparently in view of that, Benjamin and Florence for their
part initiated a Special Proceeding No. 3893 of the Court
of First Instance of Tayabas for the settlement of the
estate of Forest L. Cease on 21 April, 1960 and one
month afterwards on 19 May 1960 they filed Civil Case
No. 6326 against Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia Cease
together with Bonifacia Tirante asking that the Tiaong
Milling and Plantation Corporation be declared Identical to
F.L. Cease and that its properties be divided among his
children as his intestate heirs; this Civil Case was resisted
by aforestated defendants and notwithstanding efforts of
the plaintiffs to have the properties placed under
receivership, they were not able to succeed because
defendants filed a bond to remain as they have remained
in possession; after that and already, during the pendency
of Civil Case No. 6326 specifically on 21 May, 1961
apparently on the eve of the expiry of the three (3) year
period provided by the law for the liquidation of
corporations, the board of liquidators of Tiaong Milling
executed an assignment and conveyance of properties
and trust agreement in favor of F.L. Cease Plantation Co.
Inc. as trustee of the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Co. so
Chat upon motion of the plaintiffs trial Judge ordered that
this alleged trustee be also included as party defendant;
now this being the situation, it will be remembered that
there were thus two (2) proceedings pending in the Court
of First Instance of Quezon namely Civil Case No. 6326
and Special Proceeding No. 3893 but both of these were
assigned to the Honorable Respondent Judge Manolo L.
Maddela p. 43 and the case was finally heard and
submitted upon stipulation of facts pp, 34-110, rollo; and
17
 trial Judge by decision dated 27 December 1969 held for
the plaintiffs Benjamin and Florence, the decision
containing the following dispositive part:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants
declaring that:
1) The assets or properties of the defunct Tiaong Milling and
Plantation Company now appearing under the name of F.L.
Cease Plantation Company as Trustee, is the estate also of the
deceased Forrest L. Cease and ordered divided, share and share
alike, among his six children the plaintiffs and the defendants in
accordance with Rule 69, Rules of Court;
2) The Resolution to Sell dated October 12, 1959 and the
Transfer and Conveyance with Trust Agreement is hereby set
aside as improper and illegal for the purposes and effect that it
was intended and, therefore, null and void;
3) That F.L. Cease Plantation Company is removed as 'Trustee
for interest against the estate and essential to the protection of
plaintiffs' rights and is hereby ordered to deliver and convey all
the properties and assets of the defunct Tiaong Milling now under
its name, custody and control to whomsoever be appointed as
Receiver - disqualifying and of the parties herein - the latter to act
accordingly upon proper assumption of office; and
4) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for administration is terminated
and dismissed; the instant case to proceed but on issues of
damages only and for such action inherently essential for
partition.
SO ORDERED.
Lucena City, December 27, 1969., pp. 122-a-123, rollo.
upon receipt of that, defendants there filled a notice of appeal p. 129,
rollo together with an appeal bond and a record on appeal but the
plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the judgment
was in fact interlocutory and not appealable p. 168 rollo and this position
of defendants was sustained by trial Judge, His Honor ruling that
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal interposed by plaintiffs is
hereby dismissed as premature and the Record on Appeal is necessarily
disapproved as improper at this stage of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Lucena City, April 27, 1970. and so it was said defendants
brought the matter first to the Supreme Court, on mandamus on
20 May, 1970 to compel the appeal and certiorari and prohibition
to annul the order of 27 April, 1970 on the ground that the
decision was "patently erroneous" p. 16, rollo; but the Supreme
Court remanded the case to this Court of Appeals by resolution of
27 May 1970, p. 173, and this Court of Appeals on 1 July 1970 p.
175 dismissed the petition so far as the mandamus was
concerned taking the view that the decision sought to be
appealed dated 27 December, 1969 was interlocutory and not
appealable but on motion for reconsideration of petitioners and
since there was possible merit so far as its prayer for certiorari
and prohibition was concerned, by resolution of the Court on 19
August, 1970, p. 232, the petition was permitted to go ahead in
that capacity; and it is the position of petitioners that the decision
of 27 December, 1969 as well as the order of 27 April, 1970
suffered of certain fatal defects, which respondents deny and on
their part raise the preliminary point that this Court of Appeals has
no authority to give relief to petitioners because not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, and that the questions presented cannot be
raised for the first time before this Court of Appeals;
Respondent Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated December 9,
1970 dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners, hence the
present petition to this Court on the following assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED -
I. IN SANCTIONING THE WRONGFUL EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
BEYOND THE LIMITS OF AUTHORITY CONFERRED BY LAW UPON
THE LOWER COURT, WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO HEAR, ADJUDGE
AND ADJUDICATE -
(a) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for the settlement of the Estate
of Forrest L. Cease, simultaneously and concurrently with -
18
 (b) Civil Case No. 6326, wherein the lower Court ordered Partition
under Rule 69, Rules of Court -
THE ISSUE OF LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES
COMMONLY INVOLVED IN BOTH ACTIONS HAVING BEEN RAISED
AT THE OUTSET BY THE TIAONG MILLING AND PLANTATION
COMPANY, AS THE REGISTERED OWNER OF SUCH PROPERTIES
UNDER ACT 496.
II. IN AFFIRMING - UNSUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE
WHATSOEVER NOR CITATION OF ANY LAW TO JUSTIFY - THE
UNWARRANTED CONCLUSION THAT SUBJECT PROPERTIES,
FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS AS
ACTUALLY REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF PETITIONER
CORPORATION AND/OR ITS PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, THE
TIAONG MILLING AND PLANTATION COMPANY, DURING ALL THE
50 YEARS OF ITS CORPORATE EXISTENCE "ARE ALSO
PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE OF FOREST L. CEASE."
III. IN AFFIRMING THE ARBITRARY CONCLUSION OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT ITS DECISION OF DECEMBER 27,1969 IS AN
"INTERLUCUTORY DECISION." IN DISMISSED NG THE PETITION
FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, AND IN AFFIRMING THE MANIFESTLY
UNJUST JUDGMENT RENDERED WHICH CONTRADICTS THE
FINDINGS OF ULTIMATE FACTS THEREIN CONTAINED.
During the period that ensued after the filing in this Court of the
respective briefs and the subsequent submission of the case for decision,
some incidents had transpired, the summary of which may be stated as
follows:
1. Separate from this present appeal, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-35629
(Ernesto Cease, et al. vs. Hon. Manolo L. Maddela, et al.) which
challenged the order of respondent judge dated September 27, 1972
appointing his Branch Clerk of Court, Mr. Eleno M. Joyas, as receiver of
the properties subject of the appealed civil case, which order, petitioners
saw as a virtual execution of the lower court's judgment (p. 92, rollo). In
Our resolution of November 13, 1972, issued in G.R. No. L-35629, the
petition was denied since respondent judge merely appointed an
auxilliary receiver for the preservation of the properties as well as for the
protection of the interests of all parties in Civil Case No. 6326; but at the
same time, We expressed Our displeasure in the appointment of the
branch clerk of court or any other court personnel for that matter as
receiver. (p. 102, rollo).
2. Meanwhile, sensing that the appointed receiver was making some
attempts to take possession of the properties, petitioners filed in this
present appeal an urgent petition to restrain proceedings in the lower
court. We resolved the petition on January 29, 1975 by issuing a
corresponding temporary restraining order enjoining the court a quo from
implementing its decision of December 27, 1969, more particularly, the
taking over by a receiver of the properties subject of the litigation, and
private respondents Benjamin and Florence Cease from proceeding or
taking any action on the matter until further orders from this Court (pp.
99-100, rollo). Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of
Our resolution of January 29, 1975. After weighing the arguments of the
parties and taking note of Our resolution in G.R. No. L-35629 which
upheld the appointment of a receiver, We issued another resolution dated
April 11, 1975 lifting effective immediately Our previous temporary
restraining order which enforced the earlier resolution of January 29,
1975 (pp. 140-141, rollo).
3. On February 6, 1976, private respondents filed an urgent petition to
restrain proceedings below in view of the precipitate replacement of the
court appointed receiver Mayor Francisco Escueta (vice Mr. Eleno M.
Joyas) and the appointment of Mr. Guillermo Lagrosa on the eve of
respondent Judge Maddela's retirement (p. 166, rollo). The urgent
petition was denied in Our resolution of February 18, 1976 (p. 176, rollo).
4. Several attempts at a compromise agreement failed to materialize. A
Tentative Compromise Agreement dated July 30, 1975 was presented to
the Court on August 6, 1976 for the signature of the parties, but
respondents "unceremoniously" repudiated the same by leaving the
courtroom without the permission of the court (Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Branch 11) as a result of which respondents and their counsel
were cited for contempt (p. 195, 197, rollo) that respondents' reason for
the repudiation appears to be petitioners' failure to render an audited
account of their administration covering the period from May 31, 1961 up
to January 29, 1974, plus the inclusion of a provision on waiver and
relinquishment by respondents of whatever rights that may have accrued
to their favor by virtue of the lower court's decision and the affirmative
decision of the appellate court.
We go now to the alleged errors committed by the respondent Court of
Appeals.
19
As can be gleaned from petitioners' brief and the petition itself, two
contentions underlie the first assigned error. First, petitioners argue that
there was an irregular and arbitrarte termination and dismissal of the
special proceedings for judicial administration simultaneously ordered in
the lower court . s decision in Civil Case No. 6326 adjudicating the
partition of the estate, without categorically, reasoning the opposition to
the petition for administration Second, that the issue of ownership had
been raised in the lower court when Tiaong Milling asserted title over the
properties registered in its corporate name adverse to Forrest L. Cease
or his estate, and that the said issue was erroneously disposed of by the
trial court in the partition proceedings when it concluded that the assets
or properties of the defunct company is also the estate of the deceased
proprietor.
The propriety of the dismissal and termination of the special proceedings
for judicial administration must be affirmed in spite of its rendition in
another related case in view of the established jurisprudence which
favors partition when judicial administration become, unnecessary. As
observed by the Court of Appeals, the dismissal at first glance is wrong,
for the reason that what was actually heard was Civil Case No. 6326. The
technical consistency, however, it is far less importance than the reason
behind the doctrinal rule against placing an estate under administration.
Judicial rulings consistently hold the view that where partition is possible,
either judicial or extrajudicial, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reason. When the
estate has no creditors or pending obligations to be paid, the
beneficiaries in interest are not bound to submit the property to judicial
administration which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court, especially when judicial
administration is unnecessary and superfluous. Thus -
When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be
paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration, which is always long and
costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the
court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings (Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil, 434;
Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34
Phil., 367; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317). Syllabus, Intestate estate
of the deceased Luz Garcia. Pablo G. Utulo vs. Leona Pasion
Viuda de Garcia, 66 Phil. 302.
Where the estate has no debts, recourse may be had to an
administration proceeding only if the heirs have good reasons for
not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible,
either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with
an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons. (Intestate Estate of Mercado vs. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383)
In the records of this case, We find no indication of any indebtedness of
the estate. No creditor has come up to charge the estate within the two-
year period after the death of Forrest L. Cease, hence, the presumption
under Section 1, Rule 74 that the estate is free from creditors must apply.
Neither has the status of the parties as legal heirs, much less that of
respondents, been raised as an issue. Besides, extant in the records is
the stipulation of the parties to submit the pleadings and contents of the
administration proceedings for the cognizance of the trial judge in
adjudicating the civil case for partition (Respondents' Brief, p, 20, rollo).
As respondents observe, the parties in both cases are the same, so are
the properties involved; that actual division is the primary objective in
both actions; the theory and defense of the respective parties are likewise
common; and that both cases have been assigned to the same
respondent judge. We feel that the unifying effect of the foregoing
circumstances invites the wholesome exception to the structures of
procedural rule, thus allowing, instead, room for judicial flexibility.
Respondent judge's dismissal of the administration proceedings then, is a
judicious move, appreciable in today's need for effective and speedy
administration of justice. There being ample reason to support the
dismissal of the special proceedings in this appealed case, We cannot
see in the records any compelling reason why it may not be dismissed
just the same even if considered in a separate action. This is inevitably
certain specially when the subject property has already been found
appropriate for partition, thus reducing the petition for administration to a
mere unnecessary solicitation.
The second point raised by petitioners in their first assigned error is
equally untenable. In effect, petitioners argue that the action for partition
should not have prospered in view of the repudiation of the co-ownership
by Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company when, as early in the trial
court, it already asserted ownership and corporate title over the
properties adverse to the right of ownership of Forrest L. Cease or his
estate. We are not unmindful of the doctrine relied upon by petitioners
in Rodriguez vs. Ravilan, 17 Phil. 63 wherein this Court held that in an
action for partition, it is assumed that the parties by whom it is prosecuted
are all co-owners or co-proprietors of the property to be divided, and that
20
the question of common ownership is not to be argued, not the fact as to
whether the intended parties are or are not the owners of the property in
question, but only as to how and in what manner and proportion the said
property of common ownership shall be distributed among the interested
parties by order of the Court. Consistent with this dictum, it has been field
that if any party to a suit for partition denies the pro-indivisocharacter of
the estate whose partition is sought, and claims instead, exclusive title
thereto the action becomes one for recovery of property cognizable in the
courts of ordinary jurisdiction. 2
Petitioners' argument has only theoretical persuasion, to say the least,
rather apparent than real. It must be remembered that when Tiaong
Milling adduced its defense and raised the issue of ownership, its
corporate existence already terminated through the expiration of its
charter. It is clear in Section 77 of Act No. 1459 (Corporation Law) that
upon the expiration of the charter period, the corporation ceases to exist
and is dissolved ipso facto except for purposes connected with the
winding up and liquidation. The provision allows a three year, period from
expiration of the charter within which the entity gradually settles and
closes its affairs, disposes and convey its property and to divide its
capital stock, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which
it was established. At this terminal stage of its existence, Tiaong Milling
may no longer persist to maintain adverse title and ownership of the
corporate assets as against the prospective distributees when at this time
it merely holds the property in trust, its assertion of ownership is not only
a legal contradiction, but more so, to allow it to maintain adverse interest
would certainly thwart the very purpose of liquidation and the final
distribute loll of the assets to the proper, parties.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in its reasoning that substance is
more important than form when it sustained the dismissal of Special
Proceedings No. 3893, thus -
a) As to the dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 3893, of
course, at first glance, this was wrong, for the reason that the
case trial had been heard was Civil Case No. 6326; but what
should not be overlooked either is Chat respondent Judge was
the same Judge that had before him in his own sala, said Special
Proceedings No. 3893, p. 43 rollo, and the parties to the present
Civil Case No. 6326 had themselves asked respondent Judge to
take judicial notice of the same and its contents page 34, rollo; it
is not difficult to see that when respondent Judge in par. 4 of the
dispositive part of his decision complained of, ordered that,
4) Special Proceedings No. 3893 for administration is terminated
and dismissed; the instant case to proceed but on issues of
damages only and for such action inherently essential or partition.
p. 123, rollo,
in truth and in fact, His Honor was issuing that order also within
