1

SECOND DIVISION
On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of Sale12between the Republic of the
G.R. No. 177168, August 03, 2015 Philippines, through former Land Management Bureau (LMB) Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr., (Dir. Palad) and
petitioner NOVAI. The deed of sale was subsequently registered and from which TCT No. T-15387 was issued
in NOVAI's name.
NAVY OFFICERS' VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOVAI), Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
The Republic's Complaint for Cancellation of Title

DECISION In its complaint13 filed with the RTC on December 23, 1993, the Republic sought to cancel NOVAFs title based on
the following grounds: (a) the land covered by NOVAFs title is part of a military reservation; (b) the deed of sale
BRION, J.: conveying the property to NOVAI, which became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15387, is fictitious; (c) the
LMB has no records of any application made by NOVAI for the purchase of the property, and of the NOVAFs
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the December 28, 2006 decision2 and March alleged payment of P14,250,270.00 for the property; and (d) the presidential proclamation, i.e., Proclamation
28, 2007 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85179. No. 2487, claimed to have been issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino in 1991 that authorized the transfer
and titling of the property to NOVAI, is fictitious.
The CA reversed and set aside the August 20, 2004 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 67, Pasig
City, that dismissed the complaint filed by the Republic of the Philippines (respondent or the Republic) for the NOVAI's Answer to the Complaint
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-15387 issued in the name of Navy Officers' Village
Association, Inc. or NOVAI (petitioner). In its answer (which was later amended) to the Republic's complaint, NOVAI counter-argued that the property
was no longer part of the public dominion, as the land had long been segregated from the military reservation
pursuant to Proclamation No. 461.
The Factual Antecedents
NOVAI claimed that, contrary to the Republic's contention that there were no records of the sale, it had actually
TCT No. T-15387,5 issued in NOVAI's name, covers a 475,009 square-meter parcel of land (the
filed a letter-application for a sales patent over the property with the LMB which prepared, verified and
property)6 situated inside the former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR) in Taguig, Metro
approved the property's plan and technical description; and that the LMB delivered to it a copy of the deed of
Manila.
sale, signed and executed by Dir. Palad, after it had paid a portion of the P14,250,270.00 purchase price,
corresponding taxes, and other charges, with the balance to be paid in installments.
The property previously formed part of a larger 15,812,684 square-meter parcel of land situated at the former
Fort William McKinley, Rizal, which was covered by TCT No. 61524 issued in the name of the Republic of the
Also, NOVAI contended that, since any alleged irregularities that may have attended the sale pertained only to
Philippines.
formalities, the proper remedy for the Republic was to file an action for reformation of instrument, not for
cancellation of title. In any event, it added that the Republic's cause of action had prescribed because its title to
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 4237 "reserving for military purposes
the property had already become indefeasible.
certain parcels of the public domain situated in the municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Para�aque, province of
Rizal, and Pasay City," which included the 15,812,684 square-meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 61524.
The RTC's decision
On September 29, 1965, then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 4618 which excluded from
The RTC narrowed down the issues to: (a) the character of the property in question, i.e., whether the property
Fort McKinley "a certain portion of land embraced therein, situated in the municipalities of Taguig and
in question was part of the FBMR, and hence, inalienable; and (b) the validity of the deed of sale conveying the
Para�aque, Province of Rizal, and Pasay City," with an area of 2,455,310 square meters, and declared the
property to NOVAI, i.e., whether the title over the property was acquired by NOVAI through fraud. The RTC
excluded area as "AFP Officers' Village" to be disposed of under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. 274 9 and
resolved both issues in NOVAI's favor.
730.10cralawrednad
In its decision, the RTC ruled that: (a) the property is alienable and disposable in character, as the land falls
Barely a month after, or on October 25, 1965, Pres. Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 47811"reserving for the
within the area segregated from the FBMR pursuant to Proclamation No. 461; (b) the subject deed of sale
veterans rehabilitation, medicare and training center site purposes" an area of 537,520 square meters of the
should be presumed valid on its face, as it was executed with all the formalities of a notarial certification; (c)
land previously declared as AFP Officers' Village under Proclamation No. 461, and placed the reserved area
notwithstanding the claims of forgery, the signature of Dir. Palad on the deed of sale appeared genuine and
under the administration of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP).
authentic; and (d) NOVAI's title to the property had attained indefeasibility since the Republic's action for
cancellation of title was filed close to two (2) years from the issuance of the title.
The property is within the 537,520 square-meter parcel of land reserved in VFP's favor.
2
The CA's decision
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC's decision. It ruled that the property is inalienable land of the public
domain; thus, it cannot be disposed of or be the subject of a sale. It pointed out that, since NOVAI failed to
discharge its burden of proving the existence of Proclamation No. 2487 - the positive governmental act that
would have removed the property from the public domain � the property remained reserved for veterans
rehabilitation purposes under Proclamation No. 478, the latest executive issuance affecting the property.
Since the property is inalienable, the CA held that the incontestability and indefeasibility generally accorded to a
Torrens title cannot apply because the property, as in this case, is unregistrable land; that a title issued by
reason or on account of any sale, alienation, or transfer of an inalienable property is void and a patent nullity;
and that, consequently, the Republic's action for the cancellation of NOVAI's title cannot be barred by
prescription.
Also, the CA held that there can be no presumption of regularity in the execution of the subject deed of sale
given the questionable circumstances that surrounded the alleged sale of the property to NOVAI, 14e.g., NOVAI's
failure to go through the regular process in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) or
the LMB Offices in the filing of an application for sales patent and in the conduct of survey and investigation;
the execution of the deed of sale without payment of the full purchase price as required by policy; and the
appearances of forgery and falsification of Dir. Palad's signature on the deed of sale and on the receipts issued
to NOVAI for its installment payments on the property, among others.
Lastly, the CA held that the Court's observations and ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Southside
Homeowners Association, Inc (Southside)15 is applicable to the present case. In Southside, the Republic similarly
sought the cancellation of title - TCT No. 15084 - issued in favor of Southside Homeowners Association, Inc.
(SHAI) over a 39.99 hectare area of land situated in what was known as the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group
(JUSMAG) housing area in Fort Bonifacio. The Court cancelled the certificate of title issued to SHAI, as the latter
failed to prove that the JUSMAG area had been withdrawn from the military reservation and had been declared
open for disposition. The Court therein ruled that, since the JUSMAG area was still part of the FBMR, its alleged
sale to SHAI is necessarily void and of no effect.
NOVAI sought reconsideration of the CA's decision, which the CA denied in its March 28, 2007
resolution;16 hence, this petition.
The Petition
NOVAI alleges that the CA erred in declaring that: (a) the property is inalienable land of the public domain, (b)
the deed of sale and Proclamation No. 2487 were void and nonexistent, respectively, (c) the Republic's action
for cancellation of title was not barred by prescription, and (d) the ruling in Southsidewas applicable to the
present case.
In support of its petition, NOVAI raises the following arguments:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The property is no longer part of the public domain because, by virtue of Proclamation No. 461, s. of 1965,
the property was excluded from the FBMR and made available for disposition to qualified persons, subject to
the provisions of R.A. Nos. 274 and 720 in relation to the Public Land Act;
(b)The deed of sale was, in all respects, valid and enforceable, as it was shown to have been officially executed
by an authorized public officer under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and celebrated with all the
formalities of a notarial certification;
(c) Proclamation No. 2487 is to be presumed valid until proven otherwise; that the Republic carried the burden
of proving that Proclamation No. 2487 was a forgery, and that it failed to discharge this burden;
(d)The CA should not have considered as evidence the testimony of Senator Franklin Drilon on the nonexistence
of Proclamation No. 2487 because such testimony was given by Senator Drilon in another case 17 and was not
formally offered in evidence by the Republic during the trial of the present case before the RTC;
(e) The action for cancellation of title filed by the Republic is already barred by prescription because it was filed
only on December 23, 1993, or close to two (2) years from the issuance of NOVAI's title on January 9, 1992;
and
(f) The case of Southside is not a cognate or companion case to the present case because the two cases involve
completely dissimilar factual and doctrinal bases; thus, the Court's observations and ruling
in Southside should not be applied to the present case.
The Republic's Comment to the Petition
Procedurally, the Republic assails the propriety of the issues raised by NOVAI, such as "whether Proclamation
No. 2487 and the signature of LMB Director Palad on the assailed deed of sale are forged or fictitious," and
"whether the Republic had presented adequate evidence to establish the spuriousness of the subject
proclamation," which are factual in nature and not allowed in a Rule 45 petition.
On the petition's substance, the Republic counters that:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The property is inalienable public land incapable of private appropriation because, while the property formed
part of the area segregated from the FBMR under Proclamation No. 461, it was subsequently reserved for a
specific public use or purpose under Proclamation No. 478;
(b)Proclamation No. 2487, which purportedly revoked Proclamation No. 478, does not legally exist and thus
cannot be presumed valid and constitutional unless proven otherwise; the presumption of validity and
constitutionality of a law applies only where there is no dispute as to the authenticity and due execution of
the law in issue;
(c) The deed of sale executed by NOVAI and by Dir. Palad was undeniably forged, as Dir. Palad categorically
denied having signed the deed of sale, and a handwriting expert from the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) confirmed that Dir. Palad's signature was indeed a forgery;18
(d)NOVAI, a private corporation, is disqualified from purchasing the property because R.A. Nos. 274 and 730,
and the Public Land Act only allow the sale of alienable and disposable public lands to natural persons, not
juridical persons; and
(e) The Court's decision in Southside applies to the present case because of the strong factual and evidentiary
relationship between the two cases.
BCDA's Comment-in-Intervention
On December 28, 2007, and while the case was pending before this Court, the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) filed a motion for leave to file comment-in-intervention and to admit the attached comment-
in-intervention.19cralawrednad
3
In a resolution dated February 18, 2008,20 the Court allowed the BCDA's intervention.
