XII.

LEGITIME

A. Concept, NCC 866;

Art. 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because
the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.

Cases:

FRANCISCO VS. FRANCISCO-ALFONSO, GR 138774, MARCH 8, 2001;

FACTS: Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso is the sole legitimate daughter of Gregorio
Francisco while Petitioners are daughters of the latter with his common law wife Julia
Mendoza. Gregorio Francisco owned two parcels of residential land situated in Bulacan. When
Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the
certificate of title of his property were in the possession of the petitioners. When Gregorio
died. Aida inquired about the certificate of title from petitioners and they informed her that
Gregorio had sold the land to them in 1983 as executed by a “Kasulatan”. After verification,
Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioners.

In 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, a complaint against petitioners for
annulment of sale with damages. In their joint answer, petitioners denied the alleged forgery
or simulation of the Deed of Sale. The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
while upon appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: W/N the “Kasulatan” or Deed of Sale is valid?

HELD: The petition is hereby denied and decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

The Kasulatan was simulated. There was no cause or consideration for the contract of sale.
The same was a simulation and hence, null and void. We find it incredible that engaging in
buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00 , or that earnings in selling goto could save
enough to pay P 15,000.00, in cash for the land. The testimonies of petitioners were incredible
considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale
and also as to whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value.
They could not even present a single witness to the Kasulatan that would prove receipt of the
purchase price.

SPOUSES JOAQUIN vs. CA, GR 126376, NOV. 20, 2003;

DOCTRINE: The legitime of a compulsory heir is merely inchoate and vests only upon the
death of the parents. While still alive, the parents are free to dispose of their properties,
provided such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.

FACTS: Spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs
Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad, as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio,
Clarita, Felicitas, Fe and Gavino.

Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed
by defendant parents in favour of their co-defendant children.

The plaintiff children are claiming that no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale were
made and that the purported sale was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to
unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs of their legitime.
ISSUE: W/N the deeds of sale by the parents to their co-defendant children valid?

HELD:
Yes, The right of children to the properties of their parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely
inchoate and vests only upon the parents’ death. While still alive, parents are free to dispose
of their properties, provided such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.

Compulsory heirs have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right
commences only from the moment of death of the decedent.

There can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of their parents. In determining the
legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered.

The legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the decedent.
Plaintiffs cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while their parents live.

The testimony of the defendants particularly that of the father will show that the Deeds of
Sale were all executed for valuable consideration.

Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated.

MAONONSONG vs. ESTIMO, GR 136773, June 25, 2003;

FACTS: Allegedly, AgatonaGuevarra (“Guevarra”) inherited a property from Justina Navarro,
which is now under possession of the heirs of Guevarra. Guevarra had six children, one of
them is Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong (“Manongsong”).
The respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was
actually sold to them by Justina Navarro prior to her death. The respondents presented deed
of sale dated October 11, 1957. Milagros and CarlitoManongsong (“petitioners”) filed a
Complaint on June 19, 1992 praying for the partition and award to them of an area equivalent
to one-fifth (1/5), by right of representation. The RTC ruled that the conveyance made by
Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugal character
and that AgatonaGuevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate
with the distribution of the estate under question to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale
did not at all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and
effect against AgatonaGuevarra and should be declared a nullity ab initio.

ISSUE: W/N the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the alleged sale of the
property by Justina?

HELD:
No, The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public
document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. There is no basis
for the trial court’s declaration that the sale embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the
compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by
lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate
of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the
estate but merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the
equivalent monetary consideration. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.

The trial court’s conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is void ab initio was
not based on evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which
provides: “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership;
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” The presumption
under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. There was no
evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage.

B. Who are entitled to legitimes: Compulsory heirs, NCC 782, 887, 902;
Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law.

Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts of real and personal property are
respectively given by virtue of a will.

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2;
neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from
them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

Art. 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

Cases:

ROSALES vs. ROSALES, 148 SCRA 69;

FACTS: On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her
husband Fortunato Rosales and their two children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales.
Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox
Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes
instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The trial court
ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled each to ¼ share in the
estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming
that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.

ISSUE: W/N Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law?

HELD:
No, Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups, namely, those who
inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. There is no
provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir
of her mother-in-law. The law has already meticulously enumerated the intestate heirs of a
decedent. The Court held that Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because the
provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving
spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

INING vs. VEGA, GR 174727, August 12, 2013;

FACTS: Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-
square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without
issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining
(Gregoria), who are now both deceased.

ROMANA: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein
respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived
by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto
and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.

GREGORIA: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. (SOBRANG DAMI
PA KASI NAMED PA YUNG CHILDREN + WHO SURVIVED THE CHILDREN) Parts of the land
were also sold by some of the Gregoria children to Tresvalles and Tajonera. In short, herein
petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are
Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are
transferees of the said property.

In 1997, Leonardo (ROMANA SIDE) filed a case for partition, recovery of ownership and
possession, with damages, against GREGORIA’s heirs. Leonardo mentioned that he kept
asking for partition but this was unheeded. It was in 1979, Lucimo Sr (Antipolo, who is a kid
of Gregoria was survived by this man and others) claimed absolute ownership and deprived
Leonardo of the benefits of the land.

Lucimo’s defense: A certain Enriquez had bought the property from Leon (GREGORIA’S
FATHER) and they had bought the property from Enriquez, and Leonardo was aware of this
fact; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the
property with a just title; that they have been paying the taxes on the property; that
Leonardo’s claim is barred by estoppel and laches; and that they have suffered damages as
well.

RTC DECIDED: There was never any sale to an Enriquez but GREGORIA HEIRS won because
of adverse possession for 30 years. PRESCRIPTION DAW!

CA DECIDED: NO PRESCRIPTION! Prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962,
but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted
to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth
paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[n]o prescription shall run in
favor of a co- owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,”
ISSUE:
1. W/N there was repudiation of the coownership only during the execution of the affidavit
– in 1979? SUPPOSEDLY YES
2. W/N there was prescription? NO

HELD:

1.SUPPOSEDLY YES. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property. No prescription shall
run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership. The act of making the affidavit equated to a repudiation.

BUT WTF NO because GET THIS! Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is
not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s
daughter Teodora. One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from
the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot
effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s
heirs. HIS WIFE COULD REPUDIATE BUT NOT HIM!

2.NO. (REALLY BECAUSE DUH THERE WAS NO REPUDIATION BECAUSE HE WASN’T

COOWNER, HIS WIFE WAS) For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-
owner. The CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even
in 1980 – when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the
co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that
the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly
within the period prescribed under Article 1141.

USON vs. DEL ROSARIO, No. L-4693, JANUARY 29, 1953;

FACTS: Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left
the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria
Uson. Maria Uson sought to recover lands held by Maria del Rosario who had four illegitimate
children with Nebreda, which the latter contends that her children are given the status and
rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights, and because these
successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given
retroactive effect.

ISSUE: W/N the illegitimate children may have successional rights under the new Civil Code
by way of its retroactive effect?

HELD:
No, Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first
time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have
occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice
any vested or acquired right of the same origin. The law commands that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new
right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased
cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the
lands in dispute.
CASTRO vs. CA, GR 50974-75, MAY 31, 1989;
FACTS: Petitioners Juan and Feliciana Castro are brothers and sister of Eustaquio Castro,
while the respondent, Benita is the only child of Eustaquio. Cipriano is her husband.

On May 23, 1913, Pricola wed Felix against her will. Later that night, she cohabited with
Eustaquio and lived as husband and wife until her death in 1924. They produce a child, which
is Benita. She stayed with her father Eustaquio until she got married with Cipriano. Eustaquio
died in 1961.

In 1967, Juan and Feliciana filed an action for partition of properties against Benita,
(representing for his father) alleging that they are the forced heirs of Pedro Castro (the father
of Juan, Feliciana and Eustaquio).