Civil Case No. 632 but in connection with Special Proceedings
No. 389:3: for substance is more important Chan form, the
contending par ties in both proceedings being exactly the same,
but not only this, let it not be forgotten that when His Honor
dismissed Special Proceedings No. 3893, that dismissal precisely
was a dismissal that petitioners herein had themselves sought
and solicited from respondent Judge as petitioners themselves
are in their present petition pp. 5-6, rollo; this Court must find
difficulty in reconciling petitioners' attack with the fact that it was
they themselves that had insisted on that dismissal; on the
principle that not he who is favored but he who is hurt by a judicial
order is he only who should be heard to complain and especially
since extraordinary legal remedies are remedies in extermies
granted to parties ' who have been the victims not merely of
errors but of grave wrongs, and it cannot be seen how one who
got what he had asked could be heard to claim that he had been
the victim of a wrong, petitioners should not now complain of an
order they had themselves asked in order to attack such an order
afterwards; if at all, perhaps, third parties, creditors, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, might have been prejudiced, and could have
had the personality to attack that dismissal of Special
Proceedings No. 3893, but not petitioners herein, and it is not
now for this Court of Appeals to protect said third persons who
have not come to the Court below or sought to intervene herein;
On the second assigned error, petitioners argue that no evidence has
been found to support the conclusion that the registered properties of
Tiaong Milling are also properties of the estate of Forrest L. Cease; that
on the contrary, said properties are registered under Act No. 496 in the
name of Tiaong Milling as lawful owner and possessor for the last 50
years of its corporate existence.
We do not agree. In reposing ownership to the estate of Forrest L.
Cease, the trial court indeed found strong support, one that is based on a
well-entrenched principle of law. In sustaining respondents' theory of
"merger of Forrest L. Cease and The Tiaong Milling as one personality",
or that "the company is only the business conduit and alter ego of the
21
deceased Forrest L. Cease and the registered properties of Tiaong
Milling are actually properties of Forrest L. Cease and should be divided
equally, share and share alike among his six children, ... ", the trial court
did aptly apply the familiar exception to the general rule by disregarding
the legal fiction of distinct and separate corporate personality and
regarding the corporation and the individual member one and the same.
In shredding the fictitious corporate veil, the trial judge narrated the
undisputed factual premise, thus:
While the records showed that originally its incorporators were
aliens, friends or third-parties in relation of one to another, in the
course of its existence, it developed into a close family
corporation. The Board of Directors and stockholders belong to
one family the head of which Forrest L. Cease always retained
the majority stocks and hence the control and management of its
affairs. In fact, during the reconstruction of its records in 1947
before the Security and Exchange Commission only 9 nominal
shares out of 300 appears in the name of his 3 eldest children
then and another person close to them. It is likewise noteworthy
to observe that as his children increase or perhaps become of
age, he continued distributing his shares among them adding
Florence, Teresa and Marion until at the time of his death only
190 were left to his name. Definitely, only the members of his
family benefited from the Corporation.
The accounts of the corporation and therefore its operation, as
well as that of the family appears to be indistinguishable and
apparently joined together. As admitted by the defendants
(Manifestation of Compliance with Order of March 7, 1963
[Exhibit "21"] the corporation 'never' had any account with any
banking institution or if any account was carried in a bank on its
behalf, it was in the name of Mr. Forrest L. Cease. In brief, the
operation of the Corporation is merged with those of the majority
stockholders, the latter using the former as his instrumentality and
for the exclusive benefits of all his family. From the foregoing
indication, therefore, there is truth in plaintiff's allegation that the
corporation is only a business conduit of his father and an
extension of his personality, they are one and the same thing.
Thus, the assets of the corporation are also the estate of Forrest
L. Cease, the father of the parties herein who are all legitimate
children of full blood.
A rich store of jurisprudence has established the rule known as the
doctrine of disregarding or piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Generally,
a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct
from that of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other
legal entity to which it may be related. By virtue of this attribute, a
corporation may not, generally, be made to answer for acts or liabilities of
its stockholders or those of the legal entities to which it may be
connected, and vice versa. This separate and distinct personality is,
however, merely a fiction created by law for convenience and to promote
the ends of justice (Laguna Transportation Company vs. Social Security
System, L-14606, April 28, 1960; La Campana Coffee Factory, Inc. vs.
Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana, L-5677, May 25, 1953).
For this reason, it may not be used or invoked for ends subversive of the
policy and purpose behind its creation (Emiliano Cano Enterprises, Inc.
vs. CIR, L-20502, Feb. 26, 1965) or which could not have been intended
by law to which it owes its being McConnel vs. Court of Appeals, L-
10510, March 17, 1961, 1 SCRA 722). This is particularly true where the
fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud,
defend crime (Yutivo Sons Hardware Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals,
L-13203, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 160), confuse legitimate legal or judicial
issues (R. F. Sugay & Co. vs. Reyes, L-20451, Dec. 28, 1964),
perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law (Gregorio Araneta,
Inc. vs. reason de Paterno, L-2886, Aug. 22, 1952, 49 O.G. 721). This is
likewise true where the corporate entity is being used as an alter ego,
adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of
another corporate entity (McConnel vs. Court of Appeals, supra;
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Norton Harrison Co., L-7618, Aug.
31, 1964).
In any of these cases, the notion of corporate entity will be pierced or
disregarded, and the corporation will be treated merely as an association
of persons or, where there are two corporations, they will be merged as
one, the one being merely regarded as part or the instrumentality of the
otter (Koppel [Phil.] Inc. vs. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496, Yutivo Sons Hardware
Company vs. Court of Tax Appeals, supra).
So must the case at bar add to this jurisprudence. An indubitable
deduction from the findings of the trial court cannot but lead to the
conclusion that the business of the corporation is largely, if not wholly, the
personal venture of Forrest L. Cease. There is not even a shadow of a
showing that his children were subscribers or purchasers of the stocks
they own. Their participation as nominal shareholders emanated solely
22
from Forrest L. Cease's gratuitous dole out of his own shares to the
benefit of his children and ultimately his family.
Were we sustain the theory of petitioners that the trial court acted in
excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in deciding Civil Case No. 6326 as a case for partition when
the defendant therein, Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company, Inc. as
registered owner asserted ownership of the assets and properties
involved in the litigation, which theory must necessarily be based on the
assumption that said assets and properties of Tiaong Milling and
Plantation Company, Inc. now appearing under the name of F. L. Cease
Plantation Company as Trustee are distinct and separate from the estate
of Forrest L. Cease to which petitioners and respondents as legal heirs of
said Forrest L. Cease are equally entitled share and share alike, then that
legal fiction of separate corporate personality shall have been used to
delay and ultimately deprive and defraud the respondents of their
successional rights to the estate of their deceased father. For Tiaong
Milling and Plantation Company shall have been able to extend its
corporate existence beyond the period of its charter which lapsed in
June, 1958 under the guise and cover of F. L, Cease Plantation
Company, Inc. as Trustee which would be against the law, and as
Trustee shall have been able to use the assets and properties for the
benefit of the petitioners, to the great prejudice and defraudation. of
private respondents. Hence, it becomes necessary and imperative to
pierce that corporate veil.
Under the third assigned error, petitioners claim that the decision of the
lower court in the partition case is not interlocutory but rather final for it
consists of final and determinative dispositions of the contentions of the
parties. We find no merit in petitioners' stand.
Under the 1961 pronouncement and ruling of the Supreme Court in Vda.
de Zaldarriaga vs. Enriquez, 1 SCRA 1188 (and the sequel case of Vda.
de Zaldarriaga vs. Zaldarriaga, 2 SCRA 356), the lower court's dismissal
of petitioners' proposed appeal from its December 27, 1969 judgment as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the ground of prematurity in that the
judgment was not final but interlocutory was in order. As was said in said
case:
It is true that in Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 934 and other cases it
was held - contrary to the rule laid down in Ron vs. Mojica, 8 Phil.
328; Rodriguez vs. Ravilan, 17 Phil. 63 - that in a partition case
where defendant relies on the defense of exclusive ownership,
the action becomes one for title and the decision or order
directing partition is final, but the ruling to this effect has been
expressly reversed in the Fuentebella case which, in our opinion,
expresses the correct view, considering that a decision or order
directing partition is not final because it leaves something more to
be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of the case,
namely, the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings to
be had before them, the submission of their report which,
according to law, must be set for hearing. In fact, it is only after
said hearing that the court may render a final judgment finally
disposing of the action (Rule 71, section 7, Rules of Court). (1
SCRA at page 1193).
It should be noted, however, that the said ruling in Zaldarriaga as based
on Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, XIV Lawyers Journal 305 (May 27, 1942),
has been expressly abandoned by the Court in Miranda vs. Court of
Appeals, 71 SCRA 295; 331-333 (June 18, 1976) wherein Mr. Justice
Teehankee, speaking for the Court, laid down the following doctrine:
The Court, however, deems it proper for the guidance of the
bench and bar to now declare as is clearly indicated from the
compelling reasons and considerations hereinabove stated:
- that the Court considers the better rule to be that stated in H. E.
Heacock Co. vs. American Trading Co., to wit, that where the
primary purpose of a case is to ascertain and determine who
between plaintiff and defendant is the true owner and entitled to
the exclusive use of the disputed property, "the judgment . . .
rendered by the lower court [is] a judgment on the merits as to
those questions, and [that] the order of the court for
an accounting was based upon, and is incidental to the judgment
on the merits. That is to say, that the judgment . . . [is] a final
judgment ... that in this kind of a case an accounting is a mere
incident to the judgment; that an appeal lies from the rendition of
the judgment as rendered ... "(as is widely held by a great number
of judges and members of the bar, as shown by the cases so
decided and filed and still pending with the Court) for the
fundamental reasons therein stated that "this is more in harmony
with the administration of justice and the spirit and intent of the
[Rules]. If on appeal the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, it
would not in the least work an injustice to any of the legal rights of
[appellee]. On the other hand, if for any reason this court should
reverse the judgment of the lower court, the accounting would be
23
a waste of time and money, and might work a material injury to
the [appellant]; and
- that accordingly, the contrary ruling in Fuentebella vs.
Carrascoso which expressly reversed the Heacock case and a
line of similar decisions and ruled that such a decision for
recovery of property with accounting "is not final but merely
interlocutory and therefore not appealable" and subsequent cases
adhering to the same must be now in turn abandoned and set
aside.
Fuentebella adopted instead the opposite line of conflicting
decisions mostly in partition proceedings and exemplified by Ron
vs. Mojica 8 Phil. 928 (under the old Code of Civil Procedure) that
an order for partition of real property is not final and appealable
until after the actual partition of the property as reported by the
court appointed commissioners and approved by the court in
its judgment accepting the report. lt must be especially noted that
such rule governing partitions is now so expressly provided and
spelled out in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, with special
reference to Sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11, to wit, that there must
first be a preliminar, order for partition of the real estate (section
2) and where the parties-co-owners cannot agree, the court
appointed commissioners make a plan of actual partition which
must first be passed upon and accepted by the trial court and
embodied in a judgment to be rendered by it (sections 6 and 11).
In partition cases, it must be further borne in mind that Rule 69,
section 1 refers to "a person having the right to compel
the partition of real estate," so that the general rule of partition
that an appeal will not lie until the partition or distribution
proceedings are terminated will not apply where appellant
claims exclusive ownership of the whole property and denies the
adverse party's right to any partition, as was the ruling
in Villanueva vs. Capistrano and Africa vs .Africa, supra,
Fuentebellas express rehearsal of these cases must likewise be
deemed now also abandoned in view of the Court's expressed
preference for the rationale of the Heacock case.
The Court's considered opinion is that imperative considerations
of public policy and of sound practice in the courts and adherence
to the constitutional mandate of simplified, just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action call for considering
such judgments for recovery of property with accounting as
final judgments which are duly appealable (and would therefore
become final and executory if not appealed within the
reglementary period) with the accounting as a mere incident of
the judgment to be rendered during the course of the appeal as
provided in Rule 39, section 4 or to be implemented at the
execution stage upon final affirmance on appeal of the judgment
(as in Court of Industrial Relations unfair labor practice cases
ordering the reinstatement of the worker with accounting,
computation and payment of his backwages less earnings
elsewhere during his layoff) and that the only reason given in
Fuentebelia for the contrary ruling, viz, "the general harm that
would follow from throwing the door open to multiplicity of appeals
in a single case" of lesser import and consequence. (Emphasis
copied).
The miranda ruling has since then been applied as the new rule by a
unanimous Court in Valdez vs. Bagasao, 82 SCRA 22 (March 8, 1978).
If there were a valid genuine claim of Exclusive ownership of the inherited
properties on the part of petitioners to respondents' action for partition,
then under the Miranda ruling, petitioners would be sustained, for as
expressly held therein " the general rule of partition that an appeal will not
lie until the partition or distribution proceedings are terminated will not
apply where appellant claims exclusive ownership of the whole property
and denies the adverse party's right to any partition."
But this question has now been rendered moot and academic for the very
issue of exclusive ownership claimed by petitioners to deny and defeat
respondents' right to partition - which is the very core of their rejected
appeal - has been squarely resolved herein against them, as if the appeal
had been given due course. The Court has herein expressly sustained
the trial court's findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the
assets or properties of the defunct company constitute the estate of the
deceased proprietor (supra at page 7) and the defunct company's
assertion of ownership of the properties is a legal contradiction and would
but thwart the liquidation and final distribution and partition of the
properties among the parties hereof as children of their deceased father
Forrest L. Cease. There is therefore no further hindrance to effect the
partition of the properties among the parties in implementation of the
appealed judgment.
One last consideration. Parties are brothers and sisters, legal heirs of
their deceased father, Forrest L. Cease. By all rights in law and
24
jurisprudence, each is entitled to share and share alike in the estate,
which the trial court correctly ordained and sustained by the appellate
court. Almost 20 years have lapsed since the filing of Special
Proceedings No. 3893 for the administration of the Estate of Forrest L.
Cease and Civil Case No. 6326 for liquidation and partition of the assets
of the defunct Tiaong Milling and Plantation Co., Inc. A succession of
receivers were appointed by the court to take, keep in possession,
preserve and manage properties of the corporation which at one time
showed an income of P386,152.90 and expenses of P308,405.01 for the
period covering January 1, 1960 to August 31, 1967 as per Summary of
Operations of Commissioner for Finance appointed by the Court (Brief for
Respondents, p. 38). In the meantime, ejectment cases were filed by and
against the heirs in connection with the properties involved, aggravating
the already strained relations of the parties. A prudent and practical
realization of these circumstances ought and must constrain the parties
to give each one his due in law and with fairness and dispatch that their
basic rights be enjoyed. And by remanding this case to the court a
quo for the actual partition of the properties, the substantial rights of
everyone of the heirs have not been impaired, for in fact, they have been
preserved and maintained.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed

from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

25
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5921 July 25, 1911
THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN CODINA ARENAS AND OTHERS, defendants;
VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA, appellant.
Chicote and Miranda for appellant.
W.A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del
Pino, as principals, and Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the
Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and
severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil Company of New York,
the sum of P3,305. 76, at three months from date, with interest at P1 per
month.
On April 5, 1909, The Standard Oil Company of New York sued the said
five debtors for payment of the P3,305.76, together with the interest
thereon at the rate of 1 per cent per month from the 15th of December,
1908, and the costs.
The defendants were summoned, the record showing that summons was
served on Vicente Sixto Villanueva on April 17, 1909.
On May 12, 1909, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho were declared to
be in default and were so notified, the latter on the 14th and the former on
the 15th of May, 1909.
On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
sentenced all the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff
company the sum of P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at 1
per cent per month from December 15, 1908, until complete payment
should have been made of the principal, and to pay the costs.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Torres de
Villanueva, the wife of Vicente Sixto Villanueva, appeared and alleged:
(1) That on July 24, 1909, the latter was declared to be insane by the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila; (2) that she was appointed
his guardian by the same court; (3) that, on October 11, following, she
was authorized by the court, as guardian, to institute the proper legal
proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband
while in a state of insanity, among them that concerned in the present
cause, issued in behalf of The Standard Oil Company of New York; (4)
that she, the guardian, was not aware of the proceedings had against her
husband and was only by chance informed thereof; (5) that when Vicente
S. Villanueva gave the bond, the subject of this suit, he was already
permanently insane, was in that state when summoned and still
continued so, for which reason he neither appeared nor defended himself
in the said litigation; and, in conclusion, she petitioned the court to relieve
the said defendant Villanueva from compliance with the aforestated
judgment rendered against him in the suit before mentioned, and to
reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence in behalf of the said
defendant with respect to his capacity at the time of the execution of the
bond in question, which evidence could not be presented in due season
on account of the then existing incapacity of the defendant.
The court granted the petition and the trial was reopened for the
introduction of evidence, after due consideration of which, when taken,
the court decided that when Vicente Villanueva, on the 15th of
December, 1908, executed the bond in question, he understood perfectly
well the nature and consequences of the act performed by him and that
the consent that was given by him for the purpose was entirely voluntary
and, consequently, valid and efficacious. As a result of such findings the
court ruled that the petition for an indefinite stay of execution of the
judgment rendered in the case be denied and that the said execution be
carried out.
After the filing of an exception to the above ruling, a new hearing was
requested "with reference to the defendant Vicente S. Villanueva" and,
upon its denial, a bill of exceptions was presented in support of the
appeal submitted to this court and which is based on a single assignment
of error as follows:
Because the lower court found that the monomania of great
wealth, suffered by the defendant Villanueva, does not imply
incapacity to execute a bond such as the one herein concerned.
26
Certainly the trial court founded its judgment on the basis of the medico-
legal doctrine which supports the conclusion that such monomania of
wealth does not necessarily imply the result that the defendant Villanueva
was not a person capable of executing a contract of bond like the one
here in question.
This court has not found the proof of the error attributed to the judgment
of the lower court. It would have been necessary to show that such
monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation
in the patient; that the bond executed by the defendant Villanueva was
the result of such monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, that
is, that there was not, nor could there have been any other cause for the
contract than an ostentation of wealth and this purely an effect of
monomania of wealth; and that the monomania existed on the date when
the bond in question was executed.
With regard to the first point: "All alienists and those writers who have
treated of this branch of medical science distinguish numerous degrees
of insanity and imbecility, some of them, as Casper, going so far into a
wealth of classification and details as to admit the existence of 60 to 80
distinct states, an enumeration of which is unnecessary. Hence, the
confusion and the doubt in the minds of the majority of the authors of
treatises on the subject in determining the limits of sane judgment and
the point of beginning of this incapacity, there being some who consider
as a sufficient cause for such incapacity, not only insanity and imbecility,
but even those other chronic diseases or complaints that momentarily
perturb or cloud the intelligence, as mere monomania, somnambulism,
epilepsy, drunkenness, suggestion, anger, and the divers passional
states which more or less violently deprive the human will of necessary
liberty." (Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. V, p. 342.) In
our present knowledge of the state of mental alienation such certainly has
not yet been reached as to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision,
that he who suffers the monomania of wealth, believing himself to be very
wealthy when he is not, is really insane and it is to be presumed, in the
absence of a judicial declaration, that he acts under the influence of a
perturbed mind, or that his mind is deranged when he executes an
onerous contract .The bond, as aforesaid, was executed by Vicente S.
Villanueva on December 15, 1908, and his incapacity, for the purpose of
providing a guardian for him, was not declared until July 24, 1909.
The trial court, although it conceded as a fact that the defendant had for
several years suffered from such monomania, decided, however, guided
by the medico-legal doctrine above cited, that a person's believing
himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere illusion for a reality is not
necessarily a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to bind himself in a
contract. Specifically, in reference to this case, the following facts were
brought out in the testimony given by the physicians, Don Rudesino
Cuervo and Don Gervasio de Ocampo, witnesses for the defendant, the
first of whom had visited him some eight times during the years 1902 and
1903, and the latter, only once, in 1908.
Dr. Cuervo:
Q. But if you should present to him a document which in no wise
concerns his houses and if you should direct him to read it, do you
believe that he would understand the contents of the document?
A. As to understanding it, it is possible that he might, in this I see
nothing particularly remarkable; but afterwards, to decide upon the
question involved, it might be that he could not do that; it depends upon
what the question was.
Dr. Ocampo:
Q. Do you say that he is intelligent with respect to things other than
those concerning greatness?
A. Yes, he reasons in matters which do not refer to the question of
greatness and wealth.
Q. He can take a written paper and read it and understand it, can he
not?
A. Read it, yes, he can read it and understand it, it is probable that he
can, I have made no trial.
Q. Is he not a man of considerable intelligence, only with the
exception of this monomania of greatness and wealth?
A. Of not much intelligence, an ordinary intelligence.
Q. He knows how to read and write, does he not?
A. Yes, sir I believe that he does.
27
Mr. F.B. Ingersoll, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that as a notary he
had prepared the instrument of bond and received the statements of the
signers; that he explained to Mr. Villanueva its contents and when the
witness asked the latter whether he wished to sign it he replied that he
was willing and did in fact do so; that the defendant's mental condition
appeared to the witness to be normal and regular and that he observed
nothing to indicate the contrary; and that the defendant was quiet and
composed and spoke in an ordinary way without giving cause fir any
suspicion that there was anything abnormal.
Honorable Judge Araullo testified as a witness for the plaintiff that while
trying in the Court of First Instance, over which he presided, the case
concerning the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co, and Mr. Villanueva
having been proposed as a surety therein, the witness asked him some
questions about his property, in order to ascertain whether he was
solvent and would be adequate surety, and that Villanueva testified the
same as many, others had done, and witness did not notice any
particular disorder or perturbation of his mental faculties; that he
answered the questions concerning the property that he held, stated its
value, specified the place where it was situated, his answers being
precisely relevant to the matter treated; that he therefore approved the
bond; and that all this took place between July and September, 1908.
This witness having been asked, on cross-examination, whether Mr.
Villanueva, subsequent to the date mentioned, had again been surety in
any other case, and whether it appeared strange to witness that Mr.
Villanueva should engage in giving bonds and whether for that reason he
rejected this new bond, replied that it was in that same case relative to
the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co that he endeavored to
investigate, as he customarily did, with regard to whether Mr. Villanueva
had given any other previous bond, and the discovered that he had in fact
previously given bond in a criminal case, but that, as it had already been
cancelled, he had no objection to accepting the one offered by Mr.
Villanueva in the said Go-Cho-Co case.
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not
previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to
continue so long as the contrary be not proved, that is, that at the
moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out his mind:
which, in the opinion of this court, has not been proved in this case.
With regard to the second point, it is very obvious that in every contract
there must be a consideration to substantiate the obligation, so much so
that, even though it should not be expressed in the contract, it is
presumed that it exists and that it is lawful, unless the debtor proves the
contrary. (Civil Code, art. 1277.) In the contract of bond the consideration,
general, is no other, as in all contract of pure beneficence, than the
liberality of the benefactor. (Id, 1274.) Out of the ordinary, a bond may be
given for some other consideration, according to the agreement and the
free stipulation of the parties and may be, as in onerous and
remuneratory contracts, something remunerative stipulated as an
equivalent, on the part of the beneficiary of the bond.
It is not clear as to the reason why Villanueva gave the bond in favor of
the two members of the firm of Arenas & Co., Francisco Lara, and Juan
Arenas. Lara testified that he had never had dealings with Villanueva;
from which it is inferred that the latter could hardly have been moved to
favor the former by the benefit of an assumed obligation to pay him some
three thousand pesos, with monthly interest .But he added that Arenas &
Co. obtained an agent to look for sureties for them, to whom Arenas paid
a certain sum of money. The witness did not know, however, whether
Arenas gave the money for the signature of the bond or simply in order
that the agent might find sureties. The fact is that the sureties came with
the agent and signed the bond.
The appellant presented, as proof that Villanueva concealed from his
family his dealings with Arenas, a note by the latter addressed to his
friend, Mr. Villanueva, on the 13th of May, 1909, that is, two days before
Villanueva was declared to be in default, inviting him to a conference "for
the purpose of treating of a matter of great importance of much interest to
Villanueva, between 5 and 6 of that same day, in the garden and on the
benches which are in front of the Delmonico Hotel, on Calle Palacio,
corner of Calle Victoria, and if rained, in the bar on the corner." It can not
be affirmed with certainty (the trial court considers it probable) that
Villanueva engaged in the business of giving bonds for a certain
consideration or remuneration; but neither can it be sustained that there
was no other cause for the giving of the bond in question than the mental
disorder that dominated the intellect of the person obligated, to the extent
of his believing himself so oversupplied with money as to be able to risk it
in behalf of any person whatever. There is no proof that the said bond
was merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth, nor that, if
Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several bonds, among them that
herein concerned, he was influenced only by the monomania of boasting
of being wealthy, when he was not.
Neither is there any proof whatever with respect to the third point, that is,
that, granting that he was a monomaniac, he was dominated by that
28
malady when he executed the bond now under discussion. In the Q. From his actions toward others, did he show any indication
interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of incapacity, to wit, lunacy or of not being sane when he was on the street, according to your
insanity, it is a rule of constant application that is not enough that there be opinion?
more or less probability that a person was in a state of dementia at a
given time, if there is not direct proof that, at the date of the performance A. Half of Manila knows him and are informed of this fact and
of the act which it is endeavored to invalidate for want of capacity on the it is very strange that this should have occurred. If you need
part of the executor, the latter was insane or demented, in other words, witnesses to prove it, there are many people who can testify in
that he could not, in the performance of that act, give his conscious, free, regard to this particular.
voluntary, deliberate and intentional consent. The witness who as
physicians testified as to extravagancies observed in Villanueva's The only incorrectness mentioned by this lady is that her husband, when
conduct, referred, two of them, to a time prior to 1903, and another of he went to the market, would return to the house with his pockets full of
them to the year 1908, but none to December 15, 1908, the date of the tomatoes and onions, and when she was asked by the judge whether he
execution of the bond sought to be invalidated. the testimony of one of was a man of frugal habits, she replied that, as far as she knew, he had
these witnesses shows that when Villanueva's wife endeavored, in 1908, never squandered any large sum of money; that he had never been
to have her husband confined in the Hospicio de San Jose and cared for engaged in business; that he supported himself on what she gave him;
therein, objection was made by the director of the institution who advised and that if he had something to count on for his living, it was the product
her that if he entered in that way and lodged in the ward for old men, as of his lands.
soon as he shouted and disturbed them in their sleep he would have to
be locked up in the insane ward; to which Villanueva's wife replied "that
Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated incapacity of the
her husband was not exactly insane enough to be placed among the
appellant, and it is very evident that it can not be concluded therefrom
insane." This same lady, testifying as a witness in this case, stated: that
that, on December 15, 1908, when Villanueva subscribed the obligation
no restrictions had ever been placed upon her husband's liberty to go
now contested, he did not possess the necessary capacity to give
wherever he wished and do what he liked; that her husband had property
efficient consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed.
of his own and was not deprived of its management; that he went out
every morning without her knowing where he went; that she did not know
whether he had engaged in the business of signing bonds, and that, with Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this
reference to the one now concerned, she had learned of it only by finding instance against the appellant. So ordered.
to note, before mentioned, wherein Arenas invited him to a rendezvous
on the benches in front of the Delmonico Hotel; that she had not Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
endeavored legally to deprive him of the management of his own real
estate which had been inherited by him, although he did not attend to the
collection of the rents and the payment of the land tax, all this being done
by her, and she also it was who attended to the subsistence of the family
and to all their needs. Finally, and with direct reference to the point under
discussion, she was asked:

Q. It is not true that, up to the date of his signing this bond, he

used to go out of the house and was on the streets nearly every
day? to which she replied:

A. He went where he pleased, he does this even now. He

goes to the markets, and buys provisions and other things. In fact
I don't know where he goes go.