As the Republic has done, the BCDA contends that NOVAI is disqualified from acquiring the property given the
constitutional and statutory provisions that prohibit the acquisition of lands of the public domain by a
corporation or association; that any sale of land in violation of the Constitution or of the provisions of R.A. Nos.
274 and 730, and the Public Land Act are null and void; and that any title which may have been issued by
mistake or error on the part of a public official can be cancelled at any time by the State.
The BCDA further contends that NOVAI miserably failed to comply with the legal requirements for the release of
the property from the military reservation. More specifically, (1) the Director of Lands did not cause the
property's subdivision, including the determination of the number of prospective applicants and the area of
each subdivision lot which should not exceed one thousand (1,000) square meters for residential purposes; (2)
the purchase price for the property was not fixed by the Director of Lands as approved by the DENR Secretary;
(3) NOVAI did not pay the purchase price or a portion of it to the LMB; and (4) the Deed of Sale was not signed
by the President of the Republic of the Philippines or by the Executive Secretary, but was signed only by the
LMB Director.
Also, the BCDA observed that NOVAI was incorporated only on December 11, 1991, while the deed of sale was
purportedly executed on November 15, 1991, which shows that NOVAI did not yet legally exist at the time of
the property's purported sale.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DENY NOVAI's petition for review on certiorari as we find no reversible error committed by the
CA in issuing its December 28, 2006 decision and March 28, 2007 resolution.
I. Procedural Objections
A. In the filing of the present petition before this Court
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a party desiring to appeal from a judgment or final order of the
CA shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence
on a certain state of facts.21 The issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted.22 In contrast, a question of fact exists when a
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites the calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses; the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole; and the probability of the
situation.23cralawrednad
The rule that only questions of law may be the subject of a Rule 45 Petition before this Court, however, has
exceptions.24 Among these exceptions is when there is conflict between the factual findings of the RTC and
that of the CA.
In this case, the CA totally reversed the RTC on the nature and character of the land, in question, and on
the,validity of the deed of sale between the parties. Due to the conflicting findings of the RTC and the CA on
these issues, we are allowed to reexamine the facts and the parties' evidence in order to finally resolve the
present controversy.
B. On BCD A's Intervention
In its reply25cralawred to the BCDA's comment-in-intervention, NOVAI primarily objects to the BCDA's
intervention because it was made too late.
Intervention is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself
a party, either joining the plaintiff or defendant, or demanding something adverse to both of them.26 Its
purpose is to enable such third party to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by the
proceeding,27 such interest being actual, material, direct and immediate, not simply contingent and
expectant.28cralawrednad
As a general rule, intervention cannot be made at the appeal stage. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court,
governing interventions, provides that "the motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court." This rule notwithstanding, intervention may be allowed after judgment where it is
necessary to protect some interest which cannot otherwise be protected, and may be allowed for the purpose
of preserving the intervenor's right to appeal.29 "The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is
intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice x x x and aimed to facilitate
a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing
thereof."30cralawrednad
Thus, in exceptional cases, the Court may allow intervention although the trial court has already rendered
judgment. In fact, the Court had allowed intervention in one case even when the petition for review was already
submitted for decision before it.31cralawrednad
In the present case, the BCDA is indisputably the agency specifically created under R.A. No. 722732 to own, hold
and/or administer military reservations including, among others, those located inside the FBMR. If we are to
affirm the CA's decision, the BCDA stands to benefit as a favorable ruling will enable it to pursue its mandate
under R.A. No. 7227. On the other hand, if we reverse the CA's decision, it stands to suffer as the contrary ruling
will greatly affect the BCDA's performance of its legal mandate as it will lose the property without the
opportunity to defend its right in court.
Indeed, the BCDA has such substantial and material interest both in the outcome of the case and in the disputed
property that a final adjudication cannot be made in its absence without affecting such interest. Clearly, the
BCDA's intervention is necessary; hence, we allow the BCDA's intervention although made beyond the period
prescribed under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.
II. Substantive Issues
A. The property is non-disposable land of the public domain reserved for public or quasi-public use or purpose
We agree with the CA that the property remains a part of the public domain that could not have been validly
disposed of in NOVAI's favor. NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving that the property was withdrawn
4
from the intended public or quasi-public use or purpose.
While the parties disagree on the character and nature of the property at the time of the questioned sale, they
agree, however, that the property formed part of the FBMR - a military reservation belonging to the public
domain. We note that the FBMR has been the subject of several presidential proclamations and statues issued
subsequent to Proclamation No. 423, which either removed or reserved for specific public or quasi-public use or
purpose certain of its portions.
On the one hand, NOVAI argues that Proclamation No. 461 had already transferred the property from the
State's "public domain" to its "private domain." On the other hand, the respondents argue that Proclamation
No. 478, in relation with RA 7227 and EO No. 40, had reverted the property to the inalienable property of the
"public domain."
The classification and disposition of lands of the public domain are governed by Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
141 or the Public Land Act, the country's primary law on the matter.
Under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may, from time to time, classifylands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands, and transfer these lands from one class to another for
purposes of their administration and disposition.
Under Section 7 of C.A. No. 141, the President may, from time to time, upon recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and for purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable and
disposable public lands, declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under the Acts'
provisions.33cralawrednad
Section 8 of C.A. No. 141 sets out the public lands open to disposition or concession and the requirement that
they have been officially delimited and classified, and when practicable, surveyed. Section 8 excludes (by
implication) from disposition or concession, public lands which have been reserved for public or quasi-public
uses; appropriated by the Government; or in any manner have become private property, or those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by the Act or any other valid law may be claimed. Further, Section 8
authorizes the President to suspend the concession or disposition of lands previously declared open to
disposition, until again declared open to disposition by his proclamation or by act of Congress.
Lands of the public domain classified as alienable and disposable are further classified, under Section 9 of C.A.
No. 141, according to their use or purpose into: (1) agricultural; (2) residential, commercial, industrial, or for
similar productive purposes; (3) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and (4) reservations for
townsites and for public and quasi-public uses. Section 9 also authorizes the President to make the
classifications and, at any time, transfer lands from one class to another.
Section 83 of C.A. No. 141 defines public domain lands classified as reservations for public and quasi-public
uses as "any tract or tracts of land of the public domain" which the President, by proclamation and upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may designate "as reservations for the
use of the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof or "for quasi-public
uses or purposes when the public interest requires it."34 Under Section 88 of the same Act, these "reserved
tract or tracts of lands shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease or
other disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions of [CA No. 141] or by proclamation of
the President."35cralawrednad
As these provisions operate, the President may classify lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable,
mineral or timber land, and transfer such lands from one class to another at any time.
Within the class of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the President may further classify public
domain lands, according to the use or purpose to which they are destined, as agricultural: residential,
commercial, industrial, etc.; educational, charitable, etc.; and reservations for townsites and for public and
quasi-public uses; and, he may transfer such lands from one class to the other at any time.
Thus, the President may, for example, transfer a certain parcel of land from its classification as agricultural
(under Section 9 [a]), to residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar purposes (under Section 9 [b]) and
declare it available for disposition under any of the modes of disposition of alienable and disposable public
lands available under C.A. No. 141, as amended.
The modes of disposition of alienable and disposable lands available under C.A. No. 141 include: (1) by
homestead settlement (Chapter IV), by sale (Chapter V), by lease (Chapter VI) and by confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles (Chapters VII and VIII) for agricultural lands under Title II of C.A. No. 141 as amended; (2) by
sale or by lease for residential, commercial, or industrial lands under Title III of C.A. No. 141, as amended; (3) by
donation, sale, lease, exchange or any other form for educational and charitable lands under Title IV of C.A. No.
141, as amended; and (4) by sale by public auction for townsite reservations under Chapter XI, Title V of C.A.
No. 141, as amended.
Once these parcels of lands are actually acquired by private persons, either by sale, grant, or other modes of
disposition, they are removed from the mass of land of the public domain and become, by operation of law,
their private property.
With particular regard, however, to parcels of land classified as reservations for public and quasi-public uses
(under Section 9 [d]), when the President transfers them to the class of .alienable and disposable public domain
lands destined for residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar purposes (under Section 9 [b]), or some
other class under Section 9, these reserved public domain lands become available for disposition under any of
the available modes of disposition under C.A. No. 141, as provided above. Once these re-classified lands (to
residential purposes from reservation for public and quasi-public uses) are actually acquired by private persons,
they become private property.
In the meantime, however, and until the parcels of land are actually granted to, acquired, or purchased by
private persons, they remain lands of the public domain which the President, under Section 9 of C.A. No. 141,
may classify again as reservations for public and quasi-public uses. The President may also, under Section 8 of
C.A. No. 141, suspend their concession or disposition.
If these parcels of land are re-classified as reservations before they are actually acquired by private persons, or
if the President suspends their concession or disposition, they shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale,
lease, or other disposition until again declared open for disposition by proclamation of the President pursuant
to Section 88 in relation with Section 8 of C.A. No. 141.
5
Thus, in a limited sense, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses under Section 9
(d) of C.A. No. 141 are still non-alienable and non-disposable, even though they are, by the general classification
under Section 6, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. By specific declaration under Section 88,
in relation with Section 8, these lands classified as reservations are non-alienable and non-disposable.
In short, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses: (1) are non-alienable and non-
disposable in view of Section 88 (in relation with Section 8) of CA No. 141 specifically declaring them as non-
alienable and not subject to disposition; and (2) they remain public domain lands until they are actually
disposed of in favor of private persons.
Complementing and reinforcing this interpretation - that lands designated as reservations for public and quasi-
public uses are non-alienable and non-disposable and retain their character as land of the public domain is the
Civil Code with its provisions on Property that deal with lands in general. We find these provisions significant to
our discussion and interpretation as lands are property, whether they are public lands or private
lands.36cralawrednad
In this regard, Article 419 of the Civil Code classifies property as either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Article 42037 defines property of the public dominion as those which are intended for public use or,
while not intended for public use, belong to the State and are intended for some public service. Article 421, on
the other hand, defines patrimonial property as all other property of the State which is not of the character
stated in Article 420. While Article 422 states that public dominion property which is no longer intended for
public use or service shall form part of the State's patrimonial property.