ISSUE: W/N Benita is right in claiming that she is entitled to participate in the partition of
properties being an illegitimate child of Eustaquio?

HELD:
The Court held yes, Benita was right in claiming that she was entitled to participate in the
partition of properties of Pedro Castro.

According to Article 131 of Family Code, “ The acknowledgement of a natural child must be
made in the record of birth, in a will or in some public document”.

In this case, there is no question that Benita was natural child of Eustaquio to Pricola, being
a widower when they cohabited. Eustaquio voluntarily acknowledge Benita, as seen on her
birth certificate that it was signed, reported and registered by him. Also, it was Eustaquio who
gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano. The couple continued to live with him until
his death. Therefore, Benita has the right to participate in the partition of properties of his
late Grandfather Pedro Castro.

TAYAG vs. CA, GR 95229, JUNE 9, 1992;

The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce,
Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan,"
promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review, dismissed petitioner's Petition
for Certiorariand Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the denial of the
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot
be the subject of the said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's
remedy.

In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal
guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim
for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said complaint are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan,
by the father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the
defendant is the known administratrix of the real and personal properties left
by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City
on September 28, 1983;

3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several
years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit
amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they
begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent
desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo;

4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in
Angeles City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired, showered with exceptional
affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son as
can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo
to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder reproduced;

. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone
and for me all the time. As I have now I shall save my heart to
you and to Chad.

. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Niño for our sake and
for the child sake.

. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.

. . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him and
you. Let me bless him by my name and let me entitle him to all
what I am and what I've got.

. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.

. . . How is CHAD and you . . .

. . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the
whole world. After all we love each other and CHAD is the product
of our love.

5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled

to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;

6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner
of real and personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the
Province of Pampanga with approximate value of several millions of pesos;

7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the
defendant and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad
has not likewise been ascertained;

8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are
his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina
 Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant complaint
is filed;

9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of
friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent,
necessary and imperative that said child be extended financial support from the
estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;

10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant to
grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant failed and
refused and still fails and refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim
for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo; 3

xxx xxx xxx

Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to
render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the
deceased; and to give him support pendente lite.

Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987, disputing
the material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by way of affirmative defenses, inter
alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the action is premature; that the suit
as barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to
bring the suit; that the lower court was no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that
there is improper joinder of causes of action. 4

After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses,
the trial court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:

xxx xxx xxx

The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further

proceedings to adduce evidence on the various claims of the parties so as to
hear their respective sides

WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the

nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence is in the meantime
held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the case as set
for pre-trial . . . 5

With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19,
1987, 6 petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was granted by the
Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined respondent judge to
resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the affirmative
defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 7

In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter
denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil Case
No. 7938, in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the said motion in the following
manner:

xxx xxx xxx

The Court now resolves:

No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in favor of
the plaintiff. A cause of action being the "primary right to redress a wrong"
(Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which apparently on the face of the
complaint, plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case. Defendant's
protestation that there is no sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable.

No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is not premature. It
is exactly filed in order to prove filiation, and then recognition. To go about the
step by step procedure outlined by the defendant by filing one action after
another is definitely violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of
action.

No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court. It is
(her) spurious child that she represents as natural guardian that is instituting
the action.

No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child may file
an action for recognition within four years from his attainment of majority (New
Civil Code. Art, 285, No. 2). Whether the letters of the putative father, Atty.
Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in a hearing on the merits.

No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was done in
this case. The defendant's claim that there was a misjoinder is untenable.

No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special jurisdiction,
such as a probate court has capacity to entertain a complaint such as the one
now before it.

The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does not control the body
of the complaint.

From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient' in form
and substance and, therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be granted until
after trial on the merits in which it should be shown that the allegations of the
complaint are unfounded or a special defense to the action exists.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on January
30, 1990. 9 As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent court, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24, 1989 and January 30, 1990 of
the trial court be annulled and set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing the
petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review on certiorari.

In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:

a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's Petition

for Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THIS HONORABLE COURT providing clear exceptions to the general rule that
interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the special civil action
of certiorari;

b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner

before the Regional Trial Court and before Respondent Court of Appeals
involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined by this
Honorable Court, such as the interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the
Civil Code requiring judicial approval when the recognition of an illegitimate
minor child does not take place in a record of birth or in a will: of Art. 175, Par.
2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing for the
prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate filiation;
and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period with
respect to the action for recognition of a natural child; and

c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional Trial Court

from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. 10

Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent
in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause
of action, she submits that the recognition of the minor child, either voluntarily or by judicial
action, by the alleged putative father must first be established before the former can invoke
his right to succeed and participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that
since there is no allegation of such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for
Inheritance," then there exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and,
consequently, the complaint should be dismissed.

The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the petitioner,
as plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as defendants, to compel them
to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and
alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for
the settlement of the deceased's estate had been commenced in court; and that the
defendants had refused and failed to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased. She
accordingly prayed that the defendants therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The
defendants moved for the dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no cause of
action and that, even if it does, the same is barred by prescription.

The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of the
filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached the age of
majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that
an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or
presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to
allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the
illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to
inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the
petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the
action.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is
an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the
allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further that
the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may
be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.

As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et

al., 12 wherein we said:

The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can any
event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and
at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which,
in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided
always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of
action are present in the particular case. In, other words, there is no absolute
necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have
been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in
which that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir.
Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment
as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally
applicable in other cases. . .

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by

this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions.
Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered
well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but
who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs . . .; and the
same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of
his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of these situations has it
been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution
proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the
court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has prescribed.

Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition, private
respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is sought to be
proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, then
under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of the
illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In
the case at bar, considering that the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent,
the action has prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and,
instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. The
theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law being merely procedural
in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to apply retroactively.

Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth
of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public
document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous
possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 13

Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint
should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must
be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article
285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of
the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority
of the minor child.

Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child
to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not.

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the
minor child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the
Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14 We herein adopt our ruling in the
recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15 where we held that
the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have
the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and
such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is
procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect
pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its
operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken
before it goes into effective, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the
time the question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced.
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case
since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of
the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint
in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the
Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.

Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of the
court below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a
petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly obtaining
in the case at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.

WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

C. Concurrence of compulsory heirs and their corresponding legitimes; NCC 888-

890, 892-901, 903

Art. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children
and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (808a)

Art. 889. The legitime of legitimate parents or ascendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estates of their children and descendants.

The children or descendants may freely dispose of the other half, subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (809a)

Art. 890. The legitime reserved for the legitimate parents shall be divided between them
equally; if one of the parents should have died, the whole shall pass to the survivor.

If the testator leaves neither father nor mother, but is survived by ascendants of equal degree
of the paternal and maternal lines, the legitime shall be divided equally between both lines.
If the ascendants should be of different degrees, it shall pertain entirely to the ones nearest
in degree of either line.

Art. 892. If only one legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives, the widow or
widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. In case of a legal separation,
the surviving spouse may inherit if it was the deceased who had given cause for the same.
If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be
entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants.

In both cases, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be taken from the portion that can
be freely disposed of by the testator.

Art. 893. If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants,
the surviving spouse shall have a right to one-fourth of the hereditary estate.

This fourth shall be taken from the free portion of the estate.

Art. 894. If the testator leaves illegitimate children, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to
one-third of the hereditary estate of the deceased and the illegitimate children to another
third. The remaining third shall be at the free disposal of the testator.

Art. 895. The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the natural
children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate
children or descendants.

The legitime of an illegitimate child who is neither an acknowledged natural, nor a natural
child by legal fiction, shall be equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an
acknowledged natural child.