29
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11872 December 1, 1917
DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis
Espiritu, defendant-appellee.
Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants. Vicente Foz for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the
plaintiffs from the judgment of September 22, 1914, in which the judge of
the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiffs
and ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land,
and to pay the costs of the suit.
By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa
Mercado brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against
Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon thereafter, the complaint was
amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his
administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs
alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed
Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister
of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897,
leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area
situated in the barrio of Panducot, municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and
bounded as described in paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, which
hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their
sisters, through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita
Espiritu; that, about the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of
cajolery, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs
Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by
their mother, for the sum of P400, which amount was divided among the
two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, notwithstanding the
fact that said land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795;
that one-half of the land in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and
one-half of this share, that is, one-fourth of said land , to the plaintiffs, and
the other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the
part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes
of rice per annum, at P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to P450 per
annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received said products from 1901 until
the time of his death. Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be
rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the sale they
made of their respective shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the
defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of
the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their
deceased mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products thereof,
uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and
to pay the costs of the suit.
In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned
complaint, denying each and all of the allegations therein contained, and
in special defense alleged that the land, the subject-matter of the
complaint, had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25,
1894, its owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs'
mother, with the due authorization of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y
Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion of said
land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of
seed; that subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo
Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in his capacity as administrator of the property
of his children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the
price of P375 the remainder of the said land, to wit, an area covered by
six cavanes of seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his
(Wenceslao's) children, and this amount being still insufficient the
successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other sums of money
aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on May 17,1910, the plaintiffs,
alleging themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their sisters Maria
del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the notarial instrument inserted
integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which instrument,
ratifying said sale under pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to
their mother Margarita Espiritu, effected by their father Wenceslao
Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold
absolutely and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration of P400,
the property that had belonged to their deceased mother and which they
acknowledged having received from the aforementioned purchaser. In
this cross-complaint the defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the
plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious, and that thereby losses and
damages in the sum of P1,000 had been caused to the intestate estate of
the said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be rendered by
ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in
30
litigation and, besides, to pay said intestate estate P1,000 for losses and
damages, and that the costs of the trial be charged against them.
In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the
facts therein set forth, and in special defense alleged that at the time of
the execution of the deed of sale inserted in the cross-complaint the
plaintiffs were still minors, and that since they reached their majority the
four years fixed by law for the annulment of said contract had not yet
elapsed. They therefore asked that they be absolved from the
defendant's cross-complaint.
After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court
rendered the judgment aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted
and in writing moved for a reopening of the case and a new trial. This
motion was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and the
proper bill of exceptions having been presented, the same was approved
and transmitted to the clerk of this court.
As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3,
executed by them on May 17, 1910, on the ground that they were minors
when they executed it, the questions submitted to the decision of this
court consist in determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then
minors and therefore incapable of selling their property on the date borne
by the instrument Exhibit 3; and in case they then were such, whether a
person who is really and truly a minor and, notwithstanding, attests that
he is of legal age, can, after the execution of the deed and within legal
period, ask for the annulment of the instrument executed by him, because
of some defect that invalidates the contract, in accordance with the law
(Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain the restitution of
the land sold.
The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas
Espiritu obtained title by composition with the State, to three parcels of
land, adjoining each other, in the sitio of Panducot of the pueblo of
Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares,
and 59 centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis
Espiritu's death, his said lands passed by inheritance to his four children
named Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the partition of said
decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the complaint as
containing forty-seven and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and
sister Luis and Margarita, in equal shares. Margarita Espiritu, married to
Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno Cruz, had by this husband five children,
Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, all
surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, who, at the death of their mother in 1896
inherited, by operation of law, one-half of the land described in the
complaint.
The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent
restitution to them of two-fourths of the land left by their mother, that is, of
one-fourth of all the land described in the complaint, and which, they
stated, amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this claim
the defendant excepted, alleging that the land in question comprised only
an area such as is customarily covered by 21 cavanes of seed.
It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the
plaintiffs' mother conveyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of
P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of the land now on litigation,
or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed; and
that, on account of the loss of the original of said instrument, which was
on the possession of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore
because, during the revolution, the protocols or registers of public
documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado
y Arnedo Cruz, the widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs,
executed, at the instance of the interested party Luis Espiritu, the notarial
instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, 1901, in his own name and
those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo,
Josefa, and Amalia, and therein set forth that it was true that the sale of
said portion of land had been made by his aforementioned wife, then
deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.
However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year,
1901, the widower Wenceslao Mercado, according to the private
document Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the same man, Luis
Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of
the land that had belonged to this vendor's deceased wife, to the said
Luis Espiritu and which now forms a part of the land in question — a
transaction which Mercado was obliged to make in order to obtain funds
with which "to cover his children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the
plaintiffs' father, having died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo
and Josefa Mercado, together with their sisters Consejo and Paz,
declaring themselves to be of legal age and in possession of the required
legal status to contract, executed and subscribed before a notary the
document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, in which referring to the previous
sale of the land, effected by their deceased mother for the sum of P2,600
and with her husband's permission and authorization, they sold
absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as an
31
increase" of the previous purchase price, the land described in said
instrument and situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an
area equal to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed bounded on the
north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the heirs of Pedro Espiritu, on
the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on the south by
those of Luis Espiritu, and on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-
Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu stream.
In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed
Exhibit 3, on the ground that on the date of its execution they were
minors without legal capacity to contract, and for the further reason that
the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud
in obtaining their consent for the execution of said deed.
As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of
Apalit (plaintiffs were born in Apalit) that the baptismal register books of
that parish pertaining to the years 1890-1891, were lost or burned, the
witness Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book
Exhibit A, which she testified had been kept and taken care of by her
deceased father Wenceslao Mercado, pages 396 and 397 of which bear
the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was born on August 4,
1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this witness
corroborated the averment of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal
registration certificate of said Domingo Mercado, of the year 1914, Exhibit
C, by which it appears that in 1910 he was only 23 years old, whereby it
would also be appear that Josefa Mercado was 22 years of age in 1910,
and therefore, on May 17,1910, when the instrument of purchase and
sale, Exhibit 3, was executed, the plaintiffs must have been, respectively,
19 and 18 years of age.
The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's
death her brother and sisters removed to Manila to live there, although
her brother Domingo used to reside with his uncle Luis Espiritu, who took
charge of the administration of the property left by his predecessors in
interest; that it was her uncle Luis who got for her brother Domingo the
other cedula, Exhibit B, pertaining to the year 1910, where in it appears
that the latter was then already 23 years of age; that she did not know
why her uncle did so; that she and her brother and sisters merely signed
the deed of May 17, 1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado, prior
to his death had pledged the land to her uncle Luis Espiritu.
The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs'
father, it was Luis Espiritu who directed the cultivation of the land in
litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her sister Victoria Espiritu,
who added that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some
time, she did not know just how long, under the control of Luis Espiritu.
Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land
that fell to his wife and to his sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area
of about 8 hectares less than that of the land allotted to the
aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-
in-law Victoria a net and minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in spite
of its being high land and of inferior quality, as compared with the land in
dispute, and that its yield was still larger in 1914, when the said two
sisters' share was 764 cavanes.
Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified,
was a witness for the defendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up
by him at the request of the plaintiff Josefa Mercado; that the grantors of
the instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; that said
document was signed by the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties,
after it had been read to them and had been translated into the
Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not understand Spanish.
On cross-examination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of
age and began to court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who
was then a young maiden, although she had not yet commenced to
attend social gatherings, and that all this took place about the year 1898,
for witness said that he was then [at the time of his testimony, 1914,] 34
years of age.
Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the
properties owned by the latter, testified that Espiritu's land contained an
area of 84 cavanes, and after its owner's death, was under witness'
administration during to harvest two harvest seasons; that the products
yielded by a portion of this land, to wit, an area such as is sown by about
15 cavanes of seed, had been, since 1894, utilized by Luis Espiritu, by
reason of his having acquired the land; and that, after Margarita Espiritu's
death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another
portion of the land, containing an area of six cavanes of seed and which
had been left by this deceased, and that he held same until 1901, when
he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu. lawphi1.net
The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis
Espiritu, testified that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and
on in the house of his deceased father, about the year 1909 or 1910, and
used to go back and forth between his father's house and those of his
32
other relatives. He denied that his father had at any time administered the
property belonging to the Mercado brother and sisters.
In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the
plaintiffs, testified that he mediate in several transactions in connection
with a piece of land belonging to Margarita Espiritu. When shown the
deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not
acquainted with its contents. This same witness also testified that he
mediated in a transaction had between Wenceslao Mercado and Luis
Espiritu (he did not remember the year), in which the former sold to the
latter a parcel of land situated in Panducot. He stated that as he was a
witness of the deed of sale he could identify this instrument were it
exhibited to him; but he did not do so, for no instrument whatever was
presented to him for identification. The transaction mentioned must have
concerned either the ratification of the sale of the land of 15 cavanes, in
1901, attested in Exhibit 1, or the mortgage or pledge of the other parcel
of 6 cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis
Espiritu, as may be seen by the private document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal,
the plaintiff Josefa Mercado denied having gone to the house of the
notary Tanjutco for the purpose of requesting him to draw up any
document whatever. She stated that she saw the document Exhibit 3 for
the first time in the house of her uncle Luis Espiritu on the day she signed
it, on which occasion and while said document was being signed said
notary was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto whose names
appear therein; and that she went to her said uncle's house, because he
had sent for her, as well as her brother and sisters, sending a carromata
to fetch them. Victoria Espiritu denied ever having been in the house of
her brother. Luis Espiritu in company with the plaintiffs, for the purpose of
giving her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of her brother.
The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially,
that the purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or
intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in the document Exhibit
3, executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother
and the sisters Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz and, Josefa surnamed
Mercado y Espiritu, attested the certainty of the previous sale which their
mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of said purchaser Luis
Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her husband Wenceslao
Mercado, father of the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio
of Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan; and in consideration of the fact
that the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as an increase, the sum of
P400, by virtue of the contract made with him, they declare having sold to
him absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of the land, waive and
thenceforth any and all rights they may have, inasmuch as said sum
constitutes the just price of the property.
So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the
contract of sale of the parcel or portion of land that would contain 15
cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors' mother in favor of the
purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of
the contract of pledge or mortgage of the remainder of said land, an area
of six cavanes, made with the same purchaser, at an increase of P400
over the price of P2,600, making an aggregate sum of P3,000,
decomposed as follows: P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the
vendors' father; and the said increase of P400, collected by the plaintiffs.
In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894,
Margarita Espiritu conveyed to her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes
of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs' widowed father
mortgaged or pledged the remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of
seed to her brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is
that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, which was assailed by the plaintiffs,
recognized the validity of the previous contracts, and the totality of the
land, consisting of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold
absolutely and in perpetuity, the vendors receiving in exchange P400
more; and there is no conclusive proof in the record that this last
document was false and simulated on account of the employment of any
violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of the consent of
the vendors who executed it. Considering the relation that exists between
the document Exhibit 3 and those of previous dates, Exhibits 1 and 2,
and taking into the account the relationship between the contracting
parties, and also the general custom that prevails in many provinces of
these Islands for the vendor or debtor to obtain an increase in the price of
the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned, without
proof to the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to hold, in view of
the facts hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, now
deceased, had any need to forge or simulate the document Exhibit 3
inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he has held in the capacity of owner by
virtue of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and
likewise, since May, 1901, according to the contract of mortgage or
pledge, the parcel of 6 cavanes, or the remainder of the total area of 21
cavanes.
So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his
testate or intestate estate is in lawful possession of the parcel of land
situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes of seed, by virtue of the
33
title of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes, and,
in consequence of the contract of pledge or mortgage in security for the
sum of P600, is likewise in lawful possession of the remainder of the
land, or an area containing 6 cavanes of seed.
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel
of land, as its ownership was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a
singular title of purchase and sale; and as to the other portion of 6
cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910,
upon the payment or the return of the sum which their deceased father
Wenceslao Mercado had, during his lifetime, received as a loan under
security of the pledged property; but, after the execution of the document
Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of
said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt to
recover this latter parcel by means of the contract of final and absolute
sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.
Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements
made therein, is of the nature of a public document and is evidence of the
fact which gave rise to its execution and of the date of the latter, even
against a third person and his predecessors in interest such as are the
plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art. 1218.)
The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly
true that his wife Margarita Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she
inherited from her father, of an area of about "15 cavanes of seed," to her
brother Luis Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by her on May
25,1894 — an instrument that disappeared or was burned — and likewise
recognizing that the protocols and register books belonging to the
Province of Bulacan were destroyed as a result of the past revolution, at
the request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give
the testimony recorded in said notarial instrument, as it was the truth
regarding what had occurred, and in so doing he acted as the plaintiffs'
legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority, inasmuch as he
had personal knowledge of said sale, he himself being the husband who
authorized said conveyance, notwithstanding that his testimony affected
his children's interest and prejudiced his own, as the owner of any fruits
that might be produced by said real property.
The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified
as authentic by one of the plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record
shows no evidence whatever that this document is false, and it does not
appear to have been assailed as such, and as it was signed by the
plaintiffs' father, there is no legal ground or well-founded reason why it
should be rejected. It was therefore properly admitted as evidence of the
certainty of the facts therein set forth.
The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3
consists in that, on the date of May 17, 1910, when it was executed that
they signed it, they were minors, that is, they had not yet attained the age
of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in the
record that the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact
minors, for no certified copies were presented of their baptismal
certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any supplemental evidence
whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of
age when they signed the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910,
inasmuch as the copybook, Exhibit A, notwithstanding the testimony of
the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not constitute sufficient proof of the
dates of births of the said Domingo and Josefa.
However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on
the date referred to, it cannot be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3
they stated that they were of legal age at the time they executed and
signed it, and on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed
Exhibit 3 is perfectly valid — a sale that is considered as limited solely to
the parcel of land of 6 cavanes of seed, pledged by the deceased father
of the plaintiffs in security for P600 received by him as a loan from his
brother-in-law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes
had been lawfully sold by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother. The
courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the
sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when
in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse
themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or
to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of
the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and
absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not
violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical
rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme
court of Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) With
respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact
that it was Luis Espiritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal
registration certificate on April 13, 1910, causing the age of 23 years to
be entered therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial
instrument of May 17th of the same year; and the supposition that he did,
would also allow it to be supposed, in order to show the propriety of the
claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken out on February 14, 1914,
34
where in it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years
of age, for both these facts are not proved; neither was any proof
adduced against the statement made by the plaintiffs Domingo and
Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date when they
executed it, they were already of legal age, and, besides the annotation
contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no supplemental proof of their true
ages was introduced.

Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this
case, it cannot be concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors
when they executed the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, have suffered
positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a
result of the execution of said document, inasmuch as the sale effected
by the plaintiffs' mother, Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater
part of the land of 21 cavanes of seed, did not occasion any damage or
prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father stated in the document
Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining
portion of the land in order to secure the loan of the P375 furnished by
Luis Espiritu and which was subsequently increased to P600 so as to
provide for certain engagements or perhaps to meet the needs of his
children, the plaintiff; and therefore, to judge from the statements made
by their father himself, they received through him, in exchange for the
land of 6 cavanes of seed, which passed into the possession of the
creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must have accrued to them from
the sums of money received as loans; and, finally, on the execution of the
impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs received and divided between
themselves the sum of P400, which sum, added to that P2,000 received
by Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by Wenceslao
Mercado, widower of the latter and father of the plaintiffs, makes all
together the sum of P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the
price of all the land containing 21 cavanes of seed, and is the just price of
the property, was not impugned, and, consequently, should be
considered as equivalent to, and compensatory for, the true value of said
land.

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment
appealed from have been refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in
accordance with law and the evidence of record, we should, and do
hereby, affirm the same, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

35
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27710 January 30, 1928
ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants-
appellants.
Pedro C. Quinto for plaintiff-appellant.
Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for defendants-appellants.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the
complaint wherein it is alleged that Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the
owner, with Torrens title, of the land here in question and that the plaintiff
is the sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y
Colcotura, as regards the said land. This being so, the fundamental
question to be resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiff sold the
land in question to the defendants.
The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present
document Exhibit 1, dated July 17, 1922. The plaintiff asserts that while it
is true that he signed said document, yet he did so by intimidation made
upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who
threatened the former with imprisonment. While the evidence on this
particular point does not decisively support the plaintiff's allegation, this
document, however, is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards the
said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a
minor, which is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it
was his real intention to sell the land in question.
What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the
latter's second husband Vicente Lagera, having received a certain sum of
money by way of a loan from Genoveva Muerong in 1915 which,
according to Exhibit 3, was P200 and according to the testimony of Paula
Prado, was P150, and Genoveva Muerong having learned later that the
land within which was included that described in said Exhibit 3, had a
Torrens title issued in favor of the plaintiff's father, of which the latter is
the only heir and caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the land.
At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1,
embodies all of the requisites prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet it does
not, according to the provisions of section 50 of Act No. 496, bind the
land and would only be a valid contract between the parties and as
evidence of authority to the register of deeds to make the proper
registration, inasmuch as it is the registration that gives validity to the
transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document Exhibit 1
alone, did not acquire any right to the property sold as much less, if it is
taken into consideration, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herein
plaintiff, was a minor.
As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado
and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to
be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him pretending to
be age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did
not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to the purchaser,
the defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula
used in the acknowledgment of the document.
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have
given the plaintiff and her son in 1992 as the price of the land, the
preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was given by the
defendants to the alleged vendors in said year, but that the sum of
P663.40, which appears in the document Exhibit 1, is arrived at,
approximately, by taking the P150 received by Paula Prado and her
husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent
annum, then agreed upon, or P75 a year for seven years up to July 31,
1922, the sate of Exhibit 1.
The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven,
because the witness Paula Prado was the only one who testified thereto,
whose testimony was contradicted by that of the defendant Genoveva
Muerong who, moreover, asserts that she possesses about half of the
land in question. There are, therefore, not sufficient data in the record to
award the damages claimed by the plaintiff.
In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed
from is hereby affirmed, without any express findings as to the costs in
this instance. So ordered.
36
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12471 April 13, 1959
ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.
Oscar M. Herrera for petitioners.
R. P. Sarandi and F. Valdez Anama for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo petition for
review of the Court of Appeal's decision whereby they were required
solidarily to pay Fernando F. de Villa Abrille the sum of P10,000 plus 2 %
interest from October 30, 1944.
The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa Abrille, as a loan,
on October 30, 1944 P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in
consideration thereof, promised in writing (Exhibit A) to pay him P10,000
"in legal currency of the P. I. two years after the cessation of the present
hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has been established in
the Philippines", plus 2 % per annum.
Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille sued them in March
1949.
In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance, defendants
claimed to have received P40,000 only — instead of P70,000 as plaintiff
asserted. They also averred that Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors
when they signed the promissory note Exhibit A. After hearing the parties
and their evidence, said court rendered judgment, which the appellate
court affirmed, in the terms above described.
There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. Rosario L.
Braganza because the minority of her consigners note release her from
liability; since it is a personal defense of the minors. However, such
defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which such minors
may be responsible, (Art. 1148, Civil Code). It is not denied that at the
time of signing Exhibit A, Guillermo and Rodolfo Braganza were minors-
16 and 18 respectively. However, the Court of Appeals found them liable
pursuant to the following reasoning:
. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the
promissory note that they were not yet of legal age. If they were
really to their creditor, they should have appraised him on their
incapacity, and if the former, in spite of the information relative to
their age, parted with his money, then he should be contended
with the consequence of his act. But, that was not the case.
Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much needed
money, they readily and willingly signed the promissory note,
without disclosing the legal impediment with respect to Guillermo
and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant case, pretended to
be of legal age, in fact they were not, they will not later on be
permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled. (Mercado, et
al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.) [Emphasis Ours.]
We cannot agree to above conclusion. From the minors' failure to
disclose their minority in the same promissory note they signed, it does
not follow as a legal proposition, that they will not be permitted thereafter
to assert it. They had no juridical duty to disclose their inability. In fact,
according to Corpuz Juris Secundum, 43 p. 206;
. . . . Some authorities consider that a false representation as to
age including a contract as part of the contract and accordingly
hold that it cannot be the basis of an action in tort. Other
authorities hold that such misrepresentation may be the basis of
such an action, on the theory that such misrepresentation is not a
part of, and does not grow out of, the contract, or that the
enforcement of liability for such misrepresentation as tort does
not constitute an indirect of enforcing liability on the contract. In
order to hold infant liable, however, the fraud must be actual and
not constructure. It has been held that his mere silence when
making a contract as to age does not constitute a fraud which can
be made the basis of an action of decit. (Emphasis Ours.)
The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who
contracts with him in the belief that he is of full age must be actual
37
 not constructive, and mere failure of the infant to disclose his age occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold that they had
is not sufficient. (27 American Jurisprudence, p. 819.) profited to the extent of the value of such money, which value has been
authoritatively established in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in
The Mecado case1 cited in the decision under review is different because October 1944, P40.00 Japanese notes were equivalent to P1 of current
the document signed therein by the minor specifically stated he was of Philippine money.
age; here Exhibit A contained no such statement. In other words, in the
Mercado case, the minor was guilty of active misrepresentation; whereas Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of
in this case, if the minors were guilty at all, which we doubt it is P46,666.66, they should now return P1,166.67. 3Their promise to pay
of passive (or constructive) misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a growing P10,000 in Philippine currency, (Exhibit A) can not be enforced, as
sentiment in favor of limiting the scope of the application of the Mercado already stated, since they were minors incapable of binding themselves.
ruling, what with the consideration that the very minority which Their liability, to repeat, is presently declared without regard of said
incapacitated from contracting should likewise exempt them from the Exhibit A, but solely in pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code.
results of misrepresentation.
Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that
We hold, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Rosario Braganza shall pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e., P3,333.334 plus 2%
Braganza could not be legally bound by their signatures in Exhibit A. interest from October 1944; and Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza shall
pay jointly5 to the same creditor the total amount of P1,166.67 plus 6%
It is argued, nevertheless, by respondent that inasmuch as this defense interest beginning March 7, 1949, when the complaint was filed. No costs
was interposed only in 1951, and inasmuch as Rodolfo reached the age in this instance.
of majority in 1947, it was too late to invoke it because more than 4 years
had elapsed after he had become emancipated upon reaching the age of
majority. The provisions of Article 1301 of the Civil Code are quoted to
the effect that "an action to annul a contract by reason of majority must
be filed within 4 years" after the minor has reached majority age. The
parties do not specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth. It is undenied,
however, that in October 1944, he was 18 years old. On the basis of such
datum, it should be held that in October 1947, he was 21 years old, and
in October 1951, he was 25 years old. So that when this defense was
interposed in June 1951, four years had not yet completely elapsed from
October 1947.

Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period

fixed by Article 1301 of the Civil Code where minority is set up only as a
defense to an action, without the minors asking for any positive relief from
the contract. For one thing, they have not filed in this case an action for
annulment.2 They merely interposed an excuse from liability.

Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from
monetary responsibility. In accordance with the provisions of Civil Code,
even if their written contact is unenforceable because of non-age, they
shall make restitution to the extent that they have profited by the money
they received. (Art. 1340) There is testimony that the funds delivered to
them by Villa Abrille were used for their support during the Japanese
38
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural
Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs.
Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the
complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald
Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section
1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and
or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant
Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other
defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above
grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining
the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be
meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is
hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above
entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21,
Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY
UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c)
OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS
NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
39
 III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO
2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal
Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due
trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically,
none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of
acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed
was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed
their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin
Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to
dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive
issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not
reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the
time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living
with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration
and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on
the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier
jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil
liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.
Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code.
In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil
action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted
that it was the employer and not the employee who was being
sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have
been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence
causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence
being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also
made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
(p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as
we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in
40
the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import
of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual
life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through
any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a
crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed
to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life.
We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which
is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt,
but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such
cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both
the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has
given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more
likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73
Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the
Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts
of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force
here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of
this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized
could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the
law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that
"(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And
so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that
drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the
said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses
the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or
in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
41
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book,
(on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision,
Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article
2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when
we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former
is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has
been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due
to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts
of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction
that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that
killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the
same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of
the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character
(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime
fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the
Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also
the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity
and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case
has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is
not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his
father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees
that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of
the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation
takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also
clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor
is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can
sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant
42
case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind

the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under
Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor
children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third
persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in
providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless,
sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or
do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol.
II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial
action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve
the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does
not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill

notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his
son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs
against appellees.

43
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 445 March 31, 1902
PEDRO MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO MARTINEZ, defendant-appellee.
Carlos Ledesma, for appellant.
Felipe Calderon, for appellee.
COOPER, J.:
This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the
compulsory legal heir, against Francisco Martinez Garcia for a
declaration of prodigality against the father.
The allegations in the complaint are substantially: That Don Francisco
Martinez, owing to his advanced age, is dissipating and squandering his
estate by making donations to his second wife, Doña Anastacia Ilustre,
and to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has
given over the administration of this estate to the management of his
wife; that the defendant has a propensity for litigation and has instituted
groundless actions against the plaintiff in order to take possession of the
property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife and her
relatives.
In a supplementary prayer plaintiff asked the court to direct that the
complaint be entered in the property register of the province, which was
done by order of the court.
The defendant in his answer denies the allegations in the complaint and
sets forth a state of facts quite inconsistent with those alleged in the
complaint.
Among other things, it is stated that he has executed in favor of the
plaintiff a general power of attorney under which the plaintiff has
administered the community estate for several years; that the plaintiff has
caused the ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to
the estate, to be registered in his own name without the consent of the
father and is otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the property
of the estate, which caused the defendant to revoke the power of attorney
given to plaintiff, and that the suit brought by the defendant against the
plaintiff was due to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the fact
that the power of attorney had been revoked, refused to render an
account of his administration.
The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and
adjudged the costs against him. The plaintiff has appealed to this court.
The acts which constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code
owing to the difficulty of applying general rules to the varying
circumstances of the case and the different situations of persons.
The declaration of prodigality must be made in an ordinary action (en
juicio contradictorio). (Art. 221 of the Civil Code.)
The proceedings must be instituted by the consort or the forced heirs.
(Art. 222 of the Civil Code.)
Under our law it may inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a
morbid state of mind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the
estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of
support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the
estate.
Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and
affection. All persons who can contract and dispose of property may
make donations. (Art. 624 of the Civil Code.)
Donations may comprise all the actual property of the donor, except such
as is required for the support of the donor in a condition corresponding to
his circumstances. (Art. 634 of the Civil Code.)
And with further limitation that no person can give by a donation more
than what he can give by testament.
A donation is considered inofficious in all that exceeds such limits. (Art.
636 of the Civil Code.)
44
Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should
be imposed upon the owner, but a law which would impose restrictions
further than such as are required by public policy may well be regarded
unjust and tending in a contrary direction, as destroying the incentive to
acquire property, and as subduing the generous impulse of the heart.
Beyond these limitations the law does not attempt to adjust claims to
generosity.
There were a number of witnesses introduced both by the plaintiff and by
the defendant whose testimony it is unnecessary to recount.
accumulation of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the
mother of the plaintiff, to one-half of which estate the plaintiff has
succeeded as heir of the mother.
A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief
that the plaintiff himself possesses that propensity for instituting lawsuits
which he unjustly attributes to his father.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed and costs of suits
in both courts is adjudged against the plaintiff.

The testimony on the part of the plaintiff was wholly insufficient to support
the allegations of his complaint. It was vague, indefinite, and of an
inconclusive nature.

The father's estate consisted of city property in Manila; of farms and of

certain vessels, two of which are steamships. There is no evidence
offered to show any transfers by sale or mortgage of these properties.
This could have been easily done if such existed. Donations of real
property must be made in a public deed (art. 633 of the Civil Code), and
the acquisition of vessels must also be included in a written instrument,
and produces no effect with regard to third person if not recorded in the
Commercial Registry. (Art. 573 of the Code of Commerce.)

There is no proof that there was any money belonging to the estate, or
other personal property, the transfer of which could not be easily traced.

The son has been in possession of a greater part of the estate since
November, 1897, collecting the revenue from the ships and rents from
the city property.

The farms have been non-productive on account of the disturbed

conditions of the country, and the revenue from even these has been in
part collected by the son.

While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have
greatly increased since her marriage, there is no evidence whatever to
show that there has been any perceptible diminution of the defendant's
property. This can be accounted for only on the grounds that the father,
so far from being a prodigal, is still in the full exercise of his faculties and
still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the

45
EN BANC
March 8, 2016
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND
AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for
an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and
SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found
abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care
and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September
1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling
Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a.
Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted
their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary
Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on
petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, 2 the
petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half
of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure
from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's
new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay,
petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission
which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued
a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner
registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City.
On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification
Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. 5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport
No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently,
on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport
and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and
DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development
Studies at the University of the Philippines 8 but she opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988.
Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill,
Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political
Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the
U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of
being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew
back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July
1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel
(Brian) on 16 April 1992. 12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna)
46
and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July
1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American
citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December
2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with
Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest
daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8
July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed
back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical
condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The
petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her
father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his
estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a
severe blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her
grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of
2005.19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including
notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next semester; 20coordination with property
movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars
from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities
as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the
country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the
U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 24 and
without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed25 while her
husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as
well as to arrange the sale of their family home there. 26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until
she and her husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot
at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of
2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the
unit and parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan
City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006. 28 Meanwhile,
her children of school age began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to
supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006. 30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S.
Postal Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address
in the U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April
2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April
2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a
major Philippine company in July 2006. 33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter
lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family
home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their children have been
residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was
issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on
1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same
Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006. 37 As
can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on
petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired
her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of
the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates
(ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San
Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new
Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was
renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No.
EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner
as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an
47
"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in
Pasig City on 20 October 2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites
stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day, 21 October
2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI 46 and took her oath
of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner
stopped using her American passport. 48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the
U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a
sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that
she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with
the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. 50 In
the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside
of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29
July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a
"Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21
October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate
of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she
answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in
the Philippines before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest
number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic
Passport No. DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the
May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the
day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an
"Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections
triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were
the subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo
(Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which
was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC
Second Division.59She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction
over her petition. 60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner
committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the
day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be
considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was
a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer
natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this
line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen to begin with.64Even assuming arguendo that petitioner
was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when
she became a naturalized American citizen. 65 According to Elamparo,
natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth. 66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that
petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012
COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the
country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013
Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that
petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No.
9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the
Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from
July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act.
Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost
Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines. 67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it
was actually a petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace
Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice
(DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
48
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain
allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the
statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was
there any allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to
misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC
regarding her citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that
foundlings were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been
born of citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship
prior to the filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016
Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not
been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not
possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished
her domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired
natural-born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC
for Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and should give
way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign
right of the Filipino people to decide a purely political question,
that is, should she serve as the country's next leader. 68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a
Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running
for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016
National and Local Elections, contained material representations which
are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National
and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed
by petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December
2015 Resolution by denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S.
Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez
(Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were
consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged
that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her
for the Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot
be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is
determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory
construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the
fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of
citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to
exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she
is a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or
treaties to support her claim that foundlings have a
nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties
are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to
49
give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. 77 He also
stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically
confers natural-born status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot
avail of the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225
because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was
not as she was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did
not comply with the ten (10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined
that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time
she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or
2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to
abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband
stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S. 82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of
petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a
natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born
citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their
Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-
born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator
that she had only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6)
years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates
against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not
meet the ten (10) year residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras'
petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the
residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President
should be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year
period of residency required for said candidacy and that she made false
entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May
2016.86 Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing
petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the
date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved
by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country
before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her
Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen
and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a
cause of action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a
disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged
lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not
among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to
an elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo
warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the
Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the
COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is
on the respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her
favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to
a nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they
are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be
repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born
status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy
the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006
Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as
MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan
RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she
started reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as
demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the country,
50
purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of
their family home in Corinthian Hills. 99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of
choice in the Philippines even before she renounced her American
citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile are
complied with.100She reasoned out that there was no requirement that
renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a
new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion
of her COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith. 102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC
First Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she
failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she
committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared
therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9
May 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not
qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local
and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the
COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the
COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the
present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex
parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining
orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its
representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions
until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12
January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second
Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First
Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P.
Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D.
Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc,
upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc,
upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned
Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED
CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner
should be denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that
she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity
of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and
restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate
for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the
same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its
provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:
51
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction,
or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration
of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not
be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence
or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or
which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to
political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to
elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted,
shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with
the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by
law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in
court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts
or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall
be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it
has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or
decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on
the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the
provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of the President, the Vice-President, Senators and the
52
Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the
Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these
positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v.
Commission on Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En
Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation
in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring
the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on
February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all
the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,
cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the
creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the
COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6
of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution
withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving
the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art.
IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their
consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those
for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as
already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and
are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or
from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose
is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its
progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding
public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of
ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public
office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a
candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa.
We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473)
That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not
imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in
§4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the
consequences of the respective proceedings, the importance of the
opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule".
Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a
candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected,
there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In
contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for
acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending,
commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be
determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his
disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the
grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted
for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted;
and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he
will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates'
eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a
long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No.
120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of
Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the
elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character
proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law
makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their
53
certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they
seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made
after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases
involving charges of false representations made in certificates of
candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation
cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members
of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution
of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be. 106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as
reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15
February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. 107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party,
is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by
the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law
or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to
Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a
Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be
summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of
absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify
a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a
competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of
or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule
23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not
authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority
properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification
may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent
court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she
is suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution,"
neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due
course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not
qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the
falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can be
conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable
veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to
prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be
determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding
under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged false
representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence,
forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings 108 are not
mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in
oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said
it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the
COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner
possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that
such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has
the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino
parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is
DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is
neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of
the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. 110 That
said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino
parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the
54
burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not
a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did
not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the
possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where
there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their
identities are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under
Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-
existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except
when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of
improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of
Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability
that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics
for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there
were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of
the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669
Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures
for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female
Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year,
there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In
1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens,
or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against
only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these
figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral
arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of
the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are
the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features:
height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an
oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according
to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 113 All of the
foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is
abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of
the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more
than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino,
would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that
petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on
which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually
impossible, as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come
to the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn
babies behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such
that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a
50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions
properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that
the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a
yearly average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to
Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign
parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to
natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines
is 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is
15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661.
This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the
numbers for us, but I am confident that the statistical probability that a
child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be
affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood
that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than
99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame.
55
We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the
Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic
opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable
for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple
has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them
stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among
the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but
two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just
doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any
child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision
denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright.
There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable
hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class
of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of
common sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While
the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following
exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the
following is inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a
Filipino mother not recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the
amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of
illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of
unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current
codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein
all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are
considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of
unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the
Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is
deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are
[required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need
for amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother
recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of
unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not
recognize the child, is not unknown.
56
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude
the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the
child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas
Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should
also be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the
Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the
hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in
between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international
law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown
parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to
include a provision on the subject exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because
there was any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown
parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not
enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account, 117 cited by
petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an
amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a
foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also
foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the
inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be
governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules
of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate
children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings
followed the nationality of the place where they were found,
thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during
the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what
was declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of
foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional
silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which
prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were
legally correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based
on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even
overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola
and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the convention that
there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos
because they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of
linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear:
it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section
1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the
1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar
as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not
silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to
create a just and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots
and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent
against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the
argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must
search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an
express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is
on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against
foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to
the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic
right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social
justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present
charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
57
rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to
defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development."
Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against
foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship
upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place
to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code
which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status,
conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a
Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a
Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified
mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in
rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over
the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the
res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the
latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the
status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over
the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. 120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino
Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children
and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act
of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption,"
all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among
Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a
foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these
laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at
best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens
are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the
first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of
foundling status is done not by the child but by the
authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of
the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the
process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to
acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one
born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution,
which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that
petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in
her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which
approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as
her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a
foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include
international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,
and general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a
result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread,
and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are
principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based
on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," 127 such as
58
"general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is
embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles
which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by
this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law
and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
right to change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations
on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the
right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in
accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant
international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would
otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right
of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour,
sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the
right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a
name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it
cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization
laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both
of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the
Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The
first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall
be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is
known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born
on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of
citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the
1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within
the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.
59
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean
that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to
the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of
the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to
Article 15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that
the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we
ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said
convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of
international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the
ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the
convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even
come into force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty
states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with
the practice of international and regional state organs, regional state
practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not
determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where only four countries had
"either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters"
when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that
nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to
the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and
jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the
practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was
pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread
practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact
that "generally accepted principles of international law" are based not
only on international custom, but also on "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article
38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the
policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying
the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems
generally,"136 support the notion that the right against enforced
disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly
considered as "generally accepted principles of international law" under
the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North
and South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing
foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus
sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the
1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to
the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral
Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or
87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances,
including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a
generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as
having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is
found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this
generally accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No.
8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer
to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino
children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the
DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to
citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through
the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the
1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The
presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the
empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more
than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the
matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of
a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own
making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of
nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is
relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court
that those treaties and conventions were drafted because the world
community is concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them
legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended
up using the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift
60
foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them second-
class citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of
natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the
applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born"
citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on
the matter of repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in
particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained
as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-
born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in
several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where
we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that
restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v.
Commission on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where
we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is
categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A.
No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of
natural citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at
birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225
was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to
determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit
to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had
been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress'
determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be
continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the
phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person
who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-
born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect"
one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that
there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-
born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for
repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on
the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by
the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was
not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such,
he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of
the House of Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to
this Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule
reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v.
Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed
reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the
future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general
rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the
people's reliance thereupon should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that
petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to"
in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her
adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a
61
natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were
the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally
adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between
the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent
is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was
also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the
adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear
any notation that it is an amended issue."150 That law also requires that
"[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files
of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any
other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall
be kept strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state
that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would
be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to
disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it
cannot make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to
opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or
not petitioner committed false material representation when she stated in
her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years'
residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the
forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have
been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years.
In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11
months" which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to
a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the
U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original
domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a
new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an
intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in
or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her
family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for
good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing
her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time
she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to
September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of
their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines;
e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship
their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing
enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding
years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for
condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their
corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23
February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging
donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S.
Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement
from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their
U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire
submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had
been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora
Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and
her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and
Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind
in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed
by the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras
and Valdez cases.
62
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile
had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments,
COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first
two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but
maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC
disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the
basis of the position that the earliest date that petitioner could have
started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her
application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard,
COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v.
COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral
arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v.
COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases decree that the
stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a
permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free
entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was
still an American (without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July
2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very
different from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only
evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by the
candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who
wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from
citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after
reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v.
COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad
and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v.
COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who
had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or
had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the
citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-
month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by
this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-
year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four
cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that
residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident
visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the
evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no
other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S.
residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools,
getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of
the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to
the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right
after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines
and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing
T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here,
constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips
abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's
actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that
when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she
had entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at
R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a
Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to
treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year.
Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad
and "comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The law institutes
a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary
training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant
members of society upon their return to the country"164in line with the
government's "reintegration program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not
ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and
help him reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion
to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year.
That visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish
his life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to
the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is
exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her
children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and
then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of
change in domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been
decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is
unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the
facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v.
63
COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the
Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation where the
facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided
particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence
of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of
ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC
was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of
residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus,
according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only
in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as
true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood
the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the
day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned
residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S.
house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that
regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be
counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period
of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the
time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the
COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of
residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The
COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge
that the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than
the sale of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible
given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence,
to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of her
children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC
as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be
given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive.
There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of
residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-
Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months
as her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of
one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence
presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the
Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would
have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated
the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that
petitioner actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not
because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that
domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under
R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that
in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay
permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a
resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in
good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide
anything. As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed
against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which
the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's
repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to
repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months
in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the
media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist
Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately,
also in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence
on this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in
the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the
circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of
public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the
SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1
September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC
when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood
the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her
answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when
petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she
64
could not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous
statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned
in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at
an intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015
representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's
pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not
necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole
ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC.
Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his
COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for
elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as
to one's qualifications to run for public office. 168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually
ignored a good number of evidenced dates all of which can
evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to
the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and
staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus
having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for
Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and
therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only
commence sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this
declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing
jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the
person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the
constitutional requirement of residency for election as President. It
ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of
residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of
facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than that
presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider as
a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in
her COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered by the
SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made
the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a
period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013
Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for
election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of
residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at
the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as
yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general
public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she
would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-
residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of
residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator.
Such other facts of residence have never been proven to be false, and
these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's]
husband however stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and
arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan
City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005
and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was
enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was
already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F
of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her
family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in
Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that
her former lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to
secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of
Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents
are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to
supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March
2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States
Postal Service of the family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
65
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He
returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a
Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in
Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their family home. 170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its
intention to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false
representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by
petitioner in her COC for Senator.
the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local
and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of
SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES.
The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First
Division is AFFIRMED.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of
petitioner for her candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned
Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all,
deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second
Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent, stating that:
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11
December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED
QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local
Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the

Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by
respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby
GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First

Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P.
Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D.
Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it

hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of

66
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY
POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state
believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as
well as an inestimable acquisition,[1] that cannot be taken lightly by
anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single
question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is
brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to
hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the
judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of
silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a
natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and
American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law
and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and
jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known
as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to
be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X.
Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents,"
initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before
the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis
that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to
Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was
an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated,
that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley
and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January
2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary
exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified
photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez
attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against
the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous
relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F.
Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management
and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the
National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered
the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-
Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that
no available information could be found in the files of the National
Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of
evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by
67
Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that
there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan
F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a
certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of
the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of
Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of
Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No.
23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the
certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage
contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification
issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating
that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900
until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack
of merit.Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion
for reconsideration.The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition,
docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining
order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would
stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would
include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix
B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other,
docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the
COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for
alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-
born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false in consonance with the general powers
of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court per Rule 64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule
65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the
1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that
judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
68
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was
aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A
contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental
right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or
should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No.
161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when
it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to
instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in
the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the
sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained
this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4]as not (being) justiciable
controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse
prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.
1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal
to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the
President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and
Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent
adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973
Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the
statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the
present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-
election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or
a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one
objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A
perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme
Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or
Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or
for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates"
for President or Vice-President. A quo warrantoproceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.[5] In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule
14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al.,
vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr."
would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
69
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical
background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by
Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to
refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the
holding of an office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the
constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of
such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-
sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to include one who would both
govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment
and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights
and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on
the other.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest
of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In
the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil
citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom,
such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning
expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which
encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political
power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development
of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to
economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has
gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed
in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in
keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be
the internationalization of citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish
regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church
records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the
inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly
codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to
point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain
however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those
explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima
Recopilacion,promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the
law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of
differing views among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order
de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August
1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the
Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04
July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the
Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine
Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to
which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was
included, would be governed by special laws. [19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on
18 December 1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration
of who were Spanish citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside
of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. [20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in
the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her
sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United
States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change
in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in
force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually
intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between
Spain and the United States.[21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil
rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded
to the United States would be determined by its Congress -
70
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty
may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either
event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of
such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to
carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in
respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they
remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of
the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision
to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be
held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they reside.
Thus "The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress."[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United
States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines
ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American
citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws
and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in
the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress
of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto,
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and
as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of
April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3)
an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. [24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from
11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was
extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus
soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the
United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following
amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide
by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of
the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine
citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used
by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines
when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the
Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones
Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so
amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided,
That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States,
71
and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens
of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States
under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1)
a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said
date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus
soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to
an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for
all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino
citizenship -
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with
existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would
automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their
foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively
incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to
their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the
newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of
the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on
citizenship to reflect such concerns -
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided
that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed,
under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the
irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
72
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." [27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four
modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs[29] (1912), did not last long.With the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become
the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that
the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal
grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F.
Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in
evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a
resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his
death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ,
Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol
father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta
Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed
certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on
05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the
same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old,
unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two
years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of
FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe,
a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American
citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some
of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with
some degree of certainty from the documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that
FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody
of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by
both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and
Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to
Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit
"5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for
respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts
which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to
the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death
certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in
San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized
those material statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
73
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or
is recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth
certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facieproof of their contents. Section
44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the
entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in
the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually
affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of
most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more
likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred. [31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11
September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It
could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year
1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would
argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial
period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record
about such fact in the Records Management and Archives
Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was
at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the
residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to
conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person
at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be
extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would
have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to
1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship
or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity
(relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate
child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the
mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from
08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the
Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity.Acknowledgment was either judicial
(compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the
Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and
sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the
father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or
reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such
father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement
rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of
recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1),
which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon
as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such
reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the
names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original,
let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No.
3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of
them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners
say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public
document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be
made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a
case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent
recognizes the child as his or her own."
74
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties,
nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There
being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been
executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary
recognition remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs.
Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a document as
proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public
documents, those executed by private individuals which must be
authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public
officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in
Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made
belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary
recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of
an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as
natural.Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in
cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove
filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the
lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child,
an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument,
"authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of
voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of
the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a
private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173,
and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity.In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding
the death of either or both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of
the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
75
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child
should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary
recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code,
even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or
before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive
effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to
break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and
non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater
interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely
govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any,
to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual
would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the
State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the
Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private
relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus
[been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the
relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a
family, and those which exist among members of a society for the
protection of private interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as
those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the
domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the
separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital
authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property,
legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it,
and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons
and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed
exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best
exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the
Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant
in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,[39] such as
on successional rights and family relations. [40] In adoption, for instance,
an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents
and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal
fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law[41] and not his
political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property
laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of
members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and
illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution
and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines
and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign
blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in
the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when
the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil
Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the
sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of
political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his
citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not
inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil
Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although
good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and
family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should
govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily
precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code
provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
76
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between
the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is
already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at
issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree
is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has
occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas,
sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the
COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e,living together with
Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house,
and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently
residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance
with law do hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe,
more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged
while they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I
was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children,
Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with
our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.),
Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4)
more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew,
Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate
child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January
2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive
match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of
Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA
testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have
now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
77
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in
aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child.According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to
Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a
certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence
introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth
certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed
that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an
American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16
September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an
illegitimate child.Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen,
basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs.
Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G.
Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of
them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis
mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under
the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis
mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictumwhich did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look
closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a
Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was
the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was
whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing
about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the
naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate
son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of
a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is
nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was
about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio
Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate
son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued
that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme
Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son
of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not
Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin
therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a
Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with
an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's
father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was
illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter
dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs.
Vivo.
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection
78
clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child,
and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established
long ago by People vs. Cayat.[47] I would grant that the distinction
between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real
differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious
distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not
for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the
child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the
fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an
illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him
for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in
that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then
the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be
reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member
of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at
bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner,
unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure
a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with
the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental
authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help
the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that
the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month
and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it
is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states
that among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none
provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No.
161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-
003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from
running for the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national
elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material
representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve
a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the
Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly
be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of
discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take
on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents
him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn
from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines
was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
could have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that
the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou),
if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
79
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence,
and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation,
which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only
be material, but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.

Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.

Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in
SPA No. 04-003.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

80
 Republic of the Philippines wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second
Congress of the Philippines and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Metro Manila
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests,
Eighth Congress donations, grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing
references and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their
prejudice.

Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in
Republic Act No. 6809 December 13, 1989 at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE Approved: December 13, 1989
TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE
ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of
the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority.

Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of
eighteen years."

Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.

Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read
as follows:

"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the

person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions
established by existing laws in special cases.

"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age

of twenty-one.

"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the

duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and

81
 Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Thirteenth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of July,
two thousand and five.
Republic Act No. 9344
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
TITLE I
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER 1
TITLE, POLICY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 1. Short Title and Scope. - This Act shall be known as
the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006."It shall cover the
different stages involving children at risk and children in conflict with the
law from prevention to rehabilitation and reintegration.
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall
be observed at all times:
(a) The State recognizes the vital role of children and youth in
nation building and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. It shall inculcate
in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through
measures that will ensure the observance of international
standards of child protection, especially those to which the
Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any authority shall be
conducted in the best interest of the child and in a manner which
allows the child to participate and to express himself/herself
freely. The participation of children in the program and policy
formulation and implementation related to juvenile justice and
welfare shall be ensured by the concerned government agency.
(c) The State likewise recognizes the right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty and
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
(d) Pursuant to Article 40 of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the State recognizes the right of every child
alleged as, accused of, adjudged, or recognized as having
infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with
the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth, taking into
account the child's age and desirability of promoting his/her
reintegration. Whenever appropriate and desirable, the State
shall adopt measures for dealing with such children without
resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human rights and
legal safeguards are fully respected. It shall ensure that children
are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being by
providing for, among others, a variety of disposition measures
such as care, guidance and supervision orders, counseling,
probation, foster care, education and vocational training programs
and other alternatives to institutional care.
(e) The administration of the juvenile justice and welfare system
shall take into consideration the cultural and religious
perspectives of the Filipino people, particularly the indigenous
peoples and the Muslims, consistent with the protection of the
rights of children belonging to these communities.
(f) The State shall apply the principles of restorative justice in all
its laws, policies and programs applicable to children in conflict
with the law.
SEC. 3. Liberal Construction of this Act. - In case of doubt, the
interpretation of any of the provisions of this Act, including its
implementing rules and regulations (IRRs), shall be construed liberally in
favor of the child in conflict with the law.
82
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - The following terms as used in this Act
shall be defined as follows:
(a) "Bail" refers to the security given for the release of the person in
custody of the law, furnished by him/her or a bondsman, to guarantee
his/her appearance before any court. Bail may be given in the form of
corporate security, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
(b) "Best Interest of the Child" refers to the totality of the circumstances
and conditions which are most congenial to the survival, protection and
feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to the child's
physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means the
least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and
development of the child.
(e) "Child" refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.
(d) "Child at Risk" refers to a child who is vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses because of personal, family and social
circumstances, such as, but not limited to, the following:
(1) being abused by any person through sexual, physical,
psychological, mental, economic or any other means and the
parents or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or unable to provide
protection for the child;
(2) being exploited including sexually or economically;
(3) being abandoned or neglected, and after diligent search and
inquiry, the parent or guardian cannot be found;
(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a
parent or guardian;
(5) being out of school;
(6) being a streetchild;
(7) being a member of a gang;
(8) living in a community with a high level of criminality or drug
abuse; and
(9) living in situations of armed conflict.
(e) "Child in Conflict with the Law" refers to a child who is alleged as,
accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense under
Philippine laws.
(f) "Community-based Programs" refers to the programs provided in a
community setting developed for purposes of intervention and diversion,
as well as rehabilitation of the child in conflict with the law, for
reintegration into his/her family and/or community.
(g) "Court" refers to a family court or, in places where there are no family
courts, any regional trial court.
(h) "Deprivation of Liberty" refers to any form of detention or
imprisonment, or to the placement of a child in conflict with the law in a
public or private custodial setting, from which the child in conflict with the
law is not permitted to leave at will by order of any judicial or
administrative authority.
(i) "Diversion" refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of
determining the responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict with the
law on the basis of his/her social, cultural, economic, psychological or
educational background without resorting to formal court proceedings.
(j) "Diversion Program" refers to the program that the child in conflict with
the law is required to undergo after he/she is found responsible for an
offense without resorting to formal court proceedings.
(k) "Initial Contact With-the Child" refers to the apprehension or taking
into custody of a child in conflict with the law by law enforcement officers
or private citizens. It includes the time when the child alleged to be in
conflict with the law receives a subpoena under Section 3(b) of Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or summons under Section
6(a) or Section 9(b) of the same Rule in cases that do not require
preliminary investigation or where there is no necessity to place the child
alleged to be in conflict with the law under immediate custody.
(I) "Intervention" refers to a series of activities which are designed to
address issues that caused the child to commit an offense. It may take
the form of an individualized treatment program which may include
83
counseling, skills training, education, and other activities that will enhance
his/her psychological, emotional and psycho-social well-being.
(m) "Juvenile Justice and Welfare System" refers to a system dealing
with children at risk and children in conflict with the law, which provides
child-appropriate proceedings, including programs and services for
prevention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and aftercare to ensure
their normal growth and development.
(n) "Law Enforcement Officer" refers to the person in authority or his/her
agent as defined in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, including a
barangay tanod.
(0) "Offense" refers to any act or omission whether punishable under
special laws or the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
(p) "Recognizance" refers to an undertaking in lieu of a bond assumed by
a parent or custodian who shall be responsible for the appearance in
court of the child in conflict with the law, when required.
(q) "Restorative Justice" refers to a principle which requires a process of
resolving conflicts with the maximum involvement of the victim, the
offender and the community. It seeks to obtain reparation for the victim;
reconciliation of the offender, the offended and the community; and
reassurance to the offender that he/she can be reintegrated into society.
It also enhances public safety by activating the offender, the victim and
the community in prevention strategies.
(r) "Status Offenses" refers to offenses which discriminate only against a
child, while an adult does not suffer any penalty for committing similar
acts. These shall include curfew violations; truancy, parental
disobedience and the like.
(s) "Youth Detention Home" refers to a 24-hour child-caring institution
managed by accredited local government units (LGUs) and licensed
and/or accredited nongovernment organizations (NGOs) providing short-
term residential care for children in conflict with the law who are awaiting
court disposition of their cases or transfer to other agencies or
jurisdiction.
(t) "Youth Rehabilitation Center" refers to a 24-hour residential care
facility managed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), LGUs, licensed and/or accredited NGOs monitored by the
DSWD, which provides care, treatment and rehabilitation services for
children in conflict with the law. Rehabilitation services are provided
under the guidance of a trained staff where residents are cared for under
a structured therapeutic environment with the end view of reintegrating
them into their families and communities as socially functioning
individuals. Physical mobility of residents of said centers may be
restricted pending court disposition of the charges against them.
(u) "Victimless Crimes" refers to offenses where there is no private
offended party.
CHAPTER 2
PRINCIPLES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE
SEC. 5. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Every child in
conflict with the law shall have the following rights, including but not
limited to:
(a) the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) the right not to be imposed a sentence of capital punishment
or life imprisonment, without the possibility of release;
(c) the right not to be deprived, unlawfully or arbitrarily, of his/her
liberty; detention or imprisonment being a disposition of last
resort, and which shall be for the shortest appropriate period of
time;
(d) the right to be treated with humanity and respect, for the
inherent dignity of the person, and in a manner which takes into
account the needs of a person of his/her age. In particular, a child
deprived of liberty shall be separated from adult offenders at all
times. No child shall be detained together with adult offenders.
He/She shall be conveyed separately to or from court. He/She
shall await hearing of his/her own case in a separate holding
area. A child in conflict with the law shall have the right to
maintain contact with his/her family through correspondence and
visits, save in exceptional circumstances;
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 (e) the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate
assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of the
deprivation of his/her liberty before a court or other competent,
independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on
such action;
(f) the right to bail and recognizance, in appropriate cases;
(g) the right to testify as a witness in hid/her own behalf under the
rule on examination of a child witness;
(h) the right to have his/her privacy respected fully at all stages of
the proceedings;
(i) the right to diversion if he/she is qualified and voluntarily avails
of the same;
(j) the right to be imposed a judgment in proportion to the gravity
of the offense where his/her best interest, the rights of the victim
and the needs of society are all taken into consideration by the
court, under the principle of restorative justice;
(k) the right to have restrictions on his/her personal liberty limited
to the minimum, and where discretion is given by law to the judge
to determine whether to impose fine or imprisonment, the
imposition of fine being preferred as the more appropriate
penalty;
(I) in general, the right to automatic suspension of sentence;
(m) the right to probation as an alternative to imprisonment, if
qualified under the Probation Law;
(n) the right to be free from liability for perjury, concealment or
misrepresentation; and
(o) other rights as provided for under existing laws, rules and
regulations.
The State further adopts the provisions of the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice or "Beijing
Rules", United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile
Delinquency or the "Riyadh Guidelines", and the United Nations Rules for
the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty.
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15)
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall
be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to
an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws.
SEC. 7. Determination ofAge. - The child in conflict with the law shall
enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a
child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18)
years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's
birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In
the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from
the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as
to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to
the filing of the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a
summary proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court
which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of
the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the law and is
pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to
determine the age of the child in the same court where the case is
pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main
case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and
other government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining
the age of the child in conflict with the law.
85