Thus, from the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on Property, lands which are intended for public
use or public service such as reservations for public or quasi-public uses are property of the public dominion and
remain to be so as long as they remain reserved.
As property of the public dominion, public lands reserved for public or quasi-public uses are outside the
commerce of man.38 They cannot be subject to sale, disposition or encumbrance; any sale, disposition or
encumbrance of such property of the public dominion is void for being contrary to law and public
policy.39cralawrednad
To be subject to sale, occupation or other disposition, lands of the public domain designated as reservations
must first be withdrawn, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, from the public or quasi-public
use for which it has been reserved or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial
property, pursuant to Sections 8 and 88 of C.A. No. 141 and Article 422 of the Civil Code. 40 Without such express
declaration or positive governmental act, the reserved public domain lands remain to be public dominion
property of the State.41cralawrednad
To summarize our discussion:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Lands of the public domain classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses are non-alienable and
shall not be subject to disposition, although they are, by the general classification under Section 6 of C.A. No.
141, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, until declared open for disposition by proclamation of
the President; and
(2) Lands of the public domain classified as reservations are property of the public dominion; they remain to be
property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the public or quasi-public use for which they have been
reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, or otherwise positively declared to have been
converted to patrimonial property.
Based on these principles, we now examine the various issuances affecting the property in order to determine
the property's character and nature, i.e., whether the property remains public domain property of the State or
has become its private property.
For easier reference, we reiterate the various presidential proclamations and statutes affecting the
property:cralawlawlibrary
(1)Proclamation No. 423, series of 1957 - established the FBMR, a military reservation; the property falls within
the FBMR;
(2)Proclamation No. 461, series of (September) 1965 - segregated, from the FBMR, a portion of Parcel 3, plan
Psd-2031, which includes the property, for disposition in favor of the AFPOVAI;
(3)Proclamation No. 478, series of (October) 1965 � reserved the property in favor of the Veterans
Rehabilitation and Medical Training Center (VRMTC); and
(4)RA No. 7227 (1992), as implemented by EO No. 40, series of 1992 - subject to certain specified exemptions,
transferred the military camps within Metro Manila, among others, to the BCDA.
1. Proclamation No. 461 was not the legal basis for the property's sale in favor of NOVAI
We agree with the respondents that while Proclamation No. 461, issued in September 1965, removed from the
FBMR a certain parcel of land that includes the property, Proclamation No. 478, issued in October 1965, in turn
segregated the property from the area made available for disposition under Proclamation No. 461, and reserved
it for the use of the VRMTC.
We find it clear that Proclamation No. 478 was issued after, not before, Proclamation No. 461. Hence, while
Proclamation No. 461 withdrew a certain area or parcel of land from the FBMR and made the covered area
available for disposition in favor of the AFPOVAI, Proclamation No. 478 subsequently withdrew the property
from the total disposable portion and reserved it for the use of the VRMTC. With the issuance of Proclamation
No. 478, the property was transferred back to that class of public domain land reserved for public or quasi-
public use or purpose which, consistent with Article 420 of the Civil Code, is property of the public dominion,
not patrimonial property of the State.
Even under the parties' deed of sale, Proclamation No. 2487, not Proclamation No. 461, was used as the
authority for the transfer and sale of the property to NOVAI. The subject deed of sale pertinently
reads:cralawlawlibrary
"This DEED OF SALE, made and executed in Manila, Philippines, by the Director of Lands, Pursuant to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 878 and in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, hereinafter referred to as the
Vendor, in favor of THE NAVY OFFICERS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION (NOVA) and residing in Fort Bonifacio, Metro
Manila, referred to as the Vendee, WITNESSETH:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
WHEREAS, pursuant to Presidential proclamation No. 478 as amended by proclamation No. 2487 in relation to
the provision of Act No. 3038 and similar Acts supplemented thereto, the Vendee applied for the purchase of a
6
portion of the above-described Property which portion is identical to Lot 3, Swo-000183 and more particularly
described on page two hereof;
xxxx
WHEREAS, the Vendee has complied with all other conditions required by Act No. 3038 in relation to
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and the rules and regulation promulgated thereunder.
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the legal basis of the property's sale could not have been Proclamation No. 461.
2. Proclamation No. 2487 which purportedly revoked Proclamation No. 478 does not legally exist; hence, it did
not withdraw the property from the reservation or from the public dominion
Neither can Proclamation No. 2487 serve as legal basis for the property's sale in NOVAI's favor. Proclamation
No. 2487 purportedly revoked Proclamation No. 478 and declared the property open for disposition in favor of
NOVAI.
The Republic and the BCD A (now respondents) argue that Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist; it could
not have served to release the property from the mass of the non-alienable property of the State.
Hence, even if NOVAI relies on Proclamation No. 2487 - on which it did not as it relied on Proclamation No. 4.61
- the sale and NOVAI's title are still void. NOVAI, on the other hand, claims in defense that Proclamation No.
2487 is presumed valid and constitutional, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on the respondents.
In insisting on the presumptive validity of law, NOVAI obviously failed to grasp and appreciate the thrust of the
respondents' arguments, including the impact of the evidence which they presented to support the question
they raised regarding the authenticity of Proclamation No. 2487.
Rather than the validity or constitutionality of Proclamation No. 2487, what the respondents assailed was its
legal existence, not whether it was constitutional or not. Put differently, they claimed that Proclamation No.
2487 was never issued by former Pres. Aquino; hence, the presumptive validity and constitutionality of laws
cannot apply.
Accordingly, after the respondents presented their evidence, it was NOVAI's turn to present its own evidence
sufficient to rebut that of the respondents. On this point, we find the Republic's evidence sufficiently convincing
to show that Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist. These pieces of evidence
include:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the October 26, 1993 letter of the Solicitor General to the Office of the President inquiring about the
existence of Proclamation No. 2487.42cralawrednad
Second, the November 12, 1993 letter-reply of the Office of the President informing the Solicitor General that
Proclamation No. 2487 "is not among the alleged documents on file with [its] Office."43cralawrednad
Third, the testimony of the Assistant Director of the Records Office in Malaca�ang confirming that indeed,
after verifying their records or of the different implementing agencies, "[t]here is no existing document(s) in
[their] possession regarding that alleged Proclamation No. 2487;"44 and
Fourth and last, the October 11, 1993 Memorandum of then Department of Justice Secretary Frahklin M. Drilon
(DOJ Secretary Drilon) to the NBI to investigate, among others, the circumstances surrounding the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2487.45 Notably, this October 11, 1993 Memorandum of DOJ Secretary Drilon stated that:
"Proclamation No. 2487 is null and void x x x. [It] does not exist in the official records of the Office of the
President x x x [and] could riot have been issued by the former President since the last Proclamation issued
during her term was proclamation No. 932 dated 19 June 1992."46cralawrednad
In this regard, we quote with approval the CA's observations in its December 28, 2006 decision:cralawlawlibrary
Cast against this backdrop, it stands to reason enough that the defendant-appellee NOVAI was inevitably duty
bound to prove and establish the very existence, as well as the genuineness or authenticity, of this Presidential
Proclamation No. 2487. For certain inexplicable reasons, however, the defendant-appellee did not do so, but
opted to build up and erect its case upon Presidential Proclamation No. 461.
To be sure, the existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 2487 could be easily proved, and established, by its
publication in the Official Gazette. But the defendant-appellee could not, as it did not, submit or present any
copy or issue of the Official Gazette mentioning or referring to this Presidential Proclamation No. 2487, this
even in the face of the Government's determined and unrelenting claim that it does not exist at all.47 (Emphasis
supplied)
A final point, we did not fail to notice the all too obvious and significant difference between the proclamation
number of Proclamation No. 2487 and the numbers of the proclamations actually issued by then President
Corazon C. Aquino on or about that time.
We take judicial notice that on September 25, 1991 - the very day when Proclamation No. 2487 was supposedly
issued - former Pres. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 80048 and Proclamation No. 801.49Previously, on
September 20, 1991, Pres. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 799;50 and thereafter, on September 27, 1991, she
issued Proclamation No. 802.51cralawrednad
Other proclamations issued around or close to September 25, 1991, included the following:cralawlawlibrary
1. Proclamation No. 750 issued on July 1, 1991;52cralawrednad
2. Proclamation No. 760 issued on July 18, 1991;53cralawrednad
3. Proclamation No. 770 issued on August 12, 1991;54cralawrednad
4. Proclamation No. 780 issued on August 26, 1991;55cralawrednad
5. Proclamation No. 790 issued on September 3, 1991;56cralawrednad
6. Proclamation No. 792 issued on September 5, 1991;57cralawrednad
7. Proclamation No. 797 issued on September 11, 1991;58cralawrednad
8. Proclamation No. 798 issued on September 12, 1991;59cralawrednad
7
9. Proclamation No. 804 issued on September 30, 1991;60cralawrednad
10. Proclamation No. 805 issued on September 30, 1991;61cralawrednad
11. Proclamation No. 806 issued on October 2, 1991;62cralawrednad
12. Proclamation No. 810 issued on October 7, 1991;63cralawrednad
13. Proclamation No. 820 issued on October 25, 1991;64cralawrednad
14. Proclamation No. 834 issued on November 13, 1991;65 and
15. Proclamation No. 840 issued on November 26, 1991.66
This list shows that the proclamations issued by former Pres. Aquino followed a series or sequential pattern
with each succeeding issuance bearing a proclamation number one count higher than the proclamation number
of the preceding Presidential Proclamation. It also shows that on or about the time Proclamation No. 2487 was
purportedly issued, the proclamation numbers of the proclamations issued by President Aquino did not go
beyond the hundreds series.
It is highly implausible that Proclamation No. 2487 was issued on September 25, 1991, or on any day close to
September 25, 1991, when the proclamations issued for the same period were sequentially numbered and bore
three-digit proclamation numbers.
As Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist and therefore could not have validly revoked Proclamation No.
478, we find, as the CA also correctly did, that Proclamation No. 478 stands as the most recent manifestation of
the State's intention to reserve the property anew for some public or quasi-public use or purpose. Thus,
consistent with Sections 88, in relation with Section 8, of C.A. No. 141 and Article 420 of the Civil Code, as
discussed above, the property which was classified again as reservation for public or quasi-public use or purpose
is non-alienable and not subject to disposition; it also remains property of the public dominion; hence, non-
alienable and non-disposable land of the public domain.
As a consequence, when R.A. No. 7227 took effect in 1992, the property subject of this case, which does not fall
among the areas specifically designated as exempt from the law's operation67 was, by legal fiat, transferred to
the BCDA's authority.
B. As the property remains a reserved public domain land, its sale and the title issued pursuant to the sale are
void
As the property remains a reserved public domain land, it is outside the commerce of man. Property which are
intended for public or quasi- public use or for some public purpose are public dominion property of the
State68 and are outside the commerce of man. NOVAI, therefore, could not have validly purchased the property
in 1991.
We reiterate and emphasize that property which has been reserved for public or quasi-public use or purpose
are non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared alienable by law or by
proclamation of the President.69 Any sale or disposition of property of the public dominion is void for being
contrary to law and public policy.70cralawrednad
Since the sale of the property, in this case, is void, the title issued to NOVAI is similarly void ab initio. It is a well-
settled doctrine that registration under the Torrens System does not, by itself, vest title as it is not a mode of
acquiring ownership;71 that registration under the Torrens System merely confirms the registrant's already
existing title.72cralawrednad
Accordingly, the indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply in this case and does not attach to NOVAI's title.
The principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the sale of the property and the title based thereon are null
and void. Hence, the Republic's action to declare the nullity of NOVAI's void title has not prescribed.
NOVAI insists that the deed of sale carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties as
it bears all the earmarks of a valid deed of sale and is duly notarized.
While we agree that duly notarized deeds of sale carry the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties,73 the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, like all other disputable legal
presumptions, applies only in the absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing the
contrary.74cralawrednad
When, as in this case, the evidence on record shows not only that the property was reserved for public use or
purpose, and thus, non-disposable - a fact that on its own defeats all the evidence which the petitioner may
have had to support the validity of the sale - but also shows that the sale and the circumstances leading to it are
void in form and in substance, the disputable presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
certainly cannot apply.
C. Even assuming that Proclamation No. 2487 legally exists, the sale of the property to NOVAI is illegal.
1. Dir. Palad did not have the authority to sell and convey the property.
The subject deed of sale points to Proclamation No. 2487, purportedly amending Proclamation No. 478, in
relation with Act No. 3038,75 as legal basis for authorizing the sale.
Section 176 of Act No. 3038 authorizes the sale or lease only: (i) of land of the private domain, not land of the
public domain; and (ii) by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, not by the LMB Director. Section
277 of the said Act, in fact, specifically exempts from its coverage "land necessary for the public service." As the
sale was executed by the LMB Director covering the property that was reserved for the use of the VRMTC, it,
therefore, clearly violated the provisions of Act No. 3038.
2. The area subject of the sale far exceeded the area that the Director of Lands is authorized to convey.
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 87878 which, per the Deed of Sale, purportedly authorized the Director of Lands,
representing the Republic, to sell the property in favor of NOVAI, limits the authority of the Director of Lands to
sign patents or certificates covering lands to ten (10) hectares.
In this case, the subject deed of sale covers a total area of 475,009 square meters or 47.5009 hectares.
8
Obviously, the area covered by the deed of sale and which NOVAI purportedly purchased, far exceeds the area
that the Director of Lands is authorized to convey under B.P. Blg. 878.
3. The evidence on record and the highly suspect circumstances surrounding the sale fully supports the
conclusion that the property's sale to NOVAI is fictitious, thus, void.
We note the following irregularities that attended the sale of the property to NOVAI:
a. The absence, on file with the LMB, of any request for approval of any survey plan or of an approved
survey plan in NOVAI's name covering the property.79 The approved survey plan relating to Lot 3,
SWO-13-000183 subject of NOVAI's TCT No. 15387 pertains to the AFPOVAI under Proclamation No.
461;80cralawrednad
b. The technical description, which the DENR prepared for the property as covered by TCT No. T-15387,
was issued upon NOVAI's request only for purposes of reference, not for registration of title, and was
based on the approved survey plan of the AFPOVAI;81cralawrednad
c. There is no record of any public land application filed by NOVAI with the LMB or with the DENR Office
for the purchase of the property or of any parcel of land in Metro Manila;82cralawrednad
d. LMB Dir. Palad categorically denied signing and executing the deed of sale;83cralawrednad
e. The findings of the NBI handwriting; expert, detailed in the Questioned Documents Report No. 815-
1093 dated October 29, 1993,84 revealed that the, signature of LMB Director Palad as it appeared on
the Deed of Sale and his standard/sample signature as they appeared on the submitted comparison
documents "were not written by one and the same person," 85 and concluded that "[t]he questioned
signature of 'ABELARDG G. PALAD, JR.' xxx is a TRACED FORGERY by carbon process;"86 and
f. Lastly, the LMB Cashier's Office did not receive the amount of P14,250,270.00 allegedly paid by NOVAI
as consideration for the property. The receipts87 - O.R. No. 8282851 dated November 28, 1991, for
P160,000.00 and O.R. No. 317024 dated December 23, 1992, for P200,000.00 - which NOVAI
presented as evidence of its alleged payment bore official receipt numbers which were not among the
series of official receipts issued by the National Printing Office to the LMB, and in fact, were not
among the series used by the LMB on the pertinent dates.88
In sum, we find - based on the facts, the law, and jurisprudence - that the property, at the time of the sale, was
a reserved public domain land. Its sale, therefore, and the corresponding title issued in favor of petitioner
NOVAI, is void.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the present petition for review on certiorari. No reversible error attended the
decision dated December 28, 2006, and the resolution dated March 28, 2007, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 85179.
SO ORDERED.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the February 23, 2012 Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92584 affirming the September 11, 2008 Amended Decision[3] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024.
Factual Antecedents
As (determined by the appellate court, the facts are as follows:
Appellees Angeline Dayaoen (Angeline), Agustina Taule (Agustina) and Lawana Batcagan[4] (Lawana) filed
an Application for Registration[5] of three parcels of land located in Barangay Tabangaoen, La Trinidad, Benguet,
described as Lots 1, 6 and 7, each with an area of 994 square meters, 390 sq. m., and 250 sq. m. respectively, or,
a total of 1,634 sq. m. under Survey Plan Psu-1-002413.[6]
The subject parcels of land were originally owned and possessed since pre-war time by Antonio Pablo (Antonio),
the grandfather of Dado Pablo (Dado), husband of appellee Angeline. In 1963, Antonio gave the parcels of land
in question to appellee Angeline and Dado as a wedding gift. From that time on, they continuously occupied and
possessed the properties. In 1976 and 1977, appellee Angeline sold Lots 6 and 7 to co-appellees Agustina and
Lawana, pursuant to an Affidavit of Quitclaim and a Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Unregistered Land,
respectively. Since 12 June 1945, appellees and their predecessor-in-interest have been in public, open,
exclusive, uninterrupted and continuous possession thereof in the concept of an owner. Appellees declared the
questioned properties for taxation purposes. There was no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever
affecting the said parcels of land. Neither did any other person have an interest therein, legal or equitable, or
was in possession thereof.
On the scheduled initial hearing, appellees adduced pieces of documentary evidence to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements of notices, posting and publication. Appellee Angeline testified on the continuous,
open, public and exclusive possession of the lands in dispute.
Trial on the merits ensued. In a Decision[7] dated 6 November 2007, the court a quo granted appellees'
application for registration. Unflinching, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but
failed to attain favorable relief as its Motion was denied by the court a quo in its Order dated 11 September
2008. On even date, the court a quo rendered the assailed Amended Decision finding appellees to have the
registrable title over the subject properties.[8]
LRC Case No. N-453
Previously, or in 1979, herein respondents Angeline, Agustina and Lawana filed a similar application for
registration of the herein subject property which was docketed as LRC Case No. N-453 before the RTC La
Trinidad, Branch 8. The Republic opposed the application. After trial on the merits, a Decision [9] dated
December 26, 1994 was rendered dismissing the application on the ground that respondents failed to prove
that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Respondents did not
appeal the said Decision; thus, it became final and executory.
9
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024
The September 11, 2008 Amended Decision in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 held as follows:
Well settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who
must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land being applied for. x x x The applicant
must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements
which are more conclusion of law than factual evidence of possession. Simply put, facts constituting possession
must be duly established by competent evidence, x x x
However, given the foregoing facts, as borne out by competent, reliable, concrete, and undisputed evidence,
the Court cannot conceive of any better proof of applicants' adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and exclusive possession and occupation in concept of owners. The Court finds and concludes
that the applicants have abundantly shown the specific acts that would show such nature of their possession. In
view of the totality of facts obtaining in evidence on record, the applicants had ably complied with the burden
of proof required of them by law. The Court holds that the established facts are sufficient proof to overcome
the presumption that the lots sought to be registered form part of the; public domain. Hence, they have fully
discharged to the satisfaction of the Court their burden in this proceeding.
Moreover, the Court is mindful of what the Supreme Court said in Director of Lands v. Funtillar x x x that "The
attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their names
should not only be viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged." For
this reason, the Supreme Court limited the strict application of the rule stated in Heirs ofAmunategui v. Director
of Forestry, x x x, that "In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving
that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942.
He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has
an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those
derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30)
years preceding the filing of his application." Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtillar, the Supreme Court
liberalized the aforecited rule and stated:
The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact all laws governing natural resources is
a revered and long standing principle. It must, however, be applied together with the constitutional provisions
on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice.