The legitime of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at the
free disposal of the testator, provided that in no case shall the total legitime of such
illegitimate children exceed that free portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse
must first be fully satisfied.

Art. 896. Illegitimate children who may survive with legitimate parents or ascendants of the
deceased shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate to be taken from the portion
at the free disposal of the testator.

Art. 897. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or descendants, and
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction, such surviving spouse shall
be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children which must be
taken from that part of the estate which the testator can freely dispose of.

Art. 898. If the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or descendants, and with
illegitimate children other than acknowledged natural, or natural children by legal fiction, the
share of the surviving spouse shall be the same as that provided in the preceding article.

Art. 899. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate parents or ascendants and
with illegitimate children, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-eighth of the
hereditary estate of the deceased which must be taken from the free portion, and the
illegitimate children shall be entitled to one-fourth of the estate which shall be taken also from
the disposable portion. The testator may freely dispose of the remaining one-eighth of the
estate.

Art. 900. If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half
of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the
other half.
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized in articulo
mortis, and the testator died within three months from the time of the marriage, the legitime
of the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate, except
when they have been living as husband and wife for more than five years. In the latter case,
the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the preceding paragraph. (n)

Art. 901. When the testator dies leaving illegitimate children and no other compulsory heirs,
such illegitimate children shall have a right to one-half of the hereditary estate of the
deceased.

The other half shall be at the free disposal of the testator.

Art. 903. The legitime of the parents who have an illegitimate child, when such child leaves
neither legitimate descendants, nor a surviving spouse, nor illegitimate children, is one-half
of the hereditary estate of such illegitimate child. If only legitimate or illegitimate children are
left, the parents are not entitled to any legitime whatsoever. If only the widow or widower
survives with parents of the illegitimate child, the legitime of the parents is one-fourth of the
hereditary estate of the child, and that of the surviving spouse also one-fourth of the estate.

P.D. 603, Article 39;

Article 39. Effects of Adoption. - The adoption shall:

1. Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter: Provided, That an adopted child cannot acquire Philippine
citizenship by virtue of such adoption; lawphi1.net

2. Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parent or parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;

3. Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname; and

4. Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter: Provided, That if the adopter
is survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and by an adopted person, the latter
shall not have more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child: Provided,
further, That any property received gratuitously by the adopted from the adopter shall
revert to the adopter should the former predecease the latter without legitimate issue
unless the adopted has, during his lifetime, alienated such property: Provided, finally,
That in the last case, should the adopted leave no property other than that received
from the adopter, and he is survived by illegitimate issue or a spouse, such illegitimate
issue collectively or the spouse shall receive one-fourth of such property; if the
adopted is survived by illegitimate issue and a spouse, then the former collectively
shall receive one-fourth and the latter also one-fourth, the rest in any case reverting
to the adopter, observing in the case of the illegitimate issue the proportion provided
for in Article 895 of the Civil Code.

The adopter shall not be a legal heir of the adopted person, whose parents by nature shall
inherit from him, except that if the latter are both dead, the adopting parent or parents take
the place of the natural parents in the line of succession, whether testate or interstate.
R.A. No. 8552, Sec. 18;
Section 18. Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However,
if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary
succession shall govern.

FC 189 – 190;
Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname
of the adopters;

(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate
and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent
by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly
by both spouses; and

(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.
(39(1)a, (3)a, PD 603)

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the
following rules:
(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving spouse of
the adopted shall inherit from the adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules of
legal or intestate succession;

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted concur with
the adopters, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be
inherited by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted and the other half,
by the adopters.

(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving spouse
of the adopted, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be
inherited by the illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving spouse, and one-third
by the adopters;

(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules
of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

Cases:

SAYSON vs. CA, GR 89224 – 25, JANUARY 23, 1992;

FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on Nov. 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro,
who had married Isabel Bautista, died on Mar. 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on
Mar. 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, all
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.

On Apr. 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa and Remedios, together with Juana (Isabel’s
mother), filed a complaint for partition of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel. Delia,
Edmundo (both legally adopted) and Doribel (the legitimate daughter), who alleged
successional rights to the estate as the decedents’ lawful descendants, resisted said complaint
and filed their own complaint for the partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela
claiming that they are entitled to inherit Teodoro’s share in his parents’ estate by right of
representation.

The trial court declared them entitled to inherit by right of representation.

On appeal, the CA modified the decision disqualifying Delia and Edmundo from inheriting from
the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N Delia, Edmundo and Doribel are entitled to inherit their father’s share in the
estate of his (Teodoro) parents’ estate by right of representation?

HELD:
YES as to Doribel but NO as to Delia and Edmundo.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent here deceased father in the distribution of
the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Art. 981 (NCC), she is entitled to the share
her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares
of her grandparents’ other children.

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to
be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, those rights do not include the
right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting
parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and
Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive
heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
CA was correct however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the
inheritance of her grandparents’ intestate estate, the other private respondents being only
the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.

IN THE MATTER OF ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA, GR 148311, MARCH 31,

2005;
FACTS: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mother’s surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and
pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural
mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the
future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE: W/N an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of
her natural mother as her middle name?

HELD:
Yes, there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that “an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother.

REYES vs. SOTERO, GR 167405, FEB. 16, 2006;

FACTS: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and
settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising
who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal properties were allegedly in the
possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.

Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of
Lising and the latter’s husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the
only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the

certification of her adoption from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was
registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued by the clerk of
court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.

Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast
on Petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain “badges of fraud.”

The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the
petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos
spouse since, “imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its
authenticity under a cloud of doubt.”

ISSUE: W/N petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of
irregularities?

HELD:
No, Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she
had already presented before the trial court.
An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public records,
the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the
status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the court which rendered the
judgment.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a

public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications
issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s
adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie
evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of
petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient
evidence. Mere “imputations of irregularities” will not cast a “cloud of doubt” on the adoption
decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary
is offered.

IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM, GR 168992-93, MAY 21, 2009;

FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as
if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing
of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In
2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.
Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven
months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the
adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt?

HELD: Petition was denied.

The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall
jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses
jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word “shall”
signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent
given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as
an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise
be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency
and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF SUNTAY, GR 183053, JUNE 16, 2010;
FACTS: Petitioner, Federico, is opposing respondent’s Isabel, his granddaughter, for her
petition for Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina, Federico’s wife,
who died without leaving a will. Isabel’s father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as “null and void.”
Federico anchors his oppostion on the fact, that his son, Emilio had his marraige judicially
declared null and void alleging that based on Art. 992 of the Civil Code, Isabel has no right to
succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child.

ISSUE: (As to the Iron Clad Doctrine) Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?

HELD:
Yes, Isabel is a legitimate child. Article 144 of the Civil Code provides that children born of
such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights
and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or
not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a
voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by
final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.

Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been
entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from
being totally wiped out.

The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of
Article 89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of
annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the
same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called
natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the
second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that “ children conceived of
voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.”

SUNTAY vs. SUNTAY, GR 183053, OCTOBER 10, 2012;

The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio over the estate
of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter
Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the decision.

Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay

(respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the
issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III)
and respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to
declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu
as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is
further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No
costs.3

We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.

The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was
survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three
legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate
grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio
A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.

The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the
spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings,
Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of
Isabel’s parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal
grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed
by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.

In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her
among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the
marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on the finding that:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans memorial
Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient
was already out of the hospital, he continued to be under observation and treatment.

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified
as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist
(sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of
adequate understanding of right and wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958,
years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity
of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after (sic) existing
at the time of the marriage:

xxxx

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental
condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason.
The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist
handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication
of schizophernia (sic).4

Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a
complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same
special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted
their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty
minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s testimony in court that her
grandparents’ visits caused her and her siblings stress and anxiety.5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.

