FIRST DIVISION (2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased
father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL,
JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.
Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of
the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City,
Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family
Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following
issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when
at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G.
Nial is already dead;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the
validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their
fathers death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his
death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which
enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court
grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the
verification failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that the
allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule
7, of the 1997 Rules.[3]However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initiopursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article
58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is interested.[9] This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers
marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
family life which shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family
Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and
contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names,
the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from
that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent
Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority,
and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."[16] The only
issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of
the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous
period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the
entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have
either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-
year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract
of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-
law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been
for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of
the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the
union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The
Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local
civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x"Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known
to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person
during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,[18] subject
only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage
was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the
civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having
of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife
had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the
time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where
there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file
a petition to declare their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied
upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an
annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who
can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that
is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other
can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after
the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no
legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of
the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to such void
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well
as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property
regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The
conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there
was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be
noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never
existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void
marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order
of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that
the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot
be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law makes either the
action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish
the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case
No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
OSCAR P. MALLION, G.R. No. 141528
Petitioner,
- versus - Present:
EDITHA ALCANTARA, PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Respondent. Promulgated:
October 31, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying
a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity
bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of
marriage license?
The facts are not disputed:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a
petition[1] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City
seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha
Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended,
otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondents alleged
psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP
4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a
decision[2] dated November 11, 1997upon the finding that petitioner failed
to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is
seeking.[3] The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise
dismissed in a resolution[4] dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to
pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality,
petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition[5] for declaration of nullity
of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his
marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed
an answer with a motion to dismiss[6] dated August 13, 1999, praying for
the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping.
In an order[7] dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondents
motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of
Suits, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in an
order[9] dated January 21, 2000.
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:
A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE
DECLARATION OF HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE
MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL
OF AN EARLIER PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND
OF HIS WIFES PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL COURT
HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH
HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN
DETERMINED SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY BY THIS
COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW.
B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR
LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE
TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND
MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND
CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A
CAUSE OF ACTION AND FORUM SHOPPING.[10]
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases
was the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and
separate from the cause of action in the present case because the
operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence
required to sustain either were different. Because there is no identity as to
the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not lie to bar
the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was
no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes
the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26,
2000, counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different
ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-
95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondents marriage, and prays
for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on forum
shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on
multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been
raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the
matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential
requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same
proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a
partys psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage
license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not
fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would
it be barred by the principle of res judicata.
The contention is untenable.
Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially
acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers
to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former
suit.[11]

This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system
of jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common
law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest
of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship
on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A
contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and
neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition
on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and
happiness.[12]
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in
Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final
orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by
a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a
specific thing or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status
of a particular person or his relationship to another, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only be prima
facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order
is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as
to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity; and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
or final order which appears upon its face to have
been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res
judicata.[13] Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as bar by prior
judgment or estoppel by verdict, which is the effect of a judgment as a bar
to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand
or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res
judicata in its concept as conclusiveness of judgment or otherwise known
as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties involving a different cause of action.[14] Res
judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present
case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a
judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and
the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.[15]
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three
requisites. What is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this
regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is
to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the
two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two
actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar
to the subsequent action.[16]
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions
brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are
anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to
sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological
incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary to
sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence
of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different
grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is
the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.[17] In both
petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause
of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split
the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution
of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondents
marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the
marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took
place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP
4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had
been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now
bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which
petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier
case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every
matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but
as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that
case.[18]
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the
application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case. [19] As this Court stated
in Perez v. Court of Appeals:[20]
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is
not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of the
same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong.
Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of
action simply because the theory of the second would not
have been open under the pleadings in the first. A party
cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the
loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and limited
theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the
grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in
issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the
suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The
plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every
ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon
which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon
them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for
the same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or
equitable, must present to the court, either by the
pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon
which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at
liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by
piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds
upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest
to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails.
There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal
presentation is allowed. (Citations omitted.)
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of
action to take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been
taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and
relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding
the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and
financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same
controversy all over again.[21]
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of
their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any
defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license
is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29,
of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 DIVISION
[ GR No. 104818, Sep 17, 1993 ]
ROBERTO DOMINGO v. CA
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding
no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29,
1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage
Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036
issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage
with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid
and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime
in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23,
1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she
used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-
month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer; since 1983
up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent
upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-
month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another
woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of
her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him
about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her
attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to
turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her
brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and
possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The
petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be
declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the
time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the
proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated
no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the
declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It
added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order
denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
"Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage
by a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v.
Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under
the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by
respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another
woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second
marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said
case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court
ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void abinitio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous
rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and
Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no
property in his possession is an issue that may be determined only after
trial on the merits."[1]
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application
of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS[2] and the absence of justiciable
controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991,
Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner
fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the
motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals[3] dismissed the petition. It
explained that the case of Yap v. CA[4] cited by petitioner and that
of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because
these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while
the instant case prays for separation of property corollary with the
declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and
subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can
be had only upon proper determination of the status of the
marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the
first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid
duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage
may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the
Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other
incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties.
Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in
refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the
remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the
trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal.
The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of
merit.[5]
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the
following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private
respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly
belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling
in People v. Aragon[6] and People v. Mendoza,[7] contends that SP. No.