Every application for a concession of public land has to be viewed in the light of its peculiar circumstances. A
strict application of the Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) ruling is warranted whenever
a portion of the public domain is in danger of ruthless exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable
practices. But when an application appears to enhance the very reasons behind the enactment of Act 496, as
amended, or the Land Registration Act, and Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, or the Public Land Act,
then their provisions should not be made to stand in the way of their own implementation.
In the present case, there is no showing that any "portion of the public domain is in danger of ruthless
exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices." Instead, it is very evident from applicants' mass
of undisputed evidence that the present application will enhance social justice considerations behind the Public
Land Law and the Land Registration Act, in the light of the incontrovertible fact that applicant Angeline Dayaoen
and her three (3) children have long established their residential houses on the land subject of the application,
which is "the policy of the State to encourage and promote the distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to
economic growth and in line with the social justice ideal enshrined in the Constitution" (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-62680, November 9, 1988).
In the case at bar, the tracing cloth (Diazo Polyester film) of the approved survey plan of the land embracing the
lots subject of the application was adduced in evidence as Exhibit "H" for the applicants. At its lower left hand
corner is a certification. It states in part: "x x x. This Survey is inside the alienable and disposable areas per Proc.
No. 209, Lot-A. The land herein described is outside any military or civil reservations. x x x" Aside from this
certification, it is further certified by Geronimo B. Fernandez, in his capacity as Supervising Geodetic Engineer I,
"that this survey is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College and it is within the Proclamation No. 209,
Lot-A." Further scrutiny of the tracing cloth plan also reveals that the survey plan was approved by Regional
Director Sulpicio A. Taeza "For the Director of Lands."
The Court takes judicial notice of Proclamation No. 209[10] Issued by then President Ramon Magsaysay on
October 20, 1955. It provides:
"Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to the provisions of
Sections 83 and 89 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, President of the
Philippines do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation Nos. 99, 64, 39, 102 and 698, series of 1914,
1919, 1920, 1927 and 193[4], respectively, and declare the parcel or parcels of land embraced therein or
portions thereof situated in the Municipality of La Trinidad, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province, open
to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act, to wit: x x x"
Lot A, mentioned in the aforestated certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), is
one of the three (3) lots described in the aforecited Presidential Proclamation No. 209 opened to "disposition
under the provisions of the Public Land Act."
The categorical statement of facts in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), in conjunction
with the aforecited Proclamation No. 209, support the certification that the land subject of the survey is
alienable and disposable. The certifications therein attesting that the land, which embraced Lots 1, 6 and 7
subject of the present application, is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College reservation, that it is
within the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A; that the land is alienable and disposable - pursuant to the Proclamation
No. 209, Lot-A, and that it is outside any military or civil reservations. [This] statement of facts in the
certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan sufficiently contain all the essential factual and
legal bases for any certification that may be issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
that the lots subject of the present application are indeed alienable and disposable. More importantly, the
tracing cloth of the approved survey plan was approved by Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza "For the Director
of Lands." As such, the aforecited certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan carry not only
his imprimatur but also that of the Director of Lands for whom he was acting. Thus, the approval of the survey
plan was in effect the act of the Director of Lands. Necessarily, the certifications in the approved survey plan
were [those] of the Director of Lands, not only of the Supervising Geodetic Engineer I and Regional Director
Sulpicio A. Taeza. Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Director of Lands is empowered to issue the approved
survey plan and to certify that the land subject thereof is alienable and disposable (Exh. "H") xxx. The law states
the powers of the Director of Lands, as follows:
10
Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the
provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.
Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey,
classifications, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the
public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce.
Sec. 5. The Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall prepare and
issue such forms, instructions, rules, and regulations consistent with this Act, as may be necessary and proper to
carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions.
Therefore, to require another certification to be issued by the Director of Lands attesting to same facts already
certified in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan that the lots subject of the present application for
registration of titles are alienable and disposable is a needless ceremony, a pure act of supererogation.
It is clear, therefore, that the applicants have satisfactorily complied with their burden of proving "that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable" considering that they have established "the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative
action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute." The certifications
categorically cited Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A, as the basis in attesting that the land, which is the subject of the
survey and present application, is alienable and disposable because it is inside Lot A opened by the presidential
proclamation "to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act."
The Court finds it significant that the State has not adduced any evidence, in spite of the fact that it has all the
records, resources, and power in its command, to show that the lots subject of the present application are not
alienable and disposable part of the public domain. Having failed to refute the evidence on the very face of the
tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), which is a public document and part of a public record, the
presumption that the certifications therein contained, attesting that the lots subject of the present application
for registration are alienable and disposable, are true and correct have attained the status of concrete facts.
Hence, the Court now turns to resolve the sole issue of whether or not [sic] the herein applicants are entitled to
the confirmation of their titles to the lots subject of their present application.
It has been well established that since pre-war Antonio Pablo had been in possession and occupation of the land
(TSN, Oct. 19, 2005), which is corroborated by evidence that when the land was verbally given to applicant
Angeline Dayaoen and Dado Dayaoen as a wedding gift, the old man Antonio Pablo had already an old hut
thereon (TSN. May 29, 1984, p. 14) where the spouses stayed after their marriage (TSN, Oct. 19, 2005, p. 9), and
there were already on the land some fruit trees, and some other plants, consisting of guavas and avocados
already bearing fruits, which he had planted thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, pp. 12-14). The anterior possession
and occupation of Ajitonio Pablo of the land since pre-war should be tacked to the possession and occupation of
applicant Angeline Dayaoen, and the latter's possession and occupation, in turn, is tacked to the present
possession and occupation of her co-applicants, who acquired titles from her. Consequently, the applicants are
entitled to the benefits of Sec. 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended by R.A. 1942, which provides as follows:
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter."
This section was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which took effect on January 25, 1977 (Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48327, August 21, 1991). Section 4 thereof provides:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945
In the present case, it will be recalled that Antonio Pablo commenced possession and occupation of the land
subject of the application for confirmation of title since before the Second World War. Thus, applicant Angeline
Dayaoen was already in possession and occupation of the land under bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for more than thirty (30) years, including the anterior possession and occupation of Antonio Pablo,
when P.D. 1073 amended Sec. 48(b) if C.A. 141, as amended by R.A. 1942. Applicant Angeline Dayaoen already
acquired vested right of ownership over the land and, therefore, already excluded from the public domain, as it
was already a private property over which applicant Angeline Dayaoen has a confirmable title. Republic vs.
Court of Appeals(G.R. No. 48327, August 21, 1991) held:
It is important to note that private respondents' application for judicial confirmation of their imperfect title was
filed in 1970 and that the land registration court rendered its decision confirming their long-continued
possession of the lands here involved in 1974, that is, during the time when Section 48(c) was in legal effect.
Private respondents' imperfect title was, in other words, perfected or vested by the completion of the required
period of possession prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073. Private respondents' right in respect of the land they
had possessed for thirty (30) years could not be divested by P.D. No. 1073.
Even if Sec. 48(b) of C.A. 141 is applied in the present case in its textual form as amended by P.D. 1073, still the
present applicants are qualified thereunder to have their titles confirmed. They have already been in possession
and occupation of the lots subject of their application for confirmation of titles under bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for more than thirty (30) years since before the Second World War (or before June 12,
1945) considering that the possession and occupation of x x x Antonio Pablo, the predecessor-in-interest of the
present applicants, should be tacked to their possession and occupation. Consequently, applicant Angeline
Dayaoen had a vested right over the lots subject of the present application when she conveyed, transferred and
delivered Lots 6 and 7, respectively, to her co-applicants.
Under Article 541 of the New Civil Code, which squarely applies to applicants' present application, "A possessor
in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot
be obliged to show or prove it." Clearly, therefore, since the applicant Angeline Dayaoen and her predecessor,
11
Antonio Pablo, have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the land since before the Second
World War and have been exercising acts of ownership thereon, it is incumbent upon the State, and not the
applicants, to show that the land still forms part of the public domain. The State has utterly failed to overcome
the presumption with the sole testimony of Irene Leano Caayas, which the Court does not even accord any
weight and credence.
The tax declaration of applicant Angeline Dayaoen and religious payment of real property taxes lend strong
corroboration to the evidence of the applicants. It is the established jurisprudence that "While it is true that by
themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of
actual possession of the property" (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 533). In the present application, it
has been concretely and [indisputably] established that applicant Angeline Dayaoen and her predecessor
Antonio Pablo have been in actual and continuous possession of the parcel of land embracing the lots subject of
the present application.
In fine, therefore, the present applicants are entitled to have their titles confirmed under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. The Court concludes that the applicants have indeed confirmable and registrable
titles over the lots subject of the instant application for confirmation of titles pursuant to either Sec. 48(b) of
C.A. 141, as amended by R.A. 1942, or Sec. 48(c) of C.A. 141, as amended by R.A. 1942 and P.D. 1073.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the herein Application for
Registration of the parcels of land described as follows:
Lot 1, Psu-1-002413, in the name of ANGELINE L. DAYAOEN, particularly described as a parcel of land (Lot 1,
Psu-1-002413) situated at Brgy. of Tabangaoen, Mun. of La Trinidad, Prov. of Benguet, Island of Luzon. Bounded
on the NW., along line 1-2 by an alley (2.00m. wide); on the NE., along line 2-3 by Morris Leano; on the SE.,
along line 3-4 by lot 2 of the plan; on the SW., along line 4-1 by Mt. State Agricultural College, T.C.T. #7179;
Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being S. 63 deg. 59'E., 1391.52 m. from Tri. Sta, "TRINIDAD", La
Trinidad, Benguet, thence:
N. 45 deg. 18'E., 27.25m. to point 2;
S. 40 deg. 37'E., 33.18m. to point 3;
S. 54 deg. 05'W., 37.44m. to point 4;
N. 20 deg. 50'W., 29.94m. to point of beginning.
Containing an area of NINE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR (994) SQ. METERS, more or less.