On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate docketed
as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that:
(1) as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the
decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent,
he must be accorded preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had
been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration
of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son,
Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their
conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of the decedent’s
estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated;
and (7) Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.

Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the ground
that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate
grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void.
However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her
siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on
paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all
represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.

Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate
on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio
III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition,
alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to
administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.

On 13 November 2000, Federico died.

Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision
appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the Opposition-in-

Intervention is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed administrator
of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution
of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱ 200,000.00, conditioned as follows:

(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory;

(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the
same, or dividends thereon;

(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when required
by the court, and

(4) To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his
favor.6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of
the subject estate:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of
Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay
III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of
administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand (₱ 200,000.00) Pesos.7

As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the
appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving
weight to his interest in Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III
and

Isabel, we considered that:

1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband,
Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;

2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent,
Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence
of their marriage;

3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those of
her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership remains
undetermined and unliquidated; and

4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution
of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in
representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.

In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor of
her sole administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose
estate she seeks to administer.

Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the
order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that
Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had
demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to
become a co-administrator thereof.

Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not
an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the
decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof;
(3) Emilio III’s actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November
2001 emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section
6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint administration as there
are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented."

To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and
Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate. We did not choose.
Considering merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III
should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-
administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider
our decision of 16 June 2010.

The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down
in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in

the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment
of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving
spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been
reinforced in jurisprudence.8

The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a

decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.9 This is the same
consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule
is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the
estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the
estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to
be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in
the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.

To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the administration of
a decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving spouse’s interest in the conjugal partnership
or community property forming part of the decedent’s estate. 11 Likewise, a surviving spouse
is a compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership
or absolute community property.

It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of

administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been
allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
which specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving
spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of
the Rules of Court which say that "x x x when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or
is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x."

In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator
for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein. 13 We recognized that the
appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of a person’s
suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment
of the court exercising the power of appointment.14

Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American
jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits
of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; 15 (2) where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause,
an intricate and perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; 17 and when a person
entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.18

In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of special co-
administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the probate of the decedent’s will.
Pending the probate thereof, we recognized Matias’ special interest in the decedent’s estate
as universal heir and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in
the administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands that the two (2)
factions among the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent, consisting of an instituted heir
(Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be represented in the management
of the decedent’s estate.19

Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that "inasmuch as
petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory
heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to
the probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests."20

Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. Ventura 21 where we
allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent as
co-administrators. However, we drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of
kin, the nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona
while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The
"next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent’s property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the
nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice
of administrator. ‘Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the
amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be
preferred.’" (citations omitted)

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to
preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person
or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both
interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)

In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In that
case, we affirmed the legitimate child’s appointment as special administrator, and eventually
as regular administrator, of the decedent’s estate as against the surviving spouse who the
lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as good law, we pointed out that
unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind
or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.

In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs squabbling over
the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside the probate court’s refusal to
appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate
of the decedent and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed
by the probate court pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator
of the estatein the early part of his administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases
of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus:

Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v. Court of
Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their
claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to
appoint special co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling
heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to
designate not just one but also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now
whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among
themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion.

Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual circumstances
other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant
case. In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of
the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we
considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal.
Quite significantly, since the lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more
than one special administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the lower
court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another special
administrator.

In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator,

considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the
testatrix in her will," for this Court to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It
is also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among
the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special
administrator as this fact was taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona,
to "overshadow" the objections to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of
kinship."

Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special co-
administrator because it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns
one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will
would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in the
special administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we
held that the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin in the proper
administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only the right of succession over
a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership
for which the good or bad administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more
critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we recognized the
distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular administrator of the deceased
spouse's estate when we counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong case
to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."

Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was
based upon the independent proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee
that were not necessarily related to the demand for representation being repeatedly urged by
respondents.26(Emphasis supplied)

In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory character of the rule
on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration:

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the
issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next
of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an
administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set
aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor. 27

Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the legal contemplation of

a "next of kin," thus:

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of
the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When
the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute
of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled
to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of
whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent,
the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate
action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted
within bounds when it looked into and passed upon the claimed relationship of respondent to
the late Francisco Angeles.29

Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of, and benefits to, the
estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-administrator. We emphasized that
where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the
appointment of co-administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the
estate and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to
Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of the
attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review
of such position by the foregoing survey of cases.

The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does
not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does
squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of
preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. 31 Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in
the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of
kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a
demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court 32 and depends
on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.33

Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we
reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.

These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out
in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over
the other.

1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one
hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal
grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as adverse interest of some kind
by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;

2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working
harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent’s estate,
ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and

3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina’s estate,
has not looked after the estate’s welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice
thereof.

Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in
the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III
has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out
that after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not
looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and
prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following:

1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory,
omitted in the partial inventories34 he filed therewith properties of the
estate35 including several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock,
motor vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section 1, 36paragraph a,
Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
 2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico’s settlement of the
decedent’s estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly
belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially), and which contained a
declaration that the decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for
Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.37

In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to the
following imputations of Isabel that:

1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;

2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the decedent;

3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different individuals or
persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and

4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of falsified
documents;38

Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and performing
the functions of administrator of Cristina’s estate:

1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, Isabel, in
her pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption of that
office, arguing that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is not among the
judgments authorized by the Rules of Court which may be immediately implemented
or executed;"

2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to Isabel’s vociferous
objections to Emilio III’s attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision was
under appeal to the Court of Appeals;

3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof,
and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedent’s estate,
such that it cannot constitute a complete and total listing of the decedent’s properties;
and

4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as private
complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the
prosecutor of a possible motu propio dismissal of the cases.

While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed delay in the filing
of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in
the course of the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s
accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which
properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about.

The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted
in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became proven
fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on
two occasions of Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and
her siblings, from the list of heirs.

As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to
faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedent’s estate with the end in view of
distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio
III’s omission and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability
as administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in
the estate of the decedent, Cristina.

In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation,
is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each
other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to
work as co-administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the
testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her
siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III
bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s
estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said
estate.

Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a preliminary order to
facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not without
remedies to protect his interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of
Appeals,39 we mapped out as among the allowable participation of "any interested persons"
or "any persons interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:

xxxx

4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased
"to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of
the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;"

5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and
allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;"

6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested"
before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the
properties of the estate; and

7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an
order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are
either satisfied or provided for.44

In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in Section 2,
Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings

upon death, resignation, or removal. – If an executor or administrator neglects to render his
account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the
court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its
discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the
court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or
administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.

Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that
the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of
the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better
qualified to administer the estate of the decedent.

Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a
final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the
estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the
properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:

The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence
sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been
judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the
estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares
to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs.45

Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental Comment46 of Emilio III
questioning the Special Second Division which issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III
asseverates that "the operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional
and void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision on 16 June
2010 on the petition filed by him:

7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting separately from
the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions
of the Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special
Second Division acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila. 47

For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is not a different
division created by the Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June 2010, penned by
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different composition, with the advent of
Justice Nachura’s retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court provides:

Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed

resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special
Division. – Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution
and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the
ponente and the other Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the
decision or signed resolution.

If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited
himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall
be replaced through raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members
of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and who
concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who participated and concurred in the
rendition of the decision or signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the
new ponente.

If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or signed resolution
has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or
herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be
replaced through raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other
Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the
appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall replace the designated Justice as replacement
Member of the Special Division.

Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from among the other
Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.

If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision or signed
Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member of
the Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other
Members of the Division to which he or she belongs.