1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property
filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and
superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the
Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition
in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's intention
to remarry, said petition should, therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of
remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one
Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is void
from the beginning.[8]Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute
nullity of their marriage.[9]
The cases of People v. Aragonand People v. Mendoza relied upon by
petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous
marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however,
dissented on these occasions stating that:
"Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void
there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge
whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the
courts. x x x"[10]
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in
subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus,
in Gomez v. Lipana,[11]the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order
forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during
the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of
the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need
for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action
for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held
in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,
that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,[12] however, the Court turned around and applied
the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the
first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the
correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained
that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent
during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning
and of no force and
effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy[13] the Court
reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense.[14] Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.[15]
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee[16] which drafted what is now the Family Code of the
Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the
following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was
discussed.
"B. Article 39. -
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not
only void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above
provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only ...
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only ...
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only ...
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for h
imself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a courtaction is neede
d. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to
read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except
as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice
Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment,
they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid,
does it include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the
marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is
declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in
the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require
first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable
marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added
that annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed
to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked
that if this is so, then the phrase 'absolute nullity' can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to 'invalidity' if what they are
referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral
defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the
idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not
the marriage is void, which the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa
added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that
point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on
the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they
depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability
because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they
cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of
the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will
not be a unilateral declaration that it is a void
marriage. JusticeCaguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested t
hat they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article
39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be
invoked only on the basis of final judgment …
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis
of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and
will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if
one enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment
declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the
original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41."[17]
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again
cannot be charged with bigamy.[18]
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a
necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting
marriage before contracting another in the recent case
of Terre v. Terre.[19] The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent
Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting,
said that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is
for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void." (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is
meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise
intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally
emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage...," in which case "solely"
would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes ofremarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant
the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void
need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one
can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as
well as an action for the custody and support of their common children
and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains
subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for
purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it
"shall be protected by the State."[20] In more explicit terms, the Family
Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanentunion between
a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life."[21] So crucial are marriage and
the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation..."[22] As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a
marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished
merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their
union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract
of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and
nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be
reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed.
And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-
ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a
socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the
courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not
only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively
confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be
easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a
second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned
from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the
application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when
and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled."[23]
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the
Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that
private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to
enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is
untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of
the Committee.
"Dean Gupit commented that the word "only" may be misconstrued to ref
er to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that"only" refers to "fi
nal judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of
a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term
"solely" instead of "only," which the Committee
approved."[24] (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of
marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent
should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties
alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality,
the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be
clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and
ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to
separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were
acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised
together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation
of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings."[25] Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases,
are the following:
"Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of
the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited
in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the
guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the
innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse
who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if
such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith
shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and
intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith,
said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of
marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other
are revoked by operation of law. (n)"[26]
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer
for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to
be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose
is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It
stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a
first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the
respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower
court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated
March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 160172
Petitioner,
Present: QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
February 13, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR CV. No. 69166,[2] declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the
legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They
planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had
their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the
Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to
push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an
affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the
same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil
rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went
back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and
wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna
Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth, respondent has been the one
supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her
private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.[3] In her
complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the
latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her
as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.[4]
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that
their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake
affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the
marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not
able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also
averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has
never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,[5] the trial court ruled that
the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as
the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her
support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of
mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the
child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that
a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity
has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during
the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court
of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to
prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty
the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that
petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of
his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible.[6] Moreover, the
Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed
by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father
of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for
support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of
petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There
was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal,
to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by
the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but
it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and
not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court
should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child
and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered
into by petitioner and respondent.[7] The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC
No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1)
declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate
child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the
appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court
in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the
appellant.[8]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by
the Court of Appeals.[9] Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his
marriage with respondent because as shown by the evidence and
admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage
license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage
license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and
respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit
should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a
marriage license.[10]Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need
for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only
an ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues
that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their
marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the
instant action for support. Citing several authorities,[11] petitioner
claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus,
there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of
another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties
would be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would
be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the
courts.[12] Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage
with respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs paternity and filiation,
the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate
child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments
on the petition.[13]
In her Comment,[14] respondent claims that the instant petition is a
mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she
argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally,
but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought
for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out
that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was
uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual
encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and
from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA
testing to prove paternity and filiation.[15]
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
it was improper for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of
petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Nial
v. Bayadog,[16] it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage
in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on
the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during
the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and
that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was
false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is not valid.[17] In addition, the OSG
agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child
of petitioner and thus entitled to support.[18]
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had
the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is
the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.[19] Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if
the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.[20]
Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,[21] the Court ruled that it is clothed
with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite
the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held
that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.[22]
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any
of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.[23] In the
instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been
living together for more than five years.[24] However, respondent herself in
effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination, thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living
together as husband and wife for the last five years on or
before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.[25]
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in
the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage
license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this petitioners finger and in another picture (Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2) respondent
provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.[31]
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed
for a marriage license.[26] In the instant case, there was no scandalous Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all.The false 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is
through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of hereby REINSTATED.
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their
failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage
void ab initio. SO ORDERED.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate
daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.[27] Thus, one can prove
illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned,
or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child,
or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[28]
The Certificate of Live Birth[29] of the child lists petitioner as the father. In
addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor
of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who
was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque, Metro
Manila;[30]
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial
court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is
supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondents
own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that
petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used
to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At times, they would go to a
motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became
pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier
ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the
marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise
(Exhs. B, B-1, to B-3, C, C-1 and C-2, D, D-1 and D-2, E, E-1 and E-2, F,
F-1 and F-2, G, G-1 and G-2 and H, H-1 to H-3). In one of the pictures