Lot 6, Psu-1-002413, in the name of AGUSTFNA TAULE, particularly described as a parcel of land (Lot 6, Psu-1-
002413) situated at Brgy. of Tabangaoen, Mun. of La Trinidad, Prov. of Benguet, Island of Luzon. Bounded on
the SW., along line 1-2 by Mt. State Agricultural College, T.C.T. # 7179; on the NE., along line 2-3 by Morris
Leano; on the NE., along line 3-4 by Psu-1-000485; on the SE., along line 4-1 by lot 7 of the plan,. Beginning at a
point marked "1" on plan being S. 64 deg. 20'E. 1382.57m. from Tri. "TRINIDAD", La Trinidad, Benguet, thence:
N. 20 deg. 50'W., 47.27m. to point 2;
S. 45 deg. 15'E., 16.02m. to point 3;
S. 43 deg. 38'E., 24.91m. to point 4;
S. 38 deg. 20'W., 18.96m. to point of beginning.
Containing an area of THREE HUNDRED NINETY (390) SQ. METERS, more or less.
Lot 7, Psu-1-002413, in the name of LAWANA T. BATCAGAN, particularly described as a parcel of land (Lot 7,
Psu-1-002413) situated at Brgy. of Tabangaoen, Mun. of La Trinidad, Prov. of Benguet, Island of Luzon. Bounded
on the NW, along line 1-2 by Psu-1-000485; on the NE., along line 2-3 by Morris Leano; on the SE., along line 3-4
by an alley (2.00 m. wide); on the SW., along line 4-5 by Mt. State Agricultural College, T.C.T. #7179; on the NW.,
along line 5-1 by lot 6 of the plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being S. 65 deg. 02'E., 1385.03 m.
from Tri. "TRINIDAD", La Trinidad, Benguet, thence:
N. 62 deg. 02'E., 3.1 lm. to point 2;
S. 47 deg. 13'E., 10.58m. to point 3;
S. 44 deg. 47'W., 26.43m. to point 4;
N. 20 deg. 50'W., 10.29m. to point 5;
N. 38 deg. 20'E., 18.96m. to point of beginning.
Containing an area of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (250) SQ. METERS, more or less.
The decree of registration shall be issued upon attainment by this judgment of its finality.
This Amended Decision supersedes the Decision earlier rendered by the court.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 92584. Petitioner essentially
argued that the La Trinidad RTC erred in granting respondents' application for registration since they failed to
prove that the subject property constitutes alienable and disposable land; that the annotation on the survey
plan that the subject property is alienable and disposable is not sufficient; and that respondents failed to prove
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property.
On February 23, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the September 11, 2008 Amended
Decision of the La Trinidad RTC, pronouncing thus:
The Appeal bears no merit.
Appellant Republic asseverates that appellees[12] failed to comply with the legal requirement of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands applied for since 12 June 1945 or
earlier as required under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.[13]
Appellant's asseveration does not hold sway.
Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529 provides:
"Sec. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance x x x an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
12
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
(1) exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."
By the same token, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141[14] which took effect [in] November 1936,
amended by Section 4 PD No. 1073, provides:
"Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945."
The proceedings under the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529), and Section 48 of the Public Land Act
(C.A. No. 141 as amended by P.D. No. 1073), are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take
the nature of judicial proceedings, and both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final. Both
proceedings are likewise governed by the same court procedure and law of evidence.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14 (1) -
that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Withal, appellees must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claim and they cannot just offer
general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. Jurisprudence
dictates that a person who seeks confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title to a piece of land on the basis of
possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest shoulders the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence compliance with the requirements of Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended.
Parenthetically, case law teaches us that the determination of whether claimants were in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 1945 as required by law, is a
question of fact. Here, We find no cogent reason to deviate from the conclusion of the court a quo that
appellees have the registrable right owing to their and their predecessor-in-interest continuous possession of
the subject parcels of land. The foundation of such conclusion is primarily factual. Findings of fact of the trial
court are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence on record.
Contrary to appellant's thesis, appellees were able to prove by convincing evidence that they and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession over the subject
properties since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Appellee Angeline had personal knowledge that her predecessor-in-
interest, Antonio, owned and possessed them from pre-war time. She and her husband Dado, tilled and
cultivated the lands in question since 19621 when it was given to them by Antonio as a wedding gift. This was
corroborated by co-appellee Lawana who was a co-employee of Antonio in 1961 at the Mountain State
Agricultural College (MSAC), and witness Albert Dimas (Albert), a resident of the adjoining lot (MSAC cottage),
and witness Victor Alejandro, a neighbor of Antonio in Camp Dangwa.
In the same vein, appellees declared the subject properties for taxation purposes. Although tax declarations and
realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Next, appellant's postulations that the disputed lands were not yet alienable and disposable and that appellees
failed to overcome trie presumption that all lands form part of the public domain, carry no weight.
xxxx
In the case at bench, appellees were able to discharge such bounden duty. The subject properties are no longer
part of public domain. Their private character is declared in the annotation of the survey plan approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources through the Bureau of Lands, Regional Office No. 1, San
Fernando, La Union, viz: "The survey is inside alienable and disposable areas per Proa No. 209, Lot-A; xxx The
land herein described is outside any military and civil reservations, xxx" The Supervising Geodetic Engineer of the
same Office likewise certified "x x x this survey is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College and it is within
the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A."
We echo with approval the disquisition of the court a quo which thoroughly threshed out the issue on the
alienable and disposable character of the challenged parcels of land -
"In the case at bar, the tracing cloth (Diazo Polyester film) of the approved survey plan of the land embracing
the lots subject of the application xxx.
The Court takes judicial notice of Proclamation No. 209 issued by then President Ramon Magsaysay on October
20, 1955. xxx
Lot A, mentioned in the aforestated certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), is
one of the three (3) lots described in the aforecited Presidential Proclamation No. 209 opened to "disposition
under the provisions of the Public Land Act."
The categorical statement of facts in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), in conjunction
with the aforecited Proclamation No. 209, support the certification that the land subject of the survey is
alienable and disposable.
The certifications therein attesting that the land, which embraced Lots 1, 6 and 7 subject of the present
application, is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College reservation, that it is within the Proclamation
No. 209, Lot-A; that the land is alienable and disposable - pursuant to the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A, and
that it is outside any military or civil reservations. [This] statement of facts in the certifications in the tracing
cloth of the approved survey plan sufficiently contain[s] all the essential factual and legal bases for any
certification that may be issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the lots subject
of the present application are indeed alienable and disposable. More importantly, the tracing cloth of the
approved survey plan was approved by Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza "For the Director of Lands." As
such, the aforecited certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan carry not only his imprimatur
13
but also that of the Director of Lands for whom he was acting. Thus, the approval of the survey plan was in
effect the act of the Director of Lands. Necessarily, the certifications in the approved survey plan were [those]
of the Director of Lands, not only of the Supervising Geodetic Engineer I and Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza.
The foregoing discourse is in congruity with the principle enunciated in Republic v. Serrano[15] wherein the
Supreme Court explicitly pronounced, viz:
"While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and
disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V.
Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial
compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the
alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925.
The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. It bears
noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest
respondents' applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There being no
substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification may be equitably extended in
favor of respondents.
In precis, We discern no reversible error committed by the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Amended Decision dated 11 September 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court, First Judicial Region, La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, in LRC No. 03-LRC-0024, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Hence, the present Petition
Issues
In a November 25, 2013 Resolution,[17] this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which contains the
following assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AS WELL AS MADE FINDINGS WHICH ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH, OR NOT SUPPORTED BY, THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. LIKEWISE, IT GRAVELY MISAPPLIED
THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE, AS FOLLOWS:
(a) The land registration court gravely erred in granting the application for registration of the three (3) subject
lots despite respondents' utter failure to prove that the said lots are alienable and disposable, a mere
annotation on the survey plan that the said lots are alienable and disposable being insufficient to prove
alienability;
(b) Respondents' evidence is utterly insufficient to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation
and possession by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[18]
Petitioner's Arguments
In its Petition and Reply[19] seeking reversal of the assailed CA decision and the dismissal of respondents'
application for registration in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024, petitioner argues that respondents failed to satisfy the
legal requirements relative to proof of the alienability of the subject land and continuous, open, exclusive and
notorious possession thereof. Particularly, petitioner claims that it was erroneous for the trial and appellate
courts to consider as substantial compliance the certification or annotation in the survey plan that the subject
land is alienable and disposable; that respondents did not present in court the public officials who issued the
said certification/annotation in order that they may authenticate the same; that respondents failed to establish
the existence of a positive act of government declaring that the subject land is alienable and disposable; that
respondents failed to secure a government certification that the subject land constitutes alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of Proclamation 209, as
the exact boundaries of the lots covered by said law, as well as that of the subject land, are not a matter of
judicial knowledge; that respondents have not shown that their predecessors-in-interest were in continuous,
open, exclusive and notorious possession of the land for 30 years or since June 12, 1945 or earlier; that
respondents' possession is not genuine; that the trial court erred in relying on the testimonial evidence taken in
LRC Case No. N-453 since the transcripts of stenographic notes in said case were not submitted to the court;
and that respondents' tax declarations and receipts do not constitute proof of adverse possession or ownership
of the subject land.
Respondents' Arguments
In their Comment,[20] respondents contend that, as correctly found by the trial and appellate courts, the
annotations and certifications in the approved survey plan substantially comply with the legal requirement for a
certification as to the alienability of the subject land. They cite as follows:
Third. The approved survey plan (Exh. "H") of the respondents contain certifications attesting to the fact that
the three (3) lots, among others, which are the subject of their application for title, are within the parcel of land
described as Lot A in Presidential Proclamation 209 of the late President Ramon Magsaysay excluded from the
Mountain State Agricultural College (now Benguet State University) and released for disposition; x x x The
certifications are found at the foot of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), which, for ready reference, are here
quoted:
Note:
All corners not otherwise described are P.S. cyl. Cone. Mons. 15x60 cm. This survey is for registration purposes
and should not be subject of a public land application unless declared public land by a competent court. This
survey is claimed by Irene L. Ca-aya - representing the Hrs. of M. Leano. This survey is inside the alienable &
disposable area as per Proc. No. 209, Lot A. The land herein described is outside any military or civil
registrations. Tax declaration no. 4317 of real property has been submitted as part of the survey-returns.