If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with
the participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time
said pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)

As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in venue for the
Supreme Court's summer session held last April.48

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision in

G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate
of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

BARTOLOME vs. SSS, GR 19253, NOV. 10, 2012;

DOCTRINE:
In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and
relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

FACTS: John Colcol died in a work-related accident while he was employed as an electrician
by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’
Compensation Program (ECP).

Since John was childless and unmarried, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits with the
SSS.

However, SSS denied the claim, stating that the petitioner is not considered as the parent of
John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol, the victim’s great grandfather, therefore
Bernardina cannot be considered as John’s beneficiary because she is not the deceased’s
legitimate parent. Cornelio Colcol, however, already died on October 26, 1987, less than three
years since the decree of John’s adoption became final.

ISSUE:
W/N the biological parents of the covered qualify as the deceased’s dependent parent and,
thus, entitled to the death benefits?

HELD:
Yes, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC
missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three
(3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of
the biological parents.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed
by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely
eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from
the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the
following rules:
xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules
of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his
parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the provisions, it is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of succession
tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from
the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child,
the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights
of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the
adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too
should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the
event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

Thus, the Court rules that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in the
restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.

D. Restrictions regarding the legitime, NCC 904, 872, 905 – 907, 1347;

Art. 904. The testator cannot deprive his compulsory heirs of their legitime, except in cases
expressly specified by law.

Neither can he impose upon the same any burden, encumbrance, condition, or substitution
of any kind whatsoever.

Art. 872. The testator cannot impose any charge, condition, or substitution whatsoever upon
the legitimes prescribed in this Code. Should he do so, the same shall be considered as not
imposed.

Art. 905. Every renunciation or compromise as regards a future legitime between the person
owing it and his compulsory heirs is void, and the latter may claim the same upon the death
of the former; but they must bring to collation whatever they may have received by virtue of
the renunciation or compromise.

Art. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

Art. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory
heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.

Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things,
may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object
of contracts.

No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized
by law.

All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy
may likewise be the object of a contract.

E. Determination or computation – NCC 908 – 913;

Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator
shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed
in the will.

To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the
testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.

Art. 909. Donations given to children shall be charged to their legitime.

Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate of which the testator
could have disposed by his last will.

Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable portion, they shall be reduced
according to the rules established by this Code.

Art. 910. Donations which an illegitimate child may have received during the lifetime of his
father or mother, shall be charged to his legitime.

Should they exceed the portion that can be freely disposed of, they shall be reduced in the
manner prescribed by this Code.

Art. 911. After the legitime has been determined in accordance with the three preceding
articles, the reduction shall be made as follows:

(1) Donations shall be respected as long as the legitime can be covered, reducing or
annulling, if necessary, the devises or legacies made in the will;

(2) The reduction of the devises or legacies shall be pro rata, without any distinction
whatever.

If the testator has directed that a certain devise or legacy be paid in preference to
others, it shall not suffer any reduction until the latter have been applied in full to the
payment of the legitime.

(3) If the devise or legacy consists of a usufruct or life annuity, whose value may be
considered greater than that of the disposable portion, the compulsory heirs may
choose between complying with the testamentary provision and delivering to the
devisee or legatee the part of the inheritance of which the testator could freely dispose.

Art. 912. If the devise subject to reduction should consist of real property, which cannot be
conveniently divided, it shall go to the devisee if the reduction does not absorb one-half of its
value; and in a contrary case, to the compulsory heirs; but the former and the latter shall
reimburse each other in cash for what respectively belongs to them.

The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value
does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime.

Art. 913. If the heirs or devisees do not choose to avail themselves of the right granted by
the preceding article, any heir or devisee who did not have such right may exercise it; should
the latter not make use of it, the property shall be sold at public auction at the instance of
any one of the interested parties.

Cases:
VDA. DE TUPAS vs. RTC, 144 SCRA 622;

FACTS: Involved in this appeal is the question of whether or not a donation inter vivos by a
donor now deceased is inofficious and should be reduced at the instance of the donor's
widow.

Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving his widow,
Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir. He also left a win dated May 18,
1976, which was admitted to probate on September 30, 1980 in Special Proceedings No.
13994 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Among the assets listed in his will
were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital.
However, at the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having
donated them the year before (on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had
thereafter obtained title to said lots.

Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance, Tupas'
widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. in the same Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental (docketed as Civil Case No. 16089) to have the donation declared
inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible " ... by one-half or such
proportion as ... (might be deemed) justified ... and " ... the resulting deduction ... "
restored and conveyed or delivered to her. The complaint also prayed for attorney's fees
and such other relief as might be proper.

The Trial Court did not see things her way. Upon the facts above stated, on which the
parties stipulated, 1 said Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, rejecting her claim
on several grounds, viz.:

... (1) Article 900 relied upon by plaintiff is not applicable because the
properties which were disposed of by way of donation one year before the
death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary estate at the
time of his death on August 20, 1978; (2) the donation properties were
Epifanio's capital or separate estate; and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc. being a
stranger and not a compulsory heir, the donation inter vivos made in its favor
was not subject to collation under Art. 106 1, C.C.2

The Trial Court is in error on all counts and must be reversed.

A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is

that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). 3 If he
does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious
and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to its
taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing
donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a donation is, moreover, collationable that is, its value
is imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the tune of his death for the purpose
of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable
portion of the estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory
heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code would seem to limit collation
to the latter class of donations. And this has been held to be a long-established rule
in Liguez vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., 4 where this Court said:

... Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set aside in so far
as inofficious: i.e., in excess of the portion of free disposal (Civil Code of
 1889, Articles 636, 645), computed as provided in Articles 818 and 819, and
bearing in mind that collationable gifts' under Article 818 should include gifts
made not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of
strangers, as decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of 4 May
1899 and 16 June 1902. So that in computing the legitimes, the value of the
property donated to herein appellant, Conchita Liguez, should be considered
part of the donor's estate. Once again, only the court of origin has the
requisite data to determine whether the donation is inofficious or not. 5

The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate
of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to
collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that collation contemplates and particularly
applies to gifts inter vivos. 6 The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or
separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness does not
assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what was within
his power to give.

Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having been made to
a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law 7 chargeable to the freely disposable portion of the
donor's estate, to be reduced insofar as inofficious, i.e., it exceeds said portion and thus
impairs the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in order to find out whether it is inofficious or
not, recourse must be had to the rules established by the Civil Code for the determination of
the legitime and, by extension, of the disposable portion. These rules are set forth in
Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the Code, on the basis of which the following step-by-step
procedure has been correctly outlined:

(1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of
the testator's death;

(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be

paid out or deducted from the value of the property thus left;

(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the liabilities,
giving rise to the hereditary estate;

(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they
were made, of donations subject to collation; and

(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the total
thus found the portion that the law provides as the legitime of each respective
compulsory heir.8

Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely
disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measured. If the value of
the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it must be
allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be
reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be
returned or reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased
Epifanio R. Tupas.
For obvious reasons, this determination cannot now be made, as it requires appreciation of
data not before this Court and may necessitate the production of evidence in the Court a
quo.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-appellant Partenza Lucerna

Vda. de Tupas is adjudged entitled to so much of the donated property in question, as may
be found in excess of the freely disposable portion of the estate of Epifanio B. Tupas,
determined in the manner above-indicated. Let the case be remanded to the Trial Court for
further appropriate proceedings in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

MATEO vs. LAGUA, 29 SCRA 684;

FACTS: Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on
May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title
remained in the donor’s name.

In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter, who
lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots.
At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots’ harvests, but in 1926 he refused
to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and
won for her possession of the lots plus damages.

On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger
son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano
stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was
issued under respondent’s name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.

The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered
cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In
1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two
lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription,
having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the
donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by
494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given
by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano’s other heir, Gervacio.
The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey
to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE: W/N the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being
inofficious?