TITLE II
STRUCTURES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND WELFARE
SEC. 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC). - A Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) is hereby created and attached to
the Department of Justice and placed under its administrative
supervision. The JJWC shall be chaired by an undersecretary of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development. It shall ensure the
effective implementation of this Act and coordination among the following
agencies:
(a) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(b) Department of Education (DepEd);
(c) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);
(d) Public Attorney's Office (PAO);
(e) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);
(f) Parole and Probation Administration (PPA)
(g) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);.
(i) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP);
(i) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(k) Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA);
(l) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(m) Other institutions focused on juvenile justice and intervention
programs.
The JJWC shall be composed of representatives, whose ranks shall not
be lower than director, to be designated by the concerned heads of the
following departments or agencies:
(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);
(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);
(c) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC)
(d) Department of Education (DepEd);
(e) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
(f) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(g) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(h) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, one to be designated by
the Secretary of Justice and the other to be designated by the
Secretary of Social Welfare and Development.
The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of
this Act. The Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of Social Welfare and
Development shall determine the organizational structure and staffing
pattern of the JJWC.
The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court Administrator and
the Philippine Judicial Academy to ensure the realization of its mandate
and the proper discharge of its duties and functions, as herein provided.
SEC. 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC. - The JJWC shall have the
following duties and functions:
(a) To oversee the implementation of this Act;
(b) To advise the President on all matters and policies relating to
juvenile justice and welfare;
(c) To assist the concerned agencies in the review and redrafting
of existing policies/regulations or in the formulation of new ones in
line with the provisions of this Act;
(d) To periodically develop a comprehensive 3 to 5-year national
juvenile intervention program, with the participation of
government agencies concerned, NGOs and youth organizations;
(e) To coordinate the implementation of the juvenile intervention
programs and activities by national government agencies and
other activities which may have an important bearing on the
success of the entire national juvenile intervention program. All
programs relating to juvenile justice and welfare shall be adopted
in consultation with the JJWC;
(f) To formulate and recommend policies and strategies in
consultation with children for the prevention of juvenile
delinquency and the administration of justice, as well as for the
treatment and rehabilitation of the children in conflict with the law;
86
 (g) To collect relevant information and conduct continuing
research and support evaluations and studies on all matters
relating to juvenile justice and welfare, such as but not limited to:
(1) the performance and results achieved by juvenile
intervention programs and by activities of the local
government units and other government agencies;
(2) the periodic trends, problems and causes of juvenile
delinquency and crimes; and
(3) the particular needs of children in conflict with the law
in custody.
The data gathered shall be used by the JJWC in the improvement
of the administration of juvenile justice and welfare system.
The JJWC shall set up a mechanism to ensure that children are
involved in research and policy development.
(h) Through duly designated persons and with the assistance of
the agencies provided in the preceding section, to conduct
regular inspections in detention and rehabilitation facilities and to
undertake spot inspections on their own initiative in order to
check compliance with the standards provided herein and to
make the necessary recommendations to appropriate agencies;
(i) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of trainings for the
personnel of the agencies involved in the administration of the
juvenile justice and welfare system and the juvenile intervention
program;
(j) To submit an annual report to the President on the
implementation of this Act; and
(k) To perform such other functions as may be necessary to
implement the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 10. Policies and Procedures on Juvenile Justice and Welfare. -
All government agencies enumerated in Section 8 shall, with the
assistance of the JJWC and within one (1) year from the effectivity of this
Act, draft policies and procedures consistent with the standards set in the
law. These policies and procedures shall be modified accordingly in
consultation with the JJWC upon the completion of the national juvenile
intervention program as provided under Section 9 (d).
SEC. 11. Child Rights Center (CRC). - The existing Child Rights Center
of the Commission on Human Rights shall ensure that the status, rights
and interests of children are upheld in accordance with the Constitution
and international instruments on human rights. The CHR shall strengthen
the monitoring of government compliance of all treaty obligations,
including the timely and regular submission of reports before the treaty
bodies, as well as the implementation and dissemination of
recommendations and conclusions by government agencies as well as
NGOs and civil society.
TITLE III
PREVENTION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
CHAPTER 1
THE ROLE OF THE DIFFERENT SECTORS
SEC. 12. The Family. - The family shall be responsible for the primary
nurturing and rearing of children which is critical in delinquency
prevention. As far as practicable and in accordance with the procedures
of this Act, a child in conflict with the law shall be maintained in his/her
family.
SEC. 13. The Educational System. - Educational institutions shall work
together with families, community organizations and agencies in the
prevention of juvenile delinquency and in the rehabilitation and
reintegration of child in conflict with the law. Schools shall provide
adequate, necessary and individualized educational schemes for children
manifesting difficult behavior and children in conflict with the law. In cases
where children in conflict with the law are taken into custody or detained
in rehabilitation centers, they should be provided the opportunity to
continue learning under an alternative learning system with basic literacy
program or non- formal education accreditation equivalency system.
SEC. 14. The Role of the Mass Media. - The mass media shall play an
active role in the promotion of child rights, and delinquency prevention by
relaying consistent messages through a balanced approach. Media
practitioners shall, therefore, have the duty to maintain the highest critical
and professional standards in reporting and covering cases of children in
conflict with the law. In all publicity concerning children, the best interest
87
of the child should be the primordial and paramount concern. Any undue,
inappropriate and sensationalized publicity of any case involving a child
in conflict with the law is hereby declared a violation of the child's rights.
SEC. 15. Establishment and Strengthening of Local Councils for the
Protection of Children. - Local Councils for the Protection of Children
(LCPC) shall be established in all levels of local government, and where
they have already been established, they shall be strengthened within
one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act. Membership in the LCPC shall
be chosen from among the responsible members of the community,
including a representative from the youth sector, as well as
representatives from government and private agencies concerned with
the welfare of children.
The local council shall serve as the primary agency to coordinate with
and assist the LGU concerned for the adoption of a comprehensive plan
on delinquency prevention, and to oversee its proper implementation.
One percent (1%) of the internal revenue allotment of barangays,
municipalities and cities shall be allocated for the strengthening and
implementation of the programs of the LCPC: Provided, That the
disbursement of the fund shall be made by the LGU concerned.
SEC. 16. Appointment of Local Social Welfare and Development
Officer. - All LGUs shall appoint a duly licensed social worker as its local
social welfare and development officer tasked to assist children in conflict
with the law.
SEC. 17. The Sangguniang Kabataan. - The Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) shall coordinate with the LCPC in the formulation and
implementation of juvenile intervention and diversion programs in the
community.
CHAPTER 2
COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE INTERVENTION PROGRAM
SEC. 18. Development of a Comprehensive Juvenile Intervention
Program. - A Comprehensive juvenile intervention program covering at
least a 3-year period shall be instituted in LGUs from the barangay to the
provincial level.
The LGUs shall set aside an amount necessary to implement their
respective juvenile intervention programs in their annual budget.
The LGUs, in coordination with the LCPC, shall call on all sectors
concerned, particularly the child-focused institutions, NGOs, people's
organizations, educational institutions and government agencies involved
in delinquency prevention to participate in the planning process and
implementation of juvenile intervention programs. Such programs shall be
implemented consistent with the national program formulated and
designed by the JJWC. The implementation of the comprehensive
juvenile intervention program shall be reviewed and assessed annually
by the LGUs in coordination with the LCPC. Results of the assessment
shall be submitted by the provincial and city governments to the JJWC
not later than March 30 of every year.
SEC. 19. Community-based Programs on Juvenile Justice and
Welfare. - Community-based programs on juvenile justice and welfare
shall be instituted by the LGUs through the LCPC, school, youth
organizations and other concerned agencies. The LGUs shall provide
community-based services which respond to the special needs,
problems, interests and concerns of children and which offer appropriate
counseling and guidance to them and their families. These programs
shall consist of three levels:
(a) Primary intervention includes general measures to promote
social justice and equal opportunity, which tackle perceived root
causes of offending;
(b) Secondary intervention includes measures to assist children
at risk; and
(c) Tertiary intervention includes measures to avoid unnecessary
contact with the formal justice system and other measures to
prevent re-offending.
TITLE IV
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN BELOW THE AGE OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. - If it has
been determined that the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old
or below, the authority which will have an initial contact with the child has
88
the duty to immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents
or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child's nearest relative. Said
authority shall give notice to the local social welfare and development
officer who will determine the appropriate programs in consultation with
the child and to the person having custody over the child. If the parents,
guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take
custody, the child may be released to any of the following: a duly
registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay official
or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children
(BCPC); a local social welfare and development officer; or when and
where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein has been
found by the Local Social Welfare and Development Office to be
abandoned, neglected or abused by his parents, or in the event that the
parents will not comply with the prevention program, the proper petition
for involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local
Social Welfare and Development Office pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 603, otherwise ,known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code".
TITLE V
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM
CHAPTER I
INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE CHILD
SEC. 21. Procedure for Taking the Child into Custody. - From the
moment a child is taken into custody, the law enforcement officer shall:
(a) Explain to the child in simple language and in a dialect that
he/she can understand why he/she is being placed under custody
and the offense that he/she allegedly committed;
(b) Inform the child of the reason for such custody and advise the
child of his/her constitutional rights in a language or dialect
understood by him/her;
(e) Properly identify himself/herself and present proper
identification to the child;
(d) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from sexually
harassing or abusing, or making sexual advances on the child in
conflict with the law;
(e) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon, handcuffs or
other instruments of force or restraint, unless absolutely
necessary and only after all other methods of control have been
exhausted and have failed;
(f) Refrain from subjecting the child in conflict with the law to
greater restraint than is necessary for his/her apprehension;
(g) Avoid violence or unnecessary force;
(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of this
Act;
(i) Immediately but not later than eight (8) hours after
apprehension, turn over custody of the child to the Social Welfare
and Development Office or other accredited NGOs, and notify the
child's apprehension. The social welfare and development officer
shall explain to the child and the child's parents/guardians the
consequences of the child's act with a view towards counseling
and rehabilitation, diversion from the criminal justice system, and
reparation, if appropriate;
(j) Take the child immediately to the proper medical and health
officer for a thorough physical and mental examination. The
examination results shall be kept confidential unless otherwise
ordered by the Family Court. Whenever the medical treatment is
required, steps shall be immediately undertaken to provide the
same;
(k) Ensure that should detention of the child in conflict with the
law be necessary, the child shall be secured in quarters separate
from that of the opposite sex and adult offenders;
(l) Record the following in the initial investigation:
1. Whether handcuffs or other instruments of restraint
were used, and if so, the reason for such;
2. That the parents or guardian of a child, the DSWD, and
the PAO have been informed of the apprehension and the
details thereof; and
89
 3. The exhaustion of measures to determine the age of a
child and the precise details of the physical and medical
examination or the failure to submit a child to such
examination; and
(m) Ensure that all statements signed by the child during
investigation shall be witnessed by the child's parents or
guardian, social worker, or legal counsel in attendance who shall
affix his/her signature to the said statement.
A child in conflict with the law shall only be searched by a law
enforcement officer of the same gender and shall not be locked up in a
detention cell.
SEC. 22. Duties During Initial Investigation. - The law enforcement
officer shall, in his/her investigation, determine where the case involving
the child in conflict with the law should be referred.
The taking of the statement of the child shall be conducted in the
presence of the following: (1) child's counsel of choice or in the absence
thereof, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office; (2) the child's parents,
guardian, or nearest relative, as the case may be; and (3) the local social
welfare and development officer. In the absence of the child's parents,
guardian, or nearest relative, and the local social welfare and
development officer, the investigation shall be conducted in the presence
of a representative of an NGO, religious group, or member of the BCPC.
After the initial investigation, the local social worker conducting the same
may do either of the following:
(a) Proceed in accordance with Section 20 if the child is fifteen
(15) years or below or above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18)
years old, who acted without discernment; and
(b) If the child is above fifteen (15) years old but below eighteen
(18) and who acted with discernment, proceed to diversion under
the following chapter.
CHAPTER 2
DIVERSION
SEC. 23. System of Diversion. - Children in conflict with the law shall
undergo diversion programs without undergoing court proceedings
subject to the conditions herein provided:
(a) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committee is not
more than six (6) years imprisonment, the law enforcement officer
or Punong Barangay with the assistance of the local social
welfare and development officer or other members of the LCPC
shall conduct mediation, family conferencing and conciliation and,
where appropriate, adopt indigenous modes of conflict resolution
in accordance with the best interest of the child with a view to
accomplishing the objectives of restorative justice and the
formulation of a diversion program. The child and his/her family
shall be present in these activities.
(b) In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is not more
than six (6) years imprisonment, the local social welfare and
development officer shall meet with the child and his/her parents
or guardians for the development of the appropriate diversion and
rehabilitation program, in coordination with the BCPC;
(c) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed exceeds
six (6) years imprisonment, diversion measures may be resorted
to only by the court.
SEC. 24. Stages Where Diversion May be Conducted. - Diversion may
be conducted at the Katarungang Pambarangay, the police investigation
or the inquest or preliminary investigation stage and at all 1evels and
phases of the proceedings including judicial level.
SEC. 25. Conferencing, Mediation and Conciliation. - A child in
conflict with law may undergo conferencing, mediation or conciliation
outside the criminal justice system or prior to his entry into said system. A
contract of diversion may be entered into during such conferencing,
mediation or conciliation proceedings.
SEC. 26. Contract of Diversion. - If during the conferencing, mediation
or conciliation, the child voluntarily admits the commission of the act, a
diversion program shall be developed when appropriate and desirable as
determined under Section 30. Such admission shall not be used against
the child in any subsequent judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
proceedings. The diversion program shall be effective and binding if
accepted by the parties concerned. The acceptance shall be in writing
90
and signed by the parties concerned and the appropriate authorities. The
local social welfare and development officer shall supervise the
implementation of the diversion program. The diversion proceedings shall
be completed within forty-five (45) days. The period of prescription of the
offense shall be suspended until the completion of the diversion
proceedings but not to exceed forty-five (45) days.
The child shall present himself/herself to the competent authorities that
imposed the diversion program at least once a month for reporting and
evaluation of the effectiveness of the program.
Failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract of
diversion, as certified by the local social welfare and development officer,
shall give the offended party the option to institute the appropriate legal
action.
The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended during the
effectivity of the diversion program, but not exceeding a period of two (2)
years.
SEC. 27. Duty of the Punong Barangay When There is No
Diversion. - If the offense does not fall under Section 23(a) and (b), or if
the child, his/her parents or guardian does not consent to a diversion, the
Punong Barangay handling the case shall, within three (3) days from
determination of the absence of jurisdiction over the case or termination
of the diversion proceedings, as the case may be, forward the records of
the case of the child to the law enforcement officer, prosecutor or the
appropriate court, as the case may be. Upon the issuance of the
corresponding document, certifying to the fact that no agreement has
been reached by the parties, the case shall be filed according to the
regular process.
SEC. 28. Duty of the Law Enforcement Officer When There is No
Diversion. - If the offense does not fall under Section 23(a) and (b), or if
the child, his/her parents or guardian does not consent to a diversion, the
Women and Children Protection Desk of the PNP, or other law
enforcement officer handling the case of the child under custody, to the
prosecutor or judge concerned for the conduct of inquest and/or
preliminary investigation to determine whether or not the child should
remain under custody and correspondingly charged in court. The
document transmitting said records shall display the word "CHILD" in
bold letters.
SEC. 29. Factors in Determining Diversion Program. - In determining
whether diversion is appropriate and desirable, the following factors shall
be taken into consideration:
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged;
(b) The frequency and the severity of the act;
(c) The circumstances of the child (e.g. age, maturity, intelligence, etc.);
(d) The influence of the family and environment on the growth of the
child;
(e) The reparation of injury to the victim;
(f) The weight of the evidence against the child;
(g) The safety of the community; and
(h) The best interest of the child.
SEC. 30. Formulation of the Diversion Program. - In formulating a
diversion program, the individual characteristics and the peculiar
circumstances of the child in conflict with the law shall be used to
formulate an individualized treatment.
The following factors shall be considered in formulating a diversion
program for the child:
(a) The child's feelings of remorse for the offense he/she
committed;
(b) The parents' or legal guardians' ability to guide and supervise
the child;
(c) The victim's view about the propriety of the measures to be
imposed; and
(d) The availability of community-based programs for
rehabilitation and reintegration of the child.
SEC. 31. Kinds of Diversion Programs. - The diversion program shall
include adequate socio-cultural and psychological responses and
services for the child. At the different stages where diversion may be
resorted to, the following diversion programs may be agreed upon, such
as, but not limited to:
(a) At the level of the Punong Barangay:
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 (1) Restitution of property;
(2) Reparation of the damage caused;
(3) Indemnification for consequential damages;
(4) Written or oral apology;
(5) Care, guidance and supervision orders;
(6) Counseling for the child in conflict with the law and the
child's family;
(7)Attendance in trainings, seminars and lectures on:
(i) anger management skills;
(ii) problem solving and/or conflict resolution skills;
(iii) values formation; and
(iv) other skills which will aid the child in dealing
with situations which can lead to repetition of the
offense;
(8) Participation in available community-based programs,
including community service; or
(9) Participation in education, vocation and life skills
programs.
(b) At the level of the law enforcement officer and the prosecutor:
(1) Diversion programs specified under paragraphs (a)(1)
to (a)(9) herein; and
(2) Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the crime;
(c) At the level of the appropriate court:
(1) Diversion programs specified under paragraphs(a)and
(b) above;
(2) Written or oral reprimand or citation;
(3) Fine:
(4) Payment of the cost of the proceedings; or
(5) Institutional care and custody.
CHAPTER 3
PROSECUTION
SEC. 32. Duty of the Prosecutor's Office. - There shall be a specially
trained prosecutor to conduct inquest, preliminary investigation and
prosecution of cases involving a child in conflict with the law. If there is an
allegation of torture or ill-treatment of a child in conflict with the law during
arrest or detention, it shall be the duty of the prosecutor to investigate the
same.
SEC. 33. Preliminary Investigation and Filing of Information. - The
prosecutor shall conduct a preliminary investigation in the following
instances: (a) when the child in conflict with the law does not qualify for
diversion: (b) when the child, his/her parents or guardian does not agree
to diversion as specified in Sections 27 and 28; and (c) when considering
the assessment and recommendation of the social worker, the prosecutor
determines that diversion is not appropriate for the child in conflict with
the law.
Upon serving the subpoena and the affidavit of complaint, the prosecutor
shall notify the Public Attorney's Office of such service, as well as the
personal information, and place of detention of the child in conflict with
the law.
Upon determination of probable cause by the prosecutor, the information
against the child shall be filed before the Family Court within forty-five
(45) days from the start of the preliminary investigation.
CHAPTER 4
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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SEC. 34. Bail. - For purposes of recommending the amount of bail, the of the child in conflict with the law, the court shall determine whether or
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority shall be considered. not diversion is appropriate.