- CERTIFICATION -
I hereby certify that this survey is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College and it is within the
Proclamation No. 209, Lot A.
(Signed)
GERONTMO B. FERNANDEZ
Superv. Geodetic Engineer - I
14
In recommending approval of the survey plan, Laurentino P. Baltazar, Regional Chief, Surveys Division, of the
Regional Lands Office No. 1, Bureau of Lands, then Department of Natural Resources (now Department of
Environment and Natural Resources), at San Fernando, La Union, certified:
I certify that the complete survey returns of the herein described survey, which are on file in this Office, were
verified and found to conform with pertinent laws of the Philippines and with applicable regulations of the
Bureau of Lands. In view thereof, approval of the plan is hereby recommended.
(Signed)
LAURENTINO P. BALTAZAR
Regional Chief, Survey Division
Sulpicio A. Taeza, Regional Director, Regional Lands Office No. 1, Bureau of Lands, then Department of Natural
Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural Resources), at San Fernando, La Union, approved the
survey and plan (Exh. "H") "For the Director of Lands."
The survey plan (Exh. "H") was approved on April 10, 1976. Subsequent thereto, or on August 18, 1977, the
sketch plan of Mr. Edilberto Quiaoit (Exh. "P" and Exh. "Z" and series) was prepared. It contains this certification
of District Land Officer Amador Roxas of the Bureau of Lands at the foot thereof, to wit:
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that this sketch plan is true and correct as plotted from the technical descriptions of Lot 954,
GSS-157, & Lots 1-7, PSU-1-002413 which are on file in this Office.
Issued upon request of Mr. Lawana Batcagan in connection with Administrative Case No. (N) Angeline Dayaoen
et al. vs. Morris Leano et al.
... Bu. Of Lands, Baguio City August 18, 1977
(Signed)
AMADOR P. ROXAS
District Land Officer[21]
Respondents add that, as correctly held by the trial and appellate courts, they have satisfactorily proved their
continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land; that their predecessors-in-interest
occupied the land as early as during the Japanese occupation, or clearly prior to June 12, 1945; and that
petitioner's evidence should not be believed for being biased.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
The trial and appellate courts seriously erred in declaring that the annotation in the tracing cloth of the
approved survey plan (Exh. "H") and the certifications therein constitute substantial compliance with the legal
requirement on presentation of a certificate of land classification status or any other proof that the subject land
is alienable and disposable. We cannot subscribe to such notion.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The classification and
reclassification of such lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President may at any time
transfer these public lands from one class to another.[22]
While in 1955 the President - through Presidential Proclamation No. 209 declared particular lands in Baguio City
as alienable and disposable, they may have been re-classified by the President thereafter. This is precisely the
reason why an applicant for registration of title based on an executive proclamation is required to present
evidence on the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for. such as a certificate of land
classification status from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which only the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer[23] (CENRO) and the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Officer[24] (PENRO) are authorized to issue under DENR Administrative Order No. 38,[25] series of 1990
(DAO 38).
In Republic v. Cortez,[26] the Court made the following pronouncement:
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the
notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable.
However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant also secure a certification from the
Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan
bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only
to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the
nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
(Emphasis in the original)
Similarly, in Republic v. Roche, the Court declared that:
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per
verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. (Emphasis in the original)
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or disposable
land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the land which bears
15
no information regarding the land's classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any
certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all
requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.
The annotation in the survey plan presented by Cortez is not the kind of evidence required by law as proof
that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Cortez failed
to present a certification from the proper government agency as to the classification of the subject property.
Cortez likewise failed to present any evidence showing that the DENR Secretary had indeed classified the
subject property as alienable and disposable. Having failed to present any incontrovertible evidence, Cortez'
claim that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain must fail.
(Emphasis supplied)
Later, another pronouncement was made in Fortuna v. Republic,[27] stating thus:
Under Section 6 of the PLA,[28] the classification and the reclassification of public lands are the prerogative of
the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify
or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public domain. The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare
such land as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration
of title acquired through a public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, the C A declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by the notation in the survey
plan, which states:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August 7,
1940. It is outside any civil or military reservation.
It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor title previously
issued for the subject parcel[.]" However, we find that neither of the above documents is evidence of a positive
act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties' alienable and
disposable character. These notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable area per verification through survey by the
proper government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the original classification of the
land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.
In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, the Court ruled that
[t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declaredJpy the D,ENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or the DENR Secretary has
reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these documents
are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary
declaring the public land as alienable and disposable.
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain though a positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses Fortuna's
claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied. (Emphasis supplied and/or in the
original)
Yet again, in another subsequent decision of this Court in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Republic,[29] it was held
that —
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of Sate ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration, who must prove that the properties subject of the application are alienable
and disposable. Even the notations on the survey plans submitted by the petitioner cannot be admitted as
evidence of the subject properties' alienability and disposability. Such notations do not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject properties remain part of the
inalienable public domain. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, while judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 209 may be taken, the DENR certificate of land
classification status or any other proof of the alienable and disposable character of the land may not be
dispensed with, because it provides a more recent appraisal of the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable, or that the land has not been re-classified in the meantime. The applicable law - Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 - requires that the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration of title is filed;[30] one way of establishing this material fact is through
the DENR certificate of land classification status which is presumed to be the most recent appraisal of the status
and character of the property.
The ruling in Republic v. Serrano[31] cannot be controlling. Instead, We must apply the pronouncements
in Republic v. Cortez, Fortuna v. Republic, and Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Republic, as they are more recent and
in point. Besides, these cases accurately ratiocinate that such notations or certifications in approved survey
plans refer only to the technical correctness of the surveys plotted in these plans and have nothing to do
whatsoever with the nature and character of the properties surveyed, and that they only establish that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable per verification
through survey by the proper government office; they do not indicate at all that the property sought to be
registered is alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
On the issue of continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession, however, there appears to be no reason
to deviate from the identical findings of fact of the trial court and the CA, which are rooted in the testimonies of
the respondents and their witnesses - categorical declarations which petitioner has failed to refute. We adopt
the findings of the trial court, to wit:
It has been well established that since pre-war Antonio Pablo had been in possession and occupation of the land
(TSN, Oct. 19, 2005), which is corroborated by evidence that when the land was verbally given to applicant
Angeline Dayaoen and Dado Dayaoen as a wedding gift, the old man Antonio Pablo had already an old hut
thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, p. 14) where the spouses stayed after their marriage (TSN, Oct. 19, 2005, p. 9), and
there were already on the land some fruit trees, and some other plants, consisting of guavas and avocados
already bearing fruits, which he had planted thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, pp. 12-14). The anterior possession
and occupation of Antonio Pablo of the land since pre-war should be tacked to the possession and occupation
16

of applicant Angeline Dayaoen, and the latter's possession and occupation, in turn, is tacked to the present
possession and occupation of her co-applicants, who acquired titles from her.[32]
Thus, while respondents have complied with most of the requirements in connection with their application for
registration, they have not sufficiently shown that the property applied for is alienable and disposable at the
time their application for registration was filed. The Court is left with no alternative but to deny their application
for registration. To be sure, the nation's interests will be best served by a strict adherence to the provisions of
the land registration laws.[33]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 23, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 92584 and the September 11, 2008 Amended Decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 63 in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents' application for registration
in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 is ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
17
AGRA LAW CASE
G.R. No. 204617
ESPERANZA BERBOSO, Petitioner
vs.
VICTORIA CABRAL, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Esperanza Berboso assailing the
Decision1 dated May 7, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100831, which reversed and set
aside the Decision2dated August 30, 2006 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in
DARAB Case No. 12283, dismissing the case filed by respondent Victoria Cabral for cancellation of emancipation
patents (EP).
The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:
The subject matter of this case is a parcel of land located in Barangay Saluysoy, Municipality of Meycauyan,
Bulacan containing an area of 23,426 square meters (subject land). The subject land was awarded to Alejandro
Berboso (Alejandro) by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on September 11, 1981 pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 273 by virtue of a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-056450. The same was
duly registered with the Register of Deeds of Meycauyan, Bulacan.
On July 27, 1987, CLT No. 0-056450 was replaced by EP No. 445829 covering 22,426 sq m and EP No. 445830
covering the remaining 1,000 sqm.
On November 17, 1992, after Alejandro had fully complied with all the requirements for the final grant of title,
the Register of Deeds of · Meycauyan, Bulacan issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. EP-046 and TCT No.
EP-047 in the name of Alejandro. TCT Nos. EP-046 and EP- 047 thereby cancelled EP Nos. 445829 and 445830.
On September 8, 1993, respondent filed with the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB)
her first petition to cancel EP Nos. 445829 and 445830.
Meanwhile, Alejandro died in 1994. After his death, his heirs settled his estate and executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate. Thus, on April 15, 1996, TCT Nos. EP-046 and EP-047 were cancelled and TCT Nos.
263885(M) and 263886(M) were issued in the name of the heirs of Alejandro, namely, Esperanza V da. De
Berboso, Juan Berboso, Benita Berboso Gonzales, Adelina Berboso Villegas and Rolando Berboso.
The PARAB rendered a decision in favor of Alejandro and accordingly affirmed the validity of the EP Nos. 445829
and 445830. Respondent's appeal to the DARAB was denied. Respondent elevated the case to the CA via a
Petition for Review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44666. The CA in its Decision4 dated April 21, 1998, affirmed the
decisions of the PARAB and the DARAB.
Respondent assailed the CA decision to this Court, but on December 9, 1998 Resolution,5 this Court dismissed
the respondent's petition. Pending the resolution of the motion for reconsideration (MR) filed by the
respondent, the latter filed on February 26, 1999, her second petition for the cancellation of the said EP Nos.