HELD:
Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial court’s order of dismissal
sustained.

Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations
subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained
whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation
may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated
property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as legitime in the
properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with the evidence
then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation
involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the
respondents.

Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of
the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not
include those imposed in the will.

To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator
that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.

NATCHER vs. CA, GR 133000, OCTOBER 2, 2001;

NATURE Petition for Review

PETITIONERS Patricia Natcher

RESPONDENTS Hon. Court of Appeals and the Heirs of Graciano Del Rosario Leticia
Del Rosario, Emilia Del Rosario-Manangan, Rosalinda Fuentes Llana, Rodolfo Fuentes,
Alberto Fuentes, Evelyn Del Rosario, And Eduardo Del Rosario

SUMMARY. The respondent children of decedent Graciano assails

the sale of a parcel of land by the decedent to his petitioner-wife
(their stepmother) during the subsistence of a valid marriage. They
filed civil action for reconveyance and annulment of title against
petitioner Natcher. The RTC ruled that the sale was an advance on
her legitime. The respondent-children question the jurisdiction of the
RTC acting as a court of general jurisdiction to pass upon the
question of the advancement of property made by the decedent to
his heirs.
DOCTRINE. Under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court,
questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made
by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the
court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final
order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir.

FACTS.

 Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by a TCT. They had
six children.
 When Graciana died, Graciano and his children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Graciana’s estate adjudicating and dividing amongst themselves the real estate property.
Graciano received 8/14 of the share while his six children received 1/14 share each.
 Later on Graciano and his children entered into an Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision
of Real Property with Waiver of Rights where they subdivided among themselves the parcel
of land. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest
in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters
registered under Gracianos name. This 447.60 square meter lot was furthermore divided
into two lots covered by two separate TCTs. The first lot was sold to a third person but the
second lot was sold to Patricia Natcher (petitioner) who at the time of the sale was married
to Graciano.
 Graciano died.
 Respondents, Graciano’s children, filed a civil case before the RTC against petitioner Natcher
alleging that upon Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the lot, by making it appear that Graciano executed
a Deed of Sale. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a
consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
 Petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano on 20 March 1980 and
thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner
further alleged that during Gracianos lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance,
properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against
Gracianos estate or against herein petitioners property.
 The RTC rendered a decision holding:
o The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia
Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence
that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that
there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the
spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
o The deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally
prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
o Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may
however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher
being a compulsory heir of the deceased.
 On appeal the CA held:
o It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate. The RTC, trying an ordinary action for
reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed
the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person. Thus the RTC erred in regarding the subject property as an
advance inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule on the
validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a
separate proceeding instituted for that purpose.
 Aggrieved, petitioner Natcher assails the decision of the CA on a petition for review.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON an RTC, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for

reconveyance and annulment of title pass upon the question of advancement of
property made by the decedent to his heirs. – NO.

Under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made

or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the
 final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions
and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word may, it is nevertheless clear that the
same provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the court having jurisdiction
of the estate proceedings. Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in
its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue
of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil
Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind,
the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances,
the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly
pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his
wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

2. WON there was waiver on the part of the children of the authority of the RTC
to rule on the specific issue of advancement made by Graciano to petitioner
Natcher. – NO.

The SC does not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents
inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the
trial court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of
advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.Same rules apply here. Please do
not deviate from the template. If copying

text from a website or escra, I suggest EDIT > Paste Special > Unformatted text > “Ok”.

This Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo and Mendoza vs.
Teh that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then
Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate
jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. It is a procedural
question involving a mode of practice which may be waived. But there was no waiver in this
case.

DECISION.

Petition DENIED. CA affirmed.

COLLATION, NCC 1061 – 1077;

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title,
in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so
expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation
should be reduced as inofficious.

Art. 1063. Property left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not
otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired.

Art. 1064. When the grandchildren, who survive with their uncles, aunts, or cousins, inherit
from their grandparents in representation of their father or mother, they shall bring to
collation all that their parents, if alive, would have been obliged to bring, even though such
grandchildren have not inherited the property.

They shall also bring to collation all that they may have received from the decedent during
his lifetime, unless the testator has provided otherwise, in which case his wishes must be
respected, if the legitime of the co-heirs is not prejudiced.

Art. 1065. Parents are not obliged to bring to collation in the inheritance of their ascendants
any property which may have been donated by the latter to their children.

Art. 1066. Neither shall donations to the spouse of the child be brought to collation; but if
they have been given by the parent to the spouses jointly, the child shall be obliged to bring
to collation one-half of the thing donated.

Art. 1067. Expenses for support, education, medical attendance, even in extraordinary
illness, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary gifts are not subject to collation.

Art. 1068. Expenses incurred by the parents in giving their children a professional, vocational
or other career shall not be brought to collation unless the parents so provide, or unless they
impair the legitime; but when their collation is required, the sum which the child would have
spent if he had lived in the house and company of his parents shall be deducted therefrom.

Art. 1069. Any sums paid by a parent in satisfaction of the debts of his children, election
expenses, fines, and similar expenses shall be brought to collation.

Art. 1070. Wedding gifts by parents and ascendants consisting of jewelry, clothing, and
outfit, shall not be reduced as inofficious except insofar as they may exceed one-tenth of the
sum which is disposable by will.

Art. 1071. The same things donated are not to be brought to collation and partition, but only
their value at the time of the donation, even though their just value may not then have been
assessed.

Their subsequent increase or deterioration and even their total loss or destruction, be it
accidental or culpable, shall be for the benefit or account and risk of the donee.

Art. 1072. In the collation of a donation made by both parents, one-half shall be brought to
the inheritance of the father, and the other half, to that of the mother. That given by one
alone shall be brought to collation in his or her inheritance.

Art. 1073. The donee's share of the estate shall be reduced by an amount equal to that
already received by him; and his co-heirs shall receive an equivalent, as much as possible, in
property of the same nature, class and quality.
Art. 1074. Should the provisions of the preceding article be impracticable, if the property
donated was immovable, the co-heirs shall be entitled to receive its equivalent in cash or
securities, at the rate of quotation; and should there be neither cash or marketable securities
in the estate, so much of the other property as may be necessary shall be sold at public
auction.

If the property donated was movable, the co-heirs shall only have a right to select an
equivalent of other personal property of the inheritance at its just price.

Art. 1075. The fruits and interest of the property subject to collation shall not pertain to the
estate except from the day on which the succession is opened.

For the purpose of ascertaining their amount, the fruits and interest of the property of the
estate of the same kind and quality as that subject to collation shall be made the standard of
assessment.

Art. 1076. The co-heirs are bound to reimburse to the donee the necessary expenses which
he has incurred for the preservation of the property donated to him, though they may not
have augmented its value.

The donee who collates in kind an immovable which has been given to him must be
reimbursed by his co-heirs for the improvements which have increased the value of the
property, and which exist at the time the partition if effected.

As to works made on the estate for the mere pleasure of the donee, no reimbursement is due
him for them; he has, however, the right to remove them, if he can do so without injuring
the estate.

Art. 1077. Should any question arise among the co-heirs upon the obligation to bring to
collation or as to the things which are subject to collation, the distribution of the estate shall
not be interrupted for this reason, provided adequate security is given.

Cases:
DE ROMA vs. CA, 152 SCRA 205;
FACTS: Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died
intestate. When administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointed administratrix
and filed an inventory of the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain
properties donated by their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The
Parcels of Land totaled P10,297.50 and the value is not disputed. The TC issued an order in
favor of Buhay because when Candelaria donated the properties to Buhay she said in the
Deed of Donation “sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli” which the TC
interpreted as a prohibition to collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were
not impaired. On appeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable
not an express prohibition to collate.

ISSUE: W/N these lands are subject to collation?