SEC. 35. Release on Recognizance. - Where a child is detained, the SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is
court shall order: under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine
(a) the release of the minor on recognizance to his/her parents and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
and other suitable person; committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
(b) the release of the child in conflict with the law on bail; or sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
(c) the transfer of the minor to a youth detention home/youth
his/her guilt.
rehabilitation center.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
The court shall not order the detention of a child in a jail pending trial or
chcumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
hearing of his/her case.
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
SEC. 36. Detention of the Child Pending Trial. - Children detained
pending trial may be released on bail or recognizance as provided for
SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Upon the
under Sections 34 and 35 under this Act. In all other cases and whenever
recommendation of the social worker who has custody of the child, the
possible, detention pending trial may be replaced by alternative
court shall dismiss the case against the child whose sentence has been
measures, such as close supervision, intensive care or placement with a
suspended and against whom disposition measures have been issued,
family or in an educational setting or home. Institutionalization or
and shall order the final discharge of the child if it finds that the objective
detention of the child pending trial shall be used only as a measure of last
of the disposition measures have been fulfilled.
resort and for the shortest possible period of time.
The discharge of the child in conflict with the law shall not affect the civil
Whenever detention is necessary, a child will always be detained in youth
liability resulting from the commission of the offense, which shall be
detention homes established by local governments, pursuant to Section 8
enforced in accordance with law.
of the Family Courts Act, in the city or municipality where the child
resides.
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon
In the absence of a youth detention home, the child in conflict with the
the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
law may be committed to the care of the DSWD or a local rehabilitation
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of
center recognized by the government in the province, city or municipality
his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the
within the jurisdiction of the court. The center or agency concerned shall
law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
be responsible for the child's appearance in court whenever required.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of
SEC. 37. Diversion Measures. - Where the maximum penalty imposed
age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether
by law for the offense with which the child in conflict with the law is
to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
charged is imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) years, regardless
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
of the fine or fine alone regardless of the amount, and before arraignment
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.
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SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict with the
law shall be credited in the services of his/her sentence with the full time
spent in actual commitment and detention under this Act.
SEC. 42. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a child in conflict with
the law, and upon application at any time, place the child on probation in
lieu of service of his/her sentence taking into account the best interest of
the child. For this purpose, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968,
otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976", is hereby amended
accordingly.
CHAPTER 5
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS
SEC. 43. Confedentiality of Records and Proceedings. - All records
and proceedings involving children in conflict with the law from initial
contact until final disposition of the case shall be considered privileged
and confidential. The public shall be excluded during the proceedings and
the records shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone by any
of the parties or the participants in the proceedings for any purpose
whatsoever, except to determine if the child in conflict with the law may
have his/hes sentence suspended or if he/she may be granted probation
under the Probation Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed in the
criminal action.
The component authorities shall undertake all measures to protect this
confidentiality of proceedings, including non-disclosure of records to the
media, maintaining a separate police blotter for cases involving children
in conflict with the law and adopting a system of coding to conceal
material information which will lead to the child's identity. Records of a
child in conflict with the law shall not be used in subsequent proceedings
for cases involving the same offender as an adult, except when beneficial
for the offender and upon his/her written consent.
A person who has been in conflict with the law as a child shall not be held
under any provision of law, to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or
misrepresentation by reason of his/her failure to acknowledge the case or
recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made to him/her
for any purpose.
TITLE VI
REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION
SEC. 44. Objective of Rehabilitation and Reintegration. - The
objective of rehabilitation and reintegration of children in conflict with the
law is to provide them with interventions, approaches and strategies that
will enable them to improve their social functioning with the end goal of
reintegration to their families and as productive members of their
communities.
SEC. 45. Court Order Required. - No child shall be received in any
rehabilitation or training facility without a valid order issued by the court
after a hearing for the purpose. The details of this order shall be
immediately entered in a register exclusively for children in conflict with
the law. No child shall be admitted in any facility where there is no such
register.
SEC. 46, Separate Facilities from Adults. - In all rehabilitation or
training facilities, it shall be mandatory that children shall be separated
from adults unless they are members of the same family. Under no other
circumstance shall a child in conflict with the law be placed in the same
confinement as adults.
The rehabilitation, training or confinement area of children in conflict with
the law shall provide a home environment where children in conflict with
the law can be provided with quality counseling and treatment.
SEC. 47. Female Children. - Female children in conflict with the law
placed in an institution shall be given special attention as to their personal
needs and problems. They shall be handled by female doctors, correction
officers and social workers, and shall be accommodated separately from
male children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 48. Gender-Sensitivity Training. - No personnel of rehabilitation
and training facilities shall handle children in conflict with the law without
having undergone gender sensitivity training.
SEC. 49. Establishment of Youth Detention Homes. - The LGUs shall
set aside an amount to build youth detention homes as mandated by the
Family Courts Act. Youth detention homes may also be established by
private and NGOs licensed and accredited by the DSWD, in consultation
with the JJWC.
SEC. 50. Care and Maintenance of the Child in Conflict with the
Law. - The expenses for the care and maintenance of a child in conflict
with the law under institutional care shall be borne by his/her parents or
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those persons liable to support him/her: Provided, That in case his/her
parents or those persons liable to support him/her cannot pay all or part
of said expenses, the municipality where the offense was committed shall
pay one-third (1/3) of said expenses or part thereof; the province to which
the municipality belongs shall pay one-third (1/3) and the remaining one-
third (1/3) shall be borne by the national government. Chartered cities
shall pay two-thirds (2/3) of said expenses; and in case a chartered city
cannot pay said expenses, part of the internal revenue allotments
applicable to the unpaid portion shall be withheld and applied to the
settlement of said obligations: Provided, further, That in the event that the
child in conflict with the law is not a resident of the municipality/city where
the offense was committed, the court, upon its determination, may require
the city/municipality where the child in conflict with the law resides to
shoulder the cost.
All city and provincial governments must exert effort for the immediate
establishment of local detention homes for children in conflict with the
law.
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps
and other Training Facilities. - A child
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court,
be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular
penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that
may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
SEC. 52. Rehabilitation of Children in Conflict with the Law. -
Children in conflict with the law, whose sentences are suspended may,
upon order of the court, undergo any or a combination of disposition
measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the child as
provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
If the community-based rehabilitation is availed of by a child in conflict
with the law, he/she shall be released to parents, guardians, relatives or
any other responsible person in the community. Under the supervision
and guidance of the local social welfare and development officer, and in
coordination with his/her parents/guardian, the child in conflict with the
law shall participate in community-based programs, which shall include,
but not limited to:
(1) Competency and life skills development;
(2) Socio-cultural and recreational activities;
(3) Community volunteer projects;
(4) Leadership training;
(5) Social services;
(6) Homelife services;
(7) Health services; .
(8) Spiritual enrichment; and
(9) Community and family welfare services.
In accordance therewith, the family of the child in conflict with the law
shall endeavor to actively participate in the community-based
rehabilitation.
Based on the progress of the youth in the community, a final report will be
forwarded by the local social welfare and development officer to the court
for final disposition of the case.
If the community-based programs are provided as diversion measures
under Chapter II, Title V, the programs enumerated above shall be made
available to the child in conflict with the law.
SEC. 53. Youth Rehabilitation Center. - The youth rehabilitation center
shall provide 24-hour group care, treatment and rehabilitation services
under the guidance of a trained staff where residents are cared for under
a structured therapeutic environment with the end view of reintegrating
them in their families and communities as socially functioning individuals.
A quarterly report shall be submitted by the center to the proper court on
the progress of the children in conflict with the law. Based on the
progress of the youth in the center, a final report will be forwarded to the
court for final disposition of the case. The DSWD shall establish youth
rehabilitation centers in each region of the country.
SEC. 54. Objectives of Community Based Programs. - The objectives
of community-based programs are as follows:
(a) Prevent disruption in the education or means of livelihood of
the child in conflict with the law in case he/she is studying,
working or attending vocational learning institutions;
(b) Prevent separation of the child in conflict with the law from
his/her parents/guardians to maintain the support system fostered
by their relationship and to create greater awareness of their
mutual and reciprocal responsibilities;
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 (c) Facilitate the rehabilitation and mainstreaming of the child in
conflict with the law and encourage community support and
involvement; and
(d) Minimize the stigma that attaches to the child in conflict with
the law by preventing jail detention.
SEC. 55. Criteria of Community-Based Programs. - Every LGU shall
establish community-based programs that will focus on the rehabilitation
and reintegration of the child. All programs shall meet the criteria to be
established by the JJWC which shall take into account the purpose of the
program, the need for the consent of the child and his/her parents or legal
guardians, and the participation of the child-centered agencies whether
public or private.
SEC. 56. After-Care Support Services for Children in Conflict with
the Law. - Children in conflict with the law whose cases have been
dismissed by the proper court because of good behavior as per
recommendation of the DSWD social worker and/or any accredited NGO
youth rehabilitation center shall be provided after-care services by the
local social welfare and development officer for a period of at least six (6)
months. The service includes counseling and other community-based
services designed to facilitate social reintegration, prevent re-offending
and make the children productive members of the community.
TITLE VII
GENERAL PROVISIONS
CHAPTER 1
EXEMPTING PROVISIONS
SEC. 57. Status Offenees. - Any conduct not considered an offense or
not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense
and shall not be punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 58. Offenses Not Applicable to Children. - Persons below
eighteen (18) years of age shall be exempt from prosecution for the crime
of vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal
Code, of mendicancy under Presidential Decree No. 1563, and sniffing of
rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619, such prosecution being
inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child: Provided, That said persons shall undergo appropriate counseling
and treatment program.
SEC. 59. Exemption from the Application of Death Penalty. - The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, and other special laws notwithstanding, no death penalty shall be
imposed upon children in conflict with the law.
CHAPTER 2
PROHIBITED ACTS
SEC. 60. Prohibition Against Labeling and Shaming. - In the conduct
of the proceedings beginning from the initial contact with the child, the
competent authorities must refrain from branding or labeling children as
young criminals, juvenile delinquents, prostitutes or attaching to them in
any manner any other derogatory names. Likewise, no discriminatory
remarks and practices shall be allowed particularly with respect to the
child's class or ethnic origin.
SEC. 61. Other Prohibited Acts. - The following and any other similar
acts shall be considered prejudicial and detrimental to the psychological,
emotional, social, spiritual, moral and physical health and well-being of
the child in conflict with the law and therefore, prohibited:
(a) Employment of threats of whatever kind and nature;
(b) Employment of abusive, coercive and punitive measures such
as cursing, beating, stripping, and solitary confinement;
(c) Employment of degrading, inhuman end cruel forms of
punishment such as shaving the heads, pouring irritating,
corrosive or harmful substances over the body of the child in
conflict with the law, or forcing him/her to walk around the
community wearing signs which embarrass, humiliate, and
degrade his/her personality and dignity; and
(d) Compelling the child to perform involuntary servitude in any
and all forms under any and all instances.
CHAPTER 3
PENAL PROVISION
SEC. 62. Violation of the Provisions of this Act or Rules or
Regulations in General. - Any person who violates any provision of this
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Act or any rule or regulation promulgated in accordance thereof shall,
upon conviction for each act or omission, be punished by a fine of not
less than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) but not more than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) or suffer imprisonment of not less than
eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court, unless a higher penalty is
provided for in the Revised Penal Code or special laws. If the offender is
a public officer or employee, he/she shall, in addition to such fine and/or
imprisonment, be held administratively liable and shall suffer the penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification.
CHAPTER 4
APPROPRIATION PROVISION
SEC. 63. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged to the Office of the President.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the continued
implementation of this Act shall be included in the succeeding General
Appropriations Act.
An initial amount of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) for the purpose
of setting up the JJWC shall be taken from the proceeds of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office.
TITLE VIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
SEC. 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and
Below. - Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years
old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Such officer,
upon thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to
release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to
prevention programs as provided under this Act. Those with suspended
sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center
shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the
child.
SEC. 65. Children Detained Pending Dial. - If the child is detained
pending trial, the Family Court shall also determine whether or not
continued detention is necessary and, if not, determine appropriate
alternatives for detention.
If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults, the court
shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth detention
home.
SEC. 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict
with the Law. - The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed
to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this
Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the law under their
custody.
SEC. 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years
Pending Diversion and Court Proceedings. - If a child reaches the age
of eighteen (18) years pending diversion and court proceedings, the
appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the local social welfare
and development officer or the Family Court in consultation with the
Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court,
as the case may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case
the appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the
child in conflict the law has already availed of probation under
Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply for
probation if qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law.
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence
at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time the commission of the offense for which
they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from
the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified
under this Act or other applicable law.
TITLE IX
FINAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 69. Rule Making Power. - The JJWC shall issue the IRRs for the
implementation of the provisions of this act within ninety (90) days from
the effectivity thereof.
SEC. 70. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any section or
provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid by the
Supreme Court, the other sections or provisions hereof not dfected by
such declaration shall remain in force and effect.
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SEC. 71. Repealing Clause. - All existing laws, orders, decrees, rules
and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 72. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
from its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.

Approved,

98
 Congress of the Philippines
Twelfth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun held in Metro Manila on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July,
two thousand three.
Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO
ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have
re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this
Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of
those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act
shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain
or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet
the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and
swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to
the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines
shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to,
those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in
the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country
which they are naturalized citizens.
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Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is
held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected
thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and

regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen
(15) days following its publication in theOfficial Gazette or two (2)
newspaper of general circulation.

Approved,

100