445829 and 445830 before the PARAB docketed as DARAB Case No. R-03-02-8506'99. Respondent claimed that
petitioner sold a portion of the subject land to a certain Rosa Fernando (Fernando) within the prohibitory period
under the existing rules and regulations of the DAR and prayed again for the cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and
445830 awarded to Alejandro. Petitioner specifically denied the allegation of respondent that she sold a portion
of the subject land to Fernando.
On March 17, 1999, this Court, in its Resolution6 denied with finality the MR filed by respondent.
Then, on December 20, 2000, the PARAB issued its Decision,7 in connection with the second petition of
respondent, granting respondent's petition and ordered as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent] and against [petitioner] and order is
hereby issued:
1. ORDERING [petitioner] and other persons acting in her behalf to vacate the landholdings
in question, subject of this present litigation;
2. ORDERING the cancellation of Emancipation Patent Nos. 445829 and 445830;
3. DIRECTING the DAR officers and personnel concerned to re-allocate the subject
landholdings in favor of qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with its existing DAR
laws, rules and regulations on the matter.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner appealed the PARAB's decision to the DARAB, which the latter granted in its Decision9 dated August
30, 2006 in DARAB Case No. 12283, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Honorable Adjudicator a quo dated December 20, 2000
is hereby SET ASIDE. A NEW JUDGMENT is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition filed by petitioner-appellee
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.10
18
Respondent herein appealed the DARAB's decision to the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 100831. The CA in its
Decision11 dated May 7, 2012, reversed the DARAB and reinstated the PARAB's decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED and the assailed 30 August
2006 Decision and the Resolution dated 21 June 2007 of the DARAB is [sic] REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the 20 December 2000 Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved, petitioner brought the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues, viz.:
I. DOES THE PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR HAVE JURISDICTION TO ACT ON A SECOND PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION OF AN EMANCIPATION PATENT WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN CANCELLED, FILED AFTER THE
DEATH OF THE ORIGINAL GRANTEE/BENEFICIARY OF THE SAID EMANCIPATION PATENT[,] AND LONG REPLACED
BY A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE PETITIONER AND HER CHILDREN WHO WERE NOT
EVEN IMPLEADED IN THE SAID PETITION AND WHEREIN THE PARTIES HAVE NO TENANCY RELATIONSHIP
WHATSOEVER;
II. CAN THE RESPONDENT QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF THE TORRENS TITLE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER AND TO
HER CHILDREN BEFORE THE PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR WITHOUT VIOLATING THE EXPRESS PROVISION OF
SECTION 48 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529 WHICH EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK, IT CANNOT BE ALTERED, MODIFIED, OR CANCELLED EXCEPT IN
A DIRECT PROCEEDING IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND DOES THE PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR HAVE ANY
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN ORDER WHICH WOULD AFFECT THE RIGHTS, OWNERSHIP, INTEREST AND
POSSESSION OF THE REGISTERED OWNER OF. A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WHO WERE NOT EVEN IMPLEADED IN
THE PETITION;
III. WHEN WILL THE TEN YEARS PROHIBITORY PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 24 OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (R.A. NO. 6657) COMMENCE, IS IT FROM THE DATE THE LAND WAS AWARDED
TO THE BENEFICIARY, OR WILL IT COMMENCE TO RUN ONLY FROM THE DATE THE CLOA OR EMANCIPATION
PATENT WAS ISSUED TO THE BENEFICIARY?
IV. UNDER THE RULE OF EVIDENCE, WHICH WEIGHT [sic] MORE, A FINAL DECISION RENDERED BY A COMPETENT
COURT OR THE FINDINGS AND OPINION OF THE PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR BASE [sic] ON UNVERIFIED AND
UNIDENTIFIED PRIVATE DOCUMENTS WHOSE ORIGINAL COPY WERE NOT EVEN PRESENTED[;]
V. DOES FORUM SHOPPING AND THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA APPLIES [sic] IN THIS SECOND PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION OF EMANCIPATION PATENT FILED BY THE RESPONDENT[.] 13
Ultimately, the issues to be resolved in this case are: 1) whether the principle of res judicata and forum
shopping apply in this case, such that the second petition for cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 was
barred by Our decision in G.R. No. 135317 dismissing respondent's first petition; 2) whether the petitioner sold
the subject land to a certain Fernando in violation of the prohibition to transfer under the provisions of P.D. No.
27; and 3) whether the petition for cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 constitute as a collateral attack
to the certificate of title issued in favor of Alejandro.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, a Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law, and the factual findings of the lower courts are,
as a rule, conclusive on this Court. Despite this Rule 45 requirement, however, Our pronouncements have
likewise recognized exceptions,14 such as the situation obtaining here - where the tribunals below conflict in
their factual findings and when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.15
I
The principle of res judicata and
forum shopping does not apply in
the present case.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent in filing the second petition for cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and
445830 raised issues which have been already resolved by this Court in the first petition. The second petition
involves the same subject land, same parties, same cause of action and same reliefs prayed for. The respondent
filed the second petition while the MR in G.R. No. 135317 was still pending for resolution before this Court. As
such, respondent was guilty of forum shopping. Further, petitioner claims that the elements of litis
pendentia were clearly present in this case. In the first petition, the validity of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 was
affirmed by this Court in G.R. 135317; as such, the same constitutes res judicata to the second petition.
We are not persuaded.
In Daswani v. Banco de Oro Universal Bank, et al.,16 the Court elucidated that:
In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to consider
is whether the elements of litis pendentia concur, namely: a) there is identity of parties, or at least such parties
who represent the same interests in both actions; b) there is identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and, c) that the identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.17
Meanwhile, in Club Filipino Inc., et al. v. Bautista, et al.,18 the Court enumerated, to wit:
The elements of res judicata are: 1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; 2) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 3) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and 4) there must be as between the first and second
action, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.19
In the case at bar, the first petition for cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 was based on the validity of
its issuance in favor of Alejandro, while the second petition was based on the alleged violation of the prohibition
on the sale of the subject land. As such, there is no, as between the first petition and the second petition,
19
identity of causes of action. Therefore, the final decision in G.R. No. 135317 does not constitute as res
judicata on the second petition.
II
Respondent was not able to prove
that petitioner violated the
prohibition on the sale of the
subject land.
It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.20 The party who alleges an
affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the
party who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.21
Respondent alleged that petitioner sold a portion of the subject land to Fernando as evidenced by
the Kasunduan22dated December 17, 1994. As such, respondent bears the burden of proving that there is
indeed a sale between petitioner and Fernando, rather than petitioner to prove that there is no sale.
Examination of the records will show that the Kasunduan dated December 17, 1994 is a mere photocopy; as
such, the same cannot be admitted to prove the contents thereof. The best evidence rule requires that the
highest available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a document
are best proved by the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary
evidence.23
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rule~ of Court states that:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part
of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Rule 130, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides the rules when secondary evidence may be presented, thus:
Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof,
namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-
production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the
basis for the introduction of secondary evidence.24
Nowhere in the records will show that the respondent proved that the original of the Kasunduan dated
December 17, 1994 exists.1âwphi1 Respondent even failed to explain why she merely presented a photocopy of
the Kasunduan. Respondent likewise failed to prove the contents of the Kasunduan in some authentic
document, nor presented F emando, a party to the said Kasunduan or any witness for that matter. As such,
respondent failed to prove the due execution and existence of the Kasunduan. Therefore, a photocopy of
the Kasunduan cannot be admitted to prove that there is indeed a sale between petitioner and Fernando.
Further, the Kasunduan is merely a private document since the same was not notarized before a notary public.
Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court states that a private document, before the same can be admitted as
evidence, must first be authenticated, to wit:
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
In Otero v. Tan,25 the Court held that:
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when
the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the
genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the
adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the
document is not being offered as genuine.26
Here, the Kasunduan is not authenticated by the respondent. No one attested to the genuineness and due
execution of the document. Fernando was not presented nor did he submit an affidavit to confirm and
20

authenticate the document or its contents. Neither was the requirement of authentication excused under the
above-cited instances.
Since the Kasunduan dated December 17, 1994 was not authenticated and was a mere photocopy, the same is
considered hearsay evidence and cannot be admitted as evidence against the petitioner. The CA, therefore
erred when it considered the Kasunduan as evidence against the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 7, 2012 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100831 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 30, 2006 of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 12283 dismissing the case filed by
respondent Victoria Cabral is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

III
The petition for cancellation of EP
Nos. 445829 and 445830 constitutes
as a collateral attack to the validity
of the certificate of title issued in
favor of petitioner and her children.
Therefore, the same should be
dismissed.

Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree proscribes a collateral attack to a certificate of
title and allows only a direct attack thereof.27 A Torrens title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in
a direct proceeding in accordance with law. When the Court says direct attack, it means that the object of an
action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof.28

In Bumagat, et al. v. Arribay,29 the Court reiterated the rule that:

Certificates of title issued pursuant to emancipation patents acquire the same protection accorded to other
titles, and become indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the
issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Lands so titled may no longer be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding; nor can they be decreed to other individuals. The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public
land patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land
is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the
certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of
the Land Registration Act.30

As such, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and
indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.31 Therefore, TCT Nos. 263885(M) and
263886(M) issued in favor of petitioner and her children as heirs of Alejandro are indefeasible and binding upon
the whole world unless it is nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction in a direct proceeding for cancellation
of title.32 Thus, We find that the petition to cancel EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 is a collateral attack to the
validity of TCT Nos. 263885(M) and 263886(M); as such, the same should not be allowed.

Therefore, in view of the fact that respondent was not able to sufficiently prove that petitioner sold the subject
land to Fernando and that the petition to cancel EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 is a collateral attack to the validity
of TCT Nos. 263885(M) and 263886(M), We hold that the CA erred in reversing the decision of the DARAB.