HELD:
The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
 from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should
have so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless
the donation should be reduced as inofficious.

The SC affirmed the appellate court’s decision and that it merely described the donation as
irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the donated
properties from collation as required under the provisions of the NCC. Given the precise
language of the deed of donation the decedent donor would have included an express
prohibition to collate if that had been the donor’s intention. Absent such indication of that
intention, the rule not the exemption should be applied.

VIZCONDE vs, CA, GR 118449, FEBRUARY 11, 1998;

FACTS: Lauro Vizconde and his wife Estrellita has 2 daughters. On May 22, 1979, Estrellita
purchased from her father a parcel of land (Valenzuela property). Later on, she sold the
Valenzuela property Lim.

On June 1990, she bought from Premier Homes a parcel of land with improvements
(Paranaque property) using the proceeds from the sale of the Valenzuela property. On June
1991, the Vizconde massacre happened. Estrellita and her daughters were killed thereafter
leaving Lauro as t sole heir of their estate. Later on, Rafael (Estrellita’s father) died intestate.
The heirs of Rafael averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the
properties distributed by Nicolas to his children during his lifetime, including the Paranaque
property. The trial court in its decision did not include the Paranaque property as part of the
estate of Rafael. Ramon, one of the heirs of Rafael, filed his objection against the order of the
trial court.

ISSUE: W/N the collation is proper?

HELD:
No, The probate court made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Parañaque property.
It was the Valenzuela property that was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale. The
Parañaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the
Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation
of the Parañaque property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court presupposes
that the Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita.

Records indicate, however, that the Parañaque property was conveyed for and in
consideration of P900,000.00, by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has
no participation therein, and Lauro who inherited and is now the present owner of the
Parañaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs. Thus, the probate court's order of collation
against Lauro is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir,
and not to herein Lauro who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate.

As it stands, collation of the Parañaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers
only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs
which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Parañaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in
a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and
participation as heir" in the Parañaque property.
IMPERIAL vs. CA, GR 112483, OCTOBER 8, 1999;
TOPIC: XXI. Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession; E. Collation, Art.
1061, 1062, 1063, 1064, 1065, 1066, FC 92 (1), 109 (2), 113, 1067, FC 194, Art. 1068,
1069, 1070, 1071, 1072, 1073, 1074, 1075, 1076, 1077

DOCTRINE: Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to
a claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. CA, we declared that what is brought to
collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was
donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys
ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss
thereof is for the account of the heir of the donee.

NATURE: Petition to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals

PONENTE: GONZAGA-REYES, J.

FACTS:

1. Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land
known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the
said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired
title over the land and proceeded to subdivide it into several lots.

2. Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite the contract’s designation as one
of “Absolute Sale”, the transaction was in fact a donation.

3. On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for
annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, Civil Case No. 1177, in the CFI of Albay,
on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into signing the said
document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a compromise agreement,
approved by the CFI of Albay on November 3, 1961, under which terms: (1) Leoncio
recognized the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and
(2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of the donated
land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the convenient disposal of
Leoncio. In case of Leoncio’s death, it was agreed that the balance of the deposit will
be withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs.

4. On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died,
leaving only two heirs --- the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son,
and an adopted son, Victor Imperial.

5. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-mentioned

case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. On March 15, 1962, the
motion for execution was duly granted.

6. Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without issue,
survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of
 the disputed land. Four years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving
as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.

7. Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for
annulment of the donation with the RTC of Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No.
7646. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the
compromise judgment rendered by the CFI of Albay.

8. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

9. On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case,
for “Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession” with the RTC
of Legazpi City, seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the
above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and inofficiousness.

10. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio to execute the
donation by taking undue advantage of the latter’s physical weakness and mental
unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the
legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest.

11. In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had conveyed sufficient property to
Victor to cover his legitime, consisting of 563 hectares of agricultural land in Manito,
Albay; (2) reiterated the defense of res judicata, and (3) raised the additional defenses
of prescription and laches.

12. Plaintiff Cesar Villalon died on December 26, 1989, while the case was pending, and
was substituted in this action by his sons, namely, Antonio, Roberto, Augusto, Ricardo
and Cesar, Jr., all surnamed Villalon, and his widow, Esther H. Villalon.

13. The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor, on the
basis of its finding that at the time of Leoncio’s death, he left no property other than
the 32,837-square meter parcel of land which he had donated to petitioner. The RTC
went on further to state that petitioner’s allegation that other properties existed and
were inherited by Victor was not substantiated by the evidence.

14. The legitime of Victor was determined by the trial court in this manner:

Considering that the property donated is 32,837 square meters, one half of that or
16,418 square meters becomes the free portion of Leoncio which could be absorbed
in the donation to defendant. The other half, which is also 16,418 square meters is
where the legitime of the adopted son Victor Imperial has to be taken.

15. The proportion of the legitime of the legitimate child (including the adopted child) in
relation to the acknowledged natural child (defendant) is 10 is to 5, with the
acknowledged natural child getting ½ of the legitime of the legitimate (adopted) child,
in accordance with Art. 895 of the New Civil Code which provides:
 “The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the natural
children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each of the
legitimate children or descendants.”

16. From the 16,418 square meters left (after the free portion has been taken) plaintiffs
are therefore entitled to 10,940 square meters while defendant gets 5,420 square
meters.

17. The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years under
Article 1141 of the Civil Code, reckoned from March 15, 1962, when the writ of
execution of the compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177 was issued, and that the
original complaint having been filed in 1986, the action has not yet prescribed. In
addition, the trial court regarded the defense of prescription as having been waived,
this not being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial.

18. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Deed of Absolute Sale which is considered a
donation, is hereby reduced proportionately insofar as it affected the legitime of the
late Victor Imperial, which share is inherited by the plaintiffs herein, to the extent that
plaintiffs are ordered to be given by defendant a portion of 10,940 square meters
thereof.

In order to avoid further conflict, the 10,940 share to be given to plaintiffs should
include the portion which they are presently occupying, by virtue of the extended lease
to their father Ricardo Villalon, where the bungalow in question stands.

The remaining portion to be given to plaintiffs may come from any other portion that
may be agreed upon by the parties, otherwise, this court will appoint a commissioner to
undertake the partition.

The other 21,897 square meters should go to the defendant as part of his legitime and
by virtue of the reduced donation.

19. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Was the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of petitioner Eloy Imperial
inofficious and should be reduced?

HELD: NO.

20. A perusal of the records leads us to conclude that there is no identity of parties and of
cause of action as between Civil Case No. 1177 and Civil Case No. 7646.
21. Civil Case No. 1177 was instituted by Leoncio in his capacity as donor of the questioned
donation. While it is true that upon his death, Victor was substituted as plaintiff of the
action, such does not alter the fact that Victor’s participation in the case was in
representation of the interests of the original plaintiff, Leoncio. The purpose behind the
rule on substitution of parties is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of the
estate, or his heir, as in this case, for which no court appointment is required.

22. Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that there is substantial identity between Leoncio and
private respondents, being heirs and successors-in-interest of Victor, is unavailing.

23. Moreover, Leoncio’s cause of action as donor of the property was fraud, purportedly
employed upon him by petitioner in the execution of the donation. While the same
circumstances of fraud and deceit are alleged in private respondents’ complaint, it also
raises the additional ground of inofficiousness of donation.

24. Contrary to petitioner’s contentions, inofficiousness of donation does not, and could not,
form part of Leoncio’s cause of action in Civil Case No. 1177. Inofficiousness as a cause
of action may arise only upon the death of the donor, as the value of the donation will
then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor-deceased.

25. While in Civil Case No. 1177, Leoncio sought the revocation in full of the donation on
ground of fraud, the instant case actually has two alternative causes of action.

26. First, for fraud and deceit, under the same circumstances as alleged in Leoncio’s
complaint, which seeks the annulment in full of the donation, and which the trial court
correctly dismissed because the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 1177 served
as a ratification and waiver on the part of Leoncio of whatever defects in voluntariness
and consent may have been attendant in the making of the donation.

27. The second cause of action is the alleged inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in
the impairment of Victor’s legitime, which seeks the annulment, not of the entire
donation, but only of that portion diminishing the legitime. It is on the basis of this
second cause of action that private respondents prevailed in the lower courts.

28. Petitioner next questions the right of private respondents to contest the donation.
Petitioner sources his argument from Article 772 of the Civil Code, thus:

Only those who at the time of the donor’s death have a right to the legitime and
their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of inofficious
donations. xxx

29. As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was only Victor who
was entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing an action to contest
the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even
moved for execution of the compromise judgment therein.

30. No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must be
remembered that at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the
compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the
 execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise
agreement.

31. More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of
inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under
Article 1051 of Civil Code:

The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument,

or by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or
intestate proceedings.

32. Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latter’s death,
his act of moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an
act of renunciation of his legitime.

33. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction
of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor’s heirs, upon his death, precluded
from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized under Article 772, and
also in Article 1053:

If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right
shall be transmitted to his heirs.

34. We find merit in petitioner’s other assignment of errors. Having ascertained this action
as one for reduction of an inofficious donation, we cannot sustain the holding of both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty
years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of both courts that this case is a
“real action over an immovable” allots undue credence to private respondents’
description of their complaint, as one for “Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and
Recovery of Possession of Property”, which suggests the action to be, in part, a real
action enforced by those with claim of title over the disputed land.

35. Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to
a claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals, we
declared that what is brought to collation is not the donated property itself,
but the value of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this
is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its
acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is
for the account of the heir or donee.

36. What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an inofficious
donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation of
donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or
adoption of a child; (2) four years, for non-compliance with conditions of the donation;
and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to
support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their support.
37. Donations as in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of
impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which
reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.

38. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be
brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year
prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required
under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of
compulsory heirs.

39. From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29
SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter
nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the
death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may
be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.

40. It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case.
The action, therefore, has long prescribed.

41. A perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that not only has prescription set in,
private respondents are also guilty of estoppel by laches. It may be recalled that
Leoncio died on January 8, 1962. Fifteen years later, Victor died, leaving as his sole
heir Ricardo Villalon, who also died four years later. While Victor was alive, he gave no
indication of any interest to contest the donation of his deceased father.

42. As we have discussed earlier, the fact that he actively participated in Civil Case No.
1177 did not amount to a renunciation of his inheritance and does not preclude him
from bringing an action to claim his legitime. These are matters that Victor could not
possibly be unaware of, considering that he is a lawyer. Ricardo Villalon was even a
lessee of a portion of the donated property, and could have instituted the action as sole
heir of his natural son, or at the very least, raised the matter of legitime by way of
counterclaim in an ejectment case filed against him by petitioner in 1979. Neither does
it help private respondents’ cause that five years have elapsed since the death of
Ricardo in 1981 before they filed their complaint with the RTC.

43. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined
to assert it.

44. A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the donation to be
inofficious because Leoncio had no other property at the time of his death, the RTC
computed the legitime of Victor based on the area of the donated property. Hence, in
its dispositive portion, it awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as
Victor’s legitime. This was upheld by the Court of Appeals.

45. Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate
of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and
charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death;
(2) the value of all donations subject to collation would be added to it.
46. Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property
itself, which is brought to collation. Consequently, even when the donation is found
inofficious and reduced to the extent that it impaired Victor’s legitime, private
respondents will not receive a corresponding share in the property donated.

47. Thus, in this case where the collatable property is an immovable, what may be received
is: (1) an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same nature, class and
quality; (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired legitime in
cash or marketable securities; or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the estate,
so much of such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction.

48. We believe this worth mentioning, even as we grant the petition on grounds of
prescription and laches.

49. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 31976,
affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 7646, is
reversed and set aside. No costs.

ARELLANO vs. PASCUAL, GR 189776, DECEMBER 15 2010;

FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings,
namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano
(Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.

In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of

Administration," filed by respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa
Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner
the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance
legitime" of petitioner.

Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of the estate
by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.

Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for the
purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedents estate, the probate court
found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized
documents. It thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the
New Civil Code which reads:

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass
of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate.

ISSUE:
W/N the property donated to petitioner subject to collation?
W/N the property of the estate have been ordered equally distributed among the parties?
HELD: GRANTED
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by the
addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate;
and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title
by the testator during his lifetime.

The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is
possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious
donations may be reduced.

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine
the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguarded.

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and,
therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the testators property which he cannot
dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.

The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) concurring.
The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other
compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The
secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs;
the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring
compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary
compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring
compulsory heirs.

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at
liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives
to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made
to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory
heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-
collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil
Code, viz:

Art. 1003.If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving

spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.

Art. 1004.Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares.

F. FREEDOM TO DISPOSE FREE PORTION, NCC 914;

Art. 914. The testator may devise and bequeath the free portion as he may deem fit.

PRINCIPLES AFFECTING LEGITIME:

XIII. PRETERITION, NCC 854, 906, 855, 918;

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar
as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be
effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.

Art. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

Art. 855. The share of a child or descendant omitted in a will must first be taken from the
part of the estate not disposed of by the will, if any; if that is not sufficient, so much as may
be necessary must be taken proportionally from the shares of the other compulsory heirs.

Art. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which,
if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul
the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises and
legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair
the legitime.

Cases:

SEANGIO vs. REYES, GR 140371-72, NOVEMBER 2006;

FACTS: On September 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Segundo. Petitioners opposed assailing among others that Segundo
left a holographic will which is entirely a declaration of disinheritance affecting Alfredo, one of
the private respondents. Private respondents opposed the probate on the ground that the
holographic will did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased. RTC dismissed
the petition for probate easoning that the holographic will clearly shows preterition.

ISSUE:
W/N heirs were preterited?

HELD:
With regard to the issue on preterition, the court believes that the compulsory heirs in the
direct line were not preterited in the will. It was Segundo’s last expression bequeath his estate
to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo.

But Balane seems to buttress his contention with a Court decision that is not very direct on
the matter. In the question on preterition in Seangio v. Reyes, GR 140371-72, Nov. 27, 2006
the Supreme Court says:

With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs
in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion,
Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the
sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of
his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her
name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his
son, Alfredo.
URETA vs. URETA, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011; (Separate);

REYES vs. BARRETTO – DATU, 19 SCRA 85;

FACTS:

Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died he left his share
in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his
two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a
fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix
prepared a project of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and the shares
delivered.

Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two wills,
in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in
the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto
alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by
Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that Salud was not the
daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was
appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same.

Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of
Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano
Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the
recovery of one-half portion, thereof.

This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only
of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud
Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano
Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the
decision of the court based thereon as well.

ISSUE:
W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud did not
acquire valid title to it?

HELD:

No, Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto’s last will
and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could
not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one,
and was not null and void. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or
descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones),
and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her
being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty
to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned
to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.

Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father’s will a share smaller than her
legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total
ommission of a forced heir.
If there is a compulsory heir in the direct line, such heir is instituted in the will, and the
testamentary disposition given to such heir is less than her legitime, there is no preterition.
There is no total omission, inasmuch as the heir received something from the inheritance.
The remedy is for completion of legitime under Articles 906 and 907.

AZNAR vs. DUNCAN, 17 SCRA 590;

FACTS: Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that
Helen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided
the properties of the estate of Christensen between Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly
recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen
Garcia was preterited in the will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and
the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased died intestate.

ISSUE: W/N the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether
the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary
to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of the entire estate?

HELD:
The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.
Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited her
share to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less
than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and
willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the
